Beruflich Dokumente
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law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property. While it is true that
a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate
mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with
separately and apart from the land. In the same manner, this Court has also established
that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be
validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage. Under the foregoing
considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his
own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents
and purposes a valid mortgage.
But it is a different matter, as regards the second mortgage executed over the same
properties on May 2, 1973 for an additional loan of P20,000.00 which was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City on the same date. Relative thereto, it is
evident that such mortgage executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the
Original Certificate of Title, falls squarely under the prohibitions stated in Sections 121,
122 and 124 of the Public Land Act and Section 2 of Republic Act 730, and is therefore
null and void.
We believe that as in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of the State
neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a void contract. Indeed, it
is generally considered that as between parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to
it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy.
Sergs. vs. PCI Leasing
GR# 137705 /Aug. 22, 2000
338 SCRA 499
Facts: PCI Leasing, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for collection of sum of money
with an application of a writ of replevin. Upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing,
respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the
machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the
necessary expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioners
factory, seized one machinery with *the+ word that he *would+ return for the other
machineries. Petitioner Sergs filed a motion for special protective order invoking the
power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its
processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of
replevin. This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties
[were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. In their
Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial
to innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from
treating these machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged
agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. The sheriff again sought to
enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He was
able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. The CA
Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools and equipment
in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be personal property not subject
to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and
equipment.
Issue: WON the machines and equipment are subject to Real Property Tax
Facts: This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks
installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it
leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery
compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants. According to
Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot.
Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost
layer, a sand pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt
stratum as the top layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer,
Held: We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and
which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular wall made of
concrete, eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from sliding. Hence, according to
Meralco, the tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the
concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by
bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Each empty tank
can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location with water four feet deep.
Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when
so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61
Phil 709).
Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's decision and
resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave
error of law in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes
they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York
vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila
Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within
the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The
steel towers were considered personalty because they were attached to square metal
frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and
dismantled.
Issue: WON the said fuel tanks are subject to Realty Tax.
Held: The tanks are considered real properties subject to Realty Tax. We hold that while
the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree
of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco
for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs.
Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
Laurel v. Abrogar
GR# 155076/ Jan. 13, 2009
576 SCRA 41
FACTS: PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for allegedly
using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international long distance calls
belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method
of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from
PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage
and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)," on the ground
that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of
theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as well as
petitioners subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court. In his petition for
review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the
context of the Civil Codes definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of
real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not
included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
used the words "personal property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal
properties" as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls
and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal
properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the
phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to
electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property
susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that "business" is not personal property. It is
not the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right is
what is considered as property. Since the
services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be subject of
theft.
ISSUE: WON the international calls as well as the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
HELD: The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court and
the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended
Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of
the private offended party because the international calls, although considered as
personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be liable for theft
on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is a personal property
which is capable of being appropriated hence subject tot theft. In explaining its decision,
the court said:
Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the definition of
the term "personal property" in the penal code provision on theft had been established in
Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos,
and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible
or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of
theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term
"personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of
the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the
term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context
of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that
where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as
having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words
used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have
been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal
property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal
code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which
is defined as "carrying away."7 Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft
provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business,
however, it may be appropriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is
converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party
called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed
Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article
416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under
control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter
alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be
said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to
PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely
encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone
calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its
consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business.
Acap vs. CA
GR# 118114 /Dec. 07, 1995
251 SCRA 30
FACTS: Felixberto Vasquez inherited a parcel of land from his parents, the ownership of
which he transferred in favor of Cosme Pido by executing a Declaration of Heirship and
Deed of Absolute Sale. Pido, however, died and was survived by his wife. All of their
heirs executed Declaration of Heirship with waiver of rights for the transfer of said land
to private respondent De los Reyes. It appeared however, that even during the time that
the land was allegedly transferred to respondent, petitioner Acap remained as the tenant
of the land. By reason of the transfer, respondent now wanted the lease rentals to be
paid to him. Initially both parties allegedly agreed but when respondent demanded for
the payment, petitioner regused to recognize respondent as owner of the land.
Respondent was thus prompted to file a complaint for recovery of possession of the land
against petitioner. It was, however, the contention of petitioner that he had no knowledge
of any sale or transfer of the land to respondent. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of respondent and recognized the latters ownership over the land. When petitioner
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is
no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs
and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of
private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot
remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the
land and title the same in private respondent's name.
Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. CA
GR# 112519/ Nov. 14, 1996
264 SCRA 181
FACTS: A conflict arose with respect to ownership of Lot 1272 located somewhere in
Balanga, Bataan. Said lot was allegedly ceded thru donation by the the then parish
priest of Catholic Archbishop of Manila, prior thereto or on August 23, 1936, in favor of
the predecessor of private respondent. Said predecessor, before her death, was able to
give said lot to private respondent, also through a deed of donation. The deed was
however, refused to be registered, for unknown reasons, by the Registered of Deeds.
Despite this, however, the latter, when his predecessor died in 1945 without an issu, had
allegedly been in open and continuous possession of said lot, built a house thereon and
declared it for tax purposes until his ownership was disturbed on November 5, 1985 or
more than 49 years after said donation, by petitioner (who obtained it from Roman
Catholic Bishop of Balanga, and the latter from Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila) when
petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent. In its complaint, petitioner alleged
that during the Japanese occupation, without its knowledge and prior consent, private
respondent entered and occupied the subject property; that despite requests by
petitioner, private respondent refused to vacate the property in question.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the action has
been barred by prescription for having been filed after more than 49 years after the
donation. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto alleging that the defense of prescription
was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the
answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA stated that private
respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through
acquisitive prescription because the same having been duly registered under the
Torrens system, title thereto was indefeasible.
Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of
laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the
deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of
an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its
rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its own
inexcusable negligence and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its rights over a
tremendously long period of time.
In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the
subject property to her nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon
acceptance of the gift, private respondent immediately took possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land
taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.
The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus
clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in
continuation of the occupation of the same nature regarding the same property by the
donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches exists.
The second element also exists in this case. The second element is three-tiered: (a)
knowledge of defendant's action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such
knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the
trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the
subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore,
petitioner was clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject property
in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony of its own authorized
representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the subject property was so
proximately located to the rest of petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of
ignorance of private respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of
petitioner.
From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually
commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to
file the appropriate action to have the donation of the subject property to Ana de los
Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said
property from its present occupants.
Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to
first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such,
the second element of knowledge, opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is
undoubtedly present in the instant controversy.
The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that
impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part of private
respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated property. There was
neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed
private respondent of petitioner's intentions. In other words, private respondent
manifestly had every reason to believe that, with the passing of almost half a century
since his predecessor-in-interest accepted the donated property and without
unambiguous intimation of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure
in his possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.
In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer
irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner's
inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting its rights.
In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had
lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's
predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by
petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim
nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified
inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long. 50
Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction,
knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land,
paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to
spring an ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land
values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51 Considerable
delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of
merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is
threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches
from questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At any rate,
petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from private
respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and
neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might
have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance
resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file
seasonably the necessary suit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to be reimbursed for the value of the building and the
improvements thereon.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we
believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering
that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that
the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid
although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Pecson vs. CA
GR# 115814/ May 26, 1995
244 SCRA 407
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of a commercial lot with an apartment
building. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon, the lot was sold at a public auction to
Nepumoceno who in turn sold it to spouses Naguid. Petitioner challenged the validity of
the sale and alleged that the sale did not include the building. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent but ruled that there is no legal basis to conclude
that the sale included the building. When the case was appealed, the CA affirmed the
RTCs decision and also agreed with the RTC that the sale of the lot did not include the
building. In the meantime, the spouses Naguid filed a motion for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. In their
complaint, they admitted that the building was under lease by some tenants. They
further agreed to comply with the rules on reimbursement of the value of the building for
according to them, petitioner was a builder in good faith. The trial court rendered the
assailed decision ordering the spouses, among others, to reimburse the petitioner with
the value of the building; to offset the rental payments previously collected by petitioner
from the tenants of the lot, from the value of the building which will be reimbursed by the
spouses to petitioner. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari.
HELD: Yes. By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is
claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted
something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad
faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in
determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said
so in Coleongco vs. Regalado:
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed
the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies
only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in
bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a
building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on
the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,
the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should
be determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief
that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market
value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the
petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court
in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court pegged the value of the useful
improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of
strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs.
Agana, despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in
1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand
pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount
of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In
the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a
useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights
Narvaez v. Alciso
GR# 165907 /July 27, 2009
594 SCRA 60
FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of land situated in Benguet which she allegedly sold
with right to repurchase, first, to Sansano in 1979, which he later repurchased; and
second, to Baet in 1980. Baet in turn sold the land to spouses Narvaez in 1981. As per
demand of respondent, however, the deed of sale between Baet and Narvaez contained
a stipulation which allows respondent to repurchase said land from spouses Narvaez.
The Spouses Narvaez furnished respondent with a copy of the Deed. Corollary to the
said sale, spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the said land. When
respondent was about to exercise its right to repurchase, she and the spouses Narvaez
did not agree with the selling price prompting respondent to file a complaint praying for
the cancellation of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sale alleging that her true intention was to
mortgage the land and not to sell it and also praying that spouses Narvaez should
reconvey the land to her. The court rendered a decision declaring that the repurchase in
the 1979 sale becomes functus officio when she repurchased the property; the action to
annul the 1980 sale had prescribed; and that she had no legal personality to annul the
1981 sale but she could repurchase the land and appropriate the commercial building
after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its market value or sell the land
to spouses Narvaez. The spouses appealed. The CA rendered a decision applying Art.
448 of the Civil Code to the extent of declaring that the Spouses Narvaez were builders
in good faith and that respondent could either appropriate the commercial building after
payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land,
unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.
ISSUE: WON Art. 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case such that respondent
could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige
the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably
more than that of the building.
HELD: No. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.
Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built
the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy
the land, which they own, would be absurd.
In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles 1606 and
1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Articles 1606 and 1616 state:
Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express
agreement, shall last four years from the date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the
time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a
true sale with right to repurchase.
Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying the Spouses
Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate
payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made
on the thing sold. In the present case, the cost of the building constitutes a useful
expense. Useful expenses include improvements which augment the value of the
land.28
Cheng v. Donini
GR# 167017/ June 22, 2009
590 SCRA 406
FACTS: There was an oral lease agreement between Cheng and Sps. Donini on the
formers property in Mandaluyong City. Respondents Donini, put up a restaurant in the
leased property and agreed to pay a monthly rental of P17, 000 from December 1990.
Later on, respondents proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises. However,
before respondents business could take off and before any final lease agreement could
be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its
terms and conditions. Petitioner Cheng thus wrote respondents on January 28, 1991,
demanding payment of the deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to
continue with the agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however,
ignoring petitioners demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17, 1991
when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner.
Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages before RTC
Pasig and prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract for five
years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of
P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and
compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorneys
fees.
Petitioner, in his answer, denied respondents claims and sought the award of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its
decision dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a
new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing
the latters expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises.
10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of
reimbursement had no factual and legal bases, but this was denied by the CA in its
resolution dated February 21, 2005.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON respondents are builders or possessors in good faith?
HELD: NO. SC held that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under
these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on
the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and
546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one
who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is
one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.
Herein, respondents cannot be considered possessors or builders in good faith. As
early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., the Court clarified that
a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good faith x x x This principle of
possessor in good faith naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he
knows that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can he deny the
ownership or title of his lessor. Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues
only during the life of the lease contract and that he must vacate the property upon
termination of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces
improvements on
said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the
lessor, much less retain the premises until such reimbursement.
Being mere lessees, respondents knew that their right to occupy the premises existed
only for the duration of the lease. Cortez v. Manimbo went further to state that: If the rule
were otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out
of his property. These principles have been consistently adhered to and applied by the
Court in many cases.
It appears, however, that as soon as respondents vacated the premises, petitioner
immediately reclaimed the property and barred respondents from entering it.
Respondents also alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that the property subject of this
case had already been leased to another entity since 1991.
This is where
considerations of equity should come into play. It is obviously no longer feasible for
respondents to remove the improvements from the property, if they still exist. Petitioner
should, therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is in accord
with the laws intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now has to pay onehalf of the value of the useful improvements at the end of the lease because the lessee
has already enjoyed the same, whereas the lessor can enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.
11
are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and
subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option,
a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably
higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay
reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the
land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The
raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced coownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse
to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
HELD: YES. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing
or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
FACTS: In 1945, Maria Coprada (respondent) was able to persuade spouses Marcos
(petitioners Esmaquel and Victoria) to allow her and her family to use and occupy a
parcel of land in Laguna for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the
premises should the owners/petitioners need to use the same. Respondent and her
family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners did
not oblige the respondents to pay rent and never made an attempt to drive them away
out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place to live in.
12
On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation
of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorneys Fees against Antonio. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision sustaining Filomenas ownership on the ground that it was
Filomena who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than
Antonio. On their separate appeals with the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC for
upholding Filomenas ownership of the lot in question and for declaring Antonio a builder
in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to
determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, and the amount due Antonio. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON respondent Antonio is a builder in good faith?
HELD: YES. Antonio is a builder in good faith. In this case, Antonio was not aware of
any flaw in his title. He believed being the owner of the subject premises on account of
the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. The
improvement was, in fact, introduced by Antonio prior to Filomenas purchase of the
land.
Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the
land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good
faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred;
it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in
trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to
administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other
may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is
therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis
of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who
would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit
apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be
allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon
which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be
paid by the landowner.
Briones vs.Macabagdal
GR# 150666/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 300
FACTS: Respondent-spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty Investments
Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land located in Vergonville
Subdivision No. 10 at Las Pias City, Metro Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds of
13
only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may
remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property in accordance with
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. This case was remanded to the RTC to conduct
the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of
the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the
lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.
14
15
(1)34 of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. Clearly, the Republic is the
entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.
The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same,
at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property.
As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights
to the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of
Cuevass intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and not the
properties themselves. At the time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a
pending sales application before the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24, 1996,
that titles were issued in Tanjuatcos name. The assignment not being a sale of real
property, it was not surprising that Cuevas demanded from Tanjuatco only P85,000 for
the transfer of rights.
Meneses vs. CA
GR# 83059/ July 14, 1995
246 SCRA 162
Facts: In 1977, Pablito Meneses was issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title
over two parcels of land located in Los Baos, Laguna. Pablito Meneses acquired said
property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights
executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and
"some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses. After the execution of said
document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements
thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding
realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia
(Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as
September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square
meters located in Los Baos, Laguna with the Laguna de
Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August
14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs:
Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and
Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing. The Quisumbings applied for registration and
confirmation of title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by
the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay.
The Quisumbings then filed a complaint against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio
C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to
Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Meneses, then the Mayor of Los Baos,
16
Respondents filed a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners on April 21, 2005. In
the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have
a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC issued an Order denying the
petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to
prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has
not yet been granted. CA reversed.
Issue: W/N the character of respondents possession and occupation of the subject
property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
Held: Yes. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the
case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
Civil Code.
Under these provisions, its is clear that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of
law.
Since for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property through prescription.
Almagro vs. Kwan
GR# 175806/175810/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 250
Facts: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181
square meter parcel of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18
September 1996, they filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and
damages against the occupants, on of which are the Petitioners. MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become
foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of subject
lot on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001
when the high tide registered 1.5 meters. RTC concluded that the small portion of
respondents property which remains as dry land is not within the scope of the wellsettled definition of foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not adjacent to
17
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, (CENRO) DENR,
which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land approved as such under on March 15, 1982."
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republic interposed an appeal to
the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length
of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA reversed the RTC. It held that under Sec 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, it noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had
verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982,
the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession. This interpretation of the CA was based on the Courts ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto.
Malabanan died while the case was pending. Heirs appealed the decision
Issues: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Held: The Petition is denied. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,
such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
18
insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and executory in
1991.
Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property
before the Bureau of Lands. Casios application was ordered cancelled by DENRCENRO. In 2000, Spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to the
subject property before the RTC, invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. RTC granted the application of
Spouses Tan. CA reversed the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan
failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject
property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the
spouses Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title.
Ruling: The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, governs
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which
public lands may be disposed of, to wit:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably
inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title over the subject property. Judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by
persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073 (b): Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only be entitled
to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of their
19
Republic opposed on the following grounds: (1) that Tsai and her predecessors-ininterest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence and (3) that the property forms part of
the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
Trial court granted Tsai's application for registration. The Republic appealed to the
CA. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack of
proof of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Held: The petition has merit.
In Tsai's original application before the trial court, she claimed that she was
entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the subject
property under PD 1529. However, she did not specify under what paragraph of Section
14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. It appears that she filed her application
under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - xxx
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, there are three requisites: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration
derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or
more is not sufficient. Since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now
be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject
property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Tsai's evidence was not enough to
20
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of PD 1529 may defeat petitioners right that has already
been vested prior to promulgation thereof.
Tsai also failed to prove that the subject property has been declared alienable and
disposable by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.
HELD: As for petitioner's invocation of the provisions of the Public Land Act to have her
applications considered as confirmations of imperfect titles, the same fails. When
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which made June 12, 1945 as the cut-off date, the amendment made the law concordant
with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the latter operates when
there exists a title which only needs confirmation, while the former works under the
presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State. While the subject lots
were verified to be alienable or disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no
sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over them by petitioner
and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner's
applications cannot thus be granted.
While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of at least 30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
use, public service or the development of national wealth. 42 And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is
no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public
service. The classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain does not change its status as properties of the public dominion. Petitioner
cannot thus acquire title to them by prescription as yet.
In Addition:
As gathered from the CENRO Certifications, the lots were verified to be alienable or
disposable lands on March 15, 1982. These Certifications enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. There is also no sufficient proof that
petitioner's predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and adverse
possession of the lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
As for petitioner's reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of realty tax payments,
the documents tax declarations for Lot No. 13687 and Lot No. 13686 which were
issued only in 1991 and 1994, respectively, are indicia of the possession in the concept
of an owner. There is no showing of tax payments before these years.
Rep vs. Ching
21
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
FACTS:
On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Antonio
Ching, filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of land with
improvements, before the RTC. The subject lot is a consolidation of three (3) contiguous
lots situated in Banza, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229 square
meters. Respondent alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from
the late former governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale of Unregistered Lands.
Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that
the land belongs to the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is
doctrinal that, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the
State and the latter is the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in land.
Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, irrefutable evidence must be
shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has been declassified and
now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause
why his application for registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state
the current assessed value of the subject land and his non-compliance with the last
paragraph of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8
The OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte filed an
Opposition to the application for registration of title as well as the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondents application for
registration. The RTC was not convinced that respondents Deed of Sale sufficiently
established that he was the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion
for reconsideration with attached additional tax declarations. The RTC denied.
Respondent appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. CA reversed the RTCs earlier
resolution and granted respondents application for registration of title.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent application for registration of title be granted.
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to
show that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, therefore the
application for registration should be denied.
Likewise, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that
there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration
that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
does not measure up to the time requirement.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1)
of P.D. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. 1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
22
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration of the subject property should be
granted.
Further, the pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land,
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HELD: In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that
the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
The notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Forest Development is insufficient and
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
23
The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application on the grounds a) that neither Roche nor her
predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the required period; and b) that the
land belonged to the State and is not subject to private acquisition.13 The Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) also opposed14
On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17 granting Roches application.
On appeal by the Government,19 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC.20 The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same,
prompting the Government to file the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land subject of Roches application is alienable or disposable
land of the public domain.
HELD: CA decision is reversed and set aside.
The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and that it has
not been released into the mass of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
As such, Roche cannot register title to it in her name.
Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part of the Laguna
Lakes bed since it has always been planted to crops and is not covered by water. R.A.
4850 provides that the Lake is that area covered with water when it is at the average
maximum lake level of 12.50 meters. This presupposed that the lake extends only to
lakeshore lands. The land in this case does not adjoin the Laguna Lake.
An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529, meet three
requirements: a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land;
and c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the
latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land. Thus, the State
presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by
the applicant that the land subject of registration is alienable and disposable.
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of
the land.25 In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of
land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO)26 or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO)27 of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is
within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
24
their respective complaints before the HLURB and the MTC but had already performed
acts and acquired rights, the myriad consequences of which could not possibly be
squarely addressed in the case for unlawful detainer where possession is unlawfully
witliheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.
25
overt acts indicative of his or his predecessors permission to occupy the subject
property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to
prove his claim that petitioners possession of the subject building was by mere
tolerance as alleged in the complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered to be within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere
tolerance always carries with it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction for
silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance. In addition, plaintiff must also show that
the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very start of the
possessionfrom entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no
mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how
and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession
of his property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to
recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover
ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case as
to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Modesto vs. Urbina
GR# 189859/ Oct. 18, 2010
633 SCRA 383
FACTS: In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land situated
at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272. According to Urbina, the
Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of
this property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with
Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the parties could finalize the sale, the
Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership over the
lot. Urbina made several demands on the Modestos to vacate the property, the last of
which was through a demand letter sent on July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still
refused to vacate, Urbina filed the present action against them.
In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of the
property because it was still government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation. The RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision in favor of Urbina on
April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners to immediately vacate and surrender the lot to
Urbina and to pay him P200.00 monthly as compensation for the use of the property
from July 22, 1983 until they finally vacate. The RTC noted that the petitioners
recognized Urbinas possessory rights over the property when they entered into a
negotiated contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the Modestos were estopped
from subsequently assailing or disclaiming Urbinas possessory rights over this lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Urbinas had possessory rights over the property.
HELD: An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to
an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than
one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The
objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
As the court explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court: We hold that the power
and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does
not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and
occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management
Bureau] is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to
public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to determine
who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession
over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police
public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace
among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while
it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards.
The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal
competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. Consequently, while we
leave it to the LMB to determine the issue of who among the parties should be awarded
the title to the subject property, there is no question that we have sufficient authority to
resolve which of the parties is entitled to rightful possession.
On the issue of possessory rights
Prefatorily, the court observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has it
been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB. Therefore, the land remains part
of the public domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership
over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties have the right to
possess the property. Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property
since he has a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application, as well as tax declarations
26
over the property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess the
property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with him for
the sale of the lot in question. On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to
possess the same on their actual possession of the property. They also questioned the
legality of Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his tax declarations over the
property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not alienable
and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.
After reviewing the records of this case, the court finds the reasoning of the Modestos to
be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The court held that Urbina
utterly failed to prove that he has a better right to possess the property. Thus, the court
cannot sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce, must
dismiss the same for lack of merit.
27
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261,
September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its
point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of
the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription.
It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real
property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action
accrues:
x x x xx
3.
Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the
right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of
the fraud;
xxx
xxx
xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive
trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation
to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context,
and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1)
Upon a written contract;
(2)
Upon an obligation created by law;
(3)
Upon a judgment.
x x x x x x x x x. (Italics supplied.)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it
seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the
erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered
on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code
not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at
this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being
then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which provides: In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application.
28
29
just title. In the vintage case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson,
we explained good faith in this manner: One who purchases real estate with knowledge
of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in
good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same
rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only
from the acts of the one claiming it, as it is a condition of mind that can only be judged
by actual or fancied token or signs.
In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesas knowledge or
participation, bought the subject property on September 16, 1977 or during the
pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore, had actual knowledge that
Belachos claim to ownership of the subject property, as Gavinos purported heir, was
disputed because he (Roberto) and Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No.
B-565. Roberto even admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to
avoid any trouble.*35+ He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho.
Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period required for
ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos favor. Even the thirty-year
period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met because of the
respondents claim to have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject
property for only twenty-four years, from the time the subject property was tax declared
in 1974 to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1998. Based on the foregoing, the CA
erred in finding that the respondents acquired the petitioners one-fourth portion of the
subject property through acquisitive prescription. As aptly found by the MCTC, the
respondents are only entitled to three-fourths of the subject property because this was
Gavinos rightful share of the conjugal estate that Roberto bought from Ronito and
Wilfredo Oyao.
30
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis,
allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot
No. 1 together with their respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis
(Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1.
Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000
square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of
their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially
partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of
Margarita. Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and
occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time,
tolerating her first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.
purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather Ap-Ap
(one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during
the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba,
Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said
municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax
declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessors office of
Baguio. On the matter of the applicant*s+ indiguinity *sic+ and qualifications, there is
no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the
Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along
the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita ApAp, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert
Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of
their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing
(Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state
[that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964,
by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective
share of the applicants*+ co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the
execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights.
The trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession
of and claim of ownership over the subject property. The survey plan of the subject
property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax
declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim
that her family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the
property to the exclusion of others. The CA held that the respondent was able to
discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her
documentary evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witness.
31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March
30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26,
2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
32
erroneous in the CAs ruling treating respondents action for reconveyance as an action
to quiet title.
In Mendizabel v. Apao, we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action to quiet
title, explaining, thus:
The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its
owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one
who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.,An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year
prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as
when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real
owner of the property also
remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an
action that is imprescriptible.
Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents action as in the nature of an
action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible error.
2. The Deed of Reconveyance executed by Manuel and Romulo explicitly states that:
[W]e acknowledge and recognized the rights, interests and participation of Celso P.
Quijano, Filipino, of legal age, married to Mina P. Ney and resident of 1648 Main Street,
Paco, Manila, as a co-owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the said lot wherein his
residential house is now constructed at the above-stated address, having paid the
corresponding amount over the said 1/3 portion of the property for the acquisition costs
but whose name does not appear in the Deed of Sale executed in our favor, thus
resulting in the non-conclusion (sic) of his name in the above-stated Transfer Certificate
of Title when issued as a co-owner.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises WE, MANUEL
P. NEY and ROMULO P. NEY, do hereby transfer and convey unto said Spouses Celso
P. Quijano and MINA P. NEY their one-third (1/3) portion share of the aforedescribed
(sic) parcel of land where their residential house is now situated at their above-given
address with an area of forty (40) square meters more or less by virtue of this Deed of
Reconveyance.
Petitioners never denied the due execution of the Deed of Reconveyance. In fact they
admitted that the signatures appearing therein are theirs. The CA cannot, therefore, be
33
faulted for declaring respondents as co-owners of the subject property because it merely
confirmed and enforced the Deed of Reconveyance voluntarily executed by petitioners
in favor of respondents.
Lately, while petitioners were exercising their right over the said lots, defendants refused
to share the fruits of the lot reasoning that they are the owners thereof. Petitioners
learned that defendants filed petition for the reconstitution of the OCTs of said land.
Petitioners thus sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to deliver,
produce and surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of Title. Should the
defendants refuse to deliver the said titles, it is prayed that the court (a) declare OCTs
null and void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds to cancel said titles and in lieu thereof
issue new TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; and (c) declare OCT No. 13237 null and
void for being cancelled by TCT No. RT-3989.
[T]he Deed of Reconveyance, duly signed by [petitioners] themselves, put to rest the
focal issue between the parties. There is no denying that it outweighs the evidence
relied upon by [petitioners] despite the fact that they have the transfer certificate of title
over the entire subject lot. It is settled that it is not the certificate of title that vests
ownership. It merely evidences such title.
In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner
or to one with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently
titled in another person's name. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield
and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in
bad faith. Thus, the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision.
As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the RTC has no
jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties involved does not
exceed P20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to act and take
corrective measures with the Register of Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the alleged
destruction of the documents.
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers,
memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support of their respective
claims.
On January 27, 1998, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that it cannot
interfere with or render null and void the decision made by a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the court which ordered the reconstitution of the OCTs in the name of
Teodosia Boquilaga. Under the circumstances, petitioners owners duplicate certificates
of title in the name of Enrique Toring are deemed "overtaken by the reconstituted title[s]."
Further, the trial court found petitioners guilty of laches in not reconstituting the original
TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring and in not making any opposition to the
reconstitution proceedings filed by the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga. However, it was
declared that the dismissal of the case will not affect the reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989
in the name of Enrique Toring.
Petitioners appealed to the CA arguing that:
1. the trial court erred in concluding that the action is one for the annulment of the order
of the court which granted reconstitution, when in truth the petitioners merely sought the
delivery of the owners duplicate copies of the reconstituted OCTs.
2. the trial court faulted in failing to consider that the defendants predecessor-in-interest
had long ago sold the lots to Enrique Toring, which document of sale defendants have
not denied, and therefore defendant-heirs are no longer owners.
3. the trial court erred in finding them guilty of laches despite recognizing the existence
of the owners duplicate of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; the submission by the
petitioners of annexes in their Comment/Reply to defendants memorandum showing
that there were previous cases wherein petitioners have asserted and defended their
right over the subject properties and prevailed; and the fact that the OCTs were
reconstituted by defendants only in 1995 and the petitioners instituted this case in 1996.
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts ruling.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the CA denied the same.
34
The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish any right over the lots other than their
bare assertion that their predecessor-in-interest purchased these properties from
Teodosia Boquilaga and subsequently titles in his name were issued but were lost
during the last world war. It agreed with the trial court in finding that whatever claim
petitioners have on the subject properties was lost by their unexplained neglect for more
than fifty (50) years since the destruction of the records in the registry of deeds during
the last world war, under the principle of laches. As to the nature of the action filed by
petitioners, the CA likewise affirmed the trial courts ruling that it is one for annulment of
the reconstituted title, which essentially assails the judgment or order of a co-equal
court.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.
In the case at bar, the records showed that the original petition was filed in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bogo-San Remigio, Cebu but was subsequently transferred to the
RTC on motion of the petitioners. TCT Nos. 16802, 16803, 16804 and RT-3989 (T16805) were attached to the petition together with annexes "A", "C" to "G" mentioned
therein.
However, upon elevation to the CA, the records transmitted had missing pages,
including the pages subsequent to the original petition where copies of the aforesaid
TCTs should have been attached. At any rate, there appears to be no indication from the
pleadings filed and orders/decision issued by the trial court throughout the proceedings
that such documentary evidence was not submitted by petitioners. Hence, the CA could
have been misled by the absence of these annexes from the records transmitted on
appeal. Petitioners submitted to this Court the photocopies of TCT Nos. 16802, 16803
and 16804 certified as true copy from the records by the RTC of Bogo, Branch 61 Clerk
of Court VI Atty. Rey Dadula Caayon.
It must be noted that petitioners presented before the trial court the owners duplicate
copies of the said TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Indeed, had these pieces of
evidence been duly considered on appeal, the resolution of the issue of ownership
would have tilted in petitioners favor.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS
RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE
TRIAL COURT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACTION TO ASSAIL THE DECISION OF A
CO-EQUAL COURT, IT APPEARING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT/PETITION WAS
MERELY TO COMPEL DELIVERY OR SURRENDER BY RESPONDENTS OF THE
RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
But first, we resolve the issue of the propriety of the suit filed by the petitioners. The
nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed
irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As gleaned from
the averments of the petition filed before the trial court, though captioned as for delivery
or production of documents and annulment of document, petitioners action was really
for quieting of title and cancellation of reconstituted titles.
Held: The issues raised are purely questions of fact that this Court cannot review in a
petition filed under Rule 45. Ultimately, we are asked to determine the ownership of the
subject lots originally registered in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, respondents
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners had prayed for the following reliefs before the trial court:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued;
a. Directing defendants to deliver, produce, and surrender Original [Certificates] of Title
Nos. RO- 13240, 13238, 13239, and Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 97615 to plaintiffs,
35
make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the
one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly
introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property
as he deems fit.
In alleging that petitioners were not served any notice as actual possessors or adjacent
owners of the petition for reconstitution (Cad Case No. 7, Cad. Rec. No. 442, Decree
Nos. 230739, 230740, 231111 and 231112) filed by the respondents for reconstitution of
OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga which was granted by the court; and that the
said OCTs have already been cancelled by the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique
Toring by virtue of a deed of sale executed in 1927 by Teodosia Boquilaga petitioners
did not just seek to remove any doubt or uncertainty in the title of their predecessor-ininterest over the subject real properties, but also claimed irregularity and defects in the
reconstitution proceedings which resulted in the issuance of reconstituted OCT Nos.
RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga.
If indeed, as petitioners claimed, the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga were
already cancelled and new TCTs have already been issued in the name of Enrique
Toring as early as 1927, then the reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO13239 and RO-13240 issued in Cad Case No. 7, Cad Rec. No. 442 are null and void.
It may also be noted that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondents and the
Certifications issued by the LRA stated only the registration decree numbers issued in
favor of Teodosia Boquilaga without mentioning the numbers of the OCTs and dates of
their issuance. The reconstituted OCTs on their face contained no entry whatsoever as
to the number of the OCT issued pursuant to the decrees of registration, nor the date of
its issuance. We have held that such absence of any document, private or official,
mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was
issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution. Moreover, notice of
hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual possessors
of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect
settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the
land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
The decision granting the petition for reconstitution filed by the respondents was
promulgated on May 9, 1996. There is no allegation or proof that petitioners availed of
the remedies of appeal, petition for relief, certiorari or annulment of judgment before the
CA questioning the validity of the said reconstitution order.
Notwithstanding petitioners failure to avail of the afore-mentioned remedies, the
decision in the reconstitution case is not a bar to the adjudication of the issue of
ownership raised in the present case. The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is
the restoration of an instrument or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Its
purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form they
were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
36
Additionally, petitioners showed that they were never amiss in asserting their rights over
the subject lots whenever any incident threatened their peaceful possession and
ownership.
37
corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Caezo. This awareness of
the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses
Caezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the
spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.
A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be issued against and at the
expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this
judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo P30,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P30,000 as attorneys fees. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall
apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Title III. Co-Ownership (Arts. 484-501)
Republic v. Heirs of Sorono
GR # 171571, Mar. 24, 2008
549 SCRA 58
This is a Petition for review on certiorari to the aardecision of the CA affirming that of the
RTC Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were adjudicated on December 7, 1929
by the then CFI of Cebu in four equal shares. The two lots were not partitioned by the
adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots,
sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on October
11, 1957, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were
the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of
families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot
to enhance airport security in line with the standards set by the International Civil
Aviation Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548 covering Lot
No. 2296 and Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No. 2316. Respondents soon
asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots
but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal
Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the
38
and the redemption price should be of the purchase price paid by the CAA for the two
lots. The trial court thus disposed:
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION WHEN RESPONDENTS NO LONGER HAVE ANY RIGHT TO
RECOVER LOTS 2296 AND 2316 DUE TO THE PRIOR SALE THEREOF TO THE
REPUBLIC AND UPON THE EQUITABLE GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
Held: Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the
sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.
Petitioners insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not
ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. The trial courts discrediting thereof is well
taken. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs in 1957.
The trial courts discrediting of petitioners invocation of laches and prescription of action
is well-taken too.
As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing
market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, "(1) they received just
compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2)
the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth
several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
39
The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. As mentioned
earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale. At
any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree
to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold
against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be
disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
RTCs decision. The CA held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this
case because respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by coowner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. The CA further held that
petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with
the appropriate forum.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to
petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their
successors-in-interest.
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, she filed the instant
petition and raised before us for consideration the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE
BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT
FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES
PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER COOWNER.
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY.
Cruz v. Catapang
GR # 164110, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 512
Facts:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision RTC, which had earlier affirmed the
Decision of the 7th MCTC ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a
portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel
of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod,
Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned coowners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the
abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a
portion of the co-owned property.
When petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property during the first week of September
1995, she was surprised to see a part of respondents house intruding unto a portion of
the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish
the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The
respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of
petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify
defendants construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MCTCs ruling and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Catapang.
Petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya
cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of coownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or
thing owned in common until partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the complaint for
forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that
since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession
de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy
the property.
Issue: Whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct
a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against that person.
Held: As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was
given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a
co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of
the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a
house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to
his or her exclusive use.
40
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the petitioner learned about it.21 Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it
was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property.
Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to
get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is
within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
41
alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of
gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating
their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros,
obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed
several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot
covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the
loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC
decision, and a document denominated as Waiver that Nicholson purportedly executed
on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in
question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation
when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings
under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of
Remate.[3] At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before
the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the
court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that the disputed
lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was
subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
Issue: a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved
the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for
value.
42
required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal
presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in
Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all property
of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof
that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies
even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.[15]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank would
thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the
property in the name of Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual operates to
describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of
the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of
acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the
spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.[16]
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding Metrobank
having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal
ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure
proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt,
however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the
same having been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however
Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the
classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of
Conjugal Ownership Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art.
129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by
Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime,
vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.
43
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful
bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof
heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to
Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask
for the partition of the lot and its property rights shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to *the bank+ in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.*18+
This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.[19]
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank,
there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in
good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking
institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look
beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.[20] Unlike private individuals, it
behooves banks to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered
as security and the validity of the mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable
part of the banks operation.*21+ A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be
accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,[22] as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach
of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA
dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65
in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is
hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is
concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT
No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon are
NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned
by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to
Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Arriola v. Arriola
44
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as
part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by
public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two
phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the
actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common
property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the coownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an
entirely different matter.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken
together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home
within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and
the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution
of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need
anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles
224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles
152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling
structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying
these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner
Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years
back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the
family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of
family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first,
45
46
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed
on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse
of more than 30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor
of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had
already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit
alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts
show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged
deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos
daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence
was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale
made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily
concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia BahiaAbas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in
this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters
and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or
ratified the alleged deed of sale.[9]
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that
Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more
than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.[10] Dominador
merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on
the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading
filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged
that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and
moved to another place. The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo had
any intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardos family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for
taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case
was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to
possession of the land.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states:
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or coowners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or coowners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of
the Civil Code which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
47
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x
xx
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila
where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The
provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00
according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based
on the value alone, being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,[16] we held that:
48
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the
properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who
is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his
mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs onehalf (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being
the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs
further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all
the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since
they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of
the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that
during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had
already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose
Velasquez in the following manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias
dated February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939, for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15129 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia
Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Inter vivos) dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed by third
parties.
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and
plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants
grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to
divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they
did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof
has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all
others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already
barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which
was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents
covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as
49
agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the
parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and
recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years.
The Court finds plaintiff Santiago Meneses credible; and his testimony, credible by itself.
Santiago Meneses who is 80 years old testified spontaneously in a clear, straight
forward and convincing manner.
After trial, the decision was rendered on April 8, 1992 which ruled as follows:8
The version of the defendants to the effect that spouses Cornelio de Guzman and
Leoncia de Guzman left no properties cannot be given serious consideration. It is
incredible and unbelievable.
"From the evidence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are brothers and sisters who are
the children of Estanislao Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman and the defendants are the
children of plaintiffs counsin Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The defendants
mother Tranquilina de Guzman and plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman and Leoncia
de Guzman are full blooded sisters. The subject six (6) parcels of land were conjugal
properties of Leoncia de Guzman and her husband Cornelio Aquino were in their
possession until their death in 1945 and 1947, respectively. After the death of plaintiffs
mother Anatalia de Guzman on September 14, 1978, plaintiff Santiago Meneses came
across an affidavit of Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio Barrozo stating that
he is an adopted son of said spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman (Exhibit
"A") which, is however, not supported by evidence (a court order). The said affidavit
mentioned, among other things, a house and a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 699 located at Guiguilonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, (Exhibit "B"). The
sugar cane and coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing
an area of 27,849 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C") which
was in the possession of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman until their
death. Sometime in
1944 Leoncia de Guzman called a conference among the plaintiffs and spouses Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and told them that all their conjugal properties shall
be divided equally between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman and that
she did not sign documents regarding the conveyance of their properties; and that the
property (parcel B) in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which yielding an annual
produce worth P15,000.00 was divided between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de
Guzman.
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman who were childless had Anatalia de
Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman as their legal heirs. The latter succeeded the
former over the subject six (6) parcels of land in equal shares - belongs to Anatalia de
Guzman and the other half, to Tranquilina de Guzman."
This, notwithstanding the claim of defendants that the first parcel was donated to Jose
Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by way of "Donation Intervivos."
The second parcel, sold to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
The third and 6th parcels, donated to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; and
The 4th and 5th parcels, sold to third parties.
The claim of Cesario Velasquez that he was adopted by the Spouses Cornelio Aquino
and Leoncia de Guzman is not supported by evidence.
How did the spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman support and maintain
themselves if they disposed of their valuable properties, the six (6) parcels of land in
question, during their lifetime? Did they really leave no properties? These questions
remained unanswered.
The defendants failed to prove their allegations that the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and
Leoncia de Guzman disposed of their properties during their lifetime.
Defendant Eliseo Velasquez is a lawyer and his co-defendant brothers are retired
government officials.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs are simple, innocent country folks who have not
obtained substantial level of education.
The Court believes and so holds that the defendants manipulated the transfer unto
themselves all the properties of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman;
thus, depriving the plaintiffs their shares in the inheritance, to their prejudice and
damage.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not partition prescribes, the court believes and so
rules that it does not.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of
limitations.
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of
the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the
properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of
spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.
V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.
Held: Petitioners contend that public respondent erred when it held that the issue of res
judicata was never raised either in the Answer or at the Pre-trial such that it was not
under consideration. We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the defense of
res judicata was raised in the petitioners Amended Answer filed before the trial court
more particularly under paragraph 18, to wit:
50
that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are
present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the
first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
Since the dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this
ground alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However,
considering that this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy
between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural
technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
Petitioners next contend that private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the
nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of
petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to adduce any evidence to support
his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity. Petitioners claim that they were
able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime
disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de
donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a
portion of the second parcel and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the
complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first
parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Escritura de
Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in
favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; (d) Deed
of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a
consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation
propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. Petitioners claim that
the record is bereft of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable array of
documentary evidence but the courts below declared their nullity on the basis of the
"telltale" story of Santiago Meneses. They contend that in giving credence to the
testimony of Santiago Meneses that all the deeds of conveyances executed by the
Aquino spouses in favor of the petitioners were a nullity, Santiago would want to make it
appear that the spouses Aquino, in giving dowry thru escritura de donation propter
nuptias and donation inter vivos, were only fooling the innocent youngsters and then
future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and the innocent minors
donees Jose and Anatascia Velasquez respectively.
Petitioners submission is impressed with merit.
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence
adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below,
51
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient
documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had
already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the
year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter
nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of
donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners
Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated
August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of
Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to
overlook the probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The
donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively
was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and
acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764
and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and
the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for
the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all
their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not
one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July
14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance
executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed
of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of
the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat
52
Issue: Provided that said sale is invalid, does this make Tirso and his sibling co-owners
over these properties.
If yes, is it fatal to the filed case of Partition by Tirso and his siblings his omission to
expressly indicate the fact that they are co-owners.
Held: Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of
the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his
hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the
properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death
(1948). Until then, before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabians intestate
estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the
undivided estate of Don Fabian. And as a co-owner, his right is imprescriptible except
when he expressly repudiates his share. And Soledad, by invoking as defense of
prescription over Tirso and their other siblings, therefore admitted that co-ownership
existed.
Resolving the issue regarding the existence of co-ownership among the heirs, will Tirso
et al can avail the remedy of Partition, when co-ownership is not properly alleged.
SC held Yes. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership,
his demand from, and act of initiating Partition necessarily implies that he was asserting
his right as co-owner of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses and
that he is a co-owner of all said properties to the extent of his legal share or legitime
thereon. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved.
53
Title V. Possession
Chapter 1.Possession and the Kinds Thereof (Arts. 523-530)
Chapter.2 Acquisition of Possession (Arts.
531-538)
Bunyi v. Factor
GR # 172547, Jun. 30, 2009
Facts Constantino and Maura Factor, husband and wife, had been in actual, continuous,
peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the subject 18
hectare of land in Las Pinas before 1906. In 1975, upon petition, their children granted
Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title thus making the 7 chilren coowners of the subject land. Enrique as one of the 7 children, instead of taking his share
over the proceeds of the land when it was sold, by agreement with his siblings, he
instead take the Factor Compound as his share.
He then constructed several houses over the property including the rest house under
dispute. Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi, petitioners, were tenants inside the compound
since 1999. When Enrique died, administration on the property was entrusted to Gloria,
his eldest child. She and her family (husband and son) lived in Taguig but oversaw the
property and visit it from time to time to collect rental payments. When she died, her
daughter, Fe Factor took over the administration as a co-owner. She also allowed
Ruben Labao married to Precy to stay for free on the property. When he died, she
asserted that the property was owned by Ruben Labao and questioned Fes ownership.
RTC ruled in favor of Fe Factor. CA affirmed the decision hence this case.
Issue Whether or not Fe Factor have better right over the property who visits it from time
time over Bunyi who actually residing in the property.
Held Fe Factor have the better right. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by
itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not
require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his
possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine. Respondents
right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their
fathers death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate
proceedings.
Ong v. Republic
GR # 175746, Mar.12, 2008
548 SCRA 160
Facts: Below is the history of Transfer of Ownership of the 574 sqm lot situated in Brgy
Anolid Mangaldan Pangasinan:
1971- Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista owned subject land. They have duly paid
Tax Declaration over the properties.
1979- Sold to Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro.
1997- Sold to Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen
1998- Sold to Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil.
1999- Sold to Ong and his brothers. As such they filed an Application for Registration
of Title over subject lot. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the said lot and that
54
it is their their exclusive property. That the property is unoccupied, and that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of owners for more than 30 years.
The trial court found appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting
marijuana and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of one million pesos.
Proved that subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain by:
1927- Bureau of Lands included said land as within alienable and disposable zone
1999- DENR and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office.
RTC ruled in favor of registration, which the CA reversed. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant had freely and consciously possessed the marijuana?
Issue: Whether or not Ong and his co-owners can register said property under their
name despite it being included in public domain.
Held: No. As a general rule, properties part of public domain cannot be privately
appropriated except when the applicants or their predecessors -in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject log since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by PD 1073. Petitioners failed to prove that
they and their predecessor in interest OCCUPY sad properties. Possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession AND occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
own property.
People v. Peaflorida
GR # 175604, Apr. 10, 2008
551 SCRA 111
FACTS: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the
Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana
was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then
organized a team composed of Competente as team leader; the team boarded the
police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They
overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down
and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other
grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellants possession. The
police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof.
Chua-Bruce v. CA
GR # 109595, Apr. 27, 2000
331 SCRA 1
FACTS: On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor,
Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which
should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered
a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling
P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as
against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a
total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a
shortage, a re-verification of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank
was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated
investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager.
The second was by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then,
the banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation.
Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these
investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person
primarily responsible was the banks Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein
55
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed
a Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and
Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband,
Antonio Burce. Esm Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa
was filed against petitioner.The trial court found the appelant guilty as charged,
applelannt seasonably filed his appeal.
The Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners bought the property when it was still an
unregistered land, the defense of having purchased the property in good faith is
unavailing .It affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in finding that petitioners should
pay respondents their corresponding share in the produce of the subject land from the
time they were deprived thereof until the possession is restored to them.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contend that the 10-year period for
reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust;
that since respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that
petitioners received a summons together with respondents' complaint on August 5,
1991; thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received the summons.
Consequently, petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum
beginning August 5, 1991 instead of 1984.
56
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor
Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books,
payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the
books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price 5
On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos
who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
It turned out the Cruz was not connected with De La sale College, and the account was
already closed.Police arrested Cruz and latter went to the store of Santos and seized
the 120 books without a warrant .
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the
books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary
attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the
books to the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is unlawfully deprived of the lawfull possession
of the the books
HELD: Yes. Respondent is unlawfully deprived of her lawful possession of the books.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived
has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived"
were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the
seller's title who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another
person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price
therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and
would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right
to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first
that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA
invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By
contrast, EDCA was less than cautious in fact, too trusting in dealing with the
impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books
he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It
did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear
the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him,
57
On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests in light of FMICs
forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-President, Severino Coronacion, instructed
Jesus Arangorin to debit Francos savings and current accounts for the amounts
remaining therein. In the meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB
current account were dishonored upon presentment for payment, and stamped with a
notation account under garnishment.
Issue: WON Franco had a better right to the deposits in the subject accounts which are
part of the proceeds of a forged Authority to Debit
Held: In this case, the deposit in Francos accounts consists of money which, albeit
characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The quality of being fungible
depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or the will of the
parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct individuality.
Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully
deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPIFB simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof,
which it had mistakenly debited from FMICs account and credited to Tevestecos, and
subsequently traced to Francos account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the
Makati Case against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which passed
from one account to another, commencing with the forged Authority to Debit.
It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which involves money in a
banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a
medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.[35] Money, which had passed
through various transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of
traceable origin, is no exception.
Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate personal property,
BPI-FBs illustrative example, ostensibly based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the
instant case.
There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of Franco, but
not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of FMICs deposits to
Tevestecos account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is
governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtorcreditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired
ownership of Francos deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding
obligation to pay him an equal amount on demand.[37] Although BPI-FB owns the
deposits in Francos accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding payment of BPIFBs obligation by drawing checks against his current account, or asking for the release
of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against
his current account, he had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be
honored by BPI-FB as debtor.
58
59
created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land
from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on
the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are
reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject
to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial
sanction to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on
constructions have been held to be valid stipulations.
The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected
are crafted not solely for the purpose of creating easements, generally of light and view,
nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on
the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally
might have intended the stipulations to be. In its Memorandum, respondent states in
arguing for the validity of the restrictive covenant that the "x x x restrictions are not without specific purpose. In a low cost-socialized housing, it is
of public knowledge that owners-developers are constrained to build as many number of
houses on a limited land area precisely to accommodate marginalized lot buyers,
providing as much as possible the safety, aesthetic and decent living condition by
controlling overcrowding. Such project has been designed to accommodate at least 100
families per hectare."
There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to
promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
The statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the
construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant is not intended
for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the building, i.e., to
ensure, among other things, that the structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision
would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision dwellers. The
argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to accommodate the
individual families of their two children must fail for like reason. Nor can petitioners claim
good faith; the restrictive covenants are explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and
annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title.
In sum, the Court holds that -
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the third persons do not impair the subject
easement.
Held: Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited common area
despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act
impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of
Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
Goldcrest v. Cypress
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit:
(1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;
60
(2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;
(3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;
(4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation
of the easement;
(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;
(6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on
the servient estate; and
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate.
The appellate court did not err in holding that the road lots in a private subdivision are
private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.
Abellana v. CA
GR # 97039, Apr. 24, 1992
208 SCRA 316
Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a
subdivision road which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which
they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they
had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The
construction of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners
of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access to the
public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and
cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened
to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place
before it was developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc
Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct
route from the petitioners' land to the public highway.
Issue: Whether or not easement may be acquired by prescription.
Held:
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and
may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The
use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
(discontinuous) because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can
be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land (4
Manresa 597; Haffman vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines).
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Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of
persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes
continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent
signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man,
like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if
a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of
vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes
over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon
the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert
the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement
into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only
classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a
right of way) and
a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an
easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road in
dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To
reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner
they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has
been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its
discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the
New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by
prescription militates against petitioners claim of laches.
Salimbangon v. Tan
GR # 185240, Jan. 20, 2010
610 SCRA 426
FACTS
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As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip
of 1.5 meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading
from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent that
Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to the
establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the
common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to
give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they
were facing the street.1avvphi1
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the
easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.8 The existence of
a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.
Also, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of
1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these
lots were already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of
Way, etc." that cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A,
D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot
B.
Although the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed
location of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on
Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley
that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that their right as
dominant estate under the original partition agreement remains, then that would be
partly on a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip
on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs
intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected
Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended
beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common
owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to
have been extinguished by operation of law.
63
public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through
the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of
his property.
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the
estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per
square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not
cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk
of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio
Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated
from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right
of way to the public highway."
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of
way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot
agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of
way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not
always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance;
while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. This is the test.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that
the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or
damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father
which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any
showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records,
or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them.
Sta. Maria v. CA
GR # 127549, Jan. 28, 1998
285 SCRA 351
64
the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if
these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause
the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if the conditions
of the various tenements are the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and
experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be established.
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to
the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the national road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly through defendants' property which is the shortest route of
approximately 20 to 25 meters away from the national road;
(2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of Florentino Cruz on the left
side of their property; and
(3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their property.
In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely affected. There is sufficient
vacant space between defendants' houses of approximately 11 meters. The distance of
defendant Florcerfida's house with the adjoining adobe wall separating that of the
property of defendants Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the space
between the adobe wall and that of the latter's house is about 7 meters or a total of 11
meters vacant space for purposes of a right of way. On the other hand, plaintiffs may
negotiate with a right of way with Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property
although the same is quite circuitous. Lastly, the option through the property of the
Jacinto on the right side is very circuitous and longer. The route involves a total of about
50 yards as it has to go straight to the right of about 35 yards and turn left of about
another 15 yards before reaching the common right of way.
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that defendants-appellants'
property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffs-appellees' property to the
provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t
appears that there would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants'
property and the right-of-way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the
alternative routes pointed to by the defendants"
Quintanilla v. Abangan
GR # 160613, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 494
FACTS: Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio
Abasolo. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito (petitioner),
her son, who is now the registered owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In
the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and
finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse
on their property (the dominant estate), they filed an action asking for a right of way from
respondent Pedro.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, (the servient
estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, had earlier sold the same to DARYL'S , and
65
thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the
same with a concrete fence.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit ruling that held that petitioners
failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. On appeal, the CA affirmed the adverse decision holding that the
criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject
property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed,
petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by
the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages against respondents before the RTC.
ISSUE: WON compliance with the preconditions set forth in articles 649 and 650 of the
new civil code is superior to the "mere convenience rule against the owner of the
dominant estate.
HELD: YES. As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code,
the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on
any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the
instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will
not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the
shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such
as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as
in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide
ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can
be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public
road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that
another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to
establish a compulsory right of way.
Valdez v. Tabisula
GR # 175510, July 28, 2008
560 SCRA 332
FACTS; Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from respondentspouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land, bounded on the
North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a Creek and
on the West, by Lot No. 223-A. In their contract of sale, they have agreed that petitioners
shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters *sic+ wide road right-of-way on the western side of
their lot which is not included in this sale.
ISSUE: WON petitioners may demand for a right of way based on the clause in their
contract of sale.
HELD: NO. Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietors own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right
of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners.
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(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed
of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the
adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)meters wide, one-half of
which shall be taken from the property herein sold to theVENDEE and the other half
from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors;"
(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and
the assumption of all the rights and obligations by Ateneo, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter
wide roadway;
La Vista Assoc. v. CA
GR # 95252, Sept. 5, 1997
278 SCRA 498
(c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll and Ateneo for breach of contract
and the enforcement the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that
Maryknoll set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters,
after Maryknoll constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
Facts: Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side
and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road extends to the entrance gate
of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally
part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine
Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to Ateneo. The
Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building
Corporation into La Vista Subdivision.
(d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified, in a letter to Ateneo
President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, onehalf of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created
in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our7 1/2 m. portion
of the road in your favor;"
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private respondents
Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latters
predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said subdivision from enjoying
an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
La Vista contends that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it
Issue: Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents the use of the
Mangyan Road
Held: The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way. A legal or compulsory
easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. A
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is
quite evident when:
(e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the Ateneo property, acknowledged
the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way
between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would
be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the
owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to LaVista
Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo inequal
portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted
a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract;
the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas from
Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.
That there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court
could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the
parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both La Vista and Solid
Homes,Inc.,i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
Unisource v. Chung
GR # 173252, Jul. 17, 2009
593 SCRA 230
Facts: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a
memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over
from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.
As Sandicos property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently
annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos property until TCT No. 176253
was issued in petitioners favor. On the other hand, Hidalgos property was eventually
transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No.
121488.
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate
access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition
on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an Order
dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion. In their Answer,
respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of great
prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15
years from acquisition of the property to file the petition.
The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the
dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet
to a public road which is Matienza Street. Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals; the latter, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.
Issue: Whether or not the easement is personal since the annotation did not prove that it
is binding on the heirs or assigns of Sandico
Held:
The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from
doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in
favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way, petitioner alleged that *t+he easement is personal. It was voluntarily
constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of *the lot+
described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the
right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or
67
agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an
easement created by such court order because *the] Court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties. In its Memorandum dated September
27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that *t+he annotation found at the
back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an
enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon
Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case
at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other
contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate.
It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without
the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement.
On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the
annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement.
The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the
easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided
between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety,
without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.
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What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope of the
provisions of the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly define the word
building. However, we find helpful the dictionary definition of the word building, viz:
*A+ constructed edifice designed usually covered by a roof and more or less completely
enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or
other useful structure distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy (as
fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one place (as boats
or trailers) even though subject to occupancy.
(2) NO. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently,
the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the
safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the
public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
Heirs of Seraspi v. CA
GR # 135602, Apr. 28, 2000
331SCRA 293
Facts: Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his lifetime,
Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen
(15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into
three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each
marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold
the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second
marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage,
in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the
69
present petitioners. Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to
Dominador.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the
security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they
failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were
sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to
Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his third wife, taking
advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a stroke,
forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a
complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property
through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of
limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had
passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.
Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners action is barred by extinctive prescription; and
(2) Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the
properties in question through acquisitive prescription
Held: SC ruled for petitioners. (1)Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, it held that an
action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only
be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action
for recovery of possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987,
i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of
the possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed. This case involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the
facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what was
applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by prescription
is acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession may have been
commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title.
On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable
law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides: Real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for
the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
70
latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or
assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action against the
wrongdoer.
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta
AM # P-07-2399, Jun. 18, 2008
555 SCRA 28
Facts: Edna Palero-Tan a Court Stenographer charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. a Utility
Worker of the same court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing her
ring and bracelet. Edna claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and her sisters
pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office because she fears
that they might be lost at the boarding house she is renting. And that the only person
who was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was
respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers. On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D.
Altone (Altone), confided to her that he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable
(Nable), that respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter
discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse.
Urdaneta denied that he stole complainants jewelry. He claimed that he found a small
plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under his table, at the side nearest the
adjacent table of the complainant, and thinking that the jewelry belonged to one of the
litigants who approached him that morning, he took them for safekeeping with the
intention of returning them to whoever was the owner. He thought that the ring and
bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely placed in an ordinary
plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his coin purse
and took them home. However, his wife, on 30 June 2005, found them and accused him
of buying the pieces of jewelry for his mistress, and to stop his wifes nagging, he threw
the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house.
Issue: W/N finding a lost property charges the finder the duty to restore the same to its
owner.
Held: Yes. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become
vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the
obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his
superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719,
explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous
possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor
of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the
way he deems best.
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RP v. Silim
GR # 140487, Apr. 2, 2001
356 SCRA 1
Facts: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of
the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively
and forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia,
the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of
Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could
not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact
for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the
specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered
into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new
school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled
and transferred to the new location.
The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a
complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by
the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation.
Issues: 1. Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC? 2.
Was the condition in the donation violated?
Held: 1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance. The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of the
formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor.
Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed.
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the
school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when ViceMayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that
respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the
donor.
72
Florencio v. De Leon
GR# 149570/ Mar. 12, 2004
425 SCRA 447
FACTS: Petitioner Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828
square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the
spouses Respondent Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said
property and stay therein without any rentals therefore.
In November 1978, Pet. De Leon, died intestate. Her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio
to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate. On April 26,
1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio,
demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.
73
The latter refused and failed to vacate the property. They filed a complaint for ejectment
against the heirs of Florencio before the MTC.
The heirs of Florencio, in their answer, alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action
against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976
over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter
accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page
one of the deed. However, the original Deed cannot be produced by the latter. The lower
and the appellate court ruled in favor or Respondents.
ISSUE:1) WON there is donation?; 2)WON Petitioners, who appears to be the donee
under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material
possession of the property over the respondents who is the registered owner of the
property?
HELD: There is no donation. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the
property.
The essential elements of donation are as follows:
(a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and
(c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the
same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in
a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is
made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified
or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is
generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same
deed or in a separate public document, and the donees acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a
public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the
Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration
does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are
affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether the
petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the
respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased registered owner of the property, Teresa
de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.
74
75
donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties
donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego
Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter
vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels (6 parcels in
all) again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that
(1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime,
and that (2) the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said
spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the
parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4
to herein petitioners, Sps. Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a
deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of
donation inter vivos. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition
against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of
land. In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor.
Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at
all. On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Gestopas
and the Danlags. Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1993, the
appellate court reversed the trial court.
Issue: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.
Held: The donation was inter vivos for the following reasons:
(1) The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
(2) The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what
was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of
the properties?
(3) The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his
standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.
(4) The donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA
245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of
the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely
intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the
donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. The attending
circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent
of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution.
ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng
Kabite
xxx xxx
Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na akoy pumanaw
sa mundo, xxx.
xxx xxx
Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng
tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder
o possesion ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at
Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang
maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on
whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, was enumerated, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Thus, the petitioners cited provisions are only necessary assurances that during the
donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but,
his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon the
donors death, the donees would get all the rights of ownership over the same including
the right to use and possess the same.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the
prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even
the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition. If the donor intended to maintain
full ownership over the said property until her death, she could have expressly stated
therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to
alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the
property has been transferred to the donees.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the
acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is
a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos.
76
Maglasang v. Cabatingan
GR # 131953, Jun. 5, 2002
383 SCRA 6
Aluad v. Aluad
GR # 176943, Oct. 17, 2008
569 SCRA 697
FACTS: Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime,
raised petitioners mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad). When Crispin
died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of which, she donated to Maria.
The Deed provided:
77
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the
DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the
DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the
DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of
land herein donated.
Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to transfer in
her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676) out of the 6 donated to
Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by her to respondent.
A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the remaining four
parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties, including the land the title of
which was in her name (Lot 674), to respondent.
Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Marias heirs, herein petitioners,
thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of the two lots in
respondents possession. For his defense, respondent alleged that the first lot was
obtained by him through sale while the second lot through inheritance based on the will
executed by Matilde.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was impossible for
respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those were previously donated in
favor of the mother of petitioners.
The CA on appeal reversed the trial courts decision ruling that the donation made to the
mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa hence invalid for failing to
comply with the requisites for its validity as provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos.
HELD: NO. As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend
to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes)
lifetime.
78
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right
to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an
attribute of ownership.The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who
should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not
refer to the donee, thus:
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts,
however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a
general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to
the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to
the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the
hearing before the trial court.
Sicad vs. CA
GR# 125888/ Aug. 13, 1998
294 SCRA 183
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph
should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving
spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband
Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as 1975.
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor
provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further
force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and
effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation,
the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no
further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of
the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this
resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to
be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said
resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time
when the donee died?
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having
followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother.
But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course
to the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No.
676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August
26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of
their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot
should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by
acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open,
and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.
Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City
for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105
(in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding. Her petition was
founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis
causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the
donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT
No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622.
Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was an inter
vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729
of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently changed into an ordinary civil action. The
court held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora
Montinola's petition for lack of merit.
In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitioner-spouses
Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had expressed their disinterest
over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial courts decision hence the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos.
HELD: NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition. The evidence establishes
that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer
(Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed
her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that
the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a
new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or
interests".
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa.
In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive."
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation
in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get
possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or
any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the
right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years
from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to
the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these
circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation
reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or
encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to
the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating
a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise.
The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the
prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which,
if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they
have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument
also makes no sense, because if
they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third
person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to
the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the
donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property.
It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter
vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In Alejandro v.
Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in
consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos
(solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason."
Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the
conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services
rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds,
Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have
identical motivation."
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to
the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be
that entailing "the least transmission of rights and
79
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it
is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.
Held: That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa"
is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.10
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability"
is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.12
(Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is
the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the
donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable
and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter
vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But
this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance
the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
Ganuelas v. Cawed
GR # 123968, Apr. 24, 2003
401 SCRA 447
Held: Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the
act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death
of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the
death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez
is illuminating:24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the
donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation
mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles
74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with
all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28
80
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that
any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior
to the death of Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the
donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows
that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee.30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as
mortis causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of
donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her
presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as
witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of
love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the
donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular
significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not,
because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and affection
may also underline transfers mortis causa.
81
compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation
may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be
deemed lost and extinguished.
Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto,
being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies.
Xxxx
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land
donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall
be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the
condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended
upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance
and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private
respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation.
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest
of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified
in the policy.
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of
circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50)
years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But,
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of
the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period
of the compliance, there are no more obstacles for the court to decree the rescission
claimed.
Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all
purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to
the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance
proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation
where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties
to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third
parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and,
thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The
revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers
themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said
illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is
only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
82
reason, even Esperanzas one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated
to the petitioner.
Quilala v. Alcantara,
GR # 132681, Dec. 3, 2001
371 SCRA 311
Held: The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in
favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must
be made in a public instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of
acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law
from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the
donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and the
donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as
well as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the
donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient
cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on
the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely
is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that
is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact
that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part.
Arcaba v. Batocael
GR # 146683, Nov. 22, 2001
83
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. As already stated, the appeals court denied
reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and
Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's
surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as
Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case.
Held:
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband
and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often
repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In
this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship
the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
legitimate children.
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very
possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least,
their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law
spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human
reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion
is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art 87 of the
Family Code.
84
On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued Memorandum Circular No. 1 which
totally phased out the Zamboanga City barter trade area effective 1 October 1988.
On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias Writ of
Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Julius Rhett J. Plagata
issued on 2 January 1990. Sheriff Anthony B. Gaviola levied whatever interest, share,
right, claim and/or participation of ZBTKBI had over a parcel of land, together with all the
buildings and improvements existing thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 66,696 (formerly TCT No. 61,628) in compliance of said writ.
On 13 June 1990, the afore-described property was sold at public auction for
P96,443.53, with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder. The property was not redeemed.
As a consequence, Sheriff Gaviola issued on 25 June 1991 a Sheriffs Final Certificate
of Sale in favor of Mendoza over whatever interest, share, right, claim and/or
participation ZBTKBI had over the parcel of land.
Having failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a Petition (for
Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000, which was granted on 5 May
2000, by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata. The writ was issued to place the complainant
in possession (of) the rights, interests, shares, claims, and participations of Zamboanga
Barter Traders Kilusan Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-66,696 of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City, which were sold on
execution to the complainant on 13 June 1990, and in whose favor a final certificate of
sale for such rights, interests, shares, claims, and/or participation was executed and
issued on 25 June 1991.
Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriffs Service Report dated 22 June 2000 informing
Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata that the writ of possession was returned duly served
and fully satisfied. On the same date, Mendoza, thru a letter, acknowledged that the writ
of possession had been satisfied and implemented.
A petition for review on certiorari filed on 27 June 2001 which was denied by this Court
on 15 August 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 8 September 2001,
which Mendoza opposed.
Issue/s: Whether the CA erred that the donated property has already reverted to
petitioner-donor
Held: On the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at
Barrio Canelar, City of Zamboanga.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donated property was
no longer owned by the Republic of the Philippines because ownership thereof had
already reverted to it (petitioner).
85
Petitioners statement that neither party to the donation has expressly rescinded the
contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation that
allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties to the donation.
As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of
Dumangas, citing
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper.
The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter
trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot be
averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet exercised its option to purchase
the buildings and improvements made and introduced on the land by the Republic; or
because the Republic has not yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise,
there would be gross violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the deed
of donation.
Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Archbishop of Mla v. CA
GR # 77425, Jun. 19, 1991
198 SCRA 300
Facts: These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of the
CA which reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, as well as the order
of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its
aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint for nullification
of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with
damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before
the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Kawit, Cavite with an area of
approx 964 sq m. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not
86
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic
reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a
judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of
Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of
the opinion that there would be no legal necessity
anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the
very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the
donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of
donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the
condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void"
would not appear in the deed of donation.
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial
action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it
may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called
attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its
cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the
injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that
a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the
power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we
see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case.
Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III,
Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the
matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express
provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said
resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in
question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present
controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic
reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition
was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper.
87
De Luna v. Abrigo
GR # 57455, Jan. 18, 1990
181 SCRA 150
88
of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the
RTC of Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied
with by the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and
the reversion of the donated land to the heirs.
The assailed order of the trial court stated that revocation (of a donation) will be effective
only either upon court judgment or upon consent of the donee as held in the case of
Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. 24190, July 13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial court
dismissed the claim of petitioners that the stipulation in the donation providing for
revocation in case of non-compliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount to the
consent of the donee, opining that the consent contemplated by law should be such
consent given by the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation or violation of
the conditions imposed therein. The trial court further held that, far from consenting to
the revocation, the donee claimed that it had already substantially complied with the
conditions of the donation by introducing improvements in the property donated valued
at more than the amount of the donated land. In view thereof, a judicial decree revoking
the subject donation is necessary. Accordingly, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions
of the donation shall prescribe in four years counted from such non-compliance. In the
instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on
April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on
September 23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was
already barred by prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was adopted
to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when revocation of
the donation has not been agreed upon by the parties. By way of contrast, when there is
a stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for revocation in case of noncompliance, no judicial action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action
filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the
donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but
one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
Issue: Whether the action is to enforce a written contract instead of Art 764
Held: The petition is impressed with merit. From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or
cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is
one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation
is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of
future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less
than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens,
charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated.
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation
subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden
requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the
donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation.
89
Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the donee's
non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by private
respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the donated property
had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the
absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio
render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading." (Emphasis
supplied)
Petition is GRANTED, case is hereby ordered reinstated and respondent judge is
ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the propriety of the revocation of
the subject donation.
Ty v. Ty
GR # 165696, Apr. 30, 2008
553 SCRA 306
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
against the Decision of the CA and the Resolution therein dated October 18, 2004.
On May 19, 1988, Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro B. Ty and Bella Torres, died of cancer
at the age of 34. He was survived by his wife, Sylvia Ty, and his only daughter, Krizia
Katrina Ty. A few months after his death, a petition for the settlement of his intestate
estate was filed by Sylvia Ty in the RTC of Quezon City.
Upon petition of Sylvia Ty, as Administratrix, for settlement and distribution of the
intestate estate of Alexander in the County of Los Angeles, the Superior Court of
California ordered the distribution of the Hollywood condominium unit, the Montebello
lot, and the 1986 Toyota pick-up truck to Sylvia Ty and Krizia Katrina Ty.
On November 23, 1990, Sylvia Ty submitted to the intestate Court in Quezon City an
inventory of the assets of Alexanders estate, consisting of shares of stocks and a
schedule of real estate properties, which included the following:
1. EDSA Property a parcel of land with an area of 1,728 square meters situated in
EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of Alexander Ty
when he was still single, and covered by TCT No. 0006585;
2. Meridien Condominium A residential condominium with an area of 167.5 square
meters situated in 29 Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
registered in the name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3395;
3. Wack-Wack Property A residential land with an area of 1,584 square meters situated
in Notre Dame, Wack-Wack, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of the
spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by TCT No. 62670.
90
As a final point, the Court found that the plaintiff-appellee is not entitled to moral
damages, attorneys fees and costs of litigation, considering that the instant case is
clearly a vexatious and unfounded suit by him filed against the estate of the late
Alejandro Ty. Hence, all these awards in the judgment a quo are hereby DELETED.
The CA therefore reversed and set aside the judgment appealed from and entered
another one dismissing the complaint.
On October 18, 2004 the CA resolved to deny therein plaintiff-appellees motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether an implied trust under Art 1448 was constituted over the subject
properties.
Held: The Court disposes of the petition, as follows: The EDSA Property. Petitioner
contends that the EDSA property, while registered in the name of his son Alexander Ty,
is covered by an implied trust in his favor under Article 1448 of the Civil Code. This,
petitioner argues, is because he paid the price when the property was purchased and
did so for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted
to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary.
However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate,
of one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The CA conceded that at least part of the purchase price of the EDSA property came
from petitioner. However, it ruled out the existence of an implied trust because of the last
sentence of Article 1448: x x x However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a
child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, the CA departed from jurisprudence in that such
was not the theory of the parties.
Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he who invoked Article 1448 of the Civil Code to
claim the existence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself, in providing for the socalled purchase money resulting trust, also provides the parameters of such trust and
adds, in the same breath, the proviso: "However, if the person to whom the title is
conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO
TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of
the child." (Emphasis supplied.)
Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessary consequence of petitioners theory and
argument and is inextricably linked to it by the law itself.
91
this conference, neither Domingo nor Bulan appeared but Teotimo Eduarte did. On
August 9, 1963, Eduarte wrote a letter to the Director of Lands requesting him not to
give due course to Domingo and Estelitas application for a free patent title over lot
118since what Domingo and Estelita are occupying is Lot 138 which was titled in the
name of Bulan who refused to accept said title. After the Office of the Director of lands
took note of Eduartes protest, an investigation was conducted which revealed that
Eduarte is in actual possession of lot 118 while Domingo and Estelita occupy lot 138.
The District Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of respondents
should refer to lot 138 and the homestead application of
petitioner should refer to lot 118. Eduarte remained and continuously occupied lot 118
until on December 10, 1986Domingo and Estelita filed with the RTC of Irosin, a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Eduarte, averring that
sometime in August 1985, Eduarte by means of force, threats and intimidation entered
the subject to lot without their consent thereby depriving them of their possession of the
premises. Traversing the complaint, Eduarte asserts that he is the rightful owner of the
property in question; that he has been in possession of the same since 1942; that the
title relied upon by Domingo and Estelita was erroneously issued in their name which
was acknowledged by the Bureau of Lands; that Domingo and Estelita fully know that
they are not the owners of the lot in dispute.The lower court also ruled that petitioner can
attack the validity of respondents' title onlythrough a direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. Decision affirmed by CA, with modifications.
Issue: Whether or not Eduarte can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession
filed by Domingo and Estelita, the registered owners, assail the validity of their title.
Held: It must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the
expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon
which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. The decree of registration and the certificate
of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of fraud within one year
from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. In the case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in
his answer:3. That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual possession
of that certain parcel of land which is more particularly described as follows: xxx xxx
xxx5. That the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid property is
due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot
No. 118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and
investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;6. That plaintiff has never been in actual
possession of said Lot No. 118and therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate
of title No. P-4991, which under the circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same
to the defendant; The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of
title issued in favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. This is
not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue of the
validity of title, i.e.,whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purposes. Whether or not respondents have the right to
claim ownership of the subject land is beyond the province of the instant petition.
Velasquez vs. CA
GR# 126996/ Feb. 15, 2000
325 SCRA 552
Facts: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in
1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by
her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman
(grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses
Aquino were able to acquire several properties.
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres,
Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment, partition
and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for
the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses
Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk
with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and
Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the
conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the
properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters
had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly
promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof;
that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the children of
Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that
after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and
despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for
the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear
the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties
between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render
an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly
took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that
during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had
already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose
Velasquez.
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and
plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants
grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to
92
divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they
did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof
has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all
others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already
barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which
was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents
covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as
agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the
parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and
recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years.
Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of
limitations.
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of
the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the
properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of
spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.
V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.
Held: Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their
Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the principle of
res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is within the power of the
court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third complaint filed
by private respondents on October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and
we found that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there
is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res
judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the
first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
Since the dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this
ground alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However,
considering that this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy
between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural
technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."13
93
However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a
guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a
person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared to him, and
at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.20
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient
documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had
already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the
year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter
nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of
donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners
Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated
August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of
Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to
overlook the probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The
donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively
was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and
acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764
and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and
the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for
the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all
their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not
one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July
14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance
94
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the
documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of
validity.32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago
Meneses with clear and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners were
able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the
Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the
spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners
alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right
thereto.