Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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(I975),
pp. 367-389.
367
AGENT OF EMPIRE?
THE NATIONAL BANK OF TURKEY AND
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
By MARIAN KENT
loans to Turkey, especiallythe controversialI9IOloan, its attemptsto amalgamate with other banks and its efforts to obtain developmentconcessionsin
Turkey. How far did the Foreign Office initiate, supportor dominatethese
activities?Was the Bankan agentof Empire?
The backgroundto the founding of the Bank and its relationswith the
BritishForeignOfficeinvolvesthe internationaljockeyingof the GreatPowers
relationsundertheirnew
for precedencein Constantinople,and British-French
ententecordiale.As heir to this diplomaticinnovation,SirEdwardGrey,British
1 See, e.g. Herbert Feis, Europe the World's Banker (New Haven, I930), p. 33I; A. S. J.
Baster, The InternationalBanks (London, I935), p. iI2; D. C. M. Platt, Finance Trade & Politics
in British Foreign Policy I8I5-I914 (O.U.P., London, I968), pp. I93-4, or Jacob Viner, " International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, i88-i9I4
", in Political and Social Science
Quarterly, vol. ix, I929, pp. 407-45I. Although very valuable in many ways, on the relevant
sections of this article they all repeat roughly the same brief, partially inaccurate account. It is
worth mentioning also, that the relevant series of the Documents Diplomatiques Franfais are
likewise disappointing on this subject.
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MARIAN
368
KENT
F.O. 37I/I52,
No. 22545.
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AGENT
369
OF EMPIRE?
then combine to pursue joint interests with joint strength. This was to be the
official explanation. More explicitly, 'the relations between the Ottoman Bank
and ourselves should be an understanding that, for the reasons given above, the
support of the British and French Ambassadors would be forthcoming to such
a group for all the commercial operations which were in harmony with British
and French policy; the prospect of this support should be the consideration
which makes it worth the while of the Bank to take a hand in the business.
There is no other obligation or guarantee entailed upon us'.' The Board of
Trade's official opinion of the idea was that ' the British trader has little to lose
and perhaps a good deal to gain.... He will have French influence exerted on
his behalf as well as British and also the interest and support of the Imperial
Ottoman Bank '.4
Negotiations towards this end continued from late i906 onwards.5 Progress
was slow. First, the French negotiators, both for the Ottoman Bank and for
the Quai d'Orsay, dragged their feet, only reluctantly joining in negotiations
that they could see promised little advantage for them in their already predominant position in Constantinople. Only the intercession of Clemenceau,
then Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, brought about an agreement
by the middle of I907 on the formation of the French side of the combine, to
include a 30 per cent Ottoman Bank participation in order to avert that institution's bitter and effective rivalry. Next, when negotiations moved to London,
where the London Committee of the Ottoman Bank was to organize an English
group to work in combination with the French group, negotiations dragged
here also. Basically, the London Committee was even more reluctant than the
Paris Branch of the Ottoman Bank to help set up a rival concern aimed at
sharing their monopoly and profits. This became more and more clear to the
Foreign Office, now caught between two fires. It was blamed by the French
for the English side's delays which it was powerless to prevent. As the minutes
mounted up in the Foreign Office records, describing Mr Barry, Manager of
the London Branch, as ' slippery', 'shifty', and 'dishonest', time continued
to pass. Eventually by the middle of i908, when a year and a half had passed,
through heavy Foreign Office persuasion as one of Barry's evasions after another
was unveiled, the London Committee announced it had formed an English
group which included Sir Ernest Cassel's and Sir Albert Stern's interests.6 As
3
No.
33703.
ment comes in late 1907 does not matter - the sentiment was the same a year earlier.
4 Memo. by A. W. Fox, Bd. of Trade, and Minute by Hardinge, ii Nov. 1907, ibid., No
37427.
5 For 1g06
see correspondence in BERTIE MSS (Public Record Office, London), Nos.
Tu/o6/2, 4-5. For 1907 see ibid., Nos. Tu/o7/7, 9-12, I4-28 & Fr/o7/41; and F.O. 371/350, file
15180. For 1908 see BERTIE, Nos. Tu/o8/I-9, 25, 28; and F.0. 371/538, file 5777; 547, file
26752; 548, file 28640; 549, file 30912.
6 For a detailed and fascinating account of Sir Ernest Cassel's background and activities see
Kurt Grunwald, ' " Windsor - Cassel " The Last Court Jew. Prolegomena to a Biography of Sir
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370
MARIAN
KENT
a result the Foreign Office was able to irntroduceto Sir Gerard Lowther, its
Ambassador in Constantinople, the newly arrived manager of the AngloFrench 'Ottoman Society', Mr Arthur Vere.
But the chief lesson of the delays in the Anglo-French negotiations was yet
to declare itself. The Young Turk Revolution had by this time radically
changed the political scene in Constantinople. Now Britain was hailed as the
friend of the reformist, if inexperienced, Young Turk regime, France and
Germany being unpopular for the dominance they had achieved by supporting
the former regime. Grey wrote in late August to Lowther: 'I am of opinion
that, if events in Turkey develop satisfactorily the backing ... will be found in
this country and that the moment to strengthen the position of Great Britain in
the Ottoman Bank will then arise, since the Bank will then be able to attract
more capital and the services of more competent men.' His optimism, in the
principle if not the detail, was prophetic.
On I4 November I908 the news broke in the press that a Banque Nationale
de Turquie was to be formed by an Anglo-Turkish group. Most of the preliminary details were given, and it was clear to the Foreign Office, no less than
to the French side of the still incompletely organized Anglo-French Ottoman
Society, that the objects of the proposed National Bank were identical with
those of the Ottoman Society. The Bank was to have a capital of some
?3 million, while among its initial directoratewere Sir Adam Block and a prominent Constantinople businessman, Mr Edwin Whittall.8 The Foreign Office's
reply to the agitated Ottoman Society's manager in Constantinople was hardly
surprising: It could ' only say that it is certainly unfortunate for the Ottoman
Society that better progress has not been made. We did our best and we cannot
of course interfere with the Banque Nationale which has not been initiated or
suggested by us, and is being carried out independently of us.' The two enterprises after all, hardly bore comparison. The Ottoman Society's capital was only
Ernest Cassel ' in Year Book XIV, 1969, of the Leo Baeck Institute, pp. 1I9-161. My article corrects and supplements pp. 144-147 of Grunwald's contribution. The French Ambassador to London, incidentally was M. Paul Cambon; Jules Cambon, his brother, was French Ambassador
successivelyat Madrid and Berlin.
7 Desp. from Grey to Lowther, No. 348, 25 Aug. I908, F.O. 371/548, No. 28640.
8 In fact the nominal capital of the Bank was only XI million, called up ?250,000.
Membership of the Board also included initially, on the Turkish side: H.H. Prince Said Halim (Young
Turk, and son of the late Halim Pasha, son of Mehemed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt); Manias Zad6
Refik Bey (prominent Young Turk); General Cherif Pasha (Young Turk, and son of the late Said
Pasha, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs); Hassan Fehmi Pasha (Minister of Justice); Reshad
Sadi Bey (Young Turk, friend of Cassel); General Mahmud Muktar Pasha (son of Ghazi Muktar
Pasha); Nubar Pasha (Egyptian Armenian); H.H. Said Pasha (late Grand Vizier); Djemal Pasha
(Young Turk, son-in-law of the Sheikh-ul-Islam); A. Ralli (Greek banker, Ottoman subject); and
on the non-Turkish side, as well as Block and Whittall, were named Mr Essayan (Armenian,
British subject) and M. Bonnet (French lawyer).
9 Letter from Francis Campbell, F.O., to Mr Arthur Vere, 28 Nov. 1908, F.O. 371/547, No.
46679, and accompanyingF.O. minutes. My italics.
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AGENT
OF EMPIRE?
37I
Letter from Vere to H. C. Norman (F.O.), 29 Nov. I908, F.O. 371/549, No. 42735.
by Sir Adam Block, encl. in desp. No. 764 from Lowrher to Grey,
io Nov. I908, ibid., No. 3982I.
12 Letters from Hardinge to Block, Cassel and Huth Jackson, I3 Nov. I908,
ibid., No. 39083.
13 Minute by Hardinge, 20 Nov. I908, ibid., No. 40480.
14 Note by Hardinge for Grey, encl. letter from Cassel to Hardinge, 29 Dec. I908,
ibid., No.
letters from Block to Hardinge, 2 Mar. I909, F.0. 37I/762, No. 8682, and between Grey
45704;
11 Memo. of 3 Nov. I908,
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MARIAN
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KENT
At the end of May I909 Grey was writing to Lowther: 'Cassel is much perplexed as to getting a good enough man for his Bank. He aims high and I have
not so far been able to help him. One cannot urge the best men to leave the
public service. Nevertheless I wish his Bank could be established. It seems to
me very desirable that there should be an independent British financial interest
at Constantinople. We could then work with the French on equal terms.' 15
The search for a ' good man ' was complete by August. On 9 August the Times
announced that Sir Henry Babington Smith had resigned from his post as
Secretary to H.M. Post Office at the British Government's request in order to
accept the Presidency of the Bank. Grey explained his own role in this in a
memorandum of an interview with a member of the London Committee of the
Ottoman Bank: ' . . . we had no interest in Sir Ernest Cassel's Bank. The Turks
had taken the initiative and had arranged the matter independently with Sir
Ernest Cassel .. . I had certainly supported the scheme to the extent of encouraging Sir Henry Babington Smith to accept Sir Ernest Cassel's offer. The selection
had been made by Sir Ernest Cassel himself.' When asked whether the Foreign
Office intended to give exclusive support to Cassel's Bank in obtaining concessions at Constantinople, Grey replied, 'that if need be, we should certainly
represent to the Turks that an institution which had been brought into existence
as a direct result of their own initiative and representations ought not to be
excluded from concessions. But when occasion arose for me to support the
Bank's claims I should do what I could to encourage co-operation with French
finance.' 16 This was generosity indeed from a Foreign Secretarywhose records,
official and private, contained clear evidence of French Government and
Ottoman Society pressure on Cassel's National Bank group either to join with
them as the English group in the combine or else face the prospect of finding
that they would obtain no quotations for their operations on the very important
Paris stock exchange.'7
The extent of the Foreign Office ' encouragement and support,' though not
initiative, in the founding of the National Bank of Turkey can thus be seen.
What needs to be considered now is the extent of Foreign Office support it
received in the financial ventures it sought to undertake.
International loans played a major part in the Turkish economy, chronically
in deficit. They were normally mainly floated in France, the British investing
public seeing a more secure and patriotic return for its money elsewhere.'8
Nevertheless, Grey was saying in September I908 that his Government was
and Lowther, Priv., 8
Memos.,I909-II),
& I5
Mar.
I909,
238,
92
(F.O.
I3678.
16
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AGENT
OF EMPIRE?
373
'most anxious to attract British capital into Turkey for bona fide concessions
and commercial enterprises and that this
should not be greatly delayed.' 19
There was, however, the important reservation that he did not consider that
the British market was ready for loans to be floated there: 'H.M. Government
did not wish to see Turkish credit in this country prejudiced by failure in the
issue of a Turkish loan.' 20 When, to help make ends meet until the end of that
year, the Turks sought an immediate advance of /i y'2million on the large
loan contract made with the Ottoman Bank, the Foreign Office not only sought
out British financiers to take up the British share in this advance - not surprisingly Cassel and Stern - but inspected the draft contract before it was
signed on 25 November.21Louis Mallet, then Assistant Under Secretary at the
Foreign Office, wrote officially to Cassel on i December, in a letter approved
by both the Prime Minister and the Treasury, expressing the Government's
' satisfaction at [his] agreement, in conjunction with Sterns Bros., to advance
the money to the Ottoman Government,' declaring in addition, that 'although
it is impossible for H.M. Government to incur any financial liability in the
matter, in the event of the Ottoman Government failing to fulfil their engagements to you, you may rely on a full measure of diplomatic supportfrom H.M.
Government through H.M. Embassy at Constantinople.' 22 Further, when
Morgan's Bank, which had been approached by the Dresdener Bank to compete against Cassel's group for the English share in the advance on the loan,
sought Foreign Office advice, they were told that, though the Foreign Office
could not prevent their competing, they would not receive Foreign Office
support since that was already pledged to Cassel's group.23This contrasts with
Feis's view, that in earlier turning down the Turkish request for help in obtaining a loan in Britain, ' no attempt was made to reverse the decision.' 24 British
i, or in Z. Y. Hershlag, Introductionto the Modern Economic History of the Middle East (Leiden,
I964), the classic account is in D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire
(U.S.A., I929, and repr. I966).
19 See desp. from Grey to Lowther, No. 406 confid., i9 Sept. I908, F.O. 37I/549, No. 33I86;
also printed in B.D., v, pp. 26I-2, and quoted in varying degrees by the writers listed in n. i,
above.
20 Desp. from Grey to Lowther, No. 4I6, secret, 3 Oct. I908,
No. 34I24. See
F.O. 37I/549,
also conversation between French Charge d'Affaires and Louis (later Sir Louis) Mallet, then
Assistant Under Secretaryat the F.O., reported in letter from Grey to Bertie, iI Aug. I908, F.O.
37I/545, No. 27894.
21 Annual Report for Turkey for the Year I908, B.D., v, p. 280; corresp. in F.O. 37I/549,
Nos.
38I55, 383I4, 39464, 403II,
and 42597; and letter from Hardinge to Bertie, priv., 5 Nov.
4I344
The Turks had contracted with the I.O.B. in Sept. I908 for a loan of
I908, BERTIE Tu/o8/24.
some /T4,700,ooo nominal or LT4,ooo,ooo actual, but final details were not complete until midJune, I909, the loan to be issued in July. Correspondencein F.O. 37I/579, Nos. 23941 and 23996.
22 F.O. 37I/549,
Nos. 4I834 and 42200.
23 Minute for Grey from Hardinge on conversation with Messrs. Vivian Smith and Grenfell
from Morgans, 20 Nov. I908, ibid., No. 457I7. On German Gvt. satisfaction at the international
financial co-operation see correspondencein B.D., vi, Nos. I30, I31, I56 & Io8.
24 Feis, op. cit., p. 330.
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KENT
policy is revealed even more clearly when in September I909 the National Bank
of Turkey did not participatein the further loan then being sought by Turkey.
Grey minuted: 'While I am desirous to help the Turks and would gladly see
British co-operationwith the French in a Turkish loan, I cannot urge Cassel to
participatein anything which he does not think financially sound or desirable
in the interestseither of his bank or to Turkey.' 25
I9IO saw two different tendencies interacting in the relations between the
National Bank of Turkey and the Foreign Office. On the one hand, continuing
efforts were made to embody Anglo-French financial co-operationin Turkey in
some more tangible form than the pious hopes which were so easily and readily
expressed by each side. On the other hand, there took place the negotiations
over the i9io loan to Turkey, a question of political notoriety in history. These
negotiations were exceedingly complex but they can now be understood more
clearly, particularlythe attitude and involvement of the Foreign Office and the
National Bank of Turkey.26
The loan negotiations fell into several stages. First, there were the negotiations
with the Ottoman Bank; beginning in July I9IO when Djavid Bey, the Turkish
Finance Minister, visited Paris. But these negotiations fell through because of
the ' onerous ' conditions attached to the loan, particularly the condition of
making the Ottoman Bank the Treasury of the Turkish Government. This
condition, according to Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, was
first put forward by the Ottoman Bank and taken up by the French Foreign
Minister as necessaryfor French prestige. Further, the French Finance Minister
insisted on part of the loan being spent on purchases in France.27 While the
French insistence on controlling Turkish expenditure was in principle correct,
commented Sir Adam Block, and Djavid Bey himself might even have agreed,
the French went about it the wrong way and made agreement impossible.28
Both Block and Cassel advised Djavid Bey against quarrelling with the Ottoman Bank. This information contradicts the usually accepted interpretation
that Cassel and Block sought to obstructthe negotiations.29According to Cassel's
Minute by Grey, n.d., but I4 Sept. I909 or later, on P.O. 371/762, No. 33649.
Of the standard accounts of the general I9IO loan negotiations, Feis op. cit., pp. 323-327 is
the longest, totalling 4 pages, Baster, op. cit., pp. iIo-III and Viner, op. cit., pp. 433-434 each
allow less than 2 pages, and Platt does not discuss it at all. But the accounts in Feis, Baster and
Viner are short on facts while Viner also confuses the Ottoman Bank and Credit Mobilier stages
of the negotiations together into a composite account. The F.O. documentation derives largely
from the indefatigable Bertie, whose acute perception and well-placed sources of information were
able to keep the F.O. well informed on both backstairsgossip and ' leaked ' accounts of interviews.
27 Letter from Bertie to Tyrrell (then Senior Clerk at the F.O. and Private Secretary to Grey),
priv. & confid. iI Aug. I9IO, BERTIE, Tu/IO/3. See also memo. by Babington Smith and Cassel
I
of 4 Oct. I9IO, on the I909 and I9IO loan negotiations, and minuted in the F.O. as correct '.
to
the
F.O.
Smith
Oct.
I9IO,
F.O., 4
It was enclosed in a letter from Babington
37I/993, No.
28 Letterfrom Block to Hardinge, io Sept. I9IO, ibid., No. 33484.
36803.
29 See n. 28 above, and National Bank memo. of 4 Oct. I9IO, n. 27 above. Block also mentioned how glad he was to have been away when all this was going on for the French would
25
26
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AGENT
OF EMPIRE?
375
memorandum, he (Cassel) advised Djavid 'to make up his differences with the
Ottoman Bank if possible, and if not, to conclude as soon as possible a binding
contract with another French group.' He pointed out that market conditions in
London were still far less favourable than in Paris. In any case any financial
help in London would be facilitated by the Turks granting British interests
control over the final section of the Baghdad Railway, - a point taken by Djavid,
who said he would try his best to secure this at Berlin and Constantinople.
Only in the last resort, if the French negotiations should fail altogether, would
the National Bank, in response to Djavid's strong appeal, do what it could to
assist him.
At this point Djavid returnedto Paris and proceeded with the Credit Mobilier
stage of the negotiations. On 8 August he signed a contract with the group
headed by the Credit Mobilier for a loan of /T6 million to be issued before
I5 October with a further ,T5 million to be issued in the spring of i9ii.
Security offered for the loan was the Constantinople customs revenues, which
had not been offered to the Ottoman Bank, and which Cassel considered a good
guarantee. The contract was not binding on the French group, however, unless
the French Government allowed the loan to be listed on the Paris stock
exchange. This the French Government agreed to do, subject to certain
conditions.
It was in the negotiations over these conditions that the difficulties and delays
arose, and eventual breakdown occurred. This was chiefly because of the
intrigues of the Ottoman Bank, the Finance Minister M. Cochery, and the
French financial adviser to the Porte, M. Laurent; it mattered little that M.
Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, gave his political assent to the terms of
the loan contract.30The two main conditions laid down by the French Government were, first, control over the Ottoman Treasury, either by the Ottoman
Bank scheme or an equivalent, and second, an undertaking to give French industry a share at least equal to that of any other country in the placing of
Turkish orders, both of which conditions were categorically refused by the
Ottoman Government.3"
The British Foreign Office, while not deeply involved in the negotiations as
have been sure to say he was encouraging the Turks to disagree with the French conditions. The
accusation is made in the German documentationand repeated in Baster, op. cit., p. iii.
30 For evidence of exactly how and how far M. Cochery was pressing the Turks to give the
Ottoman Bank the Turkish Treasury, see letter from Bertie to Grey, very confid., 6 Oct., and
priv. and confid. tel, ditto, 7 Oct., & priv. & confid. letter, 8 Oct. I9IO, GREY, Vol 5I. See also
F.O. 37I/993, No. 36443, and Bertie's summary, I5 Oct. I9IO, of the negotiations between 7 & I5
No. 37848.
Oct., F.O. 37I/994,
31
There were several other conditions, subsequently not insisted on, including recognition of
French sovereignty over Tunis and recognition of Algiers as French territory. This list is taken
from the National Bank memo. of 4 Oct. as it is a later and more accurate version than that
given in the documentation at this particular point - to be found in ibid., Nos. 34385 & 34627.
The gist of the French conditions was also received by the F.O. on 27 Sept., in what appears to
be an authentic report from M. Pichon, the French M.F.A., to M. Bompard, French Ambassador
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KENT
34
in Constantinople, on the French negotiations with Hakki Pasha: See encl. in desp. from Grey
to Bertie, No. 424, very confid., 27 Sept. I9I0, ibid., No. 35044. In any case, in the course of
these negotiations, the F.O. received many such confidential documents through either a M.
Maimon, agent of Mr Barry of the London Committee of the Ottoman Bank, or from Barry himself. The documents were clearly from a ' leak ' in the French Government. The F.O.'s reaction
to receiving them varied from interest and gratitude to embarrassmentand a request to the donors
not to send any more. On Maimon, see Minute by Mallet, i8 Apr. I9I0, F.O. 37I/995, file I84,
No. I3832; for examples of the ' leaked ' documents see, e.g., F.O. 37I/993, Nos. 34933, 35044,
35294, 36093, 36094, 36095; and F.O. 37I/994, Nos. 37I9I, 3750I, 38080, 38350, 3938I.
32 Desp. from Grey to Bertie, No. 225,
F.O. 37I/993,
30 Apr. I9I0,
No. I4472, repr. in B.D.,
vi, No. 358; also desp. from Bertie to Grey, No. I83, confid., 4 May I9I0, desp. from Lowther
to Grey, No. 434 very confid., 27 June I9I0, with accompanying F.O. minutes, F.O. 37I/993,
Nos. I553I
& 23954.
Tel. from F.O. to Bertie, No. 3I5, I3 Sept., and desp. from Bertie to Grey, No. 349, confid., I4 Sept. I910, F.O. 37I/994, Nos. 32407 & 33592.
34 Draft of letter from Hardinge to Cassel, priv., I9 Sept. I910,
ibid., No. 33592. Rumours
reached the F.O. from all quarters and the French Charge d'Affaires in London even called per33
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Cassel's reply both denied the rumours and showed a conciliatory and cooperative attitude.35He reassuredthe Foreign Office that he had earlier advised
the Turks to come to terms with the French, though he pointed out his moral
obligation to help them if their negotiations broke down completely over the
exaggerated French terms. The Foreign Office accordingly issued an official
announcement to the press on 23 September, reporting Cassel's denial and of
his advice to the Turks, which produced in response, an almost complete volte
face in the French press over the Cassel rumours.36The Office also telegraphed
Bertie that, in view of Cassel's co-operativeattitude, if the French Government
did decide to quote the Turkish loan the National Bank should be given a
participation. This the French Foreign Minister welcomed, and the Foreign
Office took new heart. Hardinge minuted that 'this looks like the opening of
a new era in Anglo-French finance, which we should do our utmost to
encourage'; and British and French Ambassadors in Paris and London were
told that the French Office's basic aim was Anglo-French financial co-operation,
but that this could not be achieved unless the National Bank were included in
any arrangementsto that end.3
Despite the temporary Foreign Office euphoria it was clear that on this twopoint British policy the National Bank did not have priority. Nicolson explained
to a somewhat disgrunted Cassel and Babington Smith on 4 October that ' the
maintenance of the entente ... [is] ... the bedrock of our policy,' sentiments
which Mallet had expanded privately for the Foreign Office: 'the policy of the
Committee [of Union and Progress] is so entirely against the interests of this
country that the closest co-operation with the French Government is essential,
and the interests of the National Bank are a minor consideration.'38 A crisis
in the relations between the National Bank and the Foreign Office was fast
approaching. This crisis was triggered off by Cassel learning that, as a result
of the contest between the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, a
sonally at the F.O. to complain. He was shown Hardinge's letter to Cassel. On the rumours see:
desp. from Bertie to Grey, No. 359, 20 Sept. I9I0, Note from Hardinge to Grey, 20 Sept., tel.
from Lowther to Grey, No. I96 P confid., 20 Sept., and letter from Count de Salis to Tyrrell, i6
Sept., encl. memo. of conversation with Cassel, and tel. from Count de Salis to Grey, No. 55
confid., 2I Sept. I9I0, ibid., Nos 34I66, 34386, 34I4I and 34265.
35 Reported in tel. from Grey to Bertie, No. 346 P, 22 Sept., and see also Note from Hardinge
to Grey,2I Sept. I910, F.O. 37I/993,
No. 34385. This accountis substantiated
in the Cassel/
BabingtonSmith memo. op. cit. See also lerter from Cassel to Hardinge, 22 Sept., tel. from Grey
to Bertie, No. 329 P, 22 Sept., tel. from Bertie to Grey, No. 67, 23 Sept., and F.O. minutes, ibid.,
GREY,vol. 5I.
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OF EMPIRE?
expire, the Credit Mobilier group brought great pressureto bear on the Finance
Minister, issuing him with an ultimatum that, if he did not desist from blocking
the contract, they would make public all the circumstances. After the Foreign
Minister had agreed to some verbal amendments to the contract in order to
save the face of the Finance Minister, M. Cochery climbed down. But it was
too late. Now Turkish pride was wounded and Turkey turned down the
contract.4'
At this point in the loan negotiations there is usually said to be a ' Cassel
stage', abortive because of British Government intervention at the request of
the French Government. But, as the evidence already demonstrates, Cassel had
been involved in the negotiations on the sideline from the start; he had voluntarily advised the Turks that their best interests lay in a French loan; and such
Foreign Office pressure as had been applied had been gentle and continuous
and was certainly not evident at this point. Telegrams were exchanged between
Cassel and Djavid Bey at the end of October over the possibility of the National
Bank taking up the loan, but while Cassel was keeping the Foreign Office
constantly informed of them, pointing out that he would only take up a loan
at the request of the Foreign Office, and meantime making non-committal
replies, Djavid telegraphed that he was waiting for first proposals to come fronm
the National Bank. The Foreign Office was not distressed at the negative
results, and four days of what amounts to mutual stalling hardly constitute a
noteworthy ' stage ' in the negotiations.42Besides, the Turks had already long
been in contact with German bankers, even if not seriously until the final breakdown of the French loan negotiations. By the time of the Cassel/Djavid telegrams, the negotiations with the Germans (thirty-two different German and
Austrian interests were involved) had been well in train, press reports detailed
the negotiations from 25 October onwards and the definitive agreement was
signed with the Turks on 9 November. This was for a loan of fTii million,
secured on the Constantinople customs revenues.43The financial terms were
41 For details of the following summary see: Bertie's ' summary ' op. cit., also correspondence in F.O. 371/994, Nos. 37443, 37498, 376I8, 37752, 38227, 38243, 38329, 38330, 38332, 38438,
38477, 38625, 38664, 38748, 38775, 38913, 39035, 39473.
42 Lowther to Grey, No. 235 confid., 27 Oct. I9IO, Nicolson to Grey, 29 Oct. I9IO, Cassel to
Nicolson, confid., 30 Oct. I9IO, ibid., Nos. 39159, 39724 & 39656. Nicolson to Bertie, priv., 3
Nov. I9IO, BERTIE,Tu/IO/I3, and NIC., I9IO, ii, F.O. 800/344.
43 F.O. documentation on this stage may be found in F.O. 371/994,
Nos. 3907I, 39035, 39488,
39159, 39840, 43064; the best description of the terms of the loan are in Nos. 40350 and 41560.
See also B.D., vi, No. 407, and encl. in No. 4I4; X2, No. 4. Letters from Goschen to Nicolson,
Berlin, 28 Oct., priv., and Marling to Nicolson, 2o Dec. I9IO, NIC., I9IO, iI, F.O. 800/344.
The tentative statement by Feis, op. cit., p. 326 that ' the French Government appears at the
last moment to have made a conciliatory gesture through the French representativeson the Debt
Council, but without effect', is correct. On 27 Oct. Lowther reported to the Foreign Office that
Djavid said that France had ' now indirectly proposed to him here to give a loan on the surplus
tithes of the Ottoman Debt without any other conditions, but that Djavid refused the offer ', desp.
from Lowther to Grey, No. 235 confid.,
27
37I/994,
No. 39I59.
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harder on the Turks than the French terms, but this was considered, at the
time anyway, a cheap price to pay for having no political strings attached - a
fact that was well emphasized in the German and Turkish press releases.
One further point of interest concerning the National Bank of Turkey and
the last phase of the loan negotiations was the closely related but separatelyconducted negotiations over a possible bank fusion. In their despair at the seeming
impossibility of achieving either a strong independent position at Constantinople
or a fair participation in joint Anglo-French enterprise, Babington Smith and
Cassel suggested a radical alternative. This was that the Ottoman Bank should
be re-organized and absorbedinto the National Bank of Turkey.44
What is only more surprising in hindsight than the cheekiness of such a
proposal, is the fact that although Cassel was dubious - and rightly - about its
acceptability, it was taken up seriously and enthusiastically by the two Foreign
Offices and their Ambassadors.45From October till the end of the year the
Foreign Office was greatly pre-occupied with these negotiations, but it became
increasingly clear that the Ottoman Bank was not serious.46It was almost a
repetition of earlier Anglo-French combination negotiations. Both Foreign
Offices were anxious for the scheme to succeed, and the negotiations limped
on, at first in Paris, where the Foreign Office wanted them to continue for fear
of the London Committee's procrastinating expertise, and then in London, at
the insistence of both branches of the Ottoman Bank. The Foreign Office
repeatedly warned the French Foreign Minister that if negotiations failed it
could not restrain the National Bank any longer from acting independently,
and would have to support it, both of which would lead to Anglo-French
conflict, not co-operation.47
On 3 November Cassel and Babington Smith called at the Foreign Office to
announce that they had given up hope of coming to any arrangement with the
Ottoman Bank. They considered the negotiations as closed, and had written a
letter to the President of the Ottoman Bank, M. R6voil, to that effect. They
now expected to receive from the Foreign Office complete liberty of action. This
they received on 9 November, confirmed again on I0 December, although it
was stressed that the Foreign Secretarywas ' still most anxious to secure AngloFrench financial co-operation and would use any influence he had to support
44 Letter from Cassel to Nicolson, 8 Oct. igio, ibid., No. 37I90.
45 Letter from Nicolson to Cassel, confid., IO Oct., and to Bertie, priv., ii Oct., and desp.
from Bertie to Nicolson, 9 Oct. (also derailed in Bertie's ' summary ' No. 37848, but there dated
io Oct.), and ditto, ii Oct. I9IO, ibid., Nos. 37007 & 37082.
46
Apart from those documents specifically quoted, evidence for this section comes from: F.O.
37I/994, Nos. 37499, 37752, 37779, 37848, 38036, 38084, 382I7, 382I8, 3833I, 39724, 39792, 39901,
IO-I5; and correspondence in NIC., I9IO, Ii, F.O.
4I283, 44I72; BERTIE, Tu/io/9,
40I74,
800/344.
47 See private letter from Nicolson to H. J. O'Beirne (Councillor and sometimes Charge
d'Affaires at the St. Petersburg Embassy), 26 Oct. I9IO, NIC., I9IO, iI, F.O. 800/344; Nicolson
and NIC., I9IO, iI, F.O. 800/344.
to Bertie, Priv., 3 Nov. I9IO, BERTIE, Tu/Io/I3,
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38I
any reasonable proposals which might come from the French side.' Thus, while
he hoped the National Bank would keep the door open for such proposals, he
could not depreciatetheir taking independent action.48
What were the lessons to be learned from the I9IO loan negotiations? First
and most basic for the National Bank was that so long as its own Foreign Office
saw a glimmer of the possibility of Anglo-French financial co-operation in
Constantinople the National Bank would never receive Foreign Office support
other than to come to an accommodation with the French interests. Secondly,
the sorry story confirmed that the National Bank could not compete on the same
terms as the Ottoman Bank, particularlynot for loan contracts. Throughout the
whole of the I9IO loan negotiations the Ottoman Bank intrigued and forced
delays and complications, in the hope of forcing its own terms on the Turks.
It was able to do this because of its powerful friends, particularly the French
Minister of Finance with his power to allow or prevent quotations on the Paris
stock market, the major and essential market for Turkish loans. The French
financial adviser to the Porte was M. Laurent, who was at the very core of the
Ottoman Bank's intrigues, as the Ottoman Bank's terms for the i9io loan were
his own scheme and he stood to lose much face by failure to achieve them.49
Throughout i9iI the National Bank's fundamental difficulties were to
remain the same: intense opposition from the Ottoman Bank, to be countered
by only lukewarm backing from its own British, Foreign Office. Indeed, so
bitter were the National Bank's directors after their i9io failures that they were
almost tempted to wind the Bank up. Business in Turkey had been thin. There
had been no Government accounts and only one semi-official account. The 5 per
cent Constantinople Municipal loan of i909 had taken months of competition
to secure, though its profits had covered the Bank's expenses for one year at any
rate. Acquiring the i9io loan would have covered the Bank's expenses for at
least two to three years, pointed out the Turkish Grand Vizier in a December
i9io discussion with Babington Smith on the Bank's prospects.50If the British
Government did not 'blunder' again, in blocking the Bank's quest for further
loans and concessions, then, he said, there was a profitable field open for the
Bank and British capital. He agreed to press for approval for the Baghdad
Note from Nicolson to Grey, 3 Nov. I9I0, F.O. 371/994,
No. 45474; tel. from Grey to Bertie,
p.m., 9/I0 Nov., ibid., No. 40867; priv. letter from Nicolson to Bertie, 5 Dec. IgIo,
BERTIE, Mis/io/i8.
49 Correspondenceover the appointment of a French financial adviser to the Turks is in two
private letters from Bertie to Hardinge, i6 & 28 Sept. I908, BERTIE, Fr/o8/36 & Tu/o8/14, and
one from Bertie to Grey, No. 369, 29 Sept. I908, F.O. 37I/546, No. 33796.
50 Letter from Babington Smith to Nicolson, Constantinople, 30 Dec. I910,
encl. ' Memorandum of interview with Hakki Pasha, Grand Vizier, on Dec. 29 I910',
F.O. 37I/I240
No. 636. The
interview, but not the letter, is reprod. in B.D. op. cit., X2 with a covering desp. from Marling
to Grey, No. I4 Secrer, 4 Jan. i9ii, ibid., No. 6. See also letter from Nicolson to Hardinge,
priv., I2 Jan. I9II, HARDINGE MSS (Cambridge University Library) 92/I/24
or NIC. I9II, I,
F.O. 800/347.
48
12.30
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Municipal loan which the Bank was seeking to issue: it eventually obtained
the loan, at 6 per cent, but not until I9I2.
One further possibility of improving its position helped the National Bank's
directors settle their differences over the future of the Bank and decide to carry
on. In addition to the likely Baghdad loan issue and the freedom of action
granted the Bank by the Foreign Office, the Bank saw the prospectof a merger
with another organization, this time the Banque de Salonique or Salonica Bank.
The merger negotiations lasted throughout I9II and resumed again in early
I9I4.
The French-controlled Salonica Bank initiated the negotiations late in
I9IO and they were first discussed with the Foreign Office in January i9ii.51
Under the proposals the British interest would be predominant in the combine,
which would retain the title, National Bank of Turkey. The combine would
then seek to make arrangements with the Ottoman Bank to form a 'cartel',
dividing up territoryand business in the Ottoman Empire.52
The attitude of the Foreign Office towards the merger was basically
approving. The only alternative to the merger was the sale of the National
Bank to the Ottoman Bank, on the latter's terms, and Grey considered that
would be ' an abdication of British interests.' 5 Nicolson, who largely conducted
the Foreign Office side of the negotiations, preferred that the British Government should hold itself aloof from Banks and financiers as far as possible,
although he admitted privately that the Foreign Office was ' in a sense, somewhat bound to help the National Bank,' and the merger proposals ' appear to
offer a good means whereby such [Anglo-French] co-operation could be
achieved.' 5
Despite Foreign Office approval, the National Bank's I9II negotiations were
no more successful than its I9IO efforts, and for exactly the same reason. This
was the obstructionism of the Ottoman Bank and the pressure it was able to
exert on the French Government, which would not sanction the agreement
made between the National and Salonica Banks until they had come to a
'satisfactory' accommodation with the Ottoman Bank. The obstructionism
manifested itself in a number of ways. For example, the French Government
held to the line that, since the share capital of the Ottoman Bank was so different
from that of the National/Salonica Bank combine (some /8 million as compared
with under XI million), the only basis for cartelisation acceptable to the Ottoman Bank would not be acceptable to the combine. Therefore the only feasible
51 Letter from Mr L. D. Carnegie (Councillor and sometimes Charge d'Affaires at the Paris
Embassyuntil i913) to Nicolson, i6 Dec. I9I0, NIC. I9I0, ii, F.O. 800/344; Letter from Nicolson to Lowther, priv., 23 Jan. I9II, NIC. I9II, T, F.O. 800/347.
52 Memo. encl. in Minute from Nicolson for Grey, ii Feb. I9II,
No. 5126.
F.O. 371/1240,
53 Minute by Grey on letter from Marling to Nicolson, ii Jan. I91I,
NIC. I91I, I, F.O.
See also letter from Lowther to Nicolson, priv., 31 Jan. I9II, ibid., and n. 54 below.
800/347.
NIC. I9II, i, F.O. 800/347; and letter from
54 Letter from Nicolson to Lowther, 23 Jan. I9II,
No. 5126.
Nicolson to Cassel, 14 Feb. I9II, F.0. 371/1240
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now M. Jean Cruppi, that the Ottoman Bank, which had until recently denied
the fact, had a long-standing agreement with the Deutsche Bank to give each
other a 30 per cent participation option in all their Turkish undertakings.60
The accession of a new French Foreign Minister, M. Justin de Selves, came
just five months after the accession of the previous one. Although both Foreign
Ministers were inexperienced and ill-informed,6"Bertie at least described de
Selves as sensible, not politically extreme, and apparently truly seeking AngloFrench co-operation. But, predictably, he was not able to achieve anything and
by late in the year the matter had still reached no conclusion.62
One of the features of the National Bank's attitude which created difficulties
for its relations with the Foreign Office, lay in the type of concessions it sought
to obtain. A comment of Sir Arthur Nicolson aptly sums up this relationship:
' We cannot rely with certainty on any of these financiers being animated by
disinterested and patriotic motives. They look solely and simply at the profits
which they may derive from their enterprises and leave entirely on one side
the political character of the questions with which they have to deal. It is a
matter of perfect indifference to them ... whether the ends which they pursue
are or are not in harmony with the interests of this country.'63
Matters which sparked off such a Foreign Office reaction from i9ii on were
the National Bank's pursuit of concessions for railways in North-Eastern
Anatolia, and for enlarging the ports of Samsoun and Trebizond on the Black
Sea coast of the same area and for the Mesopotamian oil concession. By the
Black Sea Basin agreement of i9oo Russia had been given priority in any
development in which Turkish interests did not wish to become involved.
Russia was Britain's entente partner, and consequently the British Government,
which already had its own recognized sphere of interest in Mesopotamia, felt
unable to oppose the Russian Government in supporting any British nationals
seeking to compete with Russian interests supported by their own Government.
In the case of the projected railway in North-Eastern Anatolia, the French
were also interested, and to the Turks, who were anxious to have the French
money market opened up to them again after the debdlcle of the i9io loan, the
solution seemed to lie in a Franco-Russian group. When the National Bank
sought to persuade the Foreign Office to support a competing plan for an
Anglo-French scheme, the Foreign Office response was hardly surprising in
view of its entente preoccupations.This response was that since part of the area
60 Letters fromm Nicolson to Bertie, I7 May I9II,
TU/II/7, or NIC. I9II, ii, F.O. 800/348,
and from Bertie to Grey, No. 6o, i8 May i9ii, F.O. 37I/I240, No. I9007.
61 See, e.g., K. Eubank, Paul Cambon, Master Diplomatist (USA, I960), pp. I35-6.
62 Letter from Nicolson to Bertie, priv., 28 June I9II,
NIC. i9ii, iII, F.O. 800/349; desp.
No. 28548 & also repr. in B.D., X2,
from Bertie to Grey, No. 329, I7 July 191I, F.O. 371/I240,
No. 33; Letters from Lowther to Nicolson, priv., I5 Nov., and from Babington Smirh to Nicolson,
I9II, NIC. I9II, VI, F.O. 800/352.
Letter from Nicolson to Lowther, 23 Jan. I9II,
20 Nov.,
63
NIC. I9II,
i, F.O. 800/347.
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in question was undoubtedly Black Sea littoral, and since some of the lines were
undoubtedly strategic, running towards the Russian frontier, the British Government, if asked formally by the Bank for support, must first consult with the
Russian Government; but if the Bank wished to participate in them without
Foreign Office support, it was quite free to do so. The Foreign Office could
not support competition with the French or Franco-Russian groups, but if the
Bank could persuade them to let it join in the Foreign Office would have no
objection.64
The same principles applied to the other big concession sought by the
National Bank in I9II, for a construction contract for the ports of Samsoun
and Trebizond. The contract was to be for preliminary studies with an option
to receive a construction and operation contract. Here, however, the Foreign
Office could be more helpful since the Turks clearly wanted to give the contract
to the National Bank, and the Bank was eventually successful in its application
to the Turkish Government, the contract being signed in August i9ii.65 The
Black Sea Basin agreement was still the obstacle to full Foreign Office support,
but the Bank turned down the Office's suggestion that it might consult with
the Russian Government, since the Bank could end up in a far worse position
than if it had not sought such support. Informally it could still receive some
limited assistance, and this was necessary in view of the tactics of the Ottoman
Bank which wanted the concession for itself. In an effort to help the National
Bank Foreign Oflice policy was enunciated to the Turks: 'His Majesty's
Government would certainly do nothing to hamper the Bank and are anxious
for its successgenerally.
We should in fact be glad if the Bank were successful in obtaining any of
the concessions it is working for, and, subject to the concurrence of the Russian
Government, we would be ready to support it officially concerning Black Sea
ports. The Bank, however, has not asked us to approach Russian Government
on their behalf in connection with these ports.' 6
These attempts of the National Bank, especially over the railway concession,
clearly caused irritation in the Foreign Office and produced the sort of commnentas that quoted above. But there was one concession sought by the Bank,
which really put the seal of Foreign Office disapprobation on it. This was the
Mesopotamian oil concession.67 The concession had been sought since early
in the century by W. K. D'Arcy, who held the monopoly concession in South
See correspondencebetween Babington Smith, Cassel, and Nicolson, Mar.-May I9II, F.O.
Nos. II288, II682 & I472I.
65
See F.O. correspondencewith Babington Smith, Lowther and Marling, and Cambon, Apr.Nos. I472I, 27007, 26743, 27548, 27460, 27459, 28257, 28884, 29298, &
Aug. I9II, F.O. 37I/I240,
also NIC. I9II, II, III, IV, F.O. 800/348, 349, 350.
33200;
66 Tel. from Grey to Marling, No. 269R confid., F.O. 37I/I240,
No. 26743.
67
For details and documentation on this section see my forthcoming book, Oil and Empire.
(Macmillan, London, I975).
British Policy and MesopotamianOil, I900-I920
64
37I/I240,
H.J.-6
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iv,
F.O. 800/365.
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the arrangements were reported practically complete. But, like so many other
arrangements, they were overtaken by the war before they were completed,
and the National Bank was left in limbo, unable either to settle its problems or
to detach itself from them.
The First World War destroyed any realistic prospects the National Bank
had of making a large success of its activities in Turkey. Its pre-war business
had not been large - in addition to the contractsalready discussed it had acquired
in I9II the financing of the first stages of the Mesopotamian irrigation scheme
and the contract for the purchase of warships in England, covered by 5 per cent
Treasury Bonds, and in I9I3 it obtained the 512 per cent loan for docks, arsenals
and naval construction.72In I919 the British Trade Corporation had bought
up virtually all of the National Bank's shares, but a number of factors made
the Bank's success highly unlikely. In addition to the perennial competition
and strength of the Ottoman Bank, the Turkish situation was fraught with
difficulties and disturbances. Most fatal was the extent of the financial disaster
brought by the war. The Bank was faced with the loss of considerably more
than its paid-up capital. Despite its continued operation at a profit, since I9I9
?325,ooo had had to be set aside to meet the drastic depreciation of its assets.73
The end nearly came in I925 when Lord Farringdon of the British Trade
Corporation wrote to the Foreign Office that the Corporation could not continue to operate the Bank at a loss, merely on patriotic grounds, and unless it
received a subsidy it would have to liquidate the Bank. But Sir Austen Chamberlain was now Foreign Secretary. His opinion on the National Bank was that
it was ' politically a mistake from the first and quite useless now ', and Lord
Farringdon was given no encouragement.74The Bank still limped on, however,
hopeful to the end of its long drawn-out demise. This occurred relatively
quickly in 193I. On ii April it was announcedfrom Ankarathat the regulations for creating the new State Bank were now complete and all principal
banks and firms operating in Turkey would have to subscribe to its capital, in
proportion to their own share capitals, or wind up their businesses in Turkey
72 On irrigation, see correspondenceetc., I7 and 28 Mar., Io Apr., 3 July I9II,
F.O. 371/1240,
Nos. 9962, II682, II986 and 27007. On the warships contract, see letter from Babington Smith to
F.O., 2I July I9II, ibid., No. 29298. A list of loans, including the warships and the docks,
arsenals and naval construction loans, is in a letter from F.O. to Lord Farringdon, 24 Mar. 1925,
F.O. 371/IO867, No. EI700.
73 For discussion on these points, see memoranda and correspondenceof June I920 in F.O.
No. 778I. According to this documentation the Bank held important balances in Ger37I/5213,
man marks and Austrian crowns, remitted to Berlin and Vienna at pre-war rates, which, owing
to official regulations and restrictions, it was prevented from realizing. It had taken a considerable
participationin rhe 19I4 5 per cent Turkish loan which in I925 stood at about io per cent of its
nominal value, and, above all, it was a creditor to the Turkish Government for important advances which had subsequentlyto be most drasticallywritten down.
74 Letter from Lord Farringdon to Sir George Lloyd, 2 Feb. I925, and encl. ' Memo. Regarding the National Bank of Turkey ', 30 Jan. I925, and associatedF.O. Minutes and correspondence,
F.O. 371/IO867, Nos. EIO45 and EI700.
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May
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