Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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JonathanGrant
C) Societv forMilitaryHistorr
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JONATIIANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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11
JONATIAN GRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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MilitaryProduction, 1850-85
The most outstandingcharacteristicof Ottoman domestic military
productionwas the degree of state control.All the factoriesthat manufacturedand maintainedwar materialswere state-ownedand administered. The government department responsible for these various
activities was the Ministryof Imperial Ordnance (Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti), which was independent of the Ministry of War (Bab-i
Seraskeri). The Ordnance Ministrywas entrustedwith the production,
repair, and supply of weapons and militaryequipment, and directly
administeredthe Zeytinburnufactoryand powder millsin Istanbul and
Anatolia. Comprised of defense, communications,and supply departments,its main duties were guardingthe straitsand trainingtechnical
personnel.8
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JONATHANGRANT
THE JOUR-NAL OF
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TheSwordoftheSultan
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JONATIAN GRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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JONATIAN GRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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Map 1: Major dockyards in the OttonwnEmpire, c. 1870.
MILITARY HISTORY
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JONATIIANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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-________________________________________
*HaSk
'y(Imperial
akoy (Arsenal)
+
t: . :A--N
ophan
~Navy
Nse//
..3
--:--0-Arsenaly
0;/
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)-Top
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IcaIac
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21
JONATHANGRANT
palace; consequently,the ships rustedaway at anchor.Similarly,the Sultan was waryofthe armybecause he suspected thatthe militarycolleges
promoted liberalism among the graduates. Therefore,he consciously
promotedand favoredofficerswho had not been trained at the academies and who lacked backgroundin modernmilitaryscience.25
In the aftermathof the Turkishdefeatby Russia, the Sultan sought
a Germanmilitarymission to oversee trainingand modernizationof the
Ottoman army.In June 1880 he requested that officersof the German
General Staff,infantry,cavalry, and artilleryservices come to the
OttomanEmpire on three-yearcontracts.In April1882, officersKohler,
Kamphoevener,von Hobe, and Ristowarrived,and the Sultan gave them
ranks withinthe Ottoman army.Later that same year,Colmar Freiherr
von der Goltz joined the mission. AfterKohler'sdeath in 1885, von der
Goltz functionedas acting head of the mission and remained in the
OttomanEmpireuntil1895. Afterhis departurethe influenceofthe mission declined, and by 1898, only threeof the German officialswere still
in Turkey.26
Abdul Hamid had his own reasons forpreferring
Berlin.In 1876-77,
priorto the Russo-TurkishWar,the Ottoman WarMinistryhad engaged
a considerable numberof Britishofficerswith the hope that theirpresence would be followedby active Englishinterventionin favorofTurkey.
Afterthe Berlin Congress (1878), when the Britishnot only refusedto
stand up for Turkeybut in addition deprived it of Cyprus, the Sultan
made every effortto minimize the authorityand influence of these
British officers.Prospects for a French mission also seemed unlikely
because the Sultan distrustedFrance as much as Britain.Therefore,in
place of Britain,the Sultan now looked to Germanyas the firstmilitary
power in Europe and as the most disinterestedregardingTurkey.Abdul
Hamid stronglydesired to retaingood officesat Berlin. However,his distrustfulnature meant that no foreignmilitarymission would ever be
treatedwithreal confidenceand no foreignofficerwould ever be given
serious exclusive authorityexcept under the exigencies of hostilities.
Moreover,the foreignofficersdiscovered to theirdismay,accordingto a
Britishofficial,that"zeal and industryon theirpartare discouragedand
are positivelydistasteful."27
Indeed, von der Goltz complained repeatedly about his inabilityto effectmore improvementsin the Ottoman
army. Specifically,the Sultan forbade trainingmaneuvers because he
feared that they could serve as a means fora militarycoup, and out of
25. Hale, TurkishPolitics,28-29; Ziircher,Turkey,84.
Die preussich-deutschen
Mili26. JehudaWallach,AnatomieeinerMilitarhilfe,
tarmissionenin der Turkei,1835-1914 (Dusseldorf:DrosteVerlag,1976), 35, 43, 54,
64, 85.
27. Chermsideto Ford, 26 May 1893, enclosed in Ford to Rosebery,29 May
1893, FO 78/4479.
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THE JOURNAL OF
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TheSwordoftheSultan
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JONATIIANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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The Germans also improved their arms trade position by the way
theyconducted the militaryreforms.For example, in 1893 von der Goltz
declared that a numberof Ottoman officersmust become proficientin
the handlingand use ofthe riflesnewlydeveloped in Germany.He stated
furthermore
that the munitionsfactoryat Tophane would have to produce "dummy"cartridges,and then these new riflesshould be given to
the troops. Clearly, the close German ties with the Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti paid off.Duringthis time the French and Britishwere practically eliminatedfromthe Ottoman arms market.By 1894 Krupp's and
Mauser's exploitation of their complete market sovereigntybrought
accusations fromforeignobserversthatthe Germanswere sellingexpensive and low-qualitygoods. Among the German items ordered by the
Ottomans were torpedo boats, field artillery,coastal guns, rifles,and
ammunition.37
Meanwhile, it is difficultto gauge domestic production of military
supplies, rifles,and other weapons for the army from the Hamidian
period up to WorldWar I. Clearly the Turks had troublepayingforthe
maintenance of plant and foreignexperts. During the 1880s seven
Britishworkmenat Tophane filedpetitionsover wage arrearsamounting
to six thousand Turkishlira. The claims of these Britishsubjects occupied the attentionof the Britishembassy from1882 to 1889, but owing
to the "impecunious state of the Ottoman Treasury,"no settlementwas
forthcoming.
Indeed, since April1888 the Ottoman Bank had refusedto
pay anyone's salary, includingthe German generals and the Ottoman
diplomatic service.38Eventuallythe Britishemployees at Tophane did
receive back pay forthe period fromMay to September1888, but claims
forarrearsforthe previousfiveyears remainedoutstanding.39
evidence of OttomandomesticarmamentsproducThe fragmentary
tion suggests a noticeable decline in capabilities afterthe 1880s. For
example, duringthe 1890s, Tophane could turn out only ten Martinilower than the one
Henry riflesa week, a productionrate significantly
hundredriflesper week manufacturedtherein 1888.40In the years 1902
and 1903 the Turks attemptedto manufacturesix quick-firefieldguns
5.9 millionmarksworthofarms;for1892
Loewe. In 1891 theyboughtapproximately
and 1893 the amountswere10.1 millionmarksand 13.1 millionmarksrespectively.
77, 105; Ortayli,Ikinci Abdulhamit
37. WVallach,
AnatomieeinerMilitalrhilfe,
Ddneminde,68. In 1895 an additional12.2 millionmarksworthofgoods came from
Germany.All in all in the period1885-95, no less than 100 millionfrancsworthof
ordersforwar materialwentto Germanenterprises.
38. White to Salisbury,6 November1888, FO 78/4105; 15 November1888,
Enclosure:memorandum14 November1888, FO 78/4105.
39. WVhite
to Salisbury,7 December1888, FO 78/4106.
40. Captain Sir W. Cecil Domville,Report255, "TurkishFleet and Dockyards,
1890," 12, Admiralty
(ADM) 231/18,PRO; Doniville,Report188, "TurkishFleet and
Dockyards,1888," 12, ADM 231/14.
MILITARY HISTORY
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JONATHANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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-__
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JONATHANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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Thze
Sword of theSultan
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JONATILANGRANT
Board
54. Tyneand WearArchiveService(TWAS) 130/1268,no. 3, Armstrong
MeetingMinutes,30, 131, 134, 171; Giilen,Diinden BugiineBahriyemiz,185-86;
Clive Trebilcock,The VickersBrothers:Armamentsand Enterprise,1854-1914
(London:EuropeanPublishersLtd.,1977), 130. Vickersprovidedforsix months'free
creditwithpaymentin tenequal parts,and paid forthestartupcosts.The GlynMills
advance to theTurkswas ?600,000.
55. Trebilcock,VickersBrothers,121. In 1911 Vickershad contractsfromthe
5.5 mil2.2 milliongoldlira,and promisesfora further
empireworthapproximately
lion in 1913.
56. Avetian, Germanskii imperializm, 116; Gillen, Diinden Bugiine
Bahriyemiz,181, 186. The shipwas pricedat ?3.4 million,but theOttomansbought
her for?2.3 million.
57. Trebilcock,VickersBrothers,123-24; ZaferToprak,Tiirkiye'de"MilliIkti1982), 362; J. D. Scott,Vicksat 1908-1918 (Ankara:MAYAMatbaacilik-Yayincilik,
ers: A History(London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson,1963), 85; Suvla, "The Ottoman
TurkishCompanywas
Debt,1850-1939," 106. The capitaloftheVickers-Armstrong
?250,000 sterling;its loan to the Ottomanswas for1.485 milliongoldlira at 5.5 percentinterest.
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THE JOURNAL OF
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_______________________________________
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JONATIANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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Februaryand May of 1914. First,Krupp moved to open Ottoman longtermcredit and as a result acquired a large order.The Ottomans then
placed massive ordersin Germanyforguns, rifles,and bullets.65
Up to the war'sstart,Kruppand Schneidervied forordersforcoastal
artilleryforthe straits.In the summerof 1914, the Frenchsuggestedthat
the DardSchneider-Creusotbe given the concessions for fortifying
anelles. This would have been a staggeringblow to German prestige;
however,the Germans were too well entrenchedin this section of the
Ottoman defensesystemforthis to happen. Under the German military
mission,a special commissionforthe reorganizationof the fortifications
of the Dardanelles had been created, and throughthis commission all
orderswere given to Krupp.In mid-October1914, Kruppreceived both
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus reconstructionorders.66
The French made one last sales pitch beforethe war broke out. In
July1914 the OttomanMinisterofMarinevisitedthe headquartersofthe
Creusot firmand chose what he wanted to order.AnotherFrench loan
made this last orderfromSchneider-Creusotpossible, but, accordingto
forthe profitsof Schneider-Creusot,hostilan authority,"Unfortunately
ities were commenced beforethe deliveriescould be made. The Turkish
Ministerof Marine thereforecalled upon Krupp of Essen on his return
journey and spent the money he had raised in Paris to purchase a German supplyof armamentsinstead of French."67
For the sake of completeness,a brieflook at the Ottomanair arm is
in order. In 1912 the governmentordered an assortmentof reconnaissance planes forarmycooperation duties. Amongthe planes were Bristols (British),D.F.W.s (German), and Nieuportsand R.E.P.s (French). All
were flownby foreignpilots.68The representationof British,German,
and French importsin this forceshould come as no surprise,since none
of the threehad yet manifestedany clear-cutsuperiority.This being the
case, it appears the Ottoman governmentchose to play the field.This
can be considered anotherexample of takingthe best of the WVest.
65. Avetian,Germanskiiimperializm,114-15. Kruppextendeda creditof 2.5
pieces withshells,150 self-detonating
millionliraand receivedordersfor50 artillery
mines, seven fieldbatteries,and additionalriflesand machine guns. The other
Ottomanordersinvolved200 fieldguns,100 Maximguns,200,000 Mauserrifles,150
millionbullets,and 1,000 Kruppnavalgunsofvariouscaliber.From27 Februaryto 1
May 1914, some 31,200 boxes ofriflebullets,1,900 boxes offieldgun shells,74 field
300 boxes ofdynaguns,400 boxes ofgun cotton(pyroxylin),
guns,eightrapid-fire
mite,saltpeter,and fusesarrivedin Istanbul.
66. Ibid., 114.
InternationalTradeinArmamentsPriorto WorldWar
67. A. FennerBrockway,
II (New York:GarlandPublications,1972), 41.
68. David W. Wragg,World'sAir Forces (England:Osprey Publishing,1971),
148, 181.
MILITARY HISTORY
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JONATIIANGRANT
THE JOURNAL OF
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Thwe
Sword of theSultan
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JONiTHAN GRANT
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