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last and best Medieval account of the ascent to God that Augustine outlines in a number of his works, particularly, De trinitate.2
More generally, the Franciscan is considered to be the ultimate
Medieval champion of the longstanding Augustinian intellectual
tradition.3
These assumptions are founded on the fact that Bonaventure
frequently invokes the authority of Augustine in presenting his
views. Although he made some use of the recently rediscovered
works of Aristotle, this usage was apparently more conservative
1. An earlier, less-developed version of this article appears in French in the journal Etudes Franciscaines , n.s. 4 (2011).
2. C. Carpenter, Theology as the Road to Holiness in St. Bonaventure, Paulist Press,
Mahwah 1999, 76; E. Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites, Franciscan
Herald Press, Chicago 1978, 73; C. Cullen, Bonaventure, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, 87; E. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. I. Trethowan and
F. Sheed, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson 1965, 441; D. Turner, The Darkness of God:
Negativity and Christian Mysticism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, 102;
F. Van Fleteren, The Ascent of the Soul in the Augustinian Tradition, in N. van Deusen
(cur.), Paradigms in Medieval Thought: Applications in Medieval Disciplines, Edwin Mellen
Press, New York 1990, 93-110.
3. For example, see E. Bettoni, Bonaventure, trans. A. Gambateste, University of
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1964, 19; Carpenter, Theology as the Road to Holiness,
v; Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites, 2; Cullen, Bonaventure; Gilson,
The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure; S.P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science
and the Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century, vol. 1, Brill, Leiden 2001; P. Robert,
Le problme de la philosophie bonaventurienne: Aristotelisme Neoplatonisant ou Augustinisme?,
Laval thol. philos. , 7 (1950), 145-163.
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and critical than that of his contemporaries, including the Dominican Thomas Aquinas. In the view of many modern scholars,
in fact, Bonaventures overriding concern was to systematize the
previously predominant thought of Augustine so that it could
withstand the threat Aristotles rising popularity posed to its authoritative status. The decline of the Augustinian tradition towards the end of the thirteenth century would seem to suggest
that Bonaventures labours were in vain.
In this article, I propose to demonstrate that Bonaventures
work is far more innovative and impactful than it has been perceived. I will do this by showing that his understanding of the
minds journey towards God and its cognitive work overall differs
quite significantly from Augustines. On my contention, Bonaventure does not give full and final expression to Augustines views
on human knowledge so much as he codifies an altogether novel
definition of knowledge, which his immediate Franciscan predecessors had developed in the interest of accounting for Francis of
Assisis experience of God and reality.4
Though Bonaventure does indeed appeal at regular intervals to
Augustine, I suggest that he does this in keeping with the scholastic practice of bolstering personal opinions not necessarily those
of any authority by finding them in the writings of authorities
that represented a relevant cause. Since Augustine stood for the
spiritual tradition of the middle ages, and the Franciscans aimed to
cast their scholarly work in the mystical light that guided their
founder Francis, the Bishop of Hippo was the seemingly obvious
choice of sponsor. To sum up: my argument is that Bonaventure
enlisted Augustine in promoting Franciscan thought rather than
the other way around.
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There are three main reasons why I believe it is important to differentiate Bonaventure from Augustine in this respect. The first is
that doing so highlights the distinctive purposes of the Franciscan
intellectual system which is so often conflated with Augustines
and thus allows for its contribution to be recognized and celebrated in its own right. The second reason I have for undertaking this
project is to reveal the remarkable continuity of thought between
Bonaventure and his famous Franciscan successor John Duns Scotus, who is often supposed to have broken with the early Franciscan school of Bonaventure in favour of a new philosophical way.
In taking this way, Scotus has recently been criticized for laying the
conceptual foundation for modern thought and certain philosophical problems to which it gave rise; on these grounds, his ideas have
been pronounced intrinsically detrimental.5
By highlighting the continuity of Scotus and Bonaventures
thought, I aim to accomplish a third goal of exonerating Scotus of
the accusations that have been made against him. I will do this by
emphasizing that he like Bonaventure was primarily concerned
with articulating a philosophy which would promote the distinctly
Franciscan intellectual and spiritual life, although he did so in some
new forms of argument that were not employed by Bonaventure.
If Scotus intents are practically benign like Bonaventures the implication is that he cannot be blamed for any problematic modern
developments. Those developments should instead be seen as the
by-product of the de-contextualization of Franciscan views, that is,
the use of them for purposes other than those intended, namely,
the furthering of Franciscan faith and life.
This intervention towards the end of the paper in the current
debate surrounding Scotus is made possible by the argument that
constitutes most of this paper which distinguishes Augustine and
Bonaventure, thereby highlighting continuities between Bonaventure and Scotus. That is the argument I will now take up in two
parts. In the first, I will briefly investigate the account of the Triune
God, the image of God, and the process of coming to know God
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re-conforming to His image or ascending to Him that Augustine outlines in his De trinitate. Subsequently, I will evaluate the
description of Gods Triune nature and His image that Bonaventure gives in his theological writings, which underlie and anticipate
the account of knowledge he outlines in the Itinerarium.
1. AUGUSTINES DE TRINITATE
1.1. The Doctrine of God
In the first half of his De trinitate, Augustine speaks of God as one
being, which is all that is good, all the time. In other words, he speaks
of God as simple. Although he acknowledges that some find the notion of divine simplicity difficult to reconcile with the Catholic
teaching that God is Triune Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Augustine insists that it is precisely in virtue of the involvement of these
three Persons that there is one eternal and infinite God who always
does one thing.6 That one thing is to know His own glory and make
it known through the Son who expresses the Spirit of God, which is
the divine glory the Father first communicated to Him.7
1.2. The Image of God
In De Genesi ad litteram, a treatise that complements De trinitate
and was composed over the same period of time, Augustine
explains what it means to be made in the image of this God.
On his account, being made in Gods image means being made
to do the one thing God does which is simply to know and
make known the glory of God by means of a capacity to engage in a unifying pattern thinking analogous to His, which is
facilitated by three elements. Augustine calls the first element
or mode of cognition corporeal vision. In this mode, the
mind engages in sense perception.8 The second mode is spiritu-
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9. Cf. ibid.: secundum spiritale: quidquid enim corpus non est et tamen aliquid
est, iam recte spiritus dicitur et utique non est corpus, quamuis corpori similis sit,
imago absentis corporis, nec ille ipse obtutus, quo cernitur .
10. Cf. ibid.: tertium uero intellectuale ab intellectu, quia mentale a mente ipsa
uocabuli nouitate nimis absurdum est ut dicamus .
11. Aug., ord., II, 11, 30 (CCL 29, 124-125): Ratio est mentis motio ea, quae discuntur, distinguendi et conectendi potens .
12. Aug., trin., XI, 8, 15 (CCL 50, 351-352): Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id est uoluntas .
13. Cf. Aug., ord., I, 2, 3 (CCL 29, 90): sic animus a se ipse fusus inmensitate
quadam diuerberatur et uera mendicitate conteritur, cum eum natura sua cogit
ubique unum quaerere et multitudo inuenire non sinit .
14. Cf. Aug., Gn. litt., XII, 26, 54 & XII, 28, 56.
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Prior to the fall, human beings presupposed the ultimate goodness of the invisible God. At the fall, however, they fell prey to the
false notion that there are things more valuable than God to be obtained knowledge in the case of the first woman, and woman, in
the case of the first man. In doing this, they forfeited the knowledge of God as Highest Good and the knowledge of themselves as
creatures made in His image to know Him and make Him known.
As a result, their overriding desire to know God was replaced by a
desire to obtain whatever they thought would bring them immediate happiness. This desire caused them to perceive the images of
reality that were meant to be organized by an intellect cognizant of
an ultimate God tangible things and temporal circumstances as
ultimate realities themselves and thus falsely to esteem them as
things with the power to make or break their happiness.15
Ironically, Augustine observes, the fallen human proclivity for
prioritizing immediate personal happiness tends to lead to great unhappiness, inasmuch as it enslaves humanity to desires for finite
goods that are either hard to find or fleeting in fallen circumstances.
This same tendency to operate on a narrow concept of what is good
creates conflict amongst those with different notions of what brings
happiness. It promotes attitudes like pride, envy, and fear and the
destructive behaviors they engender. To summarize, the fallen habit
of pursuing limited goods as though they are the be-all and end-all
of human existence makes it impossible for people to find what is
good and therefore God in other things and other people,
which makes it impossible for them to find happiness.
In the latter half of De trinitate, Augustine explains how the Son of
God restored the knowledge of God as the Highest Good He originally imparted human beings made in His image.16 Since the scope
of human knowledge was restricted to corporeal beings in the wake
of the loss of the knowledge of the incorporeal Good, the Son of
God took on bodily form.17 In that form, the Son continued His
15. Cf. Aug., trin., X, 6, 87, 9 (CCL 50, 321-322); X, 8, 11 (CCL 50, 324-325).
16. See also Aug., doctr. christ., I, 10, 1118, 17 (CCL 32, 12-15).
17. Cf. Aug., trin., VIII, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 269-720); XIII, 10, 13 (CCL 50/A, 399-400);
XIII, 14, 18 (CCL 50/A, 406-407).
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28. Cf. Aug., trin., VIII, 5, 7-8 (CCL 50, 276-279); XIV, 16, 22 (CCL 50/A, 451-454); XV,
2, 2 (CCL 50/A, 460-462).
29. Cf. Aug., trin., XIII, 2, 5 (CCL 50/A, 385-387).
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in the world He has made in preparation to know Him in Himself.30 For this reason, Augustine argues that analogies to the Trinity can be detected in corporeal vision, which consists in the sight
of the eyes, the object seen, and the perceptive faculties attention
to its object;31 as well as in spiritual vision, which involves the
memory of sense perceptions, the internal comparison of perceptions, and the production of an image.32
By way of synopsis, the five psychological analogies that have
been discussed thus far were introduced to help the reader of De trinitate memorize how to operate by faith in Gods ultimate goodness. When the mind does remember, understand, and love God by
forming this habit, Augustine writes, it simultaneously remembers,
understands, and loves itself (meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se), such
that the sixth psychological analogy becomes apparent upon it.33
This is true because the mind that remembers God remembers that
its purpose is to work for Gods purposes rather than its own.
So long as it operates on the notion that its desires are ultimate, the
mind remains subject to fallen attitudes like envy, pride, and fear,
which caused it to over or underestimate its abilities and thus inhibits its ability to employ those abilities. So long as, and to the extent that it is selfish, in other words, it is prone to the attitudes of
self-absorption or self-deprecation that prevent it from being itself.
A commitment to unlearning the fallen habit of refusing to
give up the things regarded as too important to relinquish to sacrifice the self and to cling instead in faith to the God Christ revealed represents a choice to follow Him figuratively to Golgotha
from Gethsemene, where He gave up the will to do His own will.
Far from a decision to abandon personal identity, Augustine intimates that the decision to traverse this sacrificial path only represents a decision to abandon the enslaving desires that encumbered
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43. See K. Osborne, Alexander of Hales: Precursor and Promoter of Franciscan Theology,
in id., The History of Franciscan Theology, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure 2007,
28; see also Hayes, introduction to DQMT 13-24.
44. Bonaventure, DQMT, 2, 1, conclusion.
45. Cf. Hayes, introduction to DQMT, 42; Bonaventure, comm. sent., I, 2, 1, 2, 1.
46. Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in deum (I will quote from the Opera omnia
edition), 6, 2.
47. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 3, 8.
48. On double procession, see Bonaventure, comm. sent., I, 11, 1.
49. Cf. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron (Quaracchi, Firenze 1938), 1, 14.
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Bonaventure believes that every sense perceptible object is an absolute expression of one of Gods ideas, he does not assume as Augustine does that multiple images of related objects are important
for understanding them. For him, by contrast, forming an image is
simply a matter of stripping the sense perception of all its superfluous variants such as place and time, in order to lay the object
bare as it really is.58
Once such an image has been formed, he insists, it is stored in
the memory, where it awaits the scrutiny of the intellect that
achieves final understanding of its objects by comparing its images
to the ideas in the mind of God, after which the imaged objects
were originally patterned. Bonaventure refers to this act of checking a human idea against one of Gods as the full analysis (plena
resolutio) of a thing or as the contuition (contuendum deum59) of it,
which entails the co-knowledge of the creature and its exemplar in
God.60 From his perspective, such an act of abstraction does not
entail engagement in a unifying mode of cognition that allows for
growth in the understanding of an object as was the case with Augustine. Rather, thinking abstractly means deriving the single, immutable, and infallible abstract concept that is latent in each object
from the experience of it.61
The attainment of such completely certain ideas is possible,
Bonaventure believes, because the memory is impressed with the innate knowledge of Being, which is none other than the Being of the
God who is the source of all beings. That is to say, it is impressed
58. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 2, 6-9 (302): Abstrahit igitur a loco, tempore, et motu,
ac per hoc est incommutabilis, incircumscriptibilis, interminabilis et omnino spiritualis. Diiudicatio igitur est actio, quae speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam, introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectiuam .
59. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 2, 11.
60. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 2, 10-11; 3, 3.
61. Bonaventure derives this idea from his Franciscan teachers who in turn
learned it from eleventh century Arab philosopher Avicenna, as I show in chapter
three of Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustines Theory of Knowledge,
Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2011. See also what Dag Nikolaus Hasse suggests in Avicennas De anima in the Latin West, The Warburg Institute, London 2000.
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with His image.62 Although it would appear that the mind knows
the created objects of its knowledge first, the Seraphic Doctor insists
that in point of fact it knows its divine object first, inasmuch as the
intuitive knowledge of Being is the condition of possibility of any
further contuitive ability to make sense of finite beings.63
If the mind loves the divine Being such that its will is oriented
towards Him and implicitly, His ideas, Bonaventure writes, it cannot help but perceive the images of beings that come into the
memory as perfectly as God does and thus achieve absolute understanding of them.64 By impressing on human beings the knowledge
of His own Being, Bonaventure writes, God comes to their continual aid in acts of knowing. He supervises or cooperates with the
human mind in those acts so as to ensure that the thoughts that result from them correspond to His.65 In affirming this, Bonaventure appropriates Augustines Trinitarian analogue of memory,
understanding, and will in the effort to articulate something like a
correspondence theory of knowledge which would account for
St. Francis remarkable ability to comprehend and commune with
all created realities.
Unlike Augustine who had argued that the ability to reflect
Gods image perfectly and constantly through the co-operation of
memory, understanding, and will was lost at the fall and must be
gradually recovered, Bonaventure contends that the image was
never effaced.66 Furthermore, it could not have been, lest the fullness of God Himself be erased, which is impossible. From
Bonaventures perspective, what was lost at the fall was not the in-
62. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 3, 2 (305): Ipsa anima est imago dei et similitudo adeo
sibi praesens et eum habens praesentem .
63. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 3, 3-4 (305): Non uenit intellectus noster ut plene resoluens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuuetur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti, quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in
quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate. Quomodo autem sciret intellectus, hoc
esse ens defectiuum et incompletum, si nullam haberet cognitionem entis absque
omni defectu [...]? .
64. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 3, 5.
65. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 5, 7.
66. Cf. DQMT, qu. 1, 1, conclusion.
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tellectual capacity but the will to love God that makes the intellect
aware of its innate knowledge of the divine Being, which in turn
renders it the perfectly adequate foundation for the perfect
knowledge of beings.67
On Bonaventures account, Christ compensated for humanitys
ignorance of the innate intellectual ability by revealing that and
how human beings were made to love God. He did this by humbling Himself to appear on earth and above all to die a sacrificial
death on the cross.68 Those that love Christ and demonstrate that
love as He did, namely, through humble and self-sacrificial acts of
service, Bonaventure affirms, instantaneously revert to the full
awareness of the image that was always there and to which they
consequently need never be re-conformed. Putting it in Augustines terms, the Seraphic Doctor states that they remember, understand, and love themselves, becoming true likenesses of Christ.69
2.3. Christ-Likeness in the Itinerarium
In the Prologue to his Itinerarium, Bonaventure emphasizes precisely this point, namely, that love for Christ expressed as Christ
Himself expressed love, through humble acts of charity, opens the
door to all knowledge. At the start of the treatise, Bonaventure explains that he came to this realization upon Mount Alverna, Francis of Assisis favorite place for prayer and the site of his famous vision of a fiery, six-winged Seraph nailed to a cross a vision after
which he was marked with the Stigmata or wounds of Christ
from which he eventually died.70
The Seraphic Doctor made his retreat two years into his term as
the Franciscans Minister General and thus far enough along in it
to realize the challenges involved in leading an order that faced
external and internal opposition to its intellectual pursuits and to
the accumulation of the possessions required to undertake them.
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71. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., Prol., 2 (296): in cuius consideratione statim uisum est
mihi, quod uisio illa praetenderet ipsius patris suspensionem in contemplando et
uiam, per quam peruenitur ad eam .
72. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., Prol., 3.
73. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 200D-208C; 300B-305C.
74. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., Prol., 4 (297): Igitur ad gemitum orationis per Christum crucifixum, per cuius sanguinem purgamur a sordibus uitiorum primum quidem lectorem inuito, ne forte credat, quod sibi sufficiat lectio sine unctione, speculatio sine deuotione, inuestigatio sine admiratione, circumspectio sine exsultatione, industria sine pietate, scientia sine caritate, intelligentia sine humilitate, studium absque diuina gratia, speculum absque sapientia diuinitus inspirata .
75. Cf. ibid. (297): Nihil est speculum exterius propositum, nisi speculum mentis
nostrae tersum fuerit et politum .
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certitude, as Christ does76 and thus to study any and all of the
branches of knowledge.77
Since the Being that is known in all three cases is one and the
same, to wit, the Being of a God whose essential nature is Love,
Bonaventure points out that the three-fold knowledge of Him is
eventually bound to lead the one that acquires it to be totally consumed by Gods love as Christ was when He was transported to
the Father after His death. Those that come to know the world so
perfectly as a result of loving God so deeply thus ultimately transcend the realm of knowledge altogether, achieving ecstatic union
with divine love.78 They ascend to God as a result of having descended in humility to the point of losing life completely in Him.
This ascent by descent, Bonaventure indicates, was supremely modelled by St. Francis, who followed in the exact footsteps of
the crucified Christ.79 Once the love of God had brought the little
poor man to the point of achieving the unbroken comprehension
of and communion with creation and God for which he is famous, that knowledge of the ways in which God manifests His
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love brought about union with the Love that supersedes knowledge. By relating Francis vision in this way, Bonaventure made a
brilliant polemical move towards justifying the intellectual endeavours of his order in the presence of the university academics
and conservative Franciscans.80 In describing love of a Franciscan
sort as the way into and the goal of knowing, he implied that the
Franciscan perspective far from opposed to the purposes of academia is a wholly appropriate, if not the most appropriate, context in which to undertake intellectual pursuits.
As he explained how such pursuits culminate in a spiritual experience like Francis enjoyed, moreover, he demonstrated in the
sight of the conservative Franciscans the important part that study
can play in the attainment of Franciscan ends. In the final section
of his treatise, the Seraphic Doctor further reinforces his commitment to accomplishing Franciscan goals by emphasizing that intellectual activities are only useful until they lead to the ecstatic union
with divine love, which is the goal of all Franciscan endeavours.81
Those that opposed the intellectual life of the friars minor could
have no rebuttal to these lines of contention, according to which
intellectual pursuits require a Franciscan perspective for their success, and those who entertain a Franciscan perspective need intellectual pursuits for theirs.
3. ASCENDING TO GOD IN AUGUSTINE AND BONAVENTURE
The description of the ascent to God that Bonaventure gives in
his Itinerarium admittedly sounds in many respects like the one
that is provided by Augustine. For it involves three cognitive levels sensation, imagination, and intellection and Bonaventure
invokes Augustines Trinitarian analogies (to say nothing of ex-
80. Cf. C. Cullen, Bonaventure, 19: Bonaventures work is understood as an attempt to institutionalize the primitive spirit and to preserve the peace of the order in
the face of conflicts over learning and poverty .
81. Cf. Bonaventure, itin., 7, 4 (313): In hoc autem transitu, si sit perfectus, oportet
quod relinquantur omnes intellectuales operationes, ex apex affectus totus transferatur et transformetur in deum .
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planatory devices like illumination) to show how the latter operation occurs. Despite these apparent similarities, there are at
least three levels on which Bonaventures account can be differentiated from Augustines, namely, in terms of the account that is
given of the nature of knowledge, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for knowledge, and the apex of the ascent to the
knowledge of God through the knowledge of reality.
Regarding the first point: Bonaventure conceives the nature of
knowledge very differently from Augustine. Whereas intellectual
activity for Augustine entails engagement in a unifying mode of
cognition in which ideas about entities are subject to growth and
development, Bonaventure conceives it as the simple act of identifying the abstract nature of a thing as it is fully instantiated in
an object through efforts to remove conceptually determining factors such as place, time, and change that obscure that nature.
To strip an object of these elements so as to behold the thing itself is to see it as it compares exactly to an idea in the mind of
God. Such a theory of knowledge by complete correspondence,
I have suggested, follows logically from the Seraphic Doctors
doctrine of God, which implies that imaging God means reconciling created beings with their uncreated exemplars.
On Bonaventures account, the unchangeable, irreproachable,
and indubitable knowledge that is acquired through such acts
is attainable because the knowledge of Gods Being His image
is innately impressed on the mind, rendering it the adequate foundation for the perfect comprehension of beings. Through His
presence in the mind in the concept of Being, God assists the human intellect in its attempt to accomplish its acts. This model according to which necessary conditions for knowledge are satisfied
as a result of Gods co-operation (concursus) with human minds can
be contrasted with that of Augustine, according to whom God
does not bestow any innate conceptual content, such as that of
Being, but an innate capacity for cognizing in unifying terms.
Inasmuch as the mind thinks along unifying lines in terms of the
existence of one God, it thinks in a way that has been enabled by
God, not because He directly intervenes in human cognitive
processes per Bonaventure but because the power to perform cog-
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nitive work is one that flows in from Him through the creative
gift and Incarnate example of His Son.82
In striving to follow that example by grace through faith in
Christ, Augustine implies, the intellect satisfies the sufficient conditions for knowing. As a result of the commitment it makes to
perform its cognitive acts out of an overriding love for God
which is indicative of faith that the desired object may ultimately
be grasped Augustine elaborates, the mind becomes able to bring
faith and love to bear in all its efforts. In doing this, it cultivates the
habit of thinking along the aforementioned lines. The more it does
so, the more it expresses its hope to know God and thereby approximates that goal by degrees, recovering in the process the image of God on the intellect and thus the ability to do all things for
the purpose of recognizing His glory.
Through his efforts to train his readers to memorize how to
glorify God constantly in keeping with individual abilities, I have
shown that Augustine instructs how to express the self freely,
without the inhibitions of narrow-mindedness.83 He teaches how
to form the perspective from which the good and God can be
found in absolutely all things. To maintain this outlook on reality
is for Augustine the climax of the cognitive ascent that can be
reached in this life. From this height, the mind not only sees objects and circumstances but also itself and others in their proper
places with respect to one another. In other words, it learns to operate within the limits of its abilities and to let others do the same.
By these means, it promotes the good of all and thereby realizes
and at once reveals the benefits of adherence to belief in God.84
An incidental point worth noting here is that these conclusions
run counter to certain allegations that have been directed against
the account of the psychological analogies to the Trinity Augustine
82. J. Schmutz distinguishes between what he calls the influential and concursus
model of causality, which was newly introduced by Franciscans in the thirteenth
century, in La doctrine medivale des causes et la thologie de la nature pure (XIIIe-XVIIe sicles),
Rev. thom. , 101 (2001), 217-264.
83. Cf. Aug., trin., XIV, 5, 7 (CCL 50/A, 429-430).
84. Cf. Aug., trin., XIV, 14, 18 (CCL 50/A, 445-446).
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gives in the latter half of De trinitate for quite some time.85 According to some interpreters, the bishops reflections on the human
mind as the image of God encourage the reader to turn to the self
qua image as the foundation for all knowledge. In doing this, Augustine supposedly instigates a proto-Cartesian turn to the subject that involves turning away from relationships with others and
ultimately with God to gain awareness of and access to a fully actualized power to know, thereby promoting a problematic and typically modern individualism. As I have already intimated, however,
Augustines reflections on the image of God are designed to teach
readers how to recover gradually their lost power to know.
If something anticipating a subjective turn occurs in any context,
it happens in the thought of Bonaventures Franciscan Augustine,
according to whom the presence of the image which contra Augustine was never lost and to which one never need re-conform
predisposes the intellect to be the fully adequate foundation for all
its acts, although its adequacy ultimately comes from God through
the impression of His Being.86 Although many are ignorant of their
competence for perfect knowing, Bonaventure teaches that those
who love Christ as Christ loved humbly, sacrificially regain full
awareness of their fully functional powers to make definitive sense
of all things: beings, human beings, and God.
The point that emerges here is that Bonaventure understands
Christ likeness, that is, the ascent to God, as mainly a matter of the
will to love Him. In this he differs from Augustine who conceived
the process of ascending to God as a matter of transforming the
minds patterns of thinking through the guidance of love for God
and thus as a matter of knowledge and love, intellect and will.
For Bonaventure, love enacts the possibility of obtaining infallible
knowledge; yet the voluntary abandonment of the will out of faith
in Christ is not itself based on what is intellectual. By this account,
85. For an elaboration of this point see chapter one of my Divine Illumination, 56-57.
86. Bonaventures emphasis on interiority is generally taken as a sign of his indebtedness to Augustine by Franciscan scholars like E. Bettoni, Bonventure, 84;
Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites, 45; Z. Hayes, The Hidden Center:
Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure, Paulist Press, Mahwah 1981, 218.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
At the outset of this discussion, I mentioned three reasons why it
might be important to distinguish Bonaventures views on the nature of the ascent to God from those of Augustine. The first was to
recognize and celebrate the distinctively Franciscan features of
Bonaventures account. Among these are its emphasis so consistent with the Franciscan mission of charitable service on the primacy of love (otherwise known as voluntarism); the notion that
the divine Being is the first object of the intellect, such that the
mind maintains an unbroken intuitive connection with it, best exemplified by Francis of Assisi; and a correspondence theory of
knowledge that effectively explained the saints capacity to comprehend and commune with all created beings.
The virtues of such emphases are manifold. By prioritizing love
over knowledge, for example, Bonaventure rightly stressed that
knowledge amounts to nothing if it is turned to no useful purpose
or even to harmful purposes if it engenders pride as opposed to
humble acts of service. Furthermore, there is a sense in which
positing the intuitive knowledge of Being showed how human beings are both accountable for and able to maintain the intimate relationship with God that would enable them to see things as He
sees them, that is, as expressions of His love, and treat them accordingly. Although Bonaventures emphases may have differed
from Augustines, they enabled the beneficial ministry of the Franciscan order to be intellectually supported and carried forward.
Although John Duns Scotus employs different philosophical
forms from Bonaventure, he arguably upholds in new ways the
very Franciscan principles that he inherited, rather than breaking
from his predecessor as is commonly supposed.87 For instance, the
voluntarist bent in his thought is unmistakeable, as is a proclivity
for a correspondence theory of knowledge.88 Moreover, the idea
87. See chapter six of my Divine Illumination for a fuller account of this argument
concerning Scotus.
88. Cf. L. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, Brill, Leiden 2004,
262; K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, Brill, Leiden 1988, 64.
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89. J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids 2005, 93-96;
C. Pickstock, Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance, Modern Theology , 21 (2005), 548.
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