CASE 264: JOVELLANOS v.

COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a
contract denominated as a lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon
City Community Development Project, including a bungalow located at and known as No. 55 South Maya
Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with
whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30,
1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein
co-respondents.
Mercy Jovellanos, the daughter from the 1st marriage married Gil Martinez and at the request of Daniel
Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. With the lease amounts having been
paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, Daniel
Jovellanos donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon.
In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was
acquired by the deceased while their marriage was still subsisting which forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. Mercy and her siblings (petitioners) contend that the property, were
acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale
agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
ISSUE: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage
HELD: Yes, the house and lot pertains to the second marriage

RATIO: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is also in the nature of a contract to sell, as
contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not
transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership
is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment
of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum
reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan.
Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership of the land only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8,
1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since in
1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, the property belonged to his conjugal partnership
with his said second wife. Since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding
reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Article 118 of the
Family Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
CASE 269: HOMEOWNERS v. DAILO
FACTS: Miguela and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the
spouses purchased a house and lot in Barangay. San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property.
The deed of absolute sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee to
the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses
house and lot in San Pablo City. Gesmundo obtained a P300,000 loan, and as security, she executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of the Bank. However, this
transaction, including the execution of the SPA, took place without Miguelas knowledge.
The loan was not paid, and so the Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property and consequently, the Bank, being the highest bidder in the public sale, was issued a Certificate of
Sale. Marcelino died in 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, she learned that the Bank had

already employed Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford seldan, was destroyed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming she had no knowledge of the
mortgage on the subject conjugal property, she instituted a civil case for the nullity of the certificate of sale.
The bank was ordered to reconvey the said property. On appeal, the CA declared as void the mortgage on
the subject property since it was constituted without the wifes knowledge and consent.
ISSUE: WON the payment of the principal obligation on the mortgage should be made by the conjugal
partnership
HELD: No, the conjugal partnership is not liable for the payment of the loan
RATIO: Article 124 provides for the joint administration of conjugal properties. HSLB says that the framers
could not have intended that the co-owner spouse cannot exercise his full rights because of the bar in Article
124. There is no marriage settlement between Miguela and her dead spouse, so their property regime is
automatically conjugal partnership of gains. If there is no consent as to the action of one spouse with
regards to the administration of the property, the same is void.
Under FC 121, the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. There is
nothing in the records to compel a finding that indeed, the loan obtained by Marcelino redounded to the
benefit of the family, and so, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of principal
obligation. HSLB alleges that the loan was used to finance the construction of housing units but it was not
proven. Also, since they kept on saying that Marcelino owned the property in his individual capacity, it cannot
be admitted that the money was used for his family
CASE 277: CARLOS v. ABELARDO
FACTS: Honorio Carlos loaned to his son-in-law Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa $25K for the
purchase of their conjugal house at Paranaque, Metro Manila and to enable and assist the spouses conduct
their married life independently and on their own. Carlos issued a check in the name of a certain Pura
Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged the receipt. When he inquired on the loan he gave them
they told them that they are not yet in the position to pay. Thereafter they have expressed violent resistance
to petitioners inquiries this included dead threats. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela but this time the couple
was already separated for more than a year and they filed separate answers. The wife, Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from Carlos. She claimed, however,
that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate
payment of the full amount.
Her husband on the other hand claimed that the $25K was not a loan but his share of income on contracts
he obtained from the Construction Co. of Honorio.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership
HELD: Yes because it is clear that a loan was executed and was used for the benefit of their family
RATIO: We must remember that a payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25k was used to purchase the
subject house and lot.
Manuel and Maria Theresa did not deny that the house served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
family. Thus, respondent Abelardos are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Manuel also
cannot allege as a defense that the $25k was received as his share in the income or profits of the
corporation and not as a loan because he does not appear to be a stockholder or an employee or an agent
of the corporation, H. L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to
participate in the income or profits thereof.

CASE 282: BUADO v. BUADO

FACTS: Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of slander against spouses Roberto and
Venus Ruado. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the
petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages. The sheriff levied and
auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. The conjugal property of Erlinda, which was
valued at Php 500,000, was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for only Php 51,685. A year
after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of
Romulo Nicol. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has
jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners Buado filed a petition
where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision
given by the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: No, under the conjugal partnership of gains, it cannot be held liable without any advantage or benefit
benefiting the conjugal partnership
RATIO: The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse. The Court held in the case of Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya that a spouse is
deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in
bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal
property. Pursuant to Mariano vs. CA, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment
debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not; and the court ruled that the conjugal
property of Erlinda and Romulo is not chargeable to the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability.
The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless
some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Unlike in the system of
absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse) Moreover it cannot be said that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
CASE 288: AGGABAO v. PARULAN
FACTS: Involved in this case are two parcels of land and their improvements in Paraaque City which are
registered under the name of Spouses Parulan, who have been separated from one another. Real estate
broker Atanacio offered the property to Spouses Aggabao who upon Atanacios insistence prevailed upon
them, so they met with Ma. Elena who was Parulans wife at the location of the property. During their
meeting, Spouses Aggabao paid Ma. Elena earnest money amounting toP20, 000 which she acknowledged
with a handwritten receipt. Then and there, they agreed on the terms of how the buyers will pay the price of
the property. Spouses Aggabao complied with all the terms with regard to the payment of the properties, but
when Ma. Elena already needed to turn over the owners duplicate copies for both lands; she was able to
turn over only one which was successfully transferred to the name of spouses Aggabao.
For the other one, she said that it is with a relative in HongKong but she promised to deliver it to the spouses
in a week. However, she failed to do so and by doing their own verification, spouses Aggabao found out that
said copy of title was in the hands of Dionisios brother. The spouses met with Dionisios brother, Atty.
Parulan, who told them that he is the one with the power to sell the property. He demanded P800, 000 for
said property and gave the spouses several days to decide. When Atty. Parulan did not hear back from the
spouses, he gave them a call and was then informed that they have already paid the full amount to Ma.
Elena. Subsequently, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the declaration of
the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof.
The RTC of Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of spouses Aggabao covering
two parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband
Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON the sale of the conjugal property made by Ma. Elena by presenting a special power of attorney
purportedly executed by respondent husband in her favor was validly made to vendees

HELD: No, the Court ruled that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not
merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
RATIO: Article 124 of the Family Code provides that: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa,
for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil
Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency,
was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer
the property.
Spouses Aggabao cannot use the defense that they are buyers in good faith because they did not exercise
the necessary prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to sell.
CASE 294: FRENZEL v. CATITO
FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, a German, married Teresita Santos in 1976 but the couple separated
without obtaining divorce in 1981. While in Australia, Frenzel met Erlinda Catito, who unknown to him, was
married to another German. They fell in love and went back to the Philippines and agreed to start a beauty
parlor business. Catito found a building in Manila for the parlor and used P 20,000 from Frenzel to purchase
the rights over the property and P300, 000 to buy equipment. Frenzel then bought a house and lot from
Victoria Binuya Steckle for $20,000 and had it named under Catito. Frenzel sold all his property in Australia
and Papua New Guinea and transferred them to an account under Catitos name in Manila, and HSBC
Macao.
Frenzel discovered that Catito was married to another German since October 1978. He confronted Catito
who promised him that she would get a divorce. Frenzel paid for the lawyers services. More and more
properties bought allegedly using the funds of Frenzel. The divorce in Germany was denied. The German
husband of Catito filed a charge for bigamy. Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She
admitted that the money used for the purchase of the properties in Davao were his. The last straw for Alfred
came when someone smashed the front and rear windshields of Alfred's car and damaged the windows.
Frenzel filed a Complaint against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real
and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. Frenzel alleged that Ederlina, without his
knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own
account with the same bank. Afterwards, Frenzel filed another complaint against Ederlina with the RTC of
Davao, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money,
and damages. Quezon City Trial Court decided in favor of Frenzel but the Davao Trial Court is in favor of
Ederlina. The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of
land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the
properties, he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien, he
was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to
the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the Frenzel was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent. CA affirmed the decision of Davao City Court.
ISSUE: WON the court can compel Catito to return the money and other properties to Alfred
HELD: No because of In Pari Delicto
RATIO: In pari delicto and Constitutional Prohibition: Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other,
the defendant is in the stronger positionit signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a
court of law will administer a remedy.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands in the public domain. Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the
public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Alfred was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even
before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had
the deed of sale placed under Catito's name as the sole vendee and Catito was herself married to Klaus
Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The
evidence on record shows that the Frenzel in fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but
nonetheless purchased the subject properties under the name of Catito and paid the purchase prices
therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that Frenzel and Catito were capacitated to marry, Fretzel is
still disqualified to own the properties in tandem with Catito. From the evidence acquired, the three parcels
of land subject of the complaint were not mortgaged to the Frenzel by the owners thereof but were sold to
the Catito as the vendee, even though with the use of the Frenzel's personal funds.
Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, Frenzel cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
CASE 304: CABREZA v. CABREZA
FACTS: Ceferino filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo, which the RTC granted. The court
dissolved the conjugal partnership in accordance Article 129 of the Family Code. After the declaration,
Ceferino filed a motion for execution of the judgment dissolving their conjugal partnership, and since it was
composed of a single piece of property (their house), the motion was aimed toward its sale. The RTC
granted the motion and the sale (even authorizing Ceferino to sign on behalf of Amparo). Amparo moved to
reconsider, but the motion was denied. The RTC then granted a writ of possession in favor of the buyer, BJD
Holdings. A notice to vacate was then served on Amparo and her family. Amparo tried to stop the orders
through a motion for abeyance, arguing that Article 129 (9) of the Family Code says that she should get the
house since she's the spouse whom majority of the children chose to stay with. The RTC denied the motion
and the subsequent motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON Amparo's motions should be granted
HELD: No, she cannot stop the orders through a motion for abeyance
RATIO: The Article 129 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where there are other properties aside
from the property subject of the motion. Since Amparo was not able to prove that there were other
properties, the motion cannot be granted. Even if she's telling the truth, the order has already become final
and executory.