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Summary: It is logical that Europeans and Japanese work together to tackle “global” and “transnational” security chal-lenges. The problem is that their security dialogue seems to be stuck at an abstract level. The maintenance of a liberal and rules-based international order requires a “global” geopolitical and military balance favorable to liberal democracies. This re-quires proactive engagement on the part of Europe, Japan, and like-minded allies.
Asia Program
Policy Brie 
Europe and Japan: Toward a “Trans-Eurasian” Partnership?
by Luis Simón
1744 R Street NW Washington, DC 20009 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E ino@gmus.org
April 2015
An appeal to a “shared interest” in a liberal and rules-based international order has become the driving premise in security conversations between Japanese and European officials — whether in an EU, NAO, or bilateral context.
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 Tis appeal is ofen ollowed by reerences to the importance o “global rule-making,” on issues ranging rom cybersecurity to the fight against terrorist and criminal organizations to global environmental regulation.
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 Insoar as they share undamental  values and views on international order, it is logical that Europeans and Japanese work together to tackle “global” and “transnational” security challenges. Te problem is that their security dialogue seems to be stuck at an abstract level. Tis may be because European and Japanese leaders continue to see their international role primarily through the lens o diplo-macy, “normative” power, and multi-lateral cooperation, rendering global and transnational challenges a sort o comort-zone or both. An emphasis on the “global” ofen has the effect o
1 See Michael Reiterer, “Prospects for Comprehensive EU-Japan Cooperation Beyond Economics,”
NFG Policy Paper 
 No. 6/2015; Michito Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners,”
Research Paper 
 91 (April 2013), NATO Defence College.2 See, for instance, Sharon Stirling-Woolsey, “A Closer Japan-Europe Partnership is Long Overdue,”
The
 
German Marshall Fund of the United States
, May 14, 2014.
detaching security discussions rom their geopolitical context. A “trans-national” ocus evokes the idea that security challenges are shared, thereby downplaying anything that smacks o old-ashioned interstate competition. However, Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and Russia’s attempts to recreate a sphere o influ-ence in Eastern Europe are a reminder that inter-state competition is alive and kicking. In act, Japan and Europe have recently taken steps to counter what they perceive as strategic threats to regional order. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has initiated a debate on constitu-tional reorm aimed at allowing Japan to enter into collective sel-deense arrangements, increased the country’s deense budget, and strengthened its bilateral alliance with the United States.
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 For Europeans, Russia’s annex-ation o Crimea and ongoing meddling in Eastern Ukraine has spurred renewed interest in deense and deter-rence in an “Eastern Flank” context.
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 Te reemergence o strategic chal-lenges at their doorstep has awakened European and Japanese leaders to the
3 See Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Japan’s new approach to national security,”
Issue Brief 
 2/2014, EU Institute for Security Studies.4 See Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank’,”
Parameters
 44:3 (2014), 67-79.
 
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Asia Program
Policy Brief
realities o international politics. Yet there seems to be a disconnect in their minds between the “regional” and the “global.” Te ormer is a space where geopolitical and stra-tegic competition is perceived as increasingly relevant. Te latter is approached through a grammar o rules, norms, and multilateralism. But these are artificial separations. Te maintenance o a liberal and rules-based international order requires a “global” geopolitical and military balance avorable to liberal democracies. O particular importance is the preservation o a balance o power in the so-called “Eurasian rimland,” specifically in East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.
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 Te security o Europe and East Asia cannot be separated rom “middle spaces” such as the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and (to a lesser extent) the Arctic, which straddle the Euro-Mediterranean Basin and the Asia-Pacific. It is hard to overstate the importance o the Indian Ocean in Europe-Japan relations. Over 90 percent o the trade between Europe and East Asia is sea-borne and it is largely conducted through that ocean.
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 Te Indian Ocean connects Europe and Japan to East Arica’s mineral riches and to the Indian sub-continent, an important source o cheap labor and manuactured products. Given demographic projections, East Arica and the Indian sub-continent offer considerable potential as investment and export markets in the medium and long term or both Japan and Europe. Critically, the Indian Ocean is also the gateway to the Persian Gul, which constitutes the main source o oil or Europe and Japan, as well as an important source o gas. Te increasing dependence o countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea on Persian Gul energy indicates that the economic development and stability o East Asia is increasingly tied to the Middle East.
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 Tus, Europe and Japan share two undamental geostrategic objectives: the security o the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes o Communication and the existence o a balance o power on the Indian Ocean “rimland,” particularly in the Persian Gul. Te fight against piracy in the Gul o Aden constitutes an important step or Europe-Japan cooperation in an Indian Ocean context and could be complemented with similar efforts in the area o
5 On the geostrategic importance of the Eurasian “rimland,” see Nicholas J. Spykman,
The Geography of the Peace
 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944).6 See James Rogers, “From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian Mari-time Security,”
Occasional Paper 77
 (March 2009), EU Institute for Security Studies.7 See Jon B. Alterman, “The Asia Pivot,”
Middle East Notes and Comment
 (January 2013), Center for Strategic and International Studies.
the Strait o Malacca. However, such cooperation should be extended into other areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, joint surace and subsurace patrols, naval exercises, and training.
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 Current efforts to reinvigorate the notion o a Eurasian “silk road” in Central Asia could conceivably lead to a revalori-zation o the continental connection between Europe and Asia.
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However, Central Asia’s importance as a trade conduit between Asia and Europe pales in comparison to that o the Indian Ocean. Measured against trade via the Indian Ocean, continental routes remain both more expensive and riskier, as they transit multiple countries in geopolitically unstable areas in South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia itsel. Having said that, both Europe and Japan are interested in Central Asia’s energy and mineral riches. For Europeans, gas imports rom the Caspian Basin promise to offset their excessive dependence on Russia. okyo, or its part, is aware that the Central Asian republics are interested in reducing their export dependency on China and Russia. Although Central Asia supplies a very small percentage o Japanese gas imports, the prospect o liquefied natural gas imports rom urkmenistan is particularly interesting or okyo.
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 In addition to energy, Japan sees Central Asia as an opportu-nity to reduce its dependence on China or rare earths. I Europe and Japan are to ully exploit the energy and mineral potential o Central Asia, they must help uphold a avorable balance o power in the region. Tis is particularly important as NAO orces wind down their presence in Aghanistan, and Russia and China consolidate their influ-ence across Central Asia.
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 Te specter o Russian political hegemony, Chinese economic dominance, or some orm o Sino-Russian condominium would cut the Central Asian republics off rom the global economic system. In order to prevent this rom happening, Europe and Japan must continue to work alongside the United States, India, and like-minded partners to help underpin the autonomy o Aghanistan and the Central Asian republics, and promote political and economic cooperation among them.
8 See Luis Simón, “How Japan Matters to Europe,”
European Geostrategy 
, January 11, 2015.9 See Ussal Shabaz, “The Modern Silk Road: One Way or Another,”
On Wider Europe Policy Brief 
 (January 2014), The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 10 Author’s interview at the Japanese foreign ministry in Tokyo, November 2014.11 For a good analysis of geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia, see Alexander Cooley,
Great Game, Local Rules
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
 
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Asia Program
Policy Brief
Finally, the Arctic is another region where Europe and Japan have much in common. It is estimated that the Arctic region holds some 20 percent o the world’s gas reserves and around 25 percent o its oil reserves.
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 As such, Europe and Japan see the development o the “High North” as another opportunity to reduce their energy dependence on Russia and the Persian Gul. Beyond energy, as the polar ice caps continue to melt, the Arctic Ocean promises to acilitate communication between Europe and Northeast Asia by cutting the shipping time rom Hamburg to Shanghai by some 6,400 kilometers. As China, Japan, and South Korea reach northwards, and Russia, the United States, Canada, and northern Europeans consolidate their positions in the Arctic, the “High Northis likely to become an increasingly crowded and contested geopolitical space.
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 Europeans and Japanese must thereore work alongside their North American partners to ensure regional stability and a avorable regional balance o power — critical preconditions or the adequate integration o the Arctic as an energy and communications hub in a rules-based international liberal order.Te “middle spaces” — the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and the Arctic — should be placed at the center o the security dialogue between Japan and Europe. Tese regions harbor considerable energy and economic potential, and consti-tute the main inter-Eurasian conduits. As such, they offer the keys to the prosperity and security o Europe and East Asia, but also to the preservation o a rules-based interna-tional liberal order. Ultimately, the effective integration o the “middle spaces” into a rules-based international liberal order depends upon political stability and the preserva-tion o a avorable balance o power. Tis requires proactive engagement on the part o Europe, Japan, and like-minded allies.
12 On the Arctic’s energy potential, see Charles Emmerson,
The Future History of the  Arctic
 (Philadelphia, PublicAffairs, 2010).13 See Kristian Atland, ‘Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?’
Comparative Strategy 
 33:2 (2014), pp. 145-166.
Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the  views o the author alone.
About the Author
Luis Simón is a research proessor in international security at the Institute or European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel).
About GMF’s Asia Program
Te German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program addresses the economic, oreign policy, and security implications o Asia’s rise or the United States and Europe through research, publications, commentary, conerences, ellowships, study tours, and collabora-tions with other GMF programs. Te program’s initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum, India rilateral Forum, the Global Swing States Project, the Young Strategists Forum, rilateral Forum okyo, ransatlantic Workshop on Pakistan, and high-level conver-sations at GMF’s major conerences. Te program also publishes independent analysis by more than 15 in-house experts on Asia and externally commissioned papers looking at U.S. and European approaches to the Asia-Pacific and on deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and the West.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global chal-lenges and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to develop their skills and networks through transatlantic exchange, and supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by ostering democratic initiatives, rule o law, and regional cooperation. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gif rom Germany as a perma-nent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquar-ters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

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