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Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Shahram Chubin

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Washington, D.C.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data
Chubin, Shahram.
Iran's nuclear ambitions / Shahram Chubin.
p. cm.
Summary: “Iranian-born Shahram Chubin narrates the recent history of Iran's nuclear
program and diplomacy, and argues that the central problem is not nuclear technology
but rather Iran's behavior as a revolutionary state with ambitions that collide with the
interests of its neighbors and the West”—Provided by publisher.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-230-1 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-87003-230-5 (pbk.)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-231-8 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-87003-231-3 (cloth)
1. Nuclear weapons—Iran. 2. Iran—Military policy. 3. Nuclear arms control—Iran.
I. Title.

UA853.I7C497 2006
355.02'170955–dc22 2006018183

11 10 09 08 07 06 12345 1st Printing 2006

*ch0 .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page iii For Nasrin and Nanaz .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3 Fear of a Nuclear Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Acronyms . . . 44 4 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2 Nuclear Energy Rationale. . . . 1 1 The View from Tehran . . . . . . . . . . Domestic Politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page v Contents Foreword by Jessica T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 v . . . and Decision Making . . . . . Mathews . 64 5 The International Response . . . . . . . . . . .*ch0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii Iranian Nuclear Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 6 Iran and Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .223 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page vi vi | Contents Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*ch0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . .

would be exposed as unwilling or unable to enforce vital global rules.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page vii Foreword ran’s nuclear program looms ever larger among international IIsrael. UN Security Council demands to come back into compliance with its non-pro- liferation obligations. While Iranian leaders insist their intentions are entirely peace- ful. perhaps.*ch0 . blackmail smaller neighboring states. Were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. The world would appear ever more disordered. Moreover. threats. especially in countries with large Shiite minorities. the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime would be gravely undermined. it could menace whose existence Iran does not recognize. if Iran were to succeed in continuing to defy IAEA and. The international commu- nity. A nuclear Iran could be emboldened to foment political unrest throughout the Middle East. These violations and ongoing Iranian resistance to transparency measures demanded by vii . three years of intensive investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (chronicled in twelve agency reports) have failed to resolve the issues arising from nearly two decades of Ira- nian violations of its safeguard commitments. particularly the UN Security Council. and possibly deter the United States from ful- filling security guarantees to regional states or projecting power throughout the Persian Gulf.

militant nationalism and revo- lutionary defiance. united in resisting foreign dictation. Decision making works by elite consensus in Iran but the elite is not monolithic—it is as segmented as the rest of the society. In fusing two features of contemporary Iran. claiming pop- ular support. opinions differ on the manner in which the technology has been pursued and the wisdom of confronting the international community and defying the Security Council. Iranians are fiercely independent and proudly nationalistic. Ahmadinejad reduces Iran’s room for maneuver and makes a difficult issue more intractable. they are divided on the conditions under which they would give up the drive for fuel cycle capabilities that would give Iran a nuclear weapon option. Iran remains a country of unique complexity and contra- dictions. But they are not as one in believing that the nuclear issue is the most important issue for the country— most citizens have other priorities. the domestic factors that determine who makes decisions in Iran and why have largely been ignored in the West. Shahram Chubin’s analysis is the most trenchant English- language treatment to date of how Iran’s domestic dynamics. Subterranean tensions within Iran have intensified since the June 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. That is.” non-revolutionary state. His brand of revolutionary rhetoric and hypernationalism combined with calls for more social justice resonated with a neglected constituency in the country. . to seek a “grand bargain. but also suffering legitimacy and economic problems. The elite are divided more broadly on their willingness to engage the United States.*ch0 . It has a quasi-representative government. While the international implications of Iran’s nuclear activities have been widely analyzed. A pop- ulist and fundamentalist.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page viii viii | Foreword the IAEA’s board of governors heighten fears that Iran does seek the capability to build nuclear weapons.” and to embrace globaliza- tion and act as a “normal. Ahmadinejad harked back to the original principles of the revolution. While its members believe Iran should develop nuclear technology as other major powers do.

and worldview shape the country’s decision mak- ing regarding nuclear technology. Chubin adeptly describes the ambivalence of Western policy that. in the sense of evolu- tionary change driven by domestic forces. and regime change on the other. The countries negotiating with Iran cannot find the proper mix of isolation and cooperation. Opening up Iran by embracing it. sanctions.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page ix Foreword | ix regional interests. Understanding this proposition suggests a substantial broadening of Western policy concerns.” constructive engagement. pressure and reward. . The result is a uniquely well-rounded treatment of the Iranian nuclear challenge. will liberate pent-up dynamics for change. on one side. Focusing on the Iranian people and their welfare and human rights is therefore an important ingredient of a successful non-prolifera- tion policy. Chubin argues that the distinction between engaging with Iran and seeking to change its government is false and therefore part of the problem. he argues. and containment. and inducement. while the United States must show that it is genuinely prepared to establish positive rela- tions with the constitutional government of Iran. Germany. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions integrates this comprehensive analysis with an assessment of the international community’s attempts to bring Iran into compliance with its non- proliferation obligations. In his view. reflecting differences between the United States and France. preferring embattlement and isolation in order to keep their hold on power. the Euro- pean states and Russia and China must demonstrate a greater willingness to exert stringent political and economic pressure on Iran in cooperation with the United States. It is this element that the Iranian elite fears and resists. has been torn between promot- ing “critical dialogue. and the United Kingdom. engagement is not an alternative to regime change but a precursor and stimulant to it.*ch0 . To achieve such a balance. if they do not take into account the divisions within Iran and the divergent interests they reflect. He argues forcefully that Iran will be unmoved as long as the international community does not employ a more balanced policy that both neutralizes Iran’s threat and provides incentives for evo- lution and accommodation.

Jessica T. At the same time. contemporary analysis. Iran will not be bul- lied into submitting to policies that do not fit the country’s history. journalists. self-image.*ch0 . Mathews President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . and policy prescription. and interests. scholars. and students can acquire deeper under- standing and better ideas for addressing the interests of the Iranian people as well as the international community.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page x x | Foreword This work is a welcome new baseline from which policy mak- ers. It is a model blend of historical knowledge. the international com- munity’s legitimate interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is enormous and must be vigorously—and intelligently—pursued. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions offers insights into how this can be done.

and Gary Samore. Bob Ein- horn. who improved the draft with suggestions to make it more readable and guided it to publi- cation. None is responsible for any errors or shortcomings.*ch0 . For their encouragement I would especially single out Geoff Kemp. Thérèse Delpech. To all of the above. Scott Sagan.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xi Acknowledgments am indebted to many colleagues for discussions on this issue over ITony the past years. I express my appreciation for making a difficult job more bearable. Finally. facilitating the completion of the book. The team at Carnegie who edited and tightened the manuscript also have helped the author immeasurably. I am grateful to Paul Clark and especially to Katya Shadrina. I am grateful to George Perkovich. who have helped with indispensable research assis- tance. Harald Muller. They are too numerous to mention but include Cordesman. Paul Stares. which he has made possible. and Pal Sidhu. Joseph Cirincione. xi . Rob Litwak. Vladimir Orlov. Ariel Levite. John Simpson.

and Russia (also known as the G7+1). France. and Ger- many FAS Federation of Atomic Scientists G-8 Grouping of top industrialized nations of the world: United States.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xii Acronyms AP Additional Protocol AEO Atomic Energy Organization of Iran EU European Union EU-3 Grouping consisting of Great Britain. Japan. Canada. France. Germany. Italy. GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GPS Global positioning system IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ILSA Iran and Libya Sanctions Act IRI Islamic Republic of Iran IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (or Pasdaran) IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies MOK Mujahideen i-Khalq.*ch0 . Iranian opposition group NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFZ Nuclear-free zone NMD National Missile Defense NNWS Non-nuclear-weapons-state xii . UK.

*ch0 . derived from the German World War II V-2 rocket SNSC Supreme National Security Council UCF Uranium Conversion Facility UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission WMD Weapons of mass destruction WMDFZ Weapons of mass destruction free zone WTO World Trade Organization .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xiii Acronyms | xiii NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NW Nuclear weapon NWS Nuclear weapons state P-5 Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council PSI Proliferation Security Initiative SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq SCUD Ballistic missile.

S. objections.*ch0 . September 1 Russian technicians start construction of nuclear reactor at Bushire. Iran notifies the IAEA that it is building new facilities as a step toward developing a nuclear fuel cycle.S. 2003 January 10 North Korea withdraws from the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). December 18 Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami states that “Iran is work- ing under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher con- cludes that Iran is “actively working to develop nuclear- weapons capability. amid strong U. xiv .” reject- ing U.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xiv Iranian Nuclear Chronology 2002 August 14 Alireza Jafarzadeh of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reveals to IAEA that Tehran not only possesses its declared nuclear power plant at Bushire but also two undis- closed nuclear facilities: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. December 13 U.” releasing satellite images of sites at Natanz and Arak. allegations of Iran aspiring to develop a nuclear weapons capability.S. and Iran is a signatory to the [nuclear] Non- proliferation Treaty and does not seek nuclear arms.

*ch0 .” although it stops short of referring Iran to the UN Security Council. April 24 Al Baradei urges Iran to sign Additional Protocol allowing inspections of undeclared suspected nuclear sites. Khatami asks: “Why do countries possessing such [civilian atomic energy] technology not respect the principles of the non- proliferation treaty by not helping us acquire it?” June 6 IAEA issues report to thirty-five member countries on nuclear safeguards in Iran. despite agreement for Russia to provide all necessary uranium fuel for lifetime of Bushire reactor. IAEA report mentions several finds of highly enriched uranium in Iranian centrifuges at various sites. in preparation for the IAEA Board of Gov- ernors meeting in Vienna. the subsequent processing and use of the material and the declaration of facilities where the mate- rial was stored and processed. Al Baradei reports being “taken aback” by the advanced state of Iran’s program. suggests it must have acquired contaminated centrifuge components . Iran agrees to discuss additional protocols in future negotiations. March 11 Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) Deputy Director Assadollah Saburi announces Iran’s opposition to signing Additional Protocols to the NPT that would allow unan- nounced inspections due to already imposed sanctions. March 20 U. February 25 IAEA Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei inspects Natanz and Arak. Secretary of State Colin Powell warns Congress to be prepared for a “fairly long-term commitment” in Iraq. with ambitions for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xv Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xv February 9 President Khatami announces Iran’s intent to exploit uranium mines in Savand region. February 13 U. although admitting to uranium conversion experiments in the 1990s. Plants are to be set up at Isfahan and Kashan for this purpose. following several postponements of such a visit by the Iranians.S. invasion of Iraq commences. IAEA requires Iran to produce a report divulging all nuclear and nuclear-related capabilities and technology with a complete chronology. Iran.S. A readiness to sign if sanctions are dropped is expressed. June 19 IAEA reports that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the report- ing of nuclear material. Inspection team detects breach of NPT. describing breaches of NPT on several accounts by Iran. Iran issues a report about construc- tion of a heavy water production plant at Arak.

*ch0 . September 12 IAEA resolution calls for Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA investigations. October 10 Hasan Rowhani is officially appointed as head of Iranian nuclear “dossier. Great Britain. albeit temporarily. which is welcomed by the IAEA. He adds that the program was “not in question and never has been.” Resolution includes trigger mechanism for immediate IAEA meeting if “any further serious Iranian failures come to light. . allowing for unannounced inspections. November 26 IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted “strongly deploring Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement.” December 18 Iran signs the Additional Protocol to NPT. although its par- liament needs to ratify the protocol before it enters into legal force. United States disagrees. Secre- tary General of Iran’s Supreme National Secretary Council.” as well as sign and ratify addi- tional protocols (known as Tehran agreement).. Iran also agrees to “address and resolve . nor will be. Secretary of State Colin Powell is “very satisfied” with the resolution. call- ing IAEA conclusion “impossible to believe. there is no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program follow- ing Iranian nuclear confessions. transparency. November 10 IAEA report issued suggesting that despite clear breaches to its obligations according to the safeguard agreements. and Germany (EU-3) broker deal with Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. sparking new investigations into Iran’s foreign connections.” October 21 France. and cessation of uranium enrich- ment–related activities by October 31.S. according to Hasan Rowhani.” U.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xvi xvi | Iranian Nuclear Chronology from abroad. United States announces that this resolution is Iran’s last chance before referral to UN Security Council.. all requirements and outstanding [IAEA] issues. November 29 Iran has “voluntarily and temporarily” suspended uranium enrichment program.” November 21 Iran proposes signing the Additional Protocol to the NPT.

August 17 U.” September 20 IAEA requests suspension of Iranian uranium enrichment program at the IAEA’s 48th General Conference. February 24 Al Baradei issues report noting Iran’s continuing failure to resolve IAEA’s concerns about its nuclear program.S. urging a more forthcoming approach by Iran. Iran would decide on whether to resume its uranium enrichment pro- gram. He accuses the EU-3 of violating the October 2003 agreement. clarifies that Iranian advances toward nuclear fuel cycle technology were an attempt to overcome U. sanctions. April 6 Al Baradei and Iran agree on joint plan to resolve IAEA con- cerns by disclosing information about its centrifuge program by the end of April. June 18 IAEA resolution adopted condemning Iran’s failure to comply with inspectors. . following AQ Kahn admissions about proliferation ring on February 4. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman.*ch0 .” by the end of 2005 at the latest. June 24 Iran informs the EU-3 of its intention to resume its uranium enrichment program. Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Hasan Rowhani responds by informing the IAEA that in the following days.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xvii Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xvii 2004 February 12 Previously undisclosed centrifuge designs found by IAEA.S. Pakistan suspected of providing both centrifuge and nuclear weapon designs to Iran. May 10 Nuclear site at Lavizan that was under investigation by the IAEA is destroyed by Tehran. March 9 NCRI’s former spokesman Alireza Jafarzadeh alleges that Ira- nian leaders have recently ruled on acquiring nuclear weapons “at all costs. August 31 Iranian Information Minister Ali Younesi announces the arrest of several Mujahideen i-Khalq (MOK) members for “transfer- ring Iran’s nuclear information (out of the country). effectively canceling the October 2003 agreement. Under Secretary of State John Bolton claims that Iran admitted to the EU-3 that it was able to enrich enough ura- nium within a year to produce a nuclear weapon. ensuring self- sufficiency. He adds that Iran is in favor of banning WMDs. March 13 Iran bans inspectors in protest of IAEA resolution condemn- ing Iranian failure to disclose all its nuclear activities. February 13 Hamid Reza Asefi.

August 2 President Khatami steps down. February 10 North Korea admits to having nuclear weapons. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elected to succeed him. February 9 According to President Khatami. regardless of European proposals.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xviii xviii | Iranian Nuclear Chronology November 15 Iran agrees to the “Paris agreement. Iran is warned of being referred to the Security Council if this occurs. Visit limited to one of four areas identified to be of interest. pending Iranian intentions of recommencing uranium pro- cessing at Isfahan. 2005 January 6 Iran agrees to allow IAEA visit to Parchin military site. May 24 EU-3 officials meet with Iranian counterparts in Geneva. August 3 Official U. Iranians agree to suspend ura- nium processing in lieu of new European proposal due at the end of July. March 1 Al Baradei expresses concern about Iran not fully cooperat- ing with inspections.S. block on Iranian World Trade Organization membership as an incentive for Iran to comply. . follow- ing transparency issues. offering to lift U.*ch0 . although highlights that no new evi- dence of illicit activities has come forth. July 26 President Khatami issues statement declaring Iran’s intent to resume part of its nuclear fuel cycle program. Iran is reported to still be in compliance with the Paris agreement. Iran will never give up its rights to peaceful nuclear technology. According to Hasan Rowhani. April 30 President Khatami states that a complete halt of uranium enrichment is unacceptable. this is done “to improve relations with the West.S.” suspending uranium enrichment and related activities following talks with the EU- 3. study puts Iranian nuclear capability a decade away. although he is willing to nego- tiate or compromise. March 12 Bush backs EU negotiations with Iran.” Al Baradei reports to the IAEA that all known Iranian nuclear material has been accounted for but added that the IAEA cannot rule out any undeclared material.

September 15 President Ahmadinejad reaffirms Iran’s right to nuclear energy at a speech held at the UN 60th Session. September 24 IAEA resolution warning Iran of referral to the UN Security Council. Agency reiterates it cannot be sure there are no undeclared sites. Europe cancels further negotiations. September 25 Iran rejects IAEA resolution. . September 20 North Korea agrees to give up its “existing nuclear weapons” and return to the NPT after talks with the United States.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xix Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xix August 5 Europe proposes economic and political cooperation if Tehran relinquishes nuclear fuel aspirations. given technical problems. stating it does not meet Iran’s minimum expectations. reestablish suspension of enrichment-related activ- ity. August 27 Larijani states that Iran respects its commitment to the NPT. and reconsider heavy water research reactor. September 2 IAEA Board of Governors reports progress over Iranian nuclear issue but calls for improved transparency and coop- eration from Iran. The United States dismisses this report. October 26 Iranian President Ahmadinejad declares in a speech that Israel should be “wiped off the map. September 6 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) dossier on Iran estimates Iran is several years away from a nuclear capa- bility. North Korea announces plans to commence a peaceful nuclear energy program. August 8 Isfahan facility resumes uranium processing. August 15 President Ahmadinejad appoints Ali Larijani to replace Hasan Rowhani as head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Coun- cil. October 13 Iran agrees to resume talks with EU-3. not Iranian activities. unless measures are taken to increase transparency measure. August 11 IAEA adopts resolution expressing concern over Iran’s August 1 notification to the IAEA of resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan.” November 24 IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting addresses verification of Iran’s nuclear program. August 6 Iran rejects European proposal. August 23 Independent research reveals that weapons-grade uranium found mid-2003 was due to contaminated equipment from Pakistan.*ch0 .

March 8 IAEA submits report on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. Russia. March 1 Negotiations on Russian proposal begin in Moscow.S. February 9 U. calling for IAEA Director-General to refer Iran to the UN Security Coun- cil with a 27 to 3 majority (5 abstentions). January 10 Iran removes IAEA seals at enrichment sites. February 17 Iranian foreign minister calls for the United Kingdom to leave Iraq. February 2 IAEA Board of Governors meets to consider a draft resolution calling for Iran to be referred to the Security Council (sup- ported by EU-3. . January 16 P-5 (permanent five members of the UN Security Council) meets in London to discuss the Iranian nuclear crisis. February 4 Resolution adopted by IAEA Board of Governors. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accuses Iran and Syria of inciting violence over the Mohammad cartoon con- troversy.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xx xx | Iranian Nuclear Chronology 2006 January 3 Iran informs IAEA of its intent to resume research and devel- opment of peaceful nuclear technology. and the United States). January 18 IAEA decides to hold a special meeting on Iran on February 2. January 25 Hamas wins Palestinian parliamentary election. China.*ch0 .

the relationship between terrorism and proliferation—and rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—has become the foremost security issue. view 1 . Important as it is to keep the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) intact. In the U. or is striving to improve its posi- tion within the system. Iran’s drive for specific nuclear technology that could be used for weapons purposes raises a number of questions for the interna- tional community. accused of sponsoring terrorism and located in a sensitive geopolitical zone that has seen three wars in the past decade and a half. it is not clear whether the government Isystem of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) still rejects the international and seeks to overturn it. This question is posed starkly with respect to Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability.*ch0 . 2001. The stakes are compounded because since September 11. it appears doubly so when faced by the threat of a revolutionary Iran seeking a nuclear capability. The Middle East in particular and the global order more generally are thus challenged by Iran’s quest for nuclear status. Given the nature of the Iranian regime and its past behavior.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 1 Introduction n its twenty-seventh year.S. Iran’s nuclear aspirations appear incompatible with the maintenance of the current regional system. The more specific issues relate to Iran’s particu- lar case as a revolutionary state.

and regime change. In the 1990s non-proliferation and its link to rogue states had been identified as a priority in the post–Cold War era. The United States’ dark view of the world. North Korea and Pakistan had .introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 2 2 | Introduction at least. the U. These states. response has been forward defense.S. In this view. the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq attest to the fact that pro- liferation. was followed by a determination to prepare against any future surprise. strategic prior- ities. These same states sponsored terrorism as well. The broader issues include the possible breakdown of the non- proliferation regime through further proliferation and recognition that the NPT may allow a state to get perilously close to acquiring nuclear weapons. and the role of rogue states constitute threats that must be dealt with urgently and firmly. were now clearly assimilated into the War on Terror- ism. terrorism. preemption. but at this juncture terror- ism was still seen as largely a law enforcement issue rather than a priority—a nuisance rather than a strategic threat. the “nexus of extremism and technology” suggests massive-scale danger from actors that may not be deterrable. based on the trauma of 9/11. but the possibility that it might be married to WMD elevated it to a priority consistent with the risks it posed as an existential threat.S. Now the outlaw states became potential enablers of terrorist groups and potential suppli- ers of WMD to those who sought to inflict the maximum destruc- tion on the United States. ter- rorism was transformed into a major threat. After 9/11. It soon became apparent that the rogue states had indeed coop- erated in the area of WMD.*ch0 . Global Context The 9/11 attacks on the United States changed U. dubbed the “axis of evil” in January 2002. Particularly in the Middle East. The need to plug gaps in the treaty and to strengthen enforcement poses enormous political problems in the international system.

As the military threat has passed. Pakistan had provided.5 In dealing actively with the proliferation threat posed by Iraq in 2003.1 What was referred to as a “nuclear Wal-Mart” reflected the global diffusion of technology and the porousness of borders in a globalized world. Buttressed by record oil rev- enues and leverage afforded it by a tight oil market. In Iraq it has become a clear influence. The United States reacted by hardening its policy.4 Therefore. at best. technology and weapons designs to Libya and Iran. and in the IAEA it has used the nonaligned states’ sympathy to slip out of . Iran has challenged the United States’ creation of a new regional order. collective) responses. albeit unofficially through the AQ Khan network. while the threat posed by nuclear proliferation has increased because of its possible link with terrorism and because of the diffusion of technologies and knowledge. The regional context has therefore improved for Iran since 2003. the political context has become less conducive to effective and legitimate (that is. Iran has acted more confidently. whether motivated by profit or ideology. could further proliferation unconstrained by the legal instruments that had been devised for states. the United States has gone from a high point of regional power to a position in which its credibility is damaged and it is embroiled in an internal conflict whose outcome looks.2 Now nonstate actors. Iran has played on these divisions to cover its programs.3 This move away from a rules-based global order underlies the deeper crisis of legitimacy the NPT regime faces. North Korea and Iran had cooperated in the devel- opment of missile and possibly nuclear technology as well. The United States thus moved away from the reciprocal obligation that had been the core of the WMD order in the Cold War era toward a hegemonic order based on coercion rather than consensus.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 3 Introduction | 3 exchanged expertise on nuclear and missile technology and weapons plans. It saw no need to get permission from others to see to its own defense or to require weak and elusive multilateral consensus in order to act.*ch0 . And it is this current malaise that has led to the invocation of the image of a cascade of proliferation if current trends persist. unsure.

with incomplete results. Iran also encour- . Assuming that Iran’s technical capabilities remain limited in the next five years. confident in its ability to deflect or manage a referral to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Iran has sought to minimize its exposure to concerted international pressure. and gearing its acts to limited measures insufficient to justify a major punitive response. France. insistence on referral to the Security Council (without a strategy once there). Washington has an attitude rather than a considered. if selectively. The United States has yet to adopt a formal policy toward Iran. and Ger- many) negotiations. The United States and the EU-3 seek to constrain Iran’s access to this technology or to induce it to forgo it in exchange for privileged access to less sensitive technol- ogy. Negotiations have focused on what would constitute reassurance for the West and still enable Iran to access the technology. cooperating with the IAEA. Iran has sought to appeal to the developing states by depicting pressures on it as discriminatory and a denial of its rights under the NPT.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 4 4 | Introduction constraints imposed by the EU-3 (Great Britain. and Iran refuses to relinquish it. which would put it within months (if not days) of a weapons capability. measured policy. Negotiations have revolved around this issue. the issue will remain whether Iran will persist in its attempt to acquire a nuclear capability by stages. By for- mally. Since August 2005 Tehran has moved to con- solidate its mastery of the fuel cycle.*ch0 . the West has concluded that it cannot give Iran the ben- efit of the doubt. Despite concern about terrorism and non-proliferation and ful- minations about the nature of the regime in Tehran. Given Iran’s past record of nondeclaration of activities and dissimulation and the accompanying distrust of Iran’s intentions. Luke- warm support for European diplomacy. But Iran insists on full fuel cycle autonomy. and brandish- ing a military option (but refusing direct involvement) does not amount to a policy. avoiding major provocations. The key issue concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions is Tehran’s quest for the full fuel cycle. The basic issue is one of trust: The West does not trust Iran with the technology.

introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 5 Introduction | 5 ages and cultivates divisions among the major powers to continue on its course. Without diversion and “with- out plainly violating their agreement. Afghanistan. The difficulty posed by states seeking technology that brings them close to a bomb is not simply one of evil outlaw states.. distraction (Iraq. its threats to react strongly if the matter is referred to the Security Council have raised the stakes considerably.” states “can come within hours of a bomb.. either secretly or with explanations that cannot withstand scrutiny. terrorism. We must . The spread of nuclear tech- nology. energy prices. and second. and elections) and EU divisions and preoccupations (elections. such as Iran. It remains unclear what cost the major powers are willing to impose on a suspect proliferant and what price that state. can bring states close to a weapons capability. immigration and economies. Hurricane Katrina.”7 This sentiment was echoed by U. Tehran counts on U. officials in the 2005 NPT review conference with specific reference to Iran: “Some countries. We dare not look the other way. legitimate and even encouraged by NPT rules.*ch0 . is that the technologies are essentially the same. it believes that the out- come of such a referral is uncertain.S. By demonstrating division the Security Council would signal its impotence but a united council might only be possible by showing a different form of weakness— watering down its demands. Iran. as Albert Wohlstetter remarked in the 1970s. The NPT was always Janus-faced. are seeking these facilities (uranium enrichment or plutonium repro- cessing plants).”6 It is no wonder that thirty years later President Bush can remark that “we must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under cover of civilian nuclear programs. Iran expects the incentives for referral to the Security Council to be reduced for two reasons: first. at once promoting nuclear technol- ogy (Article IV) and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. EU referenda) to derail any momentum for sanctions. is willing to pay to get close to a nuclear weapons capability.S. The problem. In the absence of a smoking gun and its expressions of willingness to negotiate..

of negotiating style and tactics. Iran’s achievement of a nuclear capability would increase its confidence and reinforce its tendency to block Western initiatives and seek a more prominent regional role. Iran’s ambiguous quest for nuclear technology thus unfolds at a time and place of great sensitivity. who is included and who excluded. and adopting the language of a victimized non-nuclear-weapons- state simply seeking its due under Article IV of the treaty—Iran tests both the treaty and its supporters. not least in light of the discontent with the treaty on the part of many non-nuclear-weapons states. how it is going about it. The purpose of this study is first to assess the motivations driv- ing Iran toward a nuclear capability all but indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. what its motivations are.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 6 6 | Introduction close the loopholes in the Treaty that allow the unnecessary spread of such technologies. I assume this issue will not be neatly solved in the near future and . for example.”8 The problem is that tightening the treaty without renegotiating it will be difficult. A policy to deal with Iran’s specific motives and circumstances should not entail rewarding proliferation or derogating from the provisions of the NPT. and on what criteria?9 The problem is compounded by the possibility of future energy crises and environ- mental concerns about global warming. If ad hoc approaches are taken. and what it hopes to achieve. there is the issue of drawing the line: Who is to decide where the line on such technologies is drawn. using diplomacy. Necessarily the study is based on analysis and inference involving a discussion. Increased interest in nuclear power would make controlling technologies more controversial politically. devising an effective policy requires understanding Iran’s ambitions and perspectives.*ch0 . which may indicate the revival of nuclear power. as well as analyze international responses. However. I discuss reasons why this should be of concern for the international community and assess Iran’s tactics in the cur- rent negotiations and its intentions. By seeking this technology— while claiming formal adherence to the treaty. I am principally concerned with what Iran is doing.

however. It is now known that already in the 1980s Iran had been in contact with the AQ Khan network to give its sputtering program new impetus. When Germany. Reliance on Soviet and later Chinese assistance became features of Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s.*ch0 . when reformists were in office in Iran. The untested idea was to try to marry Soviet technol- ogy and nuclear core to the existing German-built foundations. The program hitherto had therefore been characterized by persistence and incrementalism. and extensive war and reconstruction expenses. Despite the fact that the unfin- ished Bushire reactor had been abandoned by German technicians and bombed by Iraq. whatever new developments may occur in the next few years. Tehran sought to revive the project. when the nuclear effort was intensified. and tactics will continue to be essential. declined to resume construction and finish the project. and when the Clinton administration was making overtures for normalization to Tehran. especially with regard to self-reliance and pre- . This changed after 1999. Iran turned to the Soviet Union. at the behest of the United States. Setting the Stage: The Background to Iran’s Nuclear Program After explicitly targeting and criticizing the Shah’s nuclear program as an example of the monarchy’s corrupt taste for megaprojects. With declining oil income (in real terms after 1986).introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 7 Introduction | 7 that a good understanding of motivations. The argu- ment for this at that time was based on the costs already sunk in the project. the Islamic Republic of Iran rediscovered an interest in nuclear power in the midst of the Iran–Iraq war (1986). with the stated rationale of energy self-sufficiency.10 The accelerated drive came at a time when Iraq was tightly contained. arguments. By this time Iran had articulated a new and ambitious long-term program for nuclear power plants. Iran could not give the program the highest priority. a rapidly increasing population. Iran’s view of nuclear weapons was influenced by the lessons of its war with Iraq.

introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 8 8 | Introduction paredness (hedging against surprise). which included constraints on its . Tehran sought an accommodation with the EU-3. Put on the defensive by these revelations (occurring when the United States was planning the Iraq war). In the 1990s. efforts to halt the transfer of tech- nology to Iran’s allegedly civil nuclear program met with only mixed receptivity in Moscow and Beijing. whose economic rationale was debatable and whose value for producing nuclear weapons was great.S. Nothing in the Security Council response to that crisis suggested inordinate risks associated with developing nuclear weapons or any inevitability about a united front in that chamber. Iran’s nuclear program was initially influenced by security issues. U. This brief synopsis of Iran’s nuclear program suggests the follow- ing. accusations about its nuclear program stemmed from a bilateral feud with Tehran appeared plausible to some. which showed that Iran had built undeclared fuel cycle facilities. a point around which to rally nationalist opinion and to legitimate the regime. Close observation of the international reaction to the North Korean case in 1994 yielded yet another lesson. Throughout the 1990s Iran’s insistence that U. as the Islamic revolution lost its luster for its supporters at home and abroad. The con- tinuing impulse for that program stemmed from a prudent though vague desire to hedge against an uncertain future.S. which evolved from insurance against Iraq to energy indepen- dence and from regional status to deterrence against the United States. well before Iran’s program took off.*ch0 . Reactivated in the midst of war under adverse conditions. And along the way it picked up domestic interest groups. Iran accelerated its nuclear program in 1999. the nuclear option appeared to offer a way out. But Saddam Hussein’s nuclear threat had essentially been eliminated or contained by 1991. In a sense the nuclear program was in search of a ration- ale. The undeclared drive for enrichment or a nuclear capability or option within the treaty was upset by the revelations of mid-2002. Iran had sought to create a fait accompli on the Korean model but was derailed by the public revelations of its undeclared activities in mid-2002.

In the two years between September 2003 and August 2005. Revelations of Iran’s activities saw the IAEA ener- gized and its Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei visit Tehran in February 2003. Under pressure and the threat of refer- ral (and possible U. Iran cooperated with the agency but remained adamant about resuming enrichment and maintain- ing opacity about some aspects of its program. Iran accepted an agreement with the EU-3 in Tehran.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 9 Introduction | 9 activities. The sketch that follows underscores the negotiations’ principal stages and results (see chronology for a complete list of key events in the timeline). Iran acted as if it were a victim rather than a state found in flagrant dereliction of its commitments. It took two years before Tehran regained its confidence to break free from the constraints it had accepted in September 2003. Iran’s negotiations with the EU-3 (and through them the international community and IAEA) proved counterproductive. In return. Iran was told to suspend all further enrichment activities and to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol (AP) for enhanced inspections. Inspections followed. Intended to find a balance between the necessity of reassuring others of the peaceful nature of its activities and its ambitions for a nuclear program. the negotia- tions succeeded only in exacerbating suspicions. In June 2005 Iran served notice of its intention to resume . When Iran sought to define its rights to include enrichment-related activities deemed suspended by its negotiating partners. suspending enrichment (for the duration of negotiations) and signing and implementing the AP. The additional distrust created by the negotiations themselves were a result of Iran’s negotiating style and tactics.*ch0 . which closed any loopholes about enrichment-related activities. Tehran sought to have its relations with the agency normalized and its nuclear file speedily dropped.S. the Tehran agreement of September 2003 was followed by the Paris agreement of Novem- ber 2004. In September the IAEA’s Board of Governors called on Iran to ensure full compliance with the safeguard agreement by taking all necessary acts by the end of October 2003. Iran thus moved away from reassuring the international community on its program to a defiant assertion of its rights. military action).

the focus on Iran’s nuclear capabilities should not obscure the primary concern: Iran’s regional policies.*ch0 . less aggressive toward Israel. Iranian Challenge An Iranian nuclear capability is primarily an issue about Iran and the Middle East regional order. The conjunction of a nuclear-capable Iran and a weakened. disintegrating Iraq under Iranian influence would com- pound the problem. destabilizing competitor in a sensitive geopolitical area.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 10 10 | Introduction conversion activities. This study argues that it is not Iran’s acqui- sition of sensitive technologies per se that is of special concern. The nature of the regime in Iran and its behavior animate special concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.11 . Moreover. a secular democratic one. A different regime. Shrugging off progressively stronger resolutions from the IAEA threatening referral to the UNSC in the autumn. the new Iranian government adopted a more belligerent tone. would be the object of less concern. notwithstanding the enormous impact on the NPT regime. Therefore. would not be perceived the same way as Tehran is today. A different Iran. dramatically destabilizing the region. power and Western influence in the Middle East. and less bent on cre- ating a different regional order would certainly be less threatening. A nuclear Iran would be a dangerous. but the nature of the regime in Tehran and its behavior and orien- tation that give the threat a world-historical dimension. A nuclear capability would also be an immediate guarantee against forcible regime change. A nuclear capability would give Iran the confidence to obstruct and challenge U. It rejected a broad incentives package pro- posed by the European states and resumed its activities in August of that year. or an Iran pursuing more moderate goals in the region. even if it were pursuing the same nuclear capabilities.S. An Iran less hos- tile to the West. Iran resumed enrichment research in January 2006. The agency decided to refer Iran’s case to the Security Council in March 2006. where it is now being considered.

and Indian interest and indulgence in respect to some of its ambitions (though not necessarily to its preferred spoiler role). the motives for investing in a nuclear option stem more from political than security imperatives. and countering its regional initiatives are thus much harder than in the case of countries like North Korea (or Libya). which suits its particular brand of assertive defiance and opportunism. Blocking Iran’s access to technology. assuming the absence of a large-scale clandestine program. thus generalizing its case and strengthening its diplomacy. This is important in practical terms because . The program has been marked by persistence and incre- mentalism. While the security rationale has been shifting. Tehran sees the extension of its influence as an integral part of the regime’s legitimacy.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 11 Introduction | 11 This means that the discussion regarding Iran’s nuclear ambi- tions is at times a discussion of the nature of the Iranian regime and raises the question of whether that regime is likely either to be replaced soon or to change its behavior to an appreciable extent. It is thus obliged to pursue its goals alone. Iran has invested in its nuclear infrastructure for nearly two decades.12 Iran seeks technology related to nuclear weapons and. mobilizing diplo- matic coalitions for sanctions. Iran is not without potential assets. Iran’s size and weight make it a more formidable rival than other states identified as pro- liferants. As the absence of a crash program would suggest. Iran is without a significant strategic partner or dependable ally. Tehran can rely on Russian. Chinese. still has not made a definitive or irreversible decision to acquire nuclear weapons as opposed to an option. even if its aims have been unclear. the political motive has remained unvarying and fixed. but in extremis it has no hes- itancy in tempering its ambitions (as in 2002–2003). The impulse behind the pro- gram has been persistent. by determination rather than urgency. Iran uses discontent with the NPT and anti-Americanism in the Middle East to pursue its goals.*ch0 . And as a major oil and gas supplier located at the cross- roads of the Caspian and the Persian Gulf and the Arab and Asian subcontinent. Iran has not yet had to choose between regime maintenance and its regional policies.

Disentangling fact from claim and argument from artifice is not easy. It is easier to argue that Iran seeks a capability than to assert that this decision has been made definitively. Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability (for “nonweaponized deter- rence”) can be understood by reference to certain key goals: a deter- rent (regime maintenance). The Iranians see it—and the issue of trust and confidence—as a two-way street of reciprocity and respect. experiences. equality. an instrument for regional influence. It is also diffi- cult to be sure whether the nuclear program has become self- sufficient. dependence on foreign suppliers. while intentions are harder to assess. the nuclear issue is one of symbolism. Finally it is difficult to be certain whether the decision has been made to acquire nuclear weapons or an “option” short of that. together with what have become enshrined as semisacrosanct “principles of the revolution. and what time frame this implies. and so on. The nuclear question is particu- larly notable for raising all of these issues in terms of access to tech- nology.” inform its nuclear policy as well as its public discourse: independence. Above all. equality of treatment. no matter what the cost. The argument presented here is that while . There is thus still time for an effective international reaction before Iran reaches the techno- logical point of no return of self-sufficiency in its nuclear program.*ch0 . and nondiscrimination. a nationalist card for regime legitimation. reflect- ing Iran’s coming of age as an important power. The lessons it learned from that hard and bitter war. whether there exist significant clandestine facilities. and a bargaining card. Grappling with Iran’s aims needs a reconstruction of motives. and worldviews. Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability by stealth is not surprising in a region where transparency is not a part of the culture and where opacity and dissimulation are the norm.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 12 12 | Introduction it signals that Iran seeks to stay within the treaty—as much for the technical cooperation it needs as for the vindication of its image as a respectable (as opposed to rogue) state. The formative experience of the IRI with international politics was in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic Republic when it was challenged by Iraq.

*ch0 . Iran’s relations with the IAEA and negotiations with the EU-3 since the 2003–2005 period can be characterized as defensive and thereafter as self-confident and assertive. . However.” with no irreversible decisions taken and these sensitive to the costs asso- ciated with proceeding. the program is pursued according to what the traffic will bear. As Iran pursues its drive for a nuclear capability. Iran’s leaders have antennas very sensitive to the relative balance of power and what they can get away with.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 13 Introduction | 13 Iran has been persistent. these questions will be addressed throughout this volume. it has also been “playing it by ear. In addition there is no strategic urgency arguing for a nuclear weapon as opposed to an option. the motives impelling it to do so and the implications of its achievement become more important. They see the regional balance of power since 2004 and the diplomatic balance of power since 2005 as having increasingly turned in their favor.

In Iran’s case.1 Since September 2001. Iran has exchanged a relatively tolerable strategic environment. they veer between overcon- fidence and insecurity. due as much to its worldview as to its response to the strategic environment. They alternately feel impelled to spread their message but feel surrounded by hostile states. the default position in its for- eign policy has been one of obstructionism. A fundamental ambivalence characterizes such states. the United States. The United States figures centrally in Iran’s threat perceptions because Iranians believe that the United States has never reconciled itself to revolutionary Islamic Iran and misses no opportunity to deny it its rightful role and to weaken it.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 14 1 The View from Tehran evolutionary states see the world as a hostile place and tend to R act to make it so. The revolutionary reflex competes with a detached pragmatism and often subverts it. for a new context in which Iran is literally encircled by its old nemesis. Normal- ization and routinization of foreign policy necessitates jettisoning revolutionary claims. in which Saddam’s Iraq was contained and Taliban Afghanistan was marginalized. Iran’s sense of frustra- tion at being blocked regionally stems as much from its sense of “status discrepancy” as from objective conditions. which are believed to be an intrinsic part of the regime’s legitimacy.2 14 .

Afghanistan under the Taliban. and they are set to become more important strategically in the next decade. Iran’s regional relations are otherwise unremarkable. and coop- eration in Tajikistan. Russia) that has held: In exchange for Iranian restraint and stabilization of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran sees India and China as “rising Asia” and part of its strategy of looking east as a counterweight to offset dependence on Europe and the United States. but it has been unable to translate its geopolitical assets into political advantage. This tacit opposition to the West gives Iran a certain weight in Russian calculations. Nor is Iran in any significant multilateral regional institution such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As a non-Arab Shiite state.4 . policies to encourage a new multipolarity remains to be seen.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 15 The View from Tehran | 15 Iran lies at a natural crossroads between the Caspian and the Gulf and the Arab world and the subcontinent. however. Like Russia. Tehran would gain access to Russian technology and arms. but it does not extend to encourag- ing Tehran in the direction of nuclear weapons. neither state wishes to see Iran acquire nuclear weapons or to have to choose between relations with Tehran and Washington. Iran retains nor- mal relations without any acute bilateral sources of dispute. as the relationship with Syria underlines. either regionally or in the wider Muslim world (Shiites are a minority in Islam). With Turkey and Pakistan. posing no threat to Iran even if they are not characterized by uniform warmth and close cooperation. Iran made a Faustian bargain with the Soviet Union (and its successor.3 How far Iran can play on resentment of U. and Nagorny Karabakh is evidence of this. especially in the area of energy. Iran’s relations with these states are growing. nor does it out- weigh Russia’s continuing imperative of maintaining good working relations with the United States. Iran also lacks dependable friends or strategic partners. Moscow considers Iran an important state and strategic partner. Iran lacks a natural constituency.S. Both states seek to keep the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from establishing a presence in the broader region and are committed to reversing it.

But absent Iranian hostility. Iran has yet to normalize diplomatic relations with Egypt. Iran’s strategic environment does not create the insecurity driving Iran’s nuclear program.. venomously directing its revolutionary rhetoric at it.”8 To conclude. Israel poses no threat to the Islamic Republic. the reverse side of U.5 If anything. without which no regional policy can be implemented. The one exception—U. Iran seeks to become the indispensable power. which pro- vides Iran with opportunities. Iran has formally mended fences.S.S.S.S. which remains suspicious of Iran’s ambitions. But with this benign scenario from Tehran’s perspective would come problems—the risk of Iraq’s disintegration. An alternative scenario would arise from a U. which is driven more by frustration over status and the ambition to be taken more seriously and to play a larger.6 It seeks to do so from a position of strength and by exploiting its leverage in the region. As former defense minister Ali Shamkhani observed: “Wherever they [that is.. The opportunity to benefit from a U. although it may be the reason why Iran continues to insist on it in the face of interna- tional opposition. Iran’s neighbors feel threatened.S. . The principal threat arises from the possibility that the U.S. encirclement in the region is U. with threat and opportunity in equal measure. The world viewed from Tehran then is mixed. not the reverse. entanglement. Iran depicts Israel as illegitimate. This scenario will hinge on the out- come of the current struggle in Iraq. retreat would be not without risks.7 Therefore. and wherever they can hit us we can hit them harder. more global role.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 16 16 | The View from Tehran With the Arab states of the peninsula. but relations are not infused with trust. presence may become permanent. Americans] are. without friends or influence. we are also . and competitive intervention by regional states. threats of regime change since 2002—does not account for the start of the nuclear program or its persistence. civil war. which would translate into an environment that leaves Iran beleaguered. Iran’s regional ambitions are clear enough. Further afield. withdrawal with its reputation compromised and inclination to pursue forward defense reduced.

. They see Libya as a case of total capitulation. Nor do they see Iraq as a model.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 17 The View from Tehran | 17 Iran’s Revolutionary Values and Non-proliferation Some have suggested that Iran may be the key proliferation tipping point in the unraveling of the NPT.” comparable to the acceptance of the United Nations (UN) resolution ending the war with Iraq (SC 598) and even to the oil nationalization crisis of 1953.. Iranian leaders have sold the nuclear program as an inalienable right under the NPT. which Iran does not. justifying the negotiations with the EU-3.12 Iranian officials deny any resemblance of Iran’s situation to that of Libya or North Korea. Iran professes a willingness to be transparent to disprove claims that it seeks nuclear weapons. as a means of diver- sifying energy sources and as cutting-edge technology necessary to enter the ranks of scientifically advanced states. Iranian officials have depicted the issue in terms of rights on the one hand and denial of technology to keep Iran backward on the other. the justification for the program has been given intense domestic coverage... In play- ing the nationalist card Tehran has unleashed forces more intran- ..”13 Conversely. Since 2002 when the nuclear issue became widely publicized internationally.10 Iranian officials admit that the crisis around their nuclear program came with revelations of secret activities in August 2002.” Rather.11 A senior offi- cial. has observed that “being a revolutionary does not mean that we must discard every- thing and put ourselves on the road to confrontation with the rest of the world. and show resistance and reluctance. because its approach “was to drip feed infor- mation.9 Iran takes the current pro- longed crisis about the scope and limits of its nuclear program seri- ously. Since 2003 the level of military alert has been raised. The Iranian leadership has characterized it as the “most difficult case in the entire history of the country. and North Korea as an inappropriate model as well because it claims to have nuclear weapons. in order to be able to maintain some facilities and activities . and in the end (Saddam’s regime) was toppled. Iran through interaction could maintain its national security and protect its interests and nuclear technology.

. nonetheless. Even if this has some costs . as an international pariah. For example. above all the defiant assertion of independence: “Iran has made a Revo- lution in order not to be the obedient servant of any country and to act on the basis of its own national interests. or want others to see it.17 The war in retrospect is seen as confirming the hostility of the outside world toward the Islamic revolution.. it signed the Additional Protocol in October 2003 under international pressure.”16 These values and the worldview they reflect. Iranian officials have had to justify Iran’s policies. The long and costly war with Iraq early in the life of the IRI has been the principal conditioner of Iran’s approach to national secu- rity ever since. as necessary prudent measures to avoid giving Iran’s enemies pretexts to attack it: “Iran (thus) has its own model and it means that we want to develop nuclear technology in Iran and at the same time gain the trust of the world. together with the lessons learned over the past quarter century. The revolution was forged through martyrdom and unity during the war.”14 Iran’s approach therefore has been to reassure the international community by being sensitive to its concerns. They merit extended examination precisely because they are intrinsic features of the discourse and politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and as such will influence Iran’s strategy and any possible negotiated agreement.”15 Iran’s willingness to bow to the cumulative pressure from coun- tries with which it desired to maintain relations differentiates it from other proliferators: It does not see itself. we are prepared to pay these costs. so it is seen as a golden period marking an epic that should . There is. a less accom- modating side to Iran’s interaction with other countries. the nuclear question symbolizes the values and aims of the revolution. are strong condition- ers of Iran’s nuclear program as well as its diplomacy.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 18 18 | The View from Tehran sigent than its negotiators. stating: “gradually we reached the conclusion that each and every industrial country that had trade ties with Iran wanted us to sign the Additional Proto- col. such as agreements to negotiate with the EU-3 in 2003 and 2004.

these values can be expressed as independence.18 Surprised by Iraq’s attack. Iranian leaders still believe that Iran constitutes a role model for others in creating an Islamic revolution and siding with the oppressed against global arrogance and an unjust international order. a nationalist glue that unites hard-liners and reformists. and respect. or domination by others as well as a desire to be taken seriously. whereas conventional deterrence was more liable to fail. A clear and overriding lesson surely was that reliance on conventional forces for deterrence was less effective than reliance on nuclear weapons. Although tempered over the past quarter century. concentrate on the inadmissibility of the use of nuclear weapons. hedge against technological surprises (such as Saddam’s use of surface to surface missiles. equality.S. They militate toward self-sufficiency in arms production. secularists and religious conservatives. treated without discrimina- tion.20 The lessons of Iran’s war with Iraq and the values of the revolu- tion reinforce each other. and do not rely on the international rules or community for any favors during crises. which caught Iran with- out equivalent weapons). With nuclear weapons.19 Iran’s quest for international status is a major element in its outlook. opposition to it.) In summary.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 19 The View from Tehran | 19 inform all subsequent policies. dictation. International efforts to con- strain Iran’s nuclear activities are seen as technology denial and .21 Iran believes that it is now—or should be—a major regional power and that no policy in the region should be implemented without taking into account its views. how- ever. The war with Iraq served as both warning and lesson.22 This defiance plays out in the issue of Iran’s nuclear energy pro- gram and the U. (Official Iranian statements. even the most dedicated or better armed foe would surely be deterred. They reflect an extreme sensitivity to any appearance of dependence. Iranians resolved never to be caught unprepared again. and accorded the status that Iran’s importance in the world merits. These lessons have now been incorporated into what might be called the revolution’s values.

wary of another round in the future. partners or allies. it would be wise to have nuclear weapons—seemed especially relevant to the Iranians.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 20 20 | The View from Tehran dictation intended to keep Iran backward and subordinate. Iraq’s enforced disarmament through the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) after Desert Storm underlined how advanced Iraq’s nuclear program had been (between six months and two years from realization) and how it had been underestimated. victory in Iraq in 1991 contrasted with Iran’s eight- year inconclusive war. Both Iran and Iraq attributed more importance to the role of mis- siles (and chemical weapons) in the outcome of the war than was warranted. the U. The rapid U. underscoring the vast military disparity in conventional power between Tehran and Washington. North Korea’s Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994 sug- gested that nuclear weapons might serve as a bargaining chip for technology and need not result in automatic sanctions or attack.24 As a result both countries.23 It also plays into the issue of discrimination or “nuclear apartheid” voiced by President Ahmadinejad at the United Nations in Septem- ber 2005. attack on Iraq in April 2003 justified by reference to suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs contrasted with .25 The experience with Iraq consequently encouraged Iran to seek self-sufficiency through the establishment of a domestic missile industry (in part to substitute for aircraft) and to maintain a certain ambiguity about its chemical.S.S. Later. As the unloved victim of chemical weapons. biological. and nuclear programs.26 Iran’s thinking was influenced by other developments as well. Finally. continued an arms race and emphasized these programs. Indian Gen- eral Krishnaswamy Sundarji’s comment—that if you wish to con- front the United States. This outlook and its war with Iraq led toward its current empha- sis on missiles and the cultivation of options to avoid surprises. Nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 passed relatively unscathed by international sanctions and in a short time became accepted as each became U.S. Iran felt even more aggrieved and justified to seek insurance against a future attack.

a self- confessed nuclear power.28 Already in mid-2002 a top Iranian offi- cial correctly predicted a U. based on its own direct experience.S. Iran’s initial reaction to 9/11 mixed sympathy with wariness. its worldview. the U. war against Iraq. Iranian leaders saw the War on Terrorism as a pretext for a foreign regional presence. which appeared to underscore Sundarji’s comment about the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. After the 2003 war with Iraq. stating that “even if Saddam lets the weapon inspectors in. This environment may have reinforced Iran’s motivation to pursue its nuclear program.S. The war in Afghanistan was indicative of this: Hostility toward the Taliban was matched by a reluctance to see the United States entrenched nearby. supporting democratic change in the region rather than the status quo at all costs.S. Iran’s response has been to show that it is not vulnerable to regime change and to demonstrate a linkage between Tehran’s influence—for good or ill—in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.30 Initially Iran was concerned that the new U. pol- icy would target it next. policy from dual containment in the 1990s to regime change after 2001.27 Iran therefore has reasons. They understood the discussion about a new draft nuclear . policy toward Tehran. especially on the nuclear issue. administration’s new policies. Iranian officials were surprised by the U.S. the United States became both a regional state (a neighbor on two sides of Iran) and a revolutionary state. The war with Iraq was preceded by a further deterioration in relations between Washington and Tehran. Additional incentives came with the change in U. Iran saw this regional presence as a threat to its interests. to consider whether nuclear weapons would add to its security.”29 In both cases Iran formally opposed the acts but remained neutral. even after Saddam’s demise.S. The Bush administration’s identi- fication of Iran as a terrorist state and with an “axis of evil” (January 2002) and the announcement of a future strategy of preemption and regime change where necessary increased Iran’s perceptions of threat. will attack.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 21 The View from Tehran | 21 the restraint and caution shown toward North Korea. and its reading of events.S.

Iranian reformists might have been emboldened by the U. funds to support the Iranian opposition in mid-2003.S. proximity and encouragement to call on external assistance. Tehran’s response was to seek an accommodation.33 When the possibility of a U. given lack of sup- port for this in Europe or elsewhere. gave Iran’s leadership pause: Regime change had become a real threat. Iran regained its confidence.34 In addition Iran has justified building its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz underground by reference to the threat of a U.S. attack. However. that a response would not be limited to the region.S.S. had offered Iran’s cooperation with the United States. Iranian leaders now talked of the failure of regime change and the fact that the United States was now bogged down in Iraq as well as Afghanistan.35 Iran also threatened retal- iation and in numerous statements suggested that an attack on Iran would not be considered limited or elicit a limited response. military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities became topical in 2004. that such a response would target U. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Washington terminated discussions between Iran and the United States in Geneva upon learning of Tehran’s provision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda elements involved with terror- ism in Saudi Arabia.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 22 22 | The View from Tehran posture review as an implicit threat to make nuclear weapons more usable against potential (nonnuclear) adversaries. pointing out the political repercussions. if it were treated as an equal. forces in the region. Washington’s interest in smaller nuclear weapons (mini-nukes) made the threat of nuclear use against alleged proliferators more worrisome to Tehran.S. with the prospect of a rapid political vic- tory fading.31 The appropriation of U.36 . and that the United States could ill afford the subsequent regional instability. Chairman of the Expediency Discern- ment Council of Iran. that Iran would itself consider preemption. Always sensitive to power realities. Iranian officials responded by dismissing the reports as part of a psychological cam- paign. as it had in Afghanistan. as the United States became more entangled in Iraq in 2003. together with the initial stunning military success of the United States in Iraq.32 By mid-2003. Already in mid- 2002.

37 Iran’s response to the enhanced U. Although Iran’s interests in Afghanistan and Iraq are largely similar to those of the United States. This response has entailed playing a spoil- ing role to assure at least a delay in the stabilization of Iraq (and the cultivation of local actors as possible conduits for policy. is considered a threat. Iran has stepped up its spoiling strategy. especially over the long term. which has parallels in Afghanistan as well). that the United States is now militarily stretched by its commitments in these two countries gives Iran breathing space to delay or blunt what might otherwise be a credible military threat on its nuclear facilities.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 23 The View from Tehran | 23 To prevent a possible resort to force by the United States. to keep it entangled. military presence in the region has been to treat the United States as a potential hostage. the U. military presence. The implicit linkage between Iran’s regional policy and Tehran’s relations with the United States is clear enough.S.39 .S. and thus to prevent a speedy success and with- drawal that would enable the United States to concentrate on the next issue: nuclear Iran.38 The question of whether the United States is willing to compromise on Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for assistance regionally has not been definitively answered—in part because the evolution of events in Iraq remains unpredictable and in part because the impli- cations of nuclear Iran are so serious as to make such a tacit exchange a losing proposition in the longer term. As the United States has looked to establish a base structure around Iran (includ- ing Central Asia). Moreover. Iran also pursued a complicated regional diplomacy.

Iran is a major producer of oil and soon gas. Secretary of the Expediency Dis- cernment Council.2 Iran currently envisages the production of 7. and Decision Making Energy Diversification and Self-Sufficiency Iran argues that it is developing nuclear energy to generate electric- ity and to master the fuel cycle to become a supplier of nuclear fuel in the future.000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear energy and initial 24 . “The important issue is that Iran’s energy basket must be a mixture of all kinds of energy. and it justifies its interest in nuclear technology by reference to the need to diversify its energy sources and keep abreast of a technol- ogy that it identifies as modern and synonymous with being an advanced scientific state. Initially cancelled by the Islamic Republic. Abandoning the nuclear program will harm our national interests.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 24 2 Nuclear Energy Rationale. The rationale was that the partially built Bushire reactor represented a “sunk cost” that should be recouped. Its arguments in support of this claim are both eco- nomic and strategic. The argument for nuclear energy was then strengthened by the prudent need for diversifying energy sources.”1 The argument is further reinforced by the fact that Iran’s rapid population growth and domestic oil consumption are reducing Iran’s oil export revenues. the Iranian nuclear program was restarted in the mid-1980s. Domestic Politics. As Mohsen Rezai. put it.

and Decision Making | 25 construction of ten nuclear reactors.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 25 Nuclear Energy Rationale. however.4 Therein lies the problem: By insisting on acquiring the full fuel cycle.”8 Because there are doubts whether these constitute Iran’s real goals.3 This program implies “self sufficiency in all aspects of using the peaceful use of nuclear energy” from extraction through enrichment.6 Iranians are proud of their efforts. most have not sought such a capabil- ity because it is not economical. Much of the world questions Iranian arguments on the need for self- sufficiency in all aspects of the fuel cycle and on the energy justifi- cation for the scale of the program. Iran would acquire the ability to fabricate the mate- rials necessary for nuclear weapons with little difficulty. including facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Iran is being tested by the inter- national response. that the nuclear issue is not just a question of energy but of science and technology and self-sufficiency. Domestic Politics.”7 Iranian leaders are unapologetic about their goals: “We want to have enrichment and all other parts of nuclear technology to use this valuable science for the good of our people and the country. it will take Iran ten years before it will be able to generate good quality reactor fuel domestically. According to one expert. Furthermore most countries with reactors do not go into enrichment. The Iranian arguments for energy diversification are more plau- sible than those justifying the program on grounds of self- sufficiency. There are several reasons why the self-sufficiency . and as such an issue of great prac- tical and symbolic significance. In the meantime.5 Iran is thus determined to avoid dependency on others for its future fuel supply and wants to be among the top fuel producers and suppliers within the next fifteen years. The Iranians insist. And we will do this at any cost. Indeed. Iran will buy fuel. claiming that “all parts of the centrifuges used in the Natanz com- plex are manufactured by Iranian experts” and that it has broken into the “monopolized nuclear fuel market. That Iran emphasizes enrichment (Natanz) and a heavy water plant (Arak) at this early phase in its program when not a single reactor is yet functioning rings alarm bells.

like the “sacred defense” of the country against Iraq. not electricity. and power are equated. Domestic Politics.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 26 26 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.. Third. with reference to increased domestic energy consumption. Therefore. First.. do not feel the need for enrichment facilities and instead buy their fuel on the open market. the problem for Iran is the growing demand for gaso- line. and peaceful nuclear power is said to give Iran entry into an “exclusive club. second. and Decsion Making argument is problematic. Iran’s domestic consumption of heavily subsi- dized and thus wasted gasoline is costly and growing in line with the population. what immense power would be forged and what a great epic it would create. Second. Iran will remain dependent on imports of uranium because it lacks adequate indige- nous supplies. Science. Atomic energy has become the glue that has reinforced the solidarity of the nation. so majestic and glorifying.) Nuclear Power and Nuclear Status Iran’s depiction of its accession to the ranks of states mastering nuclear technology as enormously significant has two functions: First. Just imagine. (Iran’s vast indigenous gas reserves are discounted from the equation. if we could link the glories of the sacred defense with the people’s national soli- darity in the area of the inalienable right we are entitled to regarding atomic energy. gives Iran greater weight internationally. nuclear power generation plants. technology. The regime’s depiction of Iran’s achievement is vague at best and deliberately distorted at worst. As reported in the Iranian press. become a rally- ing point around which all can agree. it legitimates the regime domestically and. which is less expensive. according to some. even with possessing the full fuel cycle..10 .”9 The nuclear issue has thus. which has ten reactors. even states like Sweden. which only produce electricity. will not begin to address this demand.

Iranian leaders attribute a great deal more significance to the attainment of an enrichment capability than potential energy self- sufficiency. Foreign policy. is generally far from the mind of the ordinary Iranian. it is questionable whether they would seek the nuclear fuel cycle at the cost of con- frontation with the international community. have now made the world admit that Iran is a scientific and technological power. it is said. However what has made them anxious is the Iranian nation’s access to nuclear technology. Iranian scientists. the efforts of the world of arrogance will lose their effect. referral to the UN . one leader insisted. “has advanced nuclear technology” including enrichment and “this is very impor- tant in the world. and prospects for self-betterment. including the nuclear question. in an address to prayer leaders. infla- tion.”13 Iranian officials suggest that nuclear technology has enhanced Iran’s power. stated that “the bullies of this world know full well that we do not have nuclear weapons.” Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. and Decision Making | 27 Ambiguities about the nature of Iran’s programs and ambitions are underscored by these claims.”14 In short. who is more concerned about employment. “guarantee[ing] the Islamic republic’s presence in the international scene” and giving the Europeans pause as they “real- ize they could not embark on force when talking to Iran.12 The United States and Europe. Domestic Politics While the nuclear issue is depicted by the Iranian leadership as a burning national issue.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 27 Nuclear Energy Rationale. in this mind-set. Domestic Politics. are united in pressuring Iran to abandon enrichment “because enrichment is a way forward to scientific advancement and if a country is able to succeed in doing so. While most Iranians favor an Iran that is independent and has status.” The West’s stance against Iran “indicates that Iran has access to this very exclusive and sensitive technology.”11 Iranian pride in its “amazing” progress in technology is palpable and attributed to the regime. Iran. the reality is different.

and Decsion Making Security Council. Iranians are not duped by the way the issue has been depicted. it is more importantly a surrogate for a broader debate about the country’s future—about what model Iran should adopt and how it should interact with the wider world. The debate has been manipulated by the regime. the nuclear debate in Iran is more complicated.17 In reality. however. flexibility is possible but requires determined leadership. The nuclear issue is a metaphor for Iran’s quest for greater respect and a wider regional and global role. has left the regime with less room for compro- mise. framing the issue in . as the regime insists. This national consensus. which has failed to open up the facts or issues to public scrutiny. As mentioned earlier. a broad spectrum of views on the nuclear program exists. national unity on Iran’s right to enrich- ment. When the new government adopted a more confrontational course in August 2005. and sanctions. The nuclear issue is only partly about technology and status. It has certainly oversold the notion that possessing the full fuel cycle reflects cutting-edge technology that no self-respecting nation can afford to forgo. Iranian leaders consequently invoke national demand in their international nego- tiations. Polls consistently show some 80 percent of the population sup- porting Iran’s access to nuclear technology as a right that reflects and contributes to Iran’s advanced scientific status. and questions began to be raised domestically about its course. which has been selectively invoked. Domestic Politics. Even so.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 28 28 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. Iranian stock and real estate markets plummeted.16 By tapping into and exploiting nationalist sentiment. The June 2005 presidential elections reflected this broader debate. Although no one supports technology denial as such.15 How has domestic politics influenced Iran’s nuclear program? Is there. which precludes any policy adjustment? Domestic Nuclear Debate Iran’s principal motive for developing nuclear technology appears to be domestic legitimation of the regime. the regime hopes to reinforce itself.

Iran should forgo it. rights. ideology ver- sus pragmatism—all are at play in Iran today. isolation versus engagement. or to settle for less controversial technology and improve relations with the international community. equality. Certainly the nuclear issue figures into politics and factions seek to use it politically. The extreme case was well put by one forty-five-year-old Iranian man who preferred to remain anonymous: “If the result would be sim- ilar to North Korea. whatever the price. international affairs were linked to domestic issues for the first time.S. the results change. The reformist candidate (Mostafa Moin) took the clear posi- tion that if seeking enrichment poisoned relations with the international community.”19 One difficulty in analyzing the Iranian debate is the fact that Iran denies having intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. and normal- ization internationally are connected to the struggle between their government and the international community over the nuclear pro- gram. Iranians do not want to pay a high price for the program given their domestic economic needs. and European Union (EU) objections. In the recent presidential elections. whereas reformists emphasize political deterrence (democracy and unity) and peace- ful technology. Self-sufficiency versus interdependence. investment. so offi- cials do not discuss the strategic or other rationales for seeking the capability to make or use them. Some conservatives openly argue for leaving the NPT and seeking nuclear arms. then we don’t want that.23 Iranians see that their priorities concerning jobs. where the people have a low standard of liv- ing but are making the atomic bomb.21 In the broader con- text of political flux and change in Iran. and respect. and Decision Making | 29 terms of denial. current differences on the nuclear issue today are emblematic of different views on the way Iran ought to develop and engage internationally.22 Differences do not fall strictly along factional lines but nearly so. Domestic Politics.18 When the debate is framed differently.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 29 Nuclear Energy Rationale. They wish to avoid confrontation and international isolation. The conservative .20 This muted debate over the value of nuclear weapons extends to the regime itself and is reflected in its uncer- tainty about whether to continue to seek sensitive technology in the face of U.

His dis- course reflected the broad shift away from the conservative view of the world: He embraced globalization enthusiastically and pledged “positive and constructive interaction with the international arena: renewing bonds and links with the rest of the world in order to remedy the country’s vulnerabilities on the international stage and speeding up the process of foreign investment in Iran. Domestic Politics. conservatives ran a “stop Rafsanjani” campaign. the rural and urban disadvantaged. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s populist victory was a triumph for what he promised domestically: less corruption and more attention to social equality. Outsiders find it difficult to distinguish among Iranians or to identify significant differences among them on the nuclear issue.” 27 In response. arguing that without Rafsanjani the conservatives would certainly win. Hasan Rowhani.28 In the election Rafsanjani lost to the hard-liners. concluding that continued diplomacy offered the best hope of developing technology and building confidence with others. reborn as a reformer. Strikingly. who presented the issue as the need to balance between Iran’s rights and the people’s desire to avoid hostilities and avoid disturbing the peace. the chief nuclear negotiator. and Decsion Making (former military) candidates (notably Ali Larijani and Mohsen Rezai) were equally clear: They favored acquisition of the full fuel cycle.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 30 30 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.26 Rafsan- jani. widely admired as a wily politician who might be able to actually deliver what more admirable candi- dates (like Moin) could only promise. More significantly. . His indifference to international affairs and opinion reflected his constituency. he invoked his special relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei for being able to achieve results. encouraged Rafsanjani’s candidacy. calling into question his ties with Khamenei and casting aspersions on his foreign support. Brigadier General Mohammad Bager Qalibaf. it was not what he said on the nuclear issue but what he said on Iran’s international relations that was significant. depicting it as an issue of self-respect and scientific neces- sity.24 More interesting was the position of another strong candidate with a security background. also promised more diplomacy on the nuclear issue.25 This theme was echoed by former president and can- didate Hashemi Rafsanjani.

scientific progress. and independence as linked and desirable. They do not wish to see its pursuit lead to Iran’s estrangement from the international community and hurt relations with neighbors. that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are bound to be judged by other states. The default setting in the council has been hard-line. and a broader regional role. Most Iranians accept the proposition that the nuclear issue reflects a general discrimination. and Decision Making | 31 And it is true that this issue has become a litmus test of national- ism from which there are few dissenters. nuclear policy issues have .29 Some see the issue as symbolic of “the way that world powers view the nature of Iran’s regime. While this is true up to a point. together with the resentment over discrimination. respect. the political elite determines national security policies in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).32 In practice. it is also very much self- imposed and vague. The Iranian public has not judged whether a nuclear weapons option is desirable on its own merits but only on the proposition that Iran should not be denied technology to which it is entitled. They see advanced technology. The reformists generally support the nuclear program but see nuclear as one among several technologies. neither the Holy Grail nor a panacea. This nation- alism. it could be argued. Role of Conservatives in Nuclear Policy In Iran. Domestic Politics. but all advanced technology. however. has been fanned by the regime to expand the nuclear program. The nation- alist consensus in turn has been used by negotiators to argue that domestic constraints prevent Iran from forgoing sensitive technolo- gies.”30 One reformer suggested that the nuclear issue raised still more fundamental questions: What kind of state does Iran seek to be? What sort of role does it aspire to play? And what kind of relations does it seek with other states?31 It is in this con- text.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 31 Nuclear Energy Rationale. with the reformists marginal- ized whatever their standing in the Iranian parliament (Majles). involving not just nuclear. Most Iranians support the quest for status.

leaving open the possibility of a “grand bargain”—an across-the-board accommodation that would see Iran’s interests and security guaranteed in exchange for a normalization of relations and moderation of its behavior. A strong mil- itary and security constituency (notably the militia Basij and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. It is worth noting the similarities and differences among the various factions and groups. and sought to limit the fallout from Iran’s program. whereas the ideological conservatives shun a deal and want power to be able to impose themselves on the region and beyond. and export of the revolution). and Decsion Making been decided between conservatives of two types: pragmatic (like Rafsanjani and Rowhani) and ideological (like Ahmadinejad and Larijani).*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 32 32 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. This policy stance has changed. since the ideologically conservative faction took control of nuclear policy in August 2005. were open to compromise when necessary (Tehran and Paris agree- ments). The Ahmadinejad presidency represents a throwback to the early days of the revolution. In reality they seek different ends: The pragmatic conservatives seek power to be able to cut a deal and normalize relations. Both groups seek a larger regional role for Iran and see the United States as an obstacle to that goal. Domestic Politics.33 The pragmatists who controlled negotiations during the 2003–2005 period were under constant pressure from the ideolog- ical faction. Both types of conservatives appear to agree on the need for a nuclear weapons option but differ on means or the price to be paid to achieve this. While seeking to enhance power they were unwilling to do so in a confrontational mode. They pursued a nuclear option within the NPT. known as the IRGC or Pas- . however. with its emphasis on first principles (social justice. this faction is more open to engage- ment and sees globalization as an inescapable reality. independence. For economic and strategic reasons. they were willing to suspend activities (enrichment) and under pressure to accept constraints (the Addi- tional Protocol) to keep up the appearance of reasonableness and cooperation. Sensi- tive to international opinion and to the potential costs of a disruption of relations.

not goodwill. in the view of this group. no longer will any- one dare challenge it. it sees possible offers of security guarantees as demean- ing. You have to find a way to be able to take the country’s level and status to a point so as to automatically solve your national security problem. and Decision Making | 33 daran) supports this administration as do some conservative clergy. First. sooner or later. Second. “Iran does not need these kinds of condescending guarantees and it is fairly capable of protecting itself. reflect and ratify the balance of power but add nothing to it. the West will have to concede Iran’s nuclear status. The best articulation of this view comes from Larijani. the ideological conserva- tives welcome it for several reasons. Power.” Iran in this view does not need either technology or status conferred on it: It is prepared to seize them by its own efforts. where predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate and where the only currency is military power... Domestic Politics. as it has North Korea’s. pressure Iran has to use its “prominent geopolitical position. they see Iran’s geopolit- ical position giving it a number of important cards to play. who observes that to resist U.34 The world. he believes.” Larijani has also suggested that foreign sensitivity toward Iranian nuclear activities “is partly because of Iran’s geopolitical sit- uation and its inspiring position.” What he has in mind is clear: “If Iran becomes atomic Iran. Negotiations. any more than they can be acquired through nego- tiation. values. . other- wise this pressure factor will always weigh upon you.. because they would have to pay too high a price.38 Rather than shunning confrontation. in this mind-set. What is known by Ahmadinejad as active diplomacy describes a policy that seeks to increase power not just to survive but to impose Iran on the international community.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 33 Nuclear Energy Rationale. and influence and must not be bartered away. is a Hobbesian one of unremitting struggle.35 Power and military strength thus ensure the regime’s survival.”36 This perspective translates into an approach to negotiation that aims at acquiring technology. is the indispensable element for survival and for the extension of the regime’s values beyond its borders.S. in this view.37 Larijani sees North Korea’s impla- cability as a model for Iran. notably Ayatollah Taghi Mesbahi Yazdi of the Haggani seminary at Qom.

He argued against slo- gans and for the more difficult task of delicate diplomacy: “Our main task is to prove that we are not the sort of people to utilize . As much as a deliberate provocation. and China. The pragmatic conservatives have sought to put a brake on this approach. They did him no harm on the “Arab street” that sees its governments as too timorous or corrupt to defend Palestinian rights. Third. Domestic Politics. Despite the fact that the ideological and pragmatic conservatives are agreed on the goal of increasing Iran’s power and influence and using nuclear technology to do it. is the more prone to overestimate Iran’s power and centrality and misjudge the external world. this approach will successfully divide the West from the nonaligned states. the statements reflected the new president’s complete and studied indifference to and contempt for international opinion.40 In the wake of the Ahmadinejad team’s confrontational tactics and rhetoric and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) vote on September 24 that put Iran on notice of referral to the UNSC. Rafsanjani led the rebuking voices. In the Iranian polit- ical context. and Rowhani noted that in a matter of months the new govern- ment had already provoked serious discussions of referral to the Security Council on two occasions and had once been the object of a critical Security Council statement. their ideological counterparts welcome the oppor- tunity to purify the regime and society by limiting contamination from the outside and asserting the revolution’s values of self- reliance and authenticity. iso- lation. Rafsanjani has called for serious prudence and sensitiv- ity. Ahmadinejad only voiced what the most extreme ele- ments in the regime had long felt. Russia. Where the pragmatists seek eventual normalization. and Decsion Making Iran’s increased oil income serves as a buffer against possible sanc- tions. the ideological faction. and sanctions differentiates the ideological from the prag- matic conservatives.39 Ahmadinejad’s comments on Israel (and the Holocaust) are indicative. Indifference to costs. largely self- absorbed and insular. Of the two. they have very different visions of the role Iran should play and the kind of relations Iran should have with the world.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 34 34 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.

in part because the leadership has painted itself into a corner from which it will be difficult to exit. however. if the costs of the crisis increase appreciably for Iran with the involvement of the Security Council. the broad consensus on the nuclear issue obscures very real differences that exist among the elite on overall foreign . or resigned. The critical issue remains the domestic power struggle for control over finances and sources of income.”41 Critics of the Ahmadinejad mind-set face self-imposed limits. This outcome apparently vindi- cates their approach. They are thus unwilling to push an issue that could put them at a disadvantage in terms of nationalist opinion. closer to the ideologists on it. has been unwilling to take sides on the nuclear issue and appears. but it appears unlikely. Whether this will change as the costs of this approach increase is a critical ques- tion. In sum. with no domestic force acting as a constraint. Ahmadinejad charged that critics of his foreign policy are attempting to create a diversion to continue their corrupt domes- tic practices.43 Supreme Leader Khamenei. who prefers consensus. if any- thing. especially as the other side appears uncertain. polar- ization. Domestic Politics. resumption of conversion and research) without paying a tangible price. least of all on this issue. and destabilization of the regime. Larijani and Ahmadine- jad feel they have a free hand in their approach to the nuclear issue.42 The pragmatists are unwilling to risk division. divided. The pragmatists are fighting a rearguard action to main- tain their control over lucrative areas of the economy such as energy and banking. For example. which seems set to continue.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 35 Nuclear Energy Rationale. However. then. So far their approach has gained benefits (for example. and Decision Making | 35 nuclear weapons” and to prove to Iran’s opponents that “Iran will not use the technology for military purposes. They continue to see the benefits of brinksmanship. these limits have more to do with domestic political- economic issues than nuclear strategy. the pragmatists will be in a position to point to the ineptitude of the ideological faction and the need for less haste in the program. They therefore have sought a practical accommodation on domes- tic issues with their ideological counterparts. Thus.

This division corresponds to those who are willing to consider a grand bargain with the United States and to adjust their regional policies in exchange for recognition and security guarantees and those who reject compromise in favor of pursuit of regional hegemony and self-reliance. which has aggra- vated these differences and given rise to what amounts to a strug- gle for power between these two tendencies. if possible by acquiring a nuclear capability. In nuclear policy this translates into a divi- sion between those who emphasize confidence building and are willing to compromise and those for whom a nuclear capability is indispensable and compromise unthinkable. Differences exist.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 36 36 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. and on taking an independent position in interna- tional affairs. to take sides. on how to pursue these goals and whether Iran should not adjust its aims in exchange for the achievement of some of them. The Supreme Leader will find it harder to paper over these differences in a continuing ambiguous consensus and may need. Khatami. the basic division in foreign policy is between those who seek an accommodation with the West from a position of strength (Rafsanjani. Domestic Politics. Thus. Larijani. more belligerent element. if one group sees capabilities and policies as bargaining chips. In essence. President Ahmadinejad’s election has given voice to a harder. Decision Making Policy reflects politics as well as narrower institutional considera- tions. Rowhani) and those who wish to challenge it by adopting the course of the Islamic Republic circa 1979 (Ahmadinejad. The contrast between the two is captured in the differences in the diplomacy of Rowhani and Larijani described below. and Decsion Making policy. for once. however. The broad political context and climate necessarily affect decisions. on seeking independence. then the other seeks the determined pursuit of goals without reference to the costs or consequences. Hard-line newspapers such as Keyhan have quasi-official . There is little dispute on making Iran a more important power. Ayatollah Taghi Mesbahi Yazdi).

and Decision Making | 37 status and more leeway than their dwindling reformist counter- parts.44 Rec- ognizing that these informal contacts and procedures are as influ- ential as the formal organograms. which sets the tone for—as well as skews—the public debate. Decisions reached in the SNSC provide the leadership with a sort of consensus safety net.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 37 Nuclear Energy Rationale. Domestic Politics. to give leverage to the negotiators who will have “to answer to the people” . with policies emerg- ing that are not a product of a unitary system. enabling it to avoid taking the heat for controversial decisions. Effects of Domestic Politics on Negotiations Iranian negotiators’ and politicians’ insistence on a national consen- sus behind the nuclear program serves two functions: one. Since August 2005. the composition of the leadership of the SNSC has changed. as Ali Larijani has now replaced the pragmatic Hasan Rowhani as principal negotiator (see Figure 2). In addition to the decision-making structure diagrammed in Figure 1. Figures 1 and 2 schematically and approximately reflect the nuclear decision-making structure in Iran. It can argue in terms of sunk costs. The For- eign Ministry and SNSC can argue the costs of estrangement and confrontation with Europe and the IAEA and international obliga- tions. decisions taken by the Supreme Leader reflect a rough-and-ready consensus. one could note the Supreme Leader’s soundings among his clerical network (in Qom and elsewhere) and the primacy of informal networks. which looks to its institutional interests and strongly sup- ports the nuclear program. The SNSC is not monolithic and reflects all tendencies. in 2003 was in itself a significant choice. the long-standing secretary and pragmatist as chief nuclear negotiator. there- fore. the appointment of Hasan Rowhani. experience acquired. and the costs of a long suspension of activi- ties in terms of morale and attrition of scientific personnel. Among the inputs into decisions are interested parties such as the Atomic Energy Organi- zation. Iran’s nuclear decisions reflect institutional inputs and interest group biases.

Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Mustafa Mustafa Mohammad Committee Mohammad NajjarNajjar / Defence : Defense Minister Minister Hasan Rowhani) ((Hasan Rowhani) (Khatami/)M.Supreme National Security n Sirus SirusnNaseri Naseri Council Mohammad JavadZarif Mohamma Javad Zarif Majlis Majles d Alborzi Mohammad Reza Alborzi Mohammad IRGC. 1995. 1/8. but no clearly designated replacements have been named as yet. 1/6. Velayati 1. Rowhani remained on the SNSC as the Supreme Leader’s Personal Representative.Islamic Revolutionary Guards Alaedin Alaedin Borujerdi Borujerdi Corps (Pasdaran) Ali Agha Reza Mohammadi Agha Mohammadi (Head. Since June 2005.” International Herald Tribune. In August 2005 he was replaced by Ali Larijani as Secretary of the SNSC. . Chris Hedges. The nuclear negotiating team has also changed. Negotiator. the Foreign Ministry with their foreign ramifications. The AEO has dealt with technical issues. Larijani. Khatami / M. Figure 1. National (Head. Reza Aghazadeh. The two streams were consolidated in early 2000.isisVice Vice President President & Cabinet CabinetMember Member Mohamma Mohammad SaidiSaidi (International Affairs) (International Affairs) . Rowhani’s deputy’s position (Mousavian) has been split into two: one covering international security. The new Defense Minister replacing Shamkhani is Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar. including the nuclear dossier (Javad Vaidi). rather than the Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. Rowhani (Secretary SNSC H. May 15. Velayati: International Relations Advisor Supreme Leader 2. Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad: / President (Acronyms): Hosey Hossein Mousavia Mousavian President SNSC. The preceding team has been terminated. and Arab Times (Kuwait). n Gen. and special units of the Revolutionary Guards with the security of facilities. coordinated nuclear issues. Larijani has in effect become National Security Advisor. 1995. 1/5.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 38 38 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. Akhoundzadeh serves as Ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna. Sources: Elaine Sciolino. seeking to put his own imprint on foreign policy.” August 2. p. and Decsion Making Nuclear Decision Making: Institutions and Key Players Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s was split into two parallel streams: a civilian program under the AEO. Decision making on nuclear issues in Iran has tradition- ally been confined to three institutions coordinated by the leadership. 2005. RezaAghazadeh Chief. In replacing Rowhani. “Tehran Grants a Glimpse of a Nuclear Site Reborn. President Ahmadinejad. p.” International Herald Tribune. Elaine Sciolino. 1995. has significantly changed the personnel. and another covering political and foreign affairs (Ali Monfared). will have principal responsibility for the nuclear issue. March 16. “Iran Restarts ‘Eyes’ Work at N Plant.Atomic Energy Organization Pirooz Hoseyni Pirooz Hoseyni Supervisory role Supervisory through role throughinvestigative mechanisms investigative AmirHossein Amir HosseinZamani -Nia Zamani -Nia Foreign Ministry IAEA (Vienna): NPT safeguards UN (NY) UN (Geneva) AEO experts/technicians Experts/technicians IRGC(plant IRGC (plantsecurity) security) AEO AEO Chief. After September 2003. Institutional Flow of Decision Making Supreme Leader Office Representatives Khamenei 1. and a military program under the Revolutionary Guards. “Iran Plans a Vast Nuclear Build Up. “Iran’s Push for Nuclear Arms and a Small Airstrip in Germany. National Security Security & Foreign & Foreign Policy Policy Committee) (SNSC) (SNSC) Committee) Special Special committees committees AEO. Rowhani:Secretary / Chief SNSC/Chief Negotiator. Domestic Politics. nuclear “czar” Hasan Rowhani. May 20–21. Ali AliLarijani: Larijani: Leaders Leader’s Personal Personal Representative Representative onon SNSC SNSC Hashemi Hashemi Rafsanjani IRGC SNSC H. p. Supreme SupremeLeader’s Leader’s Representative) Representative Mousavian/:Secretary Mousavia Secretary to toForeign Foreign Policy Committee Policy Negotiating Teams Br.” International Herald Tri- bune.

replaced General Ali Shamkhani (2005). . Ali Monfared Deputy to the SNSC Secretary. Report to President Khatami. Foreign Ministry (until December 23. Mohammed Mehdi Akhoundzadeh Permanent Representative to IAEA (until December 23. replaced Mousavian. Abdol Reza Rahmani-Fazli Deputy Secretary of SNSC. and Decision Making | 39 Figure 2. Keyhan Interview. Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh Deputy Director-General for political and international Affairs. The reconstruc- tion with names is the author’s and reflects informed guesswork. Key Decision Makers New Negotiating Team and Ministers: Changes for 2006 Ali Larijani Replaced Rowhani as Secretary of the SNSC. Javad Vaidi Deputy Head of International Affairs of SNSC and Head of Delegation. Source: Rowhani. Then IAEA representative. Ali Hossein Tash Deputy Head of SNSC for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Nahavandian Deputy for Economic Affairs of SNSC.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 39 Nuclear Energy Rationale. Domestic Politics. 2005). 2005). Manuchehr Mottaki Foreign Minister. replaced Kharrazi. Mustafa Mohammad Najjar Defense Minister. Mohammad Saidi Deputy Head of AEO for International Affairs.

policy will remain the same.46 Related to this is the assertion that no matter who is president. tell them that we shall not abandon the peoples’ right and we shall not sub- mit to bullying. This pressure is said to stem from the hard-liners who shun any compromise and want to provoke an international crisis to strengthen their own grip on power.” Hashemi Rafsan- jani echoed this saying that “they are telling us blatantly that we should not acquire nuclear technology: and we. and Decsion Making if they are too soft in negotiations and two.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 40 40 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. Domestic Politics. Suspension is resisted for several reasons. they entered into an asymmetrical commitment that gave the Europeans an incentive to prolong the discussions and thereby impose serious costs on Iran’s nuclear program. to stiffen the spine of politicians who might be tempted to weaken support for the proj- ect. The result is the kind of brinksmanship just short of rupture. the passage of a bill by the Majles in mid-2005 calling for a resumption of the enrichment program was quickly approved by the hard-line Guardian Council. To try to win back some of the ground it feels it lost.47 The Majles is also invoked to argue that Iranian negotiators can- not be flexible. in return.” 45 However.49 Iranian negotiators feel. in a system that has manipulated the issue of nuclear energy by depicting it as an issue of denial and dis- crimination. that by accepting a freeze on enrichment activities during negotiations with the EU-3.50 The cost of a cessation (of a small . Negotiators also say that the government is under heavy pressure. Iran has sought to impose deadlines and sometimes to manufacture an air of crisis about the urgency for an accord. For example. Rowhani has said that “any Iranian government that wishes to stop uranium enrichment will fall. with people and the media demanding results from the negotiations. For example. with reason. though with- out any legal standing.48 In response Iranian negotiators have sought to use this domestic pres- sure to pressure their European negotiating partners. skepticism is in order when Iranian leaders insist that public opinion would or would not tolerate a certain path or that it forces them to do such and such. The AEO opposes a freeze because of its impact on the retention and employ- ment of scientific personnel.

” In this there have been a few dissenters. however. are disproportionately powerful. with delay. which has been successfully depicted as a nationalist issue around which all Iranians can rally. In August it sought to depict its predecessors as “soft” in defending the “nation’s rights. And this does not seem to be the intent of the new Iranian gov- ernment. vehement. the argument is that the elimination of one of the five phases of nuclear production “will render all other phases and the efforts of scientists in past years ineffective. the earlier team revealed that they only used the negotiations to buy time and stall while continuing with conversion as long as possible.55 These revelations have not enhanced Western faith in Iran’s bona fides. relinquish its rights.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 41 Nuclear Energy Rationale. But such a leadership would have to first sideline the extremists and then retreat under a smoke- screen of strong rhetoric. a symbol of modernity and independence. is a minimum $5 billion and the failure of fifteen years of effort. under any conditions. less contentious and thus susceptible to compromise—in effect that prolonged suspension would become cessation by another name. The issue of the right to technology has elided almost imperceptibly into the “right to the fuel cycle.”51 Hard-liners are also skeptical about where the suspension will lead. Domestic Politics. Reformists’ crit- icisms of this extremism are mild but trenchant. The nuclear issue has been used to buttress the regime’s legitimacy. and vocal. A decent compromise package.53 What difference does this prevailing hard line make to decisions on the nuclear issue? Having hyped the subject domestically and put the prestige of the regime on the line. They fear that periodically rolling over the suspension will make the nuclear issue.”54 But in their defense. could be sold domesti- cally by a determined leadership.56 The hyping of the nuclear issue as a right. From a technical standpoint.52 The hard-liners. one expert argued. the Iranian government may find it dif- ficult to walk away from the contest without some compensation. and Decision Making | 41 pilot project). as well as a . Every effort was made to mobilize against this in the negotiations and to insist that suspension served no good purpose since Iran will not. while not the only forces in Iran’s politics.

Iran has objected to multinational or regional enrichment facilities or to a five.57 Because the issue is fundamentally political.59 However. Russia would then convert it into fuel rods and ship it back to the reactor in Bushire. proposed by Al Baradei. and Decsion Making consensus issue on which there is little scope for disagreement may have bound Iran’s hands and narrowed the scope for an eventual agreement. if Iran retains the right (even limited to principle) to the full fuel cycle.”58 Another possibility that looks more feasible is one in which Iran mines and processes uranium to gas (at the Isfahan facility) but then ships the uranium hexafluoride gas to Russia. The inspection burden would either be unacceptable to Iran or provide inadequate assurance for the rest of the world [emphasis added]. and because it hinges on trust. while the Europeans could claim that they stopped Iran from the enrichment process that would have given them the ability to make fissile material for nuclear weapons. Schemes that take the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle out of Iran to Russia. not technical.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 42 42 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.” Specialists have concluded that it would be “difficult if not impossible to verify that Iran was not secretly making nuclear weapons under any deal that allowed Iran to enrich uranium. for example. which is to limit enrichment to those countries .S. the international negotiators insist that “none is easier to monitor than some. approach.or ten-year moratorium on enrichment. At the same time the lack of trust on all sides makes a technical fix that might otherwise be an option less acceptable to all sides. while a freeze or the forgoing of future capabilities would be easier to swallow. Iran insists on access to the full fuel cycle but under extreme pressure might set- tle for the interim acceptance of the principle of enrichment and a limited or pilot project reflecting this. Domestic Politics. Domestic politics limits Iran’s ability to forgo enrichment or the dismantling of any facilities. But both of these proposals are less objectionable than the U. might be acceptable. this Russian proposal is unlikely to fly as it is just another way of denying Iran enrichment. This would enable Iran to claim that it is using uranium from Iran to power Iranian reactors.

in Iran’s view. It also depends on being offered a package that can be used as a cover for compromise. insis- tence that Iran forgo enrichment. Any formula that leaves Iran with a capability would be unacceptable to the United States and the EU-3. exacer- bated by a lack of trust on both sides. and it accounts for why Iranian officials have sought to depict Iran’s nuclear know-how as irre- versible and insist that Iran has already achieved the requisite capa- bility. In sum.S. Compromise appears difficult. Nevertheless.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 43 Nuclear Energy Rationale. there is leeway for choice by the leadership. This in turn depends on the leadership resisting the temptation to provoke a crisis for narrow partisan and regime rea- sons and on a realistic estimate of Iran’s relative power and lever- age. In short. negotiations that might have helped by buying time have only underscored the dif- ferences. the regime has used the nuclear issue for domes- tic legitimation and is now limited by it.60 This constitutes. and Decision Making | 43 already possessing it. Domestic Politics. then. another set of discriminations within the NPT. Iran’s negotiating strategy with the EU-3 and its behavior with the IAEA have not enhanced its goal of gaining acceptance of its right to the full fuel cycle. while any formula assuring them runs up against Iran’s red- lines regarding enrichment. Although Iranian decision making reflects a broad consensus. Ironically. as discussed in chapter five. . Iran’s insistence on self-sufficiency and right to the full fuel cycle is difficult to square with the EU-3 and U.

All of these traits are evident in the areas discussed below. Though a threat to Western interests. the nature of that threat is dif- ficult to categorize. Iran’s combination of a sense of grievance and a sense of entitle- ment is not reassuring. not being able to read a state’s nature can lead to faulty assessments.1 I Iran is not a typical outlaw state in that it has at least some redeeming qualities: It is not overtly confrontational or given to wild swings in behavior or to delusional goals. Iran has demonstrated a powerful streak of opportunism—seizing tactical openings with- out reference to other concerns and being unfussy about its tacti- cal alliances to promote its interests. the closed nature of the regime breeds secrecy.2 Moreover. increasing the risk of miscalcu- lation. particularly when deal- ing with already limited intelligence. This deliberate ambiguity facilitates activities that can be disclaimed (deniability).*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 44 3 Fear of a Nuclear Iran ran is difficult to read and Iranian society is hard to categorize. and deception. and there is evidence of pluralism and some debate within the country. As was shown in Iraq. Related is the closed nature of the regime that is often self-absorbed to the point that it can grossly misread or ignore others’ concerns. it has not denounced arms control treaties to which it formally adheres. dissimulation. Though pragmatic. 44 .

Iranian officials appear to delight in obfuscation. the way in which revela- tions of Iran’s sensitive facilities (the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and the heavy water plant at Arak) surfaced and the reluc- tant and contradictory method in which Iran has dealt with them— through half truths. Whatever the merits of a large-scale nuclear program for a state well endowed with oil and gas deposits. lies. scale. Furthermore.6 Finally. To these are added the question whether Iran—like Libya—received nuclear weapon designs through the AQ Khan network. there are ample grounds for suspicion. slipping from discussing nuclear technology to a weapons capability and back again: Believe me. The nature.5 The pattern of Iran’s clandestine procurement over the past decade has long convinced the United States in par- ticular of Iran’s weapons ambitions. which is normally associ- ated with a weapons program. activities in Lavizan and Iran’s interest in polonium. inconsistencies.3 Together with Iran’s failure to disclose certain activities to the IAEA until they were exposed and the possibility that other such activities remain in a clandestine undeclared program. there are still some troubling questions pending with the IAEA: namely. and erection of obstacles to hinder and render inspections useless—all suggest the body language of a state with something to hide. these centrifuges would shorten the time needed for Iran to build a weapon. If so.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 45 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 45 Nuclear Infrastructure and Program Iranian leaders insist that their nuclear infrastructure is intended for peaceful purposes. which raises questions about the exclusively peaceful and civil nature of program. There is also the issue of orga- nizational links and contacts between the AEO and the military. undeclared activities. the West) treat us in accordance with that .e. psychologically it is as if we have a nuclear bomb now and they (i. and sequencing of the program suggest a weapons program. the infrastructure being developed is itself a cause for concern.4 In addition there are unanswered questions about whether Iran acquired P2 centrifuge technology on offer from Pakistan.

however. Given the uncertainties of intelligence.10 Tehran has placed emphasis on missiles since 1988 and believes they will be decisive in future conflicts.. We want to produce fuel. estimates of Iranian achievement of a nuclear capability range from five to ten years. Its missile program is highly political.7 Whether Iran is. The development of the missile industry in paral- lel with the quest for nuclear technology suggests they may be linked and that the missiles are intended as delivery systems for nuclear or other WMD warheads. is that Iran relies on missiles and wants their development to reflect its sta- tus as a regional power. There are both certainties and uncertainties about this program.8 Missiles Alongside the nuclear infrastructure. or is close to being. What is clear. and much publicity and fanfare attend its various milestones.11 It initially developed missiles with assistance from North Korea (from Soviet-era SCUDs together with Korean NO DONG technology). It has nothing to do with us if technically the system for the production of fuel through enrichment is such that we are able to produce something else. Iran’s missile program is espe- cially troubling. self-sufficient in nuclear technology will determine how effective international pressure and sanctions will be. it is only a matter of time until enough fissile material is amassed for a nuclear weapon. they treat us like this because they think we have such a thing.. Today its missiles take the form of . but it is not the only one. They are always worried that something may happen and they may have to deal with a nuclear Iran with nuclear weapons. The point of no return is reached when a coun- try is no longer technologically dependent on other sources.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 46 46 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran belief .9 This may indeed be the expla- nation. We truly want to produce fuel. if the country embarks on a determined nuclear weapons program.

The missile culture of the region (missiles have been used in Iran. and Afghanistan) compounds this threat.14 It attrib- utes to missiles an almost mystical quality from the experience of the war with Iraq and seeks to make political capital from its tech- nological breakthroughs. Iran’s missile pro- gram is relatively constrained. which would increase the range of mis- siles and improve their accuracy and stability. Iraq. while largely a self-sufficient domestic industry. Given limited reaction time and the narrow margin for error. the introduction of more missiles could make for hair-trigger responses and mistakes. So far.13 It is clear that Iran has ambitions as a missile power. Iran also seeks to develop the more technically demanding solid fuel propulsion for its missiles. has been the most concerned. whose existence Iran considers illegitimate. Iran has not been very sensitive to other states’ con- cerns. Iran continues to seek cruise missiles from states and on the open market.17 It would be imprudent to assume that Iran will lag technically indefinitely or that its missile program has no relationship to the . Yemen. deployed since July 2003. does nothing to reassure Israel about Iranian intentions. with rather limited guidance and precision systems and several delays and failures.000 kilometers with a one-ton warhead. The range of Iran’s mis- siles (reaching Israel). finally. allegedly for peaceful purposes.15 While trumpeting the successes of its mis- sile program. And. Given the short distances and the cross-cutting alliances in the region. Israel has to treat any incoming missile “as if it carries WMD warheads” and react accordingly. A multistage missile will certainly have military implications. together with the anti-Israel slogans painted on missiles at parades. Similar to the SCUD-C (or Pakistan GAWRI). 16 Israel. Iran has recently announced the testing of a ballistic missile with multiple warheads as well as high-speed underwater missiles. this missile is liquid fueled and has a range of approximately 1. in particular.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 47 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 47 the SHIHAB-3. but this would imply a multistage missile that Iran has yet to master. Iran is preparing to send a satellite into orbit.12 Guidance can also be improved through generally available technology like the global positioning system (GPS).

Iran has sought to avoid reliance on outside arms suppliers since 1988 when U. they decouple destructive capacity from military capability (or skill). it is important not to infer an automatic relation- ship between Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 48 48 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran development of a nuclear infrastructure. But it would be imprudent to assume no relationship. Safety of materials and integrity of command and control are areas of con- . It would be wrong to assume any automatic relationship between a missile pro- gram and a nuclear program. Unlike airpower. missiles have been seen as a substitute for airpower. missiles are assured of pene- tration. avionics. Decision making for national security has been concentrated in a few hands. less flexible. In both cases. and carry less payload. and cheaper over their life cycle. Ever since. They are thus the ideal weapon for an ambi- tious and status-hungry state limited in military capacity. pilots. missiles can act as a crude deterrent.18 That said. one could make exactly the same argument in justification of a nuclear weapons program. Closed System The Iranian political system even after twenty-seven years still functions more like a conspiracy than a government. dispersed. which is costly (spare parts. In contrast. but both also constitute options or investments in what could become an integrated nuclear weapons and delivery sys- tem. most notably where the nuclear program is concerned. mobile). survivable (hidden. the domestic political dimension—Iran as a technologically developed state—is as important as the quest for regional status. Unfortu- nately. Both programs could have other uses.S. As such. and training) and creates dependency. Never mind that they are less accurate.19 This in itself is a cause for concern because it is not clear if the handful of decision makers are familiar with the lessons of the nuclear era or have given serious thought to the implications and responsibilities entailed in the possession of nuclear weapons materials. sanctions virtually grounded its air force.

Of 152 new members elected to the Majles in February 2004.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 49 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 49 cern as is vetting of officials for political reliability. the possibility of unreliable elements pass- ing on materials is very real. The parallels with the Pakistan expe- rience suggest that the “insider” problem may be even more serious in Iran. their zealotry has certain risks.20 In the June 2005 presidential elections. Moreover. besides Ahmadinejad. and running of terrorists. the Guards may contain unsta- ble elements willing to transfer sensitive nuclear or biological tech- nology to terrorist groups. Without strong civilian control and a clear chain of com- mand that takes very seriously the threat of leakage or transfers. Yet these same Guards have been in charge of liaison. the Guards are in a critical posi- tion to assure safety and to prevent leakage of dangerous materials to terrorists. as custodians of Iran’s most sensitive weapons sites. having interfered twice in recent months on issues about which they felt strongly. training. where there are several factions within the ruling establishment. 91 had Guards backgrounds. Technology transfer could be done by a freelance insider. perhaps unhappy with a government in a crisis. by inadvertence through leakage from poorly secured facilities.23 Whether the regime’s penchant for secrecy is compatible with accountability is worrisome. . and a fur- ther 34 former Guards officers now hold senior-level posts in the government.21 These elements may become a law unto themselves. the risk will continue to exist. there were three other candidates from the Guards. Because the Guards are recruited and chosen for their ideological commitment to the regime. In a regime with radical elements. The dominance of the Guards and intelligence officials could open the country to a new militarism. The increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s politics is another source of concern. or as a result of an institutional policy decided by the Guards leadership. the Guards could have disproportionate influence on how Iran looks at nuclear weapons and behaves with them once acquired. Vetted only for regime commitment (rather than psychological stability).22 As a hard-line interest group.

S.25 Terrorism As terrorism has evolved.26 In U. The regime has played the nationalist card in the nuclear issue. After 9/11. so far successfully. increasing the risk of miscalculation and conflict. thinking. But reliance on technology denial in an age of globalization is a thin reed on which to base security. In this view such states by definition seek WMD and consort with ter- rorists: Why would they not transfer WMD to terrorists who share their animosity toward the United States? The first thought of the .24 The cultivation and exploitation of ultranationalism is a two-edged sword that leaves regimes as much a captive as a driver of the phenomenon (note the recent parallels with China and Japan). the aims of terrorists can no longer be assumed to be limited.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 50 50 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran Besides transfer and leakage from sources within the regime. the limiting factor in terrorists’ capacity to do so has become technological. the most likely source for WMD technology for terrorists is supply from outlaw states seeking to damage the United States by waging proxy wars through asymmetrical strategies. military or civil- ian. The danger here is that in crises such regimes losing con- trol become the captive of mobs and emotions. there is a more general risk from ultranationalists. which may reflect much deeper currents. This is the tenor of the discourse of the current government. a major concern has been to close off any paths by which this destructive technology might reach hostile terrorist groups. but with one clear result: It has narrowed its own room for maneuver. Reliable barriers to prevent the diffusion and leakage of technology to groups determined to target states has become a strategic priority. Given the motivation to inflict major destruction. Iran’s grandstanding on Palestine as a Muslim issue is analogous to Arab states using it as an Arab issue—as a way of accruing domes- tic capital for their minority regimes deficient in political legiti- macy.

government reports esti- mate that “only Iran appears to have the possible future motivation to use terrorist groups in addition to its own state agent.S. and (allegedly) through it and on its own. rogue states need to be dealt with severely. “We’re determined to deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their ter- rorist allies who would use them without hesitation. “The possibility of a nuclear weapons capable Iran is particularly grave because of the Iranian regime’s connections to terrorists.”30 U. make it a potentially dangerous adversary as well as a major threat as a supplier of such weapons to terrorists groups.”28 Since 1984 Iran has been labeled a state sponsor of terrorism. homeland. The former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati has . and in recent years it has been promoted to being “the most active state sponsor of terrorism. a serious enough matter in itself.34 Characteristically. supports the crossover to Sunni Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Iran’s support of terrorism is in fact a mixed record. while keeping its options open. to plot against the U. Iran has by no means dispensed with terrorism completely. Pre- venting proliferation to such states became a means of preventing their transfer to terrorists.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 51 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 51 president after 9/11 was to wonder whether Iraq or Iran had some- thing to do with the attack.S.32 Such sup- port is now focused on the Middle East in general. is doubly so when the potential prolifera- tor has the profile of Iran. Iran still actively supports Hezbollah. As Sena- tor Richard Lugar (R-IN) put it.”31 Nuclear proliferation.33 Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah and its militia at a time when Lebanon is in flux and Syria is in retreat also exposes Tehran to crit- icism as a spoiler. Although it is no longer used routinely as an instrument of state policy.27 Since 9/11 the idea is that because of these relationships and their possible role as enablers of terrorists’ WMD ambitions. the regime in Tehran seeks to have it both ways: to show that terrorism is a thing of the past. together with its WMD ambitions and its—at best—ambiguous nuclear pro- gram.”29 This record and reputation. As President Bush said in a 2005 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy.

in Iraq.. which raised questions about Tehran’s motivations.37 Iran gave the impression that it was holding on to Al Qaeda operatives as a bargaining card.”36 Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have had contacts and cooperated before 9/11.”35 Hezbollah is also a political party in Lebanon with members sitting in Parliament.” attributing responsibility to “those who were against bal- anced and active relations . The aim is to bleed the United States and Great . as evidenced by its link with Al Qaeda and through Hezbollah with Islamic Jihad and Hamas. is Iran’s pro- vision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda elements escaping from Afghanistan in 2002–2003 and inconsistent statements about whether or not Al Qaeda elements were in Iran.38 There is no reason to believe that Iran today.” At the same time Iran reports comments from the Secretary-General of Hezbollah saying that if Iran were attacked. technology (through the cut-out and conduit of Hezbol- lah). Iranian officials initially denied providing safe haven to Al Qaeda and later suggested that they would be repatriated on a selective basis or tried in Iran.. and training. which clearly seeks WMD. who would have the motive and capacity to seek out nuclear weapons.S. however. any more that Sad- dam Hussein earlier.S. from Al Qaida to Hezbollah to various doomsday cults. Iran has used any group that can further its interests. U. As a result Hezbollah has shown restraint. control of the Iranian opposition force. providing them with arms. but such statements raise doubts and give credence to one analyst’s observation that “there are numerous groups. as well as sensitivity to Israel’s capacity to retal- iate and to its own position in Lebanese politics. The most serious development. irrespective of sectarian affiliation or polit- ical orientation. interests throughout the world would be attacked and that “we can build an atom bomb and we should have [atom bombs].*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 52 52 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran argued that even terrorism in the past was “not in the interest of the country. would transfer WMD technology to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or Hezbollah. the Mujahaddin (Islamic guerrilla fighters). possi- bly for trading against U. Hezbollah is not normally considered comparable to Al Qaeda. Currently Iran is sus- pected of arming Sunni and Shiite groups in Iraq. with Europe.

Impact of a Nuclear Capability on Iran’s Behavior Would possessing a nuclear weapons capability lead to greater restraint or more aggressive policies in Iran? How would the acqui- sition of nuclear weapons affect Iran’s goals or behavior? Even a risk-averse state might be emboldened by a new capability.42 Neither explanation— ignorance or brinksmanship—is reassuring about Iran’s use of terror- ists and its likely policies once it has a nuclear capability. and the over- lap of interest is not total.S. suggest either a degree of ignorance about the intensity of feeling on this issue in the United States.40 In the past Iran has used its ties with Hezbollah (armed with Katushya missiles) as a threat to deter Israeli strikes against Iran. This opportunistic attitude is quite consistent with Iranian oper- ating style. however. In the process Iran is abetting the diffusion of technology (such as shaped charges and infra-red bombs) in precisely the way it did from Lebanon to the West Bank and Gaza. No government that wanted to survive would hand over to such groups the means and the decisions that could affect its own vital national security interests. or an insouciance about the ability to get away with it through calculated ambiguity and indirection.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 53 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 53 Britain. together with the cur- rent policy of ambiguity toward that group. Hezbollah.41 Using ties with terrorists as deterrence against U. strikes in the future cannot be discounted.39 Relations with such groups are essentially tactical. Iran has never paid a price for this involve- ment dating from the Marine bombing in Beirut 1983 through Al Khobar in 1996. signal Iran’s regional leverage. for example. is only one of the ways that links with terrorists might increase dangers from proliferation. Analysts differ on whether nuclear weapons would have a sobering effect on . Simply put. Iranian links with Al Qaeda. Direct transfer. might feel emboldened by its sponsor’s new capabilities and act in ways expecting support from Tehran. and keep the United States bogged down and unwilling to consider targeting Iran.

*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 54 54 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran all states. and its oper- ating style) is likely to determine the command system it sets up for its nuclear capability. there are grounds for concern. perhaps by seeking to extend deterrence to them. Given the likelihood that the Revolutionary Guards will be the custodians of this new capability and that they see WMD as offensive weapons rather than deterrents. • A more activist belligerent Iran might seek to use its nuclear weapons to sanctuarize its homeland from reprisal. Iranian officials have made some characteristically veiled threats: If the United States continued its (diplomatic) pressure. but in light of its opportunism and given the uncertainties as to how a new major military capability might influence behav- ior. At the least. and on the degree of risk- taking states would be willing to run given the heightened stakes. even without a nuclear capability.45 • Iran’s track record. or by threatening states friendly to the United States.44 • Iran’s strategic culture (its experience of Iraq’s surprise attack in 1980. is not a model of restraint. by widening the dispute by stirring regional instability. the threat coming from an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is multifaceted and could include the following elements: • Iran might be tempted to support terrorist groups such as Hezbollah more openly. neither eventuality can be completely discounted. its decision-making culture. Iran would . new capabilities might stimulate more radical elements (especially in the Guards) to argue for a more ambitious set of policies.43 Broadly speaking. Iran has tended to be conscious of its own mili- tary weakness and has avoided running risks. irrespective of orientation.46 In the current impasse between Iran and the United States and the EU-3. Islamic Iran has made it a prac- tice in crises to destabilize the region by threatening hor- izontal escalation.

Iran has invested heavily in missiles. even though none of the regional threats it faces are likely to be unconventional. domestic production of arms.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 55 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 55 have “no choice but to agitate conditions for America and to endanger its interests. Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Option? Iran has been clearly influenced by other proliferators. That Iran’s conventional capabilities have remained limited and barely developed since 1988 therefore has dangerous implications. and in stretching their uses. Iran runs the risk of lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use. In looking for new and novel uses to compensate for their conventional inad- equacies. Iran may have asked itself: “Do . • Despite its far-flung borders and more than a dozen neighbors. In assessing the 1993–1994 North Korean case. and research and development of WMD.” Iran has indicated that a refer- ral to the UNSC could result in regional repercussions: “The region needs stability and the smoke of any escala- tion in the region will hurt their own eyes. Iran would thus leave itself with no other practical option except threat or actual use of such weapons.”47 In light of current and past threats to hold the region hostage. 48 Emphasis on missiles and possibly nuclear weapons might give Iranian leaders the false impression that such weapons are somehow more elastic in their uses than is warranted by the experience so far. there is room for doubt about what a nuclear-capable Iran would threaten. This threat would be reinforced domestically by a consideration of sunk costs: Of what use are these weapons if they cannot be applied practically in all contingencies? A balanced conventional force in Iran would be more reassuring to Iran’s neighbors and the international community.

*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 56 56 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran you get international cooperation by cooperating with safeguards or do you get cooperation by high-powered confrontation and bar- gaining?”49 What is striking about the North Korean case.51 Periodically. the need for deterrence vis-à-vis the United States. when Iranian officials made several statements about the necessity for WMD and specifically references to chemical weapons as “the poor man’s atomic weapon. by extension. Iran’s quest for status and regional influence.55 . deterrence.” suggesting (like Saddam Hussein) that uncertainty about Iran’s capabilities serves as a deterrent.50 There are grounds for assuming Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons.” such comments have since been repudiated. and the possible political benefits domes- tically in shoring up the regime are all possible reasons for seeking nuclear weapons. In 1998 secret comments by the Guards Commander General Safavi—to the effect that Iran needed to reconsider its participation in international conventions banning WMD in light of the threat posed by Israel—were leaked and never convincingly repudiated.54 Some conservatives have also noted the importance of cultivating or simulating “irrationality” in bargaining and. However. is the perceived centrality of nuclear weapons as the guarantor of regime security.52 There are also reports that the Guards and military strategists are convinced that only a nuclear Iran can assume its place as a major regional power and adequately deter a possible attack from the United States or Israel. which may or may not be applicable to Iran. After a rocky start in the 1980s. how- ever. This implies that it is not a bargaining chip but an insurance policy unlikely to be given up. the military in the form of the Revolutionary Guards appears to revive this thinking.53 Former Guards commander Mohsen Rezai criticized the negotiators for reducing Iran’s deterrent capability by cooperating with inspectors and “turn- ing over our country’s top intelligence documents. Iran’s own statements are at best contradictory and reflect the aim of exploiting ambiguity for strategic purposes. a nuclear weapons option might meet these needs equally well without the costs associated with overt pro- liferation.

They claim that Iran opposes WMD on principle. even when a victim of Iraq’s chemical weapon attacks between 1983 and 1988. that their own nuclear ambitions are peaceful. Consequently. stating that “the . which in their view means that “stability cannot be achieved” in the region.) Former defense minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani also opposed nuclear weapons. As proof of their intentions. This will not serve our national security. and defense doctrines—a stance they argue is reflected in Iran’s adherence to all the relevant arms control treaties.”61 (Presumably this refers to the sanctions they would trigger. but also “their production would block our progress in other scientific and technological fields.59 Rowhani has put the case more practically: Our decision not to possess weapons of mass destruction is strategic because we believe that these weapons will not pro- vide security for Iran. with statements like “nuclear weapons do not solve any problems” because power comes from morale and unity.57 They maintain that WMD have had no place in Iran’s defense strategy. national security. nonetheless. regional security will worsen. they will create big problems.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 57 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 57 Iranian officials insist that they have no nuclear weapons ambi- tions but also note Israel’s “dangerous” possession of nuclear weapons. We are confident that our possession of these weapons will force these countries to seek the support of big powers. We absolutely do not want to blow up those bridges by mobi- lizing our resources to produce weapons of mass destruc- tion. On the contrary. not just in terms of regional influ- ence.60 Earlier Rowhani argued that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms would come at too high a price.58 They further allege that Islam forbids nuclear weapons and that Supreme Leader Khamenei has issued a fatwa banning them. Iranian leaders point to their refusal to countenance the development or use of chemical weapons.56 They insist. Iran exerted huge efforts during the past few years to build bridges of confidence with the states of the region.

It seems that the only thing that atomic bombs are capable of doing is to kill innocent people and incite public opinion against the country using these weapons. by having nuclear weapons.”62 A former representative to the IAEA. given their concentrated power. whereas. and noted that for Iran nuclear weapons “would raise more threats against it. we follow a strategy of not having such a dangerous weapon. defended the NPT despite its discriminatory nature. and the lit- tle discussion that exists is characterized by an alarming degree of ignorance or oversimplification. Hard-line newspapers tend to argue for nuclear weapons on deterrence grounds.” He saw no threats on Iran’s periphery necessitating nuclear weapons and believed that any such weapons Iran acquired would not be able to deal with either Russian or Israeli nuclear weapons. nor is there reference to the specificity of the Israeli case given the existence of an existential threat and the legacy of the Holocaust. noting that Japan would not have been attacked if it had possessed nuclear weapons and that possession does not necessarily mean use. there is no public debate in Iran about the wisdom of acquiring nuclear weapons. He argued that possession would not enhance a state’s prestige.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 58 58 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran problem is that we enjoy advanced technical know-how and the enemies develop a perception that we are after nuclear arms. Curiously. Ali Akbar Salehi. gave the most detailed argument against nuclear weapons. there is little discussion about the limited value of Israel’s nuclear weapons in dealing with the Arab states’ conventional threat or the two intifadas. not assure security.64 As was discussed in chapter two.”66 There is a curious absence of serious con- sideration of the specific costs and benefits of nuclear weapons and no discussion of the relative cheapness of nuclear weapons.63 Iranians consistently emphasize Israel as a strategic alibi.65 Oth- ers argue that nuclear weapons are of doubtful utility: “In fact it is not clear what the value of having atomic bombs is. to divert accusations from Iran’s own program and to defuse any potential regional criticisms. or that the costs of such programs typi- .

which has seen leaders exaggerate the program. both the United States and Iran have. particularly the United States. No clear distinction is possible in a country that emphasizes possessing the full fuel cycle. val- ues. to give Iran space or cover for a retreat could further narrow options. as if it were easily achieved and absent associated costs. the costs of getting nuclear weapons outside the treaty do not appear commensurate with the benefits for Iran. Both goals would be consistent with the aims. In general. and lessons of the regime. Miscalculation on both sides is thus a real risk. It makes a difference for policy whether Iran seeks nuclear weapons or just the option.69 But Iran’s determined incrementalism can be upset by the dynamics of interactions. It appears doubtful that Iran has decided definitively in favor of nuclear weapons. a missile program. and a quest for recognition as a member of the nuclear club. for their own dif- ferent reasons. In the absence of strategic urgency. “exaggerated Iran’s nuclear capability. So there is no detectable grand strategy but rather a determined push to get as close to a weapons capabil- ity as possible within the treaty and then see what happens. In an unhealthy dynamic. Iran hopes to avoid paying too high a price for achieving a near capa- bility. and its nuclear drive has been consis- tent with either. And the unwillingness of Iran’s inter- locutors. the discussion appears more to be about morale and status than defense.67 Nor is the util- ity of nuclear weapons for Iran’s specific security needs post- Saddam and post-Taliban discussed. Deterrence is discussed as a catch-all rather than relational concept.” making it “harder to resolve. may inhibit Tehran from appearing to halt or reverse it.”68 The arguments for a nuclear option (or nonweaponized deter- rence) are at least as strong as those for nuclear weapons. Iran’s own domestic politics.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 59 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 59 cally come in spikes with modernization cycles. In playing the issue by ear with no irreversible commitments. Even more questionable is Iran’s intentional muddying of the issue of fuel supply security (which in principle is soluble with guarantees) and the issue of the fuel cycle itself. .

*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 60 60 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran Nuclear proliferation is traditionally visualized in terms of a threshold. The possibilities are often referred to in shorthand as models: for example. Conceptualizing it as a continuum enables one to see vari- ous stages in the process of proliferation—a spectrum of possibil- ities comprising elements of various capabilities. the Japan model (a full civilian capability easily converted to weapons capability within the treaty). As Ariel Levite has noted: Nuclear hedging refers to a national strategy of maintaining. Iranian leaders have denied even seeking a capability. or at least appearing to maintain. In its most advanced form. and the Israel model (weapons capability. the Iraq model (covert weapons activities within the treaty). claiming that they “do not want to be close to producing them [weapons]. which has been the focus of nego- tiations and the crux of the differences.71 Iran’s attempt to position itself to acquire a nuclear option is a classic case of nuclear hedging. outside the treaty) (see Figures 3 and 4 for details on these models). This so- called breakout option is implicit in what Iran seeks. change of status (nuclear/nonnu- clear) is less dramatic and more shaded.”70 Yet insistence on the fuel cycle. dramatically changes the status of a state. in effect a Japanese model of a full spectrum of capabilities short of weaponization within the treaty—precisely what the EU-3 and the United States seek to deny it. Given gradations short of a full weapons capability. ensures a close capability to produce weapons should such a decision be made. based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a rel- atively short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years. nuclear hedging involves nuclear fuel cycle facilities capable of producing fissionable materials (by way of uranium enrichment and/or plutonium separation) as well as the scientific and engineering expertise . unassem- bled. which once crossed. a viable option for the rel- atively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons.

etc. especially undeclared sites/facilities. Pathways. materials or _ uranium enrichment 2002 _ NWS option [“threshold”] Bargaining chip? _ withdrawal from NPT _ U. Security umbrella _ Virtual capability NORTH KOREA ISRAEL _ High demand / medium capability _ High demand/high capability _ Plutonium diverted _ Did not join NPT _ Enrichment – fissile material _ No inspections / safeguards _ No safeguards / inspections _ Declared withdrawal NPT _ Missile programs/submarines _ Declared NWS capability. ready for “breakout” Iran uncertainties: state of nuclear capability.S.e. Motivation and Capability Contrasted IRAN JAPAN _ Low demand / high capability _ High demand / medium capability _ NPT safeguards / inspections _ Peaceful use of N.” i.S. and Positions of Selected Nuclear-Capable States Unsafeguarded NWS Pakistan IRAN Declared outside treaty Tested Declared or virtual//opaque NPT safeguards capacity doctrine AP signatory Seeks full fuel cycle Missile/space program (Covert parallel fuel program?) Accepts constraints on fuel cycle ? Does not accept fuel Potential for “breakout” cycle constraints North Korea Japan model = (inside NPT) _ sign treaty _ develop nuclear infrastructure _ no safeguards _ energy rationale (diversification) _ no inspectors _ space/missile program Essential for _ “breakout”/expel inspectors _ plutonium economy state survival? _ plutonium 1994 _ “virtual capability..*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 61 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 61 Alternative Models Figure 3. How flexible is ultimate decision on NWS? Figure 4. technology _ A. applied _ Space/missile programs _ Missiles _ Fuel-cycle ambitions _ Energy rationale _ U.P. security umbrella] .. Thresholds. security guarantees _ “declared capability” (2005) _ so far: no test of NW material from reactors.S. missile _ Unassembled weapons capability _ Opaque nuclear doctrine _ No test [so far] _ Weaponization? _ [U.

74 This does not preclude a willingness to meet international concerns (that is. to use its claimed capability as a bargaining card). .72 IAEA Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei has suggested that “countries look at know-how as a deterrent. and to brag about (and exaggerate) its technological and sci- entific progress at home. is how close to a weapons option Iran can prudently be allowed to get. intelligence official has noted that a deterrent value need not come from a successful nuclear program but from convincing others.S. including neighbors.73 The implication is that the appear- ance of full fuel cycle capabilities can itself achieve some of the functions or benefits of a nuclear deterrent.” Taking the thought one step further. If you have nuclear material. but it does seek to drive a hard bargain that includes regime security guarantees. Iran can still take its time and drive closer to a fuel cycle capability by legally and gradually acquiring and building up under inspections its “nuclear know-how technology and materiel necessary to produce nuclear weapons some day if a dire strategic threat should arise. to maximize its opportunities within the NPT. Alternatively. then. and what can be done about it. Iran’s quest for a virtual capability is consistent with an inclination to hedge against an uncertain security future. of the existence of such a program. the weapon part is not far away.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 62 62 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran both to support them and to package their final product into a nuclear explosive charge.”75 The critical question. one U.

From Damage Limitation to Confrontation The surprise revelation of its undeclared nuclear activities in 2002 caught Tehran unprepared.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 63 4 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy IIran’ran has improvised a strategy to deal with the “outing of its nuclear facilities” undeclared to the IAEA for nearly two decades. far from reassuring the interna- tional community. s tactics and negotiating style. four years after the issue first surfaced. It came at a sensitive time. Tehran swiftly sought to limit damage and decided to deal with the revelations and attendant inquiry from within the treaty. Libya’s decision to give up its WMD activities in 2003 on the one hand and North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT and claim possession of nuclear weapons on the other clearly contrasted 63 . Iran’s policy has been conscious of developments elsewhere. questions remain as to the extent and peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. have exacerbated the problem of trust. as a way of gaining time to devise a strategy. with victory in Afghanistan feeding a U. sense of confidence that was manifest in planning the next phase of the war against terrorism and prolif- eration of WMD in Iraq.S. Thus.

. starting a slippery slope to more (U.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 64 64 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy with Iran’s course. leading to misjudgments about other states’ likely reactions. Iran’s tendency to seek to win every round of negotiations. • In the end. Tehran continued to cooperate with the IAEA and the EU-3. reluctantly and partially confirming only what was uncovered. while insisting on its rights to technology as an NPT member. • Iran’s receptivity to the EU-3 and cooperation with the IAEA has varied with Tehran’s sense of vulnerability or confidence. which is somewhere between the two. At the same time. revelations of the extent of the activities of the AQ Khan network in sales of nuclear equipment and designs to Iran put Tehran under further pressure to admit the totality of its program. • Domestic divisions also led to counterproductive grand- standing by negotiators. Iran’s approach has several defining elements.S. Taken together these attitudes sug- gested that Iran had something to hide. negotiators tied their own hands in the negotiations. negotiations reduced trust rather than built confidence. • Iran’s negotiating style. legalistic and hair-splitting. Unwilling to imitate Libya or North Korea.) demands. manufacture crises. • Iran saw concessions as dangerous. weakening any advantage Iran might have gained by the process of formal cooperation with the IAEA and the EU-3. renegotiate agreements. culminating in regime change. paral- leled its behavior toward the IAEA inspectors. • Having “talked up the issue” domestically after 2002. formally correct but unhelpful. • A certain narcissism (“how am I doing?”) is evident in Iran’s approach to the world. and redefine obligations put tactics before strategy.

and Russia through native shrewd- ness and skill. however.S. Nonetheless. giving inspectors increased access to sites. Having spent over a decade of diplo- macy depicting the denial of technology as a North–South issue. position in Iraq and the resurfacing of the North Korea crisis.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 65 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 65 The evolving strategic context after 2003.S. aggression. Against the backdrop of unwelcome revelations about the AQ Khan network and Libya’s capitulation came the deterioration of the U. diverting resources away from Iran. International negotiators have sought to force Iran to choose between the full fuel cycle and confrontation. giving Tehran the cushion of windfall revenues. without crossing the threshold of actual conflict.S. if necessary. Iran and the Negotiations Once its undeclared activities were revealed. In extenuation they argued that required declarations had not been made because U.1 Iran believed that its intrinsic importance would enable it to divide the EU–U. gave Iran reason for increasing self-confidence. also increased Iran’s sense of its own leverage (not least with new con- sumers India and China). Iran also expected support from the non-aligned countries in the UN and IAEA. not the commission of impermissible activities. The rise of oil prices and the geopolitical sensitivity of the region.2 In acting to demonstrate its good faith. sanctions imposed . Iran was seeking to reassure the international commu- nity of its benign intentions and to “remove the pretext” for U. So far Iran’s policy has been to push the door open as far as it can. Iran feels more secure and confident in 2006 than it did in 2002 and is thus willing to take the initiative in rejecting a freeze on all enrichment activities and more willing to risk confrontation. Tehran accepted inten- sified inspections and signed the stiffer Additional Protocol. Iran’s officials argued that they had only been guilty of acts of omission (a failure to report activities).S.

4 Iran saw the crisis in autumn of 2003 as a possible pretext for the United States “to carry out a new Iraq in Iran. Iran should either accept or reject the NPT: “If we accept it. the principal organ on security. Iranian negotiators accepted confidence-building measures.. and its desire to avoid a crisis with the rest of the world. “We have no other choice. As one reformist noted. we should . Iran has often acted as if it wants to cheat—to be a party to the NPT but not abide by all its rules and to claim its benefits but be ambiguous about its responsibilities.”8 More broadly. In not wishing to choose between the two. with only mixed success. which had dealt with it when it had been a routine issue. if such declarations had been made. accept the concomitant restrictions as well. the Secretary of the SNSC.”5 Iran sought a way out and grasped the lifeline thrown by the EU-3 initiative in the Tehran agreement..3 To buy time to devise a strategy.) Since then Iran has been trying to bal- ance and reconcile access to the full fuel cycle and avoidance of an international crisis. when Iran reacted again to its isolation and the ultimatum of the IAEA.”6 To bridge the gap between its quest for technology development (that is.7 Iranian officials defended the EU-3 negotiations domestically by noting that without them there would have been a crisis with the Board of Governors (BoG) of the IAEA and “the great contracts that Iran signed with their [IAEA] countries in the field of oil and gas would have been impossible. as the chief negotiator. The scenario repeated itself in autumn 2004. Causing other countries to have concerns means closing the paths to interaction” and hence failing in devel- . “not give up their rights”). Iran designated Hasan Rowhani. this time accepting the Paris agreement with the EU-3. (This agreement essentially suspended enrichment-related activities as well as enrichment itself. As chief negotiator Rowhani stated.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 66 66 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy much earlier would have been extended to those entities cooper- ating with Iran. Iran needed to have “constructive and positive interaction” with the world for its economic development. This action effectively took the dossier away from the Foreign Ministry and the AEO.

and both its cooperation and progress on answering various questions relating to its nuclear activities ensured continuous pressure on Tehran. and the United States on these issues—only differences in approach— so there was little room for creating or exploiting division. at least postponing the crisis while probing to see what benefits it could extract in exchange for renouncing the controversial technology.15 By cooperating with the IAEA. enabling them to make a point of principle and stopping inter- action with others. Iran’s leverage has been limited. dismantling facili- ties). this Rowhani/Rafsanjani view is not universally shared.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 67 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 67 opment. These periodic reports (eight between mid-2002 and October . Nobody can end it. Iran was aware of the constraints on Europe.10 Iran thus used the EU-3 channel to try to avoid making a stark choice between the two goals.9 The message was clear: Iran should not cause a crisis over the issue of enrichment that would impair its overall develop- ment prospects.” This implies that Iran cannot renounce the right to it in principle and would have extreme diffi- culty reducing its current capacity (for example. it will be a great failure for Europe and multilateralism as a whole. consisting of threats to resume enrichment and reminding the EU-3 of their stake in a successful outcome and the dangers of a breakdown. Rowhani stated that “if the talks break down and the issue goes to the Security Council. because some in Iran would prefer a cri- sis.”12 At the same time.13 Fur- thermore.14 Iranian negotiators have tried to show that their hands are tied domestically. Iran was aware that little separated the EU-3. which negotiated with the United States looking over its shoulder.11 In an interview. although freezing it in place would be politically more feasible. Russia. Iran wanted to puncture the sense of crisis and close the special nature of the inspections and cyclical periodic reporting and accounting to the IAEA Board of Governors. Therefore the red line of uranium enrichment is not negotiable because it is the “national will and is the establishment’s decision. As suggested earlier. These regular reports put Iran on notice.

*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 68 68 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy 2005) ensured that Iran had to get its story straight or risk contra- diction from technical analyses. So. It also left open questions about the source of highly enriched uranium. purchases from the AQ Khan network. Ostensibly because of the failure of the EU-3 to close the nuclear dossier in the IAEA (an unrealistic expectation given the number of unanswered and new questions appearing almost daily). no activity as such that is proscribed) with which Iran can be for- mally charged. . it is possible that late declarations about activity in tunnels and air defense around Natanz might have an innocent explanation. Iran did not declare Natanz enrichment. whether and when Iran obtained and used P2 centrifuge technol- ogy. apart from the noncompliance with safeguard obligations. and late or partial declarations were noted.17 Iran later announced its intention of resuming “the manu- facture and assembly of components”18 while affirming interest in continuing discussions for a long-term agreement with the EU-3. work on laser enrichment.16 Negotiating Style and Confidence Building Iran’s tactics have exacerbated problems of trust and reassurance. there is little (that is. In the course of these inspections. With the United States embroiled in Iraq. environmental swipes. as might the contam- ination of the imported P2 centrifuge from Pakistan. The smoking gun remains elusive. Iran threatened in March 2004 to begin testing its uranium production facility at Isfahan.19 Iran also shrugged off the IAEA’s June 2004 report critical of Iran. The Tehran agreement with the EU-3 in October 2003 soon became a subject of contention. But despite these inspection problems. and infor- mation from other sources. numerous anomalies. incon- sistencies. Tehran felt freer to harden its terms. and whether it bought weapons plans from the AQ Khan net- work as the same time as Libya. Iran argued that this facility had not been covered by the Tehran agree- ment. or the most recent on plutonium.

This interpretation was not supported by the letter of the Paris agreement.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 69 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 69 calling for more proactive cooperation by Iran as well as asking Iran to reconsider its heavy water and uranium conversion facility (UCF) programs. Iran insisted that twenty centrifuges be excluded from the suspension.24 Iran’s tendency to seek a foot in the door by exempting some centrifuges or preenrichment was now becoming a stop-and-go strategy that saw periodic crises and . Iran responded: “We are not satisfied because we believe this was the time to close the file.S. and security context and implying U. which specifically covered enrichment-related activity.”23 Much the same pattern was repeated in 2005. a move that was rejected by the EU-3. Resumption therefore was inevitable—only the date was uncer- tain. looked for a more comprehensive solution. Iran stepped back from the brink. Faced with a solid EU-3 front and the threat of referral to UNSC. Reflecting how disconnected Tehran was from international realities.22 Then. To improve its negotiating position. In March it indicated it wanted to expand quality control checks and maintenance of nonessential enrichment cen- trifuge parts to essential centrifuge parts that had been sealed by the IAEA under the suspension agreement. reached during the U.21 Iran agreed to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment pending a final agreement. This Paris agreement. economic. Tehran’s negotiating style was again in evidence. Finally. presidential elections. at the last minute. By May Iranian negotia- tors told their EU-3 counterparts that their understanding was that conversion of uranium to gas (preenrichment) does not amount to enrichment and hence was not covered by the Paris agreement. the agreement was depicted as a big victory. embedding the nuclear issue in the broader political. Iran again sought to expand the area of permis- sible activity. in which Iran “managed to defuse the threats against [it] and to defend [its] rights. involvement directly or indirectly. it sped up its uranium enrichment program leading up to negotiations.”20 Iran and the EU-3 came to a new agreement in November 2004 in Paris.S. This resulted in the adop- tion of a milder resolution in the IAEA the same month.

and grudg- ing corrections). and making last-minute demands is tactically impressive but strategi- cally counterproductive. nothing more. Iran’s negotiating style of reopening agreements. If they do we will show you ours. manufacturing crises and deadlines.25 In essence this is what occurred after August 2005 when Tehran resumed conversion while insisting on its continued interest in negotiations. inconsistencies.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 70 70 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy new agreements. Iran’s insistence on reciprocity and nondiscrimination evokes little sympathy. The result is that the EU-3 is disinclined to give Iran the benefit of the doubt and feels that Iran bears the burden of proof to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions.29 Iran’s unwillingness to suspend work on the heavy water reactor at Arak (suggested by the IAEA) and its insistence on resuming centrifuge production in . comments made to Japan TV by Deputy Head of the AEO Moham- mad Saidi come across as petulant and self-serving: “The Japanese have never shown us the pictures of their centrifuge machinery. in each case advancing its program further without incurring a response.” or “We are not bound to put forward solutions beyond what international reg- ulations and IAEA safeguards require from us. The danger of this was that Iran might slice away at understandings by proceeding with conversion before an inter- national response and then agree to another suspension. exploiting or ingen- iously creating loopholes.”28 While Iranians argue that the objective of the negotiations was to create trust. the way these negotiations have been handled has only accentuated mistrust.”27 In light of this record of obstructionism and legalistic nitpicking. For example. Thus. Iran has done little to increase either its popular- ity in the UN or its credibility with its interlocutors.26 Together with tactics similar to those used with the IAEA (delay. Iranian behavior has not been reassuring. half-truths. not to suspend ura- nium enrichment permanently. its nego- tiators say. the basis is conventions. The EU-3 concluded from this that Iran’s negotiating behavior would need to be revised if progress were going to be made. “We have one principle: for mass destruction weapons. nothing less.

but Iran remains con- vinced that compromise or weakness is self-defeating because the United States will be unwilling “to take yes for an answer.”32 The result was that Russia joined the consensus on Iran’s suspicious behavior. a con- fidence deficit has been created. The French president too appeared exasperated with Iran. “a lot of ground to make up” in building trust. and it is therefore essential that Iran works closely with the agency in a proactive manner. and threatening behavior is that it fears a true accounting of its past activities would betray the fact that those activities breached the fundamental injunction against acquiring nonexclusively peaceful nuclear know- how and capability.31 Director-General Al Baradei. and then refusing to answer questions are inconsistent with any attempt to reassure the international commu- nity about its program.30 From the view of the international community.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 71 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 71 mid-2004 further eroded trust. noted that the onus was on Iran: “In view of the past unde- clared nature of significant aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. It “chipped away at the confidence issue” and the legal- istic approach “created needless suspicions. Iran delayed a visit of the inspectors to Tehran. initially barring access alto- gether to Parchin (2005).” Iran’s problematic reporting raises questions about its motives.” Iran’s restrictions on the inspections of Parchin. Iran has. razing the entire facilities at Lavizan (2004). grudging. Dissatisfied with the wording of an IAEA resolution.33 This question of trust. Statements after the failure to give the right dates for experimentation with plutonium—to the effect that the activities were not the same as earlier reported—simply stretch credulity. Russia. which it con- sidered too critical.36 Later in 2004 as part of its brinksman- ship with the EU on the question of suspension of enrichment and possible referral of Iran’s case to the Security Council.35 Iran’s tactics match this obstructionism. Kelayeh. One explanation for its contradictory. explicitly linking the two. however. and many non- aligned states closer to the United States. the IAEA. in Javier Solana’s words. Iranian offi- . Iran’s behavior has managed to drive the EU-3. and Lavizan fed this distrust. cuts both ways. a neutral figure.34 Iran’s activities delaying access to sites (2004).

enrichment at Natanz).39 This. including conversion activities.37 Iran also tied the timing of its ratification of the AP to the resumption of “full operations” (that is.”42 AEO head Reza Aghazadeh noted the “imbalance in com- . Another tactic was Iran’s periodic deadlines for “progress” and accusations of the EU-3 “dragging out” the talks deliberately. Iran’s enrichment program. Salehi has observed that “the success of the diplomatic authorities will depend on reducing the suspension period. Iran might cease cooper- ation and leave the international community even further in the dark about its programs and aims. the total freeze on enrichment proved painful. Suspension of enrichment activities was tied to the duration of the negotia- tions. Iran tried unsuccessfully in the 2003–2005 period to narrow the areas cov- ered by the term enrichment. yet these were open-ended. It is notable that Iran uses its safeguards agreements and inspections explicitly as lever- age.41 Essentially Iran could end the negotiations and be referred to the UNSC or try to resume enrichment while continuing negotiations and risk being referred to the UNSC (something the new government chose to do in August by resum- ing conversion activities unilaterally). Assuming the absence of a covert program. Iran’s record of deceptions leaves open the possibility that there may in fact be less to the program than meets the eye. together with domestic divisions.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 72 72 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy cials threatened to remove IAEA cameras at some sites and start a series of steps commencing with the “nonratification” of the Addi- tional Protocol that they had provisionally signed.40 Iran’s periodic deadlines for ending the negotiations stem from a basic asymmetry in the structure of the negotiations.38 While asserting inalienable rights and alleging conspiracies to deny it the means for development. As long as negotiations contin- ued until July 2005. was frozen by the Paris accords. accounts for the schizo- phrenic nature of Iran’s response. Iran has had to balance two considera- tions: how to maintain (and develop) its nuclear program and how to do so without creating an international consensus against it. which implies that if pushed too far.

For Iran. of course unless in the end we sit down at the negotiations table with the first rate power [United States]. Iran resorted to many of the same tactics it used with the IAEA. In its negotiations with the EU-3. and trade and diplomatic incentives.46 Constructive ambiguity has led to differences on precisely how enrichment is defined or what it constitutes and so enrichment has been left to the IAEA to define. For Tehran the indispensable goal has been recognition of the right to the full fuel cycle. given the U. Iran sought to establish the principle of the right to enrichment and to demonstrate that this right is irreversible in that Iran has mastered the full fuel cycle and cannot unlearn it.S.”45 The negotiations with the EU-3 were. Iran has offered to voluntarily suspend enrichment (with the defi- nitional uncertainty noted) for a limited time to enhance confi- dence. including brinksmanship. and threats of open-ended crises. which alone could provide the guarantees that Iran seeks. guaranteed fuel supplies at reason- able prices.44 In judging success (at least until July 2005) one can agree with Rowhani that delaying the crisis is not necessarily its avoidance: “If the danger is not removed com- pletely. refusal to go beyond public threat. a holding action and a substitute for direct contacts with the United States. It is not to dispar- age the potential importance of the EU as a strategic commercial partner to note that in the final analysis. in effect. For the EU-3.”43 The negotiations bought time for both sides. .” saying that negotiations might last several years and the freeze is “affecting the process of our activities. For the EU-3 the aim has been to get Iran to commit to a permanent cessation of all fuel cycle activities in exchange for a package that would include proliferation-resistant nuclear tech- nologies (light water reactors). the EU-3 served as a buffer and intermediary. then one cannot label this delay a success. it was an opportunity to set into motion diplomacy that was lack- ing. security guarantees. even if subjected to military strikes. Iran would need to deal with the United States.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 73 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 73 mitments. To that end. injured pride.

especially at Natanz and also the heavy water plant at Arak. “If we manage to succeed and finish this issue.47 However. they are not acceptable for the EU- 3 in this case. In light of their suspicions about Iran’s aims. Iran’s tactics have left it with few defenders among the nonaligned states.52 One part of the negotiations after November 2004 focused on how to reassure the international community of Iran’s peaceful intentions. and the like but that it would not budge from the use of the full fuel cycle. thus jeopardizing the NPT itself. seeking to divide the EU-3 (and Russia) and even the United States by dangling the enticing prospects of participa- tion in Iran’s future economic and nuclear development.48 Iran has also been unsure how to treat the EU countries. and the EU-3 is convinced that any level of activity could be used to shield . As Rowhani noted. It rec- ognizes the EU link with the United States but is uncertain how to use this bridge. The necessary level of trust does not exist.50 This attitude can spill over into Iran’s overestimation of its posi- tion: “Politically the Europeans need us. calling a possible failure a setback for the EU in specific and mul- tilateralism in general.49 Iranian officials have noted the EU’s stake in the success of the negotiations. enhanced inspections. important ties with Europe will follow. who would be affected by any denial of Iran’s rights. Although technical fixes are theoretically possible.”51 At the same time.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 74 74 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy Iran has sought to depict its right to technology under Article IV of the NPT as an issue for all developing countries. Iran threatened to go public with its own “reasonableness” in the negotiations. But there is a recognition of Iran’s stake in the outcome as well. should they reach an impasse. Iran argued that this could be managed by monitors. They have called on Europe to stand up more to the United States. On the success of the negotiations. the EU-3 was convinced that the phrase objective guar- antees (which figures in the Paris agreement of November 2004) could have only one meaning: complete abstention from the fuel cycle including the dismantling of existing facilities. they argue.” insisted negotiator Sirus Nasseri. hangs the future weight of Europe in international affairs.

approach. “help could be positive from our point of view. Iran sees U.S. Iran has little leeway domestically to forgo technology that has been depicted as indispensable for its development. Former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati articulated the slippery slope argument against any concessions: “They are bully- ing us and if we surrender and retreat in the face of blackmail. There is little likelihood that this will be acceptable to Iran. Cessa- tion meaning no activity is thus much easier to monitor than some activity. Iranians recognize that “the Europeans and the Agency [IAEA] are what we see on the surface.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 75 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 75 a covert program.”55 Nevertheless. The EU-3 backed by the United States will find it difficult to accept Iran’s access to the fuel cycle without very firm assurances.”57 Iranian leaders believe that the issue between the two countries goes beyond access to particular technology. pressure and hostility as long-standing and not exclusively or principally tied to the nuclear issue. which would creatively reinterpret it to its advantage. manipulation of the media would make it impossible for Iran to terminate them. Role in the Negotiations Iran sees the United States today as an unpredictable power. claiming that “nuclear technology is only a pretext.54 Regarding the nego- tiations.S.”53 In addition.S. If the Americans could not use this pretext.S. they . this is in effect shutting down Iran as a country. It also believes that any level of activity in any agreement would soon be the subject of reopened negotiation by Iran. Iran is unwilling to deal with the United States because Tehran believes that enter- ing any negotiations with the United States would be a trap in which open-ended discussions would destabilize Iranian society while U. “act- ing first and thinking later. Iran’s View of the U.56 Therefore an Iranian unwillingness to engage without upfront concessions from the United States paral- lels the U. Iran sees it as seeking to internationalize its dispute with Tehran. The Americans are the ones we really have to deal with” and that U.S.

63 The U.”58 They believe that even if Iran adhered to the AP and resolved its problems with the IAEA.”62 Ultimately.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 76 76 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy would resort to other excuses such as support for terrorism and violation of human rights. . pressure would continue. Tehran is convinced that granting concessions is the thin end of the wedge for the United States to multiply its demands. aims of regime change.”65 For Iran to embrace the Libyan model then is for Iran to cease seeking to be an Islamic revolutionary role model and to relinquish its aspirations for regional leadership. U. Given the mutual distrust and lack of flexibility.60 Army Com- mander Mohammed Salimi was in no doubt about U. Iran’s behavior and negotiating style have not been conducive to build- ing that trust and may even have eroded it. The notion of a slippery slope inhibits any Iranian concession.64 It is clear that Iran does not want to follow the path of Libya in its relations with the United States. aims: “The enemies of Iran are bent on changing the regime in Iran as they had in the eastern and western states. reliance on relative bargain- ing position and overall power is bound to take priority.. giving Iran little reassurance that compro- mise would be rewarded or alter ultimate U.S.S.59 A similar view is reflected in Iran’s hesitancy about giving access to military sites (not covered by the AP)—that allowing access to military sites would constitute the thin end of the wedge to open-ended inspections of all sites. aims in Iran remain opaque at best.”61 Iranian diplomats insisted that negotiations could not precede a policy change by the United States: “A country that expresses an interest in negotiations can not at the same time talk of regime change.S. The Libyan model means following the path of recog- nizing Israel.S.. Iran’s nego- tiations with the EU-3 (with the United States present but not vis- ible) hinges on trust between both Iran and the EU-3 as well as Iran and the United States. means [cutting] off relations with liberation move- ments in the world.. But as has been noted repeatedly. Rowhani observed trenchantly that the Libyan model “does not mean that they would only assem- ble all their centrifuges and put them on a ship and send them to Washington.

By leveraging the tighter oil market. Iran intensified its diplomacy especially with the nonaligned states.–EU line on forbidding enrichment as an encroachment on the rights of NPT members—an argument that resonates with Brazil and other nonaligned states.66 Iran’s resumption of conversion in August 2005 ended the nego- tiations with the EU-3. Iran intended to buy time and deflect an attack by showing a cooperative spirit and using a moderate tone. The second reso- lution (September 24. During the 2003–2004 period. Iran also increased its cooperation with the IAEA in October by granting access to Parchin and allowing inter- views with some officials. This .S.67 Tehran has sought to widen the negotiations to include the nonaligned and other members of the IAEA board rather than limit them to the EU-3. Iran has offered international participation in its nuclear program. which considered conversion termination a precondition for further discussions. 2005) threatened eventual referral to the Security Council for “noncompliance” but gave a mixed message in that it was adopted by vote rather than consensus. but by mid-2005 Tehran had adopted a more militant and confrontational approach. Accord- ingly. Iran also stepped up its campaign to depict the U. including President Ahmadinejad. Two IAEA resolutions in September did little to change Tehran’s position. with- out prejudice to its continuing conversion activities). but the precise meaning of this offer is unclear.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 77 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 77 Iran’s negotiating behavior changed in mid-2005. Iran indicated its willingness to resume negotiations with the EU-3 “without preconditions” (that is. Iran sought to induce key states such as India and China to consider the advantages of cooperation with Iran. Iran’s harder line reflected a new ultranationalism in Tehran among some elements. Iran believed it could take a tougher line and did so by reject- ing the EU-3 package offered in late July as insufficient and resuming conversion activities. A new ultranationalist government and swollen oil rev- enues together with Iran’s sense that the United States and the EU had become distracted and weakened had turned the tide. hoping to pre- vent such a referral.

But Iran showed no signs of recognizing this in the December Vienna meeting with the EU-3. going beyond a toughening of terms. It is doubtful whether either of these speeches gained Iran any new votes. Tehran followed this up with the repeated threat to end voluntary cooperation with the agency in the event of referral and to move to full.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 78 78 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy hard-line stance is evident in the tougher diplomatic policy and the more reckless rhetoric. Al Baradei’s report on Iran’s compliance was mixed. though calmer.68 The IAEA Board of Governors meeting of November 24. Ahmadinejad’s speech on the UN’s sixtieth anniversary and his statement in Tehran on Qods (Jerusalem Day) that Israel should be “wiped off the map” reflected insensitivity to international opinion and diplomacy. This meeting left open the next phase but showed considerable support for the resumption of negotiations with the EU-3. On January 3. neither embracing nor rejecting it. Iran announced the resumption of research on enrichment. but Iran’s position toward this pro- posal appeared equivocal. which was intended to discover whether there was any basis for a resumption of negotia- tions cut off since August. Advocating the elimination of another state also did little to dampen concerns about the implications of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.69 . 2006. Iran also resorted to the usual threats: suspending cooperation with the agency on inspections and the “voluntary implementation” of the Additional Protocol and invoking a Majles bill requiring suspension in the event of referral. was another step on the road to Iran’s referral to the Secu- rity Council. industrial-scale enrich- ment (for which there is no evidence that Iran can actually accom- plish technologically). with the precondition of Iran halting enrichment- related activity. meaning small-scale experimentation and development of a pilot project. Iran invested hopes in divisions between Europe and the United States and the nonaligned movement (NAM). The only prospect was in the Russian proposal backed by the EU-3. showing some progress but pointing to continued unanswered questions. but playing for time.

Iran’s faith in support from Russia and China had proven to be. a mirage.73 A last-minute attempt to keep the diplo- matic option alive came on the eve of the March Board of Gover- nors meeting. Iran was still surprised to see that the IAEA Board vote later that month on February 24 was convincingly in favor of reporting Iran to the Security Council (27:3 with 5 abstentions). its ambiguity toward the Russian proposal con- tinued in various meetings.”72 (Al Baradei’s report for the March meeting noted that Iran was testing centrifuges and had plans to begin installation of the first of 3.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 79 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 79 Iran sought but failed to get the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to agree to production cuts that would increase its leverage on threats to cut off its oil supplies. Iran’s bottom line was encouragement of international cooperation in enrichment abroad.000 centrifuges could be operational. in Rowhani’s critical assessment. without success.70 Playing on the IAEA’s fears that Iran might leave it blind as to inspections. but not at the price of transferring enrichment out of the country. Iran sent a formal letter to the IAEA on February 2 noting that political pressures and threats of reporting Iran to the Security Council would lead Iran to “suspend all the voluntary measures and extra cooperation with the Agency that have so far” been in effect. At the same time. The threats of noncooperation and burying the Russian proposal appeared to have backfired. with the president threatening withdrawal from the NPT only to be contradicted by the Foreign Ministry. Iranian officials admitted that they needed time “before 60. to convince the Europeans to accept small-scale enrichment in Iran for an indefi- .) The Iran- ian position appeared to be in disarray as well.000 centrifuges later in 2006.71 Iran pressed ahead regardless of the fact that it was digging itself a deeper hole by immediately declaring the resumption of enrich- ment activities and the limitation of cooperation with the agency. Larijani sought. Iran’s threat to move to enrichment from the current limited 164-centrifuge capa- bility to an industrial scale appeared to be yet another bluff. leaving the pre- cise date for decision after the Director-General’s report on March 6.

and its miscalculation about the impact of its various threats. With the EU.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 80 80 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy nite period. to withdraw from the NPT itself. and equity). Far from reducing opacity. rights. A rhetorical emphasis on the legal nature of the dispute only served to blind Iran to the political nature of the problem and to convince it that it is. and reopened or reinterpreted agreements. its overesti- mation of its own importance. the threat of referral did not check its rhetoric. stonewalled. . the victim. to interrupt oil shipments.”76 This tendency toward self-deception stems from Iran’s rapt self-absorption and its tendency to convince only itself with its rhetoric. Iran has threatened destabilizing linkages.74 Iran approached negotiations as a contest of wills rather than an opportunity to reach common ground through reciprocal compro- mise. the referral of Iran to the Security Council is “not the end of the story but the beginning of a new chapter. threatened and pleaded. Iran made them nonnegotiable. According to one SNSC official.75 But true to form and Iran’s particular brand of self-deception. to aggravate regional instability. more ambigu- ously. to resume enrichment. Consistent with its behavior as a spoiler. and. with a freeze on larger-scale activity for a period over which the sides would build confidence. By elevating differences into issues of principle (justice. to end inspections and cooperation with the IAEA altogether (including application of the Additional Protocol). Iran has threatened in recent months to cut off oil supplies. In the event of referral. it has cajoled and scorned. and obfuscated in its dealings with the IAEA in respect to information and access. Self-deception accounts for its misjudgment about others’ reactions. Inside and outside the negotiations Iran has shown a proclivity for brinksmanship and managed crises.77 None of this is calculated to reassure other states about Iran’s behavior if it had a nuclear capability. again. Iran has dissembled. Tehran has played on ambiguity about its inten- tions and about the scope of its program.

S. The IAEA and the EU-3 in turn considered the U.” offering incentives and dialogue to temper U. critical of the IAEA’s failure to quickly and unequivocally condemn Iran. threats and sanctions. The cases of Iraq and North Korea may be 81 . which have been on the best way to accomplish this goal. and the D IAEA all agree on the need to prevent the emergence of a nuclear Iran. In assessing the success of the international community in the Iran arena. and the threat of Iran’s referral to the UNSC has increased the IAEA’s leverage on Tehran.S. have not posed an obstacle to policies.–Iran feud.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 81 5 The International Response espite initial differences. U. the EU-3. pressure has energized the IAEA.S. it is important to underline criteria for comparison and continuing uncertainties as to ultimate outcomes. The IAEA has lent its weight to buttress the EU-3 initiatives. The agency’s prominent role as an international institution has made its medicine more palatable politically for Tehran (and Russia and China) and defused any notion that the issue is primarily a U. The differences.S. The United States. which have been largely mutually reinforcing. showed ambivalence about the EU-3 diplomatic initiatives. the United States. response of quick referral to the UNSC as premature and probably counterproductive. while the latter has acted as a “good cop” to the United States’ “bad cop.

which wavered between non-proliferation and regime change.S. had its own motives: to deal with an important issue of international security. U. possibly followed by a condemnation and sanctions. North Korea is a testimony to the ineffectuality of the UNSC in a clearcut case of noncompliance. position was weakened by a lack of clarity about its goals. following initial underestimation of Iraq’s WMD program (1990-1991) has weakened the case for muscular responses divorced from international consensus.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 82 82 | The International Response instructive about the chances of success in the approaches in Iran.S. concerns about Iran’s proliferation fluctuated between an inclination to deal decisively with an emerging regional threat and the reality of military and diplomatic constraints on a unilateral solution. and to prevent a recur- rence of the transatlantic rift that had appeared over Iraq.S. to demonstrate the benefits of multilateralism and the 2003 EU security strategy in action. be more successful in freezing or reversing Iran’s program than the diplomatic route? And could it be contemplated realistically without first exhausting the diplomatic route? The IAEA had its own reasons for pursuing a policy of “steady engagement and robust” inspections: to deal with the first serious case of non-proliferation after Iraq (and North Korea) and to demonstrate (and test) the value of the Additional Protocol. Overreaction in 2003. 2 The EU-3.S. Reluctantly the United States supported the EU’s diplo- matic approach. The incoherence in U.1 Why would Iran’s more ambiguous case yield greater success in the UNSC? Would a referral. Prior- ity shifted from a focus on the spread of weapons technology to the . U. non-proliferation policy. which led to a change in U. unpersuaded that it would be successful. policy did little to convince Rus- sia (and by extension China) of the wisdom of following its lead. Approach After 9/11 the United States intensified its concentration on rogue states.S. too. At the same time the U.

democracy is the only assurance of lasting peace and secu- rity between states.. with Iran in a dominant position. particularly one that has nuclear technology.. the secretary noted that “Iran is pursuing policies in the Mid- dle East that are. anti-Americanism. for that of the U.” In answer to questions on this issue. while other systems are opaque.3 This shift entailed a downgrading of the impor- tance of the NPT regime (the instrument for dealing with prolifer- ation in general). Iran’s quest for a nuclear capa- bility magnifies that challenge. if not 180. This in turn led to a diminution of the reliance on international instruments and diplomacy and an increased emphasis on a unilateral posture (2002-2005).”6 Iran uses terrorism.”5 In the case of Iran. pro- liferation now became a problem not of weapons but particular states or regimes).*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 83 The International Response | 83 identity of states seeking weapons of mass destruction (that is. Later the emphasis shifted back to diplomacy. model. 170 degrees counter to the kind of Middle East that we would build.”4 One feature of democracies is openness. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave the philosophical underpinning of the administration’s policy shift.S. which seeks to substitute Iran’s rev- olutionary Islamic model.S. U. viewing it as ill-suited for dealing with the serious cases of proliferation. President Bush has emphasized this aspect of democracy in relation to Iran.” observing that “no one wants to see a Middle East that is dominated by an Iranian hegemony. officials underlined this broader con- text to Congress. and instability (in Iraq and elsewhere) to promote its preferred regional order.S. stating that “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power .-dominated regional order. but the focus on the nature of the regime in question has persisted. warning that “a non- transparent society that is the world’s premier sponsor of terror can- not be allowed to possess the world’s most dangerous weapons. The nuclear . the issue is not simply confined to that state’s opaqueness and nuclear ambitions but extends to its challenge to the U. because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within states. with Rice calling Iran “destabilizing” and the “biggest strategic challenge.

Intended to encourage the development of an opposition within Iran. . is another matter. denial strategies. a specific distinction was made between nation and regime.” In Iran’s case. Containment and freezing the program at a certain level.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 84 84 | The International Response issue is thus one of several issues of contention between the two states. and interceptions that seek to impose a cost on the continuation of the program and to delay it. the United States has increased its invest- ment in democracy promotion in Iran. Whether the funds or the means are ade- quate for the task. and support for Iranian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and increased funding ($75 million extra). through sanctions.8 In principle the United States has five broad. scholarships. President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union address again focused on a policy of “ending tyranny in the world. overlapping choices in its policy response to Iran: 1.” Care was taken to show respect for the Iranian people and their democratic aspirations—a distinction echoed by Vice Presi- dent Richard Cheney and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. Prevention . which implies a decision to prevent the emergence of a capability through its coercive elimina- tion. which necessitates that U. Rollback or reversal.S. who both emphasized the gulf between the regime and the people. This response could have military elements (strikes. A special office for Iranian affairs has been set up. export controls. 3. policy consider the nuclear issue in this overall context. the basic policy aim is clearly regime change. with President Bush describing Iran as “a nation held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its people. with more broadcasting. which implies living with some level of capability though limiting its growth but dealing with it through some com- bination of deterrence and defense.7 Acting on this premise. the United States has widened the stakes. however. Consistent with the belief that the regime itself as much as its policies are the problem. 2.

but containment attempts to deny a proliferator any strategic benefit from its capability and to ensure no further progress (with the possibility of a reversal in the future). as Libya in 2003 and South Africa in 1990 demonstrate.S. Regime change may or may not lead to a reversal of poli- cies. Both imply acceptance of some level of capability. 4. Preven- tion was the strategy attempted by the United States throughout the 1990s. covered by the term regime change. living with a nuclear Iran is something that must be prepared for but not advertised). and commerce. and the reluctance of some nuclear weapons states (notably China until the late 1990s).S. but policy reversals do not need regime change. Assessment of U. policy toward Iran today consists of a combination of elements: continuing efforts at prevention. 5. There are drawbacks associated with all five approaches. How effective an instrument of non-proliferation this can be over time is uncertain. as in the case of Iraq in 1981 and 2003) and a political dimension.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 85 The International Response | 85 invasion. Contain- ment is a policy choice in parallel with prevention or when preven- tion fails. policy has not been as coherent or as focused as the strategic stakes might dictate. moves .” the coopera- tion among pariah states. Regime change. Co-option attempts to minimize the damage for future proliferation or instability (for example. the emergence of nuclear “grey markets. Co-option.S intervention in Iraq. accepting the inevitable and trying to influence safety. security of materials. doctrine. Response U. which entails the removal of the regime by force on the model of U. Eventually the question reemerges: What to do about it? Containment is similar to co-option but at a differ- ent stage of nuclear technology. the most that can be hoped for is delay.S. the seepage of knowledge and technology. But because of globalization. U.

delegation reflected the degree of U. the need to make it consistent with international law becomes more evident.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 86 86 | The International Response toward containment. An administration that sees regimes.S. not an institution.” The United States refused to fashion its diplomacy accordingly or to define what Iran should or should not be allowed to do as encapsulating the broader chal- lenges facing the treaty.12 The United States failed to use the review . For success. Instead of focus- ing on the lacunae in the NPT. The relatively low-level representation in the U. in effective freezing the line at those who could already do so (Germany. Washington managed to have the UN pass a resolution requiring states to enact national legislation to imple- ment the NPT and prevent materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. the United States has used multilateral institutions fitfully and erratically. Another success outside of the UN is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by the United States. among others.” seeks to ensure enforcement of non-proliferation agreements by intercepting sen- sitive and illegal cargos at sea. As the number of members partici- pating increases.S. the United States sought to brand Iran (and North Korea) as noncompliant. interest in the process. Japan). the review conference would have needed more give-and- take reflecting the NPT’s “grand bargain. with bilateral agree- ments now concluded with over sixty states. To this end. By getting states to take national responsibility for inter- national commitments. UNSC Resolution 1540 was a landmark in dealing with the possible access to nuclear materials by terrorists. not the multilateral mecha- nisms to constrain them—a point that is confirmed by the U.10 In a speech in 2004 President Bush suggested that no additional states should be allowed to enrich uranium.9 At present interceptions can only take place on the high seas (as opposed to territorial waters). not weapons. failure to use the NPT Review Conference of May 2005 effectively.11 This position was aimed at Iran and North Korea but was opposed by Brazil. This initiative. and some consideration of rollback or rever- sal through regime change or policy change. face- tiously labeled “an activity. as the prob- lem tends to focus on individual states.S.

16 In July 2005 the United States threatened to seize all U. or other support to Iran’s AEO. the United States also failed to get a tough statement from the P-5 countries that could be built on to pressure Tehran on future referral to the Security Council. U.S. 102-484) banning dual-use items. which were increased in the late 1980s and supplemented by the 1996 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) that forbids foreign investment above $20 million per year in the energy sector and the Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (P.S. Though it claimed to be speaking for a strong international consensus in what was generally considered a debacle of diplomacy. Several measures strengthening these existing measures are before the U. which has been unable to develop or modernize with indigenous capital and technology alone. including the Ros-Lehtinen bill that would fund Iranian opposition groups. Congress. Black market prices in Iran are exorbitant. Since the mid-1980s sanctions were imposed for terrorism.14 Such declarations. but whether these are translated into support for strong measures in the UNSC is another matter. The United States has imposed secondary sanctions on companies and countries (includ- ing China and Russia) that trade or invest in Iran.L.S. material.15 In its prevention strategy the United States has long concentrated on unilateral (including secondary) sanctions.13 The United States allowed Iran to define the issue as one of technology denial rather than noncompliance.17 This array of sanctions has imposed an economic cost on Iran and has clearly hurt the Iranian oil industry. however. diplomacy has been more effective in getting strong statements opposing Iran’s deceptions and nuclear ambitions. the goods lack . assets of any foreign com- pany that provides or attempts to provide financial. In more restricted gatherings such as the annual G-8 meetings. are useful in rein- forcing the international dimensions of the issues raised by Iran and continuing public exposure and pressure on Iran.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 87 The International Response | 87 conference to strengthen the norm against proliferation. These secondary sanctions deter most companies that trade with the United States and have certainly discouraged investment in Iran’s oil sector by Japan and others. tech- nological.

and there is a premium on deception and evasion of sanctions through front companies. sanctions. and the like.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 88 88 | The International Response manufacturers’ guarantees. Iran has nativized the technology and has come close to the mastery of the fuel cycle even in the face of two decades of U. they remain of symbolic impor- tance today because Iran’s nuclear program has nearly reached the point of no return. the United States has not been willing to take yes for an answer in the case of Iran. UN sanctions bit over time and affected the regime’s cost calculus. or better still reversal are there? Short of regime change there is the possibility that the regime could be prevailed upon to reconsider its policies . Sanctions may have delayed Iran’s nuclear program as well.18 Largely punitive. might have been more effective had they been international (as was the case with Libya). For Libya. and other sanctions. In addition. eventually culminating in regime change. Regime change has dominated U. If U. It is no wonder that President Bush observed in December 2004 that the United States was “all sanctioned out” in respect to Iran. because they cause proliferators to reconsider the costs and benefits of a particular course. although there are now some signs that this may be changing. what other means of prevention.S. with each demand likely to generate another. false invoices. because they have cast a wide net with their ban on dual-use technology. Iranians have tended to see the nuclear issue as a pretext and U.S. sanctions alone are not likely to arrest Iran’s nuclear pro- gram. containment. the bilateral sanctions have been painful but not unbearable. However.S. however. In addition. Nor has the United States offered Iran the kind of inducements it did to Libya. because distrust and ideology have forced the United States to an all-or-nothing approach. hostility as general and open ended.S. In the case of Iran. the United States was willing to accept a change in regime policy rather than hold out for a change of regime itself. U. therefore.19 The Libyan case suggests that effective sanctions may encourage regime evolution. in being forced to develop indigenous nuclear technology.S. policy until very recently (2002-2006).

But direct discussions in Geneva in May 2003 were again torpedoed.23 Ironically. military threat had subsided because the United States was bogged down in Iraq. how- ever. Cooperation in that war might have led to more formal discussions. After the Karine A affair in December 2001. this was a lost opportunity when everything would have been on the table because Iranian leaders sensed a real threat to the regime and were willing to negotiate when the United States enjoyed maximum leverage. regional exclusion. . especially after Afghanistan. including discussion of a possible grand bargain.21 Far from rewarding proliferation. Tehran sensed that the U. how- ever.”22 Engagement. The United States has resisted this approach. Imposing economic costs could stimulate a domestic debate in Iran about the wisdom of continuing on a collision course with the West. Convincing demonstration that there will be no benefits coming from a nuclear capability (which will be offset militarily) and that the costs (sanc- tions. as evidenced by John Bolton’s comment: “I don’t do carrots. this time because of revelations that Iran was hosting Al Qaeda ele- ments. has also failed. the United States promoted Iran into the axis of evil. Tehran’s fear that the United States might target Iran next led it to a more accommodat- ing posture.S. never the preferred choice.24 By the autumn of 2003. The United States and Europe have done a poor job of stim- ulating such a debate and making clear that the issue is not denial of technology in general but objection to the regime as such and opposition to specific policies. but it was aborted by the dis- covery of a shipment of Iranian arms destined for Palestinians fight- ing Israel. thus lessening the incentive for Iran to make far-reaching concessions.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 89 The International Response | 89 as a result of domestic and international pressure.S. condemnation) will remain high is one way. Iran was confronted by U. In this new context. inducements are a means of making renunciation of technology more palatable.20 Offering inducements as well as ending sanctions would help. Iran’s rebuff of the Clinton administration’s overtures was followed by 9/11. Strengthening the incentives for states not to rely on nuclear weapons seems self-evident. power next door.

” which would be a repudiation of the kind of . more so than North Korea or even Iraq.”30 Behind his concerns were serious issues: Could Iran be brought around to renounce nuclear capabil- ities through a combination of diplomacy and threats? How durable or reliable would such an agreement be? Would not the act of direct negotiations (and possible agreement) confer legitimacy on the “repressive theocracy. the regime’s shifty behavior. and intended to appease its conservative supporters.S. From mid- 2003 the United States resorted to reliance on regime change.27 U.29 U. in part.S.28 Ulti- mately. or the lack of a domestic con- stituency or congressional support in the United States.S. and the gap between rhetoric and worked out policy is noticeable with regard to Iran. U. 26 The election of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in June 2005 served to confirm Wash- ington’s skepticism about any form of engagement strategy. the United States has had less difficulty in supporting diplomacy with Pyongyang than with Tehran. can be attributed to rivalries within the U. giving voice to its ideology. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) alluded to these divisions evident in policy toward North Korea and Iran in criticizing the “ambiguity that was neither constructive nor intended. and its controlled elections is a constant refrain. NGOs. its loathsome human rights record. policy weakness. which may be explained by Iran’s opposition to Israel. Iran is the very embodiment of evil. and unions under consider- ation in 2005 is now policy. characterized by attitude and posturing.S. which saw expression in simulta- neous calls for regime change and negotiations. administration. encouraging student demonstrations and giving declaratory sup- port to opponents of the regime and reformers.25 More concrete assistance through radio broad- casts and support of activists. Focus on the regime’s tyranny.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 90 90 | The International Response From 2003 to 2005. This theme—that the United States could not deal with an unrepresentative and repressive government—continues. policy toward Iran was incoherent. For a certain category of Amer- icans. policy toward Iran is characterized by a special antipathy going beyond distrust or the legacy of past events such as the hostage crisis and Beirut bombings.

which Washington embraced skeptically and conditionally in March 2005. verifiable. The United States now insisted that any agreement be “complete. even token.” the United States needed to get involved more directly.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 91 The International Response | 91 Middle East that the United States was now seeking? Would it be a betrayal of Iran’s democratic opposition?31 Some politicians such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ) preferred “rogue state rollback. intelligence.” while neoconservatives still argued that “only democracy in Iran will finally solve the nuclear and terrorist problems. this meant supporting the EU-3 initiative. The U.S. saw Washington as too unilateralist. Therefore. something the IAEA was unable to confirm. the United States still saw the Europeans as “wobbly.S.S. insistence on its certain knowledge that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. But there is little indication that the United States had prepared the diplomatic groundwork for a successful application of sanctions if the matter were taken to that body. 33 Instead of being “an excited bystander. Even more problematic was the U.” a formula it adapted to the case of Iran. Unable to count on regime change in time to affect the nuclear program. especially after Iraq.”32 By the end of 2004.35 Another consideration for the United States was the unhappy experience with the 1994 Korean Agreed Framework.S.S. with little prospect that unilateral sanctions could be tightened much further. Moreover. the U. aim in agreeing to support the initiative was to stiffen the EU-3 . and irreversible. policy had hit a brick wall. Given doubts about U. even friendly states gave priority to seeing whether a diplomatic solution was possible before referring the issue to the UNSC. U.S. in turn. So the U.” and the EU.34 By default. decision to embrace diplomacy was hedged. and unwilling to engage Iran directly. amounts of enrichment. the United States equated permanent cessation and objective guar- antees and refused to countenance any. While there was a need for a common front. the United States had to reconsider its policy. approach during the 2003–2005 period consisted of attempts to get the IAEA to refer Iran to the UNSC for its various failings and deceptions.

Washington was unwilling to consider the kind of comprehensive package that the Europeans considered necessary if Iran were to be convinced to forgo nuclear technology.38 Such an agreement would have to include security assurances. how this would be implemented and inspected and. . inclusion of Iran in a regional security structure.37 However. the EU-3 also committed to follow through with sanctions and referral to the UNSC in the event of diplomatic failure. if Iran refused. Europeans emphasized the need to acknowledge Iran’s “legitimate security concerns.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 92 92 | The International Response resolve and ensure that the terms of any agreement were clear and rigorous.” whereas the United States was keen to be con- vinced that the Europeans and others were prepared to take the proliferation threat seriously enough to take “risks and make any sacrifices to avert it.40 Thus.” and the United States is not. while the allies agree on what to demand of Iran. More important from the EU-3 perspective was the need for the United States to be involved in the incentive as well as the punishment side of the package. Although the United States showed a willingness to make sym- bolic gestures by lifting objections to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and to the supply of civilian aircraft parts. what would constitute the trigger for referral to the Security Council remained to be defined. as well as economic and technology assistance. Although these divisions were largely narrowed after Iran hardened its approach in mid-2005. The United States was particularly concerned to ensure that having committed to diplomacy.”39 The United States and Europe both see diplomacy as a necessary first step if the matter is to be settled by coercion. but there is a dif- ference of nuance between the two: The Europeans are less focused on the nature of Iran’s regime and would prefer the diplomacy to “succeed. there is still much room for divi- sion and disunity in their positions.36 The United States and the EU-3 easily came to an agreement on what to ask of Iran: complete and permanent cessation of its fuel cycle activities as the only basis for confidence that technology would not be diverted to weapons uses.

split as it was between those who emphatically rejected dealing with the “mullahs’ regime” and those who saw the risks of proliferation as requiring a workable policy.41 The latest formulation is that “a process which permits Iran to develop nuclear weapons is unacceptable. The official position announced by President Bush in 2003 is that the United States “will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon. For those advo- cating regime change.44 Second. which may have accounted for the “new intelligence estimate” in August 2005 that assessed Iran to be technologically further away from a nuclear weapon than many had assumed. shift was aided by two factors in mid- 2005. the United States invested more effort in diplomacy from September 2005 on by intensively lobbying key . deliberate approach that took along all the major powers was preferable to a rush to judgment that left many unconvinced. it was important to demonstrate that there remained time for this (and a sanctions) policy to be viable.43 The U. the arrival of Ahmadinejad and his behavior made the argument that Iran was an “irresponsible” state easier. the reference has been broadened to the intolerability of a “weapons capability. Making up for lost time. the administration still had not clarified its Iran policy in a convincing way. due to come on- stream in 2006-2007. facilitating a broader coalition.”42 After Iran’s rejection of the EU-3 package in mid-2005.” More recently.” suggesting opposition to any activity that involves sensitive technologies that could be diverted to weapons uses. support for the EU-3’s “lead” in a diplomatic solu- tion.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 93 The International Response | 93 the issue of sanctions (and military strikes) and the refusal of the United States to contribute to an incentives package could see divi- sions resurface and widen again. that the reactor in Bushire. should be dismantled). First.S. President Bush emphasized U. the United States did in fact become more involved.S. The U. switch to support for diplomacy and support for the March 2005 EU-3 initiative implied a recognition of the trade-off between obtaining a broad international consensus and the need for haste.S. The United States no longer insists that Iran has no need for any nuclear energy (that is. A graduated.

None of these states ini- tially supported Iran’s referral to the UN. these two states have reluc- tantly agreed to referral in order to brake any momentum and pre- vent giving the United States the pretext for unilateral action.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 94 94 | The International Response states including India.S. . diplomacy has also benefited from the sense abroad that the military option. and China. was by no means unthink- able even if the image of a trigger-happy United States gave allies pause. This reluctance may be due to the press of other events.49 Therefore. While seeking to maintain pressure on Tehran.48 The veiled threat of recourse to a military option if diplomacy is not seriously attempted has spurred Russia and China to action.47 The military option has been made more credible by domestic polls in the United States that indicate considerable public support for both sanctions and military strikes against Iran. Though averse to the change in forum from the IAEA to the Security Council (and to sanctions). first with IAEA resolutions threatening action in the Security Council and now with the threat of sanctions in that body. or it may be the inability to hammer out a clear policy acceptable to all elements within the administration. labeling Iran’s nuclear ambitions a “global menace” and a “universal” interest to prevent it. however unattractive. Certainly.46 U. a Security Council condem- nation of Iran as an internationally certified pariah would in itself be a serious sanction that would hurt the regime domestically. Russia. absent a major new trans- gression. there is a decided policy preference for the more general approaches of regime change and Security Council referral and sanctions.45 Washington sought to counter the idea that the nuclear issue is a continuation of a feud with Tehran. The official formulation that all options are on the table has been consciously repeated. Washington still lacks a convincing answer to the question of what happens after referral. even if not mandatory or universally applied. the United States still shows reluctance about getting directly involved. preferring a settlement within the IAEA (Iran’s resumption of enrichment under the label of “research” in January 2006 changed this). Mul- tilateral sanctions.

S. Multilateral diplomacy may result either in Iran’s acquiescence in the terms offered or eventually in the imposition of sanctions by a coalition of the willing or through the Security Council. The result is a stance that reflects a set of attitudes rather than a considered policy that holds diplomacy hostage to ideology. clear. which creates budgetary and other tensions. the administration has been unable to test Iranian intentions. then. resist- ing any direct diplomatic discussions on this issue. stance has evolved unac- knowledged from a policy of regime change along the Iraqi model to policy change along the Libyan model.50 Second. IAEA Approach The IAEA labors under several inherent constraints in its mission. The Bush administration has insisted that a nuclear-capable Iran is unacceptable and has kept the military option in play. First. which may or may not be . nor is it empowered to enforce NPT compliance. and that reduces U. To do so. Washington now relies on it for international sup- port. It is clear that after a series of missteps the United States is deter- mined to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly. Constrained by its ideologues from diplomacy.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 95 The International Response | 95 would impose more costs on Tehran. or consistent Iran policy. the agency has a twin mandate—to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and to promote the use of that technology with an extensive technical assistance program. from initially disparag- ing diplomacy.S. the IAEA is not the secretariat of the NPT. To summarize. The U. it would need the backing of the UNSC. options accordingly. It has now settled on a method that takes its allies and P-5 with it and stands a better chance of increasing the pressure on Iran. Its position on nuclear technology has a similar evolution from no nuclear technology to some as long as it is not sensitive. the Bush administration has had no agreed. which may buy time for reconsideration since the nuclear program may not be as far advanced as Iranians claim.

who defines noncompliance narrowly as the diversion of materials to nuclear weapons uses. and denial.55 Despite these limitations. that is. at most it can only report that nothing has been found to indicate a weapons program. violations are rarely clear-cut. And.56 He sees Iran as one of a class of problems that needs to be tackled by political as well as technical means. By their nature.52 There are still other more specific problems with verification. and against the feasible alter- natives. the agency’s only recourse is to go to the UNSC. the agency found Iran in material breach of its safeguards agreement but made a distinction between a technical infraction (failure to report) and a substantive one. political pressure.51 In addition.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 96 96 | The International Response forthcoming. which necessarily complicates responses. third. should it withdraw. A strong criticism of the IAEA is that having ascertained that Iran failed to declare inter alia the construction of its enrichment facilities. if special inspections are refused. though modest. His approach has been informed by . however. The quest for a smoking gun is thus a chimera. The IAEA policy has been shaped by Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei. the agency should be judged by its achievements. ranging from a penchant for compromise and the assumption of cooperation to a general reluctance to adopt an aggressive approach to verification. which the agency itself lacks. thereby shortening the gap between being a member of the NPT and being a nuclear weapons state. and the system can be manipulated through deception.S. It assumes all is well until proven other- wise.54 All of these issues dictate caution.53 Verification itself has inherent limits because it can never clear a state or prove a negative. in all recent cases of proliferation. there are also problems with IAEA’s corporate cul- ture. delay. Furthermore. the agency has only acted after strong U. noncompliance with NPT obligations. Undeclared facilities cannot be inspected or located without specific intelligence. One is the problem of the technology: States can legally acquire all the technology and techniques necessary for the production of fis- sile materials without actually producing them.

Al Baradei has given the agency credibility.60 This .57 This approach to a category of problems posed by holes in the treaty appears to be gaining ground as the alternatives (coercion and sanctions) prove elusive and uncertain in their results. and political pressure to widen the scope of its operations to dig deeper into the program. is not through technology denial. especially with the nonaligned states on which Iran has counted and has made it harder for Iran to escape from its assessments and requests. sensitive facilities might exist and how to respond to what was clearly (at the least) a breach of the safeguards agreement. Al Baradei argues. the challenge posed by Iran is not unique. The way to minimize security risk. or by creating new distinctions among states inside the NPT. The director-general sees the issue of proliferation broadly. political. which cannot work over time. given the gaps in the treaty that allow for acquisition of sensitive technologies that bring states close to a weapons capability.” At the same time. arguing that a nuclear program is the tip of an iceberg masking other security. This revelation raised the issue of what other undeclared. if not of the NPT itself. revealed the existence of nuclear facilities that Tehran had failed to declare to the agency as it was bound to under its safeguards agreement. Rather. used in conjunction. resultant publicity.”59 By positioning the agency as an independent and objective interlocutor. IAEA’s response dates from August 2002 when an Iranian oppo- sition group. the MOK. can be effec- tive. not in narrow terms of technology. it must be handled first by a moratorium on all enrichment activities and then by the internationalization of the fuel cycle under multilateral con- trol.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 97 The International Response | 97 recent experience: “The most important lesson is the confirmation that verification and diplomacy. The IAEA responded by using the revelations.58 At the same time Al Baradei sought to assure Iran of his bona fides in posing the issue in terms of a “need to strike a balance between the right of Iran to use nuclear technology and the concern of the international community that any nuclear program is a peaceful one” and going to some lengths to assure Iran that he would not act as “an instrument of harassment. and eco- nomic issues.

and by the firm demand of the agency’s Board of Governors in September 2003 that Iran demonstrate cooperation or face the consequences. The same pattern emerged once Iran sought to escape from its Tehran agreement by reinterpreting it in the spring and summer of 2004. the resolution asked for the director-general to report on the imple- . The result of this new pressure was a tighter agreement in Paris in November 2004 between Iran and the EU-3.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 98 98 | The International Response approach was complemented and reinforced by the subsequent agreement reached between Iran and the EU-3 in October 2003 (Tehran agreement). forcing Iran to back down from the threat.S. First. government’s attempt to have the matter referred to the UNSC. Diplomacy moved into higher gear in January 2006. and it “deeply regretted. after Iran’s resumption of “research related to enrichment.” Iran’s resumption of conversion and enrichment activities.” The Board of Gov- ernors’ meeting in February produced a tough resolution recalling that Iran was a “special verification case” with “its many failures and breaches of obligations” and noting that “full transparency is . Again in the spring of 2005 when Iran threatened to restart some of its enrichment activ- ities. the EU-3 and then the IAEA threatened to side with the U.. overdue.” “despite repeated calls.” Finally.” The resolution asked Iran to suspend “all enrichment and reprocessing activities including research and development” and be subject to IAEA verification. with the IAEA mak- ing clear its support for the EU-3 demands.. the EU-3 and the IAEA made clear their common approach and the consequences of a breakdown. This in turn built on the pressure exerted first by the U. reflecting the sense of urgency and new determination of the EU-3 and the United States to report Iran to the Security Council. position and take the issue to the UN. The resolution also asked that Iran “recon- sider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.S.” It noted that “there is a lack of confidence in Iran’s inten- tions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran’s record on safeguards. This is where matters stood before Iran unilaterally restarted conversion activities in August 2005.

found itself moving away from the center. Second. this suggestion has been received coldly by the United States. and Great Britain. would then be conveyed to the Security Council. who consider the issue to be both political and technical. Not surprisingly. Al Baradei suggested pragmatically that Iran should be allowed some enrichment capability. allowing a compromise now would send the wrong message: rewarding Iran’s deceit and cheating.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 99 The International Response | 99 mentation of this resolution at the next board session. an Iranian freeze on large-scale (industrial) enrichment would not be a meaningful concession because Iran currently lacks such a capability.61 For the first time. making mon- itoring more difficult.63 First. any enrichment capabil- ity could serve as a cover for a clandestine program. together with the accompanying Board of Governors’ resolution in March. with no guarantee that it would not be repeated in the future. while resisting U. calls for moving the issue (prematurely) to the Security Council. Finally. This meant that Iran was in dispute not with three states but the wider international community. Al Baradei’s February 2006 report examined developments since November 2005 and then made a critical overall assessment. This report. Assessment of IAEA Response The IAEA’s role has been notable in its ability to ratchet up the pressure on Iran. reflecting this.S. The director-general put the agency’s weight behind the EU-3 in resisting attempts by Iran to define the activities covered by the voluntary suspension narrowly enough to exclude preenrichment or the assembly and production of centrifuges. which underesti- mates the distrust fostered by Iran’s tactics. The IAEA used Iran’s .62 Among his findings. the threat of reporting the case to the Security Council and taking the issue from the technical-legal agency to the political-security Security Council forum had been made. France. Also “some enrichment” could serve as a means for perfecting the technology for a broader program in the future. The IAEA.

Iran values the agency for its technical assistance and independence. Instead of putting the burden of proof on the agency (to find any illegal activities). and that we are fully cooperating with the IAEA and will continue to do so.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 100 100 | The International Response breach of its safeguards obligations to improve operating proce- dures.” pressing the Irani- ans on the need to rebuild confidence.” it was a “special case. Because Iran had had a “clandestine program for almost two decades.66 The success of the agency to date can be measured in part by ref- erence to Iran’s goals and achievements.”67 That said. there is no illu- sion about the IAEA’s role.” The agency therefore asked for widespread inspec- tions to make up for the confidence deficit. as Hasan Rowhani observed: The agency and Al Barade’i are international legal entities. and given that within these institutions an eye is always fixed on the great powers. Al Baradei argued that “the ball is in Iran’s court” and that the deficit in confidence could only be restored by transparency. the situation was reversed: Now Iran was told to make up for its past transgressions and demonstrate its good will by confidence-building measures that went beyond any legal requirement.65 Requests for special inspections that Al Baradei termed “transparency visits” were expanded to examine military sites not covered by the Additional Protocol (such as Parchin and Lavizan) that might have been used for the weaponization of nuclear materials. Its officials differentiate the IAEA’s stance from that of the United States as follows: “The American statement is not very important for us.64 His approach was based on the proposition that Iran had “tried to cheat the system” and that it now had to take the consequences. they are forced to adopt multifaceted . What is important to us is the fact that our activities are based on laws and treaties that are approved by the IAEA. The director-general was “pushing the envelope under transparency. The IAEA was able to do this by adopting a neutral stance while cajoling and dispensing a mixture of friendly advice and implied threat. For example. He asked that Iran restore full suspension of “all enrichment-related activities” with no time limit.

it has been under pres- sure to give access to military sites not covered by the AP. Iran has signed the AP and is under pressure to ratify it.. Tehran cannot accuse the agency of bias or afford to antagonize it.71 The IAEA has dealt with the Iran case with considerable success. and the nonaligned states. and the international community has “made good . Iran has not been able to achieve its aim of having its relation- ship with the IAEA normalized and its nuclear file closed. Furthermore. The only victory that Iran could claim (domestically) was that it avoided being referred or reported to the UNSC between 2002 and 2005.S. while at the same time he wants to please the world powers. He does so because he does not want our cooperation with the agency to be severed. Demonstrating cooperation with it becomes an earnest of its intentions. with the international spotlight focused on its nuclear program and the agency’s reports on the quality of its coop- eration.68 The IAEA remains an important buffer against U. It has conducted by one estimate over 1.600 man/days of inspec- tions.72 Iran’s dossier remains very much open. This cooperation has been costly in terms of Iran’s stated aims. two negative ones followed by a positive. Con- sequently.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 101 The International Response | 101 positions . its Board of Governors. as a confidence-building measure to rebuild trust and has done so as a “voluntary measure.” and has been commended for it. link- ing signature with the ending of the embargo of technical materi- als on its nuclear program. pressure and a sign that Iran takes its international commitments seriously. Through the agency’s inspections much more is known about Iran..70 Iran has also found itself opposed by the agency in its efforts to stretch the meanings of what is and is not excluded from its suspension of enrichment activities. averaging three inspections per day. Al Barade’i makes one positive remark followed by a negative one. Iran had resisted accepting the Additional Protocol. and ignoring its recommendations can alienate the nonaligned states on which Iran relies for diplomatic support.69 Prior to 2003. At the insistence of the IAEA.

Al Baradei’s big picture approach to the question of proliferation (not strictly a part of his professional mandate) parallels the EU-3 initiative. The agency’s role as an international institution has made it easier for Iran to retreat from established positions and also for others like the non- aligned states or Russia to appeal to Iran to meet the agency’s demands. determined to avoid a repetition of the transatlantic rift opened up by Iraq. the case of Iraq makes it harder to fault an approach that seeks to build the case slowly through inspections without closing down a source of information that would leave the agency and governments in the dark. EU-3 Approach The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and the Iraq war have galvanized the EU to define its position on WMD prolifera- tion.74 The IAEA’s support has also strengthened the EU-3 diplomatic initiative. The pressure on Iran to suspend its enrichment program (broadly defined) amounted to a freeze on Iran’s develop- ment of sensitive technologies for the past two years.”73 Iran’s signature and application of the AP provisions complicates and makes more risky (though not impossible) any clandestine activity it might engage in. They in turn have used the agency to validate their con- cerns and implement their queries. European interests in this issue were clear enough on several fronts.75 The major criticism of the agency that can be made is to question whether a “diplomacy at any price” approach is always the right answer. taking it out of the narrow technical realm toward the broader motivations under- lying the program.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 102 102 | The International Response strides in understanding the nature and scope of its program. It is within missile range of any proliferators. decided to define Europe’s policy proactively and robustly. However. The EU-3. especially running an elaborate parallel nuclear program. It has large Muslim populations who could be upset . Proximity makes Europe and the Middle East virtu- ally part of the same neighborhood.

despite different approaches and the skeptical and lukewarm attitude of the United States toward the diplomacy. the United States believes the . it was nec- essary to coordinate positions with the United States. and. And.78 In reality they constituted three-way negotia- tions. A major difference with the U. finally. the EU defined its strategy on security and WMD as envisioning a transatlantic partnership (which came to embrace the PSI and cooperation in the G-8) with the use of force. This triangular set of interactions raised a number of prob- lems and questions in the negotiations. It depends on the region for energy security. Both agreed that the underpinnings of security are most assured where there has been a spread of freedom and democracy. it has a more general inter- est to tackle an important security issue to demonstrate the EU’s international role and effectiveness. They shared a broader perspective as well.77 The EU-3 negotiations with Iran. after this point. were more than negotiations between Europe and Iran.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 103 The International Response | 103 by further crises or radicalization of the region. between the EU-3 and the United States. as much as with Iran. The EU-3 and the United States started from similar points: the imperative to block Iran’s nuclear aspirations.”79 Iran sought to play on possible differences between Europe and the United States but failed to use the EU-3 to build bridges with the United States.S. Differences arose. For the EU-3. if necessary. and the EU-3 was the best it could “afford. approach is the EU focus on the regional sources of motiva- tions for nuclear weapons acquisition and thus on addressing the legitimate security concerns of proliferators. between Iran and the United States. between the EU-3 and Iran. there was and still is a need for an interlocutor. how- ever. the United States.76 A non-proliferation clause was added to agreements with countries seeking relations with the EU. The EU-3 was negotiating with its ally. For Iran. albeit indirectly. first in the Tehran agreement (September 2003) and then with the more detailed Paris agree- ment (November 2004). For example. by the use of force. To meet new threats preventively and if necessary through for- ward defense. if neces- sary.

condemnation. it sought to get a commitment from its allies that. limiting the nuclear pro- gram was the aim and diplomacy the preferred means. Whereas key elements in the United States see engagement and diplomacy as endorsement of the regime and a sellout of its opponents. if one accepts that the regime is illegitimate.84 Even with the EU-3 accepting agreement on referral to the UNSC and the indirect involvement of the United States.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 104 104 | The International Response Iranian regime to be the primary problem. however. These different assump- tions lead to different approaches.85 After the Paris agreement the EU-3 tightened the terms of its negotiations. the EU-3 sees it as the best means to effect regime change. the United States taking a morally inspired passive posi- tion of disengagement amounted to a “nonpolicy” that threatened to exacerbate differences between the two. they would refer Iran to the Security Council. in the event of failure. as European leaders have done?82 On the other hand. In its negotiations. Therefore.83 Before the United States decided to support the EU-3 indirectly in 2005. which implied the need for more forceful measures to see the Iranian regime exit the scene.80 The United States prefers sanc- tions and isolation of a regime that equates regime maintenance with the national interest. For the EU-3. yet differences remained on the best means to that end. While Iranian suspension of enrichment is voluntary (rather than legally binding) pending agreement or col- . if the EU-3 were to devise a package of incentives for Iran to forgo its nuclear ambitions. diplomacy appeared to be the means to demonstrate that no agreement was possible. Both agreed on what Iran should not be permitted to retain. For the United States. it had to not only coordinate with Washington but also gain its active support. how can one argue for its legitimate security interests.81 On the one hand. there remained the question of the point of the negotiations. whereas the EU-3 sees Tehran’s nuclear program as the key issue. and isola- tion would entail—or acceptance of a package of inducements to forgo the fuel cycle. the EU-3 has given Iran a structured choice: continuation of the development of the fuel cycle and referral to the Security Council—with all that sanctions.

bolster investment and trade ties. or production of centrifuges) would continue.S. The EU-3 approach was diplomatic—not to reject but to study. offer Iran proliferation-resistant nuclear technol- ogy (light water reactors). and a confidence-building gesture. For example in response to Iranian attempts to get acceptance of its retention of a pilot project of centrifuges that it argued was sym- bolic (numbers vary between 500 and 3. which it defines in practice as cessation of fissile mate- rial production.000 centrifuges). this suspension (including preenrichment. Iran sees objective guarantees as equivalent to the provisions of the Additional Protocol (that is. and increase Iran’s involvement in regional security discussions and possibly institutions. position because it would be tech- nically difficult to monitor and assure peaceful uses. agree that Iran’s acquisition of enrichment was their redline.”90 While there was no difference between the . Iran insists that its redline is enrichment.87 The United States saw its role as stiffening the spine of the EU- 3.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 105 The International Response | 105 lapse of the negotiations. which it is not prepared to forgo. It was clear to the EU-3 that there was little room for maneuver: “The problem is political but the solution is technical. In addition the question of security guaran- tees was also broached.88 The EU-3 agreed with the U. and the only technical solution we have found is cessation. assembly.86 The EU- 3 and the United States. This did not imply weak diplomacy however. evaluate. The EU-3 prepared a package to propose to Iran. not even a few. lim- ited in time. For this. Iran in turn defines its suspension as voluntary.89 Keeping the talks going assumed importance not because a breakthrough was in sight but because of the risks of a crisis that would accompany a breakdown in the talks. the EU-3 insisted on objective guarantees regarding Iran’s program. however. guarantees through enhanced inspections). the EU-3 would guarantee its fuel supply from more than one source (EU and Russia). and suggest alternatives. The aim of the agreement was to ensure Iran’s peaceful uses of nuclear technol- ogy. the United States made clear that cessation meant none. stipulating that in exchange for Iran giving up its fuel cycle ambitions.

91 Relations between the EU-3 and Iran steadily deteriorated after Tehran’s brusque rejection of the EU-3 offer of a package deal in July 2005. there was more give in the EU position. the member states noted that the dispute was not “between Iran and Europe. 2006. The following month the EU “unreservedly condemned” the comments made by Iran’s president on the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist. the board agreed to report the Iranian dossier to the Security Council. “We believe the time has now come for the Security Council to become involved to reinforce the authority of IAEA resolutions. the EU-3 convened a special meeting in Berlin. it was agreed to give diplomacy another month. that meeting showed that the votes existed in the Board of Governors for such a trans- fer.94 In a statement after the meeting. and on February 4.92 Nonetheless. after which the director- general would present an agency report prior to definitive action. and the United States rejected the suggestion of allowing Iran to retain some enrich- ment capabilities. and Russia. the states agreed to report Iran to the Security Council. hinting at diplomatic sanctions. Both rejections effectively narrowed the scope for compromise.” While still committed to a diplomatic solution.”95 This meeting was followed at the end of the month by another meeting in London of the EU-3.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 106 106 | The International Response EU-3 and the United States on the need for cessation as such. which the United States dubbed a serious escalation. in a vote of 27 to 3 (with five abstentions). . but between Iran and the whole international community.93 In response to Iran’s resumption of enrichment research in January. The November meeting of the IAEA delayed a decision on whether to send the issue to the Security Council to give the Russian proposal a chance. China. At the same time the EU-3 did not hesitate to threaten Iran with immediate referral to the UNSC when Tehran made moves toward resuming conversion activities in June 2005. At the urging of Al Baradei and Russia. the United States. The Iranians rejected the sugges- tion of suspending activities for a period of years. an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors was convened. At this milestone gathering. Within a week.

bringing it closer to the U. As the Iranians have observed. can offer Iran enough carrots to give up its insistence on the full fuel cycle. But while the United States has shown some willingness to associate itself with this diplomacy. The Russian proposal has floundered as it is not con- sistent with Iran’s quest for an indigenous enrichment capability. in particular. ultimatums. the Europeans have a stake in a successful outcome and in demonstrating that they can fly solo. but taking a firm line on essential points are tactics in the service of a diplomacy that is practical and nonideological—classic realpolitik. Assessment of EU-3 Response The EU-3 has taken an unhurried approach to negotiations. It remains unclear whether the EU-3 even with the direct and active input of the United States. the threat of mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 in the UNSC appear to be the greatest leverage for the resumption of diplo- . 96 Playing for time. it contin- ues to sharpen the sanctions at its disposal by extending its sec- ondary sanctions. view that a nuclear Iran is intolerable and must be prevented. and brinksmanship. while seeking a solution that could meet Tehran’s security interests and demonstrate the success of Europe’s diplomatic strategy. trying to build confidence. is a report that provides an overview of the issue.S. or whether Russia or China can do more than delay a crisis. as has been seen. But Iranian actions and attitude after mid-2005 hardened the European position.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 107 The International Response | 107 The result. Iran’s belliger- ent statements about Israel in October. The March 2006 agency meeting thus agreed to report Iran to the Security Council. made it eas- ier for the Europeans and Americans to agree on the need to take a harder line with Tehran. refus- ing to be harassed by Iran’s self-imposed deadlines. As things currently stand with the breakdown of negotiations due to Iran’s resumption of conversion activities and enrichment research.

In addition to being Tehran’s major arms supplier since 1989. and Armenia (against Azerbaijan). in Chechnya). The agreement in 1989 to build a nuclear reactor at Bushire had a similar commer- cial rationale.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 108 108 | The International Response macy. The EU-3 threw Iran a lifeline that Tehran rejected. but it may need a broader bargain to stand a chance of success.97 Diplomacy—and the need to reinstate suspension prior to negotiations—may resume. It has bought time. What then has the EU-3 accomplished? It has demonstrated that there is little dividing the United States and Europe on this issue. precisely because the alternatives are unpalatable to all parties. Afghanistan (anti-Taliban). even partial sanctions and a drawn-out crisis are bound to impose costs on Iran. at least indirectly. Russia has had good rela- tions with Iran. the arms and nuclear technology relationship grew. Moscow considers Iran an important stabilizing element in the region. despite U.S. For although sanctions may be difficult to realize or implement.S. where plants lie idle. In the Yeltsin era. not least because Tehran has not encouraged radical forms of Islam or fomented troubles in Russia’s south (for example. Russian Approach Since the breakup of the Soviet Union. giving the negotiations more chance of success. This quasistrategic relationship has been cemented by the two states’ opposition to NATO enlargement eastward and since 9/11 by similar concern about U. Iran’s arms purchases in hard currency have been wel- come in post-Soviet Russia. Russia has cooperated with Iran in Tajikistan. unilateralism and acquisition of bases in the region. It has given Iran a choice between a crisis and a negotiated settlement. since diplomacy has not necessarily run its course. pressure. It has brought the United States on board. Its negotiations have at least retarded Iran’s nuclear program. whether through official or semi- .

99 Russia’s relationship with Iran. however. or diplomatic support. “Economically. and there is less apparent concern about losing Iran as a commer- cial or strategic partner. In 2000 Russia repudiated the Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement and revived the arms relationship with Iran.. Nevertheless. as well as commercial and political interests. Russia appreciated Iran’s potential as a regional ally and its stubborn. technology. Russian policy has become clearer. supporting its initiatives. In reality Iran has few strategic alternatives for arms. Russia has found itself using the IAEA as the reference point for policies that Tehran might find unpalatable and in the process moving closer and closer to the position of the EU-3. as Putin put it. the United States and Russia agreed to limit further arms sales to Iran. but the reactor deal on Bushire (initially valued at $800 million) continued and Iranian technicians were trained in Russia. and since then Russian policy has attempted to bal- ance the need for good relations with its “old and stable partner” and the imperative of preventing Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons..98 In 1995 through the Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission. Russia continues to see Iran as an important state that it would prefer to accommodate if possible.”103 From 2003 forward. Russia aligned its position with that of the EU-3.102 As non-proliferation concerns have grown during the 2003–2005 period.”100 This view shifted with the revelations of Iran’s nuclear activities in mid-2002. Iran’s strategic importance was initially given new importance. This was in part a reflection of the continued zero-sum thinking vis-à-vis the United States typified by the Soviet- era Middle East expert Yevgeni Primakov. defiant independence regarding the United States. Russia is interested in cooperation . “to infringe upon a coun- try like Iran is counterproductive and could lead to quite compli- cated and serious consequences. changed somewhat with the arrival of President Putin. As Putin put it. and politically Iran should be a self-sufficient state that is ready to protect its national interests. closely consulting with the EU-3 in .101 Balancing strategic and non-proliferation interests.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 109 The International Response | 109 official channels.

Russia appeared to rel- ish the defeat and the opportunity it presented for Moscow to play a more prominent role. insistence Russia concluded an agree- ment with Iran to ensure the return of spent fuel from Bushire.107 In support of the EU-3 in 2004. and conducting its own contacts with Tehran in parallel. Russia agreed to sell Iran $1 billion in air defense missiles and argued against any precipitate act.”106 While insisting on the continuing validity of the partnership between the two countries. such as sanctions.. As Putin put it force- fully. including the security issues in the region can be solved . Balancing between the desire to keep Iran friendly and to play a leading role in the international coalition (and G-8).104 At the same time Russia made clear its oppo- sition to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Russia has given priority to preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran and exerting diplomatic muscle to that end. at U.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 110 110 | The International Response their negotiations with Iran.”111 On the other hand.109 Russian diplomacy took a slightly different turn after the failure of the EU-3 package proposal in June 2005. We are categorically opposed to the enlarge- ment of the club of nuclear states. hiding behind . Both the date of completion and the dispatch of fuel for the reactor were geared to the outcome of this diplomacy. In general Russia sought to hew closely to the international consensus.. none of the problems confronting Iran. that might “aggravate things.”105 Putin and his experts (like those in the EU-3) have extended this opposition to Iran’s develop- ment of the full fuel cycle: “Our Iranian partners must give up development of nuclear (fuel) cycle technology. “With the possession of nuclear weapons. For example.S. Russia warned Iran that failure to arrive at an agreement would lead to the end of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Moscow’s traditional ambivalence became more pro- nounced.110 On the one hand.108 And Russia tied the completion of the Bushire project to a satisfactory outcome of the discussions with the EU-3. Russia insisted that its proposal to carry out enrichment on Russ- ian soil constituted a logical way out of the diplomatic impasse and some form of Security Council sanctions.

it is the only currently active proposal. In any case. It remains to be seen whether Iran will consider Russia a more reliable supplier of fuel than the West- ern countries.112 In its negotiations with Iran. technical training. which is by no means complete (and which might include other states such as China).S. and European support—is a clear attempt to take enrichment out of Iran’s hands for a consider- able period of time (ten years perhaps) while possibly allowing it to retain some parts of the fuel cycle. and arms supplies) gives Moscow considerable future leverage over its unpredictable neighbor. The principal explanation for the evolution from a lukewarm response to Iran’s resumption of conversion activities in August to Russia’s greater support for the coalition after November 2005 seems to have been twofold: first. which Iran can reject at its own risk.”114 Although Russia may be acting constructively for the interna- tional community. the sort of problem that exists with Iran today would not occur. a point that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov noted explicitly.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 111 The International Response | 111 the IAEA and the consensus therein. . and second. The proposal. doing little to strengthen or weaken it. Russian experts stress their global per- spective: “If such a network (of international fuel centres) existed. Russia has been tough in arguing that Iran has violated its obligations to the IAEA and that for diplomacy to work Tehran should resume its suspension of enrichment for an indefinite period and accept inspections. it is clear that its proposal is not attractive for Iran economically and that control over Iran’s fuel supply (as well as its reactor programs. and avoiding a conspicuous or forward role.113 The Russian proposal—which still provides a last chance for Iran to avoid sanctions and which has U. the existence (to some extent) of a Russian formula and a leading role in the crisis. is seen by the Russians as a step toward the development of international centers for nuclear fuel production. in the nuclear diplomacy that has unfolded. the desire to embrace diplomacy to forestall a possible military alterna- tive from an exasperated United States.

. At what point Moscow’s support for diplomacy without teeth is exhausted remains to be seen.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 112 112 | The International Response At the same time Russia’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Iran in the Security Council serves to underline Moscow’s independence from the United States and its privileged ties with Tehran.

but its aims correspond more to its ambitions than to its fears. The con- tent of the order Iran envisions—beyond being Islamic and ratify- ing Iran’s leading role—is fuzzy. the exploitation of Islam.S. but the empha- sis on revolutionary Iran as a role model. A nuclear capability would help to counter and compete with that influence and demonstrate the arrival of Iran as a regional great power. which are seen as rivals having a different vision of the regional order—a vision that is antithetical to Iranian interests and aspirations. After all. 113 . U. and the zero-sum approach to the Western powers are specific to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is motivated by both offensive and defensive considera- tions. Iran’s determination to have a dominant role in the region stems from Iranian nationalism in general. encirclement is relatively new and was pre- ceded by Iran’s export of the revolution and determination to stymie the various efforts at a Middle East peace process.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 113 6 Iran and Regional Security ran seeks a leading role in the Muslim world and the Middle East Imake regional order. This objective implies a correspondingly diminished role for the United States and the West. Its efforts have focused on reshaping this order to it more conducive to Iran’s interests. but it clearly includes the elimination of the Western presence and a reduction of its influ- ence.

Al Qaeda. Iran cannot rely on any other state for automatic sympathy or support. These groups are less disposed toward compromise or moderation in the achievement of their political objectives. with periodic peace offensives. Muqtada al Sadr. Iran tries to exploit existing crises. and Taliban Afghanistan. based on a common interest in excluding or reducing U. By out- bidding the Arab states in its extremism (or support for the resis- tance in its terminology) on Palestine. Islamic Jihad. Iran appeals to the Arab street and embarrasses and puts the Arab states on the defensive. among others. At the same time Iran hopes to exploit the political instability in the region taking shape in the form of Islamist movements and parties (for example. In the north. Hamas). which makes its ambitions for greater status and power more problematic regionally.1 Sunni Arab nationalism is a potential rival and certainly a constraint on Iran’s leadership pretensions. Iran is in the minority in the largely Sunni Middle East with no natural ally or constituency upon which to rely.S. Hamas. Iran shares few bonds with its Arab Sunni neighbors. The spoiler needs leverage. As a Persian Shiite state. So. regional presence. Iran has relied on Russia as a strategic partner. power in the region. to weaken the United States in the region. discontent. This has led to cooperation on Azerbaijan. which can be done most effectively on the Palestine issue—the “Achilles’ heel” of the United States in the region. preventing a united Arab front against it is an additional incen- tive for Iran to assume a leading role. Similarly.2 Turmoil in Iraq is clearly another source that feeds the opposition of many to a U. Tajikistan. and Iran cultivates its sources with little regard for ideology: for example. As a Persian.S. The specter of Iran–Arab polarization and Iran’s containment is thus dealt with by an activist policy that redefines issues such as Palestine as Muslim rather than simply an Arab or national/territorial question.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 114 114 | Iran and Regional Security The defensive aspect of Iran’s ambitions stems from structural conditions in the region rather than hostility toward the West.3 Iran seeks to cultivate states in formal relations as well. and anti-Americanism. Shiite state with an important pre-Islamic past. Moscow values Iran’s silence on the Chechen .

5 Islamic Iran’s preoccupation with the United States is not simply a result of the United States’ dominant role in international affairs.S. the two have differed on the division of the Caspian’s resources.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 115 Iran and Regional Security | 115 issue and its willingness to forgo any attempt to exploit Islamic extremism in the Caucasus.S. In the context of a substantial U. and India to challenge the U.-dominated world order. for example. influence and increase Iran’s. a “founding myth” of the revolution. and diplomatic support reflects a strong current in Iranian thinking that seeks to align itself with a “rising Asia” behind China.- dominated region and the regime’s own survival are not compatible.S. Moscow has argued for more patience and diplomacy.4 Iran’s reliance (actually dependence) on Russia for arms. Russia has been unwilling to see Iran acquire an enrichment capa- bility and has broadly supported the EU-3 attempts to constrain it. As discussed in chapter 5. and Western policy in the Persian Gulf can be encapsulated by the terms access and denial: access to the region’s . United States as Threat and Strategic Rival Since 1945. They entail using whatever issues and conflicts exist to dilute and weaken U. influence can only translate into Iran’s disadvantage. hidden behind the IAEA. characterized by a combination of hedging strategies and a spoiler role. Russia.6 This suggests an Iranian view that is zero-sum. preferring to follow rather than lead any international sanctions that might result. It also stems from the Iranian leadership’s perception that a U. U. power.S. regional presence. in which even com- mon interests cannot be built upon because an increase in U. opposition to the United States. Similarly on the issue of nuclear technology. tech- nology.S. Iran’s objectives are largely defensive. who rely on U. The convergence in interests is not per- fect. has become a permanent goal of the Islamic Republic. however.S.S. Therefore. and has been reluctant to lead any sanctions or condemnation. In the process Iran has aggravated the suspicions of its neighbors.

10 The decline in U. credibility and moral stature as a result of the war in Iraq and revelations at Abu Ghraib has given Iran an opening to exploit the ambivalent relationship . The U. in Iraq—increased Iran’s sense of insecurity. the region. sug- gested an intent to develop a sea-denial capability to counter the United States. Iran attempted to counter dual containment by offering to cooperate with the Persian Gulf states on security issues. the United States enlarged its strategic objectives to include a makeover of the Middle East. At the same time the stakes in the region increased as the issue of energy supplies became mixed with those of terrorism.S. and weapons of mass destruction. military presence in the region—after 9/11.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 116 116 | Iran and Regional Security oil supplies and denial of the region and its resources to a hostile power. Iran has sought to reverse the trend toward forward presence.S. with bases in Afghanistan. have never accepted or acknowledged “the rule of the Islamic system. After the Cold War the threats to these interests have come from regional states. our national security and territorial integrity” and have sought to “change the conduct and nature of the Islamic republic. especially naval. As it became embroiled in Iraq.”8 Iran sees the U. the Persian Gulf. pro- curement. and submarines. when U.7 The extension of U. Central Asia.”9 In countering U.S. But the exclusion transcends the bounds of commerce: Washington and its allies.S. Islamic extremism.S. greater Mid- dle East plan as a “project for a sustained presence in the region. influence. and continued access to.” This rhetoric implied a continuing determination to play a major role in. Iran’s military. mines.S. role in trying to exclude Iran from regional politics and by way of sanctions to prevent it from cooperating in energy with the Caspian states has imposed significant costs on Iran. encouraging democratic reform and change and speaking of its goals as a “task for a generation. Iran has gained some advantages in that its defiant stance and insistence on independence evokes a certain admiration. and after 2003. Since 1990. including antiship missiles. the Iranian leaders believe. forces were first placed in large numbers on the Arabian peninsula.

” Shamkhani earlier noted that Iran was “prepared to sign non-aggression pacts and pacts to pre- vent the use of bases by a third force with all regional states. whatever the nature of the regime in Iran or Iraq and what- ever the status of Iran–Arab ties.”15 President Ahmadinejad’s chief security advisor. together with Iran’s support of terrorism. “That is right. Iran itself suffers from certain disadvantages. ran for president arguing that the United States sought to exclude Iran from regional groupings and that Iran ought to leverage . another senior negotiator.12 As the United States has become bogged down with Iraq. observed. He said that “Iran is following a path aimed at making others. One is structural: As a large non-Arab state. This includes Iraq. Wherever the US goes. Tehran has become emboldened. Iran’s Regional Ambitions Iran wants to make itself the indisputable regional power without which no regional issue of any importance can be addressed.” and Iran has “always sought such regional pacts against the wishes of outside powers.” Mousavian. any Iranian influence in Iraq is seen as undesirable by the Arab states. but there is another side to it.11 A second set of obstacles for Iran with regard to the Arab states arises from the nature of the regime in Tehran. making cooperation with a profess- edly reformed Tehran problematic.13 In reply to Rowhani’s comment that “wherever Iran goes.”14 Outgoing Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani referred to Iran’s missiles as giving the country regional deterrence. accept Iran as a regional power. Similarly.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 117 Iran and Regional Security | 117 between the Arabs and the United States. it faces the United States. despite their will. Active export of the revolution and covert interventions in the Arab states. have left a durable legacy of distrust. Thus a dispute with one becomes a dispute with all. as in the case of the islands contested with Abu Dhabi. it faces Iran. Iran is seen as a potential threat and has dif- ficulty in piercing the automatism of Arab solidarity and rank clos- ing in disputes. thus reducing its threat to Iran. At the same time. Ali Lari- jani.

Many in the region share Saudi King Abdullah’s fears about the emergence of a “Shia crescent” stretch- ing from Lebanon through Iraq to Iran and south toward Bahrain and beyond. This might embolden other restive Shiites in the Gulf. Some of the smaller states have sought the inclusion of Yemen and Pakistan in any eventual agreement. allowing Iran the possibility to use this as a basis for an alliance. Iran’s size and its past record make them suspicious.” Iran need not fear Security Council measures.20 The GCC states. For example.22 .17 When faced with the threat of referral to the Security Council.”19 Iran’s conception of a regional security arrangement for the Gulf involves building confidence through practical bilateral cooperative measures (extradition agreements on terrorists) and tying an even- tual agreement to the allusions to it in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 598. Iran’s possible exploitation of their often significant Shiite popula- tions (varying from 5 percent in Saudi Arabia to 30 percent in Kuwait to nearly 60 percent in Bahrain and Iraq) is an additional cause for concern. which ended the Iran–Iraq war. however cordial.18 Iran’s reduced sense of vulnerability (and shift in perceived relative balance of power) between 2003 and 2005 was exemplified by nuclear negotiator Sirus Naseri’s comment that “Iran is not Iraq and the US is not the self- appointed policeman of the world anymore. After the election Larijani defined Ahmadinejad’s policy as creating strategic relations with neighbors and creating “new regional arrangements and coalitions. entertain few illusions about Iran’s aims. there is the ongoing disagreement over the name of the waterway: Persian or Arab? Iran’s arms programs come under criticism as well.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 118 118 | Iran and Regional Security its regional power into geostrategic power. This fear is amplified by the prospect of the first Arab Shiite state emerging in Iraq. he pointedly observed that “considering the power it enjoys in the region.”16 Larijani has suggested to his counterpart in Iraq that the two coun- tries could be the nucleus of a new regional security system.21 Iran’s border dispute with Iraq and a territorial dis- pute with the United Arab Emirates continue to upset relations periodically.

or take greater risks through its proxies. which would be tantamount to surrender. Tehran seeks to discredit those states close to the West.23 Iran is the only state in the Middle East that denies Israel’s right to exist. It is therefore. Its bellicose policies are clearly intended to divert regional attention from Iran’s own missile and nuclear programs. On the issue of Palestine. so the thinking goes. Iran has sought to use two current conflicts to improve its position in the region and weaken that of the United States. Iran faces another choice: Should it seek to weaken the United States by bleeding it and taking the risk that a U.S. given its record of indirect conflict with Israel. failure there could translate into regionwide instability (and Sunni–Shiite polarization) or should Tehran set aside competition with the United States and build on the convergence of interest in Iraq? That overlap in interest is substantial: Both states want a unified. Iran achieves this through providing arms. undermin- ing cease-fires and sabotaging peace processes by aggravating ten- sions and preventing peacemaking. than before? At the very least. a nuclear and more confident Iran might not choose to con- front Israel more directly. Its strategic rationale goes as follows: The United States seeks hege- mony in the region and its natural resources and wants to achieve it as a first step through the roadmap foisted onto the hapless Pales- tinians. Tehran outbids the Arab states in its support for rejectionism. On Iraq.S. Given the limited scope for replacing the United States as the region’s security guarantor in the Persian Gulf states. and funding to proxies—directly to Hezbollah (with Syria) and indirectly to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. standing) becomes clearer. the duty of all Middle East countries. putting them on the defensive and inhibiting any criticism of Iran’s other regional policies. the risks of a misjudgment increase considerably.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 119 Iran and Regional Security | 119 There will be no great enthusiasm for exploring new security arrangements until the outcome in Iraq (and U. This stance requires a spoiler strategy. The ques- tion posed is whether. and as long as Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain ambiguous. to oppose Israel and any compromise peace. At the same time. . training. including Iran.

while maintaining ties with the Dawa Party. On a visit to Iraq in mid-2005 the Ira- nian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was received by Ayatollah Sistani (which no ranking U. and Ayatollah Sistani. and trained in Iran. and other Shiites (such as Prime Minister Jafaari of the Dawa Party) are naturally suspected of nefarious aims. funded. SCIRI (and its Badr Brigade militia). prisoners of war. The reality is that neither has the ability to determine outcomes but each can probably harm the other and its own interests in the stub- born competition. an Arab nationalist state. Tehran seeks to maximize its options in the fluid circumstances. there has long been inter- action between the two countries. In addi- tion a number of groups—notably the Iraqi Shiite grouping. compensation or reparations). Muqtada al Sadr. The differences arise from mutual suspicions that each seeks to dominate the future Iraq at the expense of the other’s interest. official has yet managed).26 . As a neighbor Iran has a considerable stake in the stability of Iraq. In the current near-civil war in Iraq. With a majority Shiite population in both countries and major Shiite shrines located in southern Iraq. Iran retains some influ- ence with this group. or an extremist Islamist state. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also have a presence and retain con- tacts and influence in Iraq. Kharrazi pointedly reminded his hosts that Iran would remain a neighbor long after the United States has departed. and democratic (and therefore Shiite-dominant) state. which means creating multiple contacts and links across the spectrum of opposition and government forces for possible leverage. The eight-year war between the two states in the 1980s left a number of issues unresolved (border agreement.”25 Unable to predict Iraq’s future. There are also reports that Iran is funding Sunni insurgent forces. because they target U. Neither Tehran nor Washington wants a weak or disintegrat- ing state. forces. moderate.S.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 120 120 | Iran and Regional Security stable.S.24 Iranian leaders say that Iraq “is a turning point in [the] region. the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI) with its Badr Brigade militia—were given sanctuary. Iran has sought to reassure the Iraqi govern- ment of its goodwill by offering assistance.

*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 121 Iran and Regional Security | 121 Although Iran shares U.S. confrontation. are suspicious of Iran’s intentions and issue frequent warnings to Tehran. Iran’s strategic priority has been to ensure that the United States remains bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire while maintaining its own options (and contacts or proxies) as to how it will play the endgame. and its intention to deny the United States a success or honorable exit. its desire for stability. which have been inconsistent: “The Bush administration has vacillated between two very different approaches.S. Iran has offered to use its influence to assist the U.S. power. options.S. While seeking to deflect mili- tary pressure and limit U. if sufficiently blatant.29 In effect Iran holds regional stability hostage to U. Iran seeks to outdo the Arab states in support for the Palestinians while inhibiting their .S. Above all. to an Iranian–U. mixing disruptive behavior with offers to the United States to help stabilize the country.S.31 Iran wants stability in Iraq. includ- ing the United States. 27 This strategy has entailed a complex set of policies. At times it sig- naled support for regime change[. the differences between Tehran and Washington preclude any cooperation to that end. become democratic by giving increased power to the majority Shi- ite.S. regional presence and to the future of Iraq and Afghanistan.S.”30 Iran may find it difficult to calibrate the correct balance among maintaining links with various groups.32 In sum.28 Iran links the nuclear issue to the U. Iraqi Sunnis and others. concerns that Iraq remain intact. Reports of Iran providing insurgents with shaped charges for explo- sives and increased assistance could lead. but not at the price of continued U. Iran is developing a sea-denial capability and missiles while cultivating the GCC states with confidence-building meas- ures and talk about a new security arrangement.] at other times it engaged in direct discussions with Tehran over Iraq and Afghanistan. and avoid becoming a radical Arab nationalist or Islamist state. stabilization of these countries in exchange for greater tolerance of Iran’s nuclear program. bases in that country or its own con- tainment by U. policies on the nuclear issue. Agreement to discuss Iraq will not change this.

but it is magnified by both the kind of regime it is and the regional context within which its proliferation is taking place. policy goals to rationalize the costs of the deeper engagement. supporting allies. interests. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategic Context: From Regime Change to Democratization Iran’s bid for a nuclear capability is of inherent political impor- tance. Tehran enjoys special relations with Syria and Hezbollah and exploits anti-Americanism and the sensi- tivity of regimes being labeled U. entanglement in Iraq gradually saw a shift in U. it has certain identifiable features: it is hostile to the United States (West). The United States elided from a policy of regime change to the more ambitious and open-ended one of democratization.S. The new rationale for a generational commitment in the Middle East became the necessity of democratization that alone could guarantee an end to radicalism and proliferation.S.33 It is this approach that colors policy toward Iran today.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 122 122 | Iran and Regional Security reactions to its own policies.S. it is Islamic and independent.S. and encouraging . Iran is cultivating its ties with Shiite populations in the region and hedging its bets on the future of Iraq. sensitive and unstable.S.34 U. The United States has become a regional player and revolutionary state with a long-term commitment to promoting change. The implicit trade-off is among short. clients.S. and Iran has a leading role in it. has been made the more so by U. Furthermore Iran’s policies in the region and beyond. opposed to U.S. Iran in the New U. A nuclear-capable Iran would be better placed to bring such an order into being. involvement in the region reflects and shapes the strategic context of the contemporary Middle East. This context.and long-term stability. Although the shape of the regional order that Iran would like to see is unclear. were one of the cri- teria that made the United States so implacable and hostile to Ira- nian proliferation. which Tehran would like to have as a strategic ally. The unanticipated U.

notably Bahrain and Qatar. the United States has diversified its base structure among the smaller Gulf states. the United States is also overextended militarily. where the pressures for polit- ical reform have grown.S. While militarily present and politically active in the region. and demonstrate incontrovertibly that Iran was seeking or in possession of nuclear weapons. in practical terms it is an unattractive and probably counterproductive option. whether they be missile strikes or terrorism against the United States or its regional allies. which makes it vulnerable to crises and demands on its forces elsewhere and to reverses that could call into question whatever progress has been made in Afghanistan and Iraq so far. forces a form of hostage to Washington’s good behavior). Iranian responses would have to be antici- pated. In this context. Although this course can never be totally discounted as a last resort or pru- dently devalued in diplomacy and negotiations before that stage. following prolonged attempts toward a diplo- matic effort. Some have argued that the United States . In this context.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 123 Iran and Regional Security | 123 democratic opposition and reform. It would need the full support of the interna- tional community. Together with its long-standing com- mitment to Israel. discussions of a military option to prevent Iran’s nuclear ambitions have an air of desperation and bluff.35 An attack would need to destroy all sites and be able to assure that the nuclear program would not resume or accelerate outside of the NPT. the United States has assumed a greater role in the Caucasus and Central Asia. where it has access to an arc of military bases.S. Deeper U. which remains unaffected. the United States overexposure in Iraq surely constitutes a liability (with U. and competition for Persian Gulf oil has increased. A strike would need to cover enough targets to destroy the infrastructure but not enough to constitute an act of war against the Iranian people or to strengthen the regime. oil incomes have risen. In the south. Iraq and Afghanistan will provide access facilities to the United States for the foreseeable future.36 The intelligence debacle surrounding Iraq has made tackling Iran more difficult. involvement comes at a time of transition in the region.

and further proliferation. Response to the Regional Implications of a Nuclear-Capable Iran Iran has sent mixed signals about its nuclear intentions. actionable) intelligence on Iran means U. rogue states and WMD are indistinguishable from terrorists and WMD. The most abstract threat is to the non-proliferation regime itself. discredited.S. An official and comprehensive report underscoring this suggested to professionals the need for greater caution where Iran was con- cerned. policy is flying blind on most issues affecting Iran. Since Iran’s policies “directly threaten US interests in the region and beyond. shifts in alliances.S. most especially its secret programs. Sometimes its leaders have argued that a nuclear capability would only com- plicate relations with neighbors.39 From the U. But senior U. and it is the nature of the regimes proliferating. .*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 124 124 | Iran and Regional Security invaded the wrong country. A long-standing member either leaving the NPT or openly flouting it would create doubts about the regime and set a precedent for others. not the weapons.”41 Iran would constitute a challenge on several levels.42 Weakening the NPT regime by defecting from it and setting the stage for others to do so would unravel the most important and universal arms control treaty in existence and could result in regional arms races.S. that count. Iran filled more of the criteria than Iraq. at least temporarily. Iran’s status as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world” makes its move toward a nuclear capability particularly threaten- ing. officials argued that this should not lead states to “underreact” and that “there are no guarantees where intel- ligence is concerned.”38 U. the lack of good (that is. Iran’s withdrawal might serve as a catalyst and even a model for others—the “tipping point” analogy.S. at other times they claim posses- sion of a regionwide deterrent.40 Where the United States is concerned.37 Today. perspective. What Hans Blix calls “faith-based intelligence” has been.

security commitments.44 The United States has been clear that an Iranian nuclear capa- bility would throw a shadow over the area not least because Iran’s policies “directly threaten US interests in the region and beyond. that the “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and deliv- ery systems makes Iran less secure and the region more unstable”.”47 U. Whether they would use it directly as the government of Iran or whether they would trans- fer it to a terrorist group leaves us very concerned. As John Bolton put it..S. to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. creating uncertainty and acting as a deterrent.S. proliferators “seek weapons of mass destruction .” A nuclear Iran would inhibit cost-free interventions.” Bolton. “Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and defense.”46 John Bolton noted. or more likely... . officials also underlined that a nuclear Iran is destabilizing not only to Iran’s neighbors but “for peace and security internation- ally”.43 A more direct threat would be the impact of a nuclear Iran on U. while shel- tering behind its nuclear capability. “Their repeated support for terrorism makes it particularly dangerous if they were to acquire a nuclear weapon .*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 125 Iran and Regional Security | 125 Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel and its opposition to the peace process puts it in a special category of states. fixed bases in the region as well as access are already put under threat by missile proliferation. As President Bush suggested before 9/11. “We share the view that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would be destabilizing and threatening to all Iran’s neighbors.48 U. suggesting that Israel’s possible use of nuclear weapons was less a source of con- cern. how- ever. use Hezbollah to do so. argued the opposite in the case of Israel. Iran might seek to confront Israel.”45 President Bush observed. because it was less likely to do so as a democracy and ally of the United States..S. and this would be magnified by a nuclear Iran.

and recent conflict.50 All of these are considerations that arise from the prospect of a nuclear Iran.49 Another problem caused by a nuclear Iran is the context in which this proliferation would take place—a region of instability. the states most directly affected by an Iranian nuclear capability. This was to change. While their implications are not well understood. by the end of 2005 as the protracted crisis over Iran’s nuclear program inten- sified with the arrival of a more hard-line government in Tehran. the Bolton visit underlined the liabilities of being asso- ciated with a state that has lost moral authority as a result of Abu Ghraib and credibility as a result of Iraq. A nuclear Iran. was illustrative. U. concerned by Iran’s activities in Iraq. Coming rather late. The United States’ asso- ciation with Israel (which possesses a large weapons inventory) also made denunciation of the still embryonic Iran program prob- lematic for the Arab states. competition. diplomacy has been slow and largely failed in mobilizing Iran’s immediate neighbors. might seek to burnish its leadership credentials through nuclear brinksmanship. the visit of John Bolton to the Persian Gulf in January 2005.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 126 126 | Iran and Regional Security that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons might invite an attack from another regional state. were more . Though concerned (especially about possible environmental consequences). however. Given this reality. and national— combined with the short distances involved. intra-Arab. even a moderate and satisfied state would cause concerns in seeking a nuclear capability. the imperative to arrest any further movement in that direction seems evident. it would be difficult to identify the source if any weapons are used.51 The most visible effort. The Gulf states. Given the intersecting rivalries—Arab–Iranian. if rent by domestic disorder. and that money would be better spent on conventional means of offsetting superior US forces in the region.S. Sunni–Shiite. none of the GCC states publicly denounced Iran’s nuclear program or actively lobbied against it at the Review Conference. The risks of cat- alytic war and indeed of the end of the taboo against nuclear weapons use are most likely where extremism in the name of reli- gion has become an identifying feature.

and inherently cautious. Its neighbors will have to adjust to living in the shadow of a nuclear-capable and missile-equipped Iran. Rather. This is not because they are not concerned. the regimes of the region have not taken a very active role in response to Iran’s current programs. New Delhi—which is increasingly dependent on the Gulf for energy supplies. is currently negotiating a gas pipeline from Iran. These military capa- bilities will aggravate already existing geopolitical disparities— Iran’s demographic and geographical weight and the possible polit- ical ascendance of the Shiite in the Gulf region. The United States has also tried and failed to impress on its new strategic partner. In every state in the region. the reputation of the United States has suffered.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 127 Iran and Regional Security | 127 receptive when Secretary Rice undertook a similar (and this time locally well received) visit to the Gulf in February 2006. Nonetheless. and although reliance on the United States may continue. transnational terrorism. and about how to assure Gulf security is mixed with the recognition that regional solutions are needed and that political exposure vis-à-vis the United States is dangerous. India. largely dependable regional state—has demurred. This comes at a time of change in relations with the United States. Riven by wars.52 Regional Responses The most direct impact of a nuclear Iran will be on its immediate region. Uncertainty about Iraq. Saudi Arabia’s and Turkey’s relations with the United States are lacking their earlier warmth. The follow- ing gives the broad outlines of likely regional responses rather than detailed country-by-country reactions that are available else- where. about Iran’s intentions. the need to avoid major economic agree- ments with Iran. and considers Tehran an important. silence cannot be taken for consent. other more urgent issues like Iraq preoccupy them.53 . it is marked by reluctance or by the absence of choice rather than enthusiasm.

hegemony. the members refused to emphasize the Israeli threat. apart from that which might come from the Security Council. and at the GCC summit in December 2005. with both the crown prince and the foreign minister clearly promoting a Gulf WMDFZ without making Israel’s disar- mament a precondition. U. it must necessarily be a card for non-Arabs and Shiites. . A nuclear Iran would seek to inhibit pro-Western-inclined Arab states. raising questions about the wisdom of relying on the United States exclu- sively.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 128 128 | Iran and Regional Security A flavor of the reactions to Iran’s programs is captured by two responses in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia has been less bashful about its concerns.”55 Since late 2005 the GCC states have become more vocal in their opposition to the Iranian nuclear program. Such an Iran may also seek to increase its influence in its immediate neighborhood. if not end. The Secretary-General of the GCC criticized the program. the GCC now emphasized a Gulf WMD-free zone (WMDFZ) as a first step toward a wider Middle East zone. focusing instead on Iran. Signifi- cantly. in effect separating the Gulf–Arab states from those further afield. A Saudi newspaper in 2003 observed that nobody could believe that Iran sought nuclear weapons against Israel or the United States: “The real target is the neighboring coun- tries. A nuclear Iran will tilt the balance of the region away from the Arabs. Initially careful to focus on the environmental risks and on Israel’s nuclear weapons.”54 A Gulf Research Center report concluded that the GCC and Arabs generally do not see Iran’s nuclear weapons program as constituting “an instrument of deterrence.57 This recent vocal opposition to Iran’s nuclear program by its neighbors serves notice on Tehran of the regional costs to be paid for continuation of the program. A nuclear Iran will seek to cash in on its new status to seek hegemony and leadership in the wider Muslim world.56 Equally significant. It will challenge and complicate. they are no longer inhibited from expressing concern about Iran’s pro- gram. nor does it represent a counterbalancing lever against Israel’s nuclear capabilities.S.

Moreover.S. bandwagon. Such a decision would be more attractive if Iran were considered a serious threat and if there were confidence in a U. guarantee. domestically. The alter- native might be to seek nuclear weapons or the stationing of nuclear weapons from a friendly power. Choosing this option would also risk relations with the United States.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 129 Iran and Regional Security | 129 Broadly. Saudi Arabia might also seek to buy or lease nuclear warheads from Pakistan for its existing missiles or have them sta- tioned on Saudi soil under Pakistani control (technically legal). The United States is the only contender for such a role. It is open to question whether Pakistan would be willing to guaran- tee Saudi security or accept the costs of offending the United States. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran for over a decade. but few states in the region have such a capability. they could seek to appease Iran. This option accepts the limitations involved and prefers to rely on rather than counter Iran. Fewer still have a nuclear infrastructure they could set into motion to acquire such a capability within even a decade. the GCC states could seek to balance Iran (that is. This might include seeking to entan- gle Iran in regional arrangements including trade and security. mollify it. Egypt. Second. meet its needs. the GCC states could acquire a countervailing capability (that is. Third. and internationally (with the EU and the United States).58 Turkey’s response in this scenario is also uncertain given its weak nuclear infrastructure. First. the GCC states have several options. including a theater missile defense system. a national nuclear option). Turkey’s political evolution is uncertain. Saudi Arabia is sometimes cited as following this model with an assist from Pakistan and already follows a policy of opacity in regard to IAEA safeguard inspections. regionally. This may be an attractive option. This would entail tightening ties with the United States and seeking security guarantees and military links. look to a proximate or distant balancer). which considers itself the natu- ral leader of the Arab world and puts considerable weight on its sta- tus. . and procure security by joining it.

Also Cairo’s ties with the United States (and Israel) would complicate any overt attempt to seek nuclear weapons. None of these options look attractive to the states of the region. Egypt prefers to emphasize Israeli nuclear weapons. But while Iran’s Arab neighbors are less reticent in voicing their concerns about Iran’s program. appears unlikely. The success of either of these. In general. The implications of a nuclear-capable Iran are serious but are not seen as an imminent threat in a region beset by immediate crises. Some states may position themselves to develop nuclear options. A grand bargain between the United States and Iran in parallel with serious movement on the peace process front. while examining all these options. but none are well placed to do so in the short term. depends on political solutions that are not apparent (for example. For the past decade and a half Israel has been aware that the proximate existential threats it faced have been displaced to the East. the most likely short-term response of regional states will be a tendency to hedge. Increased reliance on the United States (though not welcome) may be the most practical. could make at least progress on a regionwide approach to tack- ling WMD more likely. Israeli strategists and the Israeli Air Force first talked of military strikes against Ira- . whether diplomatic or military. however. This may be difficult given Egypt’s lack of significant nuclear infrastructure. how- ever.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 130 130 | Iran and Regional Security Any suggestion of the achievement of nuclear status by another regional state—especially Iran—is bound to give rise to pressures on Egypt to follow suit. leaving the United States and Europe to do the heavy lifting. a joint or regional response. A fourth possible approach for the GCC might be one of arms control and attempts to realize the long-discussed WMDFZ. whereas the GCC states focus on Iran’s program). Israeli Response Iran refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist.

unpredictable and shrewd. Yet few Iranians consider the Palestine issue one of national interest.59 In the 1990s Israel saw Iran rather than Iraq as the more serious threat. and believed that with Baghdad contained. Of equal concern has been Iran’s attempt to deploy its Russian-built submarines outside the Gulf and to pro- ject power throughout in the region.” the regime. at most it is an issue of . which might become more pronounced if Iran were to acquire a nuclear capability.60 Also of concern is Iran sup- plying missiles to Hezbollah together with funding and the overall strategic relationship. An obvious feature of the Iranian program that causes particu- lar concern for the Israelis has been its development of long-range missiles configured apparently for specialized warheads. aiming to act preventively before Iran became self-sufficient instead of waiting for Iran’s pro- gram to reach the point of no return and become less subject to influence from outside. The 2002 revelations of Iran’s nuclear pro- gram therefore served as confirmation of Israel’s own estimates and warnings over the previous decade. Its alarmism was deliberate. Israel sees Iran as an implacable foe. and the new government in particular. Israel was in the forefront of those seeking to sensitize President Yeltsin’s Russia to the dangers from transfer of nuclear technology to Iran.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 131 Iran and Regional Security | 131 nian nuclear installations in 1992. Even the war with Iraq in 2003 took the spotlight off the greater threat that Iran was beginning to represent. A nuclear Iran raises a host of questions for Israel ranging from Iran’s propensity for risk-taking to its attempts at extending deter- rence to Hezbollah to its behavior and posturing in crises to its possible attempts to sanctuarize itself with nuclear weapons while continuing to support or upgrade support for rejectionist elements and terrorists. shows no sign of reducing support for hard-line Palestinians. Iranian slogans against Israel on missiles do nothing to reassure Israel about Iran behaving responsibly. Although reformists in Iran have questioned Iran’s policy of being “more Palestinian than the Palestinians. Iran would be free to pursue its programs unobserved. posing an international rather than bilateral threat. Throughout the 1990s.

Israel will have to initiate a strategic dialogue with Iran to clar- ify redlines and avoid misunderstandings. Iran will need to know that Israel cannot accept the concept of limited strikes. Tehran finds it expedient to magnify the issue and demonize Israel. Israel has responded to this threat in several ways. assassination) fail. first and foremost. Israel therefore must anticipate the worst. any attack on Israel will be met by a full-scale. Israel’s main concern has been to keep the international spotlight . For example. The ARROW antimissile system con- stitutes the other part of this upgrade. Israel may consider moving from its opaque doctrine on nuclear weapons to a more overt stance. Given the experience of the Holocaust. Israel has also responded by moving its deterrent to sea. and to that end it coordinates its diplomacy closely with the EU-3. could have the effect of putting greater (domestic political) pressure on states like Egypt to follow suit. devastating response about which there should be no doubts (that is. Israel has insisted that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are. Iran needs to be disabused of any notion of using numerical superiority or the geographical asymmetries of the region to advantage. intended to act as a deterrent to Iran. Dolphin class submarines that can reach and navigate the Persian Gulf are now part of a second-strike capability that makes Israel’s deterrent more robust and survivable. there will not be proportional responses). an international problem. sharing intelli- gence and estimates. It insists that Iran is an international issue first and foremost. Still. given regular exercises. Israel must necessarily consider and plan for the possible need for preemption against facilities if all other alterna- tives (diplomacy. in the event of a military attack on Ira- nian facilities.61 Unable to deal with it unilaterally. which lends credence to allegations of an Israeli presence in Northern Iraq and Israeli use of Turkish airspace. It takes seriously Iranian threats of retaliation inter alia against Dimona.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 132 132 | Iran and Regional Security Muslim solidarity. sabotage. A move from ambiguity to quasi- public acknowledgment.

This “point of no return” will make Iran less vulnerable to sanctions and embargoes and will come before the date of actual production. Israel’s primary concern is that focusing on esti- mates of the dates at which Iran will be able to produce fissile material (3 to 5 years) will obscure the point at which Iran will have effectively achieved self-sufficiency regarding the fuel cycle. Israel must consider Iran’s refusal to recognize its right to exist together with proxy war waged with it over two decades as an existential threat.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 133 Iran and Regional Security | 133 and pressure on Iran. which will be in the front line in the event of an Iranian nuclear capability. . This means close and frank coordination with Washington. As the country most affected and most able to respond quickly. It is this earlier date that is salient for diplomacy. A nuclear Iran will complicate the regional strate- gic landscape by raising the risks of major conflict at a time when most instabilities in the region are transnational and domestic. Israel. Israel’s response to Iran’s nuclear program is the most important in the region. is bound to influence policy and calculations.

”4 His principal security advisor boastfully noted the linkage between the nuclear issue and regional politics: “They [the United States] are also con- 134 . Iran gives priority to its relations with Russia and China.3 Iran seeks a regional order in which outside powers are excluded and in which it plays a leading role in the Caucasus. which is seen as domineering.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 134 Conclusion I have argued that Iran’s nuclear ambitions reflect a broader Iranian challenge to the Middle Eastern regional order.1 Such an order is seen as a threat to Iran and its pretensions to manage regional security. this strategy entails a reduction of the U. and imperial. hegemonic. “They [the United States] want to silence us on the important issues that are going on in the region and the world of Islam. presence and influence in the region.-inspired regional order. A nuclear capabil- ity symbolizes Iran’s quest for regional leadership. They want us to follow their discipline in our foreign policy.S. Iran joins an implicitly anti-NATO and anti-Western grouping. In joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (as an observer).S. President Ahmadinejad observed. Per- sian Gulf and broader Middle East. It provides the means to block a U.2 In seeking to block it. and parts of South Asia. Iranian leaders are in no doubt about the competition for regional influence under way. As a starting point.

The United States is bogged down in Iraq. and the future shape of the EU. there is no way that Iran can be wor- ried about the threat of the Security Council. Relations with Saudi Arabia are strained over Iraq. Moreover. combined with the prospect of a Shiite- led state (in which Iran has significant influence and which emboldens Shiites in neighboring Arab states) feeds a sense of regional insecurity. or will be.”9 The smaller Gulf states are preoccupied with terrorism and are not reas- sured by Iran’s careless diplomacy. insurgency in Iraq with attendant uncer- tainty about the outcome. preoccupied with internal matters: elections. while Turkish analysts noting Iran’s “activism” and grab for regional influence see a “new danger.”7 Turmoil in the region. An Israeli analyst succinctly (and accurately) notes that “Iran is striving to become an Islamic super- power with hegemony over the greater Middle East.”6 Meanwhile the Guards Commander warns that Iran cannot be excluded from the region and that Iran is “not merely a regional power” but “a major power in the Middle East and the world.8 Accordingly Iran’s looming nuclear ambitions appear menacing. Iran’s policy on the nuclear issue has hardened.10 Since the arrival of the Ahmadinejad presidency. which they believe takes the military option off the table. The EU is.”5 He has already hinted how: “With the power it enjoys in the region. In this context Iran’s ambiguous policies in Iraq and strident rhetoric about Israel are amplified. immigration. .” which drives the development of ballistic missiles and a nuclear capability.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 135 Conclusion | 135 cerned that if Iran acquires nuclear technology the situation in the region will be altered. They are bol- stered by a belief that Iran should align itself with Asia and are not interested in the West or Western inducements. economies. The tight energy market has given Iran a buffer of approximately $15 billion in extra oil revenues for 2005. the high price of oil reduces the likelihood that any sanctions on Iran will include the oil sector. The strategic pic- ture seen from their perspective has changed for the better over the past two years. The new team is more confronta- tional by nature and more prone to brinksmanship. terrorism.

as opposed to regime–factional. the growing alienation of regional states. but who now have to debate the issues on the conservatives’ terms. the regime will not be threatened by opposition. Iran is a status quo power. while fragile. The wild cards in Iran today are the ultranationalists/Islamists who would welcome a return to a state of siege and embattlement and believe a nuclear capability is an answer for the lack of respect afforded Iran. Tehran has yet to make the choice between radicalism and being accepted (and treated) as a normal state. Iran’s ambiguity on terrorism only increases suspicions about its reliabil- ity. where hurting the United States risks a destabilization of the country and a prolonged civil war. Yet its opportunism. but they have intim- idated the more internationalist leaders. regime insecurity. At the same time. yet it is of marginal importance in terms of national. Regime evolution. and tolerance of ideological militants. together with the shift in power to the Revolutionary Guards. if not the United States. not an adventurist state. could see the emergence of less restrained policies. The challenge it poses is civilizational and ideological. the knife edge on which Tehran is poised in Iraq.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 136 136 | Conclusion An alternative analysis would be less sanguine about Iran’s posi- tion. focusing instead on the weakening of Syria. interest. unless it comes from within the system. inevitable with generational change. who see interaction or engagement with the world and the West as inevitable and neces- sary for development. Iran’s challenge to the international order is not a conventional one that can be contained militarily or susceptible to easy co- option. Territorially. may take too long to be relevant as an answer to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. the tenu- ousness of any Russian–Chinese tilt toward Iran. With strong repressive institutions it can counter threats but cannot generate enthusiasm and popularity except in the constituencies it favors with patronage. . and the necessity for good relations with the EU. its principal ally. They are a minority of the elite. Iran continues to exploit hostility toward Israel for leverage in the Muslim world and for bargaining with the United States.

regional status. and its self-absorption do not give rise to regionally responsible behavior. However. a nuclear capability necessarily assumes more importance. I have argued that Iran seeks to be recognized as a regional and even global power.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 137 Conclusion | 137 Whether it can be accommodated and whether its behavior and goals can be tempered and changed remains unclear. Iran exploits strategic ambiguity.S. and nurtures and cultivates a pop- ulist nationalism. Does it seek greater recognition within or against the system? That depends on which Iran you are speaking about. Iran’s anti- Americanism and hostility toward Israel are heartfelt and tactical. regime change. It wants to be taken seriously and its quest for nuclear sta- tus reflects this impulse. rarely consulting or acting through institutions. Iran is seeking a nuclear capability. similarly as a bargaining chip in any grand bargain. maximizing options and leverage for bargaining. which leaves it blocked diplo- matically.”11 But this begs the question whether Iran can be accommodated within the existing system or whether it seeks to overthrow the system. but with weak conventional forces and missiles. its lack of a natural regional constituency. there are elements currently in office in Iran that appear to expect to achieve this on their own terms without significantly changing their policies. Iran’s regional policies in the Arab world are that of a spoiler or dis- rupter. the benefits of which it sees as prestige and domestic legitimation. The strategic aspects are not principal. These policies are disruptive of regional order and could become more so with a nuclear capability. at least a weapons option. to be exploited to promote Iran’s version of a regional order. Iran has no grand strategy to achieve this and has been impro- vising tactically and defensively since its nuclear program was . and a greater voice in international relations. Some scholars have suggested that the starting point for a nuclear agreement with Iran is “according Iran a guaranteed lead- ing place in a Middle Eastern security order. a nuclear capability has certainly increased in value since 2002. does little to reassure its smaller neighbors. Iran’s sense of grievance. As a deterrent against U.

Seeking to moderate Iran’s behavior through engagement (and inducement) has been the approach of the European states. not the rights of the Iranian people. On the other hand. then its current capabilities are still limited and rudi- mentary and vulnerable to sanctions. certain regimes. So far Iran has held out for both. but there is still time to point to the difference between sensitive and other technologies and to underscore that it is the government’s behavior that raises concern. The nuclear issue is an attempt by Iran to force the world to deal with it on its own terms. but some may have convinced themselves that a fait accompli would force others to accept it or that it has an “Eastern” option. acting as if sanctions could work in an era of globaliza- tion. if Iran does not have a parallel clandestine program of any significance (which is not the same as undeclared facilities). stubbornly but with some reason.S. The current U. Since Febru- .12 Influencing the debate in Iran a decade ago might have been more useful. administration has insisted. The United States has handled the nuclear issue badly for over a decade. Iran wants technology and independence.S. Iran does not want nuclear weapons capability at the cost of international isolation and setbacks for development.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 138 138 | Conclusion uncovered. isolation and sanctions will only reinforce its interest in a nuclear capability. Iran after all is not Japan or Swe- den. Its policies have left Tehran free to depict the issue as one of technology denial.. hostility to the United States and recognition/status. In essence.S. that it is not weapons per se that are the prob- lem but. policy has been largely incoherent. the aim of some in Washington seems to be to get Tehran to choose between radical policies and sensitive technology. policy has fluctuated unclearly between regime change and policy change. imminent regime change. Most Iranians are concerned about bread and butter issues but do not like being dictated to or discriminated against. On the one hand. rather. rather than accommodate the terms demanded by others. consisting of bluster and bile mixed with opti- mism about a spontaneous. Neither con- tainment nor sanctions have worked very effectively. U. U.

which is to provide the fuel for Iran’s first reactor at Bushire on these lines). with the bulk of enrichment and return of spent fuel outside of the country (possibly Russia. the chances of settlement have increased. and the United States might be difficult to reject because China and India would find it much eas- ier to associate themselves with it.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 139 Conclusion | 139 ary 2005. however. Iran will insist on its willingness to continue negotiations. This limited agree- ment could take the form of giving Iran access to some parts of the fuel cycle (such as conversion but not enrichment on any scale). perhaps in a different mode or forum. when the United States joined its European allies in sup- porting diplomacy. Such an agreement sup- ported by the IAEA. Such an agreement would cer- tainly defuse the current crisis and give the international commu- nity some breathing space. At the same time. Iran has already reduced cooperation with the inspectors. Would Iran accept such an agreement? This depends on both its immediate nuclear ambitions and its perception of the threat involved in Security Council sanctions. however. the EU. political constraints. with possible withdrawal from the NPT hinted at as a last resort. to slice away at exist- ing constraints. Russia. Iran’s summary rejection of the EU package offer in July may have had more to do with the contents of the package than with distaste for an overall settlement. aims (and a temporary sense of leverage) and U. which would deal with all the issues of concern on either side. its permitted conversion activities would unwittingly fuel its program. and to make moves that restart its program with- out providing enough justification for a strong or united international response.S. In the absence of such an agreement. Iran’s calculation is that its continued cooperation with the IAEA (however imperfect) is preferable to the international community than the continuation of . Iran will continue to push for advantage. a limited or technical agree- ment on the nuclear issue appears more likely. is that if Iran has clandestine enrichment facilities.S. A larger package deal or an across-the-board agreement is unlikely. given Iranian fears about U. and on its cooperation with the IAEA. One defect of such an agreement.

Iran is now in a trap of its own making.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 140 140 | Conclusion its program without any inspections or monitoring. Absent an external threat. it will continue as in the past. lies at the heart of international reluctance to allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran. while failure to do so could jeopardize its economic prospects and development. A nuclear capability would certainly see Iran’s penchant for brinksmanship elevated to new levels. but in this it may prove mis- taken. finding it difficult to give up what it has convinced its domestic audience is essential to science and development. A state that harbors and promotes terrorists cannot reasonably be allowed WMD. opportunistic and reflexively hostile to the United States and Israel. The pri- mary aim of the regime is to stay in power. Iran’s behavior and its regional ambitions are concerns that will not necessarily change. A state that refuses . Iran may have underes- timated the degree to which its behavior has antagonized its inter- locutors and overestimated its own ingenuity to devise ways of having its cake and eating it too. Tehran’s mantra about being discriminated against obscures the degree to which Iran is the victim of its own behavior. however wel- come. has brought Iran into direct conflict with the international commu- nity.” I have suggested that a fix for the nuclear issue. while pushing for advantage. It is sensitive to power. is not the end of the story. It will use the nuclear issue and foreign policy to shore up its legitimacy. including unwillingness to assume responsibility for its own acts. It may believe a tight oil market increases its leverage. It will be regionally and globally ambitious without the means to achieve such status. A state that has elevated deniability to a new art form cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons. Iran’s irre- sponsibility. In turning down the EU-3 offer of technology and a long-term relationship and insisting on an accel- erated drive for enrichment. and when vulnerable. it will deal. it scored an “own goal. Iran still acts more like a revolution- ary clique than a responsible government that recognizes respon- sibilities as well as rights. Playing to a domestic audience. A state deficient in a sense of responsibility cannot be allowed control over dual-use technology.

any solution to the nuclear issue is necessarily a partial one that needs. the United States had recaptured the diplomatic initiative. it had accepted Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology (including the Bushire reactor) and perhaps even some parts of the fuel cycle on Iranian territory. Policy choices to deal with the nuclear issue are further constrained by the debacle in Iraq and the consequent imperative to maintain an international consensus. By early 2006. The United States had also embraced the need for diplomacy. Therefore. to encompass the broader threats posed by Iran’s ambition for regional hegemony. in time. The Iranian government is still so insecure in its legitimacy that it is unsettled by the prospect of normalization with the United States. Washington had accepted Moscow’s proposal to take enrichment from Iran to Russia as a potential means of keep- ing Iran from the full fuel cycle. It wants to claim democratic attributes without trusting democracy. the contrast between its tight control of elections and its rhetoric of the people’s participation (and choice) is stark.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 141 Conclusion | 141 other states’ right to exist should not be permitted to acquire weapons that may allow it to act on its rhetoric or encourage (or enable) others to do so. Policy Options Iran’s nuclear program presents difficult policy choices for all the players involved. Nuclear ambition is only part of a broader strate- gic challenge posed by Iran. Above all the United States had . To do so. while outsourcing this to its European allies. revolutionary rhet- oric. A state with a rather vague and fluid sense of international responsibilities in relation to international treaties cannot reasonably be trusted with technology that needs to be lim- ited by legislation to state parties. and subversive acts and in its unwillingness to assume normal relations with others lies the origin of the reluctance of others to see Iran acquire a nuclear capability. In its refusal to dispense with the cult of victimhood.

the United States needs to couch any offer to Iran in general terms. leaving the military option conspicuously on the table has been useful in concentrating the minds of the UNSC members on the need for diplomacy. in fuel assurance provisions). The U. which relies on diplomacy first adopted .13 Broadly there are two policy options—engagement and regime change—each with limitations: Engagement Policy along these lines is designed to stop. what the policy options would be thereafter. delay. and reverse poli- cies. the United States has accepted a more leisurely pace. Some believe that by freezing the program and buying time. decision in March 2005 to back diplomacy has been mixed. and if not. giving Iran time to reverse its course (ceasing conversion and research activities and reinstating Additional Pro- tocol inspections) pending a strategic decision to forgo the full fuel cycle. in which the responses are graduated and pressure is ratcheted up and taken sequentially. to deal with the lacuna of the NPT. between its desire to achieve the second without the first. First.S. that is. the Iranians may reconsider their policies or another government might do so. However. it has to choose between nonengage- ment and non-proliferation. Support for the EU-3 has been a little grudging and skep- tical but inevitable given Washington’s refusal to engage directly. The question remains whether multilateral diplomacy and the authority of the Security Council will be enough to get Iran to renounce its nuclear ambitions.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 142 142 | Conclusion accepted the need to maintain an international consensus among the Security Council members (and the IAEA Board of Governors) on the issue. This approach implies a deliberate. This policy. Supporting a broader multilateral consensus since September 2005. rather than by ad hoc arrangements conceived individu- ally (for example. The United States needs to do two things to strengthen the coalition to prevent Iran’s momentum toward a nuclear option. Second. slow pace.

seeks to convince Iran that the price for continuation of the quest for a nuclear option is too high.S. it is not self-evident that the driving force behind the nuclear program is national security in the narrow sense and therefore susceptible to security assurances. Iran would be eligible for nonsensitive nuclear and other dual-use technology and be given trade and other opportu- nities. In exchange for renouncing sensitive technology and increasing its transparency. More important. this approach depends for success on a willingness of both parties to engage with a view to an eventual grand bargain. Sanctions are part of this dialogue. could be part of a sequence of steps that leads to a broader agreement that encompasses all aspects of Iran–U. such as building on the overlapping interests of Iran and the United States in Iraq. but it comes up against several obstacles. engagement and an Ira- nian government sensitive to costs and isolation and willing to make compromises and build trust. In principle this appears the most logical solution. First. Like others suggested. however attractive for the immediate problem. a package now being renewed. So are the incentives offered by the EU-3 in August 2005 in the pack- age summarily rejected by Iran. it does not address the key strategic issues of which the nuclear question is a part: Iran’s broader role as a destabilizing force in the region opposed to the United States. relations.S. It implies a strategic decision in Tehran to forgo a nuclear weapons option. The Russian proposal currently exemplifies the strengths and limitations of this approach. The current Iranian government does not wish to bargain but seeks to attain its capa- bility to deter while accentuating its leverage vis-à-vis the United . does nothing for the broader issue posed to the NPT regime by the potential proliferation of enrichment capabilities. For success this approach requires U. however.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 143 Conclusion | 143 by the EU-3 and then continued by a broader coalition. A technical fix. But an ad hoc technical fix. It also requires a combination of pressures and incentives that make such a decision more compelling.

demand follows another. as I have argued. • Provision of access to technology (including dual use. it is con- vinced that any negotiation with the United States entails a slippery slope. both against regime change and neg- ative security assurances regarding nuclear weapons use.–Iran relations is related to everything else.S. and investment. as well as forgo nuclear weapons. It is worth sketching out what such a bargain might comprise. • Security guarantees.S. Iran feels threatened by the United States and seeks global recognition and domestic legitimation—and its quest for a nuclear capability reflects all three of these considerations—then the answer to its program is not technical or partial but comprehensive. but they will soon run up against the fact that everything in U. together with a new ideological government. like the government that preceded it. Moreover.S. In May 2003 Iran was willing to negotiate such a grand bargain. Discussions dealing with specific issues of mutual concern such as Iraq could be used as icebreakers. ending only with regime change.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 144 144 | Conclusion States. this implies recogni- tion of the Islamic Republic as a legitimately constituted state. with appropriate controls). The United States might offer Iran the following incentives through an engagement policy: • Full normalization of relations. conventional arms. Similarly. progress on Iraq (where interests objectively converge) would be contingent on Iran being reassured about U. Thus. including the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of assets. If. the United States would need to be reassured that Iran would change its pol- icy against Israel and its support for terrorism. in which one U. and . makes a rep- etition of this in the near term improbable. intentions toward Iran after Iraq is stabilized. but a perceived change in the balance of power and leverage.

A grand bargain is unlikely as much due to U. • End hostility toward the peace process and Israel. In exchange for offering these measures. • Initiate discussions with neighbors about mutual security. reluctance as to Iran’s. policy. is in fact to support regime opponents by extending radio broadcasts and assistance to NGOs and students. for what- ever cause. If so. • End support for terrorists of whatever stripe. • Cooperate on the stabilization of Iraq. This may reflect a decision to increase pressure on Tehran rather than any realistic assessment of the regime’s vulner- ability to externally assisted destabilization.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 145 Conclusion | 145 • Recognition of Iran’s legitimate security and political interests and an end to efforts to contain Iran or otherwise block its regional relationships. Regime Change If a technical fix only covers a narrow band of issues.” giving it an undeserved legitimacy.S. formulated as policy change on the Libyan model. indirect engagement is an uncertain recipe. and • Perform better on human rights. which implies any actions or rhetoric stimulating violence or hatred going beyond the accepted practice of diplomacy. and direct engagement is unac- . Current U. it is a renuncia- tion of a policy that has some chance of working for one that has virtually none. Washington today is unwilling to engage an “evil regime. the United States would insist that Iran: • Renounce the closed fuel cycle and ratify the Additional Protocol. including arms control with emphasis on missiles.S.

but it also needs international encourage- ment. If the U. its moderation in foreign policy would give it less reason to seek a weapons option or for others to fear it.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 146 146 | Conclusion ceptable. the United States will have to take the lead in containing Iran diplomatically and deterring it from gain- ing any benefit from an embryonic nuclear capability.S. there is no guarantee its successor would be less inclined to seek a weapons option. or Iran persists in its program. such a regime would be more sensitive to its international standing and less insis- tent on acting as an Islamic revolutionary role model. would certainly be an improvement. blinding the international community as to its dimensions. In the event that current diplomacy fails. The military option can be seen as a policy midway between engagement and regime change in that it could result in either delaying the program or acting as a precursor to regime change. policy choices for the immediate future revolve around the diplomacy of persuasion. which could in turn drive an accelerated program further under- ground. they may also act to solidify nationalist support and international sympathy for the regime. position in Iraq improves and . Accentuating Iran’s regional isolation through the weakening of Syria and the margin- alization of extremist groups depends on the United States’ broader diplomacy. Such a regime may emerge in Iran spontaneously. Second. pluralistic. even if the regime were destabilized or changed. U. However. although mil- itary strikes might delay the program.S. Furthermore. and trans- parent. what remains? Regime change. other issues arise. this approach is ideologically convenient and conceptually attractive. Broadly. However. if more accountable. First. This role might entail a range of measures from security assurances to the GCC states to theater missile defenses (TMD). if the problem is as much one of regime as technology. then a different regime. in one fell swoop repressive extremists are removed and with them the whole range of problems between Iran and the United States.

*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 147 Conclusion | 147 with it its leverage. it would serve to educate American and other citizens to the fact that the United States had gone as far as it could to settle the broad range of contentious issues peacefully. Even if this were proposed unilaterally and rejected by Tehran. . Washington should seriously consider a grand bargain.

*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 148 .

See William Walker. “Breakdown in the Nuclear Family. “Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules. industrial capability.” See Brad Roberts. 149 . 3.nytimes. “Arms Control and the End of the Cold War.” Foreign Policy. 45. David Sanger. and expertise are slowly spreading throughout the world.” Washington Quarterly. 15. “Turning a Blind Eye Again?” Arms Control Today.com. March 2005.” Foreign Affairs. Albert Wohlstetter. 28.” Adelphi Paper no. Challenges. “Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order.” New York Times. Winter 1976/1977. 5. p. p. 25.” Financial Times. 7. “Bush Seeks to Ban Some Nations from All Nuclear Technol- ogy. This appears to confirm Brad Roberts’ comment a decade earlier: “The inher- ently discriminatory character of non-proliferation mechanisms is incompatible with an era in which technology. 88–96. May 13. 67. vol. “In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN. 370 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. March 15. It is repeated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. pp. May/June 2005. 145–79. 2005. 2004). vol. Philip Stephens.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 149 Notes Introduction 1.” Washington Quarterly. May 2005. 2005. pp. p. and Change that reported in 2004. 12–8. 84. no. See Leonard Weiss. no. 111–28. The phrase is used by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats. 4. Autumn 1992. Permanent firebreaks between the haves and the have-nots will only fuel the ambitions of the have-nots to acquire what they have been denied. 2. vol. 6. “Unravelling the AQ Khan and Future Proliferation Networks. pp. 3. http://www. 15. 2. also David Albright and Corey Hinderstein. no.

9. October 6. “Asia’s Alliance with the Middle East Threatens America. 2005. Kurt M. “Nuclear Dangers in the Middle East: Threats and Responses. for example.” Iran (Tehran). For a striking comment to this effect. 5. For an excellent recent discussion.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/45518. 3. 2005). 11. and Mitchell Reiss. http://www. in BBC Monitoring. 2. 2006. Chapter One 1. June 2005. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2004). 995 (Washington.” Middle East Journal. 15. September 25. February 26. 1 (2000). See also Daniel Vernet. no. the senior Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani. See. February 23. see Ephraim Sneh and Graham Alli- son. Robert Einhorn. 10. requiring determination and real effort. 345. “Faut-il avoir peur de la bombe iranienne?” Le Monde. “Article IV of the NPT: Background. eds. who observed that the basis for U.org/files/ No5. “Iran Downplays Manmohan Singh’s Remarks. See Hindu. see Lawrence Scheinman. Statement to 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. May 18. Some Prospects. 2005.” and that for this reason its pressures must be resisted res- olutely to safeguard the revolution and the country.wmdcommission. September 27. 2006. 2005. Problems.. Antoine Dudalu. no. 4. Campbell. http://www.” Financial Times. Indian Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh commented at the UN that another nuclear power in the neighborhood was not desirable. opposition to Iran’s nuclear program lay in its hostility to “the essence of the Islamic revolution. Shahram Chubin. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control. 54. Stephen Rademaker. 12. http://www. May 2. Septem- ber 7.htm. p. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.S. “Iran’s Strategic Predicament. DC: Brookings Institution.htm. Einhorn and Campbell emphasize that the threshold to a decision to acquire technology for the nuclear weapons option is high.state. . The Nuclear Tip- ping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington. 15.” September 18.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 150 150 | Notes 8. 2005.” Policy Watch no. vol. Foreign Issues. Quoted in “Qom Ayatollahs Advise Minister on Domestic. 2005. This was admitted by Hasan Rowhani recently in a speech at the Strategic Studies Center of the Expediency Council in his reflections on his experience as well as in the background of the crisis subsequently published as an article in the Iran- ian quarterly journal Rahbod and the newspaper Etem’ad (Tehran). New York.” in The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report.hindu. p. p.pdf.com/the- hindu/holnus/001200509181428.

9.” Iran. Wolfsthal. Febru- ary 21. Deputy Director for Planning of the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) for the Nationaliza- tion Comparison.jpost.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). and Mohammad Saidi. April 27. DC: Carnegie Endowment. Mathews.” Jerusalem Post Online. 2003. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani (until August 2005) quoted in Amir Taheri. 10. 1.” Adelphi Paper no. “Eye of the Storm: The Buzz in Tehran. respectively.” May 9. 13.” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Network (Tehran). in Bozorgmehr. See. February 24. October 14. Ali Akbar Salehi. 2005. Information Committee Director of the SNSC Ali Agha Mohammadi. 6. 12. . Rose Gottemoeller. 6. quoted in “Iran Adopted Best Approach to Nuclear Issue. March 2005). March 10. September 22. July 28. quoted in “Most Difficult Case. see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp. and Jessica T. “Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order. 169. October 13.” Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) (Tehran). 2005. 2005. The rest is small talk. in BBC Monitoring. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Wash- ington.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 151 Notes | 151 5. 2005.” Iran (Tehran).” p. 2003.Hossein Mousavian also notes that far from feeling encircled Iran was given leverage. 2004. Ambassador to the IAEA.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=1116 383. For background. in BBC Monitor- ing.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). arguing that threats to Iran can only be removed “when Iran is powerful. in BBC Monitoring. May 10. p. 2005. 2005. 7. 304 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. George Perkovich. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. 2005. See Hasan Rowhani. February 3. 2005.” “Khamene’i Tells Commanders No Policy Made in Region without Iran. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. vol. The new chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani is a believer in raw power poli- tics. and senior negotiator Hossein Mousavian. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. quoted in “Official Says EU Aims to Delay Nuclear Talks until After Iranian Elections. Rowhani Tells Governors. Thus. stated: “Being a revolutionary does not mean we must discard everything and put ourselves on the road to confrontation with the rest of the world. p. July 27. See Najmeh Bozorgmehr. May 19.” Quoted in “Iranian Negotiator Gives Press Conference on Nuclear Issue. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (Tehran).” Quoted in “Iran Wants to Settle Its Nuclear Dossier at IAEA: Security Chief. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times. See Hasan Rowhani. 2005. quoted in “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT. Hasan Rowhani. 6. see Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement that “no policy can be implemented in the region without taking account of Iran’s views. 2005 11. 1996). September 20. March 12. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 8. http://www. Jon B. April 28. Joseph Cirincione. quoted in “Iran to Resume Nuclear Activities in Esfahan—Atomic Official.

Denounces Israel. 1994) and citations therein. August 31. and Hasan Rowhani.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). For a recent expression of this. I have elaborated on these issues at greater length in the following sources. March 10. 20. in BBC Monitoring. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. 2002). 2004. in BBC Monitoring. May 11. 2005. Security Chief Says. Ali Akbar Salehi.” Iran. in BBC Monitoring.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 152 152 | Notes November 18. “Khamene’i Tells Commanders. February 24. 2004. and Impact (Washington. Shahram Chubin. 2005. See Khamenei’s Friday lecture for all of these and related points. Iran’s National Security: Intentions. Says Iranian Defence Minister. 18. 2005. 2005. “Whither Iran? Reform. May 9. states could not obey international regulations. in BBC Monitoring. 1990. in “Iran Adopted Best Approach. 21.” Voice of the IRI Network. See “Ex-envoy Says Iran to Make Own Decision on Pos- sible Nuclear Deal.” Iran (Tehran). DC: Carnegie Endowment. In running for president in May 2005. 2005. November 5. 2005. Statement made by Rowhani. who alludes to the war with Iraq as a reason for Iran’s quest for military self-sufficiency. In light of Iran’s experience with Iraq it was evident that wherever the vital interests of a country were threatened. 17. 50–1. Iran has become . The quote is from the former envoy to the IAEA. 19.” As summarized in FBIS-NES-90-216.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “Iran Wishes to Continue Peaceful Nuclear Activities. September 3. a status and standing which befits the civilized nation of Iran. 2004. 16. an MIT- educated nuclear physicist. See Khamenei. in BBC Monitoring. See Hasan Rowhani. 2004. Hashemi Rafsanjani told Hans Blix that “the mere signing of a ban on nuclear weapons is not enough. Hashemi Rafsanjani referred to “the vast and powerful Iran” that can “find a distinguished and lofty standing among the nations of the world. pp. Shahram Chubin. 2004.” Other leaders share this view as well.” 15. Supreme Leader Khamenei more colorfully argues that the blanket denial of technology has led to Iran becoming self-sufficient and standing on its own two feet. Capabilities. Domestic Politics and National Security. Quoted in “Iran: Khamene’i Tells Scientist Iran Should be Self-Sufficient. November 7. 22. in BBC Monitoring. see Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. 2005. November 6.” Adelphi Paper no. November 19.” Quoted in “Iran Press: Rafsanjani’s Statement Outlines Reasons behind Candidacy Decision. February 24. 2005. May 14. May 8. March 8.” Hemayat (Tehran).” while former foreign minister and advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati asserts that since returning to its Islamic identity. 2004.” Iran (Tehran). “Iran’s Security Chief Presents Report on NPT Protocol. February 21. Former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezai says that in the next twenty years Iran would be the “centre of international power politics in the region. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. quoted in “Iranian Leader’s Friday Sermon Praises Country’s Progress. Quoted in “Maximizing National Strength Is Our Agenda. February 23. 2004. 14.

April 9. p. respectively.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 153 Notes | 153 “the most powerful country in the Middle East. DC: Carnegie Endowment. Iran’s National Security. Rafsanjani stated: “We thought of building missiles only after we were hit by them. See also Chubin. Iran has been saying much the same thing for the past ten years. 2004. May 1.” International Herald Tribune. October 8. This is a continuing theme of the military. “Inspector Says Saddam Wanted to Bluff Iran on Arms.” New Yorker. 2004. See. Quoted in Geoffrey Kemp and Selig Harrison.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran).” IRNA. p. See Philip Goure- vitch. Khamenei said: “They are against progress in any backward country. and “Iran’s Guards Commander Stresses .” ILNA (Tehran).” IRNA. 2003.. “Iran: The Lessons of Desert Storm. 28. 2003.” See Lawrence Freed- man. What has this got to do with you? What right do you have to determine whether or not a nation has the right to use nuclear energy?” Quoted in “Leader Says Iran Will ‘Punch’ Anyone Who Threatens Its National Interests. Revolutionary Guards Commander Rahim Safavi quoted in “Iran: Guards Commander Says the Corps Is to Receive More Research Funding. in BBC Monitoring.” Reuters AlertNet.” Financial Times. 1993).” Quoted in “Ex-president Says Iran Can Launch Missiles with 2000-km Range. in BBC Monitoring. “Letter from Korea: Alone in the Dark. September 8. for example. We then started to build them from scratch. p. 37. August 1. vol. March 5. 2005. 2004. Charles Duelfer. This was a lesson allegedly drawn by the North Koreans. 27. report for corroboration of the lessons drawn by Iraq. “A Strong Incentive to Acquire Nuclear Weapons. “Saddam the Deceiver: A Phoney Arms Threat.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004. including the use of terrorist proxies against the United States and France in Lebanon. May 25. August 2. October 6. 23. See also Shahram Chubin. December 16.” IRNA (Tehran). 26. 2004. 30 September 2004. 2005. http://www. 2003. December 15. Iran’s emphasis on morale and improvisation in the Iraq war also led to the cultivation of asymmetrical strategies. 15. and “Velayati: Iran Most Powerful State in Middle East..S. 1. in BBC Monitoring.. 2004. March 6. “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival.cia. Among many such statements. 68. See Shahram Chubin. 2005. is to own your own nuclear arsenal. 25. in BBC Mon- itoring. 2004. 20. Spring 1995. India and America after the Cold War (Washington.. in BBC Monitoring. November 1991. The arrogance [of the United States] is so impudent that it says that Iran does not need nuclear energy.” unpub- lished paper prepared for Los Alamos National Laboratory. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. 2003. no. October 5. “Iran to Play Key Role in Regional Power Politics—Expediency Council Secretary. Respected experts such as Lawrence Freedman also suggested that this was the les- son of Iraq for other proliferators: “The only apparently credible way to deter the armed forces of the U. 2004.” See. David Johnston. 24. May 3. and Evelyn Leopold.

in BBC Monitoring. New Outlook to Global Security—Iran TV.S.” IRNA (Tehran). 33.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). January 11.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). 2002. “Iran: Rafsanjani says Tehran Ready to Cooperate if There Is Change in U. Could Use Nuclear Weapons against 7 Countries. May 9. Mohsen Rezai.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). 2002. Will Attack Iran— Financial Times. January 12. quoted in “Foreign Forces in Persian Gulf Present Threats to Iran. Says Navy Chief.A. Incapable of Military Attack against Iran. 2005. 2002. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran: Uranium Enrichment Plant Underground. August 2. 2005. quoted in “Iran Senior Official Says U. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says Washington Changing Tone after Failure of U. 2005.” Quoted in “Iran: Former President Rafsanjani Says U. 32.S. 2005. 31. in BBC Monitoring. August 2.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). June 28. January 7. for example. February 2. Shamkhani stated that even a limited attack “will be regarded as an attack against the existence of the Islamic republic of Iran. For a report on U. in BBC Monitoring. 30. 2004. Febru- ary 3.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 154 154 | Notes Importance of Persian Gulf Security.-Inspired Riot. 34.. June 27. 2002. in BBC Monitoring. Hashemi Rafsanjani.” Quoted in “Minister Says U.S. March 30.” Resalat (Tehran). and Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani.S. in BBC Monitoring.” ISNA (Tehran). quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says U. 2005. 2002. July 22. ‘Hege- monic Policies’ Would Fail.” Fars (Tehran). January 13. 2005. in BBC Mon- itoring. 2004.” ILNA (Tehran).go.S. and “Iran: Raf- sanjani Says Circumstances Will Change If Israel Accepts Arab Decision. See Ali Akbar Dareini. quoted in “Iran: Senior Official Sure U. http://abcnews.” Associated Press. quoted in “Commander Says Iran Will Not Tolerate U. Brigadier General Mohammed Bager Zolgadr. March 16.S. June 22. Policy. August 2. in BBC Monitoring.S. in BBC Monitoring. 2002. in BBC Moni- toring.S. the comments of the Deputy Guard’s (IRGC) commander. appropriations of $27 million for mini-nukes. 29.” IRNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. June 22. March 29.” ISNA (Tehran). 2002. June 21. May 8. June 21. 2002.com/International/wireStory?id=558596. quoted in “Maximizing National Strength Is Our Agenda. 2002. see “Plans for Nuclear Bomb Proof of U.S. is threatening any adverse country with nuclear bombs. March 12. Presence in Region.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. 2005.S. March 25. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. Hossein Mousavian. January 6. Commander of the Iranian Navy.” ISNA (Tehran). 2003. 2004.A. Also Admiral Abbas Mohtaj.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). See the discussion by a hard-line Iranian paper: “Iran Says American Nuclear Policy Threatening World Peace. August 1. January 10. 2002. 2002. See. 36. Israel Will Not Attack Nuclear Installations. In June 2002 Rafsanjani observed that “America is now talking very arrogantly to the world and by creating an ‘axis of evil’ order. in BBC . 2005. 2002. March 10. 2005. Says Iranian Defence Minister. and Hashemi Rafsanjani. 35.

3. 37. see Ali Shamkhani’s comments reported in “Iran Warns of Preemptive Strike to Prevent Attack on Nuclear Sites. Chapter Two 1.” Financial Times.” Financial Times. Accord- ing to one Iranian official. 13. 2005. June 19.. 2005. March 3. June 19. and UK Warn Iran and Syria on Terror. “The Riots in Afghanistan: With a Little Help from Our Friends. See “Official Says Iran Energy Waste Five Billion Dollars. Brigadier General Mohammed Bager Zolgadr is quoted as saying that “Iran will not recognize any limit on defending itself. 39. threatened U. See British allega- tions of Iran’s supply of explosives to anti-British forces in southern Iraq through Hezbollah. 2005. in BBC Mon- itoring. a March 29. 2. forces. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “Iran Has a Right to Develop Nuclear Power.” New York Times.. August 18. February 18. Al Hayat report noted the threat to target U. “Iran Hints at Preemption over U.S. 5. 2004. 5.S. October 7. 2004. 2005. and Christopher Adams and Edward Alden. July 23. 2004. p. 2005. August 18. Iran’s UK Ambassador. Majlis Polls. Secretary of the Expediency Council. p.” International Herald Tribune. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. quoted in “Iran: Senior Official Comments on Ties with U. http://memri. Nuclear Program.S. and Associated Press. August 20.” See “Commander Says Attack on Iran Will Not Stay within Iranian Borders.S. 38. June 13.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 155 Notes | 155 Monitoring. 2004.com/2005/05/3/politics/03 mil- itary.S. “UK Accuses Iran over Iraqi Rebels.000 megawatts of electricity and ten to twenty reactors. “U.html.000 and 10. June 14. The figures vary between 7. It is clear that Iran seeks to use the vulnerability of the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq as a pressure point on the nuclear issue. October 6.. See Thom Shanker.” DOHA. 2005.org/).” International Herald Tribune. January 27. On the United States having no monopoly on preemption.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). May 27. See Christopher Adams and Roula Khalaf. “Pentagon says Iraq Effort Limits Ability to Fight Other Wars.and will come down on the aggressor anywhere that it wills. 2004. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times. 5. 8. See Mohammad Hossein Adeli.” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1. the Commander of the IRGC. Threat. 2003. p. See “Iran Experts Say Nuclear Power Necessary for Electricity Gen- eration. 2005. p. http://nytimes. unchecked domestic consumption is caused by price sub- sidies that entail waste on the order of $5 billion annually. bases in the region (translated by Middle East Media Research Institute. Yahya Rahim Safavi. 2005. January 26. See Sarah Chayes.” Website (Tehran). May 3. August 18. 2004. in Al-Jazeera. 2004. Chairman of the Majles Energy Committee quoted in “Majlis .net.” FARS (Tehran). Mohsen Rezai.

March 15. in BBC Monitoring. Septem- ber 8. while Rafsanjani has said that Tehran expects to become a member of the club of countries possessing nuclear technology. April 30. January 30. and “Iran Press: On West’s Opposition to Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 2005. 5.asp?parentid=24561. Ready to Negotiate. October 7. 2003. May 25. 9.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). quoted in “Ex-President Says Iran Not Seeking War. October 25. http://www. 2005. and Ali Khamenei.” UCLA International Institute. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says Iran Does Not Want Nuclear Weapons. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.isop. 2004. 2005. September 29. in BBC Monitoring. Hashemi Rafsanjani. October 6.’” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). quoted in “Envoy Says Iran Needs 10 Years to Produce Good Nuclear Fuel. 2005. University of California–Los Angeles Chancellor and nuclear expert Albert Carnesale has asked: “If you were building a nuclear power plant would you want to rely on Russia to provide the fuel for the next thirty years regardless of what your diplomatic relations were?” Leslie Evans. quoted in “Natanz Complex Achievement of Iranian Experts. quoted in “Khamene’i Tells Prayer-Leaders Iran Does Not Possess Nuclear Weapons. in BBC Monitoring. . 10. and “Raf- sanjani Says Iran Expected to Join Club of Nuclear States. “UCLA Chancellor Carnesale on the Risks of Nuclear Attacks on the United States. in “World Must Accept Iran’s Entry into the Nuclear Club—Hasan Rowhani. 2005.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran).” IRNA (Tehran). p. March 23. 2004. October 7. December 4. Not all observers are unsympathetic. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran). 4. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. October 7. May 14. May 18. 4. Deputy Head of the AEO. Ali Akbar Salehi. in BBC Monitoring.” Vision of the IRI Network 2. 2005. 2003. quoted in “Iran: National Security Council Secretary Calls for Greater Global Interaction.” ISNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. Quoted. “Iran and the US Have One Thing in Common. 2005. 2004. Los Angeles. “Iran Press: Linking Nuclear Case and ‘Holy Defence Week of Iran-Iraq War. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mohammad Saidi. 2003. 2005.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran).” IRNA (Tehran).” International Herald Tribune. March 23. March 8. Deputy Head of AEO Mohammad Saidi. and “Iran Majlis Studying Proposals on Construction of 20 Nuclear Power Plants—MP. in BBC Monitoring. March 22. Decem- ber 3. 2005. 6. 2004. in BBC Monitor- ing. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. respectively. Rowhani has said the world must accept Iran’s entry into the global nuclear club. See Hasan Rowhani. 8. 2003. October 26. in BBC Monitoring.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 2003. quoted in “Nuclear Energy Top Pri- ority in Iran’s Nuclear Program—Official. 2003. September 27. 2003.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 156 156 | Notes Deputy Says Iran Needs Nine More Nuclear Power Plants. March 13. March 7. 2004. Iran’s former IAEA envoy.” Afarinesh (Tehran).edu/ article. September 9. 7.ucla. 2005. p.” IRNA (Tehran). March 31. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. April 29. 2005. 1. and Elaine Sciolino. 2004.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). March 30. February 1. 11.

“Leader Says US. 16. in BBC Monitoring. Jan- uary 30. March 9. in BBC Monitoring.” IRNA (Tehran). October 20. March 6.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). March 4.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). The first comment is that of former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati. According to Rowhani. “Daily Says IAEA Case Aimed at ‘Preoccupying’ Iran. and “Iran’s Kharrazi Says America ‘Wise Enough’ Not to Attack Iran. 2005.” New York Times. see “Iran Daily Urges Government to Inform Public on Nuclear Dossier Talks. 2003. Quoted in “US Should Not Terrify World over Iran’s Nuclear Activities—Security Chief.” Aftab-e Yazd Website (Tehran). November 8. see “Iran Commentator Says ‘Enemies’ Will Accept Iranian Demands over Nuclear Issue. November 29. Says Spokesman. 2005. October 9. Quoted in “Former Iranian Foreign Minister Says Europe Not to Be Trusted. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. Quoted in “No Government in Iran can Forgo Nuclear Technology—Senior Negotiator. 2005. 2005. 2005. 2005. 2005. 2004. October 13. May 11. see “Iran: Editorial Urges Government Action over ‘Ailing’ Stock Exchange. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. February 2.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). “Iran’s Stocks Plunge after Vote for UN Review of Nuclear Program. Europe Aim to Hinder Iran’s Scientific Devel- opment. Ali Khamenei. For a critique on lack of information. 1. 2004. Deceiving Public. 2005. which might welcome confrontation as “political salvation. 2005.” See Bennett Ramburg. A Western source put the plunge at 30 percent since late September 2005. in BBC Monitoring. one Iranian commentator stated: “Today the same nation that was called barbarian by the West is proud and dignified and is one of the ten to fifteen countries that can run their native nuclear technology.” October 10.” International Herald Tribune. March 1. 2005. November 8. Blair ‘Bankrupt. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 2005. January 14. 2003. p.” See “Iranian Commentary Says Fundamentalism Part of Anti-Globalization Movement. 2003. and the second is that of current Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. 15. 2004. 14. See Nazila Fathi. see also the interview of Ray Takeyh by . in BBC Monitoring. January 15. March 2.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). March 5. March 8. There was a 20 percent fall in stocks between mid-July and October of 2005. Iran is eighth in a list of thirteen states capable of manufacturing equipment needed in producing nuclear fuel.’” Jomhuri- ye Eslami Website (Tehran). March 24. 18.” Keyhan (Tehran). May 12. 2004. 13. 2005. On the same theme of pride in the achievements. 2005. Bennett Ramburg argues that nuclear tension generates support for a failing regime.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 157 Notes | 157 12. For three such poll references. December 14. in BBC Monitoring. October 18. 2005.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). Hasan Rowhani referred to access to nuclear technology as a “national demand” to his Japanese counterparts. March 3. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran Made ‘Impressive’ Progress in Nuclear Technology. 17. “Dealing with Iran 11. For hard-line Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran) reaction. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran).

pp. 2005. June 5. For a discussion. Autumn 2003.” Yale Global Online. as the lamentable exchange of “candy for a pearl. DC: Nixon Center. no. In the view of reformist Mohammad Reza Khazemi. See.” Foreign Affairs. Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride. For striking parallels with Iran between conservatives and realists in North Korea divided at the time of the Agreed Framework.com/News/ ArticleView/Default. 2005. see Safa Haeri. 35–54. 19. 2005. “Taking on Tehran. 21. http://www.” Key- han. “To Have or Not to Have? Iran’s Domes- tic Debate on Nuclear Options. 2005. Lar- ijani characterized the Tehran agreement between Iran and the EU-3 in October 2003. June 6. http://www. quoted in “Moin: If Elected as President.” Asia Times. “For Tehran.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). see also George Perkovich.org/publication/7885/takeyh.swisspolitics. “Iran. http://www. “Tough Nuclear Choices Face Iran’s Next Pres- ident.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). March 21.print?id=5448.yale. http://yaleglobal. Mohsen Rezai. Going Critical: The First North Korean Crisis (Washington. which postponed referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the UNSC in exchange for suspension of fuel cycle activities.html. Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak. April 19. April 21. ed. June 4. 2005.org/20050301faessay84204/kenneth-pollack-ray-takeyh/taking-on-teh- ran. 20. Geoffrey Kemp (Washington. in BBC Monitoring. June 8.cfr.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 158 158 | Notes Bernard Gwertzman. Mostafa Moin’s speech to the Ghazvin Medical University. see Joel Wit. 2004).edu/article. Interview by Edmund Blair.” Washington Quar- terly. 26.” in Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analy- sis. 75–6.php? section=int&page=news_inhalt&news_id=5868315. 2005. June 4.html. . on the national pride in the program.” Iran Mania. in BBC Monitoring.” June 14.iranmania.com/atimes/printN. http://www. 22.html. respectively. vol. Council on Foreign Relations.” 25.org/en/news/index. Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh. June 2. leader of the main reform party and brother of outgoing President Khatami. 2005. 2001). see “Taboo of US Relations Turned on Its Head. June 5. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations. http://www.asp?ArchiveNews=Yes&NewsCode=32367&NewsKind=Cur- rentAffairs. 24. 2005.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). 4. see Farideh Farhi. “Presidential Candidate Larijani Calls for Nuclearization of Iran.atimes. March/April 2005. pp. US: Fissures within Fis- sures. March 2. 23. and Robert Galluci. quoted in “Iran Election Program: Qalibaf Hints at Developing Ties with USA. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. Mohammad Bager Qalibaf. I Will Stop the Uranium Enrichment. Ali Larijani. 2005. For intraregime differences. DC: Brookings Institution. Daniel Poneman. quoted in “Iran Presidential Candidate Reza’i Says He Will Resume Nuclear Enrichment.for- eignaffairs. 2005. 2005. 2005.

2005. For the evolution of Hashemi Rafsanjani toward pragmatism and national interest. May 15. May 31. 2005. December 18. in BBC Monitoring.” Survival. Financial Times. which is seen as the renunciation of the export of the revolution. Ari Larijani. . 28. 2005. December 28. 13. 2005.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). p. 27. Summer 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 34. “Foreign Policy: Active or Inactive?” Keyhan. 2. For a hard-line newspaper view. 2005. “Iran Press: Daily Says Next President Must Promote Nuclear Technology Firmly. February 2. June 1. see Sana Vakil. 31.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 159 Notes | 159 26. 4. 2005. Rowhani comments: “They [the United States] believe that Iran’s stand- ing will change in the region if it acquires the capability to enrich uranium.” Financial Times. noting that Iranians need to define “what is it that [they] require from the outside world and . and “Iran Election Program: Rafsanjani Announces Man- ifesto. Quoted in “Iran’s Regional Standing Is Source of Concern to USA—Former Security Chief. 2006.” Iran Fars News Agency (Tehran). See “Critics of Nuclear Policy Must Be Allowed to Express Views. see “The Nature of Political Crises and Iran’s Nuclear Problem. 2005. December 14. 47.” some- thing they wish to prevent. February 3. January 23. p. Reformist Ahmad Shirzad presents a thoughtful discussion along these lines. vol. 2005. 30..” See Hasan Rowhani..” Mehr News Agency (Tehran).” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). see Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr.” Aftab-e Yazd. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 2005. See Naser Bahramirad. in BBC Monitoring. June 2. For back- ground on the new conservative government. 2005. May 18. January 5. December 25. December 1.1–2. in BBC Monitoring. December 3. no.” E’temad (Tehran). 2005. On the impact of an advanced nuclear program in the region. 2005. The conservatives believe that an enhanced nuclear capability would affect this regional role and that “the enemy would not like Iran to play such a role. in BBC Monitoring. 32. December 15. January 14. pp. June 16. “Reformed Rafsanjani Could Be Force for Change. Ali Larijani referred to the desire to keep Iran an industrial backwater and a pattern of denial of advanced information as well as biological and nanotechnology. December 16. 2005. “Conservatives Will Win Iranian Presidency if Rafsanjani Does Not Run— Rowhani.” Vision of IRI Network 2. interview. in BBC Monitoring. what sort of system and regime do [they] wish to be?” Quoted in “Iran Press Criticizes Government’s Use of ‘Threats’ in Foreign Policy. in BBC Monitoring.” Iran (Tehran). December 21. For some. 2005. May 31. “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran. in BBC Monitoring. see “Iran Press: Rafsanjani Outlines Five Post-Election Pledges to Nation. 2006. 33. For the five postelection pledges to the nation.” IRNA. the interlude between the Iran–Iraq war and the current period has resulted in backsliding in foreign policy. quoted in “Iran Needs to Counter ‘Multi-Dimensional’ Threat from West. pp. 2005. 2005. 2005. 29.

in BBC Monitoring.1. For the back- ground to the Isargaran. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. January 1. 2005. Also Kazem Alamdari. January 3.’ Calls for Prudence. 2005. 2005. 2006. 40. January 1. January 11. Larijani in September 2005 press conference.” Keyhan.” Voice of the IRI Net- work (Tehran). December 20.1. November 15. 2005. December 13. For press analysis sympathetic to this view. “We Have Preconditions. in BBC Mon- itoring. “US Firms Not Welcomed to Join Iran’s Enrichment Plan—Larijani. “Iran’s Rafsanjani Defends Nuclear ‘Right. noting that for Russia non-proliferation took precedence over any bilateral considerations or economic advantages in relations with Iran. 2005..” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). “The Changing Landscape of Party Politics in Iran—A Case Study. December 29. no. in BBC Monitoring. see “Iran Daily Supports Ahmadinejad’s ‘Active’ Diplomacy. see “Iran’s Security Chief Explains Tehran’s Nuclear Strategy in TV Interview. See Ali Larijani. “Iran’s President Rolls Back Clock. in BBC Monitoring. 2006. 2005.” Vaseteh: The Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies. 2006. the political party supporting Ahmadinejad.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 160 160 | Notes 175–90. “Daily Says Iran ‘Great Opportunity for Europe’ in Nuclear Talks. “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. in BBC Monitoring. 36. “EU Nations Want Iran Taken to the UN.” Tehran Times. December 30. November 30. 35.” See “President Calls on ‘Monopolizers of Power’ to Step .” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). 2005. Quoted in “Larijani— Now Is the Time for Resistance. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 37. 2006. 2005. They therefore seek excuses by raising other issues [alleging] .1–4. quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Explains Tehran’s Nuclear Strategy in TV Interview. 2005. vol..” Mehr News Agency. in BBC Monitoring. 8. Winter 2005. in BBC Monitoring. Indicative of this was Larijani. and “New Government Depicts ‘Harsh Image’ of Iran—Rowhani.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). 26. 41. that the government is ignorant of con- ducting foreign policy. December 14. quoted in Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman. 39. unattributed commentary. October 1. “Rafsanjani Warns US against Military Attack on Iran. 38. p.” International Herald Tribune. 2006. December 21. September 30. January 11. 42. who argued that Iran was the key to the area for Russia. which has other more important regional concerns than nuclear prolif- eration. 2006. 1285–1301.” Farhang-e Ashti. January 12. See International Herald Tribune. see William Abbas Sami’I. January 3.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami. 2006. 2006. December 21. January 7. 2006. December 12.” Third World Quarterly. 2005. no. On Iran’s geopolitical position. 4. vol. November 17. pp.” January 13. Larijani was clearly and explicitly corrected by Russ- ian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Larijani made these comments to IRGC commanders.” Fars News Agency (Tehran). 2005. President Ahmadinejad is quoted as saying: “Some individuals are disgrun- tled because they can no longer gain access to the State Treasury. 2005. who pointedly rebutted this assertion. pp.

2005). An article in Resalat asserted that “Anyone who takes over in this election will not want to move against the peoples’ interest and the people will not allow him to do so either. interview by Najmjeh Bozorgmehr and Daniel Dombey. December 1. February 28. But Still Hope for Progress in Talks. no. May 5. see Amir Ali Nourbaksh. “EU3 Warns of ‘Managed Crisis’ over Iran Ambitions. negotiator Hossein Mousavian commented: “Now it is time [for Europe] to deliver something to Iranian public opinion and nation. “In Iran. 2005.” See “Iran Press: On Characteristics Required of Next Pres- ident. 2004.” Voice of America. November 17. A22. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. http://www. Savyon. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. May 10. See Foreign Minister Kharrazi’s comment on May 4. p. “In Iran. p. 2005. April 13.” MEMRI. Dissenting Voices Rise on Its Leaders Nuclear Strategy. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 161 Notes | 161 Aside.” Financial Times. “EU Diplomats: Iran Risks Sanctions for Nuclear Activity.” Resalat (Tehran). April 18. 1001 (Washington. May 22. 2006. 4. http://www. April 6. and Mohsen Sazegara. 2005. April 14. in BBC Monitoring. 46. 45.thar- waproject. March 27. 2005. 2004. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 14. March 16. See Gareth Smyth. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Washington Post. quoted in “Iranian Negotiator. 2005. 7. 2005. p.” Hossein Mousa- vian.” Washington Post.” Aftab-e Yazd Website (Tehran). 47. and Gareth Smyth and Daniel Dombey. One Iranian commentator said that “one must accept that the nuclear file is one that is entirely national and ultimately related to the country’s national security. Even Some on the Right Warning against Extremes. in Dafna Linzer. 2005. 43. ‘Snub’ to UK. and Karl Vick.php?option=com_keywords&task=view&id=2017&I temid=0. See also A. Hossein Mousavian. p. p.” International Herald Tribune.cfm?CFID=46290374&CFTOKEN=56257987. quoted in “Ex-President Rafsanjani Says Iran Will Not Submit to Bullying on Nuclear Issue. . 2005. May 25. 48. “Iranian Paper Views Delay to Nuclear Deal with Russia. 2005. Hashemi Raf- sanjani. 2005. March 21. in BBC Monitoring. “Nuclear Dispute Boosts Critics of ‘Great Satan’ in Iran Poll. 10.” See “Iran Press: Commentary Says Iran’s Nuclear File ‘National Challenge.com/English/index.com/english/archive/2005-05/2005- 05-10-voa34.” Iran (Tehran).” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). Conservative Factions Fear Radicalism. 2005. 253. 2005. Financial Times. 2005. “Iran’s Foreign Pol- icy and Its Key Decisionmakers. see Roger Wilkison.” ISNA (Tehran). Feb- ruary 3. September 15. “The Second ‘Islamic Revolution’: Power Struggle at the Top. “Iran Says Nuclear Plans on Hold: Leaders Are Frustrated. 49. Legislator Comment on Nuclear Dossier. February 27. For a British diplomat’s observa- tion on how hard-line pressure translates into tough rhetoric in the negotiations. p. 2005. Septem- ber 16.” Tharwa Project. See Michael Slackman.’” Iran (Tehran). “Iran: Toward a Fourth Republic?” Policy Watch no. May 1. 2006.voanews. December 2.” Financial Times. For example. A11. 44. For a useful if broad discussion. 1.

http://financialtimes. June 14.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt+%F+W. 2005. May 14. Berlin. August 19.” Middle East Report Online. see Farideh Farhi. For an exception. On the costs of suspension and technical problems caused. These revelations were picked up in the West.org/ mero/mero102405. December 20. 53. “Mixed Signals on Iran’s Nuclear Program. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran’s Nuclear File: The Uncertain Endgame. 2005. 2005.” Financial Times. 2004. see Reza Aghazadeh. 2005. 2005.merip. 2005.” Aftab-e Yazd (Tehran). and Rowhani’s statement about “cooperating to a mini- mum extent. August 4. “Iranian Officials Discuss Ways to Retain Nuclear Scientists.” Die Welt. February 22. see Gareth Smyth. August 18.” And the right wing prefers to with- draw from the NPT altogether. For Rowhani’s take on the unbalanced nature of the commitments. December 16. October 18. December 12. in BBC Monitoring.csmonitor.” See Robert Nolan. For a useful analysis. 54. 51. in BBC Monitoring. May 12. See Scott Peterson. in BBC Mon- itoring.” Christian Science Monitor.printthis. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. October 14. 2004. April 1. 2005. See the discussion of one nuclear expert. October 24. 2005. and “Daily Urges Iranian Officials to Make Prompt Nuclear Decision.” Aftab-e Yazd (Tehran). See . Hossein Shariatmadri is quoted as saying: “Whatever is going to happen after five years of suspension is going to happen now. see AEO head Reza Aghazadeh. 2005. April 1.” Foreign Policy Association. 56.com/ 2005/0614/p06s02-wome. pp. Febru- ary 21. 2005. such technical fixes might include fuel guarantees.html. 57. 55. quoted in “Iran’s Atomic Energy Chief Says Suspension of Uranium Enrichment Problem- atic. March 30. see “Iran to Definitely Resume Part of Its Nuclear Activities in ‘Near Future.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 162 162 | Notes 50.htm?section=Iran %20and%20the%20EU-3. 2003.1. in order to suspend our activities as little as possible. 2. For example.” Baztab Website (Tehran). “Call for Openness over Nuclear Pro- gram. http://www. October 16. see “Iran Reformist Criticizes Iran Officials for Policy toward EU. 2005. 2003. “President Khatami Says Iran Ready to Produce Fuel for Nuclear Plant. and Mohammad Khatami. December 12.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). March 31. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. On the retention of personnel indispensable for further progress in the nuclear area. quoted in “Cessation of Iran’s Enrichment Program Not an Option—Agency. 2005.” Sharq website (Tehran). limited numbers of centrifuges in stages. or multinational schemes for enrichment.fpa. in BBC Monitoring. http://www.’” IRI News Net- work (Tehran). http://www. 2004.org/newsletter_info2583/newsletter_info_sub_list.” ISNA (Tehran). For a critique of Iran’s dysfunctional rhetoric and negotiating style. 2005. See Mousavian’s comments about a “dual strategy” reported in “Iranian Ex-Envoy Says Country Used ‘Dual Strategy’ in Nuclear Talks with EU.html.clickabil- ity. 2004. 52. “Iran and the EU-3.

2005.” Financial Times. President Ahmadinejad’s speech to the United Nations in September 2005 seemed to be intended for a domestic audience and showed a misreading of what General Assembly speeches are about. need to import the raw uranium. http://www.iranwatch. U. however. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” (Washington.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 163 Notes | 163 Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman.cfr.org. 4. March 9. 2005). February 11. Iran’s insistence on the full fuel cycle makes little sense if it is intended to avoid dependence. testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations. For more details on the intrusiveness of the inspections that would require “anyplace. “A Plan to Bring about Nuclear Restraint in Iran. speech delivered at the National Defense University (NDU). 2005. anywhere” access. State Department. especially when the first reactor at Bushire is not yet operational. and Tim Guldiman and Bruno Pellaud. May 19. pp. 13. Iran’s current urgent insistence on an enrichment capability for its power generation program is by no means a necessity. Council on Foreign Relations. p. Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. interview by Bernard Gwertzman.” Finan- cial Times. Notably. I am indebted to Shai Feldman for emphasizing this. Bush. . The fact that the program was undeclared also suggests an illegal intent. 15. Sen- ate. see http://www.org. The IAEA has documented Iran’s experiments with polonium.S. May 19. testimony before Committee on Foreign Relations.S. it tolerates new enrichment by Brazil but not by Iran. This proposal has floated around the negotiations and is well presented by Joseph Cirincione. p. 60. June 27. Chapter Three 1. Note. 2.iranwatch. 58. anytime. DC: U.htm. http://www. DC. U. 2005. 2004. a specialized material that can serve as a neutron initiator in fission bombs. Iran is also known to have sought high-precision switches that can trigger a nuclear explosion. 2005. Senate.” See Gary Milhollin. See also the evidence compiled in Bureau of Verification and Compliance.org/Gary/sfr-milhollin-051905. for Iran will. 3. “An Offer That Iran Cannot Refuse. 59. June 6. which it does not possess in any quantity. “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control. Gary Milhollin. 72–80. President George W. This narcissism is visible in debates in Iran that often appear to reflect the belief that the whole world is concentrated on watching Iran and its development and to exaggerate the importance of Iran to others. U. Washington. that the Bush approach is selective.S. A second 40-megawatt heavy water reac- tor in Arak is “larger than needed for research but too small to make electricity and just right for producing bomb-quality plutonium. in any case.S. 2005.

html. 6. Iran can turn the enriched uranium into tablets that will be used as fuel for reactors. See William J.S. it has all the means. December 27. 2004. 2006). There are many summaries of Iran’s nuclear program apart from the eight IAEA reports (since February 2003). 2005).” CRS Report for Congress (Washington. March 4. “U. the most authoritative and com- prehensive analyses include those by the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) and Tony Cordesman (2004). to turn the ore into yellowcake. and to enrich the UF6 through centrifuges to a level of 3. p. who stated. Apparently it was the first time there was a bomb design available on the open market.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 164 164 | Notes 5. for the first time the IAEA noted unanswered questions about the “role of the military” in this peaceful program and documents “related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. “Taking Stock of Iran’s Nuclear Program. “Technologically. see Sharon Squassoni. Besides the IISS dossier. relying on its own uranium mine and resources.” See IAEA Director-General. 11. Demand Deepens Gulf with Iran over Nuclear Facilities. See also the interview with Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator.” International Herald Tribune. April 14. to convert the yellowcake into UF4 and UF6. Esther Pan.5 percent.” David Sanger. 2005. June 2. June 3. it would constitute the smoking gun regarding Iran’s weapons intentions. paras.org/publication/8075/iran. See also Ephraim Asculai.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). “Had we attempted to develop nuclear arms.” stated Hasan Rowhani. In the zirconium plant in Isfahan. 19. http://www. Quoted in “Chief Negotiator Says Iran Has Not Imported Nuclear Parts. Broad and David E. The clear implication is that if proof of Iran’s acquisition of these bomb plans comes to light. we would also have tried to attain the design for the bomb. U. saying that Iran sought only the parts but not the design for the production of bombs. officials are all but certain that Iran received the same bomb designs as Libya: “We assume that the Iranians got what the Libyans got. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments. Hasan Rowhani. Seven of these reports can be found in the British Foreign Office document. 18. March 8. Iranian leaders have carefully distinguished their purchases from that of Libya. 2004. For periodic assessments. [Iran has] obtained the nuclear fuel cycle. JCSS no. 128. February 27. 2004).html. 2004.” New York Times. “Iran: European Nuclear Negotiations” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations.” Rowhani said that Iran has the capacity. Sanger.S. Board of Governors.” Tel Aviv Notes.cfr. “Implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. http://nytimes.com/2005/05/03/ international/middle east/03npt. DC: Congressional Research Service. Besides the questions relating to origin of the contamination of some sites and full history relating to P1 and P2 centrifuge technology. if Iran wants to produce fuel for a reactor. Therefore. Can we prove it? Not yet. from the ore stage to turning the enriched material into tablets and inserting them into fuel . “Unraveling Pakistan’s Nuclear Web: Inquiry into Khan Hobbled by Discord and Concern over Ally. in BBC Monitoring.” GOV/2006/15 (Vienna: IAEA. and 38.

11. vary among analysts: see International Institute for Strategic Studies. TV Monitor Project. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. Bush.whitehouse. Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that U. “Data Is Lacking on Iran’s Arms. 2002). intelligence had information that Iran sought to adapt its missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons (December 2004).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 165 Notes | 165 rods. quoted in “Iran to Put For- ward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator. See President George W. August 2. Feb- ruary 26.S. March 13. 2005. U. http://www. August 3. May 6.” New York Times. 2005. 2005. See MEMRI.org/Transcript. Sometimes missile technology is used as a metaphor.” Quoted in “Minister Says Iran Not Targeting U.S. 2004. February 27.” ILNA (Tehran).S. Shares Details on Efforts to Intercept Weapons Technology. then. 2005. http://www.S. Clip no.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3. June 1. U. March 16.S. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. May 20.” New York Times. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the U. quoted in “Missile Technology Most Impor- tant Part of Iran’s Military Deterrent—Minister. Sirus Naseri. “Whither Iran? Reform. May 5. Power Facilities. in BBC Monitoring.S. October 6. intelligence on Iran’s program is known to be deficient. U. 2005. Director of Defense Intelligence Agency. Shamkhani has suggested that Iran would mass produce missiles like a popular automobile (the Peykan) and that “the production of the Shihab-3 will never stop. see Dafna Linzer. For a later dis- puted estimate of a longer. ten-year period. March 9.” Washington Post. Iranian nuclear negotiator.” Interview with Tony Cordesman. “Iran Is Judged Ten Years from a Nuclear Bomb. and Steven Weissman and Douglas Jehl.com/2005/03/09/international /09weapons. 4. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. 10. 2005. http://www.nytimes. according to one source. February 16. 2005. December 7. 2005.S.” Adelphi Paper no. intelligence by Laurence Silber- man and Charles Robb. 8. p. 2005. 2005.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). Panel Says. in BBC Monitoring. sources indicate their interception under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of dual-use missile technology bound for Iran. Estimates. 2005). President Bush alluded to a dozen interceptions of missile-related technology to Iran under the PSI. .voanews. 2005. interview. “U.com/eng- lish/2005-05-20-voa62.” International Herald Tribune. A01.” testimony before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2005. Davis Sanger.html. 9. speech delivered at National Endowment for Democracy. “Estimate Revised on When Iran Could Make a Nuclear Bomb. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby. See the discussion in Shahram Chubin.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran).S. Domestic Politics and National Security. There is [a] Shihab-3 missile embedded in every Iranian. “scandalously” so. http://mem- ritv. Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment (London: Routledge. U. p.. 7. VOA News.S.html. 412.cfm. See the report on U. Tony Cordesman has said that “there is virtually no technical justification for building them unless you are going to put a nuclear warhead on them.asp?P1=412.

June 1.” April 2006.” Star (Johan- nesburg). 2005). October 11. observed that after many years and repeated questions about the technological situation and after the expenditure of millions of dollars. p. 2005. 2005. See Chubin. See also “Iran Reports Gain in Test of Missile Fuel.com/2005/06/01/international/middleeast/01iran. 17. p. October 5. Iran has indulged in diplomatic ploys deflecting pressure away from its mis- sile program by asking the UN Secretary-General for reports on “missiles in all their aspects” for two consecutive years. See Robert Hewson. “Whither Iran?” Iran also emphasizes short-range missiles such as anti-ship missiles for defense in the Gulf. 2005. 13.” Wall Street Journal. father of the Israeli Arrow project. http://www. 19. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran).” Mardom-Salari (Tehran). 13. 6.” Quoted in “Iran Wants Sanctions Lifted before ‘Rigorous’ Inspections of Nuclear Sites. July 22. “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Iran. 2005. “The New . Nur Pir-Mozen. p.S. 2005. Gives IAEA Info on Iranian Missile Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead.” April 3. 21.” Weekly Standard. 6.nytimes. See also Bill Sami’i. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi justified Iran’s need for missiles for defense purposes but added that “ours are not for first use. p. has suggested this response. 16. 1998. October 7. June 4. “The Military-Mullah Complex: The Militarization of Iranian Politics. DC: National Defense Univer- sity. July 22.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 166 166 | Notes 12. Quoted in Judith Yaphe and Charles Lutes.” Janes Defence Weekly.” New York Times. 2004. 2005. 2006. Iran acknowledges possessing a maritime cruise missile program. Iran reported success in a test of a solid-fuel missile. 18. June 1.S. p. A3. 14. “we still do not know what has been going on in Bushire for the past thirty years. February 25.” Le Monde. 69 (Washington. 2003. See “U. 15. 5. June 6. Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv). Iran is reported to have purchased cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2004. 20. government reportedly has documented evidence suggesting that Iran is attempting to develop a nuclear weapon payload for its medium-range Shi- hab-3 missile. “Iran Ready to Field Cruise Missile. July 27. p. 10. The U. “Iranians Test Missile with Multiple War- heads.” Quoted in “Majles Deputy Questions Spending on Nuclear Power Plant. which would increase their range and improve their shelf life. in BBC Monitoring. Dov Raviv. in BBC Monitoring. p. The United States shared this information with the IAEA. a Majles Deputy and nuclear specialist. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. See “Iran Tests New Missile Using Solid-Fuel Technology—Agency. and Mohsen Sazegara. 11. See International Herald Tribune.” McNair Paper no. 1998. and “Iran Claims New Success with Underwater Missile. May 14. in BBC ME/3246MED/7.html. See also “Washington accuse L’Iran d’etudes sur un charge nucleaire pour missile. Iran has not joined the Hague Code of conduct regarding missiles. 2003. May 31.

” Washington Quarterly.” RFE/RL. Later they closed a new airport that they believed should not be under contract to a Turkish company that might have had ties with Israel. Robert McMahon. May 19. 108. no. CA: RAND Project Air Force. 334. October 6. see Chubin. 26. April 1.S.” testimony before Joint Hearing of Com- mittee on International Relations. Peter Lavoy. vol. no. Matthew Levitt. Terrorism and Democracy.gov/testimony/2005/ LugarStatement050519. Secu- rity.rferl. 2005). April 28. p.101–03. Paul Bracken. 30. esp. “Iran: Weapons Proliferation. Jan- uary/February 2000. no.pdf. 2004).org/featuresarti- cleprint/2005/04af8904ce-0073-4cf4-bb19-aad24016373. 1013 (Washing- ton. Bush said that the United States would make no distinction between those who committed acts of terrorism and those who supported them. http://www. See Sara Daly.whitehouse. embassy hostages. 31. see Daniel Byman. see “Iran’s Terrorist Sponsorship: Winding Down?” IISS: Strategic Comments. Biological and Chemical Weapons. and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combat- ing Nuclear Terrorism” (Santa Monica. Scott Sagan. John Parachini. and William Rosenau.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 167 Notes | 167 Iranian Government: Resurrecting Past Errors. 28. “U. March 2005.) 22.html. 5. Notably. For a recent discussion. pp. July 2005. 24. speech to the National Endowment for Democracy. The quote from a Homeland Security report is found in Eric Lipton. 99–113.senate. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 3. “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear. who had allegedly strayed into Iranian territory in a provocative manner. 27. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia and Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation. for example. “The Second Nuclear Age. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). referring to Iran and Syria. Says Iran ‘Most Active’ State Spon- sor of Terrorism.S.” International Herald Tribune. http://www. 32. reminiscent of the U. 2005.org/ . Bush. 11. February 16. 2000). 1. and James Wirtz (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. For a discussion and citations. 98–103. “Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U. U. See. 1.washingtoninstitute. Summer 2005. p. blindfolded.” opening statement of Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing. 28. http://foreign. they paraded captured British troops. http://www. 2005. Norton. p. 23. 110–11. For speculative comments on chain of command and “safety culture.” see Gregory Giles. 2.S. 2005. House of Representatives. pp. DC. 79. 33.S. “A Rosier View of Terror-List Nations.” Foreign Affairs. Al Qaida. See The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. 25. Wash- ington. vol. ed.W. “Whither Iran?” For a similar view. 2005. “Confronting Syrian-Backed Ter- rorism.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3. 2005.. Global Stability and Regional Peace. “Aum Shinrikyo.” in Planning the Unthinkable. vol.” Policy Watch no. 29.

2005. DeSutter suggests that a U. in BBC Monitoring. pp.” July 24. 2003). Allison Graham. Norton. DC: National Defense University. 2005. p. January 31. Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books.” McNair Paper no. 2005. 2005. More plausible in my view is the explanation noted earlier of “keeping options open” for bargain- ing. 69 (Washington. See also. “Still Haunting America. quoted in “Iran’s Hezbollah Leader Warns to Set World Ablaze. together with the strong influence of hard-liners in the Security apparatus.” Financial Times. “UK Accuses Iran over Iraqi Rebels. 36. “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy. See Judith Yaphe and Charles Lutes. Iranian officials argue that this was not their aim and that the decision to keep Al Qaeda members under house arrest and close surveillance in Iran was meant to keep them as hostages and a warning to Al Qaeda not to target Iranian cities. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. According to Porter Goss. see pages 85–6. 120. 38. Velayati was personally indicted by a German court in the Mykonos case. “A Look at Iran’s Spon- sorship of Terror Groups. See Christo- pher Adams and Roula Khalaf. 34. and Alan Cowell.rferl. Director of Central Intelligence. British allegations echo one by the United States a month earlier. Center for Non-Proliferation Research.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 168 168 | Notes html/pdf/Iran-Testimony-2-16-05. 38–9. 41. 2005). See 9/11 Commission Report.pdf. Febru- ary 1. the excellent discussion between Scott Sagan and Ken Waltz. p. 41. No Place Safe for Americans. Bill Sami’i. 2004). See also Economist. 1997). 10. See Chubin.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. October 7. “Whither Iran?” See also Paula DeSutter. See. 42. May 1. Hezbollah official Seyyed Mohammad Bager Kharrazi.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/ Goss_testimony_02162005. E’temad Website (Tehran). p. “Iran continues to retain in secret important mem- bers of Al-Qai’da—the Management Council—causing further uncertainty about Iran’s commitment to bring them to justice.” Farhang–e Ashti. 2005. 4. 5. Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons (Washington.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/01/ 347a2c5f-088a-408-a632-d5fc648046.” Porter J. pp. 2005. 39. response should be to “deny Iran ambiguity”. 35. February 16. p. October 6. “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Iran. pp.” February 26.S.cia. 67–8. . for example. 2004. 2005. p. “Lebanon: Time for Syria to Go. Author’s interviews with Iranian officials. http://www. See Economist. 43. 40. 47–70. Geneva.W.html. Goss. 37.” http://www. 240–1. “Blair Suspects Iran Aids Insurgents.” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence. May 2005. DC: National Defense Univer- sity.

See Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran).” United Press International. 103. Giles. See DeSutter.. 2005. 2005. Joseph Bermudez Jr. 45. Quoted in Steve Coll. quoted in “Iran Accepts Negoti- ation Offers from Any Country. 19–24 46. 137–153. “Expert: Iran Nukes Replace Old Military.” Quoted in “Iran’s Aghaz- adeh says UN Referral Would Escalate Mideast Tensions. It Wants the Bomb. The view of the IRGC as an aggressive element is supported by Paula DeSutter. p.” Wash- ington Post. Planning the Unthinkable. “The DPKR and Unconventional Weapons. in BBC Monitoring. pp. June 12. September 28. In 1993. “Nuclear Crisis Extends Well Beyond Korea. “Whither Iran?” pp. 1994 (not a bargaining chip but insurance for the regime). Septem- ber 26. and “Nuclear Chief Says U. April 14. 2005. Autumn 1993. only to be interrogated by reformist parliamentarians about the wisdom of threatening neighbors that Iran was seeking to cultivate as friends.” Survival. September 10.” IRNA (Tehran). see Chubin. and Wirtz.” See . June 27. 35. 1993. Paul Bracken. 1994. 50. Top Nuclear Official.S. 48. Sagan. October 3. in BBC Monitoring. Giles contrasts the offensive view with that of civilians in Iran who see them as deterrents. pp. 48–51. in BBC ME/1664A/8. warning that referral to the UNSC “initiates a chain of actions and reactions that escalate tension and adds volatility to an already vulnerable situation in the region. Pakistan’s tacit support for Kashmiri terrorist attacks on India seems to have increased with nuclear weapons. 47. Chung Dong Young. They were echoed by AEO head Reza Aghazadeh. “Islamic Republic of Iran. no. September 27. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran). 2005. pp. who threatened escalation in the region. For sources specifically relevant. vol. June 3. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). See also Andrew Mack. 49. there is no reason to possess a single nuclear weapon. 1/4.” p. May 20. Dis- honesty on Nuclear Issue Clear for Iran.” International Herald Tribune. For an example. 189–90.” International Herald Tribune. B01. suggesting that Iran’s conventional capabilities are “obsolescent. 1. A question posed by a Western official vis-à-vis Iran in relation to this case. 2005. p.” in Lavoy. The comments were made by Ali Larijani. Another case occurred in 2002 when General Zolgadr of the Guards threatened to destabilize the Persian Gulf if the United States threatened Iran. April 16. “North Korea Isn’t Playing Games.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 169 Notes | 169 44. 183. 1993. September 27. “Nuclear Weapons and State Sur- vival in North Korea. Iran’s Defense Minis- ter Akbar Torkan observed that Iran’s defense budget of $850 million was one- twentieth of that of Saudi Arabia.” See Stefan Nicola. 3. Tony Cordesman makes the point directly. see Rob Litwak and Kathryn Weathersby. p. Denial and Jeop- ardy. 2005. quoted Kim as saying: “If the regime secu- rity is guaranteed. “The Kims Obsession: Archives Show Their Quest to Preserve the Regime. The South Korean Min- ister of Unification.

in BBC Monitoring.ceip. 59. For references. Amir Mohebbian of the Resalat newspaper. quoted in “Iran’s Top Security Official Warns U. “Iranian Security Chief Interviewed by Al-Jazeera on Nuclear File. “Whither Iran?” 52. 2004.” International Her- ald Tribune.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 170 170 | Notes Norimitsu Onishi. against Attack.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). Geoffrey Kemp (Washington. 53.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). See quote from an anonymous policy advisor to a senior cleric. 5. 2005. Rowhani also noted that while WMD had no place in defense doctrine. Feb- ruary 9. Director-General. 3. p. “Kim Jong Il Signals Readiness to Resume Nuclear Arms Talks.army.” in Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analysis. 2004. See Kamal Kharrazi. see Chubin. See Ali Asghar Soltanieh. June 18/19.” Middle East Briefing. in BBC Monitor- ing. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. November 25. November 24. Farideh Farhi. “To Have or Not to Have? Iran’s Domestic Debate on Nuclear Options. p. remarks given at Second Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference.” 56. “Iran in Iraq’s Shadow: Dealing with Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Bid. June 22. 60. Iranians focus on Israel’s nuclear capability but curiously do not note that the “massive imbalances in military capabilities” come not from nuclear weapons but disparities in conventional capabilities. 51. 2004. quoted in International Crisis Group. Moscow. 57. http://carlisle-www. February 5–6.A.htm. This newspaper often refers to the existence of a “nuclear apartheid.mil/usawc/Parameters/ 04autumn/russell. p. quoted in “Iranian Spokesman Says Use of Nuclear Weapons Religiously Forbidden.’” ISNA (Tehran).htm. November 24. August 6. Iraq. 2005. 2001). ed. quoted in Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). However. September 13. 10. General Shamkhani made a similar argument earlier: “The existence of nuclear weapons . 2003. February 7. 2004. “Former Guards C-in-C Says Cooperation with EU Undermined Iran’s ‘Deter- rent. See also Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. 55.” Al- Jazeera TV (Doha).” Para- meters. in Richard Russell. Autumn 2004. June 19. 2003. 2005. Foreign Ministry. “Iran: Where Next in the Nuclear Standoff. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.” Hasan Rowhani. Ali Khamenei. DC: Nixon Center. there is a place for such detailed discussions and that “these discussions have been held. The principle that any directive can be reversed on the grounds of expedi- ency or necessity (maslahat) undermines the strength of this argument. September 20. http://www. the argument does appear rather carefully crafted for his regional audience.org/files/projects/ npp/resources/moscow2003/soltaniehremarks. 2003. 58. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: We Are Not Building a Bomb. August 8.S. 54. 2004. 4. p.” International Herald Tribune. 2004. 2004. September 12.

May 30. Shamkhani added that Iran signed the NPT. “Case Study on France.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). “Nuclear Weapons Will Not Bring Prestige to Iran. 65. See Hossein Mousavian. October 26. respects the safeguards agreements.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 171 Notes | 171 will turn us into a threat that could be exploited in dangerous ways to harm our rela- tions with the countries of the region. November 10. 2005. see Shmuel Bar. 64.” International Herald Tribune. 2002. no. October 25. December 24. November 10.” quoted in Takeyh. Others disagree. 57.” Keyhan. December 21. and 20 percent of the equipment portion of the defense budget. Geneva. “Hardline Daily Says Iran Must Complete Nuclear Plant. Iran has exaggerated its progress for reasons of pride.” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). November 9. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. Since the mid-1990s. February 8. 2005. Fall 2003. see Sirus Naseri.” p.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 61. and gar- nering domestic capital. 2004. 7. August 10. 2005. “Iran: Cultural Values. 67. 62. “For Many Iranians. 70. Mousavian’s comment appears apt because by talking up the issue. June 10. This is consistent with Iran’s strategic culture and approach to negotiations. 28.” p. quoted in “Iran Security Official Says Nuclear Talks Eased Concern of Possible Conflict. December 30. Bruno Tertrais. 2004. 2. See . 69. nationalism. 2003.” ISNA (Tehran). 2004. November 8. For a valuable discussion. 68. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. and wants a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the Middle East. “A Short History of the Nuclear Bomb and Nuclear Parity.” IRNA website (Tehran). 2004. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. 44–77. vol. 2002. in BBC Monitoring. and “Iran: Editorial Says Nuclear Weapons Best Deterrence against Nuclear Powers. 2003. 2004. p. in BBC Monitoring. June 9. “Nuclear Arms Detrimental to Iran’s National Interest: Defence Minister. February 7. December 13. 66. the time and space left for compromise are decreased and misused. 2004. Top Offi- cial Says. 2004. “Iran Has Mas- tered the Fuel Cycle and This Cannot Be Turned Back under any Circumstances. “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy. in BBC Monitoring. Ali Akbar Salehi. see Zeev Maoz. 2003.” International Security. For an example. For a counterconventional and persuasive discussion. pp. arguing that most of the advantages of nuclear weapons come from having the capacity to produce them rather than their actual possession. quoted in Neil MacFarquahar. Nuclear Power Is an Issue of Pride. Nuclear weapons account for 10 percent of France’s overall defense budget. 63. “Iran Builds a Bomb. See Hashemi Rafsanjani. “Iran: Rowhani Says Leader Opposed to Acquiring Nuclear Weapons.” Iran (Tehran). October 3. August 8. in BBC Monitoring.” paper presented to the workshop on “Governing Nuclear Weapons. the United States and Israel have exaggerated how advanced Iran’s capabilities are in order to limit it before it reaches the point of no return.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). 15.” Iran Daily (Tehran).

*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 172 172 | Notes Hamid Hadian. http://foreign.” Financial Times. 37. no. February 23. and could be a model for other states beyond Iran. 75.com/2005/03/09/international/09weapons. no. 73. vol. no. Carol Rodley.” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) no. 11. For discussion. Iranian officials had to explain to their domestic audience the need . “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.” See George Perkovich. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capa- bilities Three Months Short of the Bomb. “Non-Proliferation Treaty. pp. Virtual arsenals would aim to create such a cushion for the nuclear weapon states and extend it for non-nuclear weapon states. Mohammad Al Baradei. http://memri. pp.” Foreign Policy.” Survival. p. 148. http:// www. Mazarr. George Perkovich notes that this scenario.S. 18–24. 2. Spring 1998. May 19. May 23. no. The key criterion becomes the cushion of time between a given stage of nuclear technology and a deployed nuclear force. 3. vol. 72. “Data Is Lacking on Iran’s Arms. 2004. vol.” Diplomatic Hamshahri. 229. 14. Autumn 1995.e.” Survival. U. Winter 2002/03. no. Panel Says. 69. 74. p. 2005. 1.” International Security. 71. “Nuclear Weapons as the Central Focus of International Politics. May/June 2005. 20. 37. 3. 129–44. In the autumn of 2003 (Tehran agreement) and again in the November 2004 Paris agreement.cgi? Page=archives&ID=1A20905. see Christopher de Bellaigue.S. Shahram Chubin.. State Department’s second top intelligence official. 2005. Chapter Four 1. 1. testimony before the U. 40. “Virtual Arsenals. “Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals. Spring 1995.” New York Times. 27. “a variant of the Japanese model is very difficult to counter. For an early discussion of the dangers within the NPT. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See also Ariel Levite. “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival. Michael Mazarr discusses how a nuclear option might be used for arms control purposes: “For most developed and a few developing states the ques- tion is not whether they could have nuclear weapons but how long it would take to deploy them.” Michael J. September 2004. no. “Iran: Think Again.pdf.org/bin/opener.senate. see Ayelet Savyon. For a generally sensible set of comments on Iran and nuclear weapons.nytimes. p. March 9.gov/testimony/2005/PerkovichTesti- mony050519. quoted in Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt. see Avner Cohen and Joe Pilat.html?th=&pagewanted=p. vol. Testing Times: How the Grand Bargain of Nuclear Containment Is Breaking Down. 2005. quoted in Steven Fidler. “Iran Seeks EU Consent for Modelling Its Nuclear Program on the ‘Japanese/German model’: i.

” Der Spiegel. quoted in “EU Waiting for New Iranian Government to Proceed with Talks— Official..shtml. September 26. see Hasan Rowhani. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran’s Security Chief Rejects IAEA Demand to Suspend Enrichment. September 20. December 24.” IRNA (Tehran). November 21. 2004. Hossein Mousavian depicted the 2004 agreement as part of strategy of “preventing the formation of an interna- tional consensus against the Iranian nuclear program” (and possible referral to the UNSC).cbsnews. Negotiations helped create the atmosphere for long-term gas contracts with India.” ISNA (Tehran). 2003. quoted in George Jahn. 2004. in BBC Monitoring.. 2005. 2005. September 19. Hasan Rowhani. See “Iran Security Official Says Nuclear Talks Eased Concern of Possible Conflict. On U. China. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. July 14. September 25. Iran’s representative at the IAEA. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 6. Hasan Rowhani.” Iranian Labour News Agency (Tehran). at times. 2003. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. December 21. “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours. At the time Supreme Leader Khamenei defended the agreement in similar words: “They [the United States] had come close to forming an international consensus against the Islamic republic on the issue of nuclear weapons . 5. On omissions. 2003. Iran acted adroitly to clarify the situation. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. November 2. BBCTV interview. July 15. 4. quoted in “Prominent Reformist Says Iran Should Main- tain US-EU Rift over Nuclear Programme. http:// www. in BBC Mon- itoring.com/stories/2005/06/15/world/printable702166. September 15. 2003. quoted in “Security Chief Tells EU Iran Didn’t Reveal Nuclear Information due to Sanctions. Mohsen Mirdamadi. 2005.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). sanc- tions as cause of nondeclaration. September 27.” Sharq website. See Figure 2 on nuclear decision making. June 15.” CBS News. and the United Arab Emirates. November 4.S. Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee of the Majles. July 17. 7. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resigna- tion. November 17.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 173 Notes | 173 for prudent diplomacy to defuse pressures. See Hossein Mousavian. in BBC Monitoring.” Hashemi Rafsanjani. suggesting that a domestic constituency existed for confronting the international community. and Hashemi Rafsanjani. 3. see interview with Ali Akbar Salehi. Hashemi Rafsanjani has said that “it was possible that. Rowhani. 2005. “Iran Admits Expanded Nuke Work.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). Pakistan. quoted in “Iran’s IAEA Envoy Insists Tehran Not Seeking to Become a Nuclear Power. 2003. 9. Iran has not reported its activities. 2003. November 17.” IRI News Network (Tehran). 8. November 21. July 18. 2003.” ISNA (Tehran).” . quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Delivers Friday Prayers on Qods Day.” Quoted in “Iran’s Khamenei Defends Decision on Nuclear Protocol.

17.” The bottom line. 18. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation.” Financial Times. quoted in IRNA. November 21. . March 28. in BBC Monitoring. Quoted in “Iranian Paper Views Delay to Nuclear Deal with Rus- sia. 218. “The Europeans want to find a solution but their ability to manoeuvre in their political relationship with America is limited. For text of the Tehran agree- ment.globalsecurity. 13. 2005. April 19. July 14. quoted in “Failure to Close Iran Nuclear File at IAEA Risks Paris Deal—Iran Official. 2005. 2005. For criticism of Europe as the mouthpiece of the United States and “Zionists. 2004. may have an opinion similar to the Europeans. 2004. 2005. 2005. For a convenient source for all of these reports. in MEMRI.” International Herald Tribune.” see “Iran Press: Editorial Says Europe ‘Not to Be Trusted’ in Nuclear Talks. 11. p.” ISNA (Tehran). March 5. 2005. is that they all agree that Iran should not have this technology. “The Americans say that we should force Iran to abandon the program. in BBC Monitoring. The Russians too. Hasan Rowhani. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. As one Iranian negotiator noted. we should encourage Iran and gently convince it that it is to its benefit to abandon the program. 2005. Representative of this viewpoint is Mohsen Rezai. Inquiry and Analysis Series no. “Iran Threatens to End Nuclear Talks if Its Agenda Is Not Accepted. “Any Iranian government that wishes to stop uranium enrichment will fall.” IRNA. April 7. February 27.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 174 174 | Notes 10. May 26.” Sharq website. April 7. AEO Head Reza Aghazadeh. “Interview with Hasan Rowhani. 2005. 2004. See Roula Khalaf.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). Hasan Rowhani observed that if the negoti- ations failed “the region would come up against serious obstacles and regional secu- rity will be jeopardized. 2005. April 21.” Jomhuriy-eh Eslami’.” See “Iran Press: Iranian Negotiator Says Nuclear Talks Reaching Dead-End.org/wmd/library/ report/2005/cm6443. 218. quoted in “Europe Should Understand That Its Security Is Closely Linked to Iran’s Security. January 2005). March 29. 2005. See also Reuters. Inquiry and Analysis Series no. 2005. 2005. 4. 2004. July 18. May 30. 15. in MEMRI. however. Ali Akbar Salehi. and Gareth Smyth. quoted in “Iran: Atomic Energy Chief Says Test Production of Uranium Begins in 20 Days. March 9. 12.” See Rowhani. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. the Secretary of the Expe- diency Council. 14. February 28. The Europeans say no. 2005. see Secretary of State for For- eign and Commonwealth Affairs. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 16. http://www. Iran’s Nuclear Program. Rowhani noted. July 20. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Collection of Documents (Norwich: HMSO. in BBC Mon- itoring.pdf. July 15.” insisted Rowhani. For text. Iran’s Nuclear Program. in BBC Monitoring.” Iran (Tehran). November 24. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

2005. 2004. http://www.” ISNA (Tehran). 2004. 2005). May 8. quoted in “Foreign Min- ister Foresees Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Issue. and Sirus Naseri. “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator. See “Iran Refuses to Show Centrifuge Machinery. “Seeing North Korea Clearly. See Daniel A. This raises interesting questions about Iran’s strategic culture or myopia. For this episode. quoted in “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says Iran Nuclear Crisis Over. March 31.” IRNA (Tehran). 2005. 2004. For text. 2004. December 12. March 16. see Hasan Rowhani’s comments. 21. December 12. 2005. 2005. pp.nytimes. http://www. Pinkston and Phillip C Sanders. see also “Iran: Threats of SC over Nuclear Plans Are ‘Propaganda.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). 2004. 2005. See “Iran’s Nukes Program Was Speeded Up. Evelyn Leopold.php?storyid=2070. 23. 45. 2005. Going Critical: The First Nuclear Crisis (Washington. quoted in “Iran Foreign Min- istry Preparing Additional Bill. http://www. Daniel Poneman. Hasan Rowhani. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. Hossein Mousavian. 2004.com/mod- ules/news/article. Gareth Smyth. 80. Hamid Reza Asefi. Autumn 2003. in BBC Monitoring. 61. senior negotiator and IAEA delegate.com/2005/05/ 12/politics/12diplo. 3.” Al-Jazeera. quoted in “Security Chief Says Iran Resuming Manufacture of Nuclear Components. DC: Brookings Institution. See Joel Witt. “Iran to Tell U.aljazeera. 2005.” Reuters. no.com. May 12. June 27. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 175 Notes | 175 19. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian.” New York Times. vol. p. 24.N. quoted in “Nuclear Spokesman Says Resolution Not ‘Major Threat’ to Iran in Actuality. June 19. Iran’s Nuclear Program. Steven Weisman. Octo- ber 24. 2005. 75–6. “Atom Agency May Be Asked to Meet if Iran Resumes Ura- nium Work.html?. 2005. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. June 27.” Financial Times.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). and Robert Galluci. in BBC Monitoring.” IRNA (Tehran). May 9. March 30.” Survival.” IRI News Net- work (Tehran). 28.com.iranfocus. December 10. May 11. 2005. May 11. 22. The report.’” Al- Jazeera. May 11. 25. 26. is credible. There are parallels with North Korea. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. March 13. It has been suggested that North Korea has a distorted worldview and warped expectations about how countries will respond to its actions.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. . Soon of Nuclear Work—Europe Envoy. 20. 27. in BBC Monitoring. May 10. June 18. There are interesting paral- lels between North Korea’s negotiating style for the Agreed Framework 1994 and that of Iran. which is based on interviews with senior Iranian negotiators. 2004.

February 28. quoted in Elaine Sciolino and David Sanger. 2004. Gareth Smyth and Guy Dinmore. March 5. 3. June 19. 2004. 2005. June 11. Mohammad Al Baradei. noted this in March 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 176 176 | Notes 29. and it was repeated by Director-General Al Baradei in June 2005. “Prod Putin on Freedoms. 33. 2005. “Pressed. but Don’t Isolate Key Ally. quoted in “IAEA Chief Says Trust Would Improve if Iran Stopped Centrifuge Production. 3 (159). in BBC Monitoring. http://www. See “Iran Denies Monitors Access to Military Site. 35. Hashemi Rafsanjani.” See Anton Khoplov. 2005. March 2. 2004. 30.” Quoted in “Iran Says Wording of Resolution behind Delay in IAEA Visit. 2004. “New Challenges for NATO and the EU.” International Herald Tribune. 2005. 34. p.” February 23. and Reuters. 2005. no. IAEA Deputy Director-General for Safeguards. This is clearly the implication of the comments of two parliamentarians with expertise in the nuclear field. See the report of Iran IAEA delegation in response: “International Atomic Agency Delegation Will Visit Iran to Resolve Plutonium Issue. 2005. 2004. Reference to the Shiites may be to the practice of dissimulation (taqiiyah) authorized in extreme circumstances. is not appropriate in relations with Iran.nytimes. June 27. See “Iran’s Majles Debates Suspension of Additional . March 15. 2004.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 32. in BBC Monitoring. Javier Solana. sometimes bordering on naiveté. Hasan Rowhani.” speech delivered at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy. in BBC Monitoring.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). March 13. 2005.” Quoted in Elaine Sciolino. August 9.com/2005/02/28/international/midleeast/28nuke. “IAEA Confirms Iran’s Halt to Nuclear Activity. March 4. in BBC Monitoring. Iran Admits It Discussed Nuclear Technology. 3. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.au/news/newsitems/200506/ s1389877.net.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran).htm. of an unnamed British diplomat and Washington- based expert David Albright. 38. May 2005.” International Herald Tribune. 36. quoted in “Hasan Rowhani Reacts to IAEA Resolution on Iran. June 28. June 18. http://www. President Chirac told a gathering: “You can deal with the Sunnis but not with the Shi’ites. “Iran Threatens Tough Measures in Event of Sanctions. 2005.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). respectively.abc. “Chirac Holding to a Multipolar World. March 13. and USA Today.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). Pierre Goldschmidt. “Trustfulness. quoted in “(Corr) Rafsanjani Says Iran Will ‘Definitely’ Not Give Up Nuclear Technology. February 9. February 12. 31.” New York Times. 2005. 37. “Will the Iranian Atom Become a Persian Carpet for Russia?” PIR Center: Arms Control and Security Letters. In the words. March 16.” ABC News Online.html?page- wanted.” Financial Times. 2004. In reference to Iran. This was repeated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi: “We would never allow anyone to talk to us using such language. p.

Rowhani.” International Herald Tribune. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours. March 5. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 44. On invulnerability to military strikes that cannot destroy know-how. we have the yellowcake process [the process for converting uranium ore. for example. Also.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran) in Persian. 39.” Financial Times. This is clearly put by Hasan Rowhani. Nuclear technology is something that needs constant research and the knowledge needs to be completed. in BBC Monitoring. 26 May 2005. who stated: “If an attack is made. Prepared for Confrontation.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). 2005. the grandstanding by its negotiators.muslimnews. April 26.” 46. in BBC Monitoring.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 177 Notes | 177 Protocol. See former IAEA Representative Ali Akbar Salehi. 2005. Iran already has the capability. See also Aghazadeh’s comment about Isfahan’s 700 experts: “We cannot keep them idle for a long time. see Sirus Naseri. sites. http://www. in BBC Monitoring.” Muslim News. December 13. March 6. May 9.. Rowhani noted that some European politicians “told [him] explicitly in Brussels that they are not only after resolving Iran’s nuclear case peacefully but also making strategic relations with Iran. We have centrifuges. Najmeh Bozorgmehr.. 2004. the feeder material for enrichment].uk/news/print_ver- sion. 41.” Voice of IRI Network 2 (Tehran).” Quoted in “Iran Needs Nuclear Activity Resumption—Warning to EU.. into uranium hexofluoride. May 14. See.” Mardom Salari website (Tehran). 2004. 2005. May 12. 28 September 2005. Hossein Mousavian has stated that “the European concern is that when Iran has the capability of enrichment. December 14. “Iran Says That Its Nuclear Skills Not for Sale. These divisions need not concern us here but they account for the ambiva- lence of some of Iran’s statements. 2005.” Hasan Rowhani. See also Deputy Head of the AEO Mohammad Saidi. Iran will be capable of reconstructing all its nuclear installations in a year (but would end inspections). February 3.. we have what is required for a fuel pro- duction program. Tehran.” 40. quoted in “Europe Is After Strategic Relations with Iran—Security Chief. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation. May 8. scientists. 2005. 2005.” Etemad website. or yellowcake.” Quoted in “Nuclear Negotiator Says Iran Ready for Agreement.php?article=8852. 2005. and its set- ting and then ignoring deadlines. 45. Elaine Sciolino. whenever it decides in the future it can divert . 43. Reza Aghazadeh. “Iran Agrees to Continue Freeze on Nuclear Work. 42. in BBC Monitoring. February 21.” Quoted in “Iran Will Resume . 2005.” Sirus Naseri also commented on the issue: “We have mastered the technology .” See Smyth.co. Septem- ber 30. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian.” IRNA (Tehran). p. We have the minds. 2005. quoted in “Ex-Envoy Says EU Should Meet Iran’s Demands. quoted in “Iran May Negotiate Several Years. “Interview with Hossein Mousa- vian. in BBC Monitoring. 6. April 27. 2005.

Rowhani. while the other half was from nonaligned states. But Salehi noted that “even many of them are inclined to support the West. Ali Akbar Velayati. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 57. This was recognized by Iran’s IAEA representative in 2003. 2005. Kevin Morrison.” Financial Times.” Iran (Tehran). 2004. Of a Board of Governors of 35. July 28. January 8.S. Says Security Chief. respectively. 56. in BBC Monitoring. February 26. March 16. Naseri echoes this line of thought.” ISNA (Tehran). ..” Sirus Naseri. 2003. “Iran Offers to Let US Share Its Nuclear Program. “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion. 2005. all the nonaligned countries will leave. This offer is sometimes half serious and for public relations reasons. 47. who noted the good relations with the agency until 2002.’” 54. Quoted in “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Dis- cussion’ of Ending Uranium Enrichment. March 7.” Sharq website (Tehran). warning that “should Europe fail . in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 2005. January 30. Hasan Rowhani. it may not be able to play a fundamental role in another political situation in the world.” ISNA (Tehran).’ Says Iranians Not Like Afghans or Iraqis. quoted in “Iran in the Club of 10 Leading Nuclear States. February 4. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. and multilateralism as a whole. quoted in “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT. March 16.” Quoted in Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth. 2. 2005. See. and “Iran’s Nuclear Negotiator Says US Role in Talks Would Be ‘Positive. October 2.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 2005. Rowhani. “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion. 49. March 5. 48. 18 were from Western countries or those inclined to the West.” IRI News Network (Tehran). and Rowhani. April 19. Naseri. “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion. 2005. July 27. 2003.’” IRNA (Tehran). Rowhani noted that the United States “is trying to internationalize its sanc- tions on Iran and change its enmity toward Iran into an international one. Advisor to the Supreme Leader on International Affairs. p. 50. 2005.” Financial Times. 55. “If you take article IV out of the NPT.’” 52.” commented Hasan Rowhani. “Iran Turns Up Heat on Europe Ahead of Talks. Jan- uary 27.. February 5.. Rowhani calls it the “biggest test for Europe. February 25. September 30. in BBC Monitoring. as in the offer to the United States. March 13. 51.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 178 178 | Notes Nuclear Fuel Production if Europe Breaches Commitments. 2005. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. Interview with senior Iranian official dealing with this issue. June 24.” suggesting that “it would be a great failure on the part of Europe . January 6. Rowhani saw two U. Geneva.” Quoted in “Iran Ready to Repel Likely US Attack.’” 53.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran).. “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal”. 2004. quoted in “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator. “Official Rebuffs US ‘Hollow Threats.” Ali Akbar Salehi.

“Atomic Clock Ticks Down to Fallout with Iran. 2005. Election. given or frittered away. 2006. 59. p. 62. “L’AIEA reclame. Iraq. 2005. Bozorgmehr.S. 2005.” Guardian.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 179 Notes | 179 aims: “to deny Iran access to peaceful technology” and “to prepare the ground for its other plans.” p. February 26. in BBC Monitoring. “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium. It can only be earned. Khalaf. “ Le Monde. “Colour of Culture No Longer Black or White. June 8. 58.5150908-103390. June 20. 2005. Army Commander Major General Mohammed Salimi.html.3858.” 60.” Financial Times.00.” review of Mark Leonard and Martin Rose. March 22.” IRNA (Tehran). 2005. 2005 (weekend edition). See “Iran Foreign Minister on Relations with US.guardian. “British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms. February 23. 65. 64. 2005. Quoted in “Candidate in Iran Presidential Election Says US Hostile to Islamic World. quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Says Careful Plan- ning Stopped Nuclear Dossier Reaching UN. 2005. EU. June 9.” ISNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. “L’Iran doit avoir l’assur- ance qu’on ne songe pas a l’attaquer ou provoquer un changement de regime. . See Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini.” IRNA (Tehran). or rebuilt. Israeli Threats Serious. In the new world order we can do little better than rely on candour and open- ness. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. pretexts—first terrorism and later human rights—that could be exploited by the regime’s opposition abroad.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). Apposite here is the proposition advanced in a recent study of British diplo- macy that notes that “the cliché about rebuilding trust will not do: for trust is not a commodity. p. 2005. The issue is a diversion. “Former Nuclear Negotiator Quoted on Talks Background. and Smyth. 63.” Etemad website (Tehran) (in Persian). http://www. 2005.” Hasan Rowhani. W6. in BBC Monitoring. An unnamed senior Iranian official told a journalist. they would want another thing and another thing. 5. This was echoed by presidential candidate Hojat-el Eslam Mehdi Karrubi. January 28.co. March 21. March 15. June 19. 7. 61. in Stolz. who saw concessions by Iran on the enrichment issue as leading to more U.” See Peter Aspden. in BBC Monitoring.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). “Interview Transcript: Hasan Rowhani. The US wants to weaken Iran. March 19-20.” This sentiment is echoed by Foreign Minister Kharrazi. in BBC Monitoring.uk/print/ 0. 2006. Janu- ary 27. quoted in “Iranian Army Commander Calls US. See Sirus Naseri. Salehi. March 18. 2005. Iran’s view was supported by Director-General Al Baradei. These excerpts are from the Rahbod Quarterly: Journal of the Strategic Research Cen- tre of the Assembly of Experts based on a speech in Autumn 2005. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. quoted in “Iran’s Supreme Leader Rejects US ‘Lies.’ Urges Continued Nuclear Work. March 16. Even if the nuclear issue was solved. 2005. “The US is using the nuclear issue as a pretext for regime change. It cannot be built.” See Simon Tisdall. March 23.

67. For an overview. bad cop” is unclear. 2006. p. February 14. 4. on January 12 and 22. 76. 13. p.” International Herald Tribune.” Etemad website (Tehran). 4. 68. Joel Brinkley. 2005. 4. p. 2006. February 14. Quoted in “Expediency Council Secretary Says Tension between Iran and America Serious. Hasan Rowhani.” Financial Times. 2006. 2005.” Le Monde. See “Iran Threatens Jump in Atom Work: A Final Proposal to Keep the UN at Bay. in BBC Monitoring. see Associated Press. and Jan Mouawad. according to a senior nuclear official. November 7.” 74. 1. October 12. January 31.” Iran (Tehran). March 3. p.” International Herald Tribune.” Etemad website (Tehran).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 180 180 | Notes 66. “Iran Tries to Burnish Image. a confidence-building measure. March 2.” Financial Times. February 28. 70. Nougayrede and Zec- chini. 2006. 4. in BBC Monitoring. who is typical in insisting that the issue is a legal one for the agency but that the United States and Europe seek to make it a “political” one. President Ahmadinejad on February 11 and the Foreign Ministry spokesman on February 12. 1/8. Ali Hoseyni Tash. 2006. March 3. “Iran Negotiator Assesses Cost of Referral to Security Council. “Congress Irate over Talks with India. “Les negociateurs iraniens et europeens ne parvient pas a s’accorder sur le dossier nucleaire. 71. Par- ticipation appears to mean. “Iran’s Plan for Oil Cuts Is Snubbed by OPEC. See. March 6. 2006. See Carolo Hoyos and Dan Dombey. “OPEC Agrees to Maintain Current Production. Mohammad Saidi. 2006. for example. 2006. Mohsen Rezai. p. 73.” International Herald Tribune. in BBC Mon- itoring. The for- eign minister has talked of state-owned and private companies helping to develop Iran’s nuclear program. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. See Natalie Nougayrede and Laurent Zecchini. 2006. March 5-6. Iran reportedly threatened India with withdrawal of a major gas pipeline agreement if it voted against Iran in November at the IAEA. 69.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. October 13. February 15. 2006. President Ahmadinejad referred to this offer of participation at the UN.” Farhang-e Ashti (Tehran). “Les negociateurs iraniens et europeens ne parvient pas a s’accorder sur le dossier nucleaire. “ownership super- vision over Iran’s nuclear installations which is a step higher than technical and legal supervision”—in effect. . 2006. Respectively. 2006. There were reports that Larijani gave the impression to Europeans in March of disassociating himself from the president. 72. February 1. Whether this was inadvertent or an attempt to play “good cop. 75. November 1. 2005. p. See Deputy Secretary of the SNSC Javad Vaidi’s comments quoted in “Iranian Daily Calls on Government to Consider Russia’s Proposal. p. 2006. quoted in “Comment Sees Possible Lose/Lose Outcome from Nuclear Impasse. “Iran Dashes Hopes for Russian Nuclear Deal. quoted in Gareth Smyth.

” New York Times. February 24. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2.” Reuters. Similarly. 83. Mohammad Al Baradei noted the risk that if referred to the UNSC. pp. December 11. “Iran Threatens to Stop Abiding by Additional Protocol—Foreign Minister. Condoleezza Rice. 70–1. As Ephraim Asculai notes. 15.. focusing on weapons rather than states.” See Louis Charbonneau.. “Iran Threatens to Resume Enrich- ment. pp. The problem with this approach. the IAEA may.alertnet.html. RFE/RL. October 13.” Foreign Affairs. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.” New York Times. See George Perkovich. Yahoo News. June 27. and Nazila Fathi. July 8. “Iran Threatens to Stop UN Nuclear Inspec- tions. 2005. See Chen Zak. March/April 2003. is that its opening proposition is to treat North Korea as if it were Norway.” Memorandum no. 5. 18. President George W. “In Shift. “El Baradei Wary of Taking Iran to the Security Council. opinion-editorial. January/February 2004. if a state withdraws from its safeguards agreement and declares an intention to withdraw from the treaty (under Article X). “Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Bush put it more simply: “I don’t believe that non- transparent regimes that threaten the security of the world should be allowed to gain . 2.org/printable. October 2. June 2004).” Financial Times. 2005. “A Duty to Prevent.” Washington Post. 3 (Washington. 3. the Security Council is not required “to take any action or even debate the matter. Bush. pp. “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Non- Proliferation. 2005. October 2. “Confrontation Won’t Fix Iran Nuke Issue—El Baradei.htm?URL-the_news/newdesk/ LO8157593. Reuters.” Foreign Affairs. but is not obligated to. 2005. For a defense of the Bush approach. vol. 2–8. 143–4. Louis Charbonneau. Even skeptics of the IAEA role acknowledge the uncertainty of a UNSC response given the record in Iraq and Korea.” September 26.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). See Gareth Smyth. http://www.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 181 Notes | 181 77.” Ephraim Asculai. October 17. no.” Military Research Papers no.” Reuters Foundation Alertnet. 2004. 82. Iran Agrees to Resume Nuclear Talks. address to American Legion. see Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter. if something is amiss regarding verification. vol. no.1. 2005. 2006. of the Security Council. At a press conference earlier. “Iran Hints of Reductions of Oil Sales over Nuclear Dispute. “Iran Attempts to Backtrack from Oil Supply Threat. 2005.” October 7. in BBC Monitoring. “The Promise of Democratic Peace. 2. 2005. the coun- cil might not act and Iran might opt out of the NPT: “North Korea in many ways has revealed the limitations . 2005. 2004. 70 (Tel Aviv: JCSS. 4. 2002). Chapter Five 1. report it to the UNSC. pp. October 16.

speech delivered at the National Defense Univer- sity (NDU). 4. “Dissenting on the Atom Deal.S. 13. “U.” New York Times. March 2005).” Washington Post. under the cold war banner of ‘Atoms for Peace. James . p. “U. 12. p. A5. 2005. testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee. Demand Deepens Gulf with Iran over Nuclear Facilities. “Rice Asks for Funds to Buoy Policy in Iran.html.html?pagewanted. January 31. See also Elaine Sciolino and David Sanger. http://www.” International Herald Tribune.S. February 21. DC. p. p.” Le Monde. 2006. March 8. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 182 182 | Notes the technologies necessary to make a (nuclear) weapon. Bureau of Non- Proliferation. http://www. A01. March 3. May 25. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns noted. 2006.” Steven Weisman. George Perkovich. February 16. Iran is an autocratic state mistrusted by nearly all countries.” New York Times. 6.nytimes. 10.” New York Times. DC: Carnegie Endowment. June 1. p. 2006. 7.S. p. U.whitehouse.S. March 15. State of the Union address to Congress. 2005. 9. Washington. See especially David Sanger. February 11.” International Herald Tribune. “Iran Is Said to Start Enriching Fuel on a Very Small Scale. 6. efforts to lobby the G-8 to agree to sanctions on Iran should the EU-3 offer to Iran be rejected by Tehran were unsuccessful. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. U. See David Sanger. 2. May 3. p. Rose Gottemoeller. State Department press release. 2005. 2005. David Sanger.S. Pakistan and China are not members of the PSI. Mathews. and Jessica T. President George W. “The comparison between India and Iran is just ludicrous. February 14. DC.” International Herald Tribune. Bush. statement to NPT Review Conference. “U. A10. Sanger reports that “so far the administration has not declared publicly that its larger goal beyond Iran is to remake a treaty whose intellectual roots date back to the Eisenhower adminis- tration. Washing- ton. see “Bush et l’Iran.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. Andrew Semmel. see Associated Press. Jon B. 2006. Wolfsthal.. Dafna Linzer. Shares Details on Efforts to Intercept Weapons Technology. “Iran Plans Defense of Nuclear Program. 2006.nytimes. For a skeptical view. President George W. The distinction between types of regimes was emphasized in the contrasting approach of the United States toward India. stable state .com/2005/05/03/international/ middleeast/03npt. Joseph Cirincione. 2006.com/ 2005/03/15/politics15treaty.” See press conference.” New York Times. peaceful. 4. Jan- uary 26. 2004. 2006. http://www. Accuses Iranians of Aiding Iraqi Militia.. India is a highly democratic.’” 11. Reports suggest that U. See John O’Neill. February 25.html?th=&pagewanted=print&po. See Condoleezza Rice. 8. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad agrees that Iran is “an influential player seeking regional pre- eminence”(hegemony). 14. “Bush Seeks to Ban Some Nations from All Nuclear Activity. May 2. 2006. Bush.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126.

see Guy Dinmore. p. Guy Dinmore. Al Qaida. 1. 2005. 215–7.nytimes.S. Autumn 2003. 22. inter- view with Bernard Gwertzman. 15. May 13. March 31. July 8. February 24. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspira- tions. sanctions in place. 2003. “Comment: Boltonism. For this suggestion.” p. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. “Iran: U.globalsecurity. ‘Results Mixed’ on Iraqi Troops.-Iran Opportunities. see Payvand Iran News. 10. quoted in New York Times. June 14. p. Concerns. 2006. 20. Robin Wright. “Fears Grow of New Chapter in Story of Missed U. For text of statements at Evian and Sea Island G-8 meetings. for example. 7. http://www.” January 20. 2003. Samantha Power.S. 23.cfr. For a summary of past efforts along these lines. http://www. “Most analysts seem to agree that sanctions would have had a far greater effect on Iran if they were multilateral or international. 12. who argues that ideologues in the administration did not use the opportunity to engage Iran.” See Katzman. “U. “Bush to ‘Think About’ Europe’s Iran Strategy. 2005. 2005. Concerns and Policy Responses.html. Lawmakers Take Aim at Foreign Firms in Iran. “Iran: U. State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (London: Free Press.” Financial Times. See also “U. February 17. vol. http://www. “Iran Tells U. in ‘Useful’ Talks with Iran. January 2005).” Financial Times. See Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak.S. transcript of White House conference. 2003. This is corroborated by James Risen. RL32048.cfr. 13.” International Herald Tribune. no.S.” Congressional Research Service no. 2005.pdf. 2006). March 5. p. See. 2004. 24. 16. http://www.S. 19. January 19. p.org/ wmd/library/report/2005/cm6443.S. which called for Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to ratify the Additional Protocol without delay. “Back to Arms Control. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Collection of Documents (Norwich: HMSO. Council on Foreign Relations. former official Flynt Leverett. especially.” New Yorker. 2003. 18. p. May 23.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=ccdbfb92d6605f50&ex=1132203600&o ref=login. . edi- torial. legislation (PD 12938). See. 2005. p. see Kenneth Katzman. “Rafsanjani Offers Threats and Olive Branch. pp. International Herald Tribune. Bush. Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Guy Dinmore.” Los Angeles Times. 2005.” Financial Times. 23. It Has Detained Ter- ror Suspects. For the Gleneagles declaration.org/pdf/Iran_TF. Two presti- gious institutes advocated engagement as a strategy: the Atlantic Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.S. 26.” December 20.com/2004/12/20/politics/20web- ptext.pdf. 21. March 21.” Financial Times. 4.org/publication/10326/leverett.” Washington Quarterly. see President George W. 3.S. Flynt Leverett. “For Bush. CRS-26.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 183 Notes | 183 Harding and Hugh Williamson. For a useful summary of U. This followed a determination by Secretary Rice that Iran was acting to con- tribute to nuclear proliferation under U. p. 17.

June 24. “Critics Pour Water on U. “Iran’s Nuclear Tactics Send Delegates into Interactive Dystopia. p.” Financial Times.tehran. The phrase is attributed to Philip Stephens. Steven Weisman. “Bush Targets ‘Tyrants’ in Human Rights Report. 6. http://www.S. Policy on Korea. on the elec- tions. especially.” February 19. Weisman notes that “conservatives in Congress are demanding that [the United States] pro- mote dissident groups within Iran. p. July 8. “Try Diplomacy. May 6. pp. 2005. http://www.” Sonni Efron and Mark Mazzetti. June 15.” International Herald Tribune. 2005. 30. p.” Los Angeles Times. for Secretary Rice on Iran’s “loathsome record.com/bin/print_ipub. 12. p. editorial. see Guy Dinmore. 2005. March 4. it serves a purpose. other cases.S. like that of Congressman Kurt Weldon and Kenneth Timmerman. “Rice Reaches Out to Europe.” see Associated Press. see also Finan- cial Times. “Bush Condemns Tehran’s ‘Rule of Suppression. 13.” Among many references to the Bush administra- tion perception. appear more curious. “U. See. February 5. thus hesitancy. See reference in President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union address: “And I say to the Iranian people: ‘As you stand for your own liberty. See Guy Dinmore. “Iran’s Weapons Proliferation. p. p. or to respect human rights—that makes it antithetical to the U. “Rice Deflects Talk of Strike on Iran.” Financial Times. “On Iran and Korea Few Options: U. p.latimes. See Brian Knowlton.S. March 1. May 25.).” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 2005. See Senator Joseph Biden (D- Del.’” On the State Department’s human rights report. “Bush Lacks a Plan to Back Up His Middle East Pledges.S. editorial. Hawks Rooting for Hardline Can- didate. June 27.” February 9.S.” Financial Times. “U.” February 11. Faces Prospect of Diplomacy Failing.” Financial Times. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings. 2005. December 3. p. In the case of an Israeli lobby such as AIPAC. 2005. 31.” Financial Times. See Guy Dinmore and Roula Khalaf. 4.html. 2005. Caroline Daniel. 2005. 2005.S.S. p. editorial. 27.S. 26. June 17. 1. 2005.” opening statement to U. see Javier . and “Iran Turns Right. and Guy Dinmore.” Financial Times.com/news/ nationworld/world/la-fg-usiran4mar0407066840. 7. May 19. 4.php?file=/articles/ 2005/02/04/news/. 2005. 14. 2005. which notes that “it is the very nature of the regime—its refusal to recognise Israel. 29. “U. and Guy Din- more. May Aid Iran Activists. 9–10. 2004. Economist. 2005. “Two Key Senators Assail U. See also Guy Dinmore. see also Financial Times. Foreign Policy’s Fiery Vision. p.” International Herald Tribune. February 21. The second senator was Joseph Biden. 2005. “Books Add to Rightwing Campaign to Demonise Iran.’” Financial Times. Bush Goes to Belgium.” Financial Times. who made the same criticism regarding Iran policy. “Mr. pp. Offers Grants to Opponents of Iran’s Clerics. that engagement equals endorsement. 4. 2005. America stands with you. March 28. 4. 2005. 4. p. 7.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 184 184 | Notes 25.” Financial Times. Demonizing Iran is current practice. 12.iht. vision of a Middle East remade. 28.

while a referral is transmittal of a report with the expectation of action. engagement) is a more viable strategy. see Richard Haass. Autumn 2004.S. Says. “Who Is John McCain?” June 18. Vienna. make a hortatory appeal (call upon). no. Sanders. DC: Nixon Center. “U. Reporting is simply a transmittal of an IAEA report. Next Steps (Washington. pp. both terms have been used loosely and interchange- ably. “A Transat- lantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program.S. 21–32. no. They cannot get engaged because it means legitimating them. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Note that the distinction between “reporting” and “referral” of an issue to the Security Council is ambiguous and disputed. See also Guy Dinmore and Hubert Wetzel. “EU’s Solana Remains Pessimistic. March 4. He also notes that regime evolution through “opening up” (that is. See also David Sanger and Steven Weisman.S. Can’t Stay on the Sidelines. vol. Ambassador Jackie Sanders put the U. 2005. 2005.S. The assumption is that initially.” Washington Post. March 2. 37.usembassy. U.S.S. The UNSC can take note or endorse a report. condemn a policy. 4. U. 8. In the case of Iran. March 8. 2005. 2004.S. February 25.it/file2005_03/alia/ a5030204. a former official. 4. 66–78. For early advocacy of such an approach. “Regime Change and Its Limits. “U. in effect endorsing the EU-3 approach.” For- eign Affairs. “President Faces Tough Task Talking Congress Round to New Iran Stance. July/August 2005. Jim Dobbins.” International Herald Tribune. December 2. 36.” See Judy Dempsey.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 185 Notes | 185 Solana. pp.” Washington Quarterly. See Economist. http://www. (and allied) case clearly: “Given the history of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and its documented efforts to deceive the IAEA and the international community. See Robin Wright. 4. p. or move to mandatory measures requiring states to follow a cer- tain course. only the full cessation and dismantling of Iran’s nuclear fissile material production can begin to give us any confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons. U. and Iran: The Nuclear Dilemma. “Going Soft on Iran. 33. Wants Guarantees on Iran Effort. 27. 2004) 35. the U. sees delay and drift in policy and argues that regime change is a complement to diplo- macy and deterrence. 84. 1. In a statement to the IAEA. 2004.” Jackie W. and Reuel Marc Gerecht. “Iran Deceives International Nuclear Inspectors. 6. For a discussion. and EU Forge . His exact phrase was “Washington is no more than an excited bystander offering advice from a safe distance.S. p. see also Geoffrey Kemp. p. The Iranian government has noted that it makes no distinction between the terms in its evaluation of its own response. at least from mid-March 2006. U. 2005. who stated: “President Bush has said very clearly they don’t want to legiti- mate the regime.” For background. pp. 44. the Security Council has simply been given a report.htm. Feb- ruary 21. Haass. 32. “In Iran.” International Her- ald Tribune. see Robert Einhorn. 2005. vol.” Weekly Standard. 34.” statement to the IAEA Board of Governors.” Financial Times.

A more recent formulation by the president is that “the development of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable and the process which would enable Iran to develop a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. 2005. See also Economist. 12.state. 39. “Atomic Clock Ticks Down to Fallout with Iran. and . The Supplementary Act 12938 (I as amended) Presidential Directive blocks the assets of foreign governments and private companies and institutions having technical or financial cooperation with the Iranian AEO. 2005.S. “U.co.00.S. The phrase “legitimate security concerns” is repeated in Financial Times.” For less skepticism.” International Herald Tribune. See Simon Tisdall. “Europe Cannot Retreat from the World. March 14.” See Paula Wolfson.” International Herald Tribune.S.cfm?renderfor print.voanews. June 18.” January 28. p. “U. statement at the White House.3858. Reviewing European Proposal for Iran. pp. February 5. which opened a new phase in diplomacy.” Washington Post. June 10. This estimate. p. p. March 4. 2005. 2005. see Philip Stephens.html. 2005. 9–10. February 28. “A Useful Pause in the Iran Talks. Bush.S. however. “Desperate Times. 42. 44. Tisdall quotes a diplomat as saying: “The Americans are trying to create an environment so that the U. March 18.com/english/2005-06-27-voa41.” National Interest. 12–3.gov/fpc/60433.” Le Monde. pol- icy: “We began supporting the European Union negotiating effort back on March 11th of 2005 and we patiently supported that set of negotiations all the way through until just this week. 6.guardian.” This included reaching out to Russia.” May 27. pp.” Guardian. The phrase referring to Europeans and China is from Economist. 2005. “Return of the Axis of Evil.” Financial Times. 41. 2006. 2005. “Iran Is Judged Ten Years from a Nuclear Bomb. Brian Knowlton. After the successful vote to report Iran to the Security Council. 1. Dafna Linzer.” New York Times.” Voice of America News. “Wanted: Iran Policy. For the latest definition of what is unacceptable. China. can hit Iran and I don’t think the Europeans would accept this. 2005. “Bush Calls for Tough Stand on Iran’s Nuclear Program. http://fpc. editorial. see “Les européens s’interrogent sur les intentions nucléaires du nouveau gouvernement iranien. A01. March 12-13.uk/print/0.S. editorial. President Bush stated that “the international community must come together and make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of nuclear weapons. 3.” May 14. Half Measures. 2005. p. Officials Cool on Iran’s Hot Response. http://www. p. pp.5150908- 103390. U. Summer 2005. 2005. “A Grand Bargain with the Great Satan?” March 12. June 29. Bush Weighs a Joint Strategy with the Europeans. http://www.” New York Times. and Steven Weisman. and Financial Times.htm. 53–6. 12. June 27. August 2. 2005. pp. 40. 4. 13. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. p. “On Iran. Nicholas Burns acknowledged the change in U. 2003.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 186 186 | Notes Joint Strategy on Iran Talks. 43. See Nicholas Burns. might well be tainted. India. 2005. Steven Weisman.” See President George W. 2005. and oth- ers. 38. see Geoffrey Kemp.

p.” New York Times. “if unobstructed. “US Warns Iran against Pulling Out of NPT. 50. 2005. Another poll gave the figure as 42 per- cent. “Most Americans Back Sanctions on Iran. 47. 4. 15.latimes.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 187 Notes | 187 Steven Weisman and Douglas Jehl. http:// timesofindia. March 7.” Vice President Cheney repeated the formulation a year later. “Estimate Revised on When Iran Could Make a Nuclear Bomb. In Europe in February 2005. January 27. 4. Claudia Dean. U. Invested Political Capital against Iran. 2005.143. Having said that. December 19. to take options off the table.” For a dissent from the ten-year estimate.” Financial Times. January 31. see Joe Cirincione. see Dennis Ross. President Bush put it thus: “This notion that the United States is getting ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous.” Financial Times.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/30/ AR2006013001247. “Rice Fails to Win Support for Iran Referral to Security Council. August 8.washingtonpost. “Nuclear Watchdog under Fire. “The Practical Realities of the Bush Foreign Policy in the Second Term. October 4.S. “Intelligence Assessment and the Point of No Return: Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Times of India. “U.carnegieendowment. Before this National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).” Washington Post. such as that by Defense Intelligence Agency Direc- tor Lowell Jacoby in February 2005. some 57 percent of Americans favor a strike if Iran persists in its program. October 17. 48./news/releases/2005/12/print/2005/219-2html. while emphasizing the U. “commitment to the diplomatic approach. all options are on the table. see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein. estimates. remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. press conference. http://www. See Vice President Richard Cheney. 2006. September 28. respectively. Jane Martinson. were “within five years. President George W. see.” Tel Aviv Notes. August 3.com/news/printedition/ asection/la-na-fornpoll27jan27.” February 13.S. 2006. See Joel Brinkley. http://www.indiatimes.S. For a succinct and persua- sive argument against the military option. 2005.cms. DC.” Financial Times. 49. A13.S. 46. see Ephraim Asculai.05918171.gov. 2006). http://www. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.org/ publications/index. Washington. September 19. p. . 2005. According to an LA Times/Bloomberg poll. March 27. Guy Dinmore and Najmeh Bozorgh- mehr. 2005. “57% Back a Hit on Iran if Defiance Persists.” Los Angeles Times. 2006. 2005.whitehouse. p.story?coll+la=news-a section.com/articleshow/1411960. No Military Options (Washington. Greg Miller. “The Clock Is Ticking” (Washington. no. p.” International Herald Tribune. Bush.cfm?fa+print&id+17922. DC: Institute for Science and International Security. 45. For a view that sees the administration as overloaded and unable to take on much more. http://ww.” added: “People shouldn’t want the President of the U.” three to five years away. DC: Carnegie Endowment. This “schizophrenic mission” is a perennial source of criticism. for exam- ple. Perhaps the most reliable estimate put Iran. 2006. See. 2006.

DC. pp. See Guy Dinmore. 57. “Rethinking. June 21.” New Republic. Author interview with senior IAEA official. October 6. It is also accused of being an “unwitting enabler”. 5. most experts believe it could produce nuclear weapons within a matter of months. Asculai sees this as part of the IAEA’s tendency to trespass into the political rather than confin- ing itself to the intended technical area. Al Baradei had made considerable headway on this proposal in getting major actors’ support. Al Baradei observed: “Should a state with a fully developed fuel cycle capability decide. 3 (Washington. http://www. November 8. MIT. in BBC Monitoring. Washington. 51. 44. “Insecurity Drives WMD Motivation. December 2005. Al Baradei has said that “we can continue to act like a fire brigade but we need to look at the big picture. Al Baradei remarks on Iran website.” October 18. political.” Arms Control Today. Tehran. 2005. “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director Gen- eral Mohamed El-Baradei. 3. 2003. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2. to break away from its non-proliferation commitments. IISS. For trenchant observations along these lines.” Mem- orandum no. Asculai. 2005. 2004. 44.” Military Research Papers no. 70–1.S. “L’Iran doit avoir l’assurance qu’on ne songe pas a l’attaquer ou provoquer un changement de regime. all accessible on the IAEA web- site. 43–4.” see Paul Kerr. 4.” October 18. October 18. pp.” Financial Times. 13. p.org/ files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/elbaradei. See also var- ious Al Baradei speeches at Carnegie. 52. p. “Rethinking”. “Rethinking. 54. 2003. 2003. and Russia Back Establish- ment of International Fuel Bank. March 2005. Chen Zak. London.” Financial Times. “By Invitation. 56. February 2. Mohammad Al Baradei. 16–7. see Michael Levi. 2003. and Chen Zak.” Le Monde. “Enabler. 30. p. 37. Regarding the “iceberg. Economist. The U. etc. pp. . Asculai. 2002).” Financial Times. “By Invitation. 58.” Quoted in Economist. 37. and economic “baskets” discussed in various committees. 36. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy. 7.” p. By late 2005. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing World. 67–8.. government also took the position that the distinction is meaningless and the failure to declare should be put in the larger context of the covert program that it was intended to cover.ceip. Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini. March 23. 53. “Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. 17–8. October 21.S.doc. The Director-General supports the European initiative that takes into account the broader issues in the nuclear. Ephraim Asculai. and Al Baradei. p. “U. 70 (Tel Aviv: JCSS. security. July 23. 2003. for whatever reason. 2005.” Interview with Roula Khalaf.2003. “Seven Steps to Raise World Security. 41. 33.” pp.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 188 188 | Notes 1995. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. see Asculai.” 55. p.” speech delivered at the Carnegie International Non- Proliferation Conference. June 2004). p. p.

Report of the Director-General. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Elaine Sciolino. 2004. Censure of Iran.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 2005. The quote is from the Deputy Head of the AEO.dw-world. respectively. p. pressure to get enhanced access but resisted immedi- ate referral because the agency wanted to get a better idea of the scope of the pro- gram. June 15. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. Ali Akbar Salehi.” Financial Times. 2003. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agree- ment in the Islamic Republic of Iran. in BBC Monitoring. GOV/2004/83.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran).” GOV/2006/14. 61. A11. 60. “UN Nuclear Chief Presses Iran and North Korea. 63.2144. Al Baradei. Mohammad Saidi. http://news. 2006. quoted in “Iran: Rowhani Outlines Views on IAEA Resolu- tion in News Conference. p. “U.. 67. 2006. Al Baradei used U. resolution adopted February 4. 10. “Alleged Noncompliance: Nuclear Watchdog Fails to Back U.” Iran (Tehran). See Mousavian’s comment on Iran’s aims in “IAEA Resolution Amendment Possible—Iranian Spokesman.S. 2005. 106–114. See Melissa Fleming. See Gillian Tett. December 9.html. in BBC Monitoring. Hasan Rowhani. March 1.” New York Times. 2003. 2005. Europe Aligned on Iran Nuke Incentives. 2004.com/ cms/s/6c3ca1f2-4a2a-11d9-b065-00000e2511c8. “UN Concern over Iran’s N-Technology. June 16. January 6. 65. 2005. February 28. “UN Agency Says It Got Few Answers from Iran on Nuclear Activity and Weapons. July 28. in BBC Monitoring.html. January 7. Al Baradei.S. November 29. November 2. November 28. See. p. 2004. November 30. p. IAEA Board of Governors. . 2005. The technical assistance reportedly amounted to $1 billion a year. This was Tehran’s line initially in 2003 when it feared UNSC referral and speedily concluded the first agreement with the EU-3. Deutsche Welle. 4. 71.” ILNA (Tehran). June 19.” ISNA (Tehran).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 189 Notes | 189 59. 69.” March 3. and GOV/2005/67 paras. and Roula Khalaf.S. 64. The same tactic has recurred after every dispute arising from Iran’s rather free interpretation of its commitments.1507134.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). 68.” Financial Times. November 28. “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT.” IRNA (Tehran). interview by Paul Kerr. 2003. February 27.ft. March 2. 66. “Al Barade’i: Ball Is in Iran Court. 2004. interview by the BBC. 2. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “IAEA Spokeswoman Welcomes Iran’s Deci- sion to Allow Inspection of Military Site. 2003. Ear- lier reports were made in 2004 and 2005. http://www. 62. interview by Roula Khalaf.00. 42–52. in “Iran Says IAEA Report Had to Be Presented Prior to Board of Governors’ Meeting.de/dw/ article/0.” GOV/2006/15. 70. 2006. paras. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. July 27. 2004.

February 15. 3. the NAM viewed Iran’s signature of the AP as “positive” and encouraged Iran “to facili- tate access to sites requested by the agency.” IRNA (Tehran). “Engaging Iran.13–8. Can Your Diplomacy Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program? Working Paper. February 2.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_051605..euint/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_04/decl_wmd. SIPRI Research Report no. 40–72. October 3. ed. June 2005. Europe and Iran: Perspec- tives on Non-Proliferation (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- tute. 2003. quoted in “UN Watchdog Calls on U.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 190 190 | Notes See Hasan Rowhani.rferl. no.” paper presented at Conference on Transat- lantic Security and Nuclear Proliferation. Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge. New York Times. November 2005 pp. Similarly. Al Baradei said.” IRNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. 2005). 2005).700 man/days of inspections is quoted as of March 2006 (2.” See “Non-Aligned Movement Views Iran’s Signing of NPT Additional Protocol as Positive. February 14.” Strategic Assessment. December 12. 74. its a security issue. Emily Landau and Ephraim Asculai. The source is Deputy Head of the SNSC for International Affairs Javad Va’idi. in BBC Monitoring.pdf. “Status of IAEA Safeguards Inspections in Iran. 76. This is not just a technical issue.html?pagewanted= . November 24. Spring 2004. Gerard Quille. http://www. For example. 75. November 26. 73. in BBC Monitoring. pp. “Countering Iranian Nukes. December 18.” Al Baradei interview by Khalaf. RFE/R Liberty. Other sources include Steve Evert. For the EU’s WMD strategy. London: Center for European Reform.000 by June 2006). 2006. “Status of EU-Iran Nuclear Talks. 77.” Non-Proliferation Review. 2003. 2003. November 26. in BBC Monitoring.” IRNA (Tehran). November 2005). The figure of 1. “Prospects for a Common Transatlantic Strategy to Deal with New Trends in Nuclear Proliferation. Proliferation Papers (Paris: IFRI.S. to Join Europe in Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Issue. 2004.org. in BBC Monitoring. see Shannon Kile of SIPRI.” May 16. Rome.” IRNA (Tehran). http://europa. Quoted in “West Responsible for Adverse Atmosphere against Iran. http://www. For an excellent summary of these negotiations.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). and “Text of Draft Resolution Pro- posed by the Non-Aligned on Iran’s Nuclear Dossier. 8. 2005. Mark Leonard. March 2004). 78. 6. p. George Perkovich. 72.” background paper for Moscow Conference. 2003). “I hope that in the discussions [between Iran and the EU-3] everyone puts their cards on the table. December 18. 2005. see “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)” (Brussels: EU. President Putin urged Iran to stop enrichment activities and meet IAEA demands. vol. 2004. See also Shannon Kile. 21. 2003.” Working Paper (London: Center for European Reform. February 3. 2005. “Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations with EU-3. Sean Smeland. 2005. September 25. November 25. 2006. 2003. Mohammad Al Baradei. quoted in “Chairman of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Welcomes IAEA Resolution.

13. 2005. 87.”IRNA (Tehran). p. in BBC Monitoring. p. p. Roula Khalaf. 80. February 2. whether and when suspension becomes “cessation. pp. 82. we tell them that we could not afford to buy a Mercedes. But. “Beneath the Bonhomie in Munich. U. 79.” whether “objective guarantees” are weaker or stronger than those in the AP. 2005. March 2005.” See Marc Ruehl Gerecht.” Hasan Rowhani.. “EU-3 to Offer Iran Help with Nuclear Power if It Agrees Not to Make Fuel. 13. February 9.S. one congressional source commented.” Financial Times. Secretary Rice promoted Iran from “authoritarian” in 2004 to “totalitarian” in 2005 (due to faulty parliamentary elections) and responses of experts. Winter 2003–2004. 34–5. In the discussions with the EU-3. See Peter Spiegel and Daniel Dombey. p. “U. “A Common Iran Policy is Essential..” 85. vol. an EU diplomat stated: “A green light from the U. EU Commissioner for Develop- ment. I owe the phrase to Robert Litwak.” Financial Times. “Europeans: Iranians Honouring Agreement. 2005. See Christopher Adams.” Sharq (Tehran). guarantees on fuel deliveries for Iran and so on) need no further elaboration in the current discussion. 7–32. Paul Kerr. 2005. “Europe Should Be Careful What It Wishes for in Iran. 2004. July 14. 84. See Francois Heisbourg. For example. Reviewing European Proposal for Iran. Debates about whether unlimited suspension or indefinite suspension mean “permanent” or not. Rowhani likened the United States to a Mercedes-Benz and the EU-3 to the locally built and inexpensive Paykan car: “There are those who ask us why we did not choose the bicycle because Paykans are useless.S. quoted in “EU Seeks Long-Term Relationship with Iran—IRNA. March 9. and Neil Buckley. July 15. there are some who say a Mercedes- Benz would have been better. See Elaine Sci- olino. no. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation. and EU Tensions Remain. and how to assure that these and other guarantees are reciprocal (that is. 45. 86. 7. March 1. and we agree with them. and we say to them that a Paykan is still superior to a bicycle. see his “Non-Proliferation and the Dilem- mas of Regime Change. 7. “‘Madame Hawk’ Ruffles Some Paris Feathers.” International Herald Tribune.” Survival. at the same time.” Financial Times. February 14. as German Chancellor Schroeder has done.” Arms Control Today. 4.” On the other side. Regarding the EU-3. “For 26 years . However. 2. See the report of Secretary Rice’s visit to Paris where all these issues arose. 2005. the ruling mullahs have compromised economics at home and abroad to fortify a clerical dictatorship. July 15. 2005. See Louis Michel. 2005.S. in BBC Monitoring. pp. “The fear is that there will be a windup but no pitch. 83. would add a lot of leverage to our capacity to negotiate with the Iranians.” See Weisman. there is the carrot of a possible long- term relationship with Europe. March 8.” Financial Times. p. .*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 191 Notes | 191 print. 2005. 81.

3. May 2.. quoted in Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth.” Le Monde. . p. May 20. which would then supply the product to Iran. 8. “Expert: Iran Nukes Replace Old Military. 89. 34–5. “Iran Threatens to Quit Nuclear Talks if Its Agenda Not Accepted.” Tony Cordesman.gov. “EU-3 Warn of ‘Managed Crisis’ over Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. they have accomplished a great deal. 95. 2005. April 21. 2005. An unnamed EU diplomat. “EU Warns Iran over Denial of Holocaust. December 17/18. March 26/27. 2005.” Financial Times. 2005.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060110-4. p. 93. Gareth Smyth.fco. 2005. A21. stated the EU’s goal: “The main challenge is to find what we call the objective guar- antees that the Iranian program is of a peaceful nature. Gareth Smyth and Daniel Dombey.The issue is not pace but substance. The Russian proposal sought to take enrichment from Iran to Russia.” April 2005. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. 6. p. White House press briefing. Roula Khalaf. 96.” United Press International. and Arms Control Today. http://www.aljazeera. January 2. 92. “Battle to Keep Iran Nuclear Talks Alive. 2005.” Finan- cial Times.” April 21. May 13. “Pakistan Offers Nuclear Clues on Iran.” International Herald Tribune. It offered Iran a method of stepping back from insistence on having the fuel cycle on Iranian soil.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 192 192 | Notes 88. 91. http://www. 3. pp. quoted in Stefan Nicols. p. March 26. and Najmeh Bozorgmehr.html. 2005.whitehouse. January 12. 2006. 2005. “Europeans Open Talks with Iran on Nuclear Program. 3. January 10. 94.” Al- Jazeera..asp?service_ID=6912. see also Dafna Linzer. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 3. 8. 2006). “Les Européens font une concession sur le dossier Nucléaire Iranien. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. and Laurent Zecchini. 4. p. One expert has observed that “if the Europeans’ negotiations do nothing more than keep Iran from being overt in deployment and testing. “EU Gives Ahmadi-Nejad Toughest Warning Yet over Anti- Israel Remarks. December 19. http://www. 97.uk/servlet/Front?page- name=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KAr- ticle&aid=1136903810989. “E3-EU Statement on Iran” (London: FCO. 2005. Iran feigned interest in this proposal to buy time. 6. p. and Dan Bilefsky.. p. An EU spokeswoman.” Financial Times. Farhan Bokhari and Roula Khalaf.” Financial Times. This is assuming that there is no parallel covert nuclear program in opera- tion.” Financial Times. responding to Iranian criticism of EU-3 lethargy. p. p.com/me. “IAEA Criticizes Iran Cooperation. 2005.” Quoted in “EU Rejects Iran’s Call to Accelerate Nuclear Talks.” Financial Times. International Herald Tribune. p. 2005. May 25.” Washington Post. “EU Trios Relief over Tehran Nuclear Offer May Prove Short Lived. 90. Daniel Dombey. Scott McClellan. 2005. Febru- ary 3.

in BBC Monitoring. 2005. pp. quoted in International Herald Tribune. 2001.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow).” ITAR-TASS. For background of Russia’s cooperation with Iran. vol. 2005. see also Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. 2005. June 10.ru) says that 620 specialists were trained as of December 23. See Vladimir Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/04/201149_ type82916_87008_shtml. See “Nuclear Executive Describes Training for Iranians in Russia.” Washington Quarterly. Spring 2005. 104. September 26. making for a total of 707 for Bushire. 2004. 44. in BBC Monitoring. p.” International Herald Tribune. 99. “Russia Backs Initiative from Europe on Iran. see Robert Einhorn and Gary Samore. 2005.. 2. 101.” Interna- tional Herald Tribune. February 28. 102. 5. January 22–23. p.” IRNA (Tehran). “Russia to Resume Arms Sales to Iran. September 3. 2004. December 20. 2004. 105. and two more groups are to be trained at Novovoronezh in 2005. “The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue.’” RIA News Agency (Moscow). 51–70. 103. April 20. “Looking More Closely at the Mes- sage of Sochi. p. pp.. no. 2002).” ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow). “Russia and Iran Affirm Ties.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). in BBC Monitoring. 3. Estimates on the number of technicians trained in Russia vary but one esti- mate suggests there were some 300 technicians trained over a period of five years (between 1999 and 2004). we follow one indisputable principle—the non-prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons. “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb. 2005. March 2. December 21. Putin noted: “Our level of understanding (with the EU) on the Iranian problem is rather high . Quoted in “Putin Says Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons. 2004.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 193 Notes | 193 98. June 9. The figure of 700 Ira- nian experts trained at Novovoronezh is confirmed by Russian news agency ITAR- TASS. See Strobe Talbott. September 28. March 20. 2004. “Russia Hails Coordination with Europe over Iran as ‘Important. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. 2004. 2005. March 13. interview by Israeli Television Channel One. Russian President Putin. EU Share Stance on Iran Nuclear Issue. 2004. March 18. and Katrin Benhold. 2004.” Quoted in Richard Bernstein.kremlin. no. The Rosatom website (www. Sep- tember 24. See also “Iran Must Prove It Has No Nuclear Weapons—Putin. Putin has said that Rus- sia is “categorically opposed to enlarging the club of nuclear states. vol. Quoted in Michael Wines. Sum- mer 2002. including the addition of Iran. Putin has said that “a country like Iran and the Iranian people must not be humiliated.” International Herald Tribune. September 25. 28. in BBC Monitoring. 2. 100. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House.” Quoted in “Putin Says Russia. 49–66. 2005. .” Survival.minatom.” See President Vladimir Putin. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” May 18. See “Iranian Engineers Complete Training at Russian Nuclear Power Centre. http://www. 2.

*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 194 194 | Notes 106. 3.” Interfax–AVN military news agency (Moscow). February 28. GA. January 17. saying that if we reached a stand- still.” Hossein Mousavian. “Putin ‘Close’ to Iran Critics. and “Russia to Fulfil Its Contract to Supply Air Defence Systems to Iran. pp. 2006. 2003. The agreement was finally concluded on February 27. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. December 24. The Russian arms deal comprised 30 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems valued at between $700 million and $1. 2005. “Russia Will Give Iran Fuel for Reactor. 109. “On Visit Putin Criticizes Iran’s Nuclear Program. Some analysts consider Russia part of the problem rather than solution. pp.” IRNA (Tehran). “Russian Atomic Energy Chief Details Plans for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran. 2006. February 28. June 11. they would stop cooperating with us. 2005. 2006.” Vremya Novostey (Moscow).” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). Russia’s caution led to slowing the move to sanctions. April 2005. 8.1apr291. 29.” Interna- tional Herald Tribune. “Russia Delays Nuke Fuel Shipments to Iran—Source. January 17.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fq-briefs29. 2006. 2005.” International Herald Tri- bune. Transcript of press conference following the G-8 Summit. pp. An Ira- nian negotiator subsequently said: “Our talks with the Europeans were reaching a standstill and the Russians sent a message to us.kremlin. September 29.prnt. David Sanger. 2005. February 27. Steve Weisman reports that “the West’s incremental approach is . “Iran. 2005. http://latimes. Putin committed Russia to halt nuclear cooperation if Iran refused to be transparent and cooperate with the IAEA. Reuters.” April 29.” New York Times. Brian Knowlton. 25355554. 2005.4 billion.” RIA Novosti (Moscow). 1/8. May 18. 110.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/06/11/1401_72690. 2005. “Russia’s Sweetheart Deal for Iran. February 10. This is echoed by his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in “Russian Minister Counsels Extreme Caution in Handling Iranian Dispute.” International Herald Tribune. Los Angeles Times. See also “Russia Advises Iran against Creating Its Own Nuclear Fuel Cycle. in BBC Monitoring. See Economist. January 18. For Russian efforts to slow down the momentum for sanctions. p. 2004. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. see Putin’s comments warning against “abrupt erro- neous steps. Russia Reach Nuclear Agreement. See Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin. December 3. http://www. quoted on ISNA website (Tehran). At the Sea Island G-8 summit. 1–8. 2006. Others see a Russian interest in “controlled tensions” that increase Russia’s leverage. “Russia Won’t Abandon Reactor Pact with Iran. 2005. 111. Decem- ber 2. 2004. March 1. “A Colder Coming We Have of It. 2005. See “Russia to Supply Surface-to- Air Missile Systems to Iran. February 28.shtml. Sea Island. 2005 107. 2004. See Paul Kerr. February 9. in BBC Monitoring. p. 2006. April 11. but Warns on Errors.” Elaine Sciolino and Alan Cowell.” January 21. “Iran Unhappy with Russia’s Pro- posed Time-Scale for Nuclear Plant. in BBC Monitoring. p.” International Herald Tribune.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). 35–6. December 21.” Arms Control Today. May 12. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. February 2. 108.

5.nytimes.” International Herald Tribune. 2006. “Russian Defence Minister Hopes Iran Problem Will Not Turn into Armed Conflict. Chapter Six 1.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 195 Notes | 195 a response to Russian and Chinese reluctance to press for immediate sanctions. Significantly.” Keyhan (Tehran). “Ariel Sharon aura. 2005. January 26. Rosatom chief Sergey Kiriyenko. January 9. Russia has argued on practical grounds that Iran. See “Russia to Supply Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to Iran.” See his article “West Tells Russia It Won’t Press to Penalize Iran Now. The phrase is attributed to Hossein Agha.com/2006/01/19/politics/19diplo. February 3. January 19. in BBC Monitoring. p. should find it uneconom- ical to seek the full fuel cycle at this stage. peu promis. January 22. Ali Larijani has recently called Iraq.” RTR Russia TV (Moscow). 113. January 15-16. Some arms and technology issues are crucial in the current crisis over the nuclear program. January 23. January 23. Ali Larijani met Muqtada Al Sadr and pledged Iran’s support for him. “Russia Offers Terms to Iran. 5.html?page- wanted print. 2006. See Associated Press. 3. see his interview in. while Muqtada offered “Islamic support” for Iran if it were attacked.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). 2006. 2006. with only one reactor operating in the near future. in BBC Monitoring. notably 30 Tor-M1 air defense missiles. 2006. 2005. 2006. Foreign Minister Lavrov insisted on an indefinite freeze on enrichment as a precondition for talks (not enforced) as indicative of Moscow’s desire to show its toughness.” Interfax-AVN military news agency (Moscow). January 25. 2006. in BBC Monitoring.” Le Monde. p. 2006. February 2.” IRNA (Tehran). peu fait.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). 114. 14. where the Shiite are in the ascendancy. 2. 2006. December 2. 2006. The violation was underlined by Russian representative Grigoriy Berden- nikov at the IAEA. http://www. 2006. 112. January 25. in BBC Monitoring. 2006. in BBC Monitoring.” New York Times. January 10. See “Russian Representative Says Iran Violated Agreement with IAEA. Alexandr . “a natural ally. Russia has sought to balance strategic and commercial relations with Iran with its commitment to non-proliferation. See “Iraq’s Moqtada Sadr Offers ‘Islamic’ Iran Support in Case of Attack. December 3. quoted in “Russian Official Clarifies Pro- posals to Resolve Iran Nuclear Problem.” Quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Says Iraq Is Natural Ally. February 16. 4. mais énormément réalisé. 2006. in BBC Monitoring.

2005. See also “Iran Press: Bush Using Military Bases for ‘Long-Term Control’ of Iraq. 2005.dailystar.” Resalat (Tehran). in BBC Moni- toring.” Financial Times. 8. 2005. 14. 2005. in a report before his resignation as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. See. August 13. 2005. http://www. 2005. “Others Will Have to Accept Iran as a Regional Power—Defence Minister. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. Reza Djalili uses the phrase in his excellent article. .” Tehran Times. “Arab Countries Look to Play a Role Countering Iranian Influence in Iraq. p.” ISNA (Tehran). 7. for example. December 23. October 30. 15. 13. p. 2004. quoted in “Commander-in-Chief Criticizes US. August 14. December 20. “Monitor Iran’s Centrifuges and Its Honor. 10. August 9.” Keyhan (Tehran). June 11.asp?12/2/ 2004&Cat=2&Num=7.” Financial Times. 2005. quoted in “Iran Undisputable Regional Power—Defence Minister. Domestic Politics and National Security. August 10. August 14. Decem- ber 21.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArti- cleEn. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Keyhan (Tehran). 2005. 2004. for example.haaretz. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.jtml?itemNo60=610492. in BBC Monitoring. August 3. See “Iran’s Chief Negotiator Presents Khatami with Report on Nuclear Activities. 9.comlb/printable. 2005. October 15-16. November 3. August 17. Belatedly. General Yahya Safavi.” IRNA (Tehran). http://www. in BBC Monitoring.” Fars News Agency (Tehran).asp? art_ID=17482&cat_ID=5. 5. Details Naval Preparedness. December 18. 2004.com/Description.” Adelphi Paper no. See also “Iran Seeks Regional Non-Aggression Pact: Defence Minister. “Whither Iran? Reform. June 8. http://www. This statement was made by a moderate leader.158. “Leader’s Advisor Says Enrichment ‘Imperative’ for Iran’s Progress. The phrase is from Ali Shamkhani. February 3. “Russia Joins International Community. 2005. 2005.” ISNA (Tehran). Hasan Rowhani. 6. December 2. “Defence Minister Says Iran Has Nuclear ‘Counter- Attack’ Capability. 2002).” Daily Star (Beirut). Region.” Enjeux Diplomatiques et Strategiques. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. “Iran: War Is Postponed. August 29. See. See comments by Shamkhani on “deterrence. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. See the comments of the Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 196 196 | Notes Kolesnichenko.tehrantimes. August 29. See Roula Khalaf. 2004. Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advisor Ali Akbar Velayati and many others have echoed this theme. Shahram Chubin. 12. in BBC Monitoring. 2004.” quoted in Yossi Melman. 11. 6. Calls on Iran to Cease Enriching Uranium. July 31. the Arab states have stirred themselves to offset Iran’s influence in Iraq. Rami Khouri. ‘Le Paradoxe Iranien. 2004. in BBC Monitor- ing.” Ha’aretz. 2005. 2004. p.” Argumenty i Fakty (Moscow).

2005. “Iran’s Rowhani Wraps Up Five Nation Tour. See Muwaffaq al-Rubay’i. 2005. See Abdulaziz Sager. May 25.’” Inter- national Herald Tribune.” but Iran was Iraq’s permanent neighbor. in BBC Monitoring.dailystar. http://www. 3. 2005. 2005.) 21. 5. 2005.” Saudi Gazette (Jeddah).asp?art_ID=15853&cat_ID=5. September 20. 18.” Al- Hayat (London).” Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth. 17.” Financial Times.” IRNA (Tehran). 2005. “Iran Election Program: Larijani Says US ‘Propaganda. Larijani repeated the threat when the reality of sanctions came closer. 2005. On Iran’s new for- eign policy see “Larijani Who Could Become Iran’s Next Foreign Minister Explains His Principles.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). August 12. “Russia and China Put Pressure on Iran. 2005. July 22. see “Saudi Paper says Ahmadinejad’s ‘Religious Fer- vour’ Might Influence Iraq. November 16. “Iran Rejects UN Nuclear Concerns as ‘Absurd. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. June 26. June 3. May 20. July 23. in BBC Monitoring.” IRNA (Tehran).comlb/ printable. in BBC Monitoring.” Daily Star (Beirut). (Clearly. June 28. saying that “if these countries use all their means to put Iran under pressure. in BBC Monitoring. Another concern was indicated by a newspaper. June 7. 2005. June 15. p. 2005. p. in BBC Monitoring.S.” Quoted in “Saudi King on Efforts to End Syrian Crisis. June 13. 2005. The Saudi King Abdullah noted that the war in Iraq had “served Iran’s inter- ests. 2005. President Ahmadinejad expressed this rationale in New York in 2005. Terrorism in Iraq. Pakistani participation would dilute Iran’s influence. 2005. May 22. 2005. 2006. November 28. p. 22. “Le President Ahmadinejad defend devant l’ONU le droit au nucleaire et attaque les ‘puissants. 2005. June 16. p. August 26. For an excellent discussion. See Thomas Fuller. 2005.” ILNA (Tehran). July 27. in BBC Moni- toring. Iran will use its potential in the region. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran). 5. August 27. February 1. It is a very different argument from the usual one that the Palestinians have been dispos- sessed by the Israeli interlopers and that it is the duty of every Muslim to support the Palestinians and not recognize Israel.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 197 Notes | 197 16.” IRNA (Tehran). May 21. November 17. Quoted in “Iran Press: Editorial Praises Declaration by Minister Visiting Iraq. Kharrazi called Sistani’s role in Iraq “very valuable. 2005. 19. November 27. in BBC Monitoring. For Saudi security perceptions in this context. 6.” International Herald Tribune. Iraq Assert Security Depends on Regional States.” Quoted in “Iranian Min- ister Says Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s Role ‘Very Valuable’ in Iraq.’” Le Monde. “Iran.’ Policy Different. Searching for Security Is a Priority. 2005. “For Saudi Arabia and Iran. see Flynt Leverett. 23. 20. presence would end “sooner or later. See Corinne Lesnes. see Geof- . “Iran Negotiator Says President to Propose New Nuclear Solution. “Prince Turki Comes to Washington. 24. 2005. 2005.” Sharq (Tehran). Kharrazi observed that the U.

May 21. p. 2005). and help in the restoration of peace and calm in the region. “Get Out the Vote. and Abbas William Sami’i. 2005. 4. 7. 6–9. 2003. 9. 38 (London: ICG. December 17.” USIP Special Report no. Revolutionary Guards Commander General Yahya Rahim Safavi referred to the “swamp” in which the United States finds itself in Iraq. 29. May 19. create disagreements between the Shi’ites and Sunnis. pp. to accept that the revolution is permanent. quoted in “Senior Cleric Says Iraqi Elections a Victory. September 2005.” MERIA. July 25. May 29.” Siyasat–e Ruz (Tehran). 2005. February 11.S.” International Herald Tribune.. See. September 13. “US Policy Toward Iran.. in BBC Monitoring. if the Americans do not abuse public rights and entrust regional affairs to the people themselves.. Novem- ber 2005). 26.” R. claiming that the United States seeks to “stay in Iraq and .” New York Review of Books. 156 (Washington. in BBC Monitoring. 52–7. They are suffocating. 2005. Peter Gal- braith. July 21. September 12.” Financial Times. Institute of Peace. December 16. p. “Iraqi Papers Attack Iranian ‘Mullahs’ for Meddling in Iraq’s Affairs. 2005. 2005. National Security Advisor Steve Hadley also expressed concern about Iran’s attempts to increase its influence in Iraq. no.” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.. in BBC Monitoring. Nicholas Burns. 2005. 2005.” New Yorker. “Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?” ICG report no. 2005..” IRI News Network (Tehran). 7. May 20. “Iraq: Bush’s Islamic Republic. 2005. notably. 3. “US Warns N. see Seymour Hersh. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran and Iraq: The Shi’a Connection.” Quoted in “Iran Press: Guards Commander Says USA Will Not Create Problems for Iran. 25. 2005. Soft Power and the Nuclear Fac- tor.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). Hashemi Rafsanjani stated: “You see. Under Secretary of State for Polit- ical Affairs. Hashemi Rafsanjani. February 12. May 14. See Brian Knowlton. DC: U. The United States sees “continuing troubling indications of Iranian interfer- ence in Iraqi internal affairs. he noted that Iran was in a position to influence regional issues like Iraq and Afghanistan “very well”: “We can prevent extremism in the region . p. now the Americans have become bogged down in Iraq. 2005. “Iran Agrees to Extend Iraq $1bn Credit. See also. and to adopt a policy of compromise. Korea on Atomic Test. See Gareth Smyth.” See “Iran’s Rafsanjani Says Continuation of Iran- . March 21. vol.” Voice of the IRI (Tehran). 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 198 198 | Notes frey Kemp. While running for president.” Quoted in “Iran’s Rafsanjani Criticizes US on UN Iraq Role. 2003. 28. in BBC Moni- toring. Rafsanjani’s admonition to the United States to recognize Iran’s right to nuclear technology. International Crisis Group (ICG). 2005. August 11... More broadly. pp. 27.” Al Furat (Baghdad and Paris). Quoted in “Iranians Shall Benefit from All Gains of Nuclear Science Soon: Rafsanjani. May 16. “The Nearest and Dearest Enemy: Iran after the Iraq War.

Regime Change: Through the Prism of 9/11 (Baltimore. 3.S. 2005. p.” Financial Times. 83.securityconference.13. 3.” Survival. January 4. See Gary Hart. intentions regarding future bases in Iraq remain cloudy. As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger [it] will produce extremists and movements that threaten the safety of Amer- icans and their friends.” New York Times. The stakes could not be higher. February 12. 2005. May 12. 2.S. see especially Ephraim Kam. 119. December 2004. 7. pp. . “The Osirak Fallacy. 2005. 2005. 2005. 32. For a thorough and excellent discussion of U. January 2–31. policy since September 2001. May 11.” See Elis- abeth Bumiller. 47. 2005.” New Yorker. President Bush called reports of a military attack on Iran “simply ridiculous.php?menu_2005=&menu_kon feren. February 24. see Robert Litwak. Secretary of State Rice stated that “in the Middle East. While in Europe. p. 3. For indications that the United States is considering the military option. “The ‘War on Terror’ in Historical Perspec- tive.” Condoleezza Rice. no. Richard Betts. See also Senator John McCain (R-AZ).S. 31. 2005.” International Herald Tribune. 33. “Curbing the Iranian Military Threat: The Military Option. p.” Strategic Assessment. easily enough. August 20. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. “Roadside Bombs in Iraq Still Taking Heavy Toll on US Forces.” Financial Times. 2005.’” IRNA (Tehran). “End This Evasion on Permanent Army Bases in Iraq. no. 3. suggestion in November that Ambassador Khalilzad was ready to engage Iran on Iraq was met by a rejection from Iran. “Security in the Middle East: New Challenges for NATO and the EU. forthcoming 2006). President Bush has bro- ken with six decades of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing stability at the price of liberty. Peter Spiegel. August 19. The U. 30.” adding “having said that all options are on the table. U. (D-Del. p. see Seymour Hersh. March 4. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.22–5. overstretch. “Les Accusations d’inger- ence en Irak s’aggravent contre l’Iran. “Bush May Weigh the Use of Incentives to Dissuade Iran. 2005. no.” Le Monde. 2. January 18. May 19.” speech delivered at Munich Security Conference.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 199 Notes | 199 EU3 Dialogue ‘Best Option.de/konferenzen/rede. 2005. Munich. 36. Iran has moved to put some of its facilities underground.” opening statement to the U. Spring 2006. Of a volu- minous literature. 34. http://www. to the proposition that the lack of democracy was the principal cause of ter- rorism and extremism and that forcible intervention could bring about a stable democratic system. Summer 2005. vol. Senator Joseph Biden Jr. “The Coming Wars.S. For U. confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 35.” National Interest. vol. Terrorism and Democracy.).S. “Iran: Weapons Proliferation. The arguments in favor of forward defense and regime change led. See Adam Roberts. p. and Mouna Naim. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- tions. See “Iran Is Said to Build Atom Stor- age Tunnels.

“US/Iran: For- mer Weapons Inspector Says US Must Avoid Mistakes of Iraq. “More Reasons to Invade Iran than Iraq. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. Matthews.” Financial Times. http://www. 2005.” New York Times. 2005. “Pentagon Says Iraq Effort Limits Ability to Fight Other Con- flicts.com/bal- op. in BBC Monitoring.shtml?type= printable. http://asia. 2005.0. March 2005). which reported that Iran and North Korea were listed by experts as the second most important priority in pro- liferation after loose nukes in the former Soviet Union. Wolfsthal. 37.” IRI News Network (Tehran). The press has been more blatant: “Colum- nist Says Nuclear Fuel Cycle Needed for Strategic Superiority. Joseph Cirincione. March 31. “Deterring Iran. intelligence. “US Policy toward Iran.baltimoresun. December 21. “Panel Report Assails CIA for Failure on Iraq Weapons. For original Secretary of State Rice quote. DC: U. “Blix Criticizes Bush Non-Proliferation Policies. See also Senator Richard G. Rose Gottemoeller.” ISNA (Tehran). See Daily Princetonian.rferl. February 8. http://www.” Baltimore Sun. Lugar (R-IN). p. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. For press reports on parts related to Iran. 2003. and nobody can deny our power.com/2005/05/03/poli- tics/03military. For a report critical of U. May 3. March 29. Richard Clarke.” 41. 39. July 29.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 200 200 | Notes see Thom Shanker.” March 9.mytellus.org/featuresarticle/ 2005/02/A5423980-B287-4DB9-811E-9D84DDE5D06B. see Judge Laurence H.html. 15.com/news/article. US Panel Says. see Ali Shamkhani.” New York Times. Silberman and Senator Charles S. http://www. 2004. 2005.jtml?type=topNews&storyID=5372497. 2005). The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses (Washington. .irannukes22jun22.S. Senate. August 4. March 9. DC: Carnegie Endowment. June 22. July 28. For example. quoted in Ray Takeyh. and Joseph Nye. Burns. Burns. “Heed Iraq Lessons to Avoid Disaster in Iran. On complication. December 18. http://www. p.reuters. June 2005). 40.html?th=&emc=th&pagewante. see Ali Shamkhani.” 42.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2005/03/09/news/12303. see Associated Press (Paris). “Data Lacking on Iran’s Arms.nytimes. 2005. March 31. 169.” Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 30. in BBC Monitoring.” Reuters. p. http://www.do?viewType=print&articleID=1890267.S. 2005. Andrew Tully. 2004. 2005. August 7.” Keyhan (Tehran). Robb. 2005. George Perkovich. 2005.7381263. “I believe that the power of our regional influence stretches from Quds [Jerusalem] to Kandahar. Jon B. and Jessica T. quoted in “Iran Says Self-Sufficient in Producing Solid Fuel.com/newsArticle. 38. On deterrent. “US Policy toward Iran. 2005.story. DC: White House. see especially Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt.” Quoted in “Defence Minister Says Iran Has Nuclear ‘Counter-Attack’ Capability.” New York Times. Shamkhani is also quoted as saying. and David Sanger and Scott Shane. in BBC Monitoring.

2002). 43. quoted in “US Commander Warns Iran Nukes May Invite Attack by Other Regional Power. This is the theme of several of Bracken’s works.com. vol. President George W. 201. 2004. 8. http://news.” March 2.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 201 Notes | 201 43. 2005. June 24. 2005. it would find it tough to use them. p.com/sto- ries/2004/01/23/world/printable595350. Amelia Gentleman. See Bennett Remberg. see George Perkovich. http://www. “Rice Tells India about US Worries on Iran Deal. in addition to its state agents. Naomi Koppel. pp. Policy Brief no. 2005. 1.” Financial Times. President Bill Clinton observed that if Iran developed nuclear weapons. April 1.” International Herald Tribune. DC. January 27. Washington. “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival. Sagan and Kenneth N. 49. March 17.” International Herald Tribune. See Paul Bracken. See also Philip Bowring.msnbc. Summer 2001. 51.” Foreign Affairs. See Christopher Adams and Hugh Williamson. “A Rosier View of Terrorist-List Nations. 48. see Richard Russell. 2005. pp.com. Norton. includ- ing its brinksmanship.” International Herald Tribune.W. 2. speech delivered at the National Defense Univer- sity (NDU). 2005.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. Waltz. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. A Homeland Security report argued. 2005. 2005. For a suggestion of a possible strategy. p. Bush. “Only Iran appears to have the possible motivation to use terrorist groups. 44. 34 (Washington. January 30.shtml. “Clinton Urges Diplomacy for Iran. to plot against the US homeland. Burns. February 11. One could argue that the Iranian leadership’s use of the nuclear issue. 1. pp. 2004. 79. “US Official Rips into Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. quoted in Scott D.comnews?tmpl=story&cid=1521&u=/afp/ 20050302/pl_afp/usiranabi.” Eric Lipton. See Associated Press.cbsnews. “Rice Uses Europe Trip to Get Tough with Iran. DC: Carnegie Endowment. 2005. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W. 7. 4. no. Kathleen McInnis. The United States apparently is not interested in assessing whether a major Iranian investment could give it an incen- tive to maintain regional security. “The Sec- ond Nuclear Age. Among other sources for background discussion about the regional reper- cussions of an Iranian nuclear capability. p. John R. http://www.” 46. 52.yahoo. . vol. President Bush’s speech. Head of US Central Command. Burns. January/February 2000. and General John Abizaid. 45. March 22. 69–79. 53. “US Policy toward Iran”. p. Iran Is Not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbors. p. February 2005). March 24.” CBSNews. no. Bolton. “US Policy toward Iran. 146–56. 50. 2. for domestic benefits is a model. February 5-6. 144–53. “How America’s Interests Collide in Asia.” MSNBC./id/6887724/print/1/display- mode/1098. “A Way to Break the Nuclear Impasse. testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. 47.

54. 48–82. Ellen Laip- son. Wyn Q. October 10. Einhorn.” pp. Campbell. ed. Carnegie Endowment. see George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero. in BBC Monitoring. 55. in BBC Monitoring. and Reiss. “Probable Attitudes of the GCC States toward the Scenario of a Military Action against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. vol. 2005. 2005. “The Global Consequences of Iran’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons. 111-44.” Gulf Research Center Report on GCC Attitudes toward Iran’s Nuclear Program. DC. In addition. pp. 2004). “Probable Attitudes of the GCC States toward the Scenario of a Military Action against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. in BBC Monitoring.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 202 202 | Notes “Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East.” all in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington. Bowen and Joanna Kidd. and Robert Einhorn. Washington.” Policywatch. Decem- ber 18. 169–86. Mustafa Alani. and Reiss. eds. together with Thomas W.” pp. 51–88. as well as Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson. “Editorial Says Gulf Summit Signifies Tougher Stand against Iran” [text of edi- torial headlined “Important Gulf Summit by Any Yardstick]. November 30. “Taking a Stand on a Nuclear Iran: Voices from the Persian . “Turkey: Nuclear Choices amongst Dangerous Neighbors. June 12. December 21. The same newspaper noted that “Iran is not a peaceful country” and it “con- tinues to occupy Arab land. “Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained without Nukes?” pp.” Policy Analysis (Dubai: Gulf Research Center.S. ed.” leading it to argue for regional cooperation and arms control. no.” Al Sharq Al Awsat (London). Mustafa Alani. 28.” pp. December 20. April 2004. 2005). 2005). Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Washington. 2003. “The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors. “The Elephant in the Gulf: Arab States and Iran’s Nuclear Program. For a GCC official’s critique of Iran’s nuclear program. “Gulf States Declare Iran’s Nuclear Program ‘Worrisome. June 15. See also Ian Lesser. DC: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.1065 (Washington. pp.” draft. 3. November 28. “Al Attiyah: Iran’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons Causing Apprehensions in the GCC States. “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course. Al Quds al-Arabi web- site (London). 2005.” Al Sharq Al Awsat (London). no. both chapters in Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. 83-110.” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Recon- sider Their Nuclear Choices. Lippman. see Anwar al-Khatib. Leon Fuerth. Policy Analysis (Dubai: Gulf Research Center. December 19. October 8. November 2004).. “Editor Says Neighbours Fearful of Iran’s Drive to Acquire Nuclear Weapon. “Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty. 56. 2005.” Washington Quarterly. Einhorn. 89–112.’” Al-Jazeera satellite TV. See “Gulf Fears Being Scorched by Iran’s Nuclear Activities. in BBC Monitoring. Army War College. DC: Strategic Studies Institute. See also Simon Henderson. “Turkey. Iran and Nuclear Risks. 2003. 2005. 2005. Summer 2005. 2005. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2005.” Al-Rayah. in BBC Monitoring. November 2004). Emily Landau. ed. Campbell. December 21.

America has plans for the Middle East.] domineering policies in the region.” Quoted. 61. “Saudi FM says West Partly to Blame for Nuclear Stand-off with Iran. and text of report by Iranian news agency. December 14. 2006). the Persian Gulf. October 21. see Chubin.” BBC. no. 2006.frontpagemag. 2005. This was implicit in Hashemi Rafsanjani’s controversial comments on this issue. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. they are going to hit Saudi Arabia or Jordan. December 15. December 26. October 22. asp?ID=18994. December 25. they are going to kill Palestinians. “Iran Nuclear Bid Fault of West. “Dangers the Outsiders Pose to the Region. 2005.” Voice of IRI (Tehran). See. . 2005. Terrorism.” SPA (Riyadh). October 28. respectively. Novem- ber 8.” ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow). August 3. 2001. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has said that Iran is “strongly oppos- ing [U.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4615832. See Pramit Mitra. 2005. Where is the gain in that?” See Frank Gardner.157 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. If they miss Israel. in BBC Monitoring. For a brief discussion.stm). http://www.” IRNA website (Tehran). “Saudi FM Opposes Iranian Attempts to Build Nukes. and “Regimes Destroyed by Nations’ Resistance Not Nuclear Weapons—Iran’s Leader. 58. 2001. January 17. November 9. 59. 6. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 2005. Conclusion 1. “Saudi Crown Prince on Iranian Nuclear Plans. October 26. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal asked of Iran: “Where are they going to use these weapons? If they hit Israel. See “Rafsanjani Warns of High Cost of US Support for Israel. and North Africa. January 16.” Policy Review. 3.” quoted in “Iranian Vice-President Says Russia.bbc.” Voice of IRI (Tehran).” and that the United States is “build- ing an empire. January 16. For full references. January 16. see Henry Sokolski. 2005. in a London inter- view.” Keyhan. April 7. in BBC Monitoring.com/Articles/Printable. 2005.co. 2005. January 16. in BBC Monitoring. http://news.S. “Defusing the Mullah’s Bomb. 2006.” Tel Aviv Notes. 57.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 203 Notes | 203 Gulf. in BBC Monitoring. for example.” Voice of IRI Net- work (Tehran). 2006. 2006.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 2005.” Jerusalem Post online. 2. p. in “Ira- nian Leader Says International Relations Should Not Be Selective. “India’s International Oil Ties Risk US Displeasure. China Policy Priorities. “Whither Iran?” 60. They want domination over the whole world. November 1. in BBC Monitoring. Iranian First Vice President Parviz Davudi noted that “Russia and China are ‘priority’ countries for Iran’s policy. 2005. October 30.

8. “Speak to Iran in One Voice.’” IRNA (Tehran). p. in BBC Mon- itoring. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 204 204 | Notes 4.” Adelphi Paper no. 2005. Whether the two are compatible is not self-evident. Mathews. in BBC Monitoring.” Istanbul Milli Gazette.” International Her- ald Tribune. linking Iran’s security to regional security and implicitly threatening to destabilize the region if threatened. “Iran Raises the Bar. See “Iran Guards Chief (General Yahya Rahim-Safavi) Says ‘Political Pressure Will Prompt Strong Reaction.” and Nasuhi Gungor. quoted in “Iranian President Addresses Parliament. August 27. quoted in Mehr News Agency (Tehran).” September 28. August 21. 8. 15. November 1. 2005. For earlier examples. See Jessica T.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 6.” Milliyet website. Sami Kohen. Says Wants Justice in Foreign Policy. see also Anatol Lieven. February 1. . September 24.” See International Herald Tribune. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 2005. 13. See “Middle East Split over Iraq. Ali Larijani has resorted to a favorite Iranian tactic. Ambiguous or incoherent. 2005. p. in BBC Monitoring. Iran seeks at once a stabilized Iraq and an Iraq free of foreign forces. “Whither Iran? Reform. in BBC Monitoring. November 3. Saudi Arabia canceled a visit of the Iranian foreign minister to the kingdom in October to express disagreement over Iran’s interference in Iraq. 2002).” Novem- ber 4. p. 10. 2005. 11. p. November 3. see regional chapter above and Shahram Chubin. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. “Between North Korea and Iran. November 1. 2005. “Most Iranians concern themselves far more with the price of meat and onions than with the Arab-Israeli peace process or uranium enrichment. September 22. “Iran’s President’s Remarks on Israel Signal ‘New Danger’— Turkish Paper.” Al-Jazeera. “No Time to Abandon Our Natural Allies. 6.” See “Daily Criticises Iranian Government for Causing World Tension. Domestic Politics and National Secu- rity. 2005. 2005. “Lessons of Iraq: If You Can’t Lick ’em. 2005. September 23. testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.” International Herald Tri- bune. See also “Turkish Columnist Notes Iran’s Growing Influence in the Region. Try Diplomacy. Afshin Molavi writes. 2006. 2005. 9. 2005. 7. Ephraim Sneh. March 22. 2005. “Iranian Nuclear Chief Says No Alternative but to Resist Pressure by Big Powers. “Engage Muslim Support or Lose the War. and George Perkovich. Ali Larijani. July 14. 6. August 22. October 5. 12.” IRI News Network (Tehran). Iranian families “are interested in first and foremost in how to ensure their livelihood. 2005. 5. 2005. October 31. 2006. 2005.” Mardom -Salari (Tehran). October 30.” Jerusalem Post. “Iran Envoy Insists on Pursuit of Enrichment.” Financial Times. in BBC Monitoring. Anatol Lieven. September 10-11. Associated Press. 2005.

intended to deal with civil unrest. responsible for the attacks on the United States on September 11. whose task is to interpret new laws passed by parliament and determine if they are consistent with Islamic law or the constitution. Badr Brigade Armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI). 205 . Umbrella orga- nization for terrorist groups worldwide. responsible for sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway system in 1995. numerous. Although it is not a leg- islative body. it has veto power over the Iranian parliament. and dispersed throughout country. lightly armed. Hamas Palestinian Islamist (Sunni) paramilitary orga- nization and political party. Guardian Council Consisting of clerics and lawyers. AQ Khan network Network engaged in the proliferation of nuclear information. Basij A paramilitary organ affiliated to IRGC. Aum Shinrikyo Japanese religious sect (Hindu and Buddhist mix).*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 205 Glossary Al Qaeda Islamist terrorist group headed by Osama bin Laden. 2001.

Ibrahim Al-JJafaari Prime Minister of Iraq January 2005–May 2006. Accessed power through the secular Baath Party. Karine A Freighter intercepted by Israeli Defense Force in December 2001. Former Mayor of Tehran. Majles Iranian parliament. Bolton U. . responsible for 1983 U. Considered to be a religious conser- vative. Saddam Hussein Former president of Iraq.S. which was carrying weapons loaded in Iran and destined for Palestinian areas. Keyhan newspaper Most conservative Iranian newspaper. Recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005. IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (aka Pas- daran). Mohammad Al Baradei Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1997. They control the missile program and sensitive WMD sites. Islamic Jihad Syrian-based Islamist group. ambassador to the UN since August 2005. The parallel military organization set up by revolutionary Iran to assure internal or domestic security primarily. Taliban Fundamentalist Islamist group. Embassy bombing in Lebanon. People Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Succeeded Mohammed Khatami when elected President of Iran August 2005. John R.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 206 206 | Glossary Hezbollah Islamist (Shiite) political party. under direct supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader.S. founded to oppose Israeli insertions into southern Lebanon. assuming the position of president of Iraq in 1979. who sheltered Al Qaeda during their five-year reign in Afghanistan.

*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 207 Glossary | 207 AQ Khan Abdul Qadeer Khan. 2005. Mohammad Bager Qalibaf Former head of police. Hossein Mousavian Former senior Iranian nuclear negotiator. Yahya Rahim Safavi Revolutionary Guards Commander. Ali Larijani Conservative Iranian politician. Sirus Naseri Senior nuclear negotiator (until August 2005). North Korea’s leader since 1994. Pres- ident of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) from 1994 to 2004. Supreme Leader of Iran. Iranian repre- sentative at the UN from 1989 to 1997. to August 24. Admiral Ali Shamkhani Iranian Defense Minister replaced by Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar. Former president of Iran from 1989 to 1997. Hashemi Rafsanjani Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council of Iran. Lost election for a third term to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 elections. Placed sixth in Ira- nian presidential elections of 2005. Ayatollah Khamenei Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. succeeded Ahmadinejad as mayor of Tehran. Kamal Kharrazi Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs from August 20. Mohsen Rezai Former Guards Commander (IRGC) from 1981 to 1997. resigned in order to run for president in 2005 elections. Replaced Hasan Rowhani in August 2005 as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. 1997. Hasan Rowhani Hojjat-el-Eslam Former Secretary of the SNSC acting as chief negotiator with the EU-3 over Iranian nuclear program. Kim Jong-Il Chairman of the National Defense Committee and General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party. . Supported by the Islamic Iran Partic- ipation Front. “Godfather” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Mostafa Moin Iranian reformist presidential candidate in 2005 elections. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979. Secretary of Expediency Council.

. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani Senior Shiite cleric in Iraq. Javier Solana High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Bushire Site of nearly completed reactor on the Persian Gulf.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 208 208 | Glossary Hossein Shariatmadri Editor of hard-line Keyhan newspaper. Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. Places Arak Heavy water production plant. Lavizan/Parchin Sites and barracks with some nuclear-related activity. Repre- sentative of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Natanz (near Isfahan) Uranium enrichment facility. Advisor on interna- tional affairs to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Ali Akbar Velayati Former foreign minister.

112.. 163n2. 114. 180n67. Reza. 91. of. 118.S.). 45. 82 ulist victory of. 70. 134–35 of Iran (AEO) AIPAC (Israeli lobby). 122. 101. of. 25. 158n22 Arab–Iran polarization. 32. 115–16 on nuclear discrimination against Additional Protocol (AP): acceptance Iran. Iran’s threats to on political corruption of foreign suspend. Arak heavy water reactor. tion as throwback to revolution. 30. 32–33. 184n28 Afghanistan: Iran/Russian cooperation Annan. value of. 114 Ahmadinejad. military sup- access and denial: as security policy. Agha. Agreed Framework (North 164n6 Korea/U. Abu Dhabi. 20. 160n42. 114. on regional AEO. 36. bases in. 20. 72–73. 45. nuclear issues under. marginalization anti-Americanism: Iran’s exploitation of Taliban in. 149n5 in. 108 209 . 90. 116–17.S. promoting pre- 123 ferred regional order of Iran. port for administration of. election of. 64. 35. 18. See Atomic Energy Organization influence of U. 3. 65. Mahmoud: administra. on duty of Armenia: Russia/Iran cooperation in. 78. 163n3 ary days. 14. 11. Hossein. 32–33.S. 9. 197n23. hard- 197n21 line stance of. 90. 35. 34. pop- IAEA to ratify. U. 7. 108. See Additional Protocol (AP) 177n43 AQ Kahn network.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 209 Index Abdullah (King of Saudi Arabia). 195n2 83–84 Aghazadeh. pressure from policy critics. 77–78. AP. 72. Kofi. 169n47. 117 indifference toward international Abu Ghraib. 126 opinion. Muslims to oppose Israel.

126. Proliferation Secu- Blix. sibilities. 181n1. support for Burns. on interception of missile- (AEO): decision making and. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 84. 159n33 . on defense missile sales to Iran. on noncompliance. 135. 37. 188n53. 188n55 Iran. Ephraim. 79 restoration of credibility by Iran. 3. 194n111. 152nn21 rity Initiative and. 150n12 96–97.S. 186nn41–42 in. opposition to enrich. 45.S. 181n1. 134.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 210 210 | Index arms race: of Iran and Iraq. 110. 163n3. See nuclear technology between Iran as nation and regime. 165n9. 99. 31–32. Mohammad: on credibility ing of technicians for. elimination of negotiating respon. 156n5 189n60. on denying WMDs Atlantic Institute. 109. related technology for Iran. 201n50 debate. on proliferation. Grigoriy. 182n9 Bolton. 183n23 to rogue states. 188n58. on nuclear capability as Caucasus: U. 89. 187n47 99. 40–41. 196n5 167n28. 31–36. countries supporting terrorism. positions in Iran negotia- report on Iran compliance. Carnesale. 62. John. lack of infor- mation about. 32. 159n31. 108–9. 162n50 ness of democracy. on U. 181n5. 114 Bushire reactor. 84. Hans. 173n8. 20 198n28. 5–6. support of EU negotiations. Joseph. 78. Russian. 7. George W. 190n75. report on from Pakistan. 166n19. Iran’s ment. 105. on loopholes in nuclear non- with. on axis of evil. role in. 123 deterrent. 3/U. 79. technology.S. nuclear program. 181n5. 71. proliferation treaty. role in nuclear policy practice of. Central Asia: U. Russian air Bush. Richard. on regimes and nuclear arms sales: AQ Kahn network and. 7. role in. denial of plans to attack Asculai. 110. 15. 21. visit to Tehran (2003).: on axis of evil. differentiation atomic energy. return of spent Bahrain: U. 21. 83. 123 102. 89. on open- ment freeze. 136. 186n43 history of.S. military contacts 86. 109 of IAEA. 2. 164n5. Cheney.S. 195n113 Iran. Kurt M. 24. restarting Badr Brigade. 35. Campbell. ence in Iraq’s internal affairs. 64. EU- centrifuge testing in Iran. 66. 89. 187n47.. 154n31 unacceptability of nuclear Azerbaijan: Iran/Russian cooperation weapons for Iran. 184n30 with. limits on. on limiting uranium enrichment. 45. Iran’s testing of. to Palestine by Iran. bases in. 97. Albert. 9 China: as foreign relations priority for Berdennikov. 51. on referral of Iran centrifuge technology: acquisition to UNSC. 45. on Iran’s confidence deficit. Russian train- Al Baradei. 164n6. 120 of project. 123 fuel to Russia. 84. 126 conservatives: openness to engage- brinksmanship: benefits of. on tions. gas contracts Biden. Nicholas: on Iranian interfer.

support of dual containment. 135. U. 22. 142–45. 134. 122. 115–16 diplomatic initiative. 150n3. 120 fuel cycle proposal. Dawa Party (Iraq). 58. conservatives’ openness to. 115–16 103–4. regime in negotiations. 85 European Union Group of 3 (EU-3): co-option. unremarkable endorsement. 74. 103 Iran.S. 62. 146. sanctions nature of. diplomatic initiative. UNSC. Parviz. 181n5. military option 203n3.. 124 24–25. nuclear program denial and access: as security policy. 62. priorities in. 15. 107–8. 104–5. nuclear. Iran’s quest for. 192n97. 24–26 lenge to international order. as threat to neighboring as alternative to. 84. as buffer and intermediary. 183n23 192n96. 139. vs. 62. 84. security tudes toward. negotiating strategies with. 178n50. 104.S. 203n3 Iran’s negotiating tactics. and the West. Expediency Discernment Council of 129–30 Iran. 138. energy diversifica- with. IAEA policy. 109–10. Council on Foreign Relations. vs. 90. 44 on Iran. 169n48. assessment of 192n97 response to Iran. change as complement to. 60. 8–9.S. See uranium enrichment nuclear proliferation. faith-based intelligence. 89. U. rejection of package deal DeSutter. Tony. IAEA decision making. 73. 36–37. 113.S. promotion in Middle East. 85 agreement to report Iran to Cordesman. 60. 106–7. 143. See also regional as tool of. diplomatic. 184n31. as European Union (EU): Iran’s relations deterrent. 185n43 Egypt: response to nuclear Iran. chal- energy diversification. 143. distrust of Davudi. diminished role for U. 104–5. 24 Einhorn. reduction of constraints on Iran. .*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 211 Index | 211 containment. 102. 103–6. 82. 24. Paula. 199n33 66–68. 141–42. viability Freedman. 150n12 electricity: nuclear production of. 169n45 by Iran. diplomacy in. 136–37. IAEA support strengthening democracy: openness of. 183n23. as 23. 106. 83. 16. 185n33 fuel cycle: as breakout option for enrichment. EU-3 proposal to egy of. regime port of initiatives. 91–93. Iran’s U. three-way negotiations with Iran 185n33 and U. Russian sup- nuclear weapons as. EU-3 atti. 38f–39f 3–4. security strat. engagement. as regime countries. 59. 155n3 foreign relations of Iran. 68–70. 136. negotiation of constraints deniability. renewal of deterrence: full fuel cycle as. failure of. package offer. 32. 165n9. Robert. 153n27 of. Lawrence. tion and. 143.S. 4.

195n3. 173n8. 119 straints on Iran. 34.. 47 with Iran. 96. reporting obligations to UNSC. Russian support . nuclear issues 85 linked to. 100–101. aligned states’ sympathy for con- port of. 118.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 212 212 | Index 66.. inadequacies of. 114. Iranian Gulf weapons of mass destruction free cooperation with. 4. Russian intelligence: estimates of Iran’s nuclear participation in. 122. See International Atomic Energy 30. 198n28 negotiations policies of. credibility as inde- grams. Pierre. U. lack of NPT Haass. 163n3. 176n35 Iran. Hadley. 114. Chal.S.S. 182n14 International Atomic Energy Agency Guardian council. 127. 168n42 instability of region: exploitation of. 128–30 pendent agency. Steve. 121. 15. regime compared global positioning system (GPS). 169n44. 160n39 gasoline: demand for vs. 128. Agency (IAEA) 73–74 ideological conservatives. Gregory. tions. 130 Iran’s violation of obligations to. Iran’s confidence. 82. as political issue. 51–53. concerns about Iran’s building measures toward. 79. 3–4. 85 on. Peter. rela- lenges. 131 formance assessment of. Richard. 181n5. 42–43. 32–34. rejection of Iran’s threats. between Iran and U. 46. and Change (United tions of Iran with. 26 incentives for negotiation. as political tool. 139. relations with Goldschmidt. 195n113. 149n5 181n1. 99–102. 52. 143 GCC. Iran’s Iran of referral to UNSC. Nations Secretary General). nuclear program. 8 ing Iran. resolution (2006) regard- Hussein. IAEA. 109 inspections of nuclear facilities. 101. 194n108. capability. 137. electricity. Pak- Giles. 15. 63–80. 45. as right under NPT. 95–99. 119. 123–24 against Iran. 71 Goss. notice to Hezbollah: Al Qaeda vs. lobbying for sanctions 186n44. 169n45 istani support for terrorist attacks globalization. 180n66. 111. 100. non- Hamas: Iran’s support of. 95–96. Iran sup. 189n71. 98–99. zone (WMDFZ). See Gulf Cooperation Council India: gas pipeline agreement with (GCC) Iran. culture of. Saddam. liferation. 165nn8–9. 51. grey markets: nuclear technology and. 4. 185n33 enforcement powers. 97. 150n3 Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement. 110. per- support of. High-Level Panel on Threats. 103. corporate response to Iran’s nuclear pro. 52. Group of 8 (G-8): EU security and 83–84 cooperation with. as buffer distrust of Iran’s regional ambi. 67. 40 (IAEA): approach to nuclear pro- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

EU-3 as 87–88. 66. 119. 131. anti-NATO for regime. reduced democratization. Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (1996).S. 151nn6–8. Iranian influence in inter- of. relations: anti-Americanism 169n48. 122. 83–84. 198n28. interests in. security strategies and. unresolved issues in. 16. as ship with Russia. 134. denying right of Israel to challenge to U. as threat to Iran.S. 17–19. models for. role in negotiations 197n18. Iran–U. international rela. 44. 102. Iran–Arab polarization. 84. convergence of Iran/U. 44. differences. 143–45. geopolitical intermediary in. mandate of.S. dependence on regional order. negotiat- Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)).S.-inspired exist. 130. 11. as Arab Shiite state. 48–50. 196n5. 100. strategic environment in. natural ally of Iran. as ing behavior and. 114 strengthening EU-3 diplomatic Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps initiative. values of. Iran’s Iran: ambition as regional power.S. U. 95. UN resolution and anti-Western orientation of. ending. regime in.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 213 Index | 213 for nonproliferation policies. 199n33. 81. verification problems of. 103–6. 153n24. 87 tional weapons capabilities of. 136. 118.S. 53. regime minority Shiite state.S. 109. (IRGC). 77. 189n67. 84. 15. uranium imports. (See Iraq: ambiguous Iran policies toward. 114. policy toward tions (See foreign relations of Iran. sense of vulnerability. risk-taking behavior of. Iran–Iraq War (1986): Iranian interest 99.S. Iran). 1. assets of. 20. 75–76 Iraq). 204n8. disarmament 51–54. defense budget of. 3–4.S.S. 135. See Revolutionary Guards tance to Iran. 119–20. strategies of Iran). 90. 18. relations with U. 19. 78. 90. negoti. 55. as sponsor of terrorism. relations). 117. 116. 183n17. eco. 118. 17. 19. incoherence of U. change and (See regime change). 20. 14. 191n79. 152n18. 156n5. 14. strategic partner. as victim of its Iraq War (1991): Iraqi disarmament own behavior. U. nal affairs of. policy shift to opportunism of. 163n2.. relations with Iraq (See and. 96 in nuclear power and. Islamic regime in (See nation vs. 20 . twin Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. 151n12. 25. in. to divide Europe and U. Iran–U. 140–41 after. technical assis. closed nature of political sys. ating strategy of (See negotiating U. 195n1 114–15. 14. political lessons 152nn20–22. attempts 169n48. 184n28. conven. 118. pressure for 87 referral of Iran to UNSC. pragmatic 150n2. 91. 166n19. as status quo after Desert Storm. 136. 12. 113. border dispute with Iran. 83–84. 15.S. 83–84. 82. 83. 134. U. 122. difficulties in resolving nomic costs of sanctions on. 203n1. 108. insurgency power. 7. revolutionary 135. 120 tem. 159n34. 76. demonizing of. 114. 95. 138. 136–37.

152n18. 30. Hojat-el Eslam. 26–27. 131. on intentions of U. Keyhan (newspaper). response to tive of. neutrality on nuclear issues. 36 Iran support for. 37. 131.S. Fazel. 23. 164n6 Karrubi. U. 27. 119. 35.S. India regime vs. hardline and self-sufficiency. 35. Karine A affair. U. regional standing. regime dis. 30. See North Korea international goals of. 166n16. Lankarani. Ibrahim. Iran’s denial of right to chief nuclear negotiator.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 214 214 | Index Iraq War (2003– ): EU position on exist. 114. 138. 137. Ali. limitations of nuclear Iran. 151n6. nature of. 173n5. Iraq as threat to. 41–42. 150n2 ties of. on acquisi- Iran. of hostility toward. 7. 71 Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI): closed Khamenei. 10–11. 140. 121. . 43. 135. 132. U. 123.. 124–25. Iran’s regional ambitions.S. 119.S. 114. weapons of mass destruction. 195n3. 110 for. WMDs as justification Ivanov. refusal to accept limited makeover of Middle East as objec. See Revolutionary Guards Isfahan uranium enrichment facility. Kharrazi. 12. rejection of Libyan model regard- loss of U. ultranationalist attitude regional opposition to U. reducing U. 76. government and nuclear ambi. on and legitimization of regime. 51. credibility and moral ing. Kamal. 119. U. 116. threat from Iranian missiles. 116–17. Ali: on arrogance of U.S. 166n19. 126. 37 nuclear ambitions. as 197n23. Iran’s exploitation WMD proliferation and. Sergey. countries to oppose. trust limiting acceptance of nuclear decision making and. authority. commitment ence and. 198n27. 52. strike concept. 131 155n39. 136. 79.S. toward. 132.. 113. to invade sons for. 169n50 goal.S. 48–50. Iran vs. 152n22.. 57. duty of Middle East tion of full fuel cycle. 120 Corps).S. 123. on empire-building by tions. 130–33. 20 IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Al-Jafaari. 47. 130. outcome affecting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. nuclear capability nuclear technology. warnings about Iran’s Kingdom vulnerability in. 77–78. interest in nuclear power. 203n1. pres. 135. 114. nuclear program. 1 Israel: conventional weapons capabili.S. 126. response to threat from Iran. Iran-Iraq War les. fatwa banning 181n5. 184n28. threat to Iran. 197n24 remaining in power as regime Kim Jong Il. 89 68. on Iranian access to issues for. 117. uncertainty about Korea. Iran’s intelligence debacle of. demonizing of Larijani. 179n58 Islamic Jihad: Iran’s support of. 102–3. 170n56. and United to. as 153n23. approach to nuclear issues. 44. 119 Kelayeh (Iran). on denial of technology Gulf role model. history of.

78. North Iraq as natural allies. linking Iranian and 196n5. creation of new regional order. 160n39. on politi- Middle East: duty of Muslim countries cal importance of Iran to Europe. 88. 175n26. on rela. pol. Natanz uranium enrichment project. Mostafa. ian. 118 strategic context of. Ariel. Iran’s 180n73. 177n46. 117. buy- 123. 195n113 Mousavian.. Richard. on foreign sensitivity to nuclear program and. nuclear activities. 90. 123. 165n11. 110.S. Iran- ciation from Ahmadinejad. 195n1. 97 76. Iran’s 151n8 view of. Michael. Russian Iran’s regional ambitions. 190n74 Majles. 127. 169n47.S. 49. military presence following nationalism. on raw 48. Mujahideen i-Khalq (MOK). 55. power politics. 195n3 policies. 48. 74–75. 160n39 146 Lavizan (Iran). 123. ing time in. divide Europe and U. 78 narcissism of Iran. zation). 172n2. 74. Sirus: on Iran’s nuclear capa- McCain. U. 20. 161nn46–47.S. on Iran and 165n9. 47–48. 22. 71 Moin.: Iraq War intentions. regional security. 197n18. 51. 33. 23. Hossein: on Iranian public Levite. 22. 78. 122–23. 68–73. 45. encirclement of Iran. 166nn12–18. Middle East bases. recognition of Israel. 29 Lavrov. as substitute for air power. 135. on shifting balance of power. 45. weapons technology Mykonos assassinations. 134 199n33. Segey. John. demonstrations . 204n6. 60.S. See also regional security. 64. on signing Libya: acquisition of nuclear weapons of 2004 agreement. 116 ing and. disso. loss of U. 40. individual countries assuring other nations of peaceful military presence. 197n23. 62 opinion. 2–3 Lugar. to oppose Israel. 194n111. on destabilization and missiles: domestic industry and Iran nuclear capability.S. 73. 17. negotiating strategies of Iran. 117–18. 45–46. U. 46. 114. 3. sales to Iran. self-sufficiency. 91 bilities. 45 U. confidence build- post-9/11 extension of. 131. theater missile defenses. technology as metaphor. decision to U. threat of. 15. 168n35 obtained from Pakistan. 116. defining mini-nukes. 22 elements of. on Korean assistance in. 119. 163n2 Mazarr. sanctions affecting regime Muqtada al Sadr. 122. attempts to reducing threat to Iran. give up WMD activities. 63. 164n6. on designs. 63–80. tionship with Russia. Iranian. 172n74 Naseri. reputation in.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 215 Index | 215 38f–39f. U. 151n6. 25. 120. 200n42 NAM (nonaligned movement). 153n26.S. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organi- icy and democratization of.S. 17–18 9/11 attacks.

95–99. 171n68. and. noncompliance: definition of.S. EU nonpro- liferation influence on Iran. 20–21. 170n56. 180n73. 56. 17–18. parallels with North Korea’s policy toward. 128. 17–18. as pro- North Atlantic Treaty Organization tection against regime change. 165nn8–9. U. 10. fear of. (NATO). 17. 103. 68. 60. 137. strategic context of.S. 1. 134 179n58. 149n5. 20. 94. 60. support for. schizophrenic nature of. 80. 61f. ineffectiveness of UNSC sanc. 31–36. destabilization and. regional role in negotiations. tics causing mistrust by other 139. 169n47. 75–80. custodians of. 72. steps 91. 172n2. 177n40. 119. use of EU-3 nuclear capability: behavior of Iran channels to postpone crisis. 66–68 54–55. limited agreements on.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 216 216 | Index of good faith. 190n74 Iran’s self-image of. 17. See Treaty on the Non. restraint in other proliferators on Iran. justification for. 79. international response to. 81–112. 179n63. discriminatory character of tions against. 175n26. 84 nationalism and. IAEA parallels with Iran’s negotiating approach to. 122. ogy). (NGOs): U. terrorism weapons technology with other support by Iran and. 186n44. 200n42. regional stability structure (See nuclear technol- linked to nuclear issues. goals tions in. 175n26. political impor- ultranationalism and. models for. aspects of. 11–13. 54. 58. 158n22. as inappropriate nuclear hedging. 60 model for Iran’s nuclear program. 123. links with ter- NPT. nuclear proliferation: as continuum. 63 51. 102–8. 17. 65. 134 181n5. tance of.S. influence of style. 6–8. 93. 82. 15. 55. 124. infra- style. 199n35. (NPT) 187n47. 138–39. 126. 44–63. 149n2. 96–97 157n12. tac. fail. 179n63. 177n46. Iran’s missile constraints on. liferation clause. context of. 10–11. 169n45. intelligence esti- nonaligned movement (NAM). dealing with. nongovernmental organizations 186n44. Russian approach . 65–66.S. 53–55. 78. 132–33. 200n42. fuel cycle (See fuel cycle). Revolutionary Guards as North Korea: Agreed Framework. policy options and. enrichment projects (See uranium ure of tactics. enrichment). spoiler tactics in. 77–78. ineffectiveness of U. 80. 4–5. nuclear pro. 140. 71. 153n27. regional and (See nuclear capability). 68–75. nations. priorities for nuclear ambitions of Iran: capabilities containment. 150n10. U. 135. Iran as tipping point for. of. withdrawal from NPT. approach to. 63–80. 46–47. 46. 2–3. cooperation on toward achieving. 54 rogue states. full inconsistencies and late declara. 57. 141–47. EU-3 program and. 3. military options Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for limiting. rorism. 45–46. mates of. obstructionism in.

45. 46. 96 openness of democracies. 95. 66. 155n2. 58–59. 28.S. against. 164n5. technology and. 45. 164n5. 74 pragmatic conservatives. peaceful use vs. 89. 131. 182n9. as Muslim issue. incrementalism in. 21 oil nationalization crisis (1953). verification oil supplies: access to. 172nn74–75. 3. lack of polarization. support for Kashmiri ter- 159n31. Pakistan: exchange of nuclear technol- ture in Iran. 115–16 designs for. 157n15. and reduction in. 93. 41. and. 165n9 objective guarantees. U. 172n75 nuclear weapons: acquisition of petroleum: access to. 8–9.S. Organization of Petroleum Exporting tion. as in. 11. 115–16 of. restrictions as discrimination. 173n8. 163nn2–3. 189n67. Prolif- 150n12. for. Nur. 55–62. Countries (OPEC). Iran–Arab. 164n6. Guards and. Revolutionary Palestine: Iran’s support for. 24. 28–29.S. See rogue states assistance to Iran. 155n3. 12–13. 40–43. See also fuel cycle Perkovich. 135. 100. 45. Iranian. 166n19 defense budget. 63. See Iraq domestic debate over Iran’s right War (2003– ) to. 95. eration Security Initiative and. domestic: effects on nuclear ing. 140 approach to. 163n3. type of regime and pos. 169n44 activities. 73–74. politics. 15. revelation of Iran’s secret rorist attacks on India. Operation Iraqi Freedom. gas NPT and right to. 2–3. sanctions contracts with IAEA countries. 34. Western distrust of Iran ment (2004). 114 Iranian public debate on acquir. 114. hardline. Paris agreement on uranium enrich- 96. derailing of Iran’s mament after. ogy and. 45–46. 163n4 Powell. 98. 37. Parchin (Iran). Iran 84 . policy. as energy diversifica. Iran’s centrifuge weapons program. ogy with rogue states. 150n12. Iranian 178nn47–48. 195n2 149n2. 171n67. 108–12. IAEA technical outlaw states. 8. 87–88. 183n17.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 217 Index | 217 to. 7. 160n39. tight energy market Tehran agreement on. option negotiations. 32. 4. 82–95. 17. 27–36 186nn41–42 polonium. U. verification of. possession vs. 83 nuclear technology: acquisition by Operation Desert Storm: Iraqi disar- Iran. 31. 114. 17 preenrichment of uranium. 173n8. 114. George. 71 session of. 20 accelerated nuclear program. 85. in France’s Pir-Nozen. infrastruc. 69 regarding. 60. Colin. 49. self-sufficiency 131–32. 78 dates on. 24–26. 181n5. relations with. 137. transfer of. contracts with. 35 obstructionism. 69 oil revenues: domestic consumption prevention: as policy response to Iran. Achilles heel. nuclear technol- unacceptability for Iran. 182n14. 14 preemption: as U. IAEA man.

military Iran. linked with 154n31. 4. 134–35. 198n29. U. sea-denial capability. 30. call for diplomacy on Iran’s security. on arrogance of U. 122. 22. exploitation of political Qalibaf. policy of.S. in Iraq. 194n108 putes and. presence. 95. defensive objec- 114. 115–16. on Ameri. 195n3. 116. conver- Al Qaeda: Hezbollah vs. as policy public opinion. outcome of Iraq international status of Iran. on nuclear 9/11 extension of U.S. 108–9 185n33. Iran’s gence of Iran/U.. access and Putin. on tionary Iran as role model for.S.: support for sanc. inevitability liferation enforcement by. 165n9. EU-3 views of. 109–10. 127–30. See diplomacy and deterrence. 137. 31–32 state.S.S. 153n26. 198n27 structural conditions in. 52–54. 88. 52. 135.S. 23. 21. revolu- to U. 181n5. 116. Bennett. military option for. Yevgeni. 161nn46–47 policy shift to democratization. 193nn103–5. competition for influence in. 67. capability and destabilization of. 85. 86. 146.. 85. 156n9. 22. 119. 136. dual containment vs. 10. fear of Shi- ite state in Iraq. Hashemi. 104. mander). sanctions encourag- technology as a right. conception of.S. 40. 123 tors in insecurity. 115. public opinion. 113. U. U. skepticism regarding. U. on 54–55. 157n16 undesirability of Iranian influence reformists: support for nuclear pro. fac- Qatar: U. Pakistan and China not nuclear capability as protection members of. nuclear nuclear issues. regional responses ogy. 114. 119–20. Iraq. 190n74. 116. 40 121. post- 152nn20–21. 21. nonpro. 118.S. tic missile program. 155n39. 168n38. on domes.. of. offering Iranian support to nuclear Iran. 169n47. border dis- 193n99. 199n33. 121. 89. 179n64. as regional gram. Vladimir. Iraq as turn- 198n27. diplomacy effecting. ing point for. interests in cooperation with. 114. 103. War affecting. 94. Mohammad Bager. 135.S. 84. 118. 16. politics and nuclear negotiations. 138. exclusion of Iran regime change: as complement to from regional politics. 168n42 tives.S. 34–35. 27–28. 113–33. Iranian: on nuclear choice. 204n6. U. Ramburg. 182n9 against. in Afghanistan. 76. denial in. on nuclear technol. 117. Iran’s cans bogged down in Iraq. 118. 187n47 regional security. 157n12. 90. ing.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 218 218 | Index Primakov. Western tions and military option against desire for.. 119. also security policies of Iran . 117–22. 120. EU endorsement of. 88–89. bases in. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): 145–47.S. U. 30 instability. 10–11 Iran. ambitions and. Iranian Rafsanjani. 115. spoiling strategy toward Rahim (Revolutionary Guards com.

Mohammed. Russia: alignment with EU-3 initia- 120. 111. 149n2 cians. 135. 164n6. Mohammad. 151n12. 100–101. See also Iran. 117. 66–67. on weapons of mass 169n45. support for tions. 191n79. 75 to Iran. 127. 30. 57.S. 49. technology 108–9. 196n5. . against nuclear prolifer- 174n14. 37. 170n58 49. ment alternatives proposal. 109–10. Iran not typical of.S. on intensification of U. 199n33 195n4. 192n92. 108–12. 51. Safavi. 194nn108–10. on sea-denial capability of Iran. 182n14. 167n22. view of world as hos. 30. 14. David. 32–33. as tools. 108. cerns of. revolutionary values of 15.S. on U. 87 116.S. distrust of Iran’s transfer and. 114. 16. 94. fear of. pub- tactic. 116. Brad. nonproliferation con- Rice. 127. 21. 19. 71. Hasan: on acquisition of evolution. 70. Mohsen. 136. ineffectiveness against chief nuclear negotiator. 2. independent actions of. SCIRI (Supreme Council for the on Iran’s regional ambitions. 143. 87–88. 49 negotiating behavior. 73. 134. training of Iranian techni- Roberts. U. 204n9 Iran’s nuclear technology. 174n11. restrictions on nuclear Iran. Ali Akbar. arms sales to Iran. tile place. on security of revo. Yahya Rahim. strained relations with relations with IAEA. Islamic Republic of Iraq). 157n12. 135 weapons of mass destruction and. tives. 56. 54. destruction. 143. 44. 185n37 as negotiator. 177n46 2–3 Salehi. as. 56. 84 sanctions: economic costs of. Rezai. on Iran tions. session of nuclear weapons. strategic relationship with Iran. 56. 109. 183n17. 120 on Libyan model for Iran. Jackie. 131. Condoleezza. 88–89. 191n80. political role of. enrich- revolutionary states: U. 72 rollback (reversal): as policy response Salimi. 58. Iran’s lack of 38f–39f. 182n10 acceptance of nuclear Iran. Ros-Lehtinen bill (U. on delay as negotiating ation. as custo. 152n22 strategic vs. 87–88. encouraging regime Rowhani. on diplomacy and con. Saidi. on EU-3 role Sanders.).. 83. 110. 42–43. on pos. 178n47.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 219 Index | 219 Revolutionary Guards: aggressive lutionary state. 187n47 fidence building. Saudi Arabia: cooling relations with 156n9. and nuclear ambitions. 114–15. approach to Iran’s nuclear ambi- shift in power to. influence in Iraq. 76. 159n33. 109. 121 right to nuclear technology under security policies of Iran: insecurity NPT. 193n99 rogue states: as enablers of terrorism. dians of nuclear capability.S. 183n17. 106. 169nn45–46. 5. 82. 128. Ahmadinejad. North Korea. 24. on Iran. 150n10. actions of. on Iran’s nuclear ambi- nuclear program. as engagement nuclear technology. 160n39. ues of. lic’s support for. val. on global Sanger.

technology transfer and. 1. 170n60. 136–37. 169n48 SNSC (Supreme National Security Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Council). 7. initial Supreme National Security Council Iran reaction to. 114 self-sufficiency: as justification for Supplementary Act 12938 Presidential nuclear ambitions. 2. See also and. 204n6. 95–96. Shiites: Iran cultivating ties with. 2. 50–51. 1. 20. Iran’s potential exploitation of. 15. 54. U. 11. 15.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 220 220 | Index Iran–Iraq War and. 53. 117. Iranian claims of . 157n15 stay within. 65. 186n39. 2–3 Tajikistan: Iran/Russian cooperation Shamkhani. Ali. full fuel cycle as right of status discrepancy of Iran.S. 20. diffi- Solana. Manhoman. 21 negotiating strategies. 15. discontent Soviet Union. 14 participants. impact on Iran’s Supreme Leader.S. response to. strategic environment of Iran: culture 152n18. IAEA rela- stock market: hardline negotiations tionship to. threat to Iran. 184n28 Sistani. post-9/11 Iranian hostility 165n11. weapons of mass 114 destruction and. 175n26 Sunni Arab nationalism. missile technology as metaphor. Ali strategic environment. in Sundarji. on cooperation against. U. tacti- Shariatmadari. Iran desire to and. 186n42 September 11. 118. 24–26.S. strategic priorities following. 6. 114. Gulf. Javier. U. 153n24. 120 tion and. opposition to nuclear toward. on Taliban: in Afghanistan. 114 and security policy. 116. 12. 14. 152n18. and France. 167n28. 73–74. 37. 17–19. 28. 184n31 culties in tightening. 136. 102–3. against U. 153n24. Kenneth. legitimate and. 2001. 50–51. 156n5 Directive (U.S. as Islamic minority. Iran/Russian missiles as deterrence. 38f Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Akbar. on U. 136 ing. on Iran–Iraq War in. 38f presence in Middle East follow.S. 71. Hussein. 31. negotiating strategies security links to. terrorist attacks: Supreme Council for the Islamic EU position on WMD prolifera. 134 nuclear proliferation and.). Ahmad. military (SNSC). 50–51 Shirzad. 57–58. 21. 14 regional security submarines: Iran’s deployment outside self-deception: exaggerated self. 131 importance of Iran. 135. regional ity. 31. 80. 122. 108. See Khamenei. Iran’s use of proxies Shanghai Cooperative Organization. Krishnaswamy. 37. 31. 1. 122. 16 83–84. Ali. 51–54. 163n2. exploitation of ambigu- issues in. See also Russia with. 21 weapons for Iran. 16. 14. Syria: Iran relations with. since 9/11 attacks. 108. 159n31 theater missile defenses (TMD). 120 Torkan. 146 Singh. 162n52 cal relations with terrorist groups.S. 150n3 Timmerman. Republic of Iraq (SCIRI). terrorism: Iran’s support for. 92.

Iran. lack domestic support for leaving. Iran disrespect uranium enrichment: clandestine for authority of. dual containment as. justification for. reporting vs. 149n5 141–42. unilateral posture of. 95. 98.S. 106–7.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 221 Index | 221 discrimination under. 25–26. See also Iran–U. 105. 84. 104. 50. 178nn47–48 requirements for resolving differ- Turkey: concerns over Iran’s regional ences with Iran. 181n5. matic initiative. Challenges. 4–5. 2. pressure ties. United States foreign policy: creation 163n3. 184n31. 86. 77–78. referral of issues to. 105. 185n43. resumption of research on. EU-3/U. Russian proposal for alterna- Iran. Iran. with U. restraint in dealing with with. peaceful use 115–16. 139.S. Janus-faced nature of. 191n80. change as (See regime change).S. 118. under. 83. regime 182n10. right to nuclear technology nuclear technology. 106. IAEA 86. capability by Iran. 99. 25–26. 5–6. referral of facilities for. UNSC. strategic United Kingdom. suspension of. 86.. 4. nology transfer limits. response to nuclear North Korea. relations reporting obligations to. and Change. Iranian Iran as nation vs. ultranationalism. . 135. See United Nations Security ineffectiveness in dealing with Council (UNSC) North Korea. pressure for limitation of access to nuclear referral of Iran to UNSC. 68. regime type and possession of 63. 93–94. 84. 139. 82. 138. 155n39 priorities following 9/11 attacks. 136 199n33. Res. on fuel cycle for 99. cooling relations to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 93–94. incoherence of tives to. 81. United Nations Secretary General 1. 81. 9–10. 4. 91. policy toward Iran. 98–99. 189n60 for. (UNSC): EU-3 agreement to use of multilateral institutions in. 22. report Iran to. historical distrust of 78. failure to declare activi- olution 1540. 143–45. 91–93. Iran’s quest 104. materials by terrorists. 192n92. 4. 129 shift from regime change to democratization. need for. loopholes in. 111. United Nations Security Council 191n84. 5. 191n86. strategic context of Mid- United Arab Emirates. 189n60. 4. 8. 103–6. 122–23. 90. tive strategy in. 2–3.S. support for EU-3 diplo- High-Level Panel on Threats. negotiations on. 127. Iranian relations 82–85. vs. attitude as cover for weapons program. formal policy vs. tions in Iran negotiations. of international support for tech- Iran’s threats to withdraw from. 153n27. preemp- 17. 15. 122. 20–21. of new Middle East regional 72–73. 42–43. 185n35. 21. 29. posi- Iran to. response influence. toward Iran. 3. 82. regime. 143. 173n8 dle East and. U. 181n1. 90. 67–70. 98. IAEA support for some for referral of Iran to. North Korea’s withdrawal from. nuclear reactor technology order.

missiles. attack on Iraq. Yeltsin. 162n50. 68 weapons technology. 191n86. 86. 108 ing. Weisman. 21 Wohlstetter. 104–5.S. 168n35 Weldon. underestimation zirconium plant (Isfahan). as justifica. 82 Zolgadr (General). weapons of mass destruction free zone 190n74. Albert. technology transfer to terrorists. 57–58. 130 resume. 75. yellowcake. 50–51. 164n6 of Iraq program. 128. 194n111 152n22. 102. 1. threats to (WMDFZ). See weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD) War on Terrorism. 20. See arms sales. 2–3. 68. 172n74 WMD. 5 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): World Trade Organization (WTO). 92 Iran claims of opposition to. 33 tion for U. Boris. Kurt. 51–52. 170nn58–60. 169n46 . 164n6 rogue states’ cooperation regard. Steve. Yazdi. Ali Akbar. 184n28 virtual arsenals. nuclear technology Velayati.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 222 222 | Index 40–41. Taghi Mesbahi.

*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 223 About the Author hahram Chubin is Director of Studies at the Geneva Centre for S Security Policy. 223 . He was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1994 and served as Direc- tor of Regional Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

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