Forms of Talk by Erving Goffman

Review by: Michael Stubbs

Language in Society, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 77-82
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Lang. Soc. 12, 77-131.

Printedin the United States of America

REVIEWS

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS

ERVINGGOFFMAN, Forms of talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania

Press and Oxford: Blackwell, I98I. PP. 335.
All students of social interactionowe a great debt to Goffman's distinguished
writings. The indebtedness may range from amazementat the revelations contained in books such as Thepresentationof self in everydaylife (Goffman 1959),
to the more scholarly realizationthat his insights have opened up the principled
study of everyday life where no such possibility was seen before. These two
reactions will equally affect readers of his latest book. On the one hand it is
impossible to listen to radio announcers in the same way after seeing their
problems exposed in the paper on "Radio talk." Similarly, it is impossible to
organize, chair, deliver, or listen to a lecturein the same way afterreading "The
lecture." As always, Goffman's writings have the ability to change our perceptions of the world. On the other hand, Goffman meticulously picks apartconcepts which are central to the study of language but need much more careful
analysis, including: speaker-hearer;conversationalfluency; a conversationas a
basic context for utterances; and the possibility of a deterministic model of
interaction.And he develops at length several aspects of his approachto everyday behaviour, presented in Frame analysis (Goffman 1974). Goffman might
point out that these prefatoryremarkscomprise a ritualtext bracketto the main
substanceof my review, which contains variouscriticismsof the work. They are
genuinely intended for all that.
The book is a collection of five papers, three previously published and reprintedwith minor revisions; the last two published for the first time.
"Replies and responses" (from Language in Society 1976) discusses the
possibility of a formalistic and deterministic analysis of conversational exchanges including adjacency pairs such as question-answer,or more generally,
initiation-reply.Goffman admits that elegantly structuredexchanges are found,
and provides many examples of interchangeswhich show tight constraintsbetween utterances. However, utterancesmay not comprise units in a dialogue or
conversation at all, but sustain an open state of talk during some coordinated
task, such as mending a car or playing a game. In such cases, the whole framework of conversationalconstraints may be disregarded.In criticising a purely
interactionistframework(which assumes that utterancesare predominantlyini?) 1983 CambridgeUniversity Press

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tiations or responses), Goffman is also questioning the possibility of always

applying linguistic structuralanalysis to conversation. "Response Cries" (from
Language 1978) questions more directly the centralityof the concept "a conversation." It discusses many types of utteranceswhich fail to fit into the usually
assumed dialogic model of speaker-recipient.There is a general prescriptive,
moral, lay rule (often taken over by discourse analysts):no talkingto oneself in
public. But the descriptive rule is more complex: talking to oneself may be
allowed (if one trips in the street) or expected (on hearing bad news). Such
utterances often occur outside conversations, as part of some physical task.
Further,such utterancesas exclamationscomprise marginalwordsat best, which
break phonotacticconstraints,have no standardspellings, and occur only in the
spoken language. "Footing" (from Semiotica 1979) is a very general analytic
statement, although illustratedagain with very specific examples. The general
concept of change of footing is familiar to linguists in the concept of codeswitching, and Goffman uses Gumperz'swork on code-switching in Norwegian
dialects to introducehis argument. However, Goffman intends footing to be a
much more general concept, referringto the alignment of an individualto an
utterance.
"The lecture" is a lecture about lectures, delivered in 1976. This version is
modified in unspecified ways (of which there is more discussion below) fromthe
spoken version. It is essentially a description of a social event, and provides
many acute observationson the linguistic, social, and ceremonialorganizationof
lectures; the relationshipbetween lecturer and audience, between lecturerand
text, between spoken and writtenversions of the 'same' lecture;and on the ways
in which lecturerssustain the illusion of spontaneouslycomposed talk. "Radio
talk" is a long discussion of radio announcing. Its centraldescriptivetopics are
the ways in which announcersmaintainthe impressionof fluent talk, and correct
errors they make (worth reading just for the hilarious howlers, by the way).
However, the paper contains also importanttheoreticalpoints. Goffman draws
on the well-known linguistic work on speech errors, but he argues that the
collection of such errors by linguists is often ad hoc. An analysis requires
reference to the ethnographicsetting of announcers'work, includingthe transmission technology and editing practices which lead to some of the errorsand
their importance.
The whole book is in Goffman's characteristicstyle: long, inevitablyrepetitive
discussions, sometimes highly abstract, and sometimes strangelyunanalyticas
example after example is quoted without much explicit comment. As there is
very considerableoverlap between the papers, I will select some of the concepts
most importantfor linguistic study. As always, Goffman's work is packed with
insights, but my main criticism will be that it is often less explicit and systematic
than it might be. Goffman himself appearson occasion uneasy about the inexplicitness of his discussion. For example, he admits in an addedprefaceto "The
lecture" that he has revised the paper only slightly for print, and in unspecified
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ways: so that the presentationof a spoken lecture in writtenform itself provides

examples of framing issues. However, he "ventures this plea without confidence" (i6o) and admits to "abusing the reader" (i6i).
Possibly the most fundamentalconcept which is picked apartis that of speaker-hearer.Goffman argues that the commonsense notions of speakerand hearer
are crude; he (politely?) refrains from mentioning that linguists often operate
with the same undifferentiatedconcepts. He proposes three main aspects of a
speaker:Animator(A) refers to the participantwho moves his lips up and down
and produces words; author (B) refers to the person who has selected and
encoded the message; andprincipal (C) refers to the person who is committedto
the beliefs expressed. Goffman's main point is that A, B, and C typically coincide in a single person in everyday face-to-face conversation, but this is not
necessary. In fact, A, B, and C label ratherdifferentaspects of an individual.A
is a functionalrole in a communicationsystem, while C is a social role. It is left
unclear what B labels. Goffman then provides many cases where A, B, and C
diverge. A radio announceris typically only A, not B or C. He may, however,
break frame and interjectpersonalcomments (A, B, and C) into materialwhich
he is merely animating.A politician might deliver a speech (A and C) which has
been authoredby a speech writer (B). An academic delivering a paper would
normally be A, B, and C simultaneously. However, in summarizingsomeone
else's ideas, he would switch to A and B only. And if he is ill, a stand-in(A only)
might read his paper on his behalf.
Goffman develops the concept further. He distinguishes three types of vocal
production:fresh talk, readingaloud, and memorization;and points out thateach
type has typically a differentproductionformat, that is, a differentconfiguration
of A, B, and C. Thus in fresh talk, such as most spontaneous conversation,
speakers are usually A, B, and C. In reading aloud, a speakeris A, but may or
may not be B and C, depending on whether he is reading his own words. In
memorization,the speaker, such as an actor on stage, is typically only A. Each
of these productionformatsprovides a differentinterpretiveframeworkfor hearers, relevant to understandingwho is committed to what by the language used.
The basic idea is striking in its insight: Goffman clearly demonstratesthat
speaker is an unanalysed concept, and provides an analytically powerful step
forward. However, many loose ends remain. For example, an actor (A) delivers
a speech in a play written by a playwright(B). Is the playwrightalso C? Or do
works of imaginative literaturenot have a C? Hemingway was committedto the
texts he wrote aboutthe SpanishCivil War when writingfor newspapers,but not
committed in the same way to the propositionalcontent of For whom the bell
tolls. Just what Goffman understandsby commitment in this context remains
unclear. I returnto this below, but in this particularcontext a link to work such as
Searle's (0975a) on the logical status of fictional discourse would have been
helpful. Or again, what of a simultaneoustranslator?CertainlyA, but also partly
B? The concept of authorshipbecomes problematicin translation.Where, for
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example, does translationdiverge from paraphrasingin termsof authorship?Or

what of cases of multiple authorship?A spokesman, say for a trade union, is
certainly A, and typically also C, though only one representativeC. He may or
may not be one of the Bs, since an official statementis likely to have multiple
authors(Bs?) who are committed to the particularstatementformulatedby the
spokesman (B).
Goffman similarlypicks apartthe concept of hearer.A hearermay be a ratified
participantto a speech event, but may not be listening. A listener on the other
hand may be overhearing or eavesdropping. Ratified participantsmay be addressed or unaddressed.Audiences are a special case of ratifiedparticipants;but
live audiences have differentpossibilities in lecturesand in theatres,whereasTV
audiences are differentagain. The differentpossibilities for speakers'production
formats and for hearers'participationframeworks together provide a powerful
tool for analysing changes in footing, or changes in speaker-heareralignment.
Given the different possible relations between speakers and hearersimplied in
differentparticipationframeworks,it follows immediatelyalso that 'a conversation' is not the only necessary context for utterances.
Another topic of central linguistic interest is what Goffman calls embedding.
Embedding takes many forms, but refers to a change in footing; one value of
Goffman's approachis that he points out that somethingthat linguistsdiscuss is
only one aspect of a much more general phenomenon,only partlylinguistic. On
the other hand, his argumentcould be made more explicit and systematic by
reference to mainstreamwork in semantics and pragmatics. A simple case of
embedding is provided by a direct quote of someone else's words, involving a
switch from A, B, and C, to just A. Goffman also discusses explicitly the ways
that speakers have of hedging and qualifying their utterances, and distancing
themselves from what they are saying. The concept of commitmentto propositions and illocutionary acts is therefore central. He points out that multiple
embeddingis possible in examples such as To the best of my recollection, I think
that I said that 1 once lived that sort of life (149). Such examples suggest the
analysis of utterances into preface plus propositional content, and the more
general analysis of distancing and indirectnessprovidedby the very large literature by Searle (0975b) and others on indirect speech acts. However, Goffman
makes only fleeting reference to this literature, and it must be said that his
analysis of syntactic forms and semantic content is often unsystematic.As one
small syntacticexample, he refers (148) hazily to wish, think,could, andhope as
"performativemodal verbs."
The kind of systematic semantic frameworkwhich is missing fromGoffman's
account is providedby Lyons (1977; more succinctly and moreexplicitly in some
ways, x98I). Lyons points out that a sentence such as He may not come is fourways ambiguous. It may have an objective epistemic interpretation:relative to
what is known, it is possible that he will not come; or an objective deontic
interpretation:he is not allowed to come. In everyday uses of language, howev80

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er, subjective interpretationsare much more likely. A subjective epistemic interpretationwould be: I personallythink it quite possible that he will not come; a
subjective deontic interpretationwould be: I forbid him to come. Similarly,
sentences such as That willlmust be the postman are most likely to be used in a
subjective epistemic sense referringto the moment of utterance,ratherthan as
expressing a view abouta futureevent (will), or a demand(must). Lyons' topic is
thereforethe ways in which speakerscan express their own beliefs and attitudes,
qualify their commitmentto propositionsby being tentative or provisional, and
in fact express themselves.
Whereas work by Searle and Lyons lack almost entirely any real-life data,
Goffman's lacks a systematic syntactic and semanticframework.Embeddingis a
custom-made topic for the rapprochementbetween linguistics and ethnography
which Goffman recommends but does not push far enough. Having discussed
these two examples in some detail, I will make similarpoints much more briefly
about other arguments.
Anotherexample of a concept which is attractingincreasinginterestin semantics and pragmatics,and into which Goffman provides much new insight, is the
use-mention distinction. He refers to the distinction explicitly (252, 282), and
discusses at some length (280ff) the concept of metacommunication:that is,
making metalinguistic reference to linguistic forms and meanings. Again, the
discussion could be made more systematic and explicit by relating it to the
semantic and pragmaticliterature,and also by relatingmore explicitly different
insights at various places in the book. The distinction is clearly relevantto the
embedding and distancing mechanisms discussed above. Goffman cites, for
example, differentkinds of authorshipdisclaimersand the possibilityof editorial
footnotes as commentson texts by others. But he does not set out in a systematic
way the different linguistic units which it is possible to mention: for example,
both linguistic forms and meanings, as well as illocutionaryforces; and different
semantic units such as a whole proposition, a presuppositionof a statement,or a
single word. Further,Goffman discusses (xO ) the possibility of using repetition
in constructingsarcasticutterances,but does not make explicit that repetitionis
one kind of mention. (Sperberand Wilson [ I 9811 develop a convincing theoryof
irony based on this observation.) However, Goffman shows again that what
appears to be an abstruse topic of interest to philosophers (the object versus
metalanguagedistinction) is central to everyday uses of language.
It is a characteristicof Goffman's method of argumentthat he sometimes
allows argumentsto proliferatewithoutattemptingto adjudicatebetweenthem or
relate them fully. To take just one example from several in the book, in his
discussion of ways of distancing speakers from the propositional content of
utterances, he refers to Ross's 1970 performative hypothesis that "any unadorned utterance implies a higher performativeverb and a pronoun" (149).
However, this is appendedin a footnote as just anotheranalysis, with no hint of
the fact thatlinguists have for the most partlost interestin such attemptsat purely
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grammaticalexplanations of pragmaticphenomena, and that Ross's arguments

were attacked very early on the grounds, briefly, that there is no syntactic
motivation for positing performativeverbs on higher nodes in deep structure.
I may have seemed to complain in this review that Goffman has not made
sufficiently explicit the relevance of his work to linguistics. To this one might
reply that he is doing sociology not linguistics, and that he is actually attacking
some of the very assumptionsof formalismthat I am recommending.However,
he says in several places that his aim is to relate linguistic and ethnographic
concerms,and I have tried to indicate some furtherpoints of contact. Perhapsthe
task of making the relevance clear to the readersof a particularjournalis in any
case mine as reviewer. And I hope that I have made clear that the relevanceof
this work for linguistics is profound and far-reaching,even if the insights are
presentedin a form that is unfamiliarin style, with sometimes incompletearguments and an informal approachto syntactic and semantic analysis. Goffman
argues convincingly that an ethnographicdimension is correspondinglymissing
from much linguistics. He has providedthe insight and the revelations,and some
very firm if incomplete analytic frameworks, which it will take armies of researchersto refine, clarify, and formalize.
REFERENCES
Goffman, E. (0959). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Anchor Books.
(1974). Frame analysis. New York: Harper& Row.
Lyons, J. (977). Semantics. 2 vols. CambridgeUniversity Press.
(1981). Language, meaning, and context. London:Fontana.
Searle, J. (0975a). The logical status of fictional discourse. New Literary Historv 6(2): 3 19-32.
(1975b) Indirectspeech acts. In P. Cole & J. Morgan(eds.), Syntaxand semantics, vol. 3.
New York: Academic Press. 59-82.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1981). Irony and the use-mentiondistinction. In P. Cole (ed.), Radical
pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. 295-318.
Reviewed by MICHAEL STUBBS
Departmentof Linguistics
UniversitYof Nottingham
NottinghamNG7 2RD England

(Received 8 April 1982)

WILLIAM
LABOV(ed.), Locating language in time and space. (Quantitative
Analyses of Linguistic Structurei, W. Labov & D. Sankoff series editors.)
New York: Academic Press, I980, Pp. xx + 271.
This volume contains studies of linguistic change and variation, all of which
adopt quantitative methods of analysis. Unlike Sankoff's recent collection
(1978), these papersare predominantlysubstantive,ratherthan methodological,
in emphasis. As the series editors point out in their preface, "'the field has
maturedto the point thatthe advantagesand disadvantagesof variousmethodsof
treatingthe data are recognised and relatedto each other. Researchersare free to
82

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