Harris v.

New York

Ratio:

Topic: Waiver of Miranda Rights

1. Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of
an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving
counsel
2. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an
accused in the prosecutions case in chief is barred for all purposes,
provided of course that the trustworthiness of evidence satisfies legal
standards.
3. Petitioners testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January
7 contrasted sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest.
4. The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the
jury in assessing petitioners credibility, and the benefits of this process
should not be lost because of the speculative possibility that
impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.
5. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed
police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question
made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.
6. Having voluntarily taken the stand, the petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here
did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of adversary
process.
7. Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third
person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid
before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment.
8. The shield provided in Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of defense, free from risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances.
9. We hold that petitioners credibility was appropriately impeached by use
of his earlier conflicting statements.

Burger, C.J.
Facts:
1. The State of NY charged petitioner in a two-count indictment with twice
selling heroin to an undercover police officer.
2. At a subsequent jury trial, the officer was the States chief witness, and
he testified as to the details of the two sales.
3. The petitioner took a stand in his own defense and admitted knowing the
undercover police officer.
4. He denied the sale on January 4, 1966, but admitted making sale on
January 6 of baking powder and not heroin.
5. On cross-examination, the petitioner was asked whether he had made
specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest on
January 7 (such statements that partially contradicted petitioners direct
testimony at trial)
6. In response to the cross-examination, the petitioner testified that he could
not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the
prosecutor.
7. The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to
petitioner by prosecution could be considered only in passing on
petitioners credibility, and not as evidence of guilt.
8. The jury then found the petitioner guilty on second count of indictment.
9. At trial, the prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the
statements allegedly made by petitioner, conceding that they were
inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona.
10. The transcript of the interrogation used in the impeachment, but not
given to the jury, shows that no warning of a right to appointed counsel
was given before questions were put to petitioner when he was taken into
custody.
11. Petitioner made no claim that the statements made to the police were
coerced or involuntary.
Issue: WON the statement given by the petitioner is inadmissible as evidence
Held: Yes

Dissenting Opinions:
Justice Black - The voluntariness of the confession would, in this thesis, be
totally irrelevant. We reject such an extravagant extension of the
Constitution.
Justice Brenan - It is conceded that the question and answer statement used
to impeach petitioners direct testimony was under Miranda v. Arizona,
constitutionally inadmissible as part of the States direct case against
petitioner.

New York v. Quarles

Ratio:

Topic: Waiver of Miranda Rights

1. This Court believes that this case presents a situation where concern for
public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of
the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.
2. In Miranda, this Court for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to individuals subjected
to custodial interrogation.
3. The Miranda Court, however, presumed that interrogation in certain
custodial circumstances are inherently coercive and held that statements
made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is
specifically informed of his Miranda rights.
4. The Miranda warnings therefore are "not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination is protected.
5. We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers
may be admitted into evidence.
6. The application of the exception which we recognize today should not be
made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning
the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.
7. We do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require
that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety
8. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer
Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have
been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in
convicting Quarles
9. We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing
a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
10. In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case, we
acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that
rule.
11. We believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens the
necessity of that on-the-scene balancing process.
12. We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in excluding the
statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun because of the officer's
failure to read respondent his Miranda rights before attempting to locate
the weapon.
13. We hold that it also erred in excluding the subsequent statements as
illegal fruits of a Miranda violation.

Justice Rehnquist
Facts:
1. On September 11, 1980, Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring
were on road patrol in Queens, NY when a young woman approached
their car and told them that she has just been raped.
2. Thereafter, she began describing the rapist to be a black male,
approximately 6ft tall, wearing a black jacket with the name Big Ben
printed on the back. She also told the police that the man was carrying a
gun and had just entered A&P supermarket nearby.
3. Officer Kraft entered the store, while Officer Scarring radioed for
assistance.
4. Officer Kraft quickly spotted the respondent who matched the
description stated by the victim. Upon seeing the officer, the respondent
turned and ran, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun.
5. Officer Kraft reached the respondent, and discovered that the respondent
was wearing an empty shoulder holster.
6. The officer asked where the gun was. The respondent nodded in the
direction of the empty cartons and responded the gun is over there
7. Officer Kraft retrieved the gun then, formally placed the respondent
under arrest and read him his Miranda rights.
8. Respondent indicated that he would be willing to answer questions
without an attorney present.
9. Officer Kraft then asked the respondent if he owned the gun and where
he purchased it.
10. Respondent answered that he did not own the gun and that he had
purchased it in Miami, Florida.
11. In the subsequent prosecution, the judge excluded the statement, the gun
is over there and the gun because the officer had not given the
respondent warnings required by our decision in Miranda v. Arizona
before asking him where the gun is located.
12. The ruling was affirmed on appeal by the CA.
Issue: WON the statement of the respondent can be held as inadmissible
evidence
Held: No

People v. Patungan
G.R. No. 138045; March 14, 2001

12.

Topic: Waiver of Miranda rights

Gonzaga-Reyes, J.;
Facts:
1. Antonio Altarejos and his girlfriend, Antonia Eluzon were having a
drinking spree with a few of their friends beside the chapel in QC.
2. The couple noticed the van of their neighbour, Alejandro Patungan,
parked infront of the chapel and saw 2 men inside, Elmerto Pulga and
Edgar Acebuche (accused).
3. After the drinking spree, the couple went to the basketball court to talk.
Moments later they saw Patungan and his wife, Marietta, come our of the
house and walk toward the road. Marietta, however, went back to their
house while Alejandro proceeded without her.
4. After a few days, the decomposing body of Alegandro was found inside
the van.
5. An Information was then filed against Marietta Patungan for parricide
and against Pulga and Acebuche for murder.
6. These three accused pleaded not guilty.
7. In addition to the testimonies of the couple, the prosecution presented the
extra-judicial confession of the accused Pulga, the testimonies of the
police officers who took the statement, of the lawyer who allegedly
assisted the said accused during the custodial investigation, and of the
medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy.
8. The extra-judicial confession of the accused Pulga linked Marietta to the
killing of her husband.
9. However, in court, accused Pulga repudiated his extra-judicial confession
and stated that he was coerced by the police to admit participation in the
murder of Alejandro.
10. The trial court upheld the validity of the extra-judicial confession and
rendered judgment convicting the three accused guilty of the crime
charged.
11. In assailing the validity of the extra-judicial confession, the appellants
contend that the trial court failed to appreciate the underlying admissions

13.

14.

15.

16.

in testimonies that the accused Pulga was in fact denied the assistance of
counsel during custodial investigation.
The appellee asserts that confessions are presumed valid unless proven to
have been obtained through violence, intimidation, threat or reward and
that in view of the appellants failure to prove any of the aforementioned
circumstances that vitiate consent, the trial court did not err in upholding
the validity of the extra-judicial confession.
To establish the validity of Pulgas extra-judicial confession, the police
investigator testified that appellant Pulga voluntarily surrendered to the
police and told them the whole story.
Atty. Rudio, who supposedly assisted Pulga during the taking of the
extra-judicial confession, testified that Pulga expressed his consent to be
assisted by said counsel and signified that his confession is voluntary.
However, the police officer admitted that Pulga at first did not want t
confess and pointed to anther suspect as the perpetrator f the crime. This
statement negates the polices claim of voluntary surrender and places in
serious doubt the voluntariness of Pulgas extra-judicial confession.
It was only after appellant Pulga verbally confessed at the police
precinct, without the assistance of counsel, when he was brought to the
IBP office allegedly for the actual transcription of his confession in
writing in the presence of a lawyer.

Issue: WON the extra-judicial confession can he held inadmissible as

evidence
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. An extra-judicial confession to be admissible in evidence must be
express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel and a person under custodial
investigation must be continuously assisted must be continuously
assisted by counsel from the very start thereof.
2. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the
extra-judicial confession.
3. The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel.

4. Therefore, the court finds the extra-judicial confession of the appellant

Pulga inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained without
effective assistance of counsel.

People v. Ochate
G.R. No. 127154; July 30, 2002
Topic: Confession
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
1. Rowena Albiso and her older brother, Roseller were walking together on
their way home from school.
2. On the way, Rowena stopped and went to the communal water pump to
wash her food container and her slippers.
3. Roseller went ahead of his sister and on his way home he passed by the
hut of the accused, Roldan Ochate, where he saw the latter in the yard.
4. When Roseller arrived home, their father, Romulo asked for the
whereabouts of Rowena.
5. Not being home, Romulo then went to Rowena, but he was unable to
find her.
6. They proceeded to report the incident to the barangay captain, Crisanto
Montano.
7. The search was conducted the whole evening to no avail.
8. It was only on the following morning that the group found Rowena dead
in a ricefield about 50 meters away from Ochates house.
9. Suspecting that Ochate was the culprit, police officers as well as other
members of the barangay went to see Ochate at his house, but they were
not able to find him.
10. It was on September 29, 1994 that Bienvenido Pantallano, a member of
the CAFGY, was able to locate Ochate and he took the latter to his
custody and brought him to the Chief of Police.
11. On January, 9, 1995, an Information for Rape with Homicide was filed
against Ochate.
12. After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
Issue: WON confessions and statements by the accused were inadmissible as
evidence
Held: Yes
Ratio:

1. The Court agrees with the accused-appellant that his confessions to

Bienvenido Pantallano, Dr. Henry Cawley, and before the barangay
captain may not be used in evidence against him as they are in violation
of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel while under
custodial investigation.
2. Custodial investigation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement
after the person has been taken into custody or otherwise depreived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
3. Pantallano and Cawley are law enforcement officers, the former being a
CAFGU member and the latter, an NBI officer.
4. With respect to Pantallano, accused-appellants confession was made
when the former was pointing his gun at the latter; thus, depriving the
accused-appellant of his freedom of action.
5. Accused-appellants confession to Dr. Cawley was made when the
former is already under detention.
6. Both Pantallano and Cawley elicited questions that prompted accusedappellant to confess his guilt in the absence of a counsel and without
being informed of his constitutional rights.
7. Hence, his confessions are inadmissible in evidence having been
obtained in violation of the provisions of Sec. 12, Art. 3 of the
Constitution.
8. Likewise, the appellants admission of guilt before the barangay captain
is inadmissible in evidence because it appeared that the conversation
between the two was part of the then ongoing police investigation.

People v. Formentera
L-30892; June 29, 1984
Topic: Waiver of Miranda rights
Escolin, J;
Facts:
1. On January 22, 1969, an information for the crime of robbery in band
with homicide and double frustrated homicide committed in the house of
Valeriano Otadoy was filed before the Court of First Instance against
Luis Formentera et al.
2. At the arraignment only 5 of the accused were present, namely: Tampos
and Neri (pleaded guilty) and de la Torre, Rica and Nudalo (pleaded not
guilty).
3. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order setting the case for trial of the
accused who pleaded not guilty and ordered the reopening of the case
with respect to the accused who pleaded guilty.
4. The Court rendered a decision sentencing Neri and Tampos to suffer the
penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Otadoy.
5. Meanwhile, the case proceeded to trial with respect to the accused who
pleaded not guilty.
6. At about two oclock in the morning of October 20, 1968, Lucia Otadoy
was awakened by rapping sound coming from their window.
7. Immediately, she and her father, Valeriano Otadoy, raised an alarm and
cried for help. Unfortunately, nobody came to their rescue.
8. Through the testimony of other witnesses, it was shown that while the
shooting was taking place, Serapion Otadoy, a brother of Lucia, who was
residing nearby sent another brother, Felix, to the police for assistance.
9. Marcosa, Lucias sister, told the policemen that she recognized the voice
of Luis Romentera, a distant cousin and former neighbour, instructing the
other robbers. if they will not give the money, kill them.
10. Acting on the information, the police went to seek assistance in arresting
Formentera.
11. Sgt. Nicolas Nunez received a report of a boat coming from Camotes
with three persons aboard who were believed to be the wanted men.
12. Among these three men, Neri was arrested and brought to the police
station for investigation. Thereafter, de la Torre and Casas were also
arrested.
13. At the police head quarters, de la Torre and Casas were interrogated. All
three gave extrajudicial statements.

14. However, at the trial de la Torre repudiated the voluntariness of his

extrajudicial statement.
15. De a Torre testified that he went to the house of Formentera about a job
that the latter had earlier told him about.
16. At nightfall, some men arrived in the vicinity of Formenteras house.
One of them, Neri suddenly pointed a gun at him and ordered him to
follow and board a bangka.
17. They arrived in Davao City and only then did Neri and Casas allow him
to go.
18. He then boarded a jeepney going to the city. While aboard, some
policemen in a patrol car stopped the jeepney and arrested him. He was
informed that Neri was inside the patrol car.
19. When the investigation police asked him who his companions were, he
replied that he did not know that. Subsequently, he was asked about the
robbery, but he resisted that he had nothing to do with it.
20. De la Torre was then investigated and he denied any knowledge of the
incident.
21. The police investigator handed him a piece of paper saying, alright you
have nothing to do with this. You sign this so that you can go home. Not
knowing how to read, he inquired what the paper was all about. The
policeman told him that the paper would certify that he had nothing to do
with this and that he can go home. He then signed the statement.
22. The Court rendered judgment declaring de la Torre guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and double
frustrated homicide.
23. With respect with de la Torre, the trial court cast aside his plea of
innocence for being self-serving, choosing to give more credence to the
so-called inficia of voluntariness in the execution of his extrajudicial
statement.
24. The lower court found out that de la Torres statement corroborated the
extrajudicial confessions of Neri and Casas.
Issue: WON confessions and statements by the accused were inadmissible as
evidence
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. This court was unable to agree with the trial courts conclusion. Said
confessions dealt with the incident in a fleeting manner. The general
statements appeared in a consistent and somewhat suspicious pattern.

2. The incident was well publicized, and thus it is probable that the recital
contained in de la Torres statement could have come from any source
other than the said accused.
3. Besides, de la Torre signed the statement in question only after the
investigation officer assured him that the same was a mere certification
that he had nothing to do with the incident. The trial court characterized
the remark as a promise of immunity. We however, view the remark not
as a promise of immunity, but as deceit and trickery played on one who,
like the accused, barely finished grade one.
4. Aside from his alleged extrajudicial confession, which was ruled to be
involuntarily given, there is not a shred of evidence directly linking
accused de la Torre to the robbery in question.

People v. Ortilla
L-31653; May 18, 1984
Topic: Waiver of Miranda rights
Relova, J.;
Facts:
1. In the evening of July 22, 1969 a loud explosion, caused by a hand
grenade, rocked the facade of the building housing the Thomas Jefferson
memorial Library.
2. As the smoke cleared, Rodolfo Carlos laid dead on the ground.
3. Thereafter, the Manila Police Department operatives picked up the
accused Renato Ortilla at his residence for questioning.
4. During the investigation, he denied any participation in the grenade
throwing incident.
5. Detective Sunga, neighbour of the accused, arrived, vouched for the
latter and promise to produce him anytime when needed.
6. Ortilla was released until June 26 when he was again picked up by the
police who believed that he was really involved in the incident.
7. Upon interrogation, Ortilla admitted in his own handwriting to have
thrown the grenade at the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Library.
8. An information for murder was filed against Ortilla.
9. After trial, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
finding accused Ortilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
10. The plea of the accused-appellant Ortilla for the reversal of his
conviction is based on the insufficiency of the evidence as the

confessions attributed to him were involuntary and there was no

testimonial evidence to justify the finding that he was guilty of the crime
charged.
11. Furthermore, the appellant claims that when the police took him from his
house, he was tortured or maltreated into signing the statements and that
when he was investigated he was blindfolded and hit several times.
12. His declaration received confirmation from a competent and neutral
source, Dr. Lara.
Issue: WON the statements of the appellant can be held as inadmissible
evidence
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. The fact is that the prosecution did not present an eyewitness regarding
the identity of appellant that he was the one who threw the hand grenade.
2. The conviction of appellant was predicated solely on the confessions
which are being attacked because of their involuntary character.
3. Where the confession is involuntary, due to maltreatment or induced by
fear or intimidation, there is a violation of the constitutional provision
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
4. Moreover, involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts because they
are not legal evidence.
5. Therefore, the appellant is hereby acquitted.