Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of Populist Argentina, 1943-1976

Author(s): James P. Brennan

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 3, Contested Transformation (May, 2007), pp.
49-66
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648022
Accessed: 13-03-2015 02:42 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American Perspectives.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

to Neoliberalism

Prolegomenon

The Political Economy of Populist

Argentina, 1943-1976
by
James P. Brennan

Recent research in economic history recasts thedebate on economic policy in postwar

Argentina. Jtdemonstrates that thehighlypartisan writings on recent economic history
and neoliberal prescriptionsfor economic reformhave relied on an incompleteand there
fore distorted understanding of thepolicies undertaken in thedecades before theneolib
eral reforms.An analysis of the innerworkings of the country's banking system in these
years provides a new historical precision todebates on therelationship between economic
variables and political instability in thepostwar years.
Keywords:

Argentina, Capitalism, Peronism, Bourgeoisie, Economy

In December
declared a default on its foreign debt, one of
2001, Argentina
the largest defaults inmodern history, bringing to an end a decade of so-called
a near
reform. The default was
neoliberal
of the
accompanied
collapse
by

country's banking system, violent social protests in the country's major cities,
and a political crisis that saw five presidents
succeed one another in the span
to the
of a month. The election inMay 2003 of the Peronist Nestor Kirchner
seems to have signaled an end to the neoliberal
in
reforms
that
presidency
were begun during the
to
from
1976
1983.
These
military government
reality
intensified in the 1990s during the presidency
reforms were
of Carlos Sa?l

Menem

(1989-1999).

President
a model

Kirchner

tion of resuscitating
unclear what he means

has

spoken

frequently

since his elec

of "national
it remains
capitalism."
Though
by this, recent scholarship on the economic history of
the nature of the policies
these years is illuminating
prior to the
adopted
reforms and their effects on the broader political economy. This
neoliberal
historical memory about the recent past
research provides some much-needed
errors
to
in the future. The neoliberal
avoid
and perhaps
reforms
suggests
a
based
their claims to legitimacy on history, promoting
tendentious
highly
causes of Argentina's
economic
troubles as the justifica
interpretation of the
tion for radical
invoked

solutions.

to attack

Critics

of the reforms similarly have increasingly

introduced by the 1976-1983 military

the changes
by Menem.

history
government and deepened
ance to the often ideologically
Argentine economic history.

driven

This article seeks

and partisan

to restore some bal

interpretations

is an associate
of history at the University
of California,
James P. Brennan
professor
inmodern
Latin American
recent book, The Politics
and specializes
history. His most
is currently
Peronism and theArgentine
1945-1976,
Bourgeoisie,
Capitalism:
undergoing
for publication.
LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES,
DOT. 10.1177/0094582X07300588
? 2007 Latin American Perspectives

of recent

Riverside,
ofNational
revisions

Issue 154, Vol. 34 No. 3,May 2007 49-66

49

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

50

THE PER?N YEARS

(1943-1955)

the first half of the twentieth

economic devel
century, Argentina's
some
that
rest
Latin
in
America
of
the
of
and differed
ways
opment
in the region, its economy
in a number of others. As with other countries
on the export of
and foreign invest
heavily
primary commodities
depended
ment.
in Latin
Its meat and grain exports were among
the most profitable
most successful export economy
America
and the engine of Latin America's
in the
until the terms of trade began to turn against its traditional commodities
During

resembled

flows, as well as flows of immigrants, favored the country

early 1950s. Capital
was
that the first serious
during the Depression
through the 1930s, though it
and
The landowning
of
future
sluggish growth appeared.
signs
problems
to the crisis by strengthening bilateral trade relations with the
class responded
in the 1933 Roca-Runciman
incarnated
Pact.
British, a policy notoriously

that of General Agust?n P.

of the 1930s, especially
governments
Argentine
an
move
to
bilateralism
with
Justo (1932-1938), complemented
unprecedented
In 1931, Argentina
state intervention in the economy.
established
exchange
an increas
become
controls. The state's control of foreign exchange would
in
ingly important instrument of economic policy. Greater state involvement
the economy remained
the establishment

with

supply and
Grain Board

the hallmark

of economic

of the Banco

Central

credit and various

policy through the decade,

in 1935 to regulate the money
such as the National
agencies

government
Meat Board to control the supply and regulate
commodities.
The move
toward greater state
the prices of agricultural
in the economy was not uniquely Argentine; most governments
involvement
in Latin America
followed a similar path. What distinguished Argentina
from
the rest of the region was the greater resilience of its export sector and the abil
resources inwhat was a prosperous
economy with
ity of the state to allocate
and
rates
investment.
of
The
accumulation,
capital
savings,
precocious
high
of industry inArgentina was only one ofmany indicators of the
development
country's privileged position in the region.
and

the National

Historians
have traditionally regarded the military coup d'?tat of June 1943
as a turning point inmodern Argentine history. The military government
that
a
a
oversaw
half years undoubtedly
would
rule Argentina for the next two and
number of important changes in economic policy and social relations, ones that
would
be deepened
during the subsequent presidency of the individual who
had emerged as a leading figure in the military government, Colonel
Juan
Per?n. The era of popular nationalism,
trade-union power, the rise of
Domingo
and state-supported
is traced to the
the "national bourgeoisie,"
industrialization
war years and its immediate aftermath. Yet there is a
consensus
among
growing
less dramatic than once thought,
that the rupture with the past was
that themilitary junta and then the Peronist government intensified rather than
these changes, and that Per?n himself in general represented more a
caused
of
continuity with the Argentine past than had been believed
(Halperin
figure
Girbal-Blacha,
1993;
2003). Certainly in terms of economic policy, Per?n
Donghi,
career
attempting to adapt established practices and policies
began his political
to the new context of the postwar era and the political movement he was build
historians

ing. Argentina

found itself in an unusually

favorable position

at the end of the

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

war.

51

it to play the role of international creditor,

surpluses allowed
favorable terms of trade for its traditional exports. Per?n's gov
reserves to pay off overseas debt, nationalize
ernment used wartime
foreign
and subsidize
owned
The
industry and consumer
enterprises,
spending.
establishment of a state agency, the Instituto Argentino para la Promoci?n
del
and

Its wartime

it enjoyed

to control foreign trade in the country's export commodities

Intercambio,
to appropriate
and distribute a large share of foreign
allowed
the government
even in years of overall negative trade balances.
exchange,
concerns to "harmonize"
Peronist economic policy was driven by Per?n's
ensure social peace. His concept of the
and
relations
"organized
labor-capital
even his discourse of industrialization were influenced more
community" and
ones. Even before his election,
concerns than by strictly economic
by social
Per?n and indeed others in the military government
feared the disruptions
that would
result from the end of the war, especially
the negative effects on

of renewed foreign competition, perhaps

Argentine
industry because
leading
to rising unemployment
and social unrest. Industrial growth during the war
sectors and newer dynamic ones such
in both the traditional food-processing
as textiles and
had
been
significant. In 1945, for the first time in
metalworking
accounted
for a greater share of the gross domes
history, industry
Argentina's

tic product
than agriculture
2002: 129).
(Gerchunoff and Ant?nez,
(GDP)
of the Consejo Nacional
Per?n's establishment
de Posguerra was
intended to
to the postwar
for a transition from thewartime bonanza
coordinate planning
to
maintain
His
economic
all
above
the balance
policies sought
adjustments.
of forces created by the war, with industry given access to state-subsidized
class awarded a steady increase in its share of national
credit and theworking
a
to industry in that it led to an expanding
consumer
also
benefit
income,
37
and salaries accounted
for
market. Wages
income in
percent of national
1946 and rose to 50 percent by 1950, a major reason for the growth of industry
in these years (Gerchunoff and Ant?nez,
2002: 145).
and employment
To protect industry as a source of wealth
and to placate
industrialists as a powerful new interest group, Per?n continued and extended
the policies begun in the 1930s: tariffprotection, exchange controls, and import
licenses favoring the importation of capital goods and inputs needed by indus
try.All these policies combined with the expanding consumer market benefited
both established
firms and emerging ones. Nationalization
of the banking sys
tem in 1946 meant that the central government, through the Banco Central, now
an enormous
influence over the country's economy, with the money
not
to
the
tied
country's reserves and the gold standard but to the gov
supply
ernment's discretion. After experiencing a 20 percent growth between 1940 and

wielded

1945 and 1948, with industry the

2002: 148). Cheap
and
credit allowed
Ant?nez,
(Gerchunoff
major beneficiary
to
state
for rising wages. The combination of
business
compensate
protection,
and abundant
credit permitted established
increased demand,
firms such as
1945, bank

loans

increased

fivefold between

Telia, then Latin America's

company, to grow
largest metalworking
and diversify and numerous new firms and industrialists to emerge. Among
the
that today domi
latterwere the founders of some of the future conglomerates
nate the Argentine
in
economy, such as Techint, founded by Agostino Rocca
of
Franco
and
construction
firms
and
Antonio
the
who
established
Macri,
1947,
SIAM-Di

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

52

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

in the public housing projects financed by the Plan

their fortune by participating
in 1948.
Eva Per?n de Viviendas
stated intentions was
indeed to create a "national
One of the regime's
the country's
of leading
industrialization
program.
capable
bourgeoisie"
Per?n was well aware of the limitations of local capitalists in over
Nonetheless,
an economic
transformation of the country and therefore increased the
seeing
of the railroads and public
state's role as an economic actor. The nationalization
life.
services alone meant greater state involvement in the country's economic
The state also became an industrial entrepreneur, expanding military-run arma
ments factories and assuming control of a cluster of former German-owned
firms
war
and administering
them collectively through the
expropriated during the
de Industrias del Estado. Greater regulatory powers and
Direcci?n Nacional
especially its control of credit also enormously enhanced the public sector's role
in the economy. The increased presence of the state in the economy also intro
that administered the new public
duced a new economic actor, the bureaucracies
now
various
and
the
Labor, business,
government bureaucracies
companies.
wielded
the decisive influence on economic policy and pressured the executive
in corporatist fashion rather than through the political parties in a political sys
tem thatwas moving
and one-party rule.
inexorably toward "Peronization"
By the time of Per?n's
trade would
be positive

second administration,
trade deficits (the balance of
on
four
occasions
1949 and 1962) and
between
only
a
seen in
in
economic
determined
inflation
policy. This was
change
rising
terms
Per?n's
of
Second
its
from
the
Five-Year
with
Plan,
greater
everything
on agriculture, to the 1955 Productivity Congress, with its recom
emphasis

trade-union power on the shop floor, discouraging

forweakening
in Argentine
and introducing modern
absenteeism,
practices
managerial
a discursive
was also seen in Per?n's
It
abandonment
of
economic
industry.
in the oil
and his courting of foreign investment, most notably
nationalism

mendations

and automobile

industries.

of the firstyears of Per?n's

annual growth rates of 8 percent

astounding
were
followed by stagnation and even
government
The

prices for Argentina's

agricultural
exports had
negative
growth. Declining
Per?n
had
dur
baleful effects on the entire economic
constructed
scaffolding
of
his
the
deleterious
consequences
government. Among
ing the first years
was
the increasing
for the
inability to import the capital goods necessary

country to diversify its industrial base by shifting from consumer-goods

light
sec
industry to heavy industry. Industry ceased to be favored during Per?n's
ond administration, with a greater share of credit going to the agricultural sec
tor and with the projects of the Second Five-Year Plan giving priority to
in the countryside
rather than the modernization
of
improvements
in
1955
and
the
factories.
Indeed,
Argentina's
productive processes
technology
was called as a result of the failure of the Second Five
Productivity Congress
technical

Year Plan

to address

the problem of Argentine

industry (Bitr?n, 1994: 19-53).
was nonetheless difficult for a government that had
restructuring
on the
class for
made
social peace its highest priority and depended
working
to
refused
Per?n's
follow
that
would
government
policies
political support.
cam
for
the
sake
of
domestic
accumulation.
The
consumption
capital
depress
even the greater
and
to
for
increased
receptiveness
paign
productivity
foreign
in order to avoid the hard choices
investment were
tepid measures
adopted
Economic

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

53

a
more "liberal" measures
that
high-inflation populist economy and
increase
but
also
income
redistribute
from
the
away
efficiency
might
working
on the domestic
class and the industrial and commercial sectors that depended
to be setting a different economic
course when
seemed
market. Per?n
he
czar
and
economic
the
industrialist
Miranda
with
the
orthodox
Miguel
replaced
in 1949, but themargin for
economist Alfredo G?mez Morales
tinkering with the
was
state
had been following
economic policies that the Peronist
very small. This
combined with a severe drought and a series of disastrous har
basic dilemma
vests in the early 1950s launched Argentina
into a serious economic crisis in the
between

final years of Per?n's firstadministration. These years also witnessed

the appear
ance ofwhat would become one of the hallmarks of the
Argentine economy until
the 1990s: structural inflation. Argentina went from being a country with histor
fiscal policies to one inwhich monetary emission cov
ically very conservative
deficits. Per?n's wage
ered government
the
exacerbated
policies
naturally
was a
tendencies.
inflation
the
Nonetheless,
gov
though
inflationary
problem,
ernment demonstrated more fiscal restraint in the second administration,
and
inflation was largely under control by 1954. The government reduced spending
on social programs and
military expenditures and cut infrastructure by some 35
and
1948
1955. Trade balances were positive for both 1953 and
between
percent
1954. In general, Per?n was farmore effective in adapting economic policy to
new circumstances
In 1955, his last year of govern
than has been recognized.
was
a
at
7
ment, the economy
percent annual rate, and, though serious
growing
in
most
the
remained,
economy
prognoses were guardedly optimistic.
problems
Peronist economic policies were not as aberrant as many have contended. The
decision to use wartime reserves on the nationalization
of the railroads and other
and
businesses
of
the
external
debt had much to do
repatriation
foreign-owned

reserves were
the fact that Argentina's
frozen as inconvertible sterling
was also at least
in
banks.
British
Economic
deposits
"autarky"
partly the result
of U.S. agricultural policies that undermined Argentina's
traditional agricultural
exports, especially the continuing restrictions on Argentine farm products in the
to forbid recipients of
and the decision
U.S. market
foreign aid under the
to purchase Argentine
Plan
Marshall
and Llach,
1998:
(Gerchunoff
goods
with

and autarky thus responded

in part to constraints
international
and
the
U.S.
This
is not to say thatmis
economy
imposed by
policy.
in the Peronist years. The greatest failure was not devising
takes were not made
a coherent industrialization strategy
beyond the largely ineffectual two five-year
was
the
Banco
Industrial without any consistent eco
plans. Credit
dispensed by
nomic criteria in terms of long-range planning, squandering precious resources
and depriving the state of a powerful instrument with which to plan the econ
there existed real possibilities
for industrialization
in the
omy at a time when
1997;
1992;
Blacha,
country (Girbal
Rougier, 2000).
it is highly doubtful that either the failure to use Argentina's
Nonetheless,
reserves of foreign exchange
accumulated
during the first several years of eco
or the Peronist
nomic bonanza
the
government's
spendthrift ways
explain
failure of the country to develop heavy industry The capital goods required
to build such industries were scarce in the early postwar years, and the one
tier
States, sought to minimize
country that could supply them, the United
was
to
1975:
Nor
(Fodor,
159-160).
export
Argentina
entrepreneurial
spirit or
as
was
innovation
demonstrated
technological
lacking among industrialists,
174-175).

Industrialization

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

54

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

(Katz, 1982). Argentine

industry in these years, metalworking
itself to the conditions and opportunities
offered by a polit
industry adapted
ical economy that was the result of a long and complex history and a constel
lation of social forces. If it is fair to say that some of the policies adopted were
a hindrance
to sustained
it must
industrial
also be
ultimately
growth,
were
in
that
the
result
of
reasonable
decisions
they
acknowledged
adopted
or
not
to
of
conditions,
response
government
prevailing
simply
myopia
less perfidy on Per?n's part.
sector, much
opportunism
by the business

by

the key

INTEREST GROUPS:

BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE STATE

as many of his detrac

Though Per?n did not destroy theArgentine economy
tors have claimed, he did set the stage for a society thatwas highly polarized and
found itselfunable to develop a coherent economic strategy to cope with changes
in theworld economy and Argentina's place in it over the course of the next two
The Peronist

decades.
shaped

the contours
nowhere was

Perhaps
of corporative

of the 1940s and 1950s had profoundly

governments
of the Argentine political economy
in manifold ways.
their influence more important than in the establishment

interests that would

income
struggle for their share of national
and influence over national economic policy until the 1976 military coup and
subsequent government of the "Proceso" eviscerated them and created the rudi
ments of a new economy based on the financial sector and powerful holding
the
(grupos econ?micos in theArgentine political vernacular). Among
companies
eco
the
1976-1983
consolidated
the
classes,
military government
propertied
nomic power of groups that spurned the old business organizations
that had
more than once destabilized national
and
governments.
continuously pressured
of the 1940s and 1950s and
Nonetheless,
during the Peronist governments
in the two decades
in 1955,
fall from power
following Per?n's
particularly

Argentina's
political economy revolved around the struggle between diverse
business interests,with the country's powerful trade-union movement
also exer
a decisive and, in the Latin American
influence.
context,
cising
exceptional
The business groups were complex in their composition
and behavior, and
their interests shifted over time, making only generalizations
possible. On the
one hand, therewere the old export sectors tied to pampean
agriculture, increas
income redistribution had led to a rise in the domestic con
ingly grains because
of meat

and dwindling
for export. The Sociedad
Rural
surpluses
as
Rural
served
the
the
of
Society?SRA)
Argentina
(Argentine
representative
estancieros and indirectly for the exporting firms and diverse other economic
sumption

interests tied to so-called

economic
liberalism. Those advocating
greater state
intervention in the economy were the industrialists, fragmented and lacking an
formost of the Peronist period. Industrialists' tradi
institutional spokesperson

Industrial Argentina
tional peak organization,
the Uni?n
(Argentine Industrial
had been interdicted by Per?n in 1946, and an effective replace
Union?UIA),
ment had never emerged. During
the Peronist governments,
industry lobbied
the state largely through industrial associations
representing specific sectors, of
was
most
the
which themetalworking
effective, as well as through indi
industry
viduals who enjoyed personal
influence with Per?n. After Per?n's
fall from
come
serve
a
as
to
the
UIA
did
kind
of
for
power,
gradually
again
spokesperson

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

55

were the diverse regional economies

represented by the
industry Finally, there
Economic
General Econ?mica
Confederaci?n
(General
Confederation?CGE).
for all the
Per?n had sought to promote the CGE as an umbrella organization
it
that function. It
interests, but
only poorly performed
country's business
a
rather peculiar organization
led by a coterie of
remained throughout itshistory
who had used their influence as repre
one-time bolicheros (small businessmen)
sentatives of the CGE and personal contacts with Per?n to build large economic
a
was Jos? Ber Gelbard,
originally
empires. The emblematic figure among them
Province who would be the longtime president of the
merchant from Catamarca
CGE and for a time minister of the economy during the restored Peronist gov
of the CGE leadership
ernment of the early 1970s. Gelbard and other members
at
over an organization
that represented, often
cross-purposes, Gelbard
presided
and his circle, certain regional economies, and small businessmen
throughout
the country (Brennan, 1998; 2002).
and sometimes allied
trade-union movement
A well-organized
competed
if fragmented and fractious, business sec
itselfwith an equally well-organized,
tor during the period from 1955 to 1976. Argentina's political economy followed
a pattern in these years: governments
that favored the domestic market, indus
with "liberal" ones that favored
economies
alternated
try,and certain regional

increased exports, and income

through peso devaluation,
capital accumulation
of the
redistribution to agriculture and related sectors of the economy. Much
a
in
to
these
boiled
down
between
of
years
struggle
volatility
Argentine politics

groups with conflicting economic interests, with themilitary inter

eco
to break stalemates and restore equilibrium. Diverse
vening repeatedly
their agendas
either directly through presidents,
interests advanced
nomic
or
by cultivating support within the
government ministries, and state agencies
a
was
not
institution and was in fact rent
monolithic
armed forces. The military
corporative

and so-called
that
liberal groups
among nationalist
of the broader political economy. The party system,
in the firstdecades of the century and atrophied
which had grown precociously
since the 1930s, proved utterly incapable of channeling these diverse interests in
a
and was subjected to repeated military
political system that lacked credibility
trade-union
and the armed forces were
the
Business
movement,
groups,
coups.
in
economic
thus the key players
programs and implementing pol
advancing
factions, divided
reflected the divisions

with

icy during these 20 years.

The fall of the Peronist regime in 1955 did mark Argentina's
reentry into the
was
in
Per?n
headed
this direction,
already
global capitalist economy. Though
have made
the process much
slower
the social base of his movement would

in power. Under General

Pedro Aramburu's
government
rather
(1955-1958) Argentina
entry into the International
quickly negotiated
Fund and theWorld Bank and became a recipient of loans (Garcia
Monetary
Heras, 2000: 523-556). Under the government of Arturo Frondizi
(1958-1962),
after a brief flirtation with a return to populist economics, Argentina
accepted
of the international
in principle
the prescriptions
lending agencies and the
to resort rou
U.S. government but did little to implement them, continuing
Banco Industrial to cover fiscal deficits and
and
to
Banco
Central
the
tinely
a "rationalization"
in the
of the public
sector, especially
failing to adopt
2000:
The
contradictions
of
the
Frondizi
536-537).
(Garcia Heras,
provinces
of the Argentine
set the stage for the subsequent
polarization
government
had

he

remained

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

56

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

foreign debt remained small through

political economy. Though Argentina's
the early 1970s and the international financial community was not yet the dis
itwould
later become, there was great concern on
ciplinarian of the economy

interests with following the policies demanded

the part of agro-export
by the
on
fiscal
minimal
restrictions
international
restraint,
lending agencies:
profit
in
remittances
(mainly multinationals
by foreign companies
operating
a
and
other
"liberal"
similarly
deregulated
banking system,
poli
Argentina),
an
model
cies. The national-capitalist
advocated,
conversely,
expanding
domestic market and monetary
supply, protection for national
industry, gov
ernment regulation of private enterprise, and greater restrictions on foreign
course in economic
change of
Though Per?n's
policy in the final
inmany ways
to have renounced
the pro
years of his government
appeared
a national
once out of power and
Peronist
of
the
ject
capitalism,
proscribed
movement
The CGE did
again took up the banner of economic nationalism.
not formally align itself with the Peronist movement,
but it did increasingly
and the Peronist Confederaci?n
and the CGE
find points of agreement,
on a number of
Labor
General
del Trabajo
(General
Confederation?CGT)
business.

and common economic programs.

joint documents
The country's business groups remained greatly divided
through the 1960s.
a
interests embraced
In 1958, the agro-export
liberal
program and
radically

occasions

issued

Coordinadora
de Instituciones Empresarias
Libres
the Asociaci?n
In
with
the
of
Carlos
minister
of the
1967,
Juan
(ACIEL).
support
Ongania's
the
Adalbert
Vasena,
economy,
Kreiger
country's largest industries, including
in the UIA and formed the
withdrew
from active participation
multinationals,
In
the
the
meantime,
UIA, with its stronghold in
Consejo Empresario Argentino.
established

the nationally

firms of Greater Buenos Aires, began gradually to abandon

move
and
toward ones more akin to the economic nationalism

owned

liberal positions
espoused by the CGE.
two organizations
1970s. Nonetheless,

Given

remained

their history of enmity and mutual

suspicion, the
and
until
their
relations
the early
separate
frosty

along with the CGE, theUIA did begin to criticize, and with
the "denationalization"
of Argentine
increasing vehemence,
industry, especially
the
and
the
during
Ongania dictatorship. By
early 1970s, itspublic proclamations

revealed positions at odds with the prevailing economic philosophy

publications
and economic program, demanding
greater state intervention in order to regu
more
or
to foment the latter under conditions that
late foreign investment
closely
to
in the national economy. In 1972 theUIA
reinvest
required foreign companies
a treaty
in
the
CGE
signed by the Lanusse government estab
opposing
joined
a
between
trade
free
treaty supported by the
Argentina and Paraguay,
lishing
it
to
the
afraid
that
would
contraband.
ACIEL,
open up
country
and their disputes were simply themost
The diverse business organizations

of struggles for economic advantage

and sometimes for
visible manifestation
mere survival thatwent on among sectors of the Argentine
at the
bourgeoisie
and even the local level. These struggles were not
the provincial,
national,
to
but
do seem to have been particularly
intense there.
unique
Argentina
Argentina's
took place

successful integration
history?the
in the final decades of the nineteenth

that
into the global economy
and
of
decades
century
early

the twentieth and then the nationalist

capitalist model
adopted during the
interests.
Its
diverse
Peronist years?had
industrialization
precocious
produced
success
of
the
model
thus
and the
these differences
agro-export
arguably made

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

57

than elsewhere
in the region. What
deeper and more consequential
certainly
does appear sui generis was not the
to
which
various economic sectors
degree
were
organized but the degree towhich theywere free of state control and capa
ble of advancing
their interests collectively through institutional means, both
with the political leadership (civilian or
military) and with the state bureaucra
and stalemate thatwould
characterize
cies, setting the stage for the polarization
to
1955
from
1976.
Argentina

CREDIT POLICIES
How

did

the Argentine
economy work during these years, and whom did
to analyze
There are many ways
but
any economy's workings,
most
the
in
terms
useful
of
its
essential
character
and
effec
among
judging
tiveness is in terms of credit. Among
business's
concerns, perhaps none is
more crucial than access to
are
as
and
few
for under
capital,
illuminating
as
in
the
which
is
way
standing political economy
capital
acquired and used
in early 1946. The
by firms. The Argentine
system was
banking
revamped
Banco Central was nationalized
by the military regime shortly before Per?n
were
assumed
also nationalized.
This meant
that private
power. Deposits
banks
lost their autonomy
and became mandatories
of the bank. In due
also changed,
and old gold-standard
course, monetary
policies
principles
were
as well. The financial
emission
abandoned
regarding monetary
system
was reformed
1957, when the Aramburu
again inOctober
government under
took a banking reform whereby
the Banco Central
recovered most of its old
Instead
of
to
the mixed bank it had been in the 1930s,
autonomy.
returning
however, it remained a public institution, though deposits were restored to the
in private banks and the recent
banks, both state and private. New policies
a number of
of
privatization/liquidation
important public banks such as the
Banco Industrial (renamed the Banco Nacional
or BANADE
de Desarrollo
in
it benefit?

the early 1970s) have made

it possible
for researchers, for the most part eco
nomic historians, to gain access to these banks' archives for the first time. This
new research has
an
of the inner
of the
provided
understanding
workings
a
with
of
in historical schol
economy
precision that is unprecedented
degree
this new research has led to a deeper
of the
arship. Collectively,
understanding
the
1943-1976.
economy
years
Argentine political
during
themyths that have been debunked by this new research is the idea
Among
that Per?n was hostile to the country's established
economic powers, espe
The
industrial
firms
received the lion's
cially big industry.
country's largest
share of public credit in these years, partly because
loans were granted on the
of fixed collateral and partly because
of political
considerations?the
influence that these companies were able to exert on the government and state

basis

and Per?n's

concern to avoid labor

and
overriding
disputes
these firms were
the biggest employers with the
largest
labor forces, they merited
treatment from the government.
Small
special
also
benefited
from
but
the
were
beneficiaries
industry
public credit,
greatest
the established,
were
those
that
owned.
This
large firms, including
publicly
state subsidy for
system represented a massive
large firms, private and public,
since amortization was granted in long-term installments which,
combined

bureaucracies

social unrest.

Since

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

58

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

a
highly
interest rates

that the firms often paid negative

inflationary economy, meant
and
1998:
Llach,
186; Rougier, 2002: 164-166). The
(Gerchunoff
Per?n governments
of the 1940s and 1950s introduced important changes with
of the
regard to the role of the state in distributing credit. The nationalization
new
as the
and
creation
the
of
institutions
such
banking system
public lending
Banco Industrial heightened
the degree of interp?n?tration of business
and
was
This
lacked
effective
and
government.
banking system
oversight
subject
to arbitrary decisions
and constantly revised norms and regulations as well as
high turnover in its board of directors (the Banco Industrial, for example, had
12 presidents
1944 and 1955). Effective economic
never
between
planning
were
its
characterized
in nature. With
activities, which
"political"
essentially
in 1955, the government
the fall of Per?n's
of the Revoluci?n
government
reforms in the banking system, ending the state
Libertadora
sought tomake
and
for public banks
monopoly
establishing
tighter regulatory guidelines
such as the Banco Industrial, though with mixed
results.

with

One thing that did not change with the fall of Per?n was the degree of state
in the economy, which
involvement
increased throughout the years from 1955
to 1976. Business-state
relations were characterized by a growing dependence
of the former on the latter,with the state not only assigning resources but also
in and sometimes assuming outright
gradually
increasing its direct presence
control of private firms as a shareholder. Through
three public agencies
(the
Instituto Mixto de Inversiones Mobilarias,
the Banco Nacional
de Desarrollo,
and the Caja Nacional
de Ahorro y Seguro), the state assumed
the debts and
an
of
number
of
its already
increasing
private firms, augmenting
obligations
in the economy beyond
formidable presence
the many public-sector
compa
nies. The kind of state capitalism
that emerged over the course of three
in Argentina
in the mid-1940s,
had actually begun
decades
with the Banco
Industrial and the Instituto Mixto
de Inversiones Mobilarias
both buying
stocks of private firms on a small scale but increasingly after 1955.
There were many reasons for this growing state involvement
in the econ
one
in
but
the
the
1960s
and
1970s
to have
omy,
appears
predominant
early
been the weak
financial position of industrial firms and the impending bank
a
ruptcy of number of them, with fears of large layoffs and their social conse
case was
the most
that of the industrial giant
quences.
Perhaps
revealing
SIAM-Di
industrial
Telia, Argentina's
firm, which
flagship
experienced
fall from
increasing financial difficulties after Per?n's
Telia family still controlled 50 percent of the common
than a decade
later the state held more than 60 percent,
the company was under state control. Per?n himself,

power. In 1960, the Di

stock, but a littlemore
and within a few years
in one of his last acts,

it as a publicly
decree
owned
company.
establishing
was
not
reason
state
the
for
the
Impending bankruptcy
only
absorption of pri
vate firms. Interest in protecting firms regarded as essential to the national
interest and economic development
also influenced this tendency. What
is clear
is that by the time of the 1976 military coup the state was the dominant eco
nomic actor in the country, building on the legacy of Per?n as a regulator and
in the years 1955-1976 a
administrator of public firms to become
major share
ones.
holder in private companies,
industrial
especially
By 1976, the state was
a shareholder
in each of in the country's top 100 privately owned
industrial
firms and increasingly tended not simply to rescue beleaguered
companies
signed

the

1974

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

from bankruptcy but to take an active role in their administration
of their boards of directors (Rougier, 2002: 266-267).

59

as a member

CRISIS AND COLLAPSE OF NATIONAL CAPITALISM:

THE PLAN GELBARD
reached a chaotic and ultimately
The politics of national
capitalism
tragic
culmination during the Peronist restoration (1973-1976). This complex social
and political conjuncture has been studied extensively. Much
less is known
about economic policy in these years, though I have attempted to offer some

and trajectory of Gelbard's ministry and the

of the background
understanding
cornerstone of his economic program, the Pacto Social (Brennan, 1998: 99-110).
The experience of Per?n's
last government
illuminates the entire trajectory of
theArgentine political economy over the course of three decades,
the era of so
to power after almost
called national capitalism. The return of the Peronists
two decades of proscription was not due directly to economic problems, which
were
and
relatively minor compared with the critical political circumstances
the rising wave of social protest that had begun with the 1969 Cordobazo.
The
calm the waters and provide
restoration of Peronist rule, itwas hoped, would
an escape valve and national reconciliation to put a halt to
escalating social ten
sions and political violence.
were not the reason for the restoration of Peronist
Though economic problems
model
rule, the latter did provide an opportunity to take the national-capitalist
to its culminating moment.
The Peronist restoration came after the capitalist

Juan Carlos
restructuring program undertaken by the government of General
which
tensions
between
the
(1966-1971),
heightened
Ongania
country's busi
ness groups. Heavily
influenced by the economic program of themilitary gov
ernment in neighboring Brazil, Ongania's
economic program followed neither
a "liberal" nor a
model
but
stressed modernization
and full
national-capitalist
were
sectors
into
not
transnational
favored
capitalism. Agrarian
integration
by
these policies, subject as they were to greater taxation on unused
and unpro
ductive land, but neither were the nationally owned industries or the regional
thatwere linked in the national-capitalist
economies
model. Rather, the power
and the state bureaucracies
of certain public companies
representing them was
in alliance with the multinationals.
The latter were granted a welter
on
taxation and profit remittances, and macroeconomic
of favorable measures
concentration
and their domestic market possibilities,
income
favored
policies
for example, in the case of the automobile
industry. Ongania's
policies, though
objectives, failed because of
arguably successful in terms of itsmodernization
enhanced

outside the state sector, depriving his government of support

the
among
country's capitalist classes. It is not by chance that former enemies
as
such
the SRA, the UIA, and the CGE were able to find common ground in
their weakness

economic program. The subsequent governments

Roberto Levingston and General Alejandro Lanusse
looked formore
so in an
of
the
factions
but
classes,
support among
country's capitalist
they did
a decision about eco
ineffectual way, postponing
inconsistent and ultimately

their criticisms of Ongania's

of General

nomic policy

for the incoming Peronist

government.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

60

return to power also represented a return to the economic

In exile, Per?n had been forced to
first administration.
on economic
from the center and the moderate
positions
policy
in
his second administration
and
toward which he had clearly been headed
embrace a more populist agenda, one that this time had a faintlyMarxist
tinge
to it.He adapted his discourse, economic and otherwise, to the leftward direc
The Peronists'

nationalism
move
away

of Per?n's

inArgentina's
tion manifest
political culture in the 1960s and 1970s, especially
His talk of "socialism"
and "Third World
after the Cordobazo.
liberation" may
to no more than strategic calculations
in his bid to return to
have responded
to an economic program
gave more momentum
power, but it unquestionably
over agro-export
favor the so-called national bourgeoisie
that would
interests
or the technocratic-multinational
alliance
favored by Ongania. Whether
sin
cere or not,
of
the
the
Per?n
had
little
choice
1970s,
temper
political
given
early
to accept the national bourgeoisie's
economic program as his own and
as the new minister of the economy. In addi
the CGE president Gelbard
the entire government
colonized
from the
tion, CGE members
apparatus,

but

chose

and the national grain and meat

de Desarrollo
and
to the com
Granos
de
Nacional
de Carne)
Junta Nacional
(Junta
on
and
cost
of
mittee
living (Comisi?n de Precios, Ingresos y
prices, wages,
Nivel de Vida). To strengthen Gelbard's ministry, the government
forced the
in the UIA tomerge with the CGE in the Confederaci?n
industrialists grouped
board

of the Banco Nacional

boards

while
the
Industrial Argentina
(Argentine Industrial Confederation?CINA)
con
and
interests
commercial
small
of
the
agrarian
provinces
predominantly
other wings and gained new members.
tinued to be represented in the CGE's
The so-called Plan Trienal or Plan Gelbard encompassed
many facets of eco
nomic policy. It called for effective regulation of foreign capital, restricting the
access

to local credit and limiting profit remit

of the foreign multinationals
to be
tances to 14 percent of their gross profits. Foreign investment itselfwas
on a
cases
some
with
basis
(in
rights granted
case-by-case
closely regulated,
by industry, in others by firm), and foreign investment prohibited altogether
in sectors of the economy regarded as vital to national security such as bank

plans for regional economic develop

ing, oil, and public utilities.1 Ambitious
were
ment projects were also drafted, while
rising government
expenditures
to be covered by aggressively
international
trade, especially with
promoting
were
relations
the socialist bloc. Commercial
established with Cuba and trade
a number of Eastern
countries, includ
agreements worked out with
European
was
cornerstone
Soviet
Union.
The
the
the
of
the
Pacto Social, in
program
ing
their interests through represen
which business and labor were to harmonize
tation on a council to advise the government on economic policy and thereby
and compromise.
inflation through dialogue
eliminate
The first step in this
a
was
and
For the first several
freeze.
process
price
mutually
binding wage
were
the
and
in constant com
CGE
the CGT
months
of Gelbard's ministry,
was
a
success. Inflation remained
and the Pacto Social
munication
qualified
low, trade balances were favorable, and the economy was growing. Future
problems

with maintaining

thewage

and price

freeze were, however,

already

apparent.

its inmany ways

innovative character and initial success, the Plan
Despite
as many
Gelbard
suffered from the same weaknesses
economic
previous
programs

and, beyond

programmatic

positions,

operated

similarly

in terms of

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

61

in the 1940s and 1950s, the history of the financial sys

about the nature of Argentina's political economy during this
period and helps to answer the question who benefited from the system. The
were once again the key public institutions in
cementing alliances
public banks
between business sectors, regional economies, and the Peronist movement.
The
serves as an
BANADE
Banco
in
former
the
these
of
(the
Industrial)
years
history
one of Gelbard's
as minister was to
firstmeasures
example. Revealingly,
replace
board of directors with new members.
the BANADE's
The new president and
and Jos? Domingo
vice president, Ernesto Pascual Paenza
Shaw, and virtually
the
all the board members
Cordob?n
industrialist
and future presi
(including
were
dent of the CINA Carlos Coqueugniot),
associated
with the
figures closely
Paenza
and
their intention to use
CGE. Though Gelbard
loudly proclaimed
a
industrial bank to coordinate
policy of national-capitalist
Argentina's
develop
ment, the bank seemed to play more its traditional role of rewarding constituen
business-state

relations. As

tem reveals much

It did become deeply

involved in the
solidifying political alliances.
of
Gelbard's
and
Three-Year
for
Plan,
promotion
drafting
example, assuming
responsibility for coordinating the support of the CGE and the CGT for the gov
ernment's economic program. Yet the lofty rhetoric was belied by more mundane
in an improvised
Credit was dispensed
fashion without
any
preoccupations.
and essentially according
to a political
apparent
long-range planning
logic.
cies and

economies
closely tied to the CGE such as those of the Northwest
were singled out for large loans. The Chaco received a sizable
sought-after road construction program, and Tucum?n was the
on very favorable terms to
of
several
support
unusually
large loans
recipient
Influential
CGE members
the province's
such as the
struggling sugar industry.2
of the BANADE's
Federaci?n Agraria Argentina were also the beneficiaries
on one occasion a loan of
unspecified use, despite the fact that
largesse, receiving
was
a loan
as a
it
ineligible for
nonprofit business association
according to the
bank's regulations.3 Similarly, the CGE itself received a sizable loan, contraven
to hold a
ing the bank's statutes prohibiting loans to nonprofit organizations,
in
la
de
Industria"
Gelbard's
Nacional
for
purposes of
early
ministry
"Congreso
the
CINA.4
establishing

Provincial

and theNortheast
loan for a much

from these credit policies, and

industry also benefited
favorable treatment than the metalworking
industries,
with their large labor forces and long history of support for Peronist economic
to consolidate
Loans were predominantly
debts or pay the labor
policies.
was also a criterion for loan
force, though "plant modernization"
approvals.
to one of the country's oldest and most impor
A typical loan was
thatmade
tant firms. La Cant?brica
received a loan for nearly 3 million pesos to pay for
at the outset of the Pacto Social.5 But itwas not
the salary increases awarded
owned
Nationally
none received more

ones also received sizable loans. For

only the big firms that benefited; smaller
in
in
small
firms
three
1974,
C?rdoba,
Forja Argentina S.A., Industria
example,
and S. Prati and Cia.,
Latinoamericana
de Acesorias
received
SAICFM,

to
10 million,
and 10.5 million pesos respectively.6 Loans
loans of 5 million,
the industry were generally intended to resolve problems with wages
and the
semi-annual
bonus
evidenced by the
paid to Argentine workers,
(aguinaldo)
made a point of informing the UOM
fact that the BANADE
local when one of
a sizable number of UOM-affiliated
to a firm that employed
its loans went
workers.7

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

62

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

in these
the most
behavior
aspect of the BANADE's
revealing
Perhaps
was
use of
to
extent
the
which
the
CGE
made
years, however,
leadership
four"
the
CGE
the
of
credit.
Of
Julio Broner,
"big
hierarchy?Gelbard,
public
and Israel Dujovne?only
the latter did not receive a siz
Idelfonso Recalde,
able loan from the BANADE
the Peronist restoration, and one can
during
was
that it
premature death in 1975 that prevented his
Dujovne's
speculate
a loan under similarly generous terms. Broner's auto parts firm,
being granted
received two significant loans for the vague purpose of "strengthen
Wobron,
the
assumed
ing its financial structure." In June 1973, just weeks after Gelbard
a loan of 780,000 pesos to cancel out
BANADE
Wobron
the
granted
ministry,
a loan of almost 2 million
standing debts. A year later, it granted the company
same
at
and
19
annual
the
for
interest, well below what
purpose
pesos
percent
were

offering and even lower than the bank's

going rate.8
an
even
a three
loan
for
his
textile
Suixtil
received
S.A.,
firm,
larger
year loan of 3 million pesos at 20 percent annual interest, also for the stated
own auto parts
its financial structure."9 Gelbard's
purpose of "strengthening
a
in
6.5
loan
of
million
October
received
FATE,
firm,
1973,10 an even
pesos
a
in
to
13
1974
million
build
that
would man
loan
of
pesos
nearly
plant
larger
first domestically
the country's
ufacture
electronic
calculators
produced
a
2.6
million
to
FATE to
loan
of
several
months
later
and
allow
(Cifra),
pesos

private
Recalde

banks

installment of the aguinaldo bonus. Gelbard's

other business
pay themidyear
In April
ventures were
treated by the BANADE.
also well
1974, Aluar
Aluminio Argentino S.A., the aluminum plant in Puerto Madryn
(Chubut) in
which Gelbard was a major stockholder, received a loan of 3 million pesos,11
or property but that
and the collateral offered on itwas not Gelbard's
capital
that is, of the government
of the Secretar?a de Hacienda,
itself.12
to the cynical use of
Itwould
be easy to attribute the use of the BANADE
to
ends?to
the
venal
further
of a coterie of busi
power
private
shenanigans
to
ness parvenus who had risen from obscurity
the highest level of government
to pillage the state's coffers. Yet this behavior was not necessar
and proceeded
eco
and the CGE's nationalist
ideology and
ily incompatible with Gelbard's
that they were leading the national bourgeoisie
in
nomic program. Convinced
a
were
it?
the
of
national
embodiment
of
liberation?indeed,
very
project
Gelbard, Broner, and Recalde had no qualms about using the state's resources
as part of an overall program of
to strengthen their companies
protecting
national
and deepening
national
capitalism.
They also rightly
capitalists
had
that the state and public credit, including that of the BANADE,
assumed
most
been routinely used by other fractions of the Argentine
bourgeoisie,

sectors of Argentine
business
and large
to
1966-1973
the
by
public companies
military governments
(Rougier,
2004). In truth, the CGE leadership had been engaged for a number of years in
a
its business
strategy of building
complex
empires through the leverage
offered it as representative of one of the country's most important business
same time
of the
representing the small businessmen
organizations while at the
interior. Though democratic structures existed in the CGE and participation by
recently by

the most

concentrated

catered

was
con
the rank-and-file membership
high, its leaders had long had direct
tacts with the state that allowed
them to negotiate
of
the
orga
independently
nization. The most recent example was Gelbard's
negotiations with Lanusse's
government
leading to theAluar deal. During Gelbard's ministry, both he and

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

63

using the CGE as an instrument to fend off the

of
and integrate their enter
policies
ending outsourcing
once
This
became
untenable
game
complex
prises globally.
increasingly
Gelbard became minister of the economy and was expected by the CGE and
to give priority to the significant reforms that the Plan Gelbard
itsmembers
Broner were

also undoubtedly

auto multinationals'

proposed.
The business

sector generally continued to remain sharply divided, and this

too undermined
the initial success of the Plan Gelbard. The ACIEL
undertook
from the outset of Gelbard's ministry a bitter press and defamation
campaign
was not only the agro-export
interests or the multina
against the CGE. But it
Gelbard's
tionals that questioned
that
policies. The even greater problem was

the national bourgeoisie,

Gelbard, was too diverse

though perhaps united ideologically behind the Plan

a group to reconcile its individual
interests once the
of
the
economic
clear. Small industri
program became
practical implications
alists had a more difficult time adjusting to the price freeze than did themulti

to the CGE-affiliated
Federaci?n
belonged
a
on
to
Gelbard's
tax
establish
underuti
plans
Agraria Argentina
supported
lized land and an agrarian reform law but not the attempt to keep agricultural
interests were likewise unhappy with certain
prices low. Provincial business
for
of Gelbard's
the Northwest
in
sugar producers grouped
example,
policies,
Interior
the Movimiento
del
who
with
broke
the
CGE
(MEDI)
Empresarios
of the price freeze on sugar (Schvarzer, 1991: 214-216).
because
Finally, the
UIA began to raise similar criticisms, withdrawing
from the CINA not long
nationals.

The

small

farmers who

1974 Gelbard was

forced to resign, and an
of the economy
from Per?n's
second administra
tion, Alfredo G?mez Morales, who years before had been chosen by Per?n to
temper and correct the nationalist positions of businessman-turned-government
minister Miguel Miranda, was called upon to play a similar role with Gelbard.
The second half of the Peronists'
three-year return to power would be marked
a
and a gradual but inexorable aban
peso devaluation,
by fiscal conservatism,
donment of all the policies of the Plan Gelbard. Though
the country's crisis
was
in
and
social
nature,
political
uncertainty about the econ
predominantly
after Per?n's

orthodox

death.

In October

former minister

discontent and made

the 1976
omy and rising inflation heightened
possible
and
of
Proceso
the
(1976-1983), which
coup
subsequent military government
would usher in a new era inArgentine history.

CONCLUSIONS
from the economic programs during the decades
leading up
one level, the answer
might seem banal: different
since economic policy changed in these years and
was not all of a piece. Indeed, disputes over economic policy and the distribu
tion of resources were at the heart of the country's notorious instability in these
on which
and losers depended
in power.
years. Winners
government was
a
certain consistency to economic policies during this
there is
Nonetheless,
a number of them were the common
in
property of all governments
period, and
these years, whether Peronist, Radical, or military. The state capitalism that had
in the governments
its antecedents
of the 1930s and was deepened
under the
Who

benefited

to the neoliberal reforms? On

groups at different moments,

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

64

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

ones of the 1940s and 1950s was maintained

to some degree by all the
one so
in
Even
this
liberal as Aramburu's
outspokenly
governments
period.
in
retained institutions and perpetuated
finance, the industrial rela
practices

Peronist

tions system, and the growth of the public sector that it had vilified in the
Economic disputes were more about the distribution of
Peronist governments.
the spoils of the system than they were about the system itself. Some govern
in particular, attempted tomake significant modifications
in
ments, Ongania's
the basic rules of the game, but none sought to scuttle it altogether.
How, then, can one explain the highly fractious nature of theArgentine polit
in the era of national capitalism? Comparisons
ical economy
with the experi
ences of other Latin American
countries in these years are instructive. One
inArgentina business gener
apparent difference might be the degree towhich
small
business
mobilized
but
initially
ally
particularly
independently of the state.
This large sector,which eventually produced powerful business leaders who had

policies of the 1940s and 1950s, pressured

inArgentina's
system of state capitalism,
with
itself
the
ultimately allying
country's most important political
politically
awaits
the
Peronism.
further research, nothing on the
force,
Though
question
same scale appears to have
in
Brazil, Chile, orMexico, where the state
happened
was the
major instigator of gremialismo empresarial and controlled business orga
nizations more tightly than inArgentina. The contrast with Mexico
is particu
benefited

from the Peronist economic

and engaged

in politics

for inclusion

lacked the independence

of the
larly intriguing, There, business organizations
more
state
to
have
in
and
been
the
effective
than
CGE,
appears
generally
in
business
into
state
the
and
organizations
apparatus
Argentina
integrating

their demands and behavior

moderating
model became
The national-capitalist

(Schneider, 2001: 77-118).

in the
the b?te noire of the neoliberals
some
undesirable
years following the 1976 military coup and did indeed have
itwould be wrong to regard it as a complete
effects on the economy. However,
the model was highly inflationary, unemployment
failure. Though
remained
ini
low, and, contrary towhat has been said by its detractors, entrepreneurial
even
a
and
kind
of
did
take
innovation,
tiative, technological
"development"
recent studies on the Argentine
economy have demon
place. For example,

of Argentine
strated that the presumed
technological backwardness
industry
was not nearly so great as critics have maintained
and even economies of scale
were achieved
in some industries (Katz and Kosacoff, 2000: 291, 307-309). The
seem to have had more to do with the ineffectiveness of
failures of thismodel
state intervention and political manipulation
of public agencies
such as the

se. Economic
banking system than with intervention per
planning did not fail
suc
was
never
in Argentina;
economic
genuine
planning
attempted. Rather,
cessive governments devised policies in accordance with the sectoral interests
as broad
they represented, expressed
ideological precepts that served in real
to
than
the
determine
behavior of interest groups and cor
ity to justify rather
to establish
Unable
their hegemony,
the various
organizations.
porative
have to await the military gov
factions of the Argentine bourgeoisie would
a combination
ernment of the Proceso
to break the stalemate, when,
through
of public institutions, the
of state terrorism, foreign debt, and a disarticulation
basic rules of the game and even the leading actors of Argentina's
political
be profoundly altered.
economy would

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Brennan/POPULIST ARGENTINA, 1943-1976

65

NOTES
use the
and more
Gelbard
pro
effectively
public-sector
companies,
a
in a single enterprise,
de Empresas
the Corporaci?n
Nacionales,
separate
as a full
thatwould
economic
partner in the government's
participate
planning.

to modernize

1. In order
posed

them

grouping

agency
government
2. Archive
of the Banco

Nacional
de Desarrollo
Libro de Actas, no. 341,
(henceforth ABND),
no. 29, vol. I, Letter from BI to
Libro Copiador
June 1974, vol. II, Acta no. 2041, June 1974:10153;
no. 330, vol. II, Acta no. 2023,
Ministerio
de Econom?a,
10, 1973; Libro de Actas,
September
in late 1973 and 1974 to the
1974:
3167.
bank
also
made
loans
The
govern
February
provincial
to pay wages
ment
and to the Uni?n
Azucarera
for 100 million
Ca?eros
Nu?orco
S.A. for
pesos
a modernization
to purchase
and undertake
pesos
program.
machinery
3. ABND,
1973: 13041.
Libro de Actas, no. 321, vol. Ill, Acta no. 2005, November
no. 31, Letter
to Dr. Alfredo
4. ABND,
Libro Copiador
President
of the
Concepci?n,
de la Industria, August
The loan was
Confederaci?n
General
for 200,000 pesos.
9,1973.
5. ABND,
Libro de Actas no. 306, July 1973, vol. II, Acta no. 1972, July 19,1973:
4971; no. 307,
no. 1975,
5325-5326.
July 30,1973:
July 1973, vol. Ill, Acta
6. ABND,
Libro de Actas, no. 329, February
1974: 2659;
1974, vol. 1,Acta no. 2021, February
no. 341,
no. 338,
1974: 7491-7492;
1974, vol. II, Acta no. 2035, May
1974, vol. II, Acta no.
May
May
18 million

2041,May 1974: 10450.

7. ABND,
8. ABND,

Libro

Libro

no. 31,1973
"Provincias
Varias,"
no. 304, June 1973, vol. I,Acta no.
2039, June 1974: 9302.

Copiador
de Actas

21,1973.
August
1966, June 25,1973:

3563;. no. 340,

June 1974, vol. I,Acta no.

9. ABND,
Libro de Actas,

no. 2043,
July 1974, Acta
July 12,1974.
no. 318, vol. IV, Acta no. 1998, October
1973: 13483.

1973: 10782; no. 322, vol. I,

no. 2007, December
no. 339, vol. Ill, Acta no. 2037,
11. ABND,
1974: 8414; Acta. no. 2048,
Libro de Actas,
May
8,1974; Acta no. 2054, September
26,1974.
August
12. ABND,
1974: 5370.
Libro de Actas no. 335, vol. I,Acta no. 2029, April
10. ABND

Libro

de Actas

Acta

REFERENCES
In?s
Barbero, Mar?a
inAlfred Chandler
1987 "Argentina:
industrial growth and enterprise organization,
1880-1980/'
et al. (eds.), Big Business and theWealth ofNations. Cambridge:
Press.
Cambridge
University
Bitr?n, Rafael
1994 El Congreso de la Productividad:
nista. Buenos Aires: El Bloque.
Brennan,

La reconversi?n

econ?mica

durante

el segundo

gobierno

pero

James
"Industrialists

and bolicheros: business

and the Peronist populist
in
alliance,
1943-1976,"
Resources.
James P. Brennan
(ed.), Peronism and Argentina. Wilmington:
Scholarly
la pol?tica de cohabitaci?n
in Juan Carlos
2002 "El empresariado:
Torre
1943-55,"
y oposici?n,
historia argentina, vol. 8. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
(ed.), Nueva
1998

Cochran,

Thomas

C.

and Ruben

E. Reina

in Argentine
1971 Capitalism
Culture:
Press.
of Pennsylvania
University
Fodor, Jorge
1975 "Per?n's
David

Rock

policies

Study

of Torcuato

Di

Telia

and S.I.A.M.

Philadelphia:

or commonsense?"
for agricultural
in
exports, 1946-1948:
dogmatism
in the Twentieth Century. Pittsburgh:
of Pittsburgh
University

(ed.), Argentina

Press.
JohnWilliam
1970 El sector industrial

Freels,

en la
pol?tica nacional. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.
Ra?l
Heras,
2000 "La Argentina
financieros
internacionales
y los organismos
523-556.
Econ?mico
67 (October-December):

Garcia

Ant?nez
and Dami?n
Pablo
Gerchunoff,
a la crisis de desarrollo,"
2002 "De la bonanza
peronista
toria argentina, vol. 8. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.

El Trimestre

(1955-1963)."

in Juan Carlos

Torre

(ed.), Nueva

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

his

66

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Pablo

Gerchunoff,

and Lucas

Llach
Un

1998 El siglo de ilusi?n y desencanto:

Noem?
Girbal-Blacha,
1992

"Reforma

Buenos
1997

financiera
1946-1950."

Aires,
"Dichos

sis hist?rico."
2003 Mitos,
Universidad

y hechos

siglo de pol?ticas

econ?micas

y cr?dito a la producci?n:
Ciclos 2 (13).

el caso

del gobierno

(1946-1955):

peronista

6 (13).
Entrepasados
en la
paradojas y realidades
Argentina
Nacional
de Quilmes.

peronista

argentinas.
del

Banco

Buenos
de

Aires:

la Provincia

Buenos

de

en el an?li

lo f?tico y lo simb?lico
(1946-1955).

Ariel.

Aires:

Editorial

Tulio
Donghi,
en la tradici?n
"El lugar del peronismo
in Samuel
Amaral
pol?tica
argentina,"
Mariano
Ben Plotkin
Editores.
(eds.), Per?n del exilio al poder. Buenos Aires: C?ntaro

Halperin
1993

and

Katz,

Jorge
1982 Cambio

de estudios

en la industria metalmec?nica

tecnol?gico
de caso. CEPAL

Working
Kosacoff

Jorge and Bernardo

2000 "Import-substituting
in Enrique
shortcomings,"

Katz,

Latin America,

Rougier,
2000

vol.

in Argentina,

industrialization
et al.

C?rdenas

3. New

York:

latinoamericana:

Resultados

de un programa

51.

Paper

St. Martin's

(eds.), An
Press.

1940-1980:

Economic

History

its achievements

and

of Twentieth-Century

Marcelo
La pol?tica crediticia
Centro de Estudios

del Banco

Industrial

durante el primer peronismo

Buenos
(1944-1955).
la Empresa
Desarrollo.
y
en la
una
2002 "Acerca
de la relaci?n
(1950-1980):
estado-empresarios
Argentina
aproxi
in Fernando
maci?n
Jumar (ed.), Empresarios
y empresas en la historia argentina.
emp?rica,"
Buenos Aires: UADE.
Aires:

2004

Industria,

Desarrollo
Schneider,
2001

finanzas

(1967-1976).
Ben Ross

"Why

isMexican

de

Econ?micos

e instituciones
Bernai:
business

Universidad
so

en

la Argentina:
La experiencia
Nacional
de Quilmes.

organized?"

Latin American

Research

del Banco

Review

Nacional

37 (1): 77-118.

Schvarzer,

Jorge
1991 Empresarios

del pasado:

La Uni?n

Industrial Argentina.

Buenos

Aires:

de

Imago Mundi-CISEA.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 02:42:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions