The Surrender of Medina, January 1919

The Surrender of Medina, January 1919
Author(s): Elie Kedourie

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1977), pp. 124-143
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Surrenderof Medina,January1919

ElieKedourie
Accordingto clause 16 of the armisticeof Mudros,signedon 30 October

1918, all Ottoman garrisons in the Hijaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria and
Mesopotamia were, on the coming into force of the armistice, to
surrender'to the nearest Allied Commander'.'But, as is commonly
known, this stipulationwas not carriedout in the case of Medina, the
Ottomangarrisonof which had succeededin holding their own against
Sharifianhostility from June 1916 onwards.In fact it was not until 10
January1919 that the Ottomancommander,FakhriPasha, surrendered
and the city was enteredby the Sharifians.The officialversionof these
events is enshrinedin an official communiquecomposed in the Cairo
residencyand publishedon 16 January.This documentexplainedthat
the sacredcharacterof the city 'renderedit incumbenton King Hussein
to secureits capitulationby arrangementand not by assault'.Assault,it
was explained,was renderedout of the question by the fact that the
Ottomanforces were using the Great Mosque as an ammunitiondepot.
Hence, 'not a single shell could have been thrown into the position
withoutgraveriskof the destructionof the Prophet'stomb'.2
Some such versionwas also put about by Colonel T. E. Lawrencein
an anonymousarticleon 'The Arab Campaign'publishedin The Times
of 26 November 1918, i.e. before the surrenderof Medina. 'It is', he
explained,'a Holy City, so that the Arabs have never fired, and will
neverfire, a shot againstit (ideal conditionsfor a besiegedarmy)'.3This
story,or a variantof it, seems to have establisheditself as the truth,for
we find, over half a centuryafter the event, a writerin The Economist
categoricallydeclaringthat 'the physicalreasonwhy, afterthe armistice,
Ali's [i.e. the Sharifian]troops could not storm Medina and force the
surrenderof the Ottoman garrisonwas that the Ottoman commander
had threatenedto blow up the Prophet'stombif attacked'.4
But what the writerin The Economisthas assertedwith the anonym's
bold assurancehas little or no relation to the facts of the case. This
emergesfrom the evidence yielded by documentswhich, for a decade
now, have been in the publicdomain.Medinawas one of the objectsof
the Sharif'santi-Ottomanconspiracyin 1915-16. Earlyin 1916 he had
sent his eldest son Ali there to organisea rising of tribes and occupy
Medina at the right moment. But the moment never came. The
Ottomans became suspicious, and sent Fakhri Pasha, Jemal Pasha's
deputy, with reinforcementsfrom Syria. When the Sharif, fearing to
delay further,proclaimedhis rebellionin June, Ali failed to oust the
Ottomansfrom the city, and his youngerbrotherFaysaltriedto come to

THESURRENDEROF MEDINA
125
the rescue, but failed equally.In a reportdated 30 October Lawrence,

who had by then establishedfriendlyrelationswith Faysaland heardhis
account of these events, wrote that he did not think the Sharifianshad
ever been near taking Medina, 'as Feisal's forces are only a mob of
activeand independentsnipers'who werefrightenedand demoralisedby
the Ottomanartillery.5
The initial coup having failed, the Sharifianshad to try and cut the
railwaylinkingMedinato Ottoman-controlled
territoryin the north,and
to lay siege to the city itself. In the autumn of 1916 Fakhri Pasha
disposedin Medina and its protectingposts of Bir Darwish,El Ghayir
and Bir el Mashi,of approximately9,500 men, two field guns and three
mountainguns.6It is againstthese forcesthat Ali, Abdullahand, to start
with, Faysal had to lead theirBedouinlevies fortifiedby contingentsof
regularEgyptiantroopswhich were sent to the Hijaz immediatelyafter
the outbreakof the Sharif'srebellion,in orderto guardagainstthe by no
meansnegligibleriskthat Fakhrimightsucceedin recapturingMecca.?
What strategywas it advisablefor the Sharifiansto adopt towardsthe
Ottomansin Medina?Lawrence'swell-knownview was that it was an
advantagefor the Ottomansto have their troopstied down in guarding
the city and the lines of communication,and that the Sharifiansshould
thereforecontentthemselveswith harassingand steadilyweakeningtheir
enemy. An expressionof such a view occurs, for instance,in an Arab
Bulletinreport, 'Situationof the SherifianRevolt', which appearedin
October 1917. 'On the whole', this appreciationsaid, 'seeing what the
retention of Medina and of the long L[ines] of C[ommunication]is
entailingon the OttomanGeneralStaff, we may look with equanimity
on a prolongationof the presentsituation'.8But differentobjectivesand
changes in the situation in the Hijaz entailed other strategies.Thus,
Abdullah, as always looking forward to the conquest of Syria,
considered that this had to follow the fall of Medina.9Faysal also,
jealous of his brotherAbdullahwho had acquiredglory by occupying
Taif, and not yet establishedin Akaba,wantedto be the one who would
take Medina."But much moreimportantthan the dreamsand wishesof
the sons of the Sharif,the Britishauthoritiesin Cairo were not always
sure that it was so very safe to leave Medina unsubdued.Thus the
French military attache in Cairo, who was generally well-informed,
wrote at the beginningof November 1917 that he had gatheredfrom
BrigadierClayton that 'the Arab Bureau,long indifferentto the fall of
Medinamust now bringit about beforethe end of the year. It considers
this the only way to guardagainstthe seriousdangerrepresentedby the
increasingdisaffectionof the Southerntribestowardsthe GrandSharif.
In addition, it thinks this will enable it to confine the Mecca regime
within the confines of the Hijaz, and ensure for the Emir Faisal
independencevis-A-vishis father.This autonomyof Faisal's,who would
be under the Allies' exclusive control, will become necessary when
communications between the British Army in Palestine and the
NorthernSharifianforcesbecomeeasier'.11
Thus, at varioustimes and for variousreasons- whetherto isolate the
Medina garrison,or to prevent the city serving as a focal point for

126
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
anti-Sharifianor pro-Sauditribes,or to enhancethe Sharif'spositionin

the Hijaz, or (howeverimprobably)to use it as a jumping-pointfor a
Sharifianconquestof Syria- it was thoughtdesirablethat the Sharifian
troops should adopt an active and aggressive posture towards the
Ottomansin Medina and its outposts. But, as it turnedout, successive
plans for occupyingMedinaor inflictinga defeat on Fakhriin the end
came to naught.In his firstdespatchon militaryoperationsin the Hijaz,
dated 25 June 1917,Wingateexpressedthe hope that continualpressure
on the railwaysand lines of communications'now being followed'would
in the end 'resultin wearingdown the enemyand securingthe captureof
Medina, retaining meanwhile in the Hedjaz a considerableTurkish
garrisonand cutting off from all communicationwith Headquartersthe
enemy units in Asir and Yemen'. In his next despatch,dated 15 June
1918, Wingate had to record the disappointmentof these hopes. The
plan had been for Faysal,Abdullahand Ali to attackMedinaseparately
from different directions. 'Owing, however, to the various causes of
delay inseparablefrom Arab combinations',by the time preparations
were completedseriousdifficultieshad arisenwith regardto the water
supplyand the prospectwas abandoned.Wingatehoweveraffirmedthat
raidingoperations,rigorouslycarriedout, had inflictedheavy casualties,
and succeededin severingthe railwaycommunicationsin a mannersuch
that 'the effective isolation of Medina ... may at last be regardedas
accomplished'.In the same despatch,Wingateexpressedthe belief that
the reactionof his brothersto Faysal'ssuccessin Akaba 'has produced,
in emulation,a degreeof activityin the southerntheatrenever hitherto
attained, and a determinationof their part to undertake the longdeferredcombinedoffensive north of Medina,with a view to securing
the close and permanentinvestmentof that fortress'.The thirdand last
despatchon the Hijazoperations,dated27 December1918,recordedthe
failureof these hopes. Abdullahattackedsome positions at the end of
May 1918; at the first assault some outlying advanced posts were
captured,but the attack failed to develop.A week later, anotherattack
in co-operationwith Ali was undertaken,'but, again, little more than
demonstrationwas effected'.An attackby Abdullahin Junedid resultin
the destructionof 1200 rails, a bridge, three large culverts,and of a
water train and its locomotive;Ottomanlosses were said to be heavy
and prisonerswere taken. At the end of July, Ali attemptedanother
offensiveagainstan Ottomanposition,but the offensivefailed. Earlyin
August a mobile force of camel-mountedinfantryand artillerybegan to
be formedat Wejhwith a view to an autumnoffensive,but plaguebroke
out in September and spread to the troops; preparation for the
operationsin prospect were therefore'indefinitelypostponed'.'2There
mattersstood when the Ottomantroopssufferedin Septembera debacle
in Syria,and when the Ottomangovernmentdecidedin Octoberto seek
a generalarmistice.
The formal,measuredand discreetprose of a public despatchis not,
of course, meant to expose the inner history of the long campaign
againstMedina.It does, however,establishthat it was far from brilliant
or successful and, more important, that, contrary to Lawrence's

127
assertionsin The Timesand to those of the officialcommuniqueissued

on the surrenderof Medina,if the city did not fall, it was hardlybecause
the Sharifianshad refrainedfrom attackingit. But other evidence is
available to fill out the sketchy picture which Wingate's despatches
provide.Thus we see the Arab Bulletinof 23 May 1917 reportingthat
CaptainLawrence,in the courseof a stay in Abdullah'scamp, tryingto
prod him into activity.Abdullah,Lawrencereported,was 'too fond of
pleasure and, in a sense, evidently too civilised for his present wild
work'.But Lawrence,it seems,'got him to do a greatdeal' - to pay some
tribestheir allowanceswhich were in arrears,'to take an interestin his
guns and machine-guns,to send out his dynamiteparties,and to begin
to prepare for a general move towards the railway'."3Lawrence's
proddingdoes not seem to have producedresultssince we find Colonel
C. E. Wilson, the Britishrepresentativeat Jeddah,pressingHusaynand
his sons Ali, Abdullah and Zayd 'to try to get a move on against
Medina'and writingto the Arab Bureauthat he was 'constantlyrubbing
it in to thembut withoutmuchsuccessup to date I fear'.'4
Sharifianinaction had many reasons.His brotherFaysal offered an
apologia for Abdullah'squiescenceon the Medina front in a conversation with Lawrencewhich took place at the beginningof December
1917. 'It is not fair', Faysal said, 'to condemn my brotherAbdullah,
without reserve. He is taking no part in the war against the Turks,
because his whole heart,his head, and all his resourcesare engaged in
the problemsof Nejd'. Whatwas importantwas to unite all the Arabsof
the Peninsulaunder the Sharifianflay and 'strangle'the Wahabicreed.
'If we fail', Faysal claimed'all our efforts and victoriesover the Turks
will be wasted. Great Britainwill not profit by the Arab revival,if the
tomb at Medina and the Haram at Mecca are destroyed, and the
pilgrimageis prevented.Abdullahis fightingall our battles,and if he has
no leisureto campaignagainstthe railwaymeanwhile,he shouldnot be
judged too harshly." Faysal'sreasoning,if taken seriously,meant that
the British should help to levy war against Ibn Sa'ud. It was an
unexpectedoutcome to McMahon'snegotiationof 1915-16 from which
so much had been hoped in the war againstthe Ottomans.Whetherthe
Britishauthoritiesin Cairograspedthe ironyof this we do not know,but
it seems that they were either unwillingor unable to preventAbdullah
from using their subventions for anti-Sa'udi,rather than for antiOttoman,purposes.'6
A reporton the 'Situationof the SherifianRevolt' appearingin the
Arab Bulletinof 26 February1918 recordedthe disappointingperformance of Ali's and Abdullah's forces. Ali's contingent had done
'practicallynothing' except to 'effect some minor demolitions and
captureof small enemy posts. The rest of this force has been content
with watchingthe outpostsof Medinaon west and south-westand with
occasional,and ratherfutile, artillerypractice'.As for Abdullah,he had
effected- over a stretchof 112miles - 'a desultoryseriesof demolitions,
which latterlyhave been on a largerscale than formerly,and appearto
have taxed severely,if not the enemy'ssupplyof sparerails,at least that
of bolts, nuts, etc.' Of both Ali's and Abdullah'sforcesthe Arab Bulletin

128
declares that the improvementin their situation 'consists more in the

relative decline of enemy strength'opposed to them, in the 'serious
losses' sustainedby the Ottomansin both men and rollingstock, and in
the successful blockade which had for a month or two stopped the
supply of fresh meat. These were optimisticappreciations,even though
the reportdid admit that the enemy'slong line of communicationhad
not been cut definitely.But the optimismdoes not seem to have been
well-founded.When Medinawas surrenderedFakhriPashatold Captain
H. Garlandthat he could have held Medinafor manymonthsmore - he
had enoughto see him adequatelythroughfor a periodof threemonths.
As for the blockade,it does not seem to have been as watertightas the
reportin the Arab Bulletinclaimed,for in the same conversationwith
GarlandFakhriremarkedthat he 'had often felt gratefulto [the British]
for issuingsuppliesso freelyto the Bedouin'.17
The Arab Bulletin report of February 1918 had something to say
about the qualityof the Sharifianforceswhichmay serveto explaintheir
mediocreperformance:
Abdullah's army [the report explained] is largely drawn from
fluctuating contingents of Bedouins of inferior fighting quality,
whose spirit has been impairedby variouscauses - by the winter
cold (the Bedouin campaigningseason is summer),by protracted
failure,of suppliesdue to certainmanoeuvresof those responsible
for transportfrom Yanbo, by enemypropaganda,and, most of all,
by the slow payment of promised subsidies.The last cause has
particularlyaffected the Harb in both Abdullah'sforce and Aii's.
On the other hand, the Juheinah,for what they are worth, have
kept loyal, and the Ateibahcontingent,thoughwortheven less, has
been favouredat the others' expense, while a new and energetic
auxiliaryhas been found in Ferhanel-Aida and his Anazeh.To the
latter and to the co-operationof a French Algerian detachment,
Abdullahhas chiefly owed such enhancedsuccess as he claims in
his raidingoperationsduringthe past five months.'8
Ali's and Abdullah'sdifficultiesclearlyarosefrom the undisciplinedand
mercenarycharacterof theirforces.As it happens,therehas surviveda
reportby the editor of Husayn'sMecca newspaper,al-Qibla,which is
quite invaluablein supplementingthe hints and remarksofferedby the
Arab Bulletinreport.Its author,Ahmed ShakirKarmi,was well-placed
to observeSharifianpoliticsand administrationat close quarters,and he
felt able, in a reportdestinedfor Britishauthorities,to writefranklyand
without inhibition; and what he has to say not only is cogent and
convincingin itself, but much of it can actuallybe confirmedfromother
sources. Karmi defines for us the relation in which the Bedouins,on
whom the Sharifdependedto carryon the anti-Ottomanrebellion,stood
to Husayn:
... it is quite evident [he observes] that the tribes who have
submittedto him in this warhave not done so out of fearor respect
for his authority but from pure greed for the money which is

THE SURRENDER OF MEDINA
129
lavishedupon them regardlessly.Anyone who knows the character

of the Bedouinsof the Hejaz knows how true this is, for they are
well known for their greed and their lack of any praiseworthy
qualities,for they do not hesitateto kill pilgrimswho come fromfar
and near.It is [not?]strangethat moneywhichhas been given them
duringthe warhas not inspiredthemwith any respectfor the King,
for they realisethat the Sherifpays nothingout of his own pocket
and that he is paidjust as they are, the money all being that of the
English.
As for the assistancerenderedby the Bedouins,it has been given
throughsheerlove of plunder,and they would not hesitateto help
the Turks if it suited their purpose.The armiesof the Amirs Ali
and Abdullah were filled with Bedouin riff-raff,and they often
desertedthe regularswhen they werein a tightcorner,and the only
heroismthey ever showedwas in a love of loot and a propensityto
run awayon the firstappearanceof danger.'9
Karmi'sobservationschime in with what is known of the behaviourof
the Bedouinsin the Hijazbeforeand afterthe Sharifianuprising,and his
judgments seem sounder and more accurate than the exalted picture
presentedby Lawrenceof men who were 'intenselynational'and 'more
sophisticated'than their appearanceled one to expect. In the paper,
dating from Nove-mber1916, where he expressed these judgments,
Lawrencealso pejorativelyremarkedthat the 'towns are sighingfor the
contentedobstructionistinactivityof the OttomanGovernment,or for
the ordered quiet of our own rule'.20The menace of Bedouin
depradationswas for townsmenin the Hijaza constantthreat- a threat
which proved to be a realityas recentlyas the inceptionof the Sharif's
rebellion when, as Karmi says, they 'plundered all the houses in
Mecca ... and every house in Taif when it surrendered',and when on
the sameoccasionthey similarlywent on the rampagein Jedda.2'
Karmi'sreport also gives us a glimpse of one reason why Ali's and
Abdullah's forces could effect so little against Medina or the Hijaz
railway.He recountsa storywhich the Directorof Quarantineat Jedda,
Dr. Muhammadal-Husayni, told him about the Bedouins' fighting
methods. Husayni was present with the force which entered Medina
upon its surrender.While there,a Bedouinshaykhasked him for tuition
in the art of blowingup railwayswith dynamite.The shaykhexplained
that Husaynwas payinghis tribehalf of what the Turksused to give 'as
the price of peace',and blowingup railwayswould compel the King of
the Hijaz to restore the subsidy to its customarylevel. Husayni then
askedwherethe shaykhwas able to obtaindynamite,
and the Sheikh replied that he had enormous quantities of
dynamitethat he had collectedfrom the Bedouins,for men sent by
the Princes to blow up the railway used to throw away the
dynamitethey had with them two hours distancefrom the railway
and then went back and told the Emirsthat they had used up all

130
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
theirdynamite.The Bedouinsthen pickedup this dynamiteand so

collectedenormousquantities.
Both Ali and Abdullah had the benefit of military advice from
Europeanofficersattachedto theirforces.With Ali was CaptainDepui,
a French officer who came with the French militarymission led by
GeneralBremondwhen the Sharifdeclaredhis rebellion.To Abdullah
was attachedCaptainGarlandof the EgyptianArmywho was presentin
the Hijaz from the beginningof the rebellion,and who had begun by
heading a trainingschool in demolitionwork at Wejh. Both men were
thereforeexperiencedand knowledgeablein the ways of the Sharifian
forces,and theirreportsare worthattendingto. We find Depui reporting
in March 1918on the state of mind of the Arab officerswith Ali's force,
officers who had either deserted from the Ottoman Army or, having
in Britishcamps,had volunteeredfor
found themselvesprisoners-of-war
service with the Sharif. Depui reported that Baghdadi officers had
formed a committeeof 'troublemakers'
(factieux)and declared;'These
officersdo not want to fight and, what is more serious,do not want that
thereshouldbe fighting'('Ces officiersne veulentpas se battreet ce qui
est plus grave,ne veulentpas qu'onse batte). They attemptedto subvert
North Africanofficerswho had been sent by the Frenchto reinforcethe
Sharifby askingthem whetherthey reallyintendedto make use of their
weapons against their 'Muslimbrethren';while one officer used, in his
reports,the term shahid (martyr)in referringto Turks who had been
killedin engagementswith the Sharifians.22
Captain Garland also reportedabout the operationsof Abdullah's
force and the conditionsin his camp,but, more strikingand informative
than a formal report, there has survived a sketch which he wrote
sometimebetween the Armisticeand the surrenderof Medina,entitled
'A Day at El Jafr'.It conveys vividly the atmospherewhich reignedin
Abdullah'scamp, relaxed, unmilitaryand faineant, its inmates being
above all preoccupiedwith burningissues of pay and post-warpolitics.
The sketch,by someonewho had servedwith the Sharifianforces from
the inception of the rebellion,is in refreshingcontrast to Lawrence's
exalted and overheatedproductionsand, to judge by what we know
from other evidence, sensibly more faithful to the reality. It is reproducedin an appendix.
In his final despatchon operationsin the Hijaz, Wingatestated that
'Fromthe beginningof August until the Turkishdebaclein Syriain the
last week of Septemberno operationsworthyof separatementionwere
carriedout by the forces of Emirs Ali or Abdullah'.23What Wingate
does not revealis that in Augusthe sent Fakhria summonsto surrender
to which he receiveda scathingand contemptuousrejoinder.Fakhri's
curt reply, dated 4 September,was addressed'To Him who broke the
power of Islam and caused bloodshedamong Moslemsand placed the
Caliphateof the Emir,who was God's representative,in bondage and
under the dominationof the British',and informedHusayn that 'As I
am now underthe protectionof the Prophetand most high commander,
I am busyingmyselfwith strengtheningthe defencesand the buildingof

131
roads and squaresin Medina.I beg you not to troubleme with useless
requests.'24
In his final despatchWingateis also silenton anotherepisoderelating

to Medina which took place in October, before the signing of the
armistice of Mudros. The foreign office informed Wingate on 16
October that the French high commissionerin Arabia was suggesting
that his governmentshouldsupply25 mm. guns to enable the Sharifians
to take Medina.This seemedto alarmthe Britishauthoritiesin London.
The directorof militaryintelligenceat the war office urged that the use
of guns would entail considerabledamageto the city, and that it could
be peaceably secured under the terms of the armistice which then
seemedimpending.Sykes at the foreignoffice, however,was of another
opinion,in whichhe was supportedby Sir EyreCroweand LordRobert
Cecil. 'Politicalconsiderations',the foreign office told Wingate,had to
be taken into account: it was in the 'Interestboth of ourselvesand of
Arabsthat Medinashouldbe takenby forceof armsthan as the resultof
an armistice;and this, if operationsare to remainunder Arab control,
would point to their being urged to act with all possible speed and
determination'.Wingate agreed with this view. He answered on the
following day that Abdullah was undertaking a 'more vigorous
prosecutionof siege' and that the Sharifians'appearto realise importanceof captureof town and are showingincreasedenergy'.He followed
up this information - which there was no evidence to justify - by
anothertelegramon 18 Octoberin which he insistedthat the Sharifians

did not need French guns since they 'have been sufficientlygunned by
us and use of artilleryagainstHoly City has to be restrictedon political
grounds'.He himselfhad urgedon Husaynand his sons 'importanceof
their obtaining early captureof Medina and this advice coupled with
news of victoriesin Syriaseems to have decided them to take energetic
action'.But Wingateclearlydid not expectmuchresultfromhis urgings,
since he ended his telegramby expressingthe hope that the military
situation would compel Fakhri to surrender,even though the Hijaz
Arabs'arenot disposedto attacka fortress'.25
The eventsof the next few
months were to show that Wingate'sjudgment in this respect was
entirelycorrect,and that the conclusionof his final despatch- namely
that the Sharifianforces were preparingin October, by an 'early and
vigorous effort to secure the capitulationof Medina', but that these
preparationswere 'renderedabortiveby the Armisticewith Turkey'merelydrew a decent veil of decorousreticenceover the real course of
events.
The Allied armisticeproposalsincludeda clause which stipulatedthe
surrenderof all garrisonsin the Hijaz, Asir and the Yemen 'to the
nearest Allied Commanderor Arab representative',but the Ottoman
negotiatorsfearedfor the fate of theirtroopsif they were to surrenderto
an 'Arab representative',and succeededin deleting this conditionfrom
the final text which, as has been said, was signed at Mudros on 30
October 1918.26 The armistice terms were, immediately afterwards,
transmittedby the Ottomangovernmentto its commandersin the field,
including Fakhri at Medina. But it soon appeared that Fakhri was

132
absolutelyunwillingto surrenderMedina. He did not recogniseAli or

Abdullah as an 'Allied Commander',neither would he concede that
Captain Garland, for instance, had such a status. The Ottoman
govemmentrepeated,in cypher,the instructionsto surrenderwhich had
at first been sent en clair. Fakhriagain refusedto surrender,declaring,
first,that he would surrenderonly 'on writtenorderduly certified'from
his government,and then that he wouldendeavourto hold Medina'until
a decree from the Khalif was communicatedto him'. These exchanges
took up the whole of November.Wingatereportedon 22 Novemberthat
the delay was 'exasperatingArabswho threatenattackand reprisal'.In
reply,on 3 Decemberthe foreignoffice instructedhim, at the suggestion
of the war office, to fix a date by which Medinawas to be surrendered,
and that unless it was surrenderedby then 'we shall take no further
measuresto restrainArabs'.Wingaterepliedon 6 Decemberthat he was
informingFakhri that Medina had to be surrenderedby noon on 15
December.27
The fifteenthof Decembercame and went but Fakhridid
not surrender.Some two months later Wingate told General LyndenBell that Fakhri's response to his ultimatum had been: 'I am a
Mohammedan.I am an Osmanli.I am the son of Bayer Bay. I am a
soldier'.28
In spite of their'exasperation'as reportedby Wingate,the ultimatum

by no means pleased the Sharifians.When he read it, Abdullah's'high
spirits',Garlandwrote, 'desertedhim, and the prospectof war did not
seem to give him the satisfactionhis previousdeclarationshad led me to
expect at timeswhen he was grumblingat the delay.Moreover',Garland
significantlyadded,'a resumptionof hostilitiesherewould interferewith
all his plans against Ibn Saud'. Garland explained that the fall of
Medinato Sharifianarmswouldpossesstwo unusualfeaturesin that the
investingregularforce was much weaker than the besieged force, and
the greaterpartof the besiegers,namelythe Bedouins,wouldbe likelyto
requiremore control than the armyto be evacuated.Garlandexpressed
the opinion that it was necessary to keep constantly in mind the
necessityfor effectivelypreventingthe Bedouinsfrom enteringthe city
before the regulararmyfor fear of plunder.If - as later events were to
show - Garlandwent wrongin his estimate,this was in thinkingthat the
Sharifianregularswould behave better than the Bedouins.When the
hope that Fakhriwould surrenderfaded, Wingateorderedhostilitiesto
be resumed on 20 December, but Garland did not believe that the
renewed hostilitieswould bring about the fall of Medina. He did not
anticipate more than desultory Bedouin raids 'as they are evidently
waiting for the Allies to send troops to their assistance'.In Garland's
view, to attack the strong defensive positions around Medina and to
capture the city was an operation which requireda skilled military
commandertogetherwith sufficientregulartroops - and the Sharifians
had neither.29
The armisticewhich was to expire on 15 Decemberwas not finally
denounceduntil 20 December.The delay was allowedin the hope that
an Ottomanofficerwho had been sent fromConstantinoplewith written
instructionsfromthe governmentwouldsucceedin persuadingFakhrito

133
surrender.In this the officer,Zia Bey, was completelyunsuccessful.He

spent some days in Medina and then returned to the Sharifian
headquarters,which he reachedon 24 December.He reportedthat as
the officer responsiblefor the Prophet'sTomb, Fakhriconsideredthat
he could be relievedof his responsibilityonly by a personalorderfrom
the Sultan, and not by a letter from the governmentsuch as Zia was
carrying.In this attitudeZia believed Fakhrito be 'implacable'.30
In a
conversation with Captain Wiggin of the Arab Bureau after the
surrenderof MedinaZia explainedFakhri'sattitude.Fakhri,he said
felt it an outrageto his dignityto surrenderto the Arabs,who were
rebels and had shown themselvesinferiorto his own men in every
respect.With their superiorityin numbersthey could have carried
Medinaby assaultat any time had they been troopsof any fighting
valuewhatsoever.
Again,and significantly,
he was securelyinstalledwherehe was and had a fairlygood supply
of food, chiefly rice and dates. Further,as a rule, no Arab Forces
were to be met with for many miles from Medina and trainsran
freelyout of the town while he was there;the state of affairscould,
in fact, hardlybe called a siege, so that, by comparison,surrender
to an enemywho could not for a momentbe trustedto observethe
laws of warwas muchthe worsealternative.
Wiggin asked Zia whether Fakhri was a religiousfanatic. Zia replied
that
Fakhri was intensely religious,but he had at the same time too
strong a vein of practical shrewdnessin him to allow him, for
instance, to commit suicide in the Haram purely from religious
sentiment.His insistenceon his duty of protectingthe Prophet's
Tomb was due chiefly to the fact that religion was his chief
instrumentof discipline. Captain Zia illustratedhis meaning by
saying that Fakhri would probablyhave resistedindefinitelyand
died in the Haramif his troopshad stood by him, and if therehad
been any chance that such resistancewould be of any practical
value to his country.3'
This pictureof Fakhri,a stout-heartedand resourcefulmilitaryleader,
full of staminaand jealous of his honour,stands in markedcontrastto
that of the passive and supine Abdullahwho, when Garlandinformed
him of Wingate'sultimatumto Fakhri- mentionedabove - countered
by a telegramfrom his father advising him not to worry, and not to
embarkon hostilitysince an Ottomanenvoy, i.e. Zia, was coming 'by a
special ship' with a letter from the Ottomangovernmentwhich would
secure Fakhri's surrender.32
Our impression of Fakhri's characteris
confirmedand enhancedby the languagewhich he himselfheld while a
prisoner-of-war.He told CaptainBassett - Wilson'sdeputy in Jedda that

134
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
In his eyes the Arabs were insurgents, and in subsequent

negotiationswith CaptainGarlandhe as a Generalof Divisionand
the Commanderof a fortresswhich was furtherone of the Holy
Cities of Islam could not regarda Captainwho signed 'for British
Representativein the Hedjaz'as an 'Allied Commander'underthe
terms of the Armistice... He was [he continued]still up against
what appearedto him to be a 'situationinsupportableau point de
[sic]militarisme'.
Was he, 'Un Generalde Divisionet vieux soldat'to give his sword
to a Captainholdingapparentlya politicalpost? In battle,he said,
a subalternmay take prisonera Field Marshalbut when it was a
questionof the surrenderof an unbeatengarrisonunderthe terms
of an armisticesuch a position seemed to him impossible,quite
apartfrom the peculiarsituationin which he was placedas regards
the Holy City.33
Though the emissaryfrom Istanbulwas not able to induce Fakhrito
surrender,yet his presenceand the news from the outside world which
he broughtwith him seem to have had an unsettlingand demoralising
effect on some of Fakhri'sofficers.One of them, Emin Bey, organiseda
secretsociety among some officersand circulatedon 28 December1918
a manifestoattackingthe general'spolicies.Fakhrisent for this officer,
who took fright, decamped and surrenderedto the Sharifians.But
Fakhriwas not able to destroythe secretsociety,the membersof which
decided to arrest Fakhri and appoint another officer, Ali Negib, to
commandin his place. Fakhriwas enticed outside the Haramwherehe
had retiredwith a few officers and soldiers,arrestedby his mutinous
officers and handed over to the Sharifians.The conspiratorssigned a
surrender agreement which was described as 'Drawn up between
Captain Garland and the Arabs with Negib Bey independentlyof
Fakhry'.34
In conversationwith GarlandFakhriexpressedhis belief that the two
ringleadersof the conspiracy,Emin Bey and a Baghdadiofficer called
Sabry,had, as Arabs, intriguedwith 'personsin Arab Camp' to bring
about his arrestand supersession.35
This, then, was the mannerin which
Medinafell to the Sharifians.In June 1920,the Britishrepresentativein
the Hijaz, Colonel C. E. Vickery, reported Abdullah as 'frequently'
saying to him that the great leadersin the late war were Foch, Haig,
Allenbyand himself,addingthat
history will probably give me the first place because I have
personallybeen engagedin so many more battlesthan they. I have
foughtin 128actions!6
The Sharifianentryinto Medinarealisedthe fearswhichGarlandhad
expressed only a few days before. The events which took place in
Medinaafter its surrenderwould probablynever have been known but
for the presence of two experiencedMuslim observerswho were not
Sharifiandependants,and who deemed it their duty to report to their
own authoritieswhat their eyes had seen and ears heard. One was an

135
Egyptian officer with Abdullah'sforces, Miralai (Colonel) Sadik bey

Yahya, D.S.O.; the other was the French MuslimCaptainDepui, who
was with Ali's forces. Both of them witnessedthe events in Medinaand
its environsand compiledtheir recordwhile they were still in the city.
The reportswere entrustedto camel messengersfor despatchto Jeddah
but they never reachedtheirdestination.MiralaiSadik Yahya returned
to Jeddahin May 1919,and it was only then that the Britishrepresentative heard about his missing report,'and there is reason to believe',
wrote Bassettto the Arab Bureau,'it was purposelyheld up by orderof
H.H. EmirAli'. Depui'sreportwas presumablysuppressedon the same
orders.37But MiralaiSadik Yahya had with him a copy of the report,
minussome appendiceswhich had been attachedto the original,and he
handedit over to Bassett.And, while Depui'sreportnevercame to light
subsequently,some of the matter it contained we may reasonably
assumeto have been incorporatedin the monthlyreporton the Hijazfor
February1919sent to Parisby the Frenchmilitarymissionin Egypt,and
which Depui himself wrote.38In due course, Sadik Yahya'sreportwas
sent by the Cairo residencsyto London,but in a somewhatshortenedand bowdlerised- version. 9
In view of the allegationsmade at the time, and still being retailed
fifty-sevenyears after the event by the anonymof The Economist,it is
interestingto note that ColonelSadikYahya(who knew Medinafrom a
previousvisit in 1909)reportedthat 'Not a single Maximor any other
gun was put in or on the Haramas we had heardbefore'.Fakhridid use
threemosquesto store ammunition,but this was on the calculationthat
shouldan aeroplaneattackMedina,it would not bomb such places.The
report goes into great - not to say minute - detail about Fakhri's
administration,the result, clearly, of extensive enquiries among the

inhabitantswho had experiencedfor over two years stringenciesand
shortages.The picture which emerges is one of orderlyand equitable
rule in which propertyrightswere respected,food suppliesassured,and
morale maintained.To increase food supplies, Fakhri took particular
pains to foster agriculture.A month before the surrenderhe bought
6,000 Kgs. of wheat which he had planted in land on the outskirtsof
Medina:'The crop grewsplendidlyuntil the bladeswereabout 10 inches
high just before the arrivalof the Arab Armies at Medina.The Arab
troopssoon aftertheirarrivalat Medinawent directlywith theircamels,
horses, mules etc. to the cultivatedarea to graze their animalsand in
seven days there was not a single blade to be seen.' Particularly
interestingin view of the siege which the Sharifianswere supposedto be
enforcing against Medina is Colonel Sadik Yahya's observationthat
'Goodsused to come to Medinafromdifferentpartsof Arabia,Hail etc.,
until 5 monthsbeforethe surrenderof Medina.Duringthe last 5 months
everything that came was from Wejh and Rabegh [in Sharifian
territory]'.The Colonel also reportedthat all the forts, towers, outer
defencesand posts aroundMedinawere stronglyfortified'andwerevery
carefullycontrolledand well arranged',thus confirmingGarland'sview
that the takingof Medinawould have requireda regularforce led by an
experiencedcommander.

136
Fakhri was made prisoner on 10 January 1919; Abdullah entered

Medina on 13 Januarywith some of his Bedouins;on 15 Januarythe
officer commanding Ali's regular troops, Nuri el-Kueri, arrived in
Medinaof which he was to be the governoron behalf of Ali, to whom
the city was apparentlyto be handedover. It was on the same day that
ColonelSadikYahyaarrivedin the city.
I regret to say [he declared in his report] that when I entered
Medina on the 15/1/1919 I found all the houses which number
about 4850 and which were locked and sealed by the Turkish
Governmenthad been brokenopen by the Arabs who looted the
furniturewhich they sold at a very cheap price in the Suk because
they were ignorant of their value. The Ashraf and others who
enteredMedinawith the EmirAbdullahused to go from house to
house and take what they liked and they used to live in the houses
as they pleased and this went on for 12 days and even the houses
whose ownerswere at Medinawere looted. I myself have seen the
Bedouinboys carryingpieces of good and valuablefurniturein the
town and selling them cheap ... There were no guardsat Medina
for 20 days after the entranceof the Emir. It was not only the
Bedouinwho practisedlootingbut 80 per cent of the Baghdadiand
Syrianofficerstook partin the game by meansof theirregularand
Bedouin troops. Only one eighth of the houses were saved from
beinglooted.
SadikYahya also recountedhow his own Somalicook while on his way
one afternoon to the Prophet'smosque was attacked and beaten by
Bedouinswho took his moneyand his revolver.SadikYahyacomplained
to Abdullahwho said that the Bedouinswere denying the whole thing.
When Salik Yahya insisted that the incident be properlyinvestigated,
Abdullahsaid that
he had issued an order to bring the mulahhas(It is customary
amongst the Bedouinwhen one steals anythingand denies it they
bringa man whom they call mulahhaswho puts a thin rod of iron
in the fire until it becomes red hot and then passes it over the
tongueof the suspectedone and if the tongueis burnt,i.e. swollen.
then the suspectedone will be consideredas the real thief,if not he
will be consideredas innocent)I told the Emirthat it is not wise to
substitute the mulahhas for the properjudgements of the well
organisedcourts and mehkemehsharia - the word mulahhasis
derived from the verb lahasa which means the one who makes
anotherlick something- especiallyin a place like Medina.Nothing
was done by the Emirand the cook did not get his moneyback nor
were the culpritseverpunished.
It was Sadik Yahya'sjudgmentthat the people of Medinalost more in
the days following the Sharifianoccupationthan they had during the
two yearsof Fakhri'srule.
Sadik Yahya and Depui concurredin the view that Medinasuffered
these disordersbecause Abdullah was unwilling to curb his trcops -

137
whetherregularofficers or Bedouins.Depui attributesthis attitude of
Abdullah'sto the bad relationsbetween him and his brotherAli owing
to jealousyover the successionto theirfather'sthrone.The two brothers,
outwardlyfriendly,remarkedDepui, 'were constantlyseeking to harm
one another. This hatred', Depui added, 'is much more marked in
Abdullah'scase'.
It may have been theirantagonismwhichled to the dismissalfromhis
post of Ali's chief of staff, Kueri, who (as has been seen) had been
appointedcommandantof the city and who, accordingto Depui, triedto
suppressthe looting and the disorder.It does not seem, however,that
Medinafared any better under the regimeof Ali, who enteredthe city
on 2 February. Disorders and pillage in Medina continued to be
reportedmonths later. For example,a reportfrom Medinaby a North
AfricanMuslim,writtenin June 1919,speaksof Ali's grudgeagainstthe
Medinesewho had stayed in the city duringFakhri'srule, and how he
allowed his deputy Sharif Shahhat to make free of their goods and
persons.41Again, in a surveyof conditionsin the Hijaz dated 1 March
1920, Catroux reports that Bedouins were blockading the roads to
Medinaand preventingfood fromreachingthe inhabitants.The military
governor,Shukrial-Ayyubi,and the civil governorSharifShahhat
se partagentune autoriteaux attributionsconfusesdont ils n'usent

guere que pour se creer mutuellementdes embarras.Les Administressont les victimesde ces rivalites.Au scandalede ces methodes
de gouvernement[Shahhat]ajoute la honte de sa conduite privee,
l'ivrognerieet la debauche. On comprendque l'ecoeurementait
gagne les Medinois, qu'ils regrettent le regime ottoman, qu'ils
fassent des voeux secrets pour le rattachementde leur ville a la
Syrie et que pour sauvegarderleurs biens et leurs personnes,ils se
placent sous la protectionde CheikhsBedouinsauxquelsils paient
en retourune redevance.42
It remains to record that when those extracts from Sadik Yahya's
report which Cairo considered fit for the eyes of the authoritiesin
London reached the Foreign Office, a memberof its EasternDepartment, CaptainW. H. Young,minutedthe despatchas follows:
The scenes which took place on the occupationof Medinaby the
Arab Armywere reproducedat Deraa, Damascusand Aleppo, and
the apprehensionsof the educatedtownsmenwere fully sharedat
these threeplaces.Arab civilisationis a distinctputtingback of the
clock when comparedto the Turkish.43
Young, it is well known,did a greatdeal to establisha Sharifianregime
in Mesopotamia.We may deprecate the sweeping (and unjustified)
judgmentby this staunchArabophileon the meritsof Arab civilisation;
but the minute as a whole is reassuringevidence that, though in his
publishedmemoirs(engaginglyentitled The IndependentArab) Young
chose to be discreetabout the scenes which he witnessedon the fall of
Dar'a and Damascus, this liberal and high-mindedofficial, in doing

138
what he did over Mesopotamia,was not (be it said to his credit)acting

in, or out of, ignorance.
NOTES
1. Text of the Mudrosarmisticeis reproducedin GwynneDyer,'TheTurkishArmistice
of 1918:2-A Lost Opportunity',MiddleEasternStudies,vol. 8, no. 3 (Oct. 1972),pp.
340-1.
2. Text of communique in F.O. 371/4166, 7853/740. Crown copyright records
publishedby kindpermissionof The Controller,H.M. StationeryOffice.
3. The article is reprintedin Stanley and Rodelle Weintraub,eds., Evolutionof a
Revolt, 1968.The quotationis at p. 35.
4. TheEconomist,May 1, 1976,p. 6, col. 3.
5. Lawrence'sreport,publishedin the ArabBulletinof 18 Nov. 1916is reprintedin his
Secret Despatchesfrom Arabia, 1939, the quotationis at p. 21. In the Times article
mentionedaboveLawrencealso gave an account,presumablyalso derivedfromFaysal,of
the unsuccessfulattackon Medina;Weintraub,op.cit.,pp. 34-5.
6. Detailsin Sir ReginaldWingate'sfirst despatchon militaryoperationsin the Hijaz,
dated 25 June 1917. A proof of the three despatcheson these operationswhich were
eventuallypublishedin The London Gazette is convenientlyfiled in F.O. 371/4166,
86025/740.
7. See Wingate'sfirstdespatch,loc.cit.,and an interestinglettersent to him by Sultan
Husayn Kamil, Cairo, 6 Nov. 1916, copy in Grey Papers F.O. 800/48, folios 528-30.
Lawrence'ssarcasmat the expense of these troops (Secret Despatchesp. 24) seems
misplaced.
8. F.O. 882/26, ArabBulletinno. 65, 8 Oct. 1917,p. 397.
9. Service historiquede I'Armee,Paris, Papersof the Mission militaireau Hedjaz,
17N498,Millet,Djedda,to Defrance,Cairo,tel. no. 66 (partI), 18Feb. 1917.
10. Loc.cit. 17N498, Bremond,Djedda, to Defrance, tel. no. 81, 1 March 1917.
Bremonddescribeshere Sharifianviews and ambitionsat thatjuncture.In conversation,
Abdullahsaid that the plan was for Husayn and his youngest son Zayd to reside in
Medina, Ali would govern Mecca, Faysal would get Syria, and Abdullah himself
Mesopotamia.Abdullah further said that there were only two great Muslim leaders
remaining:his fatherand ImamYahyaof the Yemen.
11. Loc.cit.,17N499,St. Quentin,Cairo,to Bercher,Djedda,tel. no. 205, 5 Nov 1917.
12. FO. 371/4166,86025/740citedabove.
13. SecretDespatches,p. 111.
14. F.O. 882/7, C. E. Wilson,Jeddah,to ArabBureau,6 July 1917,enclosingcopiesof
lettersto Husaynand his sons on the subjectof Medina.
15. SecretDespatchespp. 145-7, reproducingLawrence'sreportpublishedin the Arab
Bulletin,24 Dec. 1917.
0
16. Service historiquede l'Arm&e17N499, tel. from St. Quentin, Cairo no. 21 to
CommandantCousse,Jeddah,6 Mar. 1918.St. Quentinreportedthat at the ArabBureau,
'on a l'impressionqu'Abdallaconsacreune bonnepartiedes subsidesanglaisa essayerde
soudoyerla cientele d'IbnSaoudet n6gligede payerregulierement
ses proprescontingents
donnantainsiprisea la propagandeturque'.
17. F.O. 882/20, folios 180-84, Garland'sinterviewwith Fakhrion 6 April 1919.The
reporton Ali's and Abdullah'soperationsappearedin the Arab Bulletinno. 80, 26 Feb.
1918,pp. 57-60. F.O. 882/27.
18. F.O. 882/27, ArabBulletinno. 80, loc.cit.
19. F.O. 882/22, folios 143-152,'Translationof personalsketchof King Husseinand
conditionsin the Hejaz, writtenby the Editorof the "Qibla"(Ahmed ShakirKarmi)'.
Undated,circa,June 1919.
20. SecretDespatchesp. 39, 'Nationalismamongthe Tribesmen'publishedin the Arab
Bulletin,26 Nov. 1916.
21. F.O. 882/22, loc.cit.,and reportby TewfikAboucassem,the Syrianmanagerof the
OttomanBank branchin Jedda enclosedwith despatchno. 319 from Defrance,French
Ministerin Cairo,Archivesdu ministeredes AffairesEtrangeres,Paris,Guerre1914-18,
vol. 1684.

139
22. Servicehistoriquede l'Arm6e,17N498,file 12/1, reportno. 29 by CaptainDepui,24

Mar. 1918. On Depui, known also as 'CapitaineIbrahim'see Georges Catroux,Deux
Paris1958,pp. 183-6.
missionsen Moyen-Onient,
23. F.O. 371/4166,86025/740,despatchof 27 Dec. 1918.
24. F.O. 371/3393, 177593/7659,translationof Fakhri'sletterenclosedwith Wingate's
despatchno. 232, Cairo 30 Sept. 1918; translationof Husayn'searlierletter is enclosed
with Wingate'sdespatchno. 202, 31 Aug.,ibid., 163511/7659.
25. F.O. 371/3393, 170870,174125and 175126/7659.
26. Dyer,loc.cit.p. 328.
27. F.O. 371/3416, file 187338, which contains the various telegramssummarised
above.
28. F.O. 371/4166,81504/740,copy of Wingate'sletterof 20 Feb. 1919to Lynden-Bell,
waroffice.
29. F.O. 882/7, Garlandto Wilson,El Jafr,29 Dec. 1918.
30. F.O. 371/3416, 213617/187338,Wingate'stelegramno. 1985,Cairo,30 Dec. 1918.
See also the translationof CaptainMehmedZia'sreportto the Ottomanministerof war,
Yanbo, 2 Jan. 1919,enclosedwith Wingate'sdespatchno. 19, Cairo, 10 Jan. 1919,F.O.
371/4166, 12838/740.
31. F.O. 882/20 CaptainA. F. Wiggin'sreportto Director,ArabBureau,18 Jan. 1919,
sent to London with Cheetham'sdespatch no. 39, Cairo, 24 Jan. F.O. 371/4166,
21996/740.
32. F.O. 882/7, Garland'sreportfromEl Jafr,29 Dec. 1918,citedabove.
33. F.O. 882/20, Bassettto Wilson,BirDarwish,17 Jan. 1919.
34. F.O. 371/4208, 100945/17610;Arab Bulletin,no. 110, 30 April 1919, reporton
surrenderof Medina;F.O. 371/4166, 12952/740,copy of telegramfromHejazOperations
Staff to War Office, 16 Jan. 1919;F.O. 882/20 folios 167-69 for translationof Medina
surrenderagreement.
35. F.O. 882/20, 'Interviewwith GeneralFakhriEddin Pasha by CaptainGarland',
cited above.
36. F.O. 686/43, Vickeryto ArabBureau,Jeddah,7 June 1920.
37. F.O. 882/23, Bassett to Arab Bureau,Jeddah, 27 May 1919, forwardingSadik
Yahya'sreport.
38. A.E., serieE Levant,Arabie,vol. 3, 'Rapportmensuel31 Janvier- 28 fevrier1919',
2 Mar. 1919.
39. F.O. 371/4167, 101307/740,enclosedwith Allenby'sdespatchno. 304, Cairo, 26
June 1919.
40. A.E., serieE, Levant,Arabie,vol. 3, Picot'stelegramno. 276, Beirut,19 Feb. 1919.
41. loccit., Arabie, vol. 5, extracts from letters dated 4 and 5 June 1919 from
Benslimane,forwardedby CatrouxfromJedda.Vol. 4 containsthe Hijazreportfor April
1919writtenby Depuiwhichdeclaredthatlootingwas stillgoingon in Medina.
42. loc.cit.,Arabie,vol. 9.
43. F.O. 371/4167, 101307/740,cited above,Young'sminuteof 12 Aug. 1919.On the
Armenianmassacrein Aleppoin February1919see E. Kedourie,Englandand the Middle
East, 1956,pp. 157-58.The incidentsat Dar'aand Damascusare of coursebetterknown
thanthe Aleppomassacre.
Appendix*
PRIVATE
A Day at El JAFR
As I finish my breakfast in my tent about 7-30 a.m. GAMAL BEY ALI
enters: the 'Bey' is intrusive, and I know not what rank he held in the Turkish
Army, but he is now a Bimbashi in the Hedjaz forces. Will I do him a favour? I
reply 'yes, if possible'. His family is at MECCA and he wants leave to bring it to
YANBO
* F.O. 882-7, folios 385-390.

140
'How do you, a Baghdadi,come to haveyourfamilyat MECCA?'I ask.

'I brought it from MESOPOTAMIAwhen I joined the Hejaz Army.' I
promisedto write a letter to Jeddahaskingthat facilitiesfor travelbe given if
Hedjaz authoritiesapprove the move. He goes out amidst a reiterationof
profoundthanks,and in his place entersMonsieurLieut.ClaudePROSTof the
FrenchArmy.
'Bonjour, monsieurGarland'.
After a lot of unnecessaryenquiriesas to the state of my health,he proceeds
to divulgehis latest piece of intelligence.'Thereis', he says, 'a cinematographin
MEDINA,with 4000 films.'
Frenchintelligencealwaysdealsin unitsof thousands.
Aftera protractedstay,duringwhichhe has smokedabouthalf a dozenof my
cigarettes,and pumpedme for all he is worth to make me exude, reciprocally,
any similarmomentousintelligenceI may have, he takes his leave and I apply
myselfto my correspondence.
But not for long. I am interruptedby the boisterouspigeon-English'Good
morning'of Said Bey Hamid,Inspectorof Artilleryand assistantchief Banditof
SherifAbdullah'sforce.
'Anynews?'he asks.
'Mafeesh'I reply.
'Do you know', he breaksout after a silence which I have endeavouredto
rendervery suggestive,'I believe the King is not going to give us officersany
gratuitywhenwe leave.'
'Indeed'I reply,half hoping His Majestyhas that intention.'But what more
do you want?You'vebeen gettinggood pay.'
'Butall Governmentsgive theirsoldiersa gratuityaftera war.'
I say that I do not know the arrangementsof the SherifianArmy, and he
replies that if the SherifianGovernmentfails to do its obvious duty in this
matter, the British Government,which was responsiblefor bringing Syrian,
Baghdadianand othersoldiersto fightthe Turk,shouldgive the gratuities.
My efforts to change the subjectof conversationare unavailingand SAID
Bey proceedsto detailthe circumstancesunderwhichhe and his brotherofficers
wereinducedto takearmsagainstthe Turks.
As I happen to know that SAID Bey Hamid is about as undeservingof a
gratuityas anyone possiblycould be. I feel I cannot take much interestin his
arguments,and he accepts the dismissalI infer by continuingmy correspondence.
It is now 11 a.m. and a post fromYamboarrives.I am in the midstof reading
it throughwhen Doctor Issa walksin. Dr Issa is a stayerand veryfond of cigars.
I have not had time to hide the box containingmy last five, consequentlyhe
helps himselfand proceedsto ask:
'Arethe Allies going to give Syriato the Kingof the Hedjaz?'
'I don'tknow'.
'Surelythey are not going to put an intellectualpeople under the King of a
countrylike this?'
'I don'tknow'.
'Do you thinkthe Frenchwill get Syria?'
'I don'tknow'.
'Do you know the Syrianswantindependence?'
'I know nothingexceptthat I recentlyreadin a paperthat Syriais to selectits
own Govermnent'.
'Oh yes', repliedDr Issa, 'Somefew peoplewho have receivedFrenchgold in
the past will vote for France,but they arenot representative.'

141
Dr ISSA then enters into a lengthy discussionin the course of which he

describesthe awfulresultsthatwill ensueif eitherthe FrenchGovernmentor the
King of the Hedjaztakesover Syria,or if the King retainsDamascus.
I have nothingto say. Beingat presenta soldier,I am preventedfromstating
any personalopinions.
Having finished his cigar, Dr Issa takes another, and departs. In a few
moments Sherif Abdullah pops in and after seating himself, breaks out 'Ye
MajorGarland',(he alwaysinsistson the 'Major').'Whatis going to happento
Mesopotamiaand Syria?'
MentallyI feel roundfor my bumpof diplomacy,but cannotthinkof a better
answerthan the one I gave to Dr Issa, 'I don'tknow'.Thenhe expounds,'When
we enteredthe war,we had an agreementwith the BritishGovernmentthat the
ArabCountries,exceptthosealreadyunderBritishProtection,shouldbe ours.'
'The BritishGovernment',I reply, 'as you no doubt know, makes a point of
standingby its agreements:but the map of the worldis going to be decidednow,
not by the BritishGovernment,but by a conferenceof all the Powersthat have
been associatedagainstGermanyand her Allies. I feel sure that the decisions
they makewill not be unfair.'
SherifAbdullahdoes not appearto be too pleasedwith this replybut it was
my best efforton the spurof the moment.
After askingme what whiskyis made from, the Emirleaves for his mid-day
prayer,I begin to feel tired of visitors,but there is no relief, for Rashid Bey
comes into the tent full of 'good mornings'whichhe followswith the questIon:
'Is it trueMesopotamiais gettingindependence?'
'I don'tknow'.
'The Britishwill have a lot of troubleif they try to governMesopotamia,'he
statesfrankly.
I reply that althoughI don't know whetherthe BritishGovernmentwants
MESOPOTAMIAor not, I do know that I don't.
Rashid Bey has got a comfortablebank account and thinks of nothing else
but gettingback to BAGHDAD to investhis moneythere.He is the verypicture
of exquisitemisery.
But he eventuallysays 'adieu',and I settledown againto my letters.
In a few moments,a slaveof the Emirscomes to tell me that lunchis ready.
We lunch off very palatablefood, though one could wish the servantswho
serveit would cleansetheirgarmentsmorefrequently.SherifAbdullahis always
veryamiableat mealtimesand monopolisesthe conversation.
Whencoffee and tea is served,we sit in a circleand the Emirsuddenlybreaks
the silencewith 'Ya MajorGarland,in your countrydo the girlson theirbridal
nightscry and refusetheirhusbands?'
Abdullah has an awful bad habit of breakinga splendid silence with an
astoundingquestionof that sort.
I do not propose to record my reply, but the Sherif said that Arab wives
usually do, and that they put up a tremendousbarragesof tears; which gave
SherifNasir the chanceof epigrammatically
adding'the greaterthe fortification,
the moresatisfactionin reducingit.'
Then I was regaledwith tales of Arab marriagesand took my leave about 3
pm.
Shortlyafterwardsa Turkishprisonerappearedat my tent complainingthat
he had no blanket and the weather is very cold. I gave him a note to the
Commandantaskingthat a blanketbe issuedand he went away feelingthat the
BritishareTHE people.
I felt that I was nowjustifiedin takinga little rest,but hardlyhad I settledon

142
my bed before IZZETEff. came into the tent and said he would like to send
some money to his familyat BAGHDAD. I couldn'thelp feelingsorryhe had a
family,but took his money and agreedto despatchit in due course.He seemed
inclinedto makea protractedstay but left when I took off my coat and returned
to my bed.
Shortlyafter, my servantcame in and said an Egyptianwanted to see me.
Now, after mixingwith BAGHDADISand BEDUIN it is a real treat to see an
Egyptianand I felt compelledto listento his grievance.He said he was a civilian
but had been in the E.A. He had lost his Armydischargecertificate.I told him
not to worryand that I would give him a certificateswearing.......
1918he
had come to me and had statedthat he hadjust lost his dischargecertificate.He
went away quite content.Five o'clockhad come roundand with it came Sherif
Abdul Kerim el Bedawi. Abdul Kerim had a terriblelot of salaams to get
throughbecausehe had not seen me for a long time,to wit, one month.
Abdul Kerim is distressinglyimportantin demeanour,almost regal, and
considershimselfthe last wordin correctconduct.We are old friends,or at least
I shouldsay he considersI am an old friendof his. I knowAbdul Kerimthrough
and through,but I must keep in with him now, because the Turkishprisoners
have shortlyto pass throughhis country.
'Mafeeshmowash',he exclaims.
'Ya salaam',I reply.
'No', he continues,'now eleven months withoutpay, and the Bedu will not
standsuch treatment.'
'No doubt the Emirwill give you a nice sum out of the next consignment,'I
answer.
'Inshallah'.
AbdulKerimhelpshimselfto half a dozencigarettesand leaves.
Enter a very black person whom I do not recognizein the darkness.He
attemptsto kiss my handand turnsout to be one of Abdullah'sslaves.
From his enquiriesand those that have precededthem duringthe day, one
would thinkthe state of my healthwas one of the most momentousquestionsof
the day. I satisfyhis anxietyand, seatinghimself,he tells me how, about a year
beforethe war,he took a voyagefromPortSudanin a sambukand on arrivalat
Jeddahwas takenby BEDUIN as a slave, the pricepaid being 7 Reals; how he
was ultimatelysold for ?32 somewherenearRabegh.But he has not come to ask
for freedomfromslavery,for he proceeds:'No pay for fourmonthsnow'.
'Really'
'No, and we are all hardup'.
'Really!'
Anothersilenceensues,but he spoils it with a requestthat I shouldlend him
fourpounds.
'Fourpounds!Do you thinkI am a bank?'I ask.
'It is verynecessaryfor me', he responds.
'I'msorry,but it can'tbe done.'
I hand him PT.50 to coverimmediatedemandsand he departswithoutmuch
externalindicationof gratitude.
Dinner time has come round and I go to dine with SAID HILMI and his
seniorofficers.The topic of conversationis WADI KHURMA. SherifAbdullah
has told them duringthe day of the Army'sforthcomingmove to that district
and the officers,in turn, explain for my benefit how they were broughtfrom
Indiaand elsewhereunderthe auspicesof the BritishGovernment,and that they
agreedto fight, not under any special flag, but solely to drive away the Turk.

143
They explain that when the Turks have evacuatedArabia their duty will be
finished,and they have no intentionof joining in any combat of Arab versus
Arab.
And how hard they try to draw from me some statementof opinion on the
matter!But my ignoranceis again colossaland I can only replythat, if, as they
assert, they are now citizens of independent countries, viz Syria and
Mesopotamia,no doubt they will be able to claim all the privilegesof such
citizenshipin due course.
And with that I retirefeelingthat my campbed is a relieffromthe hot-bedof
Arabpoliticsin whichat presentI havemy being.
H. Garland.
signed:
Captain.
Copiesto:-Colonel Wilson,C.M.G.,D.S.O.
MajorCornwallis,D.S.O.


The Surrender of Medina, January 1919

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The Surrender of Medina, January 1919

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The Surrender of Medina, January 1919

Author(s): Elie Kedourie

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