The Seat of Self and Consciousness in the Brain: A Buddhist Perspective

In recent decades there have been major advances in scientific understanding of the human
brain. To a large extent these advances have been driven by new neuroimaging technologies
that have provided neuroscientists with increasingly refined images or maps of the brain.
One specific arm of neuroscientific research has made use of these neuroimaging techniques
in order to try to identify the neurological seat of the self or consciousness. Todays post
briefly highlights some of the key findings of this research and discusses them in relation to
core Buddhist principles concerning the manner in which the self is believed to exist.
Neuroimaging studies exploring how and where the brain processes information concerning
the self have identified associations between certain self-related cognitive processes and the
activation of specific areas in the brain. For example, self-referential memories (i.e.,
memories concerning the self) are associated with increased activation of the medial
prefrontal cortex. A further example is the role played by the left cerebral hemisphere in the
regulation of self-recognition (i.e., an individuals ability to recognize itself in, for example, a
reflection or visual image).
The ability to distinguish between self and other is a key aspect of adaptive psychosocial
functioning and it therefore makes logical sense that there exist areas within the brain that
play a role in processing information concerning the self. However, despite the fact that
neuroimaging studies have provided some valuable data in terms of brain areas that
correspond to self-referential processes, the activation of such brain areas does not equate to
the location of consciousness or the nucleus of an inherently existing self. Rather, neuron

activation in these brain areas simply demonstrates that most individuals have a pronounced
sense of self.
According to the Buddhist teachings, there is an ocean of difference between individuals
having a sense of self and there actually being a self that inherently exists. Buddhism accepts
that a sense of self is essential if society is to function effectively. For example, most
elucidations of the practices of loving-kindness and compassion two core aspects of the
Buddhist teachings are based on the assumption that there is both a giver (i.e., self) and a
receiver (i.e., other). If the historical Buddha didnt have a sense of self that allowed him to
identify that his level of spiritual insight was in some way different than most of his
followers, then it is reasonable to assume that he would not have felt the need to expound a
path to overcome suffering and ignorance.
However, although beings at the stage of enlightenment have a sense of self (and understand
fully that this sense of self is necessary if they are to effectively function in the world), they
are also fully aware that the self is an illusion. The reason why Buddhism teaches that the
self is an illusion relates to the principle of emptiness which asserts that beings (and all
phenomena) exist only as interdependent and mentally designated constructs. For example, a
flower manifests in dependence upon the water and air in the atmosphere, heat of the sun,
seed from which it grew, nutrients in the soil, insects and animals that died and decomposed
in order to produce those nutrients, and so forth. Consequently, the flower does not exist in
isolation of all other phenomena and it is empty of an independent and inherently existing
self. Thus, as we discussed in our Zen-style post on Dream or Reality, phenomena certainly
appear to be real but the manner in which they are perceived does not actually equate to the
manner in which they truly exist.
Enlightened and unenlightened beings both have a sense of self, but a key difference
between these two types of being is that the latter is caught up in the belief that they
inherently exist. As we discussed in our post on Deconstructing the Self, due to a firmlyembedded (yet scientifically and logically implausible) belief that the self is an inherent and
independently existing entity, Buddhism asserts that afflictive mental states arise as a result of
the imputed self incessantly craving after objects it considers to be attractive or harbouring
aversion towards objects it considers to be unattractive. As part of our academic work we
have termed this condition ontological addiction and have defined it as the unwillingness to

relinquish an erroneous and deep-rooted belief in an inherently existing self or I as well as the impaired
functionality that arises from such a belief.
The idea that at the ultimate level there is no such thing as a self that intrinsically exists may
be a difficult notion to digest. However, scientific experiments have recently been conducted
that appear to add credence to the validity of emptiness. For example, a study published in
the journal Nature in 2010 demonstrated that a minute metal blade of semi-conductor
material can be made to simultaneously vibrate in two different energy states. This is the
kinetic equivalent of matter being in two different places at the same time and it
demonstrates that at the sub-atomic level, particles (and any property of self that they might
possess) can never be absolutely located in time and space (i.e., they exist nowhere and
everywhere at the same time).
Using neuroimaging techniques in order to explore where and how we regulate selfreferential processes is important for advancing scientific understanding about the human
brain. However, from the Buddhist perspective, consciousness and self are absent of intrinsic
existence and they abide just as much within the brain as they do outside of it. Therefore,
according to Buddhist theory, attempts by some scientists to identify the specific location of
self or consciousness in the brain might be considered a somewhat futile endeavour.
Ven Edo Shonin & Ven William Van Gordon
Further Reading
Kelley, W.T., Macrae, C.N., Wyland, C., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T.F. (2002).
Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 785794.
Heatherton, T. F., Macrae, C. N., & Kelley, W. M. (2004). What the social brain sciences
can tell us about the self. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 190-103.
OConnell, A.D., Hofheinz, M., Ansmann, M., Bialczak, R.C., Lenander, M., Lucero, E. .
& Cleland, A.N. (2010). Quantum ground state and single-phonon control of a
mechanical resonator. Nature, 464, 697-703.
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2014). Dream or reality? Philosophy Now, 104, 54.
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Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2014). Searching for the Present Moment. Mindfulness, 5,
105-107
Turk, D. J., Heatherton, T.F., Kelley, W.M., Funnell, M.G., Gazzaniga, M.S., & Macrae, C.
N. (2002). Mike or me? Self-recognition in a split-brain patient. Nature Neuroscience, 5,
841842.