IBAA Employees Union v.

Inciong
G.R. No. L-52415
October 23, 1984
Petitioner: Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU)
Respondents: Hon. Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor
and Insular Bank of Asia and America
Facts:
The petitioner, Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union filed a
complaint for payment of the holiday pay against the respondent bank, Insular Bank
of Asia and America which the court decided in favor of the petitioner. Without
appeal, such was complied with by the respondent bank in accordance with Article
208 of the Labor Code which states:
(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than
10 workers
A few months later, PD 850 was promulgated to amend the Labor Code by
indicating that persons with a right to a holiday pay should get a rate of twice their
regular rate. Subsequently, the Department of Labor promulgated the rules and
regulations for the new law. The said section states:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked
or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the
statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve
Such was further interpreted through Policy Instruction No. 9 by the Secretary
of Labor by stating that the ten paid legal holidays is only intended to benefit the
principally daily employees, however, monthly paid employees if such ten legal
holidays are not yet included in the payment of wages shall be benefited, such
policy further added that, The new determining rule is this: if the monthly paid
employee is receiving not less than P34p, the maximum monthly minimum wage,
and his monthly pay is uniform to January to December, he is presumed to be
already paid the ten paid legal holidays. However, if such deductions are made
from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he
is still entitled to the ten paid legal holidays.
By reason of such interpretation, the respondent bank followed the rule and
stopped the payment of holiday pay to its employees. The petitioner filed a motion
for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision, which the respondent bank
opposed by reason of the new law contending that it repeals or modifies the said
judgment and law corresponding to it.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent correctly applied the newly promulgated law,
and if such law may modify and amend a previous final judgment.

Decision:
The interpretation of the then, Secretary of Labor in the newly amended law
was incorrect; it was not an interpretation, but an amendment of the law. The
Secretary of Labor distinguished monthly paid employees with and without the
incorporation of holiday pays which should not be the case, as the law pertains to
specific types of employees on the basis of rank and industry. In such case when
there is confusion, the Art. 4 of the Labor Code must always be enforced, which
means that in case of doubt, such must be construed in favor of labor. Furthermore,
a final judgment has no retroactive effect. Such respondent bank did not appeal to
the judgment of the lower court, implying that such is willfully complied with,
without any intention to violate it. The final judgment in this case is, aside from
partially executed, already out of the jurisdiction of the courts, as it is not their duty
to modify or amend a judgment upon its execution.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople

G.R. No. L-44717
August 28, 1985
Petitioner: The Chartered Bank Employees Association
Respondents: Hon. Blas F. Ople, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary
of Labor, and The Chartered Bank
Facts:
A complaint was filed by the petitioner, Chartered Bank Employees
Association, against the respondent bank, Chartered Bank for the payment of ten
unworked legal holidays as well as premium and overtime differentials for worked
legal holidays. The Collective Bargaining Agreement was presented by the petitioner
in light of the computation of the wages and such was ruled in favor of the
petitioner.
Upon appeal, the respondents raised Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 which states that monthly paid
employees, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not. With the addition of PD 850, the creation a new interpretation was made
stating, if the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the
maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten paid legal holidays. However,
if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months
where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten paid legal holidays. Thus, the
former ruling was dismissed for lack of merit.
The petitioner stand on the issue that the Minister of Labor gravely abused
his discretion due to the change in the clear and concise intent of the law, while the
respondent contends that such was not a grave abuse of discretion but a
classification of those monthly paid employees including holiday pay and those that
exclude such in the computation.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law in promulgating
Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Decision:
The construction made by the Secretary of Labor is erroneous; it added a
group of monthly paid employees which were not provided for by law. What the law
excludes from the holiday provisions are those government employees, managerial
employees, field personnel members of the family of the employer who are
dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of
another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of
Labor in appropriate regulations. Although it is the duty of the courts to also give
weight to the interpretation of the executive officers, such erroneous interpretation

of the statute could not be possibly considered as it is equivalent to altering the law.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement has a different divisor from the respondent
bank which further explains discrepancies in the computation of salaries. In such
case one must rule in favor of the workers based on the CBA.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission

G.R. No. L-16704
March 17, 1962
Petitioner-Appellant: Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent-Appellee: Social Security Commission
Facts:
The respondent, Social Security Commission (SSC) issued Circular No. 22:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due
the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions
will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
Such was based on the amendment of Section 8 (f) of R.A. 1161 through R.A. 1792
which redefines compensation as follows:
Section 8 (f) of R.A. 1161
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value
of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part
of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2)
bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other
payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do
so.
R.A. 1792
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value
of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of
the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. upon receipt of the same wrote to the
respondent saying that such is contrary to Circular No. 7 which excludes overtime
pay and bonus in the monthly premium contributions. The company further added
that in computing such, it must be based on Republic Act 1161 which specifically
defines compensation, remuneration and wages respectively. Moreover, it claimed
that the SSC had no authority to enforce it without the approval of the president and
publication in the Official Gazette. The SSC ruled that such is not a regulation that
requires the usual approval and publication of a law to be effective but a mere
interpretation of the statute and policy on how it should be understood.

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is contrary to its aim of determining how the
law should be construed.
Decision:
Clearly, the Circular No. 22 only had the advisory opinion on how
compensation as defined in R.A. 1792 should be understood. It did not put in details
of law but merely interpreted what is within the said law. As such it is not
subordinate legislation enforced but an advisory. The Circular No. 22 only advised
the companies in light of the amendment of the law which the respondent is obliged
to enforce.
Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R. No. 79974
December 17, 1987
Petitioners: Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla
Respondents: Salvador Mison, in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Budget
Facts:
The respondents, Salvador Mison, and Guillermo Carague are both appointed
by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Secretary of the Department of Budget respectively. Knowing the position of Mison
was not approved by the Commission on Appointments, the petitioners, Ulpiano
Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla filed a petition for prohibition against the
respondents from disbursing in the payment of Misons salaries and emoluments.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution states:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Clearly, there are four groups of people which may be appointed by the
president. The first group should be appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments and the second and third, without such approval. The same was
proven in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission; as well as the removal

of the term bureaus from the first group. The fourth group, with the aid and
interpretation of amicus curiae needs no approval by the Commission on
Appointments as well.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Mison, may perform his function as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs despite the lack of approval from the
Commission of Appointments.
Decision:
The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines or R.A. 1937, was made during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Section 601 of R.A. 1937 as amended by
P.D. 34, asserts the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs as a position
to be appointed by the President of the Philippines. As stated in the deliberations,
appointment of the heads in the first group already excluded bureaus and because
laws should be construed in harmony of the Constitution such would imply that the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs needs no consent of
the Commission on Appointments.
Perfecto v. Meer
G.R. No. L-2348
February 27, 1950
Plaintiff-Appellee: Gregorio Perfecto
Defendant-Appellant: Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts:
Justice Gregorio Perfecto was required by the appellant, Bibiano Meer to pay
his income tax as member of the Court. Upon payment, the petitioner Perfecto
instituted an action in court saying that because the Constitution states that there
will be no diminution of salary of the judiciary, his salary should not have been
taxable.
Several court decisions in the United States of America were used to resolve
the issue of taxability of salaries of judges; while some have ruled that there should
be non-taxability by reason of its being independent from the judiciary, another
ruling considers taxability as a question of policy.
Issue: Whether or not the taxability of the salaries of the members of the judiciary
constitutes as a diminution of compensation, contrary to the Constitution.
Decision:
Taxing the salaries of the members of the judiciary is considered a
diminution. The law emphasizes the importance of an independent judicial body
free from any legislative or executive influence. The non-taxability does not make
them a privileged branch of the government but a security of justice through judicial
independence.

Endencia v. David
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
Plaintiff-Appellees: Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo
Defendant-Appellant: Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts:
The appellee justices Pastor Endencia and Fernando Jugo paid their income
tax as members of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court respectively.
Section 13 of R.A. 490 states that no salary wherever received by any
public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. The appellees contend
that such provision should be rendered unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not the provision of Section 13 of R.A. 590 is considered as a
violation of the constitutional prohibition on legislative interpretation of the
Constitution.
Decision:
The act of promulgating such provision is already beyond the powers vested
upon the legislature by the Constitution. Section 13 of R.A. 590 is therefore,
unconstitutional. The power of the legislature is to enact laws which are within the
bounds of the Constitution; the power to interpret is a judicial power. Allowing the
legislature to enact provisions that interpret the law is not only a violation of the
prohibition against legislative interpretation but also a cause of irregularity in the
interpretation of the laws, especially those which the courts have already
interpreted in the past.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. L-78780
July 23, 1987
Petitioners: David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo and Maximo A. Savellano,
Jr.
Respondents: Commissioner of Internal Revenue and The Financial Officer,
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Facts:
The petitioners, David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr. are
all appointed and qualified judges seeking to prohibit the respondents,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court
from deducting withholding taxes from their salaries though Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution which states that during their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.
According to the 1973 Constitution, no salary or any form of emolument of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax, however, the petitioners relied on the 1987
Constitution which did not affix the same which reverts back the intent of nondiminution of salaries.
Issue: Whether or not the members of the judiciary may be taxed.
Decision:
The judiciary should be taxed like all tax payers in the practice of equality
with all the branches of the government. In view of the deliberations of the framers
of the Constitution, the provision presented by the petitioners should be read in
light of the 1973 Constitutional provision aforementioned. The obscure intent of the

Constitution cannot be held as a reason to allow such inequality. As it is a violation

of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. By allowing such would
allow the judiciary to be a privileged member of the government with a right which
cannot be exercised by anyone else.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
G.R. No. 45459
March 13, 1937
Petitioner: Gregorio Aglipay
Respondent: Juan Ruiz
Facts:
Gregorio Aglipay is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church;
he sought to prohibit the Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. Director of
Posts, Juan Ruiz, despite the attorney of the petitioners protest against the postage
stamps still publicly announced the designs of the stamp described and can clearly
be identified with Catholicism. The petitioner claims that such act of the Director of
Posts of allowing such commemorative stamp is contrary to the Constitution:
Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI. No public money or property shall ever
be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to
any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The petitioner contends that allowing the postage stamps to be designed in
such a manner is contrary to the principle of separation of church and state. Such a
case could allow both parties to be a weapon against the citizens to impose or limit
certain acts.

According to the respondent, the postage stamp design is merely to

effectuate Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature, whose purpose is to simply
appropriate costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs with
the appropriation of P60,000, and that such appropriation is focused at what is more
advantageous to the Government and for this reason, granting the writ prayed for
would cause the Government of the Philippines to suffer losses.
Issue: Whether or not creating the postage stamps in question is contrary to the
principle of separation of church and state.
Decision:
Act. No. 4052 has no religious inclination or purpose, what the Director of
Posts simply aims to have is to create special postage stamps advantageous to the
Government. In this case, it does not violate the Constitution as it does not aim to
use public money for the church. Its real aim is to take advantage of the upcoming
Eucharistic Congress to be held in the Philippines. Moreover, the design of the
stamps actually shows the map of the Philippines. Thus, its true purpose is to raise
funds as well as tourism and such idea of inclination to another religion is merely
incidental to the cause.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156
February 3, 1997
Petitioner: Manila Prince Hotel
Respondents: Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel
Corporation, Committee on Privatization on Privatization and Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel
Facts:
Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation, filed a petition against the
execution of the contract between the respondents, and a Malaysian firm, Renong
Berhad, by invoking Section 10, second paragraph, of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution specifically states that, in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos. The petitioner, and Renong Berhad were both
bidders to the sale of 51% of the shares of respondent MHC sold by GSIS for the
privatization of program the Philippine Government. The Renong Berhad won being
the highest bidder but before such declaration, the petitioner matched the bid, but
was refused by GSIS, hence the petition.
The respondent invoked that the provision of the Constitution invoked by the
petitioner was not self-executing and thus, requires subsequent legislation to be
instituted.

Issue: Whether or not the Filipino First Policy is a self-executing provision in the
Constitution.
Decision:
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and every law, judgment and
contracts should be in conformity with it. While some provisions contained in the
Constitution are not self-executing, such provisions in Article II, provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is self-executing. This provision, in
this case, is self-executing as it is complete in itself and grants a right that may be
enjoyed or protected. When the Constitution vests a right under certain conditions it
is presumed that such right may be enforced even in the absence of subsequent
legislation.

Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
Petitioners: Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
Respondents: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, Hon. Joaquin Venus, Melquiades P. De
La Cruz, and Florendo S. Pablo
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette the various laws, including letters of instruction,
general orders, proclamations, letter of implementation and administrative orders
by reason that it is a public right under the Constitution to be informed on matters
of public concern.
The respondents claimed that they are not proper parties to the case but the
court ruled that since the issue is on the basis of public right, any person may raise
the issue. In addition to the respondents defense, Article 2 of the Civil Code stressed

that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided Therefore, if
some other date is provided for its effectivity, the publication in the Official Gazette
becomes unnecessary.
The argument may be correct in so far as the date is concerned but to
observe that the publication in the Official Gazette is not mandatory should be
questioned. Cases when publication is necessary are cited under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
Issue: Whether or not laws may be enforceable in the absence of publication of the
same in the Official Gazette.
Decision:
Based from the Commonwealth Act, it is necessary that laws are published in
the Official Gazette, especially matters involving general application. It is a clear
objective of such provision that all matters be informed to the public through the
Official Gazette; otherwise, the principle of ignorance of the law excuses no one if
applied, would prejudice the citizens who had no notice or information that such
laws came to effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
Petitioners: Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhod, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini)
Respondents: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, Joaquin Venus, Melquiades P. De La
Cruz, Etc., et al.,
Facts:
The petitioners writ of mandamus in a past case was affirmed by the courts
of their demand to publish laws as required by law. In light of such judgment the
court ruled in the necessity of publication of some laws. In addition to such ruling,
the petitioners move for reconsideration and clarification of the decision in relation

to publication. In addition, petitioners suggested that all laws should be publicized

and not just laws of general application.
The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the case as it is an advisory opinion
and that the unless otherwise provided clause in Article 2 of the Civil Code only
means that publication is not always required and does not always have to be
published in the Official Gazette.
Article 2 of the Civil Code states:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
Issue: Whether or not the unless otherwise provided clause speaks of the
publication of laws and date of effectivity.
Decision:
Based on the ruling in the past case and the present case it is evident that
the true intent of the term unless otherwise provided is the date of effectivity and
not a choice to publicize or not. The law simply states that in the absence of a date
of effectivity, it shall be effective fifteen days after publication. If such date of
effectivity is stipulated, then upon publication, such date of effectivity would then
apply, otherwise, such would lead to the violation of the right to information of
public concern. In addition, while it is true that newspapers of general circulation
could be fit to publish laws, as long as there is no amendment in Article 2 such laws
should strictly be published with the Official Gazette. Furthermore, considering that
laws mean all laws whether of general application or not, all must be published as
laws which do not concern the public would be considered as an ultra vires act of
the legislature.

Primicias v. Urdaneta
G.R. No. L-26702
October 18, 1979
Plaintiff-Appellee: Juan Augusto B. Primicias
Defendants-Appellants: The Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, et al.,
Facts:
Juan Augusto Primicias, was driving his car in the Municipality of Urdaneta
when he was asked to stop by a policeman 200 meters away from a school building
for the reason that he violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3 and because he overtook

a truck. A criminal complaint was filed against him for violation of Ordinance No. 3.
The petitioner, Primicias prayed for the issuance of preliminary injuction to restrain
the defendants. The Court of First Instance held that the ordinance was null and
void due to R.A. 4136.
The ordinance provides the following provisions:
SECTION 1 - That the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the
National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the territorial limits of
Urdaneta shall be as follows:
a. Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at 'blind corners,
passing school zones or thickly populated areas, duly marked with
sign posts, the maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20 kph.
SECTION 2 - That any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle
violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first
offense; P20.00 for the second offense; and P30.00 for the third and
succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall recommend the cancellation of
the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle's Office (MVO); or failure to
pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in accordance
with law.
The appellants claim that because the ordinance was patterned after the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law it should be valid and that they failed to note that such
law was already repealed by R.A. 4136 and that because of this since the matter
covers the same subject and enforced at the time of arrest of the petitioner, the
same should still be considered as a violation of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance imposed by the defendants is contrary to a
statute and is therefore, void.
Decision:
In view of the hierarchy of laws it should be understood that ordinances must
give way to statutes. In this case, the argument of the appellants that such
Ordinance was valid at the time of the arrest of the petitioner should be void.
Furthermore, the ordinance made by the respondents did not make complete
classifications and definite terms for the enforcement of its ordinance necessary to
avoid confusion and misinterpretation. Moreover, the respondents have their own
maximum allowable speeds under the ordinance which is contrary to R.A 4136
which specifically indicated that no other maximum allowable speeds may be
specified aside from what the statute provides. In conclusion, in the imposition of
any ordinance it is necessary that statutes are considered for their validity.

La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez

G.R. No. L-12436
May 31, 1961
Petitioners-Appellants: La Carlota Sugar Central and Elizalde & Co., Inc.
Respondent-Appellee: Pedro Jimenez, Auditor General of the Philippines

Facts:
La Carlota Sugar Central (Central) is managed, controlled and operated by
Elizaldo & Co. (Elizalde). Central imported tons of ammonium sulphate and
ammonium phosphate, the sum was in US dollars and was paid through the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation in the name of Central and in favor of
the Overseas Central Enterprises in the U.S.A. All other incidental documents were
in the name of the Central.
When the fertilizers arrived, Central paid the corresponding special excise tax
on the same to the Central Bank. A few months later, Central filed a petition for the
refund of the taxes paid because such was imported to be used by five haciendas:
three owned by Elizalde and the rest managed by the same. Therefore, they must
be exempt from the 17% excise tax under Section 1 in accordance with Section 2 of
R.A. 601. Section 1 and 2 of the said R.A. states:
Section 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be assessed,
collected and paid a special excise tax of seventeen per centum on the value
in Philippine peso of foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank of the
Philippines, or any of its agents until June 30, 1956.
Section 2. The tax provided for in section one of this Act shall not be collected
on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and or
other charges of fertilizers when imported by planters or farmers directly
or through their cooperatives.
The Audditor o the Central Bank denied their petition even after
reexamination of the papers and appeal to the Auditor General of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Central may be exempt from the 17% special excise tax.
Decision:
Central is not exempted. The law is clear that only those planters or farmers
who imported directly or through their cooperatives may be exempt from the 17%
tax. While the use maybe for the haciendas it is still clear that the planters or
farmers are not the ones who directly or through their cooperatives. Central is
neither a planter nor a cooperative and can therefore, only be an agent. The rule is
that exemption of tax should be construed liberally in favor of the State and against
the taxpayer.

CIR v. CA
G.R. No. 115349

April 18, 1997

Petitioner: Commission of Internal Revenue
Respondents: The Court of Appeals, The Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo
De Manila University
Facts:
The private respondent, Ateneo De Manila University, being a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution was ordered by the petitioner, Commission of Internal
Revenue to pay its taxes because of the independent research projects undertaken
by the formers auxiliary unit, the Institute of Philippine Culture from sponsorships of
international organizations, private foundations and government agencies.
The petitioner raised Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code
which taxes at three percent on gross receipts to contractors, proprietors, or
operators of dockyards, and others and defines independent contractors to include
persons (juridical or natural) not enumerated above (but not including individuals
subject to the occupation tax under Section 12 of the Local Tax Code) whose activity
consists essentially of the sale of all kinds of services for a fee regardless of whether or
not the performance of the service calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental
faculties of such contractors or their employees. In addition, the petitioner also made
mention of the exceptions under the same provision and contended that because said
respondent does not belong to any of the exceptions provided by the provision, the
same cannot be exempt from taxation.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent university falls under the purview of
independent contractor pursuant to Section 205 of the Tax Code.
Decision:
The respondent university is not an independent contractor in view of Section
205 of the Tax Code. In the imposition of taxes, it is a well settled doctrine that the
laws should be strictly interpreted. When a law does not specifically exempt one
from payment of taxes, it cannot be implied that the same may be taxed. In relation
to the interpretation of the provision, it is clear that the law pertains to certain class
of persons whose businesses are engaged in the selling of their services, which the
university does not fall into. While the petitioner may claim that it is the contractual
obligation taxed and not the university itself, no records show their services were
for a fee. Furthermore, donations received by the university are tax-exempt and
these researches, along with other activities undertaken by the respondent are
considered as incidental projects made in accordance with the corporations
academic and educational goals.

Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos

G.R. No. 120082
September 11, 1996
Petitioner: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
Resppndents: Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, the City of Cebu, represented by Mayor Hon.
Tomas R. Osmena and Eustaquio B. Cesa
Facts:
The Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was built under R.A. 6958 to
control and manage the Mactan International Aiport. Under Section 14 of such
statute, the petitioner is exempt from realty tax. However, on October 11, 1994, the
City of Cebu demanded payment of realty tax on the parcels of land of the
petitioner; the petitioner upheld Section 14 and claimed that it was an
instrumentality of the government which should not be taxed by the local
government under Section 133 of the Local Government Code. Section 133 clearly
specifies that the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units cannot be taxed by Local Government Units unless otherwise
provided herein. The respondent City asserted that Section 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code had already withdrawn the tax exemption.
Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in
this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all
persons whether natural or juridical,including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No.
6938, non-stock, and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property taxes. . . .
(a) . . . (c) . . . Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real
property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Upon compliance of the petitioner, it subsequently filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief asserting that while it is a government-owned and controlled corporation, it
should be perceived as an instrumentality of the government due to the nature of
its powers and functions. The respondent City contends that the petitioner is not an
instrumentality as it is clearly stated by the law as a government-owned
corporation. The respondent judge ruled in favor of the respondents and stated that
the law does not make any distinction between a governmental function and one
performing proprietary ones.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may be taxed by Local Government.
Decision:
The Local Government has authority to tax the petitioner by reason that only
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government

units may be exempt from taxation. The law is clear that the petitioner is a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and by virtue of Section 193 and
234 of LGC, its tax exemption has been withdrawn. The petition is therefore, denied.

Serfino v. CA
G.R. No. L-40858
September 15, 1987
Petitioner: Spouses Federico Serfino and Lorna Bachar
Respondents: The Court of Appeals and Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc.
Facts:
A parcel of land was patented under the name of Pacifico Casamayor under
the Homestead Patent; it was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental under OCT No. 1839 and issued in the name of Pacifico
Casamayor. The same property was sold to Nemesia Baltazar. OCT No. 1839 was
lost during war and the court, upon petition of Nemesia, reconstituted OCT No. 14R
1839) still in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On the same day, Nemesia was given
her TCT No. 57-N after cancellation of OCT. No. 14-R (1839). She later on sold this
property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc. but the latter failed to register the
same in the Office of the Registry of Deeds because said property was already
covered by another title under the name of Federico Serfino. Upon review of the
discrepancy it showed that the property was auctioned for tax delinquency and only
Pacifico was notified. Federico purchased the said property. Serfino with sufficient
papers to the lot, mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank.
The Office of the Register of Deeds sought the cancellation of either the TCT
of Nemesia or the TCT of Lopez Sugar Central. The respondent corporation instituted
an action for annulment of OCT No. 14-RP (1839), TCT No. 38985 and the mortgage
executed by the Serfinos, filed for the registration of the Deed of Sale, for the
issuance of a TCT in its name and for recovery of the land. The court ruled that
Lopez Sugar Central should pay PNB for the land mortgaged and that the petitioners
should return the land to the respondent corporation. Both parties appealed.
On appeal the respondent contends that the mortgage should be considered
null and void because such property is not the property of the Serfinos. The
petitioner however, asserts that because they executed the mortgage in good faith,
due to their belief in the validity of their title it should be given consideration. The
court modified the ruling; the respondent is required to reimburse the spouses of
the unpaid taxes and penalties they incurred from repurchase.
The petitioners filed an appeal for certiorari on the ground that under Section
121 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, no corporation, association, or partnership
may acquire or have any right whatsoever to any land granted under the free
patent, homestead or individual sale unless suh is consented of the grantee with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and solely for commercial,
industrial, educational, religious or charitable purposes or for right of way. The
respondents argued that under Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141 both
Pacifico and Nemesia legally transferred the properties because such Section only
prohibits the alienation of the homestead lots to private individuals upon lapse of 5
years upon issuance of the patent.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent corporation has the right of ownership on the
land in question.

Decision:
The respondent corporation has the right of ownership. However, due to its
failure to declare the land in its name and pay the complete taxes, it should pay the
mortgage loan of the petitioners. Both claims of the parties are actually meritorious,
but evidence shows that the respondent had not been delinquent in paying its
corresponding taxes, hence, the Province had no right to auction such lot.
Manahan v. ECC
G.R. No. L-44899
April 22, 1981
Petitioner: Maria E. Manahan
Respondents: Employees Compensation Commission and GSIS (Las Pinas
Municipal High School)
Facts:
The petitioner Maria Manahan is the wife of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr
who worked as a public school teacher in Las Pinas Municipal High School and died
of Enteric Fever. Manahan filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance for
the death benefit of her husband and was denied because his typhoid fever is not
an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration asserting
that when her husband was admitted to the school, he was still in perfect health
and therefore, his illness was acquired from his employment. However, the
Government Service Insurance System as well as the Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance.
On appeal, the petitioner explains that an entric fever is acquired from an
infection through feces and urine of carriers. Typhoid fever, or enteric fever includes
abdominal pain caused by the excretion of the organism to the stool for several
months. Flies and other species scan deliver the same to food and drinks. The
medical certificate of her husband shows that ulcer was an included complication to
his typhoid fever. In addition, the evidence shows that before he was employed, he
had perfect health, and it was only during his employment in said school that he
was treated for epigastric pain.
Issue: Whether or not the ailment of the petitioners husband may qualify as a
ground to claim his death benefit.
Decision:
It has always been a practice, that in case of doubt it should be resolved in
favor or the worker; hence the law leans toward relief to the workman and his
dependents. As such, it is clear that no judgment can be easily affirmed a second
look at the evidence of the petitioner. The deceased has always used the facilities of
the school. He ate his meals in the canteen, and used the comfort rooms. Since
salmonella is acquired through contaminated food or drinks, these findings can lead
to the conclusion that the chances of contracting this illness went higher when he
was working in the public school. The petitioner should receive the compensation
benefit of her husband.

Villavert v. ECC
G.R. No. L-48605
December 14, 1981
Petitioner: Domna N. Villavert
Respondents: Employees Compensation Commission & Government
Service Insurance System (Philippine Constabulary)
Facts:
The petitioner, Domna Villavert, is the mother of the deceased Marcelino
Villavert. Marcelino was a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary; however, in
addition to that, he is also a computer operator and clerk typist due to lack of
employees. He is required to do many activities at work that he continued working
even if he was already having chest pain and headache. It caused him to work
overtime and go home really late at night. When he arrived home at the day of his
death, he immediately slept. His mother saw him gasping for breath, perspiring and
mumbling; she tried all efforts to wake her son, but to no avail. He was brought to
the hospital, and pronounced dead due to hemorrhagic pancreatitis.
Domna filed a claim for income benefits.To support the petitioners claim she
presented a certification from Lt. Colonel Felino C. Pacheco Jr. as well as an affidavit
from Rustico P. Valenzuela verifying Marcelinos nature of work, habits, health, and
time of death. but it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System, as
well as the Employees Compensation Commission on the ground that Marcelinos
ailment is not an occupational disease and that such illness was acquired from the
nature of his work. ECC even made mention that such illness is usually acquired
from alcoholism or trauma. According to the autopsy of Marcelinos body, there
were no clear signs or causes of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis nor was there
alcoholic intoxication, but physical and mental stress are strong causal factors.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may claim benefits from ECC and GSIS.
Decision:
The petitioner should be able to claim benefits. According to Article 4 of the
Labor Code, All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The same should therefore be applied as there is no known cause of his death.

Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRC

G.R. No. L-64204
May 31, 1985
Petitioner: Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.,
Respondents: The National Labor Relations Commission, Paulino Mabuti,
Napoleo Borata, Silvino Tudio and Calinar Security Agency
Facts:
Calinar Security Agency entered into a Contract of Services with Del Rosario
& Sons to supply the latter with security guards at a rate of P300.00 per month each
guard. Sometime later, two employees, Paulino Mabuti and Napoleo Borata filed a
complaint against the employer Security Agency and the petitioner for
underpayment of salary, non-payment of living allowance and 13 th month pay. Soon
after, five other guards filed similar complaints.
The petitioner argued that such complaints have no cause of action as it does
not have an employer-employee relationship with them. The respondent agency
denied liability as well for reason of inadequate payment paid to it under the
Contract of Services and therefore could not comply with the payments required by
the labor code. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the case of the
petitioner but demanding payment of salaries and benefits from respondent agency.
Upon appeal with the NLRC of the respondent agency became jointly and severally
liable with the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is jointly and solidarily liable with the
respondent agency.
Decision:
Both petitioner and respondent agency should be liable. Under Art. 106 of the
Labor Code, when a contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees, both shall be liable to the employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, while Art. 107 indicates that such petitioner is indeed
an indirect employer. The judgment of the court is affirmed but does not prejudice
any action which may be filed by the petitioner for the reimbursement of excessive
amount of payment.

Ty v. First National Surety

G.R. No. L-16138
April 29, 1961
Plaintiff-Appellant: Diosdado C. Ty
Defendant-Appellee: First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.,
Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., United Insurance Co., Inc.,
Philippine Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., Reliance Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc., Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., Far Eastern Surety & Insurance
Co., and Inc., Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
Facts:
The appellant Diosdado Ty is a operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway
Cotton Factory. He insured himself in 18 local insurance companies which all issued
him of personal accident policies upon the payment of P8.12 for each policy. His
employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, also serves as beneficiary and the payer of the
insurance premiums.
When a fire destroyed his employer company, the appellant ran out of the
factory and incurred fractures in the fingers of his left hand and a lacerated wound
caused by a heavy object. According to the hospital which treated his injuries, he
has a temporary total disability on his left hand causing him to file a notice of
accident and notice of claim to all of the defendants for indemnity.
According to his insurance policy, if the insured sustained a bodily injury
through violent, external, visible and accidental means and is not proven to be fatal
but causes, within sixty days from its occurrence, a Total or Partial Disability, the
company shall pay subject to exceptions provided for. The policies indicated that
the loss of either hand shall entitle the insured an indemnity of P650.00, and
defined loss of a hand as loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist. The
defendants rejected his claim by reason that there was clearly no severe
amputation of the left hand, hence his injury is not covered by the policy which was
affirmed by the Court of First Instance.
Upon appeal the appellant explains that the insurance policies for the loss of
his left hand does not necessarily mean amputation but resulted to him being
unable to perform his work and that the obscure stipulation of the defendants
should be a reason for the court to lean in his favor.
Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by the appellant falls under the
insurance policy.
Decision:
The express conditions are clear in the insurance policies that in order for the
insured to be indemnified, the injury he sustained should have been a loss of either
hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist; such is absent in his case. His
injury is merely a temporary and not total or partial disability as indicated in the
insurance policy.

De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance

G.R. No. L-21574
June 30, 1966
Plaintiff-Appellee: Simon De la Cruz
Defendant-Appellant: The Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.
Facts:
The son of the plaintiff, Eduardo de la Cruz, was a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc
Mines, Inc. in Baguio and a holder of an accident insurance policy. During the
celebration of New Year, his employer company sponsored a boxing contest for
entertainment which Eduardo participated in against another person, both of them
being non-professional boxers. In the course of their fight, Eduardo slipped, and was
hit by his opponent on the back of the head causing him to fall. His head landed on
the rope of the ring. He died in the Baguio General Hospital due to a hemorrhage.
The plaintiff and father, Simon De la Cruz was the beneficiary of the
insurance policy of the defendant Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.; the latter
filed a claim for the payment of indemnity under the policy but it was denied. As a
result, Simon filed a case against the insurance company; the court decided in favor
of the former.
Upon appeal, the defendant claimed that the case of Eduardo cannot be
considered an accident because his unfortunate death was due to his voluntary
participation in the boxing match. Furthermore, the defendant asserted that their
insurance policy intended that the term accidental be attributed to the cause of
the death and not the death itself.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to indemnity as beneficiary to his
sons insurance policy.
Decision:
Even if the defense of the company were to be taken into account, the case
of Eduardo is still an accidental means which caused his death. Accident should be
interpreted as an unforeseen, or unexpected result of an act. While Eduardo
participated in the boxing match voluntarily, it was unintentional, unforeseen, and
unexpected that he would slip causing him to receive a blow on the head resulting
to his death. Just because injuries are expected from boxing, such death could not
be presumed to be foreseen. In addition, according to the policy, death or
disablement consequent upon the insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking,
steeple chasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling
is excluded from protection of the insurance contract. There was no mention of
boxing implying that said act could not have been intended to be omitted from
liability.

Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance

G.R. No. L-4611
December 17, 1955
Plaintiff-Appellee: Qua Chee Gan
Defendant-Appellant: Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., LTD.,
represented by its agent, Warner, Barnes and Co., LTD.
Facts:
The warehouses of the plaintiff, Qua Chee Gan were completely burned down
due to a fire that broke out. The plaintiff informed the defendant and submitted his
claims the next day. The fire adjusters working for the insurance company went
there for an investigation and as a result, the Insurance company refused payment
by reason of violation of warranties and conditions and because the fire was made
on purpose. A subsequent charge of arson was filed by the defendant.
The defendant claims that the there was a breach of warranty in their policies
because such indicated that for every 150 feet of external wall, with not less than 1
feet of hose piping and nozzles for every two hydrants kept under cover in
convenient places there should be hydrants being supplied. In this case the plaintiff
only had 2 when they were supposed to have 11. Furthermore, they also violated
the hemp warranty which under their policy prohibits items to be placed in the
bodega such as oils when gasoline was placed in such bodegas. In addition the
plaintiff also failed to submit to them the list of books and vouchers demanded of
them.
Issue: Whether or not the appellee should not be entitled to claim proceeds of his
fire insurance.
Decision:
The plaintiff should not be convicted of arson and is entitled to claim
proceeds from his fire insurance. This is because first of all, the discount on
compliance of number of fire hydrants was given to the plaintiff without actually
having the proper quantity provided them. It creates fraud, allowing the defendants
to easily leave the plaintiff uncompensated. Hence, it is only proper to consider that
such warranty is void. Furthermore, the policy is ambiguous in indicating oils in its
policy without pointing out that gasoline is included, but regardless of which,
gasoline became necessary for the business of the plaintiff and can, therefore be
excused in this case because such policy can only be deemed applicable when such
item is unnecessary. Moreover, the failure of the plaintiff to submit the list of items
causing discrepancy as to the amount of damage should be considered an honest
mistake between the insured and the adjustor because they had different methods
employed in its computation. As to the crime of arson, such could not be alleged
because no person would commit arson as against his source of income while still
buying the same amount of materials for his business, only to be burned down to
claim his proceeds. In this case, the court upholds the rule that in the ambiguity of
an insurance policy such should be held in favor of the insured.

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines

G.R. L-34382
July 20, 1983
Petitioner: Home Insurance Company
Respondents: Eastern Shipping Lines and/or Angel Jose Transportation,
Inc. and Hon. A. Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of
First Instance, Branch XVII

Co v. Republic
G.R. No. L-12150
May 26, 1960
Petitioner-Appellee: Benjamin Co
Oppositor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines
Facts:
The petitioner Benjamin Co is a Chinese National born in the Philippines of
Chinese parents. He is married to his Chinese wife with whom he had a child with.
Since his birth he never left the country; he lived, studied, and socialized with
Filipinos for a very long time and grew fond of the customs. He is familiar with not
only Tagalog, but also Ilocano, and English. He has never been accused of a crime
involving moral turpitude and claims he believes in democracy and is not against
the government; in fact he even claimed that if he would be granted the petition he
would serve the government. He has a tobacco business which grew through his
savings and hard work alone. He contributes in civic and charitable organizations.
He claims he pays his taxes correctly, but have failed to file an income tax return for
the P3,000 he got from his father as investment.
When he was asked about a principle he believed in under the Philippine
Constitution, he only stated he believed in democracy and the laws of the
Philippines. When questioned about the unfiled income tax return he said he would
file his. He showed his alien certificate of registration, but not of his wife and child.
Due to these errors, the government appeals the decision of the court which
granted naturalization to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be rejected of his application for
naturalization by failing to follow the some of the laws of the country.
Decision:
The naturalization laws are generally against the applicant and strictly
construed in favor of the government, therefore, it is the duty of any applicant to
ensure that all requirements for naturalization and all other laws of the Philippines
are complied with. For any petitioner for naturalization it is essential that every law
enforced by the state is given great importance.

Lee Cho (Sem Lee) v. Republic

G.R. No. L-12408
December 28, 1959
Petitioner-Appellee: Lee Cho alias Sem Lee
Oppositor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines
Facts:
Lee Cho was born in China of Chinese parents, when he went to the
Philippines; he had an alien certificate of residence and registration. After several
years he married another Chinese national, Sy Siok Bin and had thirteen children all
born in their current residence of Cebu. All of them had alien certificates of
registration except Lourdes Lee who was married to a naturalized Filipino Citizen
named Lim Kee Guan. All of his children are studying in private schools and colleges
recognized by the government with the exception of William, who is not of school
age, and his two daughters, Angelita who only finished grade five, and Lourdes who
stopped at third year high school.
The petitioner studied from first to seventh grade in an institution recognized
by the Government. His familys religion is Roman Catholic. He is capable of
speaking and writing English and Cebu dialect. He engaged himself in the corn
business and later on lumber business and has been associated with some Filipinos.
He invested in the lumber business and his share grew. Inspite of this he has no tax
liability.
Lee Cho asserts that because he has lived in the Philippines for more than
thirty years, and that because he has given primary and secondary education to all
of his children in all private schools recognized by the government, he need not file
a declaration to become Filipino citizen.
He has been naturalized but the
government disputed such argument by reason of the lack of education afforded to
his two daughters. Angelita Lee married before completing her studies which
deprives her of Philippine Civics, History and Government, while Lourdes admitted
that she stopped by reason of poor health but continued to study in a strictly
Chinese School which does not teach those aforementioned subjects.
Issue: Whether or not the Lee Cho should be naturalized despite his failure to
afford education to his daughters.
Decision:
Lee Cho did not only fail to afford education, but also failed to allow his
children to embrace Philippine Citizenship. Being married as the case of Angelita is
not sufficient reason to deprive her of the lessons required by law; it implies that
such civics, history and government subjects are not of importance to the petitioner.
Lourdes case gives an even greater weight of betrayal as she continued to embrace
her nationality. If Lee Cho had the honest intention of changing his nationality, he
would not have allowed such to occur.

Guerrero v. CA
G.R. No. L-44570
May 30, 1986

Bello v. CA
G.R. No. L-38161
March 29, 1974
Petitioner: Juan Bello and Filomena C. Bello
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Francisco Llamas, as Judge of
Pasay City Court, and Republic of the Philippines
Facts:
The petitioner spouses, Juan Bello and Filomena Bello, were charged and
convicted of estafa. They filed their notice of appeal to the Court of First Instance of
Pasay City; the prosecution likewise filed a petition to dismiss appeal on the
ground that such appeal should have been taken to the Court of Appeals under
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act or Republic Act 296. The petitioners cited Rule 50
Section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it
shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor. The court of first instance
dismissed the appeal and considered the same for execution of judgment.
When the petitioners were called for the execution of their judgment, it was
only then that they had knowledge that their appeal was dismissed. They filed with
the city court a motion to elevate appeal to the Court of Appeals by reason that
their case was an excusable neglect for erroneously filing a notice of appeal in the
court of first instance but the respondent city court denied the petition.
As a result the petitioner spouses filed their petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of
judgment as well as to compel the respondent city court to elevate the appeal to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals however, still dismissed the petition
because the city court was not the proper principal party which should have been
the court of first instance, therefore, it could not grant any relief at all even on the
assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities, even upon
motion for reconsideration, the same had been denied.
Issue: Whether or not both respondent judges of the Court of Appeals and Court of
First Instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal filed
by the petitioners.
Decision:
The court of first instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case erroneously brought to it instead of endorsing the same to the
Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals likewise committed a grave abuse of
discretion of dismissing the petition instead of setting aside the challenged order of
the CFI simply because the respondent city court was not the proper party to the
case. While the appeal was procedurally wrong it is the exercise of the courts to
correct such and not completely deprive the petitioners of their substantial right of
appeal. It is within the inherent power of the CFI to exercise the process and orders
to endorse the appeal to the CA under Rule 50 Section 3 as mentioned by the
petitioners. Thus, the petition for prohibition against the respondent city court from
executing judgment is granted; furthermore, the city court is commanded to elevate
the petitioners appeal to the CA.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

G.R. No. 14355
October 31, 1919

Villanueva v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-54718
December 4, 1985
Petitioner: Crisologo Villanueva Y Pardes
Respondents: Commission on Election, Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Dolores, Quezon, Vicencio G. Lirio
Facts:
On the last day of filing for certificate of candidacy for the local elections,
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy for the position of vice
mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. However, later that day he withdrew
his candidacy through filing an unsworn letter in his own handwriting. After having
knowledge of such withdrawal, the petitioner, Crisologo Villanueva filed a sworn
Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution for Mendozas office of mayor. The
petitioner was the clear winner against the respondent, Vicencio Lirio, but such
votes made in his favor were considered stray votes because the petitioners name
was not included in the certified list of candidates implying that his certificate of
candidacy in substitution was not accepted. Lirio was considered as an unopposed
candidate and was elected vice mayor.
Comelec justified their decision through Sections 27 and 28 of the Election
Code. Section 27 states that no certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be
considered withdrawn unless the candidate files with the office which received the
certificate or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal, while
Section 28 explains that if, after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a
candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should withdraw any voter
qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which
the candidate who has withdrawn was a candidate on or before midday of
election Comelec clarified that because the withdrawal made by Mendoza was
not sworn into and because he did not withdraw before, but on the same day of the
last filing for the certificate of candidacy, there can be no substitution made in favor
of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not irregularity of the letter of withdrawal of candidacy may
render the Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution of the petitioner void.
Decision:
The mere irregularity cannot be held as a reason to deny the Certificate of
Candidacy in Substitution of the petitioner, hence, he must be declared the true
winner of the election for vice mayor. Comelec contends that because Mendozas
letter of withdrawal was not made under oath, such withdrawal cannot be
considered as accepted. However, the election registrar accepted such without any
objection. In fact, the latters name was not even in the list of registered candidates.
Furthermore, since Mendozas withdrawal was made on the very last hour of not
only the last day of filing for candidacy, but also the same day as he filed for
candidacy shows that he was not very serious about his candidacy. Such action,
should not, however, prejudice the petitioner who ran in as substitute of the former.
Such action by the Comelec to deny the candidacy of the petitioner is therefore, not
in consonance with the intent of the law.

In RE: Tampoy
G.R. L-14322
February 25, 1960
Deceased: Petronila Tampoy
Petitioner-Appellant: Diosdada Alberastine
Facts:
Petronilla Tampoy created a two-page last will and testament. She requested
Bonigfacio Minoza to read the same at the latters house in the presence of three
witnesses, Rosario Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Omboy Simeon. All witnesses
including Bonigfacio Minoza signed at the bottom of every page. The deceaseds
attorney, Kintanar did the same. The deceased signed all the pages of the will in the
presence of the witnesses; it was declared that such is free and without force,
intimidation or undue influence. Two weeks after the passing of the testator, her
heir, Carmen Alberastine also passed, leaving her mother, Diosdada Alberastine,
who also happens to be the petitioner for the probate of will of the deceased. Such
probate of will was not executed by the lower court by reason of lack of thumbmark
in the first page.
Issue: Whether or not the lack of thumb mark of the testatrix on the first page of
the will can render the will inoperable.
Decision:
Although it may be true that the intention of the deceased supported by the
signature of the witnesses of the will and the lack of opposition to the probate of will
is ascertained, it cannot be denied that it does not express such in accordance with
law. Section 618 of Act 190 requires that all pages of the will be signed by the
testator in the presence of witnesses and likewise signed by the latter in the
presence of the testator. It is not an option, but a mandatory act necessary for the
validity of the will. Such provision on the law is strictly followed even the reason of
the inoperability of the will is based on an absence of one thumbmark.

Capati v. Ocampo
G.R. L-28742
April 30, 1982
Plaintiff-Appellant: Virgilio Capati
Defendant-Appellee: Dr. Jesus P. Ocampo
Facts:
The plaintiff, Virgilio Capati was a contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building who entered into a sub-contract with defendant Dr. Jesus
Ocampo to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the said building.
It was agreed by both parties that such construction should be completed on or
before June, 5, 1967, but such was finished fifteen days after said date.
The defendant filed an action for recovery of consequential damages in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga which the defendant asked for a motion to
dismiss on account that such action was contrary to their contract which specifically
states that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga. The plaintiff opposed by interpreting
such provision as merely an option due to the word may. The lower court
dismissed by reason that such stipulation if merely optional had no reason to be
indicated at all.
Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in their contract is only optional.
Decision:
The term may is permissive, and not obligatory, thus there remains
discretion on the part of the plaintiff to decide. Also, it is held in a precedent case of
Nicolas v. Reparations Commission that such stipulation is not to be strictly
followed, but is provided only as an option. Thus, the court stands by the precedent
case permitting the court of origin to handle such case.

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications

G.R. No. 126496
April 30, 1997

Alfon v. Republic
G.R. No. L-51201
May 29, 1980
Petitioner: Estrella S. Alfon
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Facts:
The original name of the petitioner is Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
the same was the name used in her birth certificate and baptismal certificate. Her
parents, Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte have been taken
cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon, who happen to be the petitioners uncle and
aunt. When the petitioner started going to school she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon up to the time she graduated College. She also used the name when she
exercised the right of suffrage and all of her friends are aware Hence, she filed a
petition for change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S.
Alfon.
The court ruled that the change of name is not proper and reasonable with
respect to th surname because as a legitimate child it is only proper that she carry
the surname of Duterte. Article 364 of the Civil Code invokes that the last name of
the father should be principally used by a legitimate or legitimated child.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may legally change her name.
Decision:
According to a precedent case there are three reasonable causes that the
court may allow a change in name: first is when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce, second, when the
request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimated and third, when the change is necessary to
avoid confusion.

Rura v. Lopena
G.R. No. L-69810-14
June 19, 1985
Petitioner: Teodulo Rura
Respondents: The Hon. Gervacio A. Leopena, Presiding Judge of the 2 nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, TUbigon, Bohol and the
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Teodulo Rura committed estafa five times all on different dates, but all were
consolidated to a single trial were he was convicted guilty to all charges. Each
criminal case had a sentence of three months and fifteen days totaling his sentence
to seventeen months and twenty-five days. When he applied for probation he was
disqualified by the court by reason that those who have previously been convicted
by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos are
disqualified from probation under the Probation Law. This judgment was affirmed by
the regional trial court upon appeal. He appealed with the Supreme Court
contending that all five estafa cases were jointly tried, thus he had no previous
conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation.
Decision:
The dates of commission are not important as basis to disqualify him of his
application for probation. The petitioner is right in asserting that there is no
previous conviction at the time he was convicted guilty of the estafa charges
because all were tried at the same time and only one decision was made for all.
Hence there was no previous conviction, but a simultaneous conviction, which the
law does not bar from application of probation.

NHC v. Juco
G.R. No. L-64313
January 17, 1985
Petitioner: National Housing Corporation
Respondents: Benjamin Juco and the National Labor Relations Commission
Facts:
The respondent, Benjamin Juco was a project engineer of the National
Housing Corporation who was eventually terminated due to the crime of theft for
allegedly selling pieces of scrap G.I. pipes of the corporation. He filed a complaint of
illegal dismissal against the petitioner with the Department of Labor for the reason
that he was dismissed based on fabricated charges; the petitioner contended for the
dismissal of the case in consideration that the NHC, being a government owned and
controlled corporation is not under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor. The
NLRC claimed through jurisprudence that the NLRC is not barred from judgment of
the case if in doing so, justice is served.

Issue: Whether or not the employees of the National Housing Corporation are
covered by the Labor Code or the civil service law and civil service rules and
regulations.
Decision:

Aparri v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-30057
January 31, 1984
Petitioner: Bruno O. Aparri
Respondents: The Court of Appeals and Land Authority, the latter in
substitution for Remedios O Fortich, as Chairman, Angelino M. Banzon,
Rafael B. Hilao, Valeriano Plantilla and Severo Yap, as members of the
Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitarion
Administration(NARRA)
Facts:
Bruno Aparri was appointed as a General Manager of the defunct National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration under R.A. 1160 without a fixed
term. Such is clearly discussed in Section 8:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors
shall have the following powers and duties: ...
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager ..., subject to the
recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of
the President of the Philippines, .... The Board, by a majority vote of all
members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic
Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines,
suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General
Manager
After more than two years as General Manager, the Board submitted to the
office of the President, their desire to fix the term of the general manager; such was
approved by the President.
Because of this, petitioner filed a case against NARRA to annul the resolution
and allow the petitioner to resume office as General Manager until he vacates the
office. Such case was still pending when NARRA was abolished but the same shall
still be tried for its academic purpose.
Issue: Whether or not the Board Resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of
the petitioner without cause.
Decision:
Facts show that Bruno accepted such position without a fixed term and under
the law, such appointment is terminable at the discretion of the Board of Directors.
Hence, the resolution made by the Board was not to remove him from office;
Brunos term of office is just considered as ended through such resolution. Term is a
fixed and definite period, while removal, entails being ousted from the position
before the term had expired. R.A. 1160 gave discretionary powers to the board to
appoint and fix the term, and since the term had not yet been fixed, it is only at
their discretion when such term shall be considered ended.

Demafiles v. Comelec
G.R. L-28396
December 29, 1987
Petitioner: Agripino Demafiles
Respondents: Commission on Elections, Provincial Board of Antique, in its
capacity as Board of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of
Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and Benito B. Galido
Facts:
Both petitioner, Agripino Demafiles and respondent, Benito B. Galido are
candidates for mayor in Sebaste, Antique. During the canvassing of the returns in
the elections, Galido asked the provincial board to disregard the election return from
precinct 7 by reason that the said return has 188 voters voted and were registered
but only 182 were registered according to a certificate of the municipal election
registrar. The board voted, and such return was rejected. Galido was proclaimed
mayor-elect based on the results.
Demafiles protested the boards action of rejecting the return and the
proclamation of Galido as well as the position of the two board members who were
reelectionists. Galido said that the two members of the provincial board were
disqualified only as provincial board but not as a municipal board of canvassers.
Furthermore, the decision to annul the canvass and proclamation of officials was
issued without giving Galido the opportunity to be heard, thus the proclamation
should stand. Demafiles failed to secure reconsideration and filed a petition for
mandamus and certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the position of the two members as well as disregarding
election return from precinct 7 are valid.
Decision:
It is the duty of the canvassing board to ensure that all election returns are
valid, hence it is not easy to exclude the same from canvass by reason that the
votes cast from the precinct where it came from are illegal. There is nothing on the
face of the return that such votes may be constituted as illegal but only in the
number of registered voters. Hence, the canvass and proclamation should be
annulled. Furthermore, the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvas and
illegal proclamation by reason of incomplete returns to order a new canvass to be
made in counting the excluded votes. In addition, according to Section 28 of the
Revised Election Code, any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council,
who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said
body in the performance of the duties relative to said election By application of
the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos, when the law does
not distinguish, the courts do not distinguish, therefore, whether provincial or
municipal, they cannot be members of the board of canvassers.

Arabay v. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte

G.R. No. L-37684
September 10, 1975
Petitioner: Arabay, Inc.
Respondents: The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Norte, Branch
II, The City of Dipolog and Emilio L. Tagailo, in his capacity as City
Treasurer of the City of Dipolog, et. al.
Facts:
The Municipality of Dipolog imposes tax on gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel
fuel oils, and petroleum based on the monthly allocation actually delivered and
distributed and intended for sale under Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53. This
ordinance took effect on 1966, four years later the Municipality of Dipolog was
made into a city. However, despite it, the petitioner, Arabay, Inc. continued to pay
amounts under the ordinance until 1972 even during the filing of the complaint by
Arabay Inc. in 1971. During said proceedings, Arabay Inc. made mention of Section
2 of Ordinance No. 53.
SEC. 2 Taxation Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to
impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any
occupation or business, or exercising privileges in chartered cities,
municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to secure licenses at
rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the municipal
council of the municipality, or the municipal district council of the municipal
district; to collect fees and charges for service rendered by the city,
municipality or municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable fees for
services rendered in connection with any business, profession or occupation
being conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district and
otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or
fees:Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case,
impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon
nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue: Provided, however, That no
city, municipality or municipal district may levy or impose any of the
following: ...
The court ruled in the validity of the provision on the ground that Arabay Inc
failed to prove that the tax provision imposed a sales tax.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Dipolog should refund to Arabay Inc. the taxes
paid by the latter.
Decision:
The ordinance clearly establishes a sales tax as the terms clearly impose a
tax on the sale of the products mentioned. It is clear that the amount collected is in
direct proportion to the volume of sales. Because Dipolog became a city, there is no
more power levied on them to enforce such municipal ordinance, hence, the local
sales taxes paid should be refunded with the exception of those levied on gasoline
sales based on Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act which states that

municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax
on sales or other taxes on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline, under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. The City of Dipolog should refund
the sales taxes paid by Arabay, Inc. with the exception of gasoline sales.

US v. Hart
G.R. No. L-8848
November 21, 1913
Plaintiff-Appellee: The United States
Defendants-Appellants: William C. Hart, C.J. Miller and Serviliano
Natividad
Facts:
The accused, William Hart, C.J. Miller and Serviliano Natividad were all
charged of vagrancy. They were all previously charge guilty of gambling. Hart
conducts gambling games, Miller enjoys both gambling and going in houses of
prostitution, and Natividad gambled every night and sometimes even acts as a
banker. Aside from gambling, they all have legitimate business. Hart operated a
hotel and saloon with another partner at Angeles which earned an income of
P96,000 for nineteen months before the trial. In addition to that he is also a sole
proprietor of a saloon, raised and sold imported hogs which allowed him to raise
P4,000. Furthermore, he was authorized to sell hectares of land, had the power of
attorney to the same and had contracted with the government for the building of a
public school for which he was paid for. Miller had been discharged from the Army a
year ago with a rating of excellent as a sergeant. Upon discharge he engaged
himself in a tailoring business with another person with a contribution of P1,000.
Miller attends to his business everyday; such business earned him P300 a month.
Natividad was a tailor who earned P80-P100 per month.
Under the law persons may be considered a vagrant if they fall within any of
the following circumstances: (1) Every person having no apparent means of
subsistence, who has the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or
herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible
means of support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone,
either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either of said offenses,
and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any
gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute
person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at
unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse,
vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the permission
of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute
person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; (7) every common prostitute and
common drunkard.
According to the Solicitor General, the second clause was the cause of their
conviction; all of them appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused falls within the meaning of a vagrant.
Decision:
By analyzing the second clause, loitering means wasting ones time.
Therefore, people who are guilty by virtue reason of this clause wastes so much of
their time in gambling houses, saloons or dram shops which is not the intention of
the lawmakers. The offense of vagrancy defined in Act No. 519 is considered as a
means to stop reform those who are considered as parasites of society, and it is in

the absence of visible means of support that these people are paid heed by the laws
to stop them. Therefore, the interpretation of the solicitor general should have been
understood as all persons classified within the mining of the law without any visible
means of support. While the punctuations have made them all the more confusing
such must be understood in view of legislative intent.
Victoria v. Comelec
G.R. No. 109005
January 10, 1994
Petitioner: Juan D. Victoria
Respondents: The Commission on Elections and Jesus James Calisin
Facts:
When the Governor of the Province of Albay was suspended, the ViceGovernor took over, leaving his vacant position to be filled by the highest ranking
Sangguniang member. The respondent, Jesus James Calisin was the highest ranking
in his district, and so is the petitioner, Juan D. Victoria although the latters votes
were numerically higher by reason of number of registered voters in their district.
The respondent was considered as the highest ranking member and the petitioner
was second, both computed in direct proportion to the registered voters in their
respective districts; by reason of this, the former was declared as senior Sanggunian
member for the Province of Albay and was later on designated as acting ViceGovernor of the province.
The petitioner asserts that the rank should not only be computed in direct
proportion with the number of registered voters but also multiplied by the number
of votes actually obtained, in this formula, the petitioner would have been the
highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent was erroneously declared as the
highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Decision:
The private respondent Calisin is correctly declared as the senior Sanggunian
member by reason that Section 44 of the Local Government Code clearly provides
for the purpose of succession the basis for determining the ranks in the Sanggunian
which is the number of votes in proportion to the total number of registered votes.
Such provision is merely applied in its clear and literal meaning; neither the courts
nor the petitioner is in the position to question the law.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology

G.R. No. 153866
February 11, 2005

Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771
March 31, 1971
Plaintiff-Appellant: Cornelia Matabuena
Defendant-Appellee: Petronila Cervantes
Facts:
Six years before their marriage, Felix Matabuena, now deceased, donated a
parcel of land to the defendant, Petronila Cervantes, his common-law wife. Upon the
death of the deceased his sister, Cornelia Matabuena filed a complaint in court
alleging that the donation made to Petronila should be considered null and void due
to the prohibition of Article 133 of the Civil Code on donation between spouses.
Petronila however, asserts its validity because such donation was made during their
cohabitation and not during their marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during marriage also
applies to common-law spouses.
Decision:
The court rules that such prohibition applies to common-law spouses.
Donation made is null and void because such is contrary to public policy. The
legislators upheld that donations between spouses are prohibited under the Civil
Code, allowing donations between common-law spouses would entail circumvention
of the law as any couple, would, instead of first being married, choose to cohabit in
order to protect their creditable interests or validly donate to each other for some
other purpose which the law is trying to prevent.

People v. Santayana
G.R. L-22291
November 15, 1976
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellant: Jesus Santayana Y Escudero
Facts:
The accused Jesus Santayana was appointed as a Special Agent of the CIS by
Colonel Jose C. Maristela. A Memorandum Receipt was issued in the name of the
accused for a pistol with one mag and stock. An undated certification to effect that
(1) Santayana was an accredited member of the CIS, (2) the pistol in the
memorandum was given to him by reason of his appointment and (3) he has
authority to carry and possess the same in the exercise of his duties and personal
protection issued by Col Maristela. A few months later he was caught in Plaza
Miranda for possession of the same pistol without a license. The accused was
convicted of the crime, but he appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the accused may possess and carry the said firearm without
need of applying a license.
Decision:
The appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was unnecessary for him
to register and apply for license because such firearm was government property,
while Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas told him that his position as CIS agent did not require
him to apply for a permit to carry. Therefore, he should have no criminal liability for
possession of the firearm given in connection to his appointment.

Rubio Jr v. Paras
G.R. No. 156047
April 12, 2005

Mutuc v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-32717
November 26, 1970
Petitioner: Amelito R. Mutuc
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts:
Amelito Mutuc ran for the position of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. The Commission on Elections sent him a telegram that his certificate of
candidacy is recognized, however, he is refrained from using jingles in his vehicles
equipped with sound systems including loud speakers. The petitioner claimed that
such order was contrary to his constitutional right to freedom of speech. The
respondent used the Constitutional Convention Act to justified their order as it
makes unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." The
respondent claims that such campaign jingles constitute an electoral propaganda.
Issue: Whether or not a campaign jingle is considered as a tangible propaganda
material prohibited under the Constitutional Convention Act and also considered as
a material for the exercise of the Constitutional right to freedom of speech.
Decision:
The campaign jingle falls under the words and the like of the Constitutional
Convention Act, and is therefore considered unlawful for the candidacy of the
petitioner. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, such is considered an electoral
propaganda because although it may not be included in the enumeration, it is of the
same class or kind mentioned in the Act. Not interpreting it as such puts
Constitutional defects on the statute in which it is enforced. Also, it is not a
complete censure or removal of a right to free speech, but a regulation to avoid any
evil caused by allowing such electoral propaganda which is considered as a means
to suppress the Constitutional right claimed by the petitioner. It is never the
legislatures duty to ignore the Constitution and repeal its parts, the Constitution is
the highest law of the land and no restriction may be used to suppress or regulate
rights embraced in the Constitution. The respondent is ordered to refrain from
implementing such law or demanding its compliance. The use of the political tapes
is therefore a lawful act in the exercise of ones freedom of speech.

People v. Manantan
G.R. No. L-14129
July 31, 1962
Plaintiff-Appellant: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellee: Guillermo Manantan
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan, a defendant to a dismissed case, objected the Courts
ruling that the order of dismissal entered by the trial court on his case be set aside
and remanded for trial on the merits. He said that remanding such case to the lower
court for trial already places him in double jeopardy because it was already
dismissed by the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not Manantan may invoke the defense of double jeopardy.
Decision:
The plea of double jeopardy is rejected. It was already too late for the
defendant to claim such defense because it should been raised when it was
appealed by the government to the Court. When there is no exercise of resistance
to the appeal, it is presumed that the defendant had already waived his right.

Lopez v. CTA
G.R. No. L-9274
February 1, 1957
Petitioner: Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc.,
Respondent: The Court of Tax Appeals
Facts:
The petitioner, Rufino Lopez & Sons, imported wire netting. When the Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the customs duties on importation, the same was
paid by the petitioner. The shipments were released but the freight of the wire
netting caused a reassessment adding additional customs duties which the
petitioner again must pay. Lopez & Sons tried to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and additional customs duties with the Collector of Customs, but after
failing to do so, they filed an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. The appeal was
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Under Section 7 of R.A 1125,
the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs while Section 11 speaks that one of those who may appeal before the
Court of Tax appeals are those who had a decision or ruling from the Collector of
Customs. The petitioner contends that due to this error, it should be interpreted to
mean that one may seek appeal from either the Court of Tax Appeals or the
Collector of Customs.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals have jurisdiction over cases decided
by the Collector of Customs.
Decision:
The Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner
of Customs but not of the Collector of Customs. The legislators have made a clerical
error in indicating the Collector of Customs when it should have been Commissioner
of Customs under Section 11. Based on the Customs Law, the Collector of Customs
is a subordinate of the Commissioner of Customs; the decision made by such
collector may be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs to affirm, modify or
reverse such decision. Clearly, the act of the Court by saying that it is a clerical
error, is not judicial legislation, but merely interpreting the law on the basis of
legislative intent.

Sanciangco v. Rono
G.R. No. L-68709
July 19, 1985
Petitioner: Napoleon E. Sanciangco
Respondent: The Honorable Jose A. Rono Minister, Ministry of Local
Government; The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City; The Honorable
Benjamin A. Fuentes, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz City and Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City; The Honorable Antonio G.
Caballero, Jesus A Anonat, Manuel T. Cortes, Irene S. Luansing, Remedios
J. Ramiro, Dominador B Borje, FIlomeno L. Romero, Florencio L. Garcia, and
Harry S. Oaminal Members, Sanguniang Panlungsod of Ozamis City
Facts:
Napoleon Sanciangco was elected Barangay Captain and later, elected as
President of the Association of Barangay Councils. By reason of his position as
President of the Association, the President of the Philippines appointed him as a
member of the Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod. Years later, the petitioner filed a
Certificate of Candidacy in line with the upcoming elections but did not succeed.
The petitioner for the purpose of returning to the Sangguniang Panlungsod
made mention of Section 13 of Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which states:
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Integrated National Police, as well as officials and employees of governmentowned and government-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,shall
ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue
in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay
officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy be considered on forced
leave of absence from office.
The petitioner invokes that because he was a member of the sanggunian
under Sec. 13 paragraph 2, it is considered that upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy he should be considered on forced leave of absence. Moreover, he made
mention that Section 13 (2) makes no distinction between an elected and an
appointed official and his case is therefore deemed as covered by the provision.
Issue: Whether or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who
ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa should be considered as resigned or
on forced leave of absence upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Decision:
The appointive member is considered to have ceased in office or position as
the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy by virtue of Section 13(1) of the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697. The petitioner cannot be under paragraph 2 as he

purports to be because such provision is only for those elected officials and not of
appointed officials, even if he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It has
been practice that since a certain provision is more particular with the other, the
former must prevail. Thus, although the second paragraph makes mention of
members of the various sanggunians it is more precise to put the petitioner under
the first paragraph as there is a clearer distinction that appointive officials are
covered by the said provision.

Lozano v. Yorac
G.R. Nos. 94521 & 4626
October 28, 1991

Manila Railroad Co. v. Collector of Customs

G.R. No. 30264
March 12, 1929
Plaintiff-Appellee: Manila Railroad Company
Defendant-Appellant: Insular Collector of Customs
Facts:
Manila Railroad Co. uses dust shields on all its railway wagons. Dust shields
are manufactured of wool and hair mixed which according to paragraph 141 of
Section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, should have an ad valorem tax of ten percent
because such is a manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for. However,
Manila Railroad Co. being a railroad company owning vehicles for use on railways
and tramways, and detached parts can also be taxed under paragraph 197 of
Section 8 of the same code for ten percent ad valorem tax.
Issue: Whether or not the Company may be taxed in accordance with paragraph
141 or paragraph 197 of Section 8 of the Tariff Law.
Decision:
While it is true that dust shields contain wool, it is of no doubt that it is a
detached part of a vehicle for use on railways as provided for in par. 197. The law
should always be interpreted based on the language used. In addition, par. 197 is a
special provision, while par. 141 is a general provision, therefore, the special
provision should be considered as operative and the general provision as to the
extent that it does not fall within special provisions provided by the Code. Finally, it
has always been a practice that in case of doubt in the interpretation of the statute,
the same should be construed strongly against the Government and in favor of the
citizen.

Almeda v. Florentino
G.R. No. L-23800
December 21, 1965
Plaintiff-Appellant: Policarpio Almeda
Defendant-Appellee: Julian Florentino
Facts:
Both appellant Policarpio Almeda and appellee Julian Florentino claim the
position of Secretary to the Municipal Board of Pasay City, both parties refer to R.A.
No. 183 in defense of their appointment to the position. Section 12 of R.A. No. 183
was amended by R.A. No. 2709 to give the Vice-Mayor authority to appoint all
employees of the Municipal Board who may be suspended or removed in
accordance with law, and shall approve the payroll of the said employees, was the
provision used to appoint the appellant, while Section 14 which states that the
Board shall appoint the Secretary to the municipal board, was the appellees
defense.
Issue: Whether or not Section 14 of Republic Act 183 should prevail in the manner
of appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City.
Decision:
The court favored the appellee. Section 12 should be interpreted to exclude
the Secretary of the Municipal Board because such is provided for in a separate
Section. Furthermore, the amendment made in R.A. No. 2709 was made only to
Section 12 and made no mention of Section 14; without an indication or intent of
the Legislature to repeal, the courts cannot repeal.

Laxamana v. Baltazar
G.R. No. L-5955
September 19, 1952
Petitioner: Jose L. Laxamana
Respondent: Jose T. Baltazar
Facts:
Upon suspension of the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, Vice Mayor and
respondent, Jose Salazar assumed office as mayor under Section 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, with consent of the
provincial board, assigned the petitioner, Jose Laxamana as mayor by virtue of
Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code. He immediately took his official oath.
According to the petitioner, Section 2195, which states that when the mayor
has a temporary disability by reason of absence, suspension or other temporary
disability as mayor, the vice mayor shall be the acting mayor and if there is none, it
shall be the councilor who has the highest number of votes in the last general
election, is already repealed by Section 21, which provides power for the provincial
governor with the consent of the provincial board to fill in, by appointment,
temporary vacancies in any elective local office in a provincial or city office and that
it is only in cases of permanent vacancy where the vice mayor may assume office.
Issue: Whether or not the Lazamana, appointed by the provincial governor may
assume office as acting vice mayor.
Decision:
Being that Section 2195 pertains to a particular provision, the respondent
Vice Mayor has the authority to assume office as acting mayor. The Revised
Administrative Code states that 2195 should prevail in case there is a temporary
vacancy in the office of the municipal president or mayor, and that such municipal
president cannot designate persons to act in his position during his temporary
absence or disability. The petitioner cannot interpret the laws as an implied repeal
due to the doctrine that implied repeals are not favored by the courts. Also, in
interpreting conflicting laws or provisions, special laws or provisions should prevail
over general ones. In this case, the specific provision on temporary vacancy of a
mayor, should prevail over temporary vacancy of any elective local office.

Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan

G.R. No. L-21516
April 29, 1966
Petitioner-Appellee: Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
Respondents-Appellants: City of Butuan, Et Al.
Facts:
The petitioner, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise for an
electric light, heat and power system under RA 399 and issued a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission.
An ordinance was imposed a few years before the grant of the petitioner that
all businesses in the city shall be taxed at 2% on gross sales or receipt. This
ordinance was amended several times to form a list of the businesses; the latest
amendment includes businesses engaged in electric light, heat and power.
Furthermore, an ordinance, specifically, ordinance no. 1004 makes unlawful the
disconnection of electric wires without the consent of the consumer except in cases
of fire, a clear and positive danger to the lives and properties of residents, or upon
order by the authorities.
The respondent, City of Butuan, justifies that the city is empowered to levy
and collect tax such as the imposition of 2% tax aforementioned, for general and
special purposes under the Local Autonomy Act and R.A. 523 against the petitioner.
The petitioner contends, however, that such ordinances are unconstitutional
as it impairs the obligation and contract of the petitioners franchise as well as the
deprivation of its property without due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not the city ordinances constitute as ultra vires and are
therefore, void.
Decision:
The city ordinances are contrary to the statutes and the constitution. The
Local Autonomy Act does not authorize the respondent to tax a franchised business
as it provides that although persons who operate electric, light heat and power may
be taxed, persons that pay franchise tax cannot be taxed; allowing such would
already constitute as double taxation. In addition, Ordinance No. 104 is already
considered an unwarranted exercise of power for general welfare which only the
legislature may exercise. Such ordinance is already contrary to the constitution as it
deprives the petitioner from claiming unpaid bills while still continuing to provide
service to delinquent clients. Though such would not prohibit the petitioner from
filing a case against the consumer, such unpaid bills would continue causing the
petitioner to spend more money not only to continue litigation, but also to endure
the expense of the consumers unpaid bills. In conclusion, the act of control of
public services is lodged only to the Public Service Commission under the
legislature.

Arayata v. Joya
G.R. No. L-28067
March 10, 1928
Plaintiff-Appellant: Basilia Arayata
Defendants-Appellants: Florentino Joya, et. al.
Facts:
The late Cecilio Joya inherited his right of least to six lots of friar lands. Later
on he married the plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. Upon acquisition of the Insular
Government to the said lands, he continued his lease in accordance with law. Cecilio
Joya bought the six lots he had been leasing on installments but since he could not
purchase more than he had, two were put up for sale.
Cecilio conveyed his right to one of his lots to Florentino Joya for P2,000
which was duly accounted for and approved by the Director of Lands. Soon after,
the deceased also conveyed his right to other lot to Marcelina Joya, and Francisca
Joya for P450. It appears that three days after his conveyance of his right to
Florentino, he executed a will giving the said lot to the latter, and the remaining lots
to Pablo Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, Agustin and Pedo Joya, Feliciano and
Asuncion Bobadilia, and Marcelina and Francisca Joya respectively. Cecilio died
before full payment to he said lots except the lot given to Marcelina and Francisca.
Florentino Joya served as the administrator of his estate who presented his will to
court. Such was disapproved by the court due to the plaintiffs opposition
contending that these are conjugal properties which cannot be easily served as
legacies.
In order to pass judgment upon this case, the court turns to Section 16 of Act. No
1120 which provides:
SEC. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of
which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed
by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a
deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied
with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same.
Issue: Whether or not the legacies are null and void by reason of the exclusive
entitlement of the spouse to the lots in question.
Decision:
Based on the interpretation of Sec. 16 of Act No. 1120, even before full
payment of the said lots, a holder of the certificate may subrogate his rights to the
said lot to another person who shall then serve as the new holder therewith. Hence,
only those conveyed by the deceased during his lifetime are not considered as
conjugal properties and such mention of these properties in his will are mere
ratification to such transfer. Therefore, his conveyances to Florentino, and Marcelina
and Francisca of the two lots respectively, serve as the properties of the latter and
not part of the conjugal property of the deceased. In addition, the aforementioned
lots are not to be considered under the Civil Code but under Act. No. 1120; thus, the
claim of conjugal property is not applicable. Since Act. No. 1120 is a special law, it
will prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. In conclusion, in the

application of said act, the wife may only gain ownership and enjoyment of its fruits
if such lots were intended to be purchased by her.

City of Manila v. Teotico

G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
Petitioner: City of Manila
Respondents: Genaro N. Teotico and Court of Appeals
Facts:
The respondent, Genaro Teotico hailed a jeep and when he was about to
board it, he fell into a manhole. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital
where his injuries were treated. The injuries he sustained caused him to be absent
from work for twenty days.
He filed a case against petitioner, City of Manila to claim damages from the
result of such accident. The petitioner justified that such catch basin had been
missing but only sometime after he fell. Petitioner was not aware if it had been
covered the days before, but the City has always tried to change the catchbasin
cover and place it on the sidewalk to prevent constant thefts of the catch basin but
the court ruled in favor of Teotico.
Upon appeal by the City of Manila, they presented two conflicting laws:
Section 4 of R.A. 409 and Art. 2189 of the Civil Code.
Section 4. The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons
or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
The petitioner contends that between the provision for payment of damages
of the city provided for in Section 4 of R.A. 409 and Art. 2189 of the Civil Code,
Section 4 must prevail. The petitioner adds that because the accident took place in
a national highway the City of Manila should not be liable.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila should be held for damages.
Decision:
The City of Manila should be held liable for damages incurred by Teotico. As
to the question which law shall prevail, it should be Art. 2189 of the Civil Code
because although such is a general law, it speaks of damages arising from the
condition of particular public properties, as compared to Section 4 of R.A. 409,
which is a special law, with a general provision. Moreover, whether the incident
occurred in a national highway or not, the fact remains that it occurred within the
control and jurisdiction of the City in accordance with Section 18 of R.A. 409.

Tac-an v. CA
G.R. No. L-62251
July 29, 1985
Petitioners: Irene Tac-an-Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. Tac-an and
Soccorro Tac-an Genobaten
Respondents: The Court of Appeals and Alfonso G. Tac-an
Facts:
When the father of the parties died, their mother, Luisa Guzman, managed
the entire estate which includes an agricultural land at San Isidro. Upon the death of
their mother, the petitioner, Diosdado Tac-an filed a petition for intestate
proceedings for the settlement of Luisas estate. This was opposed by the
respondent, Alfonso Tac-an who claims that he should have one-half of the 6,159
coconut trees at the San Isidro property by reason of his agreement with his mother.
Consequently, the parties resorted to a Compromise Agreement, but such did not
prevent the respondent from filing a separate suit.
In the respondents complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees
and Damages against petitioners, he contends that after he completed his mothers
request to plant coconut trees in on the agricultural land of their late father, they
agreed, without the objection of his siblings, that such property would be divided
between them equally with such equal shares continuing for fifteen years. The
petitioner asserted that due to their amicable compromise agreement for the
settlement of the claim, the respondents claim is barred by prior judgment. The
court dismissed the respondents petition. On appeal, the respondent was able to
claim one-half of the produce of the coconut trees but return 40 cows from their
compromise agreement. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, still
asserting the prior judgment made by court in their compromise agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may claim one half of the San Isidro
agricultural land of their late father.
Decision:
No partition may be made between persons over the estate of another by
oral agreement. In the alleged agreement of the mother and son, they would each
have half of the property, but such cannot be the case as it is the estate of the late
husband and not of the late wife, hence, in case of partition, the respondent can
only have half of what his mother had from the partition of the estate of their father.
In addition, upon the death of their father, the title of the property was replaced by
a TCT under the names of all the children and the spouse dividing herein in seven
equal parts, the estate of the father. However, with respect to the number of cows
deducted from the Compromise Agreement, the court ruled that such cannot be
deducted as the court may not impose a different judgment from the agreement.

Villegas v. Subido
G.R. No. L-31711
September 30, 1987
Petitioner-Appellants: Antonio J. Villegas as Mayor of the City of Manila
and Manuel D. Lapid
Respondents-Appellees: Abelardo Subido as Civil Service Commissioner,
Eduardo Z. Romualdez as Secretary of Finance, Jose R. Gloria as Acting
Asst. City Treasurer of Manila, and Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez as Presiding
Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila
Facts:
The Secretary of Finance, Eduardo Romualdez appointed Jose Gloria to
assume the duties of Assistance City Treasurer. Mayor Antonio Villegas objected this
on the ground that Romualdez had no authority to make that designation. After a
few months the said mayor appointed Manuel Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer
which Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, disapproved by reason of
Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code and not Section 4 of the
Decentralization Law.
The appellants filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus
with application for writ of preliminary injunction with the aim of a decision
declaring void and illegal the designation made by Romualdez and that the writ of
mandamus be issued to Subido to order him to approve the appointment of Lapid.
The court dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Villegas has authority to revoke Glorias position and
appoint Lapid by reason of the implied repeal.
Decision:
Such claim is contrary of the well settled doctrine that implied repeals are not
favored. However, even if such is, Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, which they
are asserting, states that all other employees, except teachers, paid out of
provincial, city or municipal general funds, and other funds shall, subject to civil
service law rules and regulations, be appointed by the provincial governor, city of
municipal mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned, but the
Assistant City Treasurer is not an employee, but an officer according to the Revised
Administrative Code, hence, such position is still excluded from appointment. In
addition, had the court favored the petitioners, the court in effect would be acting
as a legislator because such decision would mean that the Decentralization Act
would repeal the current ordained city charter. Only the legislature may manifest
such intention as it is only for the court to interpret laws and not create nor revive
them.