USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 1 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
TIMOTHY VANDER PLAATS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LAFAYETTE,
LAFAYETTE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CHARLES WILLIAMS in his individual
and official capacities,
MICHAEL BARTHELEMY in his
individual and official capacities,
Defendant.

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CASE NO.: 4:14-cv-00009-JTM-PRC

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION

I.

Proemial Statement

[H]e needs to get the messagethat, you know, he cant fuck with a cops family, said
Lafayette Police Officer Ronald Dombkowski when giving a statement to internal affairs about the
incident involving Timothy Vander Plaats at BW3s on January 21-22, 2012. On the early morning
of January 22, after Vander Plaats exchanged pleasantries with Officer Michael Barthelemys
fianc, the officer looked around the restaurant for Vander Plaats and then demanded that his fianc
give him Vander Plaatss cell phone number. The officer then called Vander Plaats and stated
something like, You fucking pussy you got a lot of balls calling while were sitting in the room.
He later gave a statement recounting what he had said, I was telling him to come back here. Come
back here, you know, keep your shit up. You know, well see what happens. Stuff like that.
Officer Charles Williams, who was with a group of officers at BW3s, called Vander Plaats

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and left a message telling him, Im going to fucking kill you. And its not gonna be awesome, I
mean its gonna be like, little body parts in a fireplace kind of death, and thats really gonna suck.
Ten days later, Vander Plaats was brutally attacked by three men, one of whom called for
him by name, shortly after he had taken his little brother from the Big Brother Big Sisters
organization home for the evening. Vander Plaats was knocked unconscious for a time. The
assailants did not take or steal anything from Vander Plaats, but removed his phone from his pocket
and placed it on the ground nearby him. It can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that
Barthelemy attacked or participated in the attack of Vander Plaats.
Officers Barthelemy and Williams intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon
Vander Plaats in an apparent effort to dissuade him from speaking to Officer Barthelemys fianc.
Approximately ten days later, after an internal affairs investigation, Officer Barthelemy attacked
Vander Plaats in an alley near his home while he was working as a police officer. Vander Plaats
suffered extensive physical injuries as a result of the attack. The City owed a duty and breached
its duty to Vander Plaats. Moreover, the City was negligent in failing to protect Plaintiff and
negligently retained, trained, and supervised its officers.
II. Statement of Genuine Disputes
On January 22, 2012, Officer Michael Barthelemy went to dinner with his finance, Officer
Zach Hall, and Officer Halls wife (Barthelemy, p. 17:7-8). Officer Barthelemy had one or two
drinks at dinner (Barthelemy, p. 18:4-5). The group then traveled to the BW3s in Lafayette where
they met up with more officers from the Lafayette Police Department and officers from the
Sheriffs Department (Barthelemy, p. 19:4-8; Williams, Ex. A p. 2). The group was seated in the
bar area (Barthelemy, p. 19:12-13). While at BW3s, Barthelemy was intoxicated (Barthelemy, p.
27:14-15).

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On that evening, Timothy Vander Plaats had attended a party for his employer, the
Lafayette Savings Bank at the Trails Banquet Hall (Vander Plaats, p. 43:15-23). Vander Plaats
and others from the party went to BW3s (Vander Plaats, p. 45:7-10). The group sat in the main
dining area (Vander Plaats, p. 46:8-9). Vander Plaats had a shot and one other beverage at BW3s
(Vander Plaats, p. 46:24, 47:9). At some point during the evening, Barthelemy recognized Vander
Plaats and told his fiance Amanda Shorter, theres Timmy (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 4). Shorter
then went over to Vander Plaats (Barthelemy, Ex. D p.4). Vander Plaats and Shorter came to know
each other in 2009 through an organization called Leadership Lafayette (Vander Plaats, p. 26:2427:1, 47:22-48:2). Vander Plaats and Shorter exchanged a couple of words and a hug (Vander
Plaats, p. 48:15-20; Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 4). He was pretty sure that Shorter said, you know,
Mike is over there or words to that effect (Vander Plaats, p. 48:23-24). After their interaction,
they both returned to their groups (Vander Plaats, p. 48:15-20; Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 4). When he
got back to the table, Vander Plaats texted Amanda because he wanted to make sure she was alright
(Vander Plaats, p. 52:12-13). Someone from Vander Plaatss group said to him, those guys over
there dont look like theyre too happy with you. (Vander Plaats, p. 54:7-9). Vander Plaats left
the restaurant about a half hour or forty minutes later (Vander Plaats, p. 59:14-16). On the car ride
home, Vander Plaats indicated he was upset by the looks that he received from the officers sitting
at the table (Clark, p. 35:13-15).
Officer Barthelemy, who remained at the restaurant, became upset once he saw that Vander
Plaats had continued to call and text (Barthelemy, p. 27:9-10). Officer Barthelemy stood up and
looked around to see if Vander Plaats was still there (Barthelemy, p. 27:16-23).

Officer

Barthelemy intended to talk to him about why he was continuing to call and text from across the
room (Barthelemy, p. 27:16-19). Officer Barthelemy demanded that Amanda give him Vander

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Plaatss number (Barthelemy, p. 27:24-28:1). She was reluctant to do so because she knew it
would be a bad decision (Barthelemy, p. 28:2-6). A bunch of guys started yelling, whats Vander
Plaatss number? (Williams, Ex. A p. 4). Once Vander Plaats arrived home, calls started coming
in from unknown numbers (Vander Plaats, p. 62:7-8).
Although he did not answer initially, when Vander Plaats did answer, Officer Barthelemy
cursed at him and stated something like, You fucking pussy you got a lot of balls calling while
were sitting in the room. (Barthelemy, p. 30:2-5). Officer Barthelemy also stated, Why dont
you come back[?] (Barthelemy, p. 30:2-5). He later gave a statement to police recounting what
he had said to Vander Plaats (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 5). Specifically, he stated, I was telling him
to come back here. Come back here, you know, keep your shit up. You know, well see what
happens. Stuff like that. (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 5-6).
Vander Plaats answered another call and spoke to an individual who identified himself as
a fireman (Vander Plaats, p. 63:9-10). While he presumed that it was Amandas boyfriend who
was prank calling him, it was actually LPD Officer Nathan LaMar that made that comment
(LaMar, p. 19:1-4, 24-26; Vander Plaats p. 65:9-11). Vander Plaats received another call and a
voice mail message at approximately 12:57 a.m., which stated:
Hi Tim. This is Bobby. I just wanted to tell you that youre
a huge fuckin douche bag, and I swear to God if I hear your
name again Im going to fucking kill you. And its not gonna
be awesome, I mean its gonna be like, little body parts in a
fireplace kind of death, and thats really gonna suck. SoI
would just kinda crawl into a hole today [inaudible] for
awhile, or[inaudible]. Thanks.
(D.E. 20-7, McCoy Dec. 11). Officer Williams listened to the voice mail and believes that he
left that message (Williams, Ex. A p. 5-6). Williams started asking around and a couple of people
heard me say something to that effect (Williams, Ex. A p. 6). He stated, So thats when I knew,

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well obviously, I mean it was me. (Williams, Ex. A p. 6). He later stated, quite honestly Id give
anything to take it back. It was just a stupid ass decision. (Williams, Ex. A p. 6).
Vander Plaats played the message threatening his life a couple of times (Clark, p. 120:1325). He was concerned about the damning picture the officers painted for his future (Vander Plaats
Decl. 8). Vander Plaatss girlfriend at the time, Amanda Clark, noticed that Vander Plaats was
in shock and bothered by the voice mail (Clark, p. 122:7-8). Vander Plaats was scared and worried
because of what had happened at BW3s earlier (Clark, p. 122:17-20). At approximately 1:07
a.m., Vander Plaats called his friend, LPD Officer Jacob Daubenmier, to tell him about what had
happened (Vander Plaats, p. 77:12-25; Ex. 3). Vander Plaats called to tell the officer that these
guys were doing this to me, but he indicated that he did not think the officer got that he was talking
about police (Vander Plaats, p. 77:12-25). The officer told him to follow up and make a complaint
(Vander Plaats, p. 77: 23-25). The next morning, Vander Plaats contacted a friend who was a
lawyer (Vander Plaats, p. 79:4-5). On the advice of counsel, Vander Plaats made arrangements to
go see somebody at City Hall (Vander Plaats, p. 88:19-20). Vander Plaats first met with a police
officer and gave a statement (Vander Plaats, p. 89:5-6, 91:1-3).
Vander Plaats was shaken up by the voice mail message for weeks and months (Clark, p.
143:17-18). He was concerned about the places he would go in public and was afraid to go to a
lot of places (Clark, p. 143:24-144:9). Clark noticed that Vander Plaats was timid all of the time
(Clark, p. 144:3-4). Specifically, during the Super Bowl held in Indianapolis, Vander Plaats did
not feel comfortable going into the Kilroys restaurant with his friends (Clark, p. 144:1-9). He
stayed outside and waited for them to come out (Clark, p. 144:1-9). Further, he would look around
before he would exit his car and his blood pressure would go up every time he saw a police officer
(Vander Plaats Dec. 10).

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Following Plaintiffs reporting of the incident on January 24, 2012, an internal affairs
investigation was initiated by LPD concerning the incident at BW3s (Barthelemy, Ex. D). Officer
Barthelemy, Officer Williams, Officer Dombkowski, and Officer LaMar gave statements on
January 25, 2012 (Barthelemy, Ex. D; Williams, Ex. A; Dombkowski, Ex. A; LaMar, Ex. A).
Those statements centered on what occurred at BW3s on the evening of January 21-22, 2012
(Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 2; Williams, Ex. A p. 2; Dombkowski, Ex A p. 2; LaMar, Ex. A p. 2). The
investigating officer asked Officer Barthelemy, Did you ever put any other officers up to
contacting him or arresting him or anything like that? (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 11). When
explaining the context of why he was upset with Vander Plaats, Officer Barthelemy confided the
following to the investigator:
But you know, that pissed me off. And it just finally, I had
enough after a year and a half, however long its been since
I think some of the text messages, we went back and looked,
were like from, well theyre from 2010, because thats when
we got the IPhones on that account. So thats as far back as
we can see. In like November of 2010. And its just been
non-stop since then. And Ive, Ive, when I worked district
three I would see him stumbling home drunk as hell,
bouncing off the buildings so many nights. And, you know,
I thought about PIn him and, but Im not like that. And I,
again I thought that would just
(Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 11).
In his statement to LPD, Officer Dombkowski stated that at one point during the evening,
Officer Barthelemy approached him and was upset (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 3). Officer Barthelemy
told him that this guy keeps calling and texting his fianc (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 3). Officer
Dombkowski, who was an experienced officer, told him, he needs to get the message or
something that, you know, he cant fuck with a cops family. That kind of thing. (Dombkowski,
Ex. A p. 3). Officer Dombkowski told the investigating officer that he spoke to Officer Barthelemy

USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 7 of 26

and Officer LaMar the night before his statement and after the incident at BW3s (Dombkowski
Ex. A p. 4). Officer Dombkowski continued:
Because, you know, Barthelemy let this get out of hand.
Thats his only fault in my opinion. He shouldve nipped
this in the, a long time ago. If someone was texting or calling
my fianc wed have some problems. You guys might be
doing an invest on me for something more serious than
threats on a guy if he kept messing with my family. You
know what I mean? I mean were all like that. So, you
know, that was my conversation with him was, you know,
blah, blah, blah and now this guy comes down to make a
compliant. He doesnt come to West Lafayette PD, he
doesnt go to Tippecanoe County Sheriffs Department, he
comes to Lafayette PD to make this complaint, the criminal
complaint. Two prong. You know, one to get Mike in
trouble both at work as well as, uh, criminally I guess.
(Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6).
On January 31, 2012, Vander Plaats was spending time with his little brother from the Big
Brothers Big Sisters organization (Vander Plaats, p. 103:11-12). He had picked him up after work,
had dinner with him, and went back to his residence (Vander Plaats, p. 104:3-7). The two ended
up hanging out while Vander Plaatss girlfriend, Amanda Clark, who was making cookies (Vander
Plaats, p. 104:3-7). As depicted in LPD Security video of the area, just prior to 9:00 p.m. that
evening, Vander Plaats took his little brother home, which was located one or two blocks away
from Vander Plaatss residence (Vander Plaats, p. 106:16-20; Security Video, 8:53:58-8:55:37).
At around 8:59 p.m., Vander Plaats was walking back to his residence, when he heard somebody
with a male voice say his name (Vander Plaats, p. 114:13-17, 120:5-7; Security Video, 8:58:418:59:36). Vander Plaats said something back to the individual and walked into a parking lot
(Vander Plaats, p. 116:2-8; Security Video, 8:58:41-8:59:36). Vander Plaats focused his attention
on two people he saw, when all of a sudden another man came from his side, hit him, and threw
him to the ground (Vander Plaats, p. 121:20-122:5). Vander Plaats was struck in the head and was
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knocked unconscious (Vander Plaats, p. 122:23-24). He tried to get up a couple of times, but he
was kicked or something and kept down (Vander Plaats, p. 124:7-10). He was then struck in the
back of the neck with something, an object of some kind (Vander Plaats p. 124:9-10). The area
that Vander Plaats was in a parking lot that was not a very well lit (Vander Plaats, p. 143:2-4).
Vander Plaats called 911 from his phone, but the call was dropped (Vander Plaats, p.
146:22-147:1). Security video shows Vander Plaats re-emerge from the alley approximately
twenty-five minutes after he entered (Security Video, 9:24:28-9:24:54). The video depicts Vander
Plaats struggle down the street, stopping at one point and bending over (Security Video, 9:24:289:24:54). Vander Plaats was able to make it behind a secure door in his building (Vander Plaats
p. 148:14). Clark, who had been at the grocery store, came in through the door, saw him beat up,
and called 911 (Vander Plaats p. 148:12-16). Clark called 911, spoke briefly with the dispatcher,
who then handed the phone to Vander Plaats who proceeded to explain what had happened and his
injuries (Clark p. 77:4-78:11). The dispatcher then transferred the call to LPD (Clark, p. 78:8-9).
After she and Vander Plaats got off of the phone, the two sat there for about twenty, twentyfive minutes, which Clark believed was plenty of time for a police officer to show up (Clark p.
75:21-76:3; 80:4-6). She observed that Vander Plaatss face was swollen from being hit and that
he had blood on his shirt (Clark, p. 61:18-23). Vander Plaats and Clark sat there waiting for a
while and wondered when a police officer was going to show up (Clark, p. 79:17-19). Clark did
not call police again from the residence because she was irritated (Clark, p. 80:9-12). Vander
Plaats was not doing well so it was wait or get up to the hospital where he could get some care
(Clark, p. 80: 9-12). Clark drove Vander Plaats to the hospital and arrived at approximately 9:59
p.m. (Clark, p. 80:18-20).

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Clark called 911 once she arrived at the hospital (Clark p. 85:15-17). Officer Kurt Sinks
was dispatched to the hospital (Sinks, p. 10:24-11:1). He spoke with nursing staff, Vander Plaats,
and Clark (Sinks, p. 12:1-15:13). Vander Plaats told Officer Sinks that he had some kind of recent
incident with Officer Barthelemy (Sinks, p. 16:6-7). And that was his onlyonly person he had
an issue with. (Sinks, p. 16:15-16). That prompted Officer Sinks to call Sergeant Clark (Sinks,
p. 16:17-19). Officer Sinks also called Officer Barthelemy and told him he should let his shift
commander know that Officer Sinks just notified shift command and made him aware (Sinks, p.
16:19-22). Officer Barthelemy was concerned that he might be accused of the assault (Barthelemy
p. 40:4-16). After receiving the call from Officer Sinks, Officer Barthelemy returned to the
training center and met with then Sergeant Tim Payne (Barthelemy, p. 38:16-17).
The following day, February 1, 2012, LPD imposed discipline on Officers Barthelemy,
LaMar, and Williams for the BW3s incident (Barthelemy, Ex. A; LaMar Ex. B; Williams Ex. B).
Officers Barthelemy was formally reprimanded for unbecoming conduct (Barthelemy, Ex. A).
Officer LaMar was suspended for one day and had his take home vehicle privileges were removed
for one week for unbecoming conduct and failure to conform to the laws (LaMar, Ex. B). Officer
Williams was suspended for five days for unbecoming conduct, failure to conform to the laws, and
improper use of alcohol while off duty (Williams, Ex. B).1
On February 28, 2015, Vander Plaatss sister, Jessica Johnson attended a charity function
for the Harrison Youth Baseball Organization, which was held at the Trails Banquet Facility in
Tippecanoe County (Johnson Decl. 2, 4). The charity event was an adult only fundraiser where
alcohol was served (Johnson Decl. 5). Lt. Tim Payne of the Lafayette Police Department

Despite LPDs determination that Officer LaMar and Williams were in violation of Rule (2)
Conformance to Laws, neither were criminally charged for their unlawful criminal conduct
(LaMar, p. 8:20-21, Ex. B; Williams, p. 28:14-15, Ex. B).
1

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attended the function and consumed alcohol (Johnson Decl. 3, 5). Jessica spoke with Lt. Payne
that evening about her brother and asked him questions about her brothers case (Johnson Decl.
6). Lt. Payne made a comment to Jessica that Vander Plaats was never beaten up and, further,
there is no proof LPD was involved because there is no footage or words to that effect (Johnson
Decl. 6). Payne was in a position to know that information, as he was the first individual Officer
Barthelemy reported to after speaking with Officer Sinks (Barthelemy, p. 38:16-17). After he was
asked to leave, Lt. Payne became verbally abusive toward Jessica (Johnson Decl. 8, 9).
Specifically, he called her a fucking bitch and stupid fucking bitch multiple times (Johnson
Decl. 9). At one point, Jessica felt a bit unsafe as Lt. Payne started to walk towards her angrily
as if he was going to get into my face; however, he was prevented from doing so by others (Johnson
Decl. 10).
IV. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should only be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
in his favor. Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986)). The nonmovant will successfully oppose summary judgment
only when it presents definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Vukadinovich v. Bd. of
Sch. Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432,
437 (7th Cir. 2000).

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A courts role on summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility
determinations, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts, but instead to determine whether
there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007);
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, a court in ruling on a summary judgment
motion construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in that partys favor. Washington, 481 F.3d at 550. Moreover, whether or
not the presentation of an alibi is sufficient is a question of fact for the judge or jury. Cottingham
v. State, 261 Ind. 346, 347-48, 303 N.E.2d 268, 268-69 (1973).
V. Argument
Initially, the City erroneously maintains in a footnote that Plaintiff has not sued the City
for the officers torts or under the theory of respondeat superior. Simply stated, he has. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(A) only requires (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief and (3) a demand for the relief sought[.] To satisfy the noticepleading standard, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must give a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which gives the defendant fair notice
of the claim and the basis for that relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
plaintiff does not need to plead specific facts or specific legal theories. Id.; see also Hatmaker v.
Memorial Medical Center, 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). The complaint must merely
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). However,
enough factual matter must be included such that, when accepted as true, the complaint states a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570.

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Here, Plaintiff filed his claims against Officers Barthelemy and Williams in their individual
and official capacities (D.E. 6, Amended Complaint, p. 1). In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged
that on or about January 31, 2012, Officer Barthelemy was working as an officer based on his
authority and official position as an officer with LPD (D.E. 6, Amended Complaint 46). Plaintiff
alleged that on or about January 31, Officer Barthelemy committed battery and/or served as an
accomplice to the commission of an assault and battery against Plaintiff (D.E. 6, Amended
Complaint 53, 59). Indeed, Plaintiff expressly stated that another LPD officer noted that
Barthelemy was on duty at the time of the attack (D.E. 6, Amended Complaint 60). To the extent
that the City suggests that Plaintiffs complaint did not allege that Officer Barthelemy was acting
in the scope of his employment and assert liability through the theory of respondeat superior, it is
mistaken. Officer Barthelemy was on duty and serving as a police officer when he assaulted and
battered Plaintiff. Stated another way, Plaintiffs complaint put the City on notice as to the assault
and battery claims and its liability for those actions. As such, the City is liable for the injuries that
Plaintiff suffered as a result of being attacked on January 31, 2012, which was approximately ten
days after two LPD officers threatened to physically assault him.
A. Defendants committed intentional infliction of emotional distress when they called
Vander Plaats in an effort to intimidate him into not contacting Shorter.
The intent by both Barthelemy and Williams at BW3s was clear. They intended to
verbally assault, abuse, and bully Vander Plaats in a clear effort to try to convince him to stop
communicating with Officer Barthelemys fiance, Amanda Shorter. Officer Barthelemy admitted
as much in his internal affairs statement when he stated, And how I am, Im pissed because this
has been a year and a half, two years of this guy pullin this shit. (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 5). Indeed,
Amanda Shorter prophetically indicated her concern about the potential ramifications of her
conversation with Vander Plaats when she stated that Mike was over there and reluctantly gave
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Barthelemy Vander Plaatss telephone number after he demanded that she give it to him (Vander
Plaats, p. 48:23-24; Barthelemy, p. 5-6).
Nonetheless, Defendants assert that the conduct of Barthelemy by telephoning Vander
Plaats to stop bothering his fiance and the conduct of Williams in telephoning Williams to get a
few laughs from his U.S. Marine Corps buddies does not rise to any atrocious, indecent or
damaging conduct[.] (D.E. 24 p. 10). Defendants not only downplay the officers drunken
thugary at BW3s, but overlook the fact that Williams himself conceded in his deposition that his
actions were outrageous, extreme, and pretty embarrassing. (Williams, p. 40:1-7). In fact,
Officer Williams also confided in his internal affairs interview that Iquite honestly Id give
anything to take it back. It was just a stupid ass mistake. (Williams, Ex. A p. 6).
Defendants characterization of the facts stretches the bounds of advocacy, which are
supposed to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Washington, 481
F.3d at 550; see also Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendants
inexcusably failed to reference applicable authority). Rather than describing the incident for what
it is, an officer who summoned Plaintiff to return to the restaurant so a violent confrontation could
occur and another officer who threatened to barbarically and painfully kill Plaintiff, Defendants
pretend they were seeking gentlemanly discourse or cracking a pedestrian joke in front of his army
buddies. It is as though Defendants wish this Court to ignore or overlook their own admissions to
their admittedly outrageous and ignominious actions.
Further, Defendants scare tactics had their intended effect and caused Plaintiff severe
emotional distress. Vander Plaats replayed the message a couple of times and found the level of
detail particularly alarming (Clark, p. 120:13-121:3; Vander Plaats Decl. 5). Shortly after
receiving the message, he called a Lafayette police officer, who was a friend of his (Vander Plaats,

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p. 77:12-25; Ex. 3). Vander Plaats was with his girlfriend who noticed that he was in shock and
bothered by the voice mail (Clark, p. 122:7-8). Vander Plaats described himself as strung out and
disturbed (Vander Plaats Decl. 6). He was scared and worried because of what had happened
at BW3s earlier and that there was a police officer or officers that wanted to kill him (Clark, p.
122:17-20; Vander Plaats Decl. 8). The next morning, Vander Plaats spoke with a lawyer about
the incident (Vander Plaats, p. 79:4-5). The next day, Vander Plaats made arrangements to go see
somebody at City Hall, met with a police officer, and gave a statement (Vander Plaats, p. 88:1920, 89:5-6, 91:1-3). For the next year, Vander Plaats did not go out with his friends as much,
which he had previously done frequently, and was worried about his safety in public (Vander
Plaats Decl. 9).
Beyond the initial reporting, Vander Plaats was shaken up by the voice mail message for
weeks and months (Clark, p. 143:17-18). He was concerned about the places he would go in public
and was afraid to go to a lot of places (Clark, p. 143:24-144:9). His concern was legitimized by
the fact that Officer Barthelemy acknowledged watching him near his home while he was on duty
(Barthelemy Ex. D p. 11). His girlfriend noticed that Vander Plaats was timid all of the time
(Clark, p. 144:3-4). Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff is required to
seek professional medical assistance as a precondition to a successful claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (D.E. 21, p. 15-16, D.E. 24, p. 9-10) Rather, the fact that he dealt
with his distress on his own and without the assistance of professional medical support is of no
moment to the severe suffering that he endured for weeks and months. See Methodist Hospitals,
Inc. v. Johnson, 856 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that expert testimony is not
required when the fact-finder can understand that a defendants conduct fell below the applicable
standard of care without technical input from an expert witness). The facts and reasonable

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 15 of 26

inferences demonstrate that Defendants intended to and actually succeeded in causing Vander
Plaats to suffer severe emotional distress. Further, a reasonable jury could conclude as such.
B. A reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Barthelemy assaulted and battered
Plaintiff, or participated in the assault and battery of Plaintiff.
The facts and reasonable inferences most in favor of Plaintiff demonstrate that Officer
Barthelemy attacked or participated in the attack of Vander Plaats. Officer Barthelemy spoke to
Officer Dombkowski after the incident at BW3s, but before officers gave their statement to LPD
(Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6). It can be reasonably inferred from his statement that Officer
Dombkowski indicated to Officer Barthelemy that he let it go too far and that he needed to impose
some sort of street justice and physical harm on Vander Plaats in order to protect his family,
specifically his fianc (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6). See, e.g. and generally Marilyn S. Johnson,
Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City 15-18 (2003). Indeed, Officer
Dombkowski brazenly told the LPD investigator that if it were him, LPD might be doing an
investigation for something more serious than threats (Dombkowski, Ex. A. p. 6).
After his talk with Officer Dombkowski, Officer Barthelemy gave a statement to LPD
(Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6, Barthelemy, Ex. D). He told to the internal affairs investigator that the
text Vander Plaats sent pissed me off. And it just finally, I had enough after a year and a half,
however long its been since I think some of the text messages[.] (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 11). He
went onto explain and confess that he had previously spotted Vander Plaats while he was working
as an officer and had thought about arresting or PIn him numerous times (Barthelemy, Ex. D p.
11).
With respect to the incident at BW3s, Barthelemy admits that while he was intoxicated,
he stood up and looked around the restaurant for Vander Plaats (Barthelemy, p. 27:14-23). He
then demanded that his fiance give him Vander Plaats telephone number and she reluctantly
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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 16 of 26

complied, though she knew it would be a bad decision (Barthelemy, p. 27:24-28:6). He then
repeatedly called Vander Plaats; when Vander Plaats answered, Officer Barthelemy stated
something to the effect of, [y]ou fucking pussy you got a lot of balls calling while were sitting
in the room. (Barthelemy p. 30:2-5). He continued, I was telling him to come back here. Come
back here, you know, keep your shit up. You know, well see what happens. Stuff like that.
(Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 6). It can be reasonably be inferred Officer Barthelemy was attempting to
summon Vander Plaats back to the restaurant so he could physically confront him.
As a result of his actions and the incident at BW3s, Officer Barthelemy was interviewed
by internal affairs approximately two days later (Barthelemy Ex. D). In that statement, he admitted
that he was pissed off at Vander Plaats, obtained his phone number, and verbally confronted him
(Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 5, 11). Approximately seven days later, and one day before Officer
Barthelemy was disciplined by the Department for the BW3s incident, Vander Plaats was
assaulted by three men, one of whom called him by name (Vander Plaats, p. 114:13-17, 116:2-8,
120: 5-7, 121:20-122:5, 124:7-10, Security Video, 8:58:41-8:59:36). The assault and attack of
Vander Plaats was not a random criminal act, but one committed by a person who knew him. In
fact, LPD Officer Dombkowski, who has sixteen years of law enforcement experience, testified
that random muggings and assaults do not usually happen in Lafayette (Dombkowski, p. 39:1922, 40:3-6). While certain portions of the incident and Plaintiffs verbal interactions with at least
one of the assailants were captured by the Citys street cameras, the actual attack itself was not
captured (Security Video, 8:58:41-8:59:36).

As recently declared by LPD Lt. Payne in a

conversation with Vander Plaatss sister in February of 2015, there is no footage of the actual
assault (Johnson Decl. 6).

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 17 of 26

On the night that Vander Plaats was attacked, Officer Barthelemy was working in LPDs
Street Crimes Unit with two other officers (Barthelemy, p. 34:7-10). At approximately 8:00 or
8:30 p.m., which was approximately a half hour before three men assaulted Vander Plaats, Officer
Barthelemy had left the training center, which was not far away from the assault, approximately
one block south and five blocks east (Barthelemy, p. 34:23-36:2; Anderson, p. 30:15-17). It takes
approximately five minutes to walk from the training center to 9th and Main (Anderson, p. 30:1821). Barthelemy had the clear motive, opportunity, and ability to harm Plaintiff. Defendants do
not and cannot point to any evidence, other than Barthelemys or the Departments general denial,
that excludes him as the assailant or as an accomplice. Shortly after Plaintiff was attacked, Officer
Sinks called and spoke with Barthelemy (Barthelemy, p. 40:2-7; Sinks, p. 16:19-22). Barthelemy
stated, I was concerned that I might be accused, but was thankful that I was at work. (Barthelemy
p. 40:4-16).
Timeline of Events
Type of Occurrence
Interaction between Vander Plaats and Amanda Shorter at
BW3s
Phone calls and/or text messages between Officers
Barthelemy, Williams, LaMar, and Dombkowski and Vander
Plaats
Call from Vander Plaats to Police LDP Officer Jacob
Daubenmier (Vander Plaats, p. 77:12-25)
Vander Plaats made a report to LPD (Vander Plaats, p. 89:5-6,
91:1-3)
Dombkowski discussion with Barthelemy and LaMar
(Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 4)
Internal Affairs statements by Barthelemy, LaMar,
Dombkowski, and Williams (Barthelemy, Ex. D.; LaMar, Ex.
A; Dombkowski, Ex. A; Williams, Ex. A.)
Assault and attack on Vander Plaats (Vander Plaats, p. 114:1317, 116:2-8, 120:5-7, 121:20-122:5, 122:23-24, 124:7-10)
Discipline imposed on Barthelemy, LaMar, and Williams
(Barthelemy, Ex A; LaMar, Ex. B; Williams, Ex. B)

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Date of Occurrence
January 22-23, 2012
January 22-23, 2012

January 23, 2012

January 24, 2012
January 24, 2012
January 25, 2012

January 31, 2012

February 1, 2012

USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 18 of 26

Given his previous threats and communications with Vander Plaats, his discussions with
Officer Dombkowski, the timing of the attack as it relates to the BW3s incident and the LPD
investigation, his physical proximity to the location of the attack at the time of the attack, and the
fact that the attacker targeted Vander Plaats and knew him by sight and by name, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Barthelemy attacked Vander Plaats while he was working as an officer on
duty.2 To be sure, Officer Barthelemys identity as the individual who assaulted and battered
Plaintiff or participated in that incident is based on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence includes suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior toward or
comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which
an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn. Troupe v. May Dept. Store Co., 20 F.3d
734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Lott v. State, 690 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 1997) (noting that
testimony about certain conversations, the corresponding timing of the murder, and the defendants
unprompted comment were sufficient to infer defendant was part of an agreement to kill the
victim).
Neither the Plaintiffs reliance on circumstantial evidence, nor the Defendants beliefs as
to the viability of such evidence warrants dismissal on summary judgment. Rather, Officer
Barthelemys alibi defense is an issue of believability and credibility for the jury as the fact finder.
See Cottingham, 303 N.E.2d at 268-69. See also, e.g. Johnston v. State, 578 N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ind.
1991) (noting that, without a body, a jury is entitled to presume the death of a victim if there is
circumstantial evidence to support that conclusion).
In an apparent attempt to redirect attention elsewhere, Defendants suggest, without any
supporting evidence, that Plaintiff was attacked by a drug dealer based on an incident that
happened approximately two years before the incidents at issue here (D.E. 24, p. 6; Vander Plaats
p. 251:12-16). However, that is an argument for the fact-finder and does not negate the clear
evidence that Officer Barthelemy had the motive, opportunity, and ability to attack and injure
Vander Plaats.
2

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 19 of 26

Barthelemy threatened physical harm to Plaintiff, knew where he lived, had repeatedly
observed him and contemplated arresting him, and was concerned that he would be viewed as the
attacker shortly after the beating occurred (Barthelemy, 30:2-5, 40:4-16, Ex. D p. 5-6, 11). Those
facts combined with the fact that Plaintiff was attacked by three individuals, one of whom knew
his name, on a night that Officer Barthelemy was working near Plaintiffs residence with two other
individuals demonstrate that he attacked or participated in the attack. Further, the intent of the
officers to protect their families was vocalized to an internal affairs investigator, but nothing was
done to protect Vander Plaats. As such, it appears as though sending a message that individuals
cant fuck with a cops family is an established custom or practice with the Department
condoned (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 3).
Plaintiff has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence, which would permit a reasonable
jury to believe that Officer Barthelemy attacked or participated in the physical attack on Plaintiff.
See, e.g., Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the convincing mosaic
standard is simply shorthand for the concept that a party must present circumstantial evidence, that
when considered together, would permit a reasonable jury to believe the plaintiffs claim). A
reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Barthelemy attacked or participated in the attack of
Plaintiff following the threats he made several days earlier in order to prove the point that Vander
Plaats cant mess with his family.
C. The City is liable for its negligence against Plaintiff.
To prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff
by defendant; (2) breach of duty because of conduct falling below the applicable standard of care;
and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendants breach of duty. Kroger Co. v.
Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 2010).

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 20 of 26

As alleged in Plaintiffs amended complaint, the City is responsible for the harm and
suffering that Plaintiff endured (D.E. 6, Amended Complaint 64). The City owed a duty to
Plaintiff to prevent the alleged misconduct. A master has the duty to exercise reasonable care so
as to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment so as to prevent him
from intentionally harming others if the master knows or has reason to know that he has the ability
to control his servant; and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control. Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Here, the City knew or had reason to know that it has the ability to control its police
officers, whether they are off duty or on duty. Rule 14 of the Lafayette Police Departments rules
for conduct expressly addresses officers use of alcohol while off duty and requires that they shall
refrain from consuming intoxicating beverages to the extent that it results in impairment,
intoxication, or obnoxious or offense behavior which discredits them or the department, or renders
the member unfit to report to their next regular tour of duty. (D.E. 20-7, McCoy Dec. 4).3
The fact that the officers may not have been in full uniform at BW3s when they were
becoming intoxicated, in Williamss case to the point where he did not recall some facts of the
evening, is of no moment to the Citys control over its officers.

The City was aware of the

necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. The City had the occasion to deal with an
incident in the winter of 2008 where Officer LaMar fired a handgun into the ground at an off-duty
gathering of friends and alcohol was consumed (LaMar, Ex. E). At that same gathering, Officer
Williams fired a weapon (Williams, Ex. C). Another officer, Deputy Heath, who was present at
the BW3s incident, fired rounds from his handgun out the windows of the vehicle, but he could
3

Although Officer Barthelemy admitted that he was intoxicated and Officer LaMar admitted he
had been drinking that evening, the discipline that was imposed for the BW3s incident
approximately a day after Plaintiff was attacked did not include a violation of Rule 14 for either
officer (Barthelemy, Ex. A; LaMar, Ex. B).
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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 21 of 26

not recall exactly who fired or how many rounds were fired (Williams, Ex. A p. 2; LaMar Ex. F).
The City knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control
of its officers based on their clear display of bad judgment when alcohol is consumed.
The harm that Plaintiff suffered was foreseeable to the City. At the outset, the Citys
implementation and use of the long standing rule prohibiting off-duty alcohol consumption that
results in obnoxious or offensive behavior which discredits them or the department is, itself, a
demonstration of the Citys concern that officers who consume alcohol excessively will exercise
poor judgment and discredit themselves and the department as they did here. Again, the City had
dealt with this circumstance in 2008 where multiple officers, who were at an off-duty gathering
where alcohol was consumed, and at least two officers fired their weapons in a reckless manner
(Williams, Ex. C; LaMar, Ex. E, F). Moreover, as it relates to Officer Barthelemy, the City was
aware and had imposed discipline for his abusive behavior. Specifically it imposed a corrective
write up when he called a child a piece of shit, (D.E. 20-14, McCoy Dec. Ex. G). The verbal
abuse and severe emotional distress that Plaintiff suffered at the hands of intoxicated LPD officers
was foreseeable to the City.
Moreover, the harm that Plaintiff suffered as it relates to the physical attack by Barthelemy
was foreseeable to the City. Largely because Plaintiff immediately reported the incident to a police
officer and filed a report with the Department at the first opportunity, the City was aware that two
of their police officers threatened, either impliedly or directly, physical harm or death to Plaintiff
(Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 6; Williams, Ex. A p. 5).

Further still, Officer Barthelemy confided to

LPDs internal affairs investigator that he had worked District three, would see Plaintiff allegedly
stumbling home, and thought about PIn him so many nights. (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 11). That

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 22 of 26

is, while he was working, Officer Barthelemy knew where Plaintiff lived, watched him repeatedly,
and thought about the arrest powers given to him by LPD to take Plaintiff to jail.
A duty of care may also arise where one party assumes such a duty. Medtronic, Inc. v.
Malander, 996 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting PlanTec, Inc. v. Wiggins, 443
N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). The assumption of such a duty creates a special
relationship between the parties and a corresponding duty to act in the manner of a reasonably
prudent person. Id. A partys failure to act in a reasonable manner will give rise to an action for
negligence. The existence and extent of such a duty are ordinarily questions for the jury. Id. A
party who undertakes to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to
perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance
of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Id.
The City had a special relationship with Plaintiff when it undertook an internal affairs
investigation concerning multiple threats of physical harm by multiple LPD officers directed to
Plaintiff. The City should have, but failed to, recognize the necessity of protecting Plaintiff from
its very own officers that threatened physical harm and death to Plaintiff. Less than seven days
before he was attacked, the City was not only aware that Barthelemy had verbally abused and
threatened Plaintiff, but it was also aware that Barthelemy had repeatedly observed Plaintiff near
his home and thought about arresting him (Barthelemy, Ex. D p. 11). Further still, Officer
Dombkowski brashly declared to the internal affairs investigator, [y]ou guys might be doing an
invest[igation] on me for something more serious than threats on a guy if he kept messing with my

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 23 of 26

family. (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6). He continued and asked the LPD investigator, [y]ou know
what I mean? I mean were all like that. (Dombkowski, Ex. A p. 6). Despite these facts, the City
put its misbehaving employees on the street and provided them with the opportunity for criminal
misconduct. See Frye v. American Painting Co., 642 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Clark, 890
N.E.2d at 765. The City owed a duty to protect Vander Plaats as a potential victim.
The City breached its duty when it failed to protect Plaintiff from its officers on the evening
of January 21-22, 2012, and later on the evening of January 31, 2012, and failed to appropriately
respond after the assault. Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the threats,
including a threat on his life. Moreover, Plaintiff suffered significant physical injuries as a result
of the brutal attack on January 31. The City through its police department is liable for that harm.
D. The City was negligent in its retention, supervision, and training of its officers.
The City asserts that training and supervision are discretionary functions and points to the
decision in Smith v. Ciesielski, 975 F. Supp. 2d 930, 943 (S.D. Ind. 2013) in support of their claim
that it is entitled to immunity (D.E. 21, p. 12-13). However, the Citys reliance on that decision is
misplaced and unpersuasive. That decision noted that negligent retention and training claims are
barred [s]o long as none of the police departments personnel decisions relating to the Defendant
officers violated clearly established constitutional or federal rights, then the City is exempt from
suit. Id.
In the winter of 2008, Officers Williams and LaMar were disciplined for an incident
involving the use of firearms at an off-duty gathering where alcohol was consumed (Williams, Ex.
C; Lamar, Ex. E).

At the time of this incident, the Department was led by Chief Don Roush

(Roush p. 8:16). Despite that incident, Chief Roush had never ordered an alcohol substance
evaluation and treatment for an officer (Roush p. 34:9-10). In this instance, despite the fact that

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 24 of 26

this incident concerned his second documented incident involving alcohol, the Department did not
order alcohol substance evaluation and treatment (Williams, Ex. B p. 2). Further, although Officer
Barthelemy admitted that he was intoxicated and Officer LaMar admitted that he had been
drinking, neither officer was disciplined for a violation of Rule 14, the Departments policy
concerning the consumption of alcohol while off duty (Barthelemy, Ex. A; LaMar, Ex. B).
Particularly with respect to Officers Barthelemy and LaMar, the Department effectively ratified
their drunken behavior by overlooking what was a clear violation of Rule 14 of the Department.
It can be reasonably be inferred that the need for more or different training or discipline for
Williams and other officers was obvious.
Yet, in May of 2009, Office Williams was involved in a traffic stop conducted by a Major
with the Indiana State Police (Williams, Ex. G). Officer Williams and another officer were
operating separate vehicles at extremely high rates of speed (Williams, Ex. G). It was determined
that Officer Williams was driving his vehicle at 112 mph (Williams, Ex. G). In addressing that
incident, Captain Kurt Wolf noted that that there has been a history of poor judgment and decision
making on the part of Officer Williams in the past. (Williams, Ex. H). Captain Wolf continued,
[h]e has been counseled and disciplined for those, but it does not seem to be making an impression
on the young officer as seen in his reaction to the internal investigation of this event. (Williams,
Ex. H).
Approximately four months later, in September of 2009, Officer Williams was found to be
untruthful (Roush, p. 36:5-13). Specifically, Officer Williams entered information into his patrol
unit indicated he arrived on scene; however, he was a little over one half mile away from the
location and traveled less than one block at the time he cleared the call (Williams, Ex. E p. 1).
Although Chief Roush recommended termination, the Merit Commission agreed to a suspension

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 25 of 26

of 30 days (Roush, p. 36; Williams, Ex. E p. 2). That is, LPD continued to employ an officer that
is apparently believed disregarded discipline it imposed.
The City was aware of an officer who was intentionally untruthful in the course of his
official duties and used City equipment to perpetuate that fraud, but still elected to keep him on
the force. That is, the City kept an officer in a position to perpetrate the same offense in the future.
See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting police who falsify reports in
a successful attempt to persuade prosecutors to prosecute a suspect have violated suspects civil
rights and enjoys no immunity). And Officer Williams was untruthful in this case when he falsified
his identity in the voicemail by identifying himself as Bobby (D.E. 20-7, McCoy Decl. 11).
Moreover, the City was immediately aware that two officers threatened Vander Plaats after
he had communicated with the fianc of one of the officers. Approximately ten days later, before
formal discipline was imposed by the City, he was attacked by Officer Barthelemy. See Clash v.
Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that police officer do not have the right to
shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.). See
also Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 686 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that it is
difficult to conceive of a reasonable explanation for [the officers] conduct, and a reasonable jury
could readily conclude that [the officer] used excessive force.). The record demonstrates that the
City was negligent in its retention, training, and supervision of LPD officers. The City is liable
because those errant decisions violated clearly established constitutional and federal rights.
VI. Conclusion
Plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of material fact with respect to all claims raised in
his amended complaint. Moreover, Plaintiffs claims are not precluded as a matter of law. As

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USDC IN/ND case 4:14-cv-00009-JTM document 28 filed 04/08/15 page 26 of 26

such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendants Motions for Summary
Judgment, set this matter for trial, and grant him all just and proper relief.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Scott L. Barnhart
Scott L. Barnhart, Attorney No. 25474-82
Keffer Barnhart LLP
Attorney for the Plaintiff
Certificate of Service
I certify that on April 8, 2015, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of
this filing will be sent to the following parties by operation of the Courts ECF filing system.
That system may be accessed by email or manually through the courts system.

/s/ Scott L. Barnhart

Scott L. Barnhart
Keffer Barnhart LLP
Keffer Barnhart LLP
230 East Ohio Street, Suite 600
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Office: (317) 857-0160
Fax: (855) 641-5311
Barnhart@KBindy.com
www.KBindy.com

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