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167
PHOENIx, Vol. 28 (1974) 2.
168
PHOENIX
5Cf.Resp. 584b.
169
170
PHOENIX
The next item in our account is representedby Book 7 of the NicomacheanEthics'o-but chronologicallythis may be nearlycontemporary
with our versionof Rhetoric1. At 1152 b 13 Aristotlementionsa theory
that all pleasure is a perceptible
process to a natural state
(alOyrO-7)
the theory
that he had at least used as a
~orTL eis k~oLv ailaorqr7),
(yOveoLs
workinghypothesisin the Rhetoric." But he now argues against the
theory,though without mentioningthe names of its supporters.What
objections does he adduce? The crucial sentence at 1152 b 33 ff. (Kar-a
V
LK'V
al KaOLUrTaaLE6~
T7lv4VO
'
LV76CiTEaL
a E0LV) seems to mean that
Av#uppl3E7K6
the
processofrestorationto a naturalstate is onlyaccidentallypleasant.12
Thus pleasure cannot now be definedas a restoration.And Aristotlegoes
further.The "activity" that is goingon when we desiresuch restoration
PLEASURE: 360-300B.C.
171
172
PHOENIX
Here the fact that all beasts and men pursue pleasure is held to be an
indicationthat in some sense (iros) pleasure is the best thing."1The "in
some sense" cannot be neglected; and it fitsour interpretationof the
previous section. "The best thing is in some sense pleasure," seems to
mean that the best thingis pleasurable, or even, the most pleasurable,
not that the best thingis to be simplyidentifiedwith pleasure.
What we have then is not an identificationof pleasure as the supreme
good, but a statement about the principal object of desire which is a
pleasure.But, an objectionmightrun,all beasts and menpursuepleasure,
but it is not the same pleasure whichtheyall pursue. Aristotle,however,
will not have this-and his commentson it have rightlybeen seen as a
particularlystrikingfeatureof the discussionin (A). Perhaps,he explains,
it is reallythe same pleasure that is pursued,even if the pursuersdo not
recognizethe fact. But why should this be so? Because beasts and men
share somethingdivine by nature, and-Aristotle apparentlywishes to
say-this fact is indicated in the universal search fora pleasure, which
must thereforebe an identical pleasure.
For our own purposesthereare a fewspecificpointsin the later part of
(A) to whichwe must draw particularattention: the notion that a man
can be happy on the wheel is rejected at 1153 b 19; and it is argued at
1154 b 6 ff.,that thereare people so constitutedthat forthemthereis no
neutralstate betweenpleasure and pain. Hence both absence of pleasure
and positive pain are to them painful. Thus pain would appear to be
definable as an absence of pleasure. Finally the whole discussion of
pleasure in (A) ends witha theorythat,since our natureis not "simple,"
we cannot enjoy a singlepermanentpleasure as God can. Our pleasures,
because of some weakness
TL), come and go. Hence we cannot
(romptavw which God
enjoy that pleasure in rest
enjoys; we need also
(bv 7)pei4l)
pleasure in movement (bv Kwi(fTe). Both pleasures are, of course, still
activitiesin the Aristoteliansense, forthereis an activityof movementas
well as an activityof immobility.17
From this briefaccount of some of the relevantparts of (A) let us now
extracta seriesof propositions:
1. Pleasure is not a process
but may be an accompanimentof a
(ybvEs)
in
those
or
process occurring
organs parts of organswhichdo not need
"restoration."
2. Pleasure is an activityand an end.
3. There are two kinds of pleasure, pleasure in movement
and
(KlVtIOS)
pleasure in immobility.Both are (as 2 above) activities.
'"The point was made in general by A. Barbieri, "Aristotele e l'edonismo di Eudosso,"
j pj
"Cf. Eth. Eud. 1249 a 20 (ob ylverat 5~b~5ovt)
v rpde).
173
pleasures,
katastematic
(D.L. 10.136),20 and those which are Karc KlU7VV or EVKUi7El. This appears
to be the Aristotelian distinction. Even the phrase 'V KtV'7YO occurs in (A)
PHOENIX
174
r'XoS,
osov
lotpa)-and
roiT
&KosatoLs
the same
7rL-y'ELbv
be foundin Book 2.25 And thereasonwe do not continue
attitudeseemsto
than
feelingpleasure indefinitelyis also explained somewhat differently
in account (A). In (B) the somewhatsimplisticremarkthat we are not
simple is given more body. Pleasure depends on the state of each organ,
and tirednesswill lead to a declinein pleasure,just as it leads to a decline
in the successfuluse of the organ itself(1175 a 4-10).
In brief,although(A), (B),26 and Epicurus agree that pleasure is not a
processand that it is therefore
completein the instant,in several respects
where(A) and Epicurus come together,(B) remainsapart. For Epicurus
and (A) pleasure is the end, or an end. (B) qualifies this: pleasure is
specificallya supervenientend. And if (A) and (B) are nearerthan they
look, the wordingof (A) is much nearerto that of Epicurus. Above all,
where (A) emphasisesthe divine in the search forpleasure and brackets
men with animals,27 thus pointingto Epicurus, (B) emphasisesthe ques24As we shall see, the Magna Moralia commentsthat a life freefrompain is "near" to
pleasure (1204 a 24).
25Cf. Eth. Nic. 2, 1104 b 4-6, 32tIEov 4 ~El 7rocElOaL 7Cov
r@wv yOe 7 PLv
L/olP
Xbrtv
T
and 1104 b 34,
L
Kal
rEaL
S,
rosl
Epyoys
roL
KOLWvT
re yd&paIryTTolS
60ovV
b~rb
r7ry alppeovLrapaKOXoovOe. We should notice that the nearest passage in the parallel
section of Eth. Eud. does not contain formsof ArTyLIyvcrOat
or irapaKoXoOEETV
(Eth. Eud.
1220 b 13-14, ols rera~ ... .7 aI0crT7TLKI)
KaO' ab-r; cf. Eth. Nic. 10,
'ovl) ' Xv7r7
1175 a 6).
the relation between (A) and (B) see now Owen (above, note 13).
260On
27Cf.Merlan (above, note 15) 20, 22.
PLEASURE:
360-300 B.C.
175
176
PHOENIX
Philebus.
"*Sext.Emp. Math. 11.73 = SVF 3.155.
"*Ibid.
177
Stoicarguments;
theinternal
ononepointall theStoicsagree:pleasure
is at besta by-product,
a cosmetic
forCleanthes,
likehairunderthe
for
Archedemus.
More
K
is thephraseTrXLKY
armpits
important
,yaOv,
Wedonotknowwhosephrase
itwas.Again,
appliedtoxapdbyStobaeus.
it
be
an
of
echo
a
one."'Butagain,
Aristotle,
perhaps, may
thoughdistant
notan echoof(A).
certainly
Let us tryto pull a fewthreadstogether.
on pleasure
Discussion
flaresup againin the late 350's,and Plato's Philebusis a witness.
Aristotle's
Rhetoric
and(A) indicate
further
(andpossibly
contemporaneof
this
and
intowhichthe
ous)fragments discussion,38 thisis thecontext
workofEpicurus
fits.Oddlyenough,
theMagnaMoraliatoohassimilaritieswiththissetofwritings,
thisprobably
though
onlymeansthat
sourceforthediscussion
ofpleasure.
Ontheotherhand
(A) isitsprimary
on
(B) marksa different
phase-a phaseofwhichtheStoiccomments
seem
to
be
a
distant
echo.WheretheStoicsgobackbehind(B)
pleasure
tobelooking
attheoriginal
ofPlato'sPhilebus,
themes
theyseemperhaps
orLaws,or evenRepublic,
rather
thanto otherAristotelian
discussion.
WhileEpicurusrepresents
whichbeganin the
partof theargument
seemtobe ofan agewhere
theissueis nolonger
350's,theStoicwritings
live.
Is it possible to put dates to the Epicurean and Stoic discussions?
Epicurus arrivedin Athensin 323 at the age of 18. Althoughnot without
previous exposure to philosophy, he probably firstmet the ideas of
Aristotle,howeverbriefly,at this time. Demetriusof Magnesia, however,
only tells us that he listened to the Platonist Xenocrates (D.L. 10.13).
But in any case Aristotledied in the next year,322, so that both (A) and
(B) musthave existedat the timeof Epicurus' visit,iftheyare Aristotelian
at all. But of course we do not know in what formthey existed.
Diiring has proposed a relative chronologyof Aristotle'sworkswhich
makes a good deal of sense.39He puts an originalversionofRhetoric1 and
2 between 360 and 355, and the Eudemian Ethics, togetherwith the
Philebus,between355 and Plato's death in 347. That means that if (A)
was originallypart oftheEudemianEthics,or derived froman account in
the Eudemian Ethics,it must,along withthe Philebus,be a contribution
to the ongoing debate about pleasure. Diiring dates the Nicomachean
Ethics (and thereforecertainlyaccount [B]) to the period afterPlato's
178
PHOENIX
179
in323.42
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE, TORONTO
41Cf. Usener 171, and I. Diiring, Aristotlein the Biographical Tradition (G5teborg
1957) 385-386.
42Atvarious stages this paper has been read by Professor T. M. Robinson, Dr A. A.
Long, and ProfessorF. H. Sandbach, and I should like to thank them fortheirconstructive criticism.