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The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914

Author(s): Jonathan Grant


Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 9-36
Published by: Society for Military History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677343
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The Swordofthe Sultan:


OttomanArmsImports,1854-1914

JonathanGrant

ATthe beginningof the nineteenthcenturythe Ottoman Empire was

in its armamentsproduction,yet by 1914 its domesself-sufficient


tic militaryand naval manufacturingcapacity had eroded to such an
extent that the empire had become almost completely dependent on
imports.While Turkishattemptsto fosterdomestic productioncapabilities proved sporadic and unsuccessful,the Ottoman Empire was transformedinto one of the most importantmarketsfor armaments in the
world.Why did this erosion in productioncapacity occur, and why did
the Ottomans ultimatelyrely on importingthe hardware rather than
domesticatingthe technology?Did the unwillingnessof foreignfirmsto
transfertechnologyforcethe Turksto importthe finisheddefensegoods
and preemptthe developmentof Ottoman war industries?Was there a
conscious designon the partofthe European producersofarmamentsto
make the Ottomans dependent? In lightof the evidence, the answer to
the last question mustbe negative.
Rather than to any foreignplot, the process leading to Ottoman
dependency on foreignarms suppliers should be attributedmore accuratelyto the interplayof external and internalfactors.Externally,the
impersonalforcesof rapid technologicalchange and the developmentof
an internationalarmamentsmass marketmade the rapid acquisition of
the latest defenseequipment a financiallysound choice. Internally,the
political and personal decisions of Sultan Abdul Hamid 11(1876-1909)
profoundlyaffectedthe course ofTurkishpolicy.This articleemphasizes
Turkishagency over foreignmanipulationas the key to understanding
the erosion of the domestic defense industries.Furthermore,although
in armamentsproduction,
the Ottomansfailedto achieve self-sufficiency
the Turkish case may be considered a qualified success in that the
Ottoman state did obtain high quality equipment quickly and relatively
cheaply,given its limitedfinancialmeans.
The Journal of MilitarvyHlistory66 (January 2002): 9-36

C) Societv forMilitaryHistorr

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JONATIIANGRANT

Ottomanwar industrieshad deep roots in the gunpowderage. Since


the fifteenth
centurythe Ottomanshad manufacturedtheirown military
and naval equipmentusingforeignexpertiseand copyingforeignmodels.
Afterfallingbehind technologicallyduringthe eighteenthcentury,Turkish domesticproductionbegan to returnto a highlevel of qualitybeginning in the 1780s, thanks to the help of formalmissions of technical
specialists fromwestern Europe. By the early nineteenthcenturythe
in its military
Ottoman Empire once again had become self-sufficient
production.'
Ottoman armaments policy from the 1850s up to World War I
reflectedthe empire'sweak industrialand financialfoundations,as the
Ottomangovernmentincreasinglylooked to the industrialand financial
capabilities of Germany, Britain, and France to meet its needs for
weapons and militaryequipment. Ultimately,importedarms became a
substitutefordomestic ones, as the Ottoman state armamentsindustry
could not compete withthe foreignproducers in quantityor modernity
of weapons and ships. It became easier simply to restock with the
newest, top-of-the-lineequipment rather than lose time and money
attemptingto create and maintaina domestic arms industry.
This complete dependence on foreignsuppliers to meet Ottoman
defense needs placed the countryin an extremelyvulnerableposition,
and presented the potentialforforeignsuppliers to exert influenceon
Turkishpolicy throughthe manipulationof the flowof arms and equipment.Recognizingthispossibility,the Ottomangovernmenttriedto minimize risksby avoidingexclusive reliance on any singleforeignsupplier.
Given these conditions,the Ottoman Empire in the pre-1914 years
can serve as a valuable case studyforthe dynamicsof the arms trade in
the ThirdWorld.
The Ottoman Empire was not unique in grapplingwith the challenges ofmodernizingits defensesector.Russia, Japan,China, and Egypt
similarlyconfrontedthe problemof importingmilitarytechnologyfrom
the West,withvaryingdegreesofsuccess. By 1914 Russia and Japan had
accomplished the mostin termsofdevelopinga domesticmilitaryindusin armaments
trialbase, yet even theyhad not achieved self-sufficiency
or warship production. For all these modernizingcountries,the challenges posed by the high costs of foreignexpertise,importedmaterials,
and skilled labor placed severe economic strains on state resources. In
orderto meet defenserequirementsas quicklyas possible,all these powers turnedto importsto a greateror lesser degree.2
theOttoman'Decline': MilitaryTechnologyDif1. JonathanGrant,"Rethinking
to EighteenthCenturies,"JournalofWorld
fusionin theOttomanEmpire,Fifteenth
History10 (Spring1999): 179-201.
2. David B. Ralston,Importingthe European Army (Chicago: Universityof
ChicagoPress,1990); ThomasL. Kennedy,TheArmsofKiangnan:Modernizationin
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The Sword of theSultan

While they made this substitutionof imports,the question facing


Ottoman policy-makerswas fromwhom to buy arms, for they always
considered multipleoptions for suppliers. Based on an analysis of the
patterns of Ottoman arms and equipment purchases, it is possible to
establish a periodization consistingof fourphases: (1) circa 1850-85,
when domestic arms productionwaned as reliance on importsfor the
bulk of defense items grew; (2) 1885-95, markedby the preferencefor
Germanyin both militaryand naval orders; (3) 1898-1907, the period
of renewal of naval orders fromBritainand France while Germanycontinued as the preferredsupplier forland forces;and (4) 1908-14, when
Britain was preeminentin Ottoman naval orders and the Franco-German rivalryin militaryordersended in the selection of Germany.
Overall, the entire period may be seen as characteristicof one way
in which the Ottoman Empire reacted to the issue ofWesternization.In
the realm of warfare,it was more acceptable, or ratherless objectionable, to incorporateWesternborrowingsthan in otherareas of state and
society. The eclecticism with which the Ottomans combined arms systems and purchases fromvarious countries demonstrateda "Take the
best fromthe West" policy. A concise summaryof the sixty-oddyears
would be that the Ottomans bought supplies fromthose countriesrecognized as worldleaders in particularcategories.More specifically,this
meant that the Ottomans imported army weapons and supplies from
Germanyand naval systemsfromBritain(and to a lesser degreeFrance).
In both cases, the respective countries were acknowledged and
respected as the best.
A good deal of attentionhas been given to the place of the Ottoman
Empire, and the Middle East in general, in the developingworld econof
omy.These studies have tended to concentrateon the transformation
marthe
traditionalagricultureintoan exportsectorserving needs ofthe
kets of the core of the worldeconomy,or theyhave examined the ruination of domestic textile industries by cheaper European imports.3
However, there has been no real systematicstudy of the changes in

theChinese Ordnance Industry,1860-1895 (Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1978);


ArmamentsIndustry,"
JournalofMilitary
JohnDunn, "Egypt'sNineteenth-Century
History61 (April 1997): 231-54; JonathanGrant,"TsaristArmamentStrategies,
1870-1914," Journalof Soviet MilitaryStudies 4 (March 1991): 141-49; Joseph
Bradley,Gunsfor theTsar: The State,Labor and TechnologyTransferin theRussPress,1990); "Japan,"
ian Small ArmsIndustry(DeKalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversity
in Conway'sAll the World'sFightingShips 1906-1921 (London: ConwayMaritime
Press,1985), 222-23.
3. *evketPamuk,The OttomanEmpireand European Capitalism,1820-1913
Press,1987); RogerOwen,TheMiddleEast in the
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
WorldEconomy,1800-1914 (London:Methuenand Co., 1987).
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11

JONATIAN GRANT

Ottoman war industries.This is rather surprisinggiven the historical


importanceof the militaryin the Ottoman Empire.4
Superficially,
one mightexpect a degree ofdependency in the armaments sector because the rest of the Ottoman economy was subinfeudated to the West; however,thisproved not to be the case. There was no
monolithicWesterncontrol because the West was not a single unitary
economic actor. The individual states and the private arms suppliers
engaged in keen competitionpoliticallyand economically,allowingthe
Ottomans to exercise choice in arms and financialmarkets.
Ultimately,the primarycause of the decline of Ottoman war industrieswas a financialone. By farand away moneywas the commoditythe
Porteimportedthe most,and capital proved to be the truebottleneckin
Ottomanproduction.Technical expertiseor necessarymaterialssuch as
coal and iron could be obtained withease ifthe fundswere available. It
is truethatthe technologicalchanges caused difficulties
foran unskilled
labor force,but the Turkishworkerswere certainlytrainable.Moreover,
the greatesthardshipforthe Ottomansregardinglabor was retainingforeign experts,due largelyto the need to pay them highersalaries.
Governmentrevenues were the lifebloodof the war industries,and
by the nineteenthcenturythe Ottoman "Sick Man of Europe" clearly
had a circulatoryproblem. Attemptsto raise revenues failed, and the
Ottomanslacked the means to cover the costs of reformsand continual
wars. When they had the money,the Ottomans chose to pay the high
costs required to maintain their armed forces. During the 1830s the
armyclaimed 70 percentof totalrevenues.5The governmentsimplyran
out of money in the 1840s, and consequently,the war industriesbegan
to atrophy.
State borrowingofferedthe apparentsolutionto the problem.Beginning in 1841 the state issued short-termbonds to pay a war indemnity
but soon exhausted internalsources. The only alternativewas foreign
loans, which commenced duringthe Crimean War (1854-56) when the
Turksborrowedfromprivatebankersof theirmilitaryallies, Britainand
France. Afterthe war Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-76) continued to spend
money,mostlyforthe constructionof palaces, and the debt increased
further.Due to inefficientadministration and tax collection, the
Ottomangovernmentregularlyran in the red financiallyand covered the
deficitsby more borrowingat highrates ofinterest.UnderAbdul Aziz, as
4. WilliamHale, TurkishPoliticsand theMilitary(London: Routledge,1994).
Turkishnaval importsin the period 1908-14 are describedin Paul Halpem, The
MediterraneanNaval Situation,1908-1914 (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1971), 314-54.
5. Owen,MiddleEast, 59-62. In theearly1800s theOttomanannualpublicrev?2,250,000-?3,750,000comparedto the Britishaverageof
enue was approximately
?16,800,000 for1787-90.
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The Sword of theSultan

much as one-thirdofgovernmentincome wenttowardpayingthe debts.


As a result,duringthe 1870s the salaries forsoldiers and bureaucrats
were chronicallyin arrears.6
By 1880 the governmentfaced bankruptcy,and the large Turkish
war indemnity to Russia resulting from the Russo-TurkishWar of
1877-78 threatened catastrophe. To stave offfiscal collapse, Sultan
Abdul Hamid II in 1881 issued the Decree of Muharremcreating the
OttomanPublic Debt Administration(PDA). The Ottomansderivedconsiderablebenefitfromthe PDA, as halfoftheirdebt was forgivenand borrowingfromEuropean sources became easier. A negativeaspect of the
PDA, though,was its authorityto collect its own taxes withinthe empire;
consequently,much of the state revenue thatcould have flowedinto the
government'shands went instead to the PDA. Over the whole period
from1854 to 1914, Ottomangrossborrowingtotaled399.5 millionTurkish lira. Of the loans, 45 percentwas used to liquidate debts, another34
percent was taken out as part of the commissioningof the loans, and
only 6 percent (22.3 millionTurkishlira) wentformilitaryexpenditure.
Sultan Abdul Hamid II saved the state fromfinancialruin, but at the
expense of not paying teachers' salaries or buying the technological
means forthe empire to defenditselfwithits own domestic resources.7

MilitaryProduction, 1850-85
The most outstandingcharacteristicof Ottoman domestic military
productionwas the degree of state control.All the factoriesthat manufacturedand maintainedwar materialswere state-ownedand administered. The government department responsible for these various
activities was the Ministryof Imperial Ordnance (Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti), which was independent of the Ministry of War (Bab-i
Seraskeri). The Ordnance Ministrywas entrustedwith the production,
repair, and supply of weapons and militaryequipment, and directly
administeredthe Zeytinburnufactoryand powder millsin Istanbul and
Anatolia. Comprised of defense, communications,and supply departments,its main duties were guardingthe straitsand trainingtechnical
personnel.8

6. Owen,MiddleEast, 61; AfifBiiyiiktugrul,


OsmanliDeniz Harp TarihiIII. Cilt
(Istanbul:T. C. Deniz Basimevi,1973), 1; JustinMcCarthy,
The OttomanTurks(New
York:AddisonWesleyLongman,1997), 301-4. By 1863 the internaldebt was 32.5
millionTurkishlira,and theforeigndebthad reached40 million.
7. McCarthy,
OttomanTurks,304-13.
8. Erkem Mustevellioglu,
Osmanli Askeri Teskilat ve Kiyafetleri1876-1908
(Istanbul:AskeriMiizeve KiiltiirSitesiKomutanligi
Yayinlari,1986), 9-10.
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JONATHANGRANT

In general,Ottomanindustrywas weak and underdeveloped,and the


domestic defense industrieswere no exception. The fewexistingfactories had resulted fromgovernmenteffortsto create a modern army.
Technological developments played a role in drivingunder Ottoman
domestic firearmsmanufacturing.The advances in rifledgun barrels
duringthe 1840s required a greater degree of technical precision and
more money than the Ottomans were able to manage. By the middle of
the nineteenthcentury,Ottomanfactoriesproducingmilitarygoods consisted of the factoryat Izmit that made cloth and militaryuniforms;the
Istanbulfez factory;the Zeytinburnufactorythatproduced cottoncloth
for militaryuniforms;the militaryequipment factoryat Beykoz that
manufacturedmilitaryshoes, boots, bandoliers,and cartridgebelts; and
the Tophane arsenal and artilleryfactoryin Istanbul.9This list demonstratesthat most of the factoriesproduced items of militaryclothing.It
would appear then, that greateremphasis was put on having the army
dress in a modern style,ratherthan equipping it withmodernweapons.
By the early 1870s, the domesticmilitaryproductionofthe Ottoman
Empirecould not provideenough equipment and supplies to sustain the
empire'sarmed forcesin timeof war.The Tophane works,whichwithits
associated workshops employed about fifteenhundred men, was the
main Ottoman arsenal. It had the capacity to repair every kind of
weapon withconventionalgunstock,as well as swords.In addition,a factory at the Golden Horn (Halic) could repair and manufacturesome
weapons. The Zeytinburnufactorycould produce ten thousand cartridgesper day. The powderworksat Bakirkoyand Azadli, establishedor
modernizedduringthe 1790s, continued in production.There were also
two major saltpetreworksand one major sulphurworks.However,these
establishmentsproved incapable of meetingTurkishrequirements,and
almost everythingwas obtained from foreign firms. Furthermore,
althoughthe arsenals at Tophane and Zeytinburnumaintainedan enormous quantityof militarystores, the bulk was obsolete and worthless.
Witha supplementofEnglishcraftsmenbroughtto the IstanbulTophane
factories,some rifles,bronze cannon, and mountainguns could be manufactured,but not in sufficientquantities. Besides guns, the Imperial
arsenal at Tophane also turnedout a numberof largecases intendedfor
submarinemines and some torpedoes.10
9. OmerCelal Sarc, "OttomanIndustrialPolicy1840-1914,"in CharlesIssawi,
ed., The Economic Historyof theMiddle East, 1800-1914 (Chicago: University
of
ChicagoPress,1975), 55-56; Owen,MiddleEast, 117. See also LarryH. Addington,
IndianaUniversity
Th-ePatternsofWarSince theEighteenthCentu?y(Bloomington:
Press,1984), 3.
10. Rumboldto Granville,3 April1872, ForeignOffice(FO) 78/2216;Elliotto
Earl of Derby,3 May 1875, FO 78/2383,Public RecordOffice(PRO), Kew,Surrey,
England;RamizErtem,1877-1878 Osmanli-RusHarbi KafkasCephesiHarekatiH.
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TheSwordoftheSultan

An examinationof the equipment of the Ottoman armyand navy at


the time of the Russo-TurkishWar of 1877-78 will allow for a better
appraisal of the changes that occurred over the course of the empire's
last fourdecades. On the eve of the war,the Ottoman armyappeared to
use a hodgepodge of assorted systems of guns and ammunition. The
artilleryconsisted of muzzleloaders, breechloaders, bronze and steel
guns, and rifledand smoothbore cannon. Within the same regiment,
French, Prussian, and English systems existed side by side. Almost all
artilleryunits possessed four-pounderand six-pounderKruppguns from
Germany.The fortson the straitshad mostlyheavy caliber Kruppguns,
although Fort Mecidiye also had a pair of heavy Armstrongguns from
Britain."1In the fortson the Caucasian front,the numberofdomestically
manufactured15-cm. guns exceeded the number of comparable Krupp
guns. Yet on the whole, Krupp guns comprised the backbone of the
artillerycomponentat these forts.'2
The armamentof the infantrywas as varied as that of the artillery
service. Infantryunits had in hand breechloadingRemingtonsfromthe
United States, as well as English-maderifles.About 600,000 Sniders
were in the hands of the troops,and approximately80,000,000 Snider
cartridgeswere in store by 1875. Additionally,the Ottoman army possessed about 50,000 repeatingcarbines on theAmericanWinchestersystem. Beforethe war,at the beginningof 1876, the governmentordered
600,000 Martini-Peabodyrepeaterriflesfromthe ProvidenceTool Company in Rhode Island, and by Julyof 1877 some 442,240 had arrived.'3
The vast amounts of American weapons and munitions present in
Ottoman hands are a great anomaly in the patternof Ottoman foreign
arms purchases. Afterthe 1877-78 war,any Americanpart of the trade
virtuallydisappeared.
The fact that American weapons were purchased at this particular
timehelps to illuminatethe key elementsin Ottomanarmamentspolicy.
There were two reasons forthe unprecedentedsurge in purchases from
the United States: first,the recognitionofAmericanweapons as state of
the art since the Civil WVar;
second, and perhaps most important,expediency. Seeing that war was likely,the Ottoman governmentmoved to
Cilt (Ankara: Gnkur BaskanligiYayinlari,1985), 45; William Smith Cooke, The
OttomanEmpire and its TributaryStates (ExceptingEgypt), Witha Sketch of
Amsterdam:B. R. Gruner,1968), 25, 38; The War CorreGreece (1876; reprinted,
spondenceoftheDaily News 1877 (London:Macmillanand Co., 1878), 27-28.
11. Colonel Lennox to Constantinople,13 February1877, War Office(WO)
5 June1877,WO 106/2;EdmundOllier,Cas106/2,PRO; Lennoxto Constantinople,
sell's IllustratedHistoryof the Russo-TurkishWar (London: Cassell, Pelter and
Galpin,1880), 1: 138; WarCorrespondenceoftheDaily News, 27.
12. Dangallto Layard,No. 9, 1878, WO 106/2;Ertem,Kafkas Cephesi,41-42.
1869,"WO 106/1;Ollier,Cassell's IllustratedHistory,
13. "Turkey.Confidential,
1: 138-39; Ertem,KafkasCephesi,45.
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15

JONATIAN GRANT

obtain the materialsnecessary formaintainingthe armythat domestic


sources could not provide.As the governmentsoughtan immediateremedy for the situation,American industrypicked up the slack. In this
instance the Ottoman choice appeared remarkablysimilarto Egyptian
decisions in the late 1860s.'4
The easy acquisition of modern weapons fromforeignmanufacturers greatlyfacilitatedthe immediatestrengthening
ofthe Ottomanarmy.
This armamentpolicy certainlymade an impressionon the foreigncorrespondentscovering the war. According to the London Daily News,
"The various fortsand lines [at Varna] mounted over three hundred
guns, varyingfrom10 to 15 centimetrescalibre, and all of the latest
model. The supplyof ammunitionseems unlimited;and all day long the
troopstoil unloadingthe bargescrammed withshell and cartridgeboxes
broughtup by the transports."'5Moreover,the Ottomanimportstrategy
yielded a significantqualitative advantage for the Turks over the Russians in this war. The Turks achieved superior firepowerand longer
range withtheirAmericanrepeaterriflesand German steel breechloading artillery.Armed with these imported weapons, Turkish forces
inflictedextremelyhighcasualties on Russian forcesusingRussian-made
weapons of lesser quality.'6
As a field test of the import strategy,the Russo-TurkishWar of
1877-78 resoundinglyvalidated Ottoman choices. Both Russia and the
OttomanEmpirehad a traditionofstrongstate controlin militaryindustry.Both had attemptedto modernize theirforcesin the eighteenthcenturyand had fallenbehind again by the time of the Crimean War,when
the two empireshad possessed comparable levels ofmilitarytechnology.
Their respectivereactions to the Crimean experience showed the growing dependency of the Ottomans. The two states adopted strategiesfor
modernizationwhich were absolute opposites. Whereas the Ottomans
moved ever closer to total dependency on Westernimportsto modernize theirforces,Russia diligentlyworkedto establish a modern,domestic military industry. Yet, when war came in 1877, the Turks
undoubtedlyheld the advantagein quality of arms.
Naval Production, 1850-85
Ottoman naval productioncapabilities fellbehind in the mid-nineteenth century.The failureof Ottoman naval yards to develop into a
source forthe empire was due in large measure to
trulyself-sufficient
14. Dunn,"Egypt'sNineteenth-Century
ArmamentsIndustry,"
242-43.
15. WarCorrespondenceoftheDaily News, 36.
16. WilliamMcElwee,TheArtof War Waterlooto Mons (Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Press,1974), 193-94.
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The Sword of thte


Sultan

threefactors:time,money,and the rapidlychangingtechnologyof naval


systems.These factorscombined to end the possibilityfora strong,reliable indigenousnaval industry.Any naval program,even fora country
witha well-establishedcapabilityfornaval production,takes a greatdeal
oftimeand money,both ofwhich the OttomanEmpirelacked. Throughout the period,thegovernmentfaced wars and enjoyed only intermittent
peace; thus,it did not have enough time to wait forships to come offthe
the governlocal yards. Confrontedwithcontinual financialdifficulties,
ment certainlydid not have the resources to cover the expenses of the
ships themselves,much less the start-upcosts ofexpanded docks. These
two factorsserved only to magnifythe impact of the thirdfactor,the
incrediblyrapid changes takingplace in naval technology.For example,
perhaps the most unstable, unpredictable time in the historyof naval
developmentwas the final quarter of the nineteenthcentury and the
early part of the twentieth,when the rapid transitionfromironclads to
heavy steel dreadnoughtsmade many systems obsolete before very
much timehad elapsed. As a result,the Ottomangovernment,along with
many other states,foundit more prudentto buy fromabroad, and then
make replacementsas new technologyarose.
Aftermaintaininga reasonablyrespectablenaval constructioncapabilityforthe firstpartof the century,the Sublime Porte's(government's)
position deterioratedin the 1850s and significantdomestic naval production began to come to an end. Duringthe Crimean War,Russia crippled Ottomannaval strengthby destroyingthe Ottomanfleetat Sinop in
1853. To compensate for the loss, the Porte purchased warships from
abroad forthe firsttime,acquiringeightvessels fromBritainand France
in 1854 and payingforthem with a foreignloan.17 The developmentof
steam-poweredironcladsalso contributedto the demise ofTurkishnaval
yards.The necessityto maintainsome kind ofnaval forcecomparable to
the European ironclads caused more foreignpurchases. As a result of
these factors,the foreigncomplementwithinthe Ottoman navy steadily
rose. In the period 1859-68, some thirtyships were purchased abroad,
as opposed to thirteenmanufactureddomestically. The British- and
French-madeships carriedjust over one-halfofthe navy'sguns and most
of the tonnage.Whole classes of ships were entirelyforeign.For example, all four sail corvettesoriginatedin Britain,all five rivergunboats
came fromFrance, and the entireironclad fleetwas of Britishor French
manufacture.18
17. Nejat Giilen,Diinden BuguineBahriyemiz(Istanbul:Kastas A. S. Yayinlari,
1988), 122.
18. Bulwerto Russell,13 June1860, FO 78/1507;Alisonto Earl of Clarendon,
Osmanli Deniz Harp TarihiIII. Cilt,
27 December1857, FO 78/1276;Biiyiiktugrul,
16-18.
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JONATIAN GRANT

The governmentdid make effortsto produce some of its own ships.


When the Turkishgovernmentbecame aware of ironclad vessels in the
1860s, Sultan Abdul Aziz importedexpensive machineryand raw materials to expand his naval building capacity. He sought to complete a
Turkishironclad fromstem to stern includingthe boiler,the necessary
steam engine, and plate-rollingmills, on the Golden Horn. Due to the
lack of available infrastructure,
most of the necessary materials and
know-howhad to be imported. The financingof this operation came
fromBritainand France.19
This Ottomannaval programwas not completelywithoutsuccess. In
1870 the Nusretiyebecame the firstironclad produced entirelyin the
Ottoman Empire. Then, in 1872 the Imperial arsenal at Haskoy laid
down the keel of the ironclad Mukaddeme-i Hayir. Some effortwas
made to expand naval constructionfacilitiesbeyond Istanbul. Prior to
the war withRussia in 1877, Ottoman naval yardswere located at Eregli,
Basra, Mytilene,Rhodes, and Suda. Additionally,Sinop was to be made
into a major naval fortresswith extensive constructionfacilities.20
Nevertheless,Ottoman domestic naval capabilities remainedfarbelow selfsufficiency.
The compositionof the navy in 1877 showed a remarkablediversity
of foreign-madeand armed vessels. The Ottoman fleet consisted of
twenty-oneironclads (including five gunboats), one hundred wooden
vessels, fivesteam frigates,ten steam corvettes,twenty-sixsteam transsmall war steamers,and twenty-four
ports,thirty-five
small sail vessels.
As mentionedearlier,two of the ironclads were produced domestically,
while most of the rest were Britishor French. Of the fourOsmaniyeclass broadside ironcladsproduced in Britainin 1864-65, Napier & Sons
made threeand the Thames Iron Worksone. The FrenchfirmLa Seyne
builtthreebatteryironclads (launched 1868). Two Turkishcoast defense
turretships also originatedin France in 1868, this time at Bordeaux. In
Britain the manufacturersThames Iron Works and Samuda Brothers
provided, respectively,two and one casemate ironclads, launched in
1869-70. Two of these Britishships were exceptionallygood, considered
by contemporaryopinion to possess the highestdegree of speed of any
ships of war of the same class and equal tonnage. The Thames Iron
Works also produced two Mesudiye-class central battery ironclads,
launched in 1874-75. An additional ironclad was built in Trieste and
19. Bulwerto Russell,30 August 1864, FO 78/1806; Elliot to Granville,17
November1871, FO 78/2178;A. Gallenga,Two YearsoftheEasternQuestion,vol. 1
(London: Samuel Tinsley,1877), 248-49; Conway'sAll the World'sFightingShips,
1860-1905 (New York:Naval InstitutePress,1976), 388.
20. Elliotto Granville,15 January1874, FO 78/2329;Gulen,Diinden Bugiine
Bahriyemiz,134; Ollier, Cassell's IllustratedHistory,1: 135; Cooke, Ottoman
Empire,59-60.
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..........
...
.
........

.....

....

.....
...... . ...

. .....

....

.. .

. . ....

.... ... ...

......

P
Map 1: Major dockyards in the OttonwnEmpire, c. 1870.

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19

JONATIIANGRANT

launched in 1870.21 Finally,because of nonpayment,fourironcladswere


never actuallydelivered.
Amongwooden vessels, domesticproductionfiguredmuch more significantly.These vessels included frigatesand sloops. It appears that a
littleover halfof the wooden ships came fromdomesticyards.While the
Turkishconstructionwas verygood, it also relied on Englishmechanics.
Most of the wooden ships came fromTurkishwharvesusing high-quality
lumberfromAsia Minor,Bulgaria,and the Danubian Principalities.The
Istanbul and Izmit yards produced frigatesand sloops, while additional
sloops came fromGemlik.The rest of the wooden ships apparentlywere
the workof Britishfacilities.22
Overall, then, the Ottoman fleet at the time of the Russo-Turkish
War was an impressiveforce,containinga high numberof state-of-theart ironclads purchased fromabroad, as well as a couple of domestic
manufacture.Althoughbasically a coastal defensenavy,the fleetshould
have been more than adequate forthe empire'sneeds. The London Daily
News evaluated the fleet in the followingmanner: "Turkey then, has
numericallyspeaking,one of the finestfleetsin the world,and this naval
forcein otherrespectsalso is now not so deficientas it was some months
ago."123At the outset of the war, most foreignobservers rated the
Ottoman navy superiorto the Russian one. The fact that the Russians
outperformedthe Turks and crossed the Danube rathereasily reflected
more on the qualityof Ottomannaval leadership than on its equipment.
The years fromthe 1870s to 1885, then,can be seen as a phase of
decreasing importance of domestically manufactured weapons and
ships. This was true of both the army and the navy.Accordingly,each
service branch developed its own patternof imports.The armyfavored
German artilleryand American or French rifles,while the navy tended
towardsBritishand French ships and Britishguns.
MilitaryProduction,1885-1907
In the next period, 1885-95, German defenseimportsrose to a position of virtualhegemony,as part of a broader expansion of the German
role in Ottoman economic relations.Since 1800 Great Britainhad been
the major Ottoman tradingpartner,accountingforroughlyone-quarter
of all Ottoman exports (mostlyagriculturalproducts) and deliveringin
turnbetween 30 and 40 percentof Ottomanimports.In termsof foreign
investmentwithin the Ottoman Empire, however, the British share
21. Ollier, Cassell's Illustrated History, 1: 141; Giilen, Diinden Bugimne
Bahriyemiz,134-35; Conway'sAll theWorld'sFightingShips, 1860-1905, 389-9 1.
22. Ibid.,392-93; Cooke,OttomanEmpire,60.
23. WarCorrespondenceoftheDaily News, 22.
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TheSw ord ofthte


S ultan

-________________________________________

*HaSk

'y(Imperial

akoy (Arsenal)

+
t: . :A--N

ophan

~Navy
Nse//

..3
--:--0-Arsenaly

0;/

'-

)-Top
.-k.

IcaIac

Map 2: Istanbul area.


decreased over the period 1888-96 from50 percentto 20 percent.At the
same time the German share of foreigninvestmentrose from1 percent
to 25 percent,while the French became the single largestinvestorby
increasing their share from 30 percent to 50 .24

The Germans owed their new-foundadvantageous position to the


who was highly
policies and temperamentof Sultan Abdul
ra,Hamid
autocratic,deeply suspicious, and overlycontrolling.He had an obsessive preoccupationwithloyaltyand relied heavily on a privatenetwork
of internalspies and police informers.The value he placed on personal
loyaltyover efficiencyor performancethus promoted corruptionand
favoritism.The effectsofhis autocraticstylemanifestedthemselvesnegativelyin the Ottomanarmed forces.The Sultan distrustedthe Ottoman
navy because it had played the key part in the coup thatdeposed Abdul
Aziz, his predecessor.Ever fearfulof conspiracy,Abdul Hamid kept his
forces on a shortleash. He forbade the navy to leave its docks on the
Golden Horn in order to forestallany potential movementagainst the
24. Erik Zurcher,Turkey:A Modern History(London: I. B. Tauris and Co.,
1997), 89.
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21

JONATHANGRANT

palace; consequently,the ships rustedaway at anchor.Similarly,the Sultan was waryofthe armybecause he suspected thatthe militarycolleges
promoted liberalism among the graduates. Therefore,he consciously
promotedand favoredofficerswho had not been trained at the academies and who lacked backgroundin modernmilitaryscience.25
In the aftermathof the Turkishdefeatby Russia, the Sultan sought
a Germanmilitarymission to oversee trainingand modernizationof the
Ottoman army.In June 1880 he requested that officersof the German
General Staff,infantry,cavalry, and artilleryservices come to the
OttomanEmpire on three-yearcontracts.In April1882, officersKohler,
Kamphoevener,von Hobe, and Ristowarrived,and the Sultan gave them
ranks withinthe Ottoman army.Later that same year,Colmar Freiherr
von der Goltz joined the mission. AfterKohler'sdeath in 1885, von der
Goltz functionedas acting head of the mission and remained in the
OttomanEmpireuntil1895. Afterhis departurethe influenceofthe mission declined, and by 1898, only threeof the German officialswere still
in Turkey.26
Abdul Hamid had his own reasons forpreferring
Berlin.In 1876-77,
priorto the Russo-TurkishWar,the Ottoman WarMinistryhad engaged
a considerable numberof Britishofficerswith the hope that theirpresence would be followedby active Englishinterventionin favorofTurkey.
Afterthe Berlin Congress (1878), when the Britishnot only refusedto
stand up for Turkeybut in addition deprived it of Cyprus, the Sultan
made every effortto minimize the authorityand influence of these
British officers.Prospects for a French mission also seemed unlikely
because the Sultan distrustedFrance as much as Britain.Therefore,in
place of Britain,the Sultan now looked to Germanyas the firstmilitary
power in Europe and as the most disinterestedregardingTurkey.Abdul
Hamid stronglydesired to retaingood officesat Berlin. However,his distrustfulnature meant that no foreignmilitarymission would ever be
treatedwithreal confidenceand no foreignofficerwould ever be given
serious exclusive authorityexcept under the exigencies of hostilities.
Moreover,the foreignofficersdiscovered to theirdismay,accordingto a
Britishofficial,that"zeal and industryon theirpartare discouragedand
are positivelydistasteful."27
Indeed, von der Goltz complained repeatedly about his inabilityto effectmore improvementsin the Ottoman
army. Specifically,the Sultan forbade trainingmaneuvers because he
feared that they could serve as a means fora militarycoup, and out of
25. Hale, TurkishPolitics,28-29; Ziircher,Turkey,84.
Die preussich-deutschen
Mili26. JehudaWallach,AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,
tarmissionenin der Turkei,1835-1914 (Dusseldorf:DrosteVerlag,1976), 35, 43, 54,
64, 85.
27. Chermsideto Ford, 26 May 1893, enclosed in Ford to Rosebery,29 May
1893, FO 78/4479.
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TheSwordoftheSultan

similar concerns, he never allowed the troops to practice with live


rounds.28

For theirpart,the Germansused theirprivilegedpositionto support


the cause of German militarysuppliersas theyoverhauledthe Ottoman
armed forces.29Because theywere incorporatedwithinthe frameworkof
the Ottoman militarysystem, members of the German mission had
tremendousopportunitiesto expand the role ofGermanarms and equipment in the Ottoman army. Primarily,this unique position gave the
German officerseasy and frequentaccess to membersof the Ordnance
whichcontrolledsupplyand militaryproduction.Until1889 all
Ministry,
the German officerswere subject to the Serasker (War Minister).However,aftervon der Goltz refusedto renew his contractthatyear because
of dissatisfactionwith his lack of influence,he was attached directlyto
the ImperialMilitaryHousehold withthe rightto address reportsto the
Sultan. Some Turkishofficersand foreignobserversgrumbledabout the
German mission.A Britishrepresentativenoted: "One of the main handles forintriguehas been the accusation againstthe Chiefof the Mission
beinginterestedin supplies ofwar-likematerialby Germanfirms. .. but
in 1891-92 there was an active but unsuccessful intrigueby the then
FrenchMilitaryAttachein favourof a French MilitaryMission."30
The German militarymission provedto be a boon forGermanfirms.
In 1882, the Ottoman governmentplaced a large order with Krupp for
artilleryto replace and repair the fortificationsand batteries of the
Bosphorus and (anakkale. This order largely resulted fromthe insistence ofvon der Goltz,head ofthe mission,who in 1885 managed to sell
500 Kruppheavy guns to the Ottomans. The magnitudeof this sale can
be appreciatedwhen one considers that in the 1877-78 war,there were
590 fieldguns amongthe armyin Europe. In 1886 the Ottomansbought
426 fieldguns and 60 mortarsfromKruppand favoredthe German firm
Schichauwerftwithan orderfortorpedoboats. Then in 1887, as a result
ofthe militarymission'srearmamentprogramforthe Ottomanarmy,the
Ottomans purchased half a million riflesand fiftythousand carbines
fromthe German firmsofMauser and Loewe.31

28. Hale, TurkishPolitics,29.


29. For a thoroughdiscussionof the German militarymission,see Wallach,
35-85.
AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,
30. Ford to Earl of Rosebery,No. 159, 24 April1893, FO 78/4479;No. 208, 26
May, 1893; enclosure,Chermsideto Ford, Positionof GermanMilitaryMissionat
Constantinople.
31. Whiteto Rosebery,11 February1886, FO 78/3869;Whiteto Salisbury,18
February1888, FO 78/4098;Ilber Ortayli,Ikinci AbdulhamitDdnemindeOsmanli
ImparatorlugundaAlman Niifuzu (Ankara: Ankara finiversitesiSiyasi Biligiler
no. 479, 1981), 65-68; Ollier,Cassell's IllustratedHistory,1:140;
FakultesiYayinlari,
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JONATIIANGRANT

Undoubtedly the Germans profitedfrom these sales, but Abdul


Hamid acted as the decisive forcein grantingthe ordersto Germanyand
played a directrole in selectingthe armaments.For example, in 1887 an
Ottoman militarycommission deliberatedwhetherto adopt the Mauser
or the Martinias the new riflesystem. Over the objections of the War
Ministryand other Turkish militaryauthorities,the Sultan ordered a
provisionalcontract with Mauser. Only financialdifficultiesprevented
the immediateconversionof the provisionalcontractinto a finalone.32
In spite ofgrowingagitationin Istanbul against the Mauser contract,the
Sultan considered the deal "as his own act and deed," and in the end his
will prevailed.33However,by 1890 none of the Mausers had yet been
issued to the troopsor trainingschools; instead,theyremaineduncrated
in storage.34
The year 1889 was a banner one for German arms sales to the
Ottomans,who as a resultof the Kaiser's visit to Istanbulplaced a massive new order forartilleryfromKrupp,riflesfromMauser and Loewe,
and torpedoboats fromSchichau. Such a large orderrequiredfinancing,
and the Germans happilyarrangeda loan. The Deutsche Bank acted as
contractor,and the income fromthe Public Debt's fishingindustrywas
When put into context with the annual expendipledged as security.35
tures in the Ottoman budget, the enormityof this purchase becomes
apparent: the loan representedan amount equal to 19 percent of the
total military/naval
budget and about 10 percent of the total Ottoman
revenues forthe year. In the years ahead, the Sultan continuedto make
large arms purchases fromthe Germans.36
WVallach,
AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,105. The 1882 orderwas for1,206,987 liras
In 1888 Turkishwar ordersto Germanfirmsamountedto 2.2 milworthofartillery.
lion marks.
32. Whiteto FO (telegraphic),No. 10, 30 January1887, FO 78/4002.
33. WVhite
to Salisbury,28 November1887, FO 78/4001.
16 January1891, FO 78/4342.
34. Chermsideto WVhite,
Suvla,"The Ottoman
105; Rafii-Sukru
AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,
35. WVallach,
Debt 1850-1939," in Issawi,ed.,EconomicHistory,104. The Ottomansspenta total
of 15.3 millionmarksin 1889. JustinMcCarthy,The Arab World,Turkey,and the
Balkans: A HandbookofHistoricalStatistics(Boston:G. K. Hall and Co., 1982), 160,
184. The amountof the loan issued was 1,617,647 gold lira,althoughthe amount
actuallyreceivedtotalled1,132,352lira,or roughly70 percentoftheissue. The sum
actuallycollectedby the Ottomangovernmentin the financialyear 1888-89 was
15.7 milliongold lira). The budgetallocated
1,571,375,960kurus(or approximately
fortheHarbiyeNezaretiand the navywas 807,203,175kurus(or roughly8.1 million
goldlira).
36. Chermsideto Fane, 5 July1890, FO 78/4276;Ford to Rosebery,24 April
1893, FO 78/4479;LotharRathman,Berlin-Baghdad(Berlin:DietzVerlag,1962), 18;
105; Ortayli,Ikinci AbdulhamitDoneminde,
Wallach,AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,
68. In 1889 and 1890 the Ottomansspent six millionmarksforsuch itemsas one
thousandfieldgunsfromKruppand severalhundredthousandriflesfromMauserand
24

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The Sword oftheSultan

The Germans also improved their arms trade position by the way
theyconducted the militaryreforms.For example, in 1893 von der Goltz
declared that a numberof Ottoman officersmust become proficientin
the handlingand use ofthe riflesnewlydeveloped in Germany.He stated
furthermore
that the munitionsfactoryat Tophane would have to produce "dummy"cartridges,and then these new riflesshould be given to
the troops. Clearly, the close German ties with the Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti paid off.Duringthis time the French and Britishwere practically eliminatedfromthe Ottoman arms market.By 1894 Krupp's and
Mauser's exploitation of their complete market sovereigntybrought
accusations fromforeignobserversthatthe Germanswere sellingexpensive and low-qualitygoods. Among the German items ordered by the
Ottomans were torpedo boats, field artillery,coastal guns, rifles,and
ammunition.37
Meanwhile, it is difficultto gauge domestic production of military
supplies, rifles,and other weapons for the army from the Hamidian
period up to WorldWar I. Clearly the Turks had troublepayingforthe
maintenance of plant and foreignexperts. During the 1880s seven
Britishworkmenat Tophane filedpetitionsover wage arrearsamounting
to six thousand Turkishlira. The claims of these Britishsubjects occupied the attentionof the Britishembassy from1882 to 1889, but owing
to the "impecunious state of the Ottoman Treasury,"no settlementwas
forthcoming.
Indeed, since April1888 the Ottoman Bank had refusedto
pay anyone's salary, includingthe German generals and the Ottoman
diplomatic service.38Eventuallythe Britishemployees at Tophane did
receive back pay forthe period fromMay to September1888, but claims
forarrearsforthe previousfiveyears remainedoutstanding.39
evidence of OttomandomesticarmamentsproducThe fragmentary
tion suggests a noticeable decline in capabilities afterthe 1880s. For
example, duringthe 1890s, Tophane could turn out only ten Martinilower than the one
Henry riflesa week, a productionrate significantly
hundredriflesper week manufacturedtherein 1888.40In the years 1902
and 1903 the Turks attemptedto manufacturesix quick-firefieldguns
5.9 millionmarksworthofarms;for1892
Loewe. In 1891 theyboughtapproximately
and 1893 the amountswere10.1 millionmarksand 13.1 millionmarksrespectively.
77, 105; Ortayli,Ikinci Abdulhamit
37. WVallach,
AnatomieeinerMilitalrhilfe,
Ddneminde,68. In 1895 an additional12.2 millionmarksworthofgoods came from
Germany.All in all in the period1885-95, no less than 100 millionfrancsworthof
ordersforwar materialwentto Germanenterprises.
38. White to Salisbury,6 November1888, FO 78/4105; 15 November1888,
Enclosure:memorandum14 November1888, FO 78/4105.
39. WVhite
to Salisbury,7 December1888, FO 78/4106.
40. Captain Sir W. Cecil Domville,Report255, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,
1890," 12, Admiralty
(ADM) 231/18,PRO; Doniville,Report188, "TurkishFleet and
Dockyards,1888," 12, ADM 231/14.
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25

JONATHANGRANT

on the Krupp model presentedby the Kaiser,but Tophane's production


proceeded rather slowly owing to want of funds.41By the time of the
Balkan Wars (1913), Tophane was manufacturing
some hand grenades.42
The underdeveloped state of Ottoman industry generally becomes
apparentwhen compared to other sectors of the economy. In 1894-95
therewere approximately186,000 factoryworkerscomparedto 185,000
governmentofficials,and a combined total of servants,maids, and secretariesexceeding 186,000.43
By and large the equipping of the Ottoman army became the
province of foreignimports,especially fromthe Germans. During the
1890s, the mainstayof the Ottoman infantrybecame the Mauser rifles
manufacturedin Germany.44
Here again, the Ottomansfoundit easier to
buy the newer models. German dominance in orders forthe armywas
still unquestionable. The Germans achieved their greatest sale-over
twice the size of the large 1889 order-in 1905, when the Ottomans
placed an enormous order formilitaryequipment fromKrupp. Because
of the order's size, once again the Deutsche Bank contractedthe loan.
Since the Ottoman governmentfound itself unable to pay arrears
amountingto almost one millionlira on its formercontractsforKrupp
guns and Mauser rifles,it was decided to pay offthe old debt and at the
same timearrangea new contractby means ofa loan fromthe Deutsche
Bank. Additionalcustoms duties formilitaryequipment and the 6 percent additional revenues of the Public Debt Administrationserved as
securityforthe loan.45
41. IntelligenceDepartment,WVar
Office,"Reportson Changesin VariousForWar
eignArmiesDuringtheYear1902," 82, WO 106/6179;IntelligenceDepartment,
Office,"Reportson Changesin VariousForeignArmiesDuringthe Year 1903," 85,
WO 106/6180.
42. Captain Sir NV.Cecil Domville,Report188, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,
1888," ADM 231/14;Captain Domville,Report255, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,
1890," ADM 231/18; Ortayli,Ikinci AbdulhamitDdneminde,69; Ramiz Ertem,
Balkan Harbi Garp Ordusu Karadag Cephesi H. Cilt (Ankara:GnkurBasimevi,
1984), 40.
43. Kemal H. Karpat,Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and
Social Ch-aracteristics
ofWisconsinPress,1985), 59, 218.
(Madison:University
44. Fordto Earl of Rosebery,24 April1893, FO 78/4479;"Reportson Changes
in VariousForeignArmiesDuringtheYear 1902," WO 106/6179;"CaptainC. B. Norman, "The TurkishArmyof To-Day,"in AmericanMonthlyReview ofReviews, 16
(November1897): 593-94.
45. "Reportson Changesin VariousForeignArmiesDuringtheYear1905," WO
106/6182;A. S. Avetian,Germanskiiimperializmna blizhnemvostoke (Moskva:
Izdatel'stvoMezhdunarodye
Otnosheniya,1966), 109-10; Suvla,"The OttomanDebt
1850-1939," 105. The Krupporderin 1905 was worthbetween60 and 70 million
francs.The new loan fromDeutsche Bank amountedto 2.64 milliongold lira, of
which2,098,800(about 79.5 percent)was actuallyreceived.
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The Sword of theSultan

Naval Production, 1885-1907


The late 1880s saw littlenew naval construction,and the domestic
naval programof the latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign proved to be
largelyabortive.In 1886 the Turksdid succeed in buildingtorpedoboats
boat builtby the French firm
in Istanbul by copyinga one-hundred-foot
Forgeset Chantiersand purchased the previousyear. Based on this initial success the Turkishdockyardlaid down the keels forthreeadditional
boats.46 British AdmiraltyIntelligence observed about these torpedo
boats that "Everythingwas made in the dockyard,and it speaks highly
fortheirfactorythat they should be able to run the engines withouta
hitch the firsttime theywere tried,and to make 17 knots." Royal Navy
observerCaptain HenryKane rated the Turkishdockyardin Istanbul as
betterthan the Russian yardsat Kronstadtor Nikolaevin 1886, although
not as good as Englishyards. Captain Kane reported,"The factoryis a
large establishment,fairlyfittedup with machines, and capable of good
work.They have iron and brass foundries,a puddlinghouse withseveral
furnaces,millsforrollingarmour-plates,angle-iron,bars,and sheets; two
smitheries,with a 15-ton and 7.5-ton hammer; fitting,erecting,and
However,
boilershops, and altogether,a verycomplete establishment."47
just a fewyears laterthe conditionsin the dockyardhad deterioratedsignificantly.The steel factoryproved to be dysfunctional,and most of the
heat fromthe furnace.By
castings were useless because of insufficient
1894 the dockyardhad fallen into a neglected state. Constructionhad
commenced forseveral ships,which remainedin skeletalformforyears.
The yard lacked systematicmanagement.For example, afterdesigning
new hulls thatrequiredyears to build, the Turksput old engines and old
guns into them.In one glaringcase, the Turksleftthe armor-cladAbd-ul
Khadir on an inadequate buildingslip, and fortwo years the ship sank
into the ground.A comparativelylarge naval buildingprogramwas initiated in the 1890s. Construction of two Shadiye-class cruisers commenced at Izmit,but neitherwas ever launched. Similarly,a battleship
begun in 1892 was never completed. Althoughthe domestic naval program of the late Hamidian period did have some degree of success
regardingsmallerships, the Hamidian era essentiallymarkedthe end of
domestic building programsin the empire.48In terms of domestically
produced warships,the mediocre programof the 1890s was the last one
22 April 1886, enclosed in Whiteto Rosebery,23 April
46. Trotterto WVhite,
1886, FO 78/3870.
47. Captain HenryC. Kane, R.N., Report127, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards
1886," 6, 11, ADM 231/10.
48. Captain Domville,Report255, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,1890," ADM
231/18;Captain Egerton,Report385, "Turkey,Fleet,Dockyards,Guns, 1894," ADM
231/24;Gillen,Dunden BugiineBahriyemiz,158-59.
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27

JONATHANGRANT

to give any significantorders. Thereafter,especially duringthe Young


Turk era, foreign-manufactured
ships completelydominated the Ottoman naval buildingprogram.
The period 1885-95 also markeda point of departurein the pattern
of Ottoman naval purchases, which the Germans came to dominate.
Expediency,cost, and Abdul Hamid's personal involvementall played a
part in bringingabout the turningpoint fornaval procurementin 1886.
Initially,the Turkshoped to buy more boats fromFrance,but the French
informedthe TurkishAdmiraltythatno torpedoboats would be available
for immediate purchase. Faced with the need to place construction
orders, the Turks solicited bids. The Germans sharply underbid the
French and offeredspectacularsavings,agreeingto providetwelveboats
at a lowertotal price than the French had proposed foronly eightboats.
In the ongoingcompetitionwith
The Sultan gave the contracthimself.49
Armstrong,Krupp gained the upper hand. From 1886 to 1890 all five
Sinub-class wooden sloops were rearmedwithKrupps.In 1891, many of
the Ottomanships replaced theirpreviouslymountedBritishArmstrongs
withKrupps.Additionally,the torpedogunboats and third-classcruisers
builtat Istanbul possessed Krupps.In termsof ship production,German
firmsalso gained substantially.The Ottomannavy had no German-built
ships in 1877, but in thisnew periodthe Germanfirmsproducedthirteen
torpedoboats (fivebuiltby Schichau in 1886, eightbuiltby Germania in
1887-92). The French did sell six torpedoboats to the Ottomansin the
years 1885-86 (La Seyne and Des Vignes builtthreeeach), but received
no more orders after1886.50Therefore,1886 can be seen as the beginningof German hegemonyin the Ottomannaval market.
Obviously,the big loser in all this was Britain.The true magnitude
of German gain at this time showed in the almost complete removal of
Britain from a naval market which she had commanded previously.
Britainstill had a minormarketin supplyingWhitehead torpedoes,but
thiswas a mere fractionofher formerbusiness. Nevertheless,the Sultan
did take a likingto the English-madeNordenfeltsubmarineand accordinglypurchased a pair out of his personal funds.To an Englishobserver,
thispurchase seemed morea vanityas "His Majestyhas alreadypaid, not
only the value of the material obtained fromEngland, but the cost of
puttingthemtogetherhere,the latteroperationhavingtaken threetimes
as long and cost threetimes as much as the estimate."'51
The German hegemonyin Ottoman naval orders turned out to be
short-lived.From the late 1890s to 1907, the Ottoman government
49. Whiteto Granville,29 April1885, FO 78/3751;CaptainHenryKane,Report
127, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards1886,"ADM 231/10.
50. Chermsideto Fane, 5 July1890, FO 78/4276;CaptainHenryKane, Report
127, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,1886," ADM 231/10.
51. Ibid.
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Thze
Sword of theSultan

embarked upon a foreignbuilding and reconstructionprogramfor its


navy. During those years the British firmArmstrongmade a rousing
comeback. In 1898, the contract for rebuildingthe ironclad Mesudiye
went to Armstrong-Ansaldo,
a branch of the Britishfirmin Genoa. Armstrongcompletedthejob in 1903, along withthe new constructionofthe
armored cruiserAbdul Hamid. In the reconstructionof 1903-7, Armstrong-Ansaldomodernized three ironclads. Only one ironclad was
handed to a German firm(Krupp) in 1903-7, and this was only because
Ansaldo had been unable to complete the workin 1899. The Britisheven
moved into the German domain of torpedo boats. Armstrong-Ansaldo
builteleven ofthese craftin the years from1901 to 1906. So, the period
1897-1907 marked the returnof Britainto the Ottoman naval market.
Meanwhile,the French and Germans also acquired some Ottomannaval
ordersin the 1903-7 program.52
Naval Production, 1908-14
The Young Turk Revolution broughta change in naval affairs.By
deposing Abdul Hamid II in 1909, the Young Turks removed the single
most importantimpedimentto revitalizingthe Turkish navy. Accordingly,they planned formajor improvementsin the composition of the
fleet and called for six battleships,twelve destroyers,twelve torpedo
boats, and six submarines.53The Young Turksdid not limittheirambitions merely to upgradingthe class of their navy, but also sought to
strengthendomesticproductionby developingthe capacity to build their
own dreadnoughts.To this end they pursued a naval docks contract
which would put in place the necessary infrastructure
forself-sustained
warshipconstructionwithinthe empire.
However, the Young Turk program did not have the chance to
the Balkan Wars,and finallyWorldWVar
I
develop fully.The Italian NVar,
interruptedand hamperedit. As a stopgapmeasure,thegovernmentpurchased a numberofvessels which had originallybeen intendedforother
countries.In the end the YoungTurkplans forself-sufficiency
were frustratedby events,and expediencyonce again favoredimportsas the solution forOttoman policy makers.
Having announced the new naval policy,the governmentset about
achieving its goals. In 1909 the Young Turk governmentdiscussed the
procurementof capital ships forthe firsttime.The plan for1910 called
fortwo battleshipsof the Reshadiye class, and the correspondingorder
went to the BritishfirmVickers. AlthoughKrupp lobbied hard for the
52. Report841, "Turkey,Greece and Roumania.War \Tessels.1908," 30-36,
ADM 231/49;Giilen,DiindenBugiuneBahriyemiz,134-35.
53. Conway'sAll theWorld'sFightingShips, 1906-1921, 388.
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29

JONATILANGRANT

a particularlysweet deal to the Turks.


order,Vickerswon out by offering
Then in July 1911, Vickers' bankers Glyn Mills guaranteed a large
advance to the Turksin respect of paymentdue to Vickerson the warships.54

Vickers became the primarynaval supplier in the final phase of


Ottomanpolicy.55Ultimately,the battleshipdeal withVickersturnedout
to be unfortunatefor the Ottomans because the Britishretained the
Reshadiye afterits launch in 1913. In the meantime,the Ottomanstried
to bolster their fleetas quickly as possible by buyingtwo old German
battleships in 1910. As another stopgap measure, in 1913 they purchased the Rio de Janeiro, which Brazil had intended to buy from
Britain,at a reduced price.56
War I, Britainruled the Ottoman
For the last fewyears beforeWVorld
naval market.This resurgencein Turkeywas part of her improvednaval
trade worldwideforthe years 1900-14, when Britishexportersof warships and naval ordnance had 63.2 percent of the world market compared with Germany's 7.6 percent. Vickers had in hand Turkish
armament orders equivalent to 84 percent of British manufactured
exportsto the Ottoman Empire in 1913. The crowningBritishachievementthatyear was the acquisitionof the docks contractforthe VickersArmstrongTurkish Company, the result of collaboration between
Vickersand Armstrongforthe exploitationof Ottoman state docks and
arsenals. The Ottomangovernmentheld the controllingshare ofthe capital of this enterprise,with the minoritydivided between Vickers and
Armstrong.5'

The dock commission triggereda war of threatsbetween Germany


and Britain.In October 1913, the Ottomangovernmentplanned to reach

Board
54. Tyneand WearArchiveService(TWAS) 130/1268,no. 3, Armstrong
MeetingMinutes,30, 131, 134, 171; Giilen,Diinden BugiineBahriyemiz,185-86;
Clive Trebilcock,The VickersBrothers:Armamentsand Enterprise,1854-1914
(London:EuropeanPublishersLtd.,1977), 130. Vickersprovidedforsix months'free
creditwithpaymentin tenequal parts,and paid forthestartupcosts.The GlynMills
advance to theTurkswas ?600,000.
55. Trebilcock,VickersBrothers,121. In 1911 Vickershad contractsfromthe
5.5 mil2.2 milliongoldlira,and promisesfora further
empireworthapproximately
lion in 1913.
56. Avetian, Germanskii imperializm, 116; Gillen, Diinden Bugiine
Bahriyemiz,181, 186. The shipwas pricedat ?3.4 million,but theOttomansbought
her for?2.3 million.
57. Trebilcock,VickersBrothers,123-24; ZaferToprak,Tiirkiye'de"MilliIkti1982), 362; J. D. Scott,Vicksat 1908-1918 (Ankara:MAYAMatbaacilik-Yayincilik,
ers: A History(London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson,1963), 85; Suvla, "The Ottoman
TurkishCompanywas
Debt,1850-1939," 106. The capitaloftheVickers-Armstrong
?250,000 sterling;its loan to the Ottomanswas for1.485 milliongoldlira at 5.5 percentinterest.
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The Sword of theSultan

an agreementwith the Britishconsortiumabout the constructionof a


dock at Izmit and a transferof all Ottoman naval orders to Britain.The
German representativein Istanbul wrote to Berlin that Germanycould
not allow this.He arguedto the Ottomansthatthe late Mahmud Shevket
Pasha had promised him to address orders concerningbattleshipconstructionto Germany;however,Germanywould approve the deal with
Armstrongif the Ottomans would buy a ?500,000 dreadnoughtfrom
Germany.In response,Armstrongthreatenedto refuseto constructthe
dock or arsenals ifthe Ottomans grantedGermany'sdemand. Afterdiscussion in the Ottoman Council of Ministers,in December 1913 Armstronggot the agreementto manage the newlyestablisheddock forboth
shipbuildingand repairoperationsforthirtyyears.58
In the wake of this coup, Britishfirmspressed formore. By 1914
and JohnBrownteamed up to secure Turkishorders
Vickers,Armstrong,
for three superdreadnoughts,six destroyers,and two scouts. Joining
forces,the three firmswere at a tremendousadvantage. According to
Clive Trebilock,"Able to offerin one vessel, Armstronghulls . . ., Brown
armour, and Vickers ordnance, mountingsand engines, commodities
separatelyof the highestinternationalrepute,here available in combination, this armourers' conclave could deliver a sales pitch which
brooked fewequals in overseas trade." In addition to these advantages,
Britisharmamentproducts were also competitivelypriced and British
producers could offermore rapid delivery(twenty-four
months forthe
largest class warship, while German producers were 30 percent
slower).59Once again, the elements of expediency and money manifestedthemselvesin Ottoman armamentpolicy.
The YoungTurksalso purchased ships fromthe French. On 30 April
1914, the Porteagreed to a contractwithSchneiderforthe construction
of two submarines.On 2 May,the French shipbuilderNormanwon constructionofsix torpedogunboats,and a subsequent agreementfortwelve
more. At the same time the St. Nazaire and Le Havre shipyardswere set
up forseven gunshipsforthe Ottomans.60
MilitaryProduction, 1908-14
Turningonce again to the armyorders,the Young Turks continued
the Ottoman preferencefor Krupp and the Germans but kept their
58. TWAS130/1268,392; Avetian,Germanskiiimperializm,110-11; Conway's
All theWorld'sFightingShips, 1906-1921, 2, 388.
59. Trebilcock,VickersBrothers,125 (quoted), 126-27.
60. Avetian,Germanskiiimperializm,116. See also Djemal Pasha,Memoriesof
a TurkishStatesman,1913-1919 (New York:ArnoPress, 1973) 95, 102. The submarinescost 2.2 millionfrancseach.
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31

JONATIANGRANT

optionsopen withthe French. Like Abdul Hamid beforethem,the Young


Turks requested and received a new German military mission to
strengthentheirposition,and theyput forththe question about the rearmament of the artilleryand coastal fortifications
of the straitsby German factorieswithbroad creditfoundations.The FrenchtoldCemal Bey,
the Ministerof Marine, that they would not object to the German mission as long as France was not deprivedof ordersforwar materials.The
strugglebetween French and German firmsbecame so bitterthat Cemal
Bey undertooknegotiationswiththe business and governmentcircles of
each country.6'
Justa year beforeWorldWar I began, both Germanand Frenchfirms
lobbied forwar orders.In the fallof 1913 the OttomanWVar
Ministrywas
preparingto orderabout six hundredguns,ofwhich two-thirds
would be
mountainguns and one-thirdfieldguns. Prospects forlargerorders of
shells lay ahead, since their number did not exceed two hundred for
everyfieldor mountaingun. The Balkan Wars had shown the superiorityof Schneider artilleryover Kruppguns, and therefore,Ottoman officials generally agreed that the mountain guns should be ordered in
France.62 The Ottoman government'saspiration to support modern
artilleryand concentratea large part of the order with Schneider compelled the Germans to take correspondingmeasures. At this time the
numberof Krupp pieces in the Ottoman armywas twice as great as the
number of artillerypieces of other manufacturers,and Krupp had no
intentionof lettingthis commandingposition slip away.63
The Ottoman officialsused the French-Germancompetition to
obtainvarious concessions in negotiationsabout economic questions. By
February 1914, Krupp presented to the Ottomans a financialpackage
whichwould make it possible forthe empireto pay Kruppforall received
material.While the GrandVezir assured the Germansthatthe Ottomans
would turnaway fromFrance, Cavid Bey, the Ministerof Finance, gave
consent forgovernmentmilitaryorders with France for376 mountain
millionbullets,two submarines,and six torpedoboats. A new
guns, fifty
French loan could be used to pay forthese items; however,it was stipulated that French loans should not serve forpaymentof orders outside
of France. The Porteaccepted and placed the orderswithFrance.64Having lost some ground to the French, the Germans recovered between
61. Djemal,Memories,111.
62. Djemal,Memories,102. Accordingto Djemal Pasha, "We also orderedfrom
of the FrenchmounFrance a numberof mountainguns as soon as the superiority
expert,Gentaingun to thatof Krupphad been ascertainedby our leadingartillery
eral Hassan Riza Pasha."
63. Avetian,Germanskiiimperializm,112.
64. Ibid., 112-14. See also Djemal,Memories,73-74. Krupp'spackageinvolved
six millionlira.The Porte'sordersto Francewereworthone hundredmillionfrancs.
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-Thte Sword of theSultan

Februaryand May of 1914. First,Krupp moved to open Ottoman longtermcredit and as a result acquired a large order.The Ottomans then
placed massive ordersin Germanyforguns, rifles,and bullets.65
Up to the war'sstart,Kruppand Schneidervied forordersforcoastal
artilleryforthe straits.In the summerof 1914, the Frenchsuggestedthat
the DardSchneider-Creusotbe given the concessions for fortifying
anelles. This would have been a staggeringblow to German prestige;
however,the Germans were too well entrenchedin this section of the
Ottoman defensesystemforthis to happen. Under the German military
mission,a special commissionforthe reorganizationof the fortifications
of the Dardanelles had been created, and throughthis commission all
orderswere given to Krupp.In mid-October1914, Kruppreceived both
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus reconstructionorders.66
The French made one last sales pitch beforethe war broke out. In
July1914 the OttomanMinisterofMarinevisitedthe headquartersofthe
Creusot firmand chose what he wanted to order.AnotherFrench loan
made this last orderfromSchneider-Creusotpossible, but, accordingto
forthe profitsof Schneider-Creusot,hostilan authority,"Unfortunately
ities were commenced beforethe deliveriescould be made. The Turkish
Ministerof Marine thereforecalled upon Krupp of Essen on his return
journey and spent the money he had raised in Paris to purchase a German supplyof armamentsinstead of French."67
For the sake of completeness,a brieflook at the Ottomanair arm is
in order. In 1912 the governmentordered an assortmentof reconnaissance planes forarmycooperation duties. Amongthe planes were Bristols (British),D.F.W.s (German), and Nieuportsand R.E.P.s (French). All
were flownby foreignpilots.68The representationof British,German,
and French importsin this forceshould come as no surprise,since none
of the threehad yet manifestedany clear-cutsuperiority.This being the
case, it appears the Ottoman governmentchose to play the field.This
can be considered anotherexample of takingthe best of the WVest.
65. Avetian,Germanskiiimperializm,114-15. Kruppextendeda creditof 2.5
pieces withshells,150 self-detonating
millionliraand receivedordersfor50 artillery
mines, seven fieldbatteries,and additionalriflesand machine guns. The other
Ottomanordersinvolved200 fieldguns,100 Maximguns,200,000 Mauserrifles,150
millionbullets,and 1,000 Kruppnavalgunsofvariouscaliber.From27 Februaryto 1
May 1914, some 31,200 boxes ofriflebullets,1,900 boxes offieldgun shells,74 field
300 boxes ofdynaguns,400 boxes ofgun cotton(pyroxylin),
guns,eightrapid-fire
mite,saltpeter,and fusesarrivedin Istanbul.
66. Ibid., 114.
InternationalTradeinArmamentsPriorto WorldWar
67. A. FennerBrockway,
II (New York:GarlandPublications,1972), 41.
68. David W. Wragg,World'sAir Forces (England:Osprey Publishing,1971),
148, 181.
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33

JONATIIANGRANT

Fromthe previousdata, the weakness of Ottomandomestic military


productioncan be inferred.Still,it is possible to obtain a fairlyclear picture of the financialsituation regardingthe Ottoman militaryindustry
forthe year 1910-11. For that year the budgetforsalaries and expendituresof the Ministryof War amounted to roughly10.7 milliongold lira,
whereas the correspondingfigurefor the navy was approximately1.6
milliongold lira. The amount spent forsalaries and expenditureson militaryproductionand manufacturing
(Imalat-i Harbiye) was 432,000 lira,
of which 412,000 went to the Central AdministrationIstanbul Vilayet,
and the next highestwas Izmit with approximately3,500 lira.69From
these figuresone can see that domestic militaryproduction did not
account formuch of the empire'sarms and war equipment.
Summary
The Ottoman slide into importdependency cannot be blamed on
foreignsuppliers. The Westernarmaments producers engaged in keen
competitionwithone anotherand evinced no reluctanceto supplyor to
establishproductionfacilitiesaround the globe. As we have seen, Britain
and France each helped lay the basis forOttomanironcladconstruction
under Sultan Abdul Aziz. Later, the intense competition created a
buyer'smarket,whereincreditcould easily be arranged.The Ottomans
manipulated the various parties as best they could, and in turn were
wooed by the lure of possible loans. The same marketforcesthat made
it easy forthe Ottomans to acquire modern weaponrywere also at play
when the Young Turks contracted with the Britishfirmsto construct
modern naval productionfacilitieswithinthe empire. In effect,competitionin the world naval marketwas so intense that foreignproducers
offeredto build factorieswithinthe buyercountriesin orderto avoid losing to other competitors.Thus, Vickers and/orArmstrongbuilt modern
shipyardssimultaneouslyin Russia,Japan,Spain, Italy,and Turkeyprior
War.70
to the outbreakof the WVorld
Ottoman preferences bore a striking resemblance to Japanese
choices, as both opted forBritishmodels fortheirnavies and German
models fortheirarmies.71However,the Japanese case differedexternally
fromthe Ottoman situation in dramatic ways. Whereas the Ottomans
foundthemselvesconstantlyon the defensivedue to the relentlesspressures of Great Power rivalriesentailed in the Eastern Question and the
correspondingloss of Balkan provinces,the Japanese enjoyed the luxury
69. McCarthy,
HistoricalStatistics,194-95, 201.
70. Basil Collier,Armsand theMen: TheArms Trade and Governments(London: HamishHamilton,1980), 138-42.
71. Conway'sAll theWorld'sFightingShips, 1906-1921, 222.
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Thwe
Sword of theSultan

of layingthe groundforoffensivewars againstChina in 1895 and Russia


in 1904. The Japanese decisions to pursue war abroad encouraged technological developmentand successfulindustrializationbased on domestic financialresources.72
The absence of indigenousprivatedefense enterprisedistinguished
the Ottomancase most clearlyfromthe more successfulcases of Russia
and Japan, where privatefirmsfacilitatedthe domesticationof foreign
technologyand fosteredinnovationbased on theirprofitmotive. Lacking a privatesector,the Ottomansshared the same fateof importdependency as their counterpartsin Latin America, the Mediterranean,the
Balkans, and China.73
Abdul Hamid II must shoulder most of the responsibilityfor the
Ottomandefenseerosion. He ruled more than thirtyyears,the longestof
any sultan in the period, and while on the thronehe decisivelyfavored
importsover domesticproduction.In fairnessto the Sultan,the financial
squeeze he inheritedgreatlydebilitatedthe empire'soptionsforwar production. Like the case of Khedival Egypt, the Ottoman capacity for
tax collection led to
domestic productionquicklywitheredas inefficient
Abdul Hamid's use of foreignmoney to acquire
under-capitalization.74
foreign weapons effectivelybrought first-classequipment into the
empire at the least expense, and the Turks owed their strongshowing
againstRussia in 1877 to theirsuperiorimportedweapons. Nevertheless,
the cost to Ottoman industryin the long run proveddisastrous.
However,Abdul Hamid's suspicion ofhis armed forces,especiallythe
navy, had a tremendous detrimentaleffect.As David Stevenson has
shown,it was in naval armamentsthat the privatesector made its decisive breakthoughin Britain,France, and Germany.75Yet, naval armamentwas preciselythe area most hinderedby Abdul Hamid. The Young
Turkstried to turnthe situation around, but the world war terminated
dock constructionin Turkey.We willneverknowwhethersuch an enterprise would have revitalizedOttoman domestic naval production;however,such an outcome was indeed possible.
The weak industrialbase of Republican Turkey after 1923 was a
direct legacy of the Ottoman policies. Because Atatuirk'sgovernment
confronteda similar set of conditions, Turkish policy makers in the
72. Kozo Yamamura,"Success Ill-gotten?
The Role ofMeijiMilitarism
in Japan's
TechnologicalProgress,"Journal of Economic History37 (March 1977): 113-35;
in RobertE. Ward
XVilliam
NV.Lockwood,"Economicand PoliticalModernization,"
and DankwartA. Rustow,eds.,PoliticalModernizationin Japan and Turkey(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1964), 120.
73. David Stevenson,Armamentsand theComingof War,Europe, 1904-1914
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996), 19.
74. Dunn,"Egypt'sNineteenth-Century
ArmamentsIndustry,"
254.
75. Stevenson,Armamentsand theComingofWar,29.
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35

JONiTHAN GRANT

interwar years continued to use the methods employed by their


Ottomanpredecessorspriorto the Great War.Duringthisperiod Turkey
received modern militaryequipment froma varietyof supplierswithout
beingdependent on any one of them. Furthermore,the suppliergovernments furnishedthe financialmeans to acquire the desired equipment
on relativelyeasy terms.76
In conclusion, the Ottoman armamentspolicy duringthe late nineteenthand early twentiethcenturies was based on importation.During
those years the significanceof imported arms and ships increased in
both number and value, while domestic war production decreased in
importance.Over the course of this importpolicy,the Ottomansfavored
differentcountries during distinct periods. In the end, the Germans
dominated the army orders and the Britishthe naval ones. These two
powers were the recognizedworld leaders in theirrespectiverealms of
militaryand naval power,and Ottoman officialsopted forthem in their
"Best of the West" importpolicy.The sorryconditionof the empire can
be seen in the state of affairswhereinthe formerIslamic power became
dependenton the \Vestforthe means to defenditself.

76. GotthardJaischke,Tiirkei (Berlin:Junkerund DiinnhauptVerlag,1941),


58-61; ArthurS. GouldLee, Special Duties,Reminiscencesofa RoyalAirForce Staff
in theBalkans, Turkeyand theMiddleEast (London:SampsonLow,Marston
Officer
and Co., 1946), 28-30.
36 *

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