*ch0 - frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page i

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Shahram Chubin

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Washington, D.C.

*ch0 - frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page ii

© 2006 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
202-483-7600, Fax 202-483-1840
www.CarnegieEndowment.org

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional
positions on public policy issues; the views and recommendations presented in this
publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment, its
officers, staff, or trustees.

To order, contact:
Hopkins Fulfillment Service
P.O. Box 50370, Baltimore, MD 21211-4370
1-800-537-5487 or 1-410-516-6956
Fax 1-410-516-6998

Composition by Oakland Street Publishing
Printed by Edwards Brothers, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data
Chubin, Shahram.
Iran's nuclear ambitions / Shahram Chubin.
p. cm.
Summary: “Iranian-born Shahram Chubin narrates the recent history of Iran's nuclear
program and diplomacy, and argues that the central problem is not nuclear technology
but rather Iran's behavior as a revolutionary state with ambitions that collide with the
interests of its neighbors and the West”—Provided by publisher.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-230-1 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-87003-230-5 (pbk.)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-231-8 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-87003-231-3 (cloth)
1. Nuclear weapons—Iran. 2. Iran—Military policy. 3. Nuclear arms control—Iran.
I. Title.

UA853.I7C497 2006
355.02'170955–dc22 2006018183

11 10 09 08 07 06 12345 1st Printing 2006

frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page iii For Nasrin and Nanaz .*ch0 .

*ch0 .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page iv .

. . . . . . . . xii Iranian Nuclear Chronology . . . . . . . . . Domestic Politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Introduction . . . . and Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page v Contents Foreword by Jessica T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 The View from Tehran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 v . . . . 64 5 The International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Acronyms . vii Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mathews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2 Nuclear Energy Rationale. . . 81 6 Iran and Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*ch0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3 Fear of a Nuclear Iran . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Glossary .*ch0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page vi vi | Contents Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 . .223 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. it could menace whose existence Iran does not recognize. A nuclear Iran could be emboldened to foment political unrest throughout the Middle East.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page vii Foreword ran’s nuclear program looms ever larger among international IIsrael. The international commu- nity. threats. if Iran were to succeed in continuing to defy IAEA and. especially in countries with large Shiite minorities. blackmail smaller neighboring states. Moreover. would be exposed as unwilling or unable to enforce vital global rules. UN Security Council demands to come back into compliance with its non-pro- liferation obligations. particularly the UN Security Council. These violations and ongoing Iranian resistance to transparency measures demanded by vii .*ch0 . While Iranian leaders insist their intentions are entirely peace- ful. The world would appear ever more disordered. perhaps. three years of intensive investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (chronicled in twelve agency reports) have failed to resolve the issues arising from nearly two decades of Ira- nian violations of its safeguard commitments. the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime would be gravely undermined. and possibly deter the United States from ful- filling security guarantees to regional states or projecting power throughout the Persian Gulf.

Ahmadinejad reduces Iran’s room for maneuver and makes a difficult issue more intractable. but also suffering legitimacy and economic problems. Iran remains a country of unique complexity and contra- dictions. the domestic factors that determine who makes decisions in Iran and why have largely been ignored in the West. His brand of revolutionary rhetoric and hypernationalism combined with calls for more social justice resonated with a neglected constituency in the country. opinions differ on the manner in which the technology has been pursued and the wisdom of confronting the international community and defying the Security Council. It has a quasi-representative government. claiming pop- ular support. While its members believe Iran should develop nuclear technology as other major powers do. Iranians are fiercely independent and proudly nationalistic. they are divided on the conditions under which they would give up the drive for fuel cycle capabilities that would give Iran a nuclear weapon option. Decision making works by elite consensus in Iran but the elite is not monolithic—it is as segmented as the rest of the society. militant nationalism and revo- lutionary defiance. to seek a “grand bargain.” and to embrace globaliza- tion and act as a “normal. While the international implications of Iran’s nuclear activities have been widely analyzed. . The elite are divided more broadly on their willingness to engage the United States.” non-revolutionary state.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page viii viii | Foreword the IAEA’s board of governors heighten fears that Iran does seek the capability to build nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad harked back to the original principles of the revolution. In fusing two features of contemporary Iran. Subterranean tensions within Iran have intensified since the June 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. A pop- ulist and fundamentalist. united in resisting foreign dictation. That is. But they are not as one in believing that the nuclear issue is the most important issue for the country— most citizens have other priorities.*ch0 . Shahram Chubin’s analysis is the most trenchant English- language treatment to date of how Iran’s domestic dynamics.

and containment. In his view. in the sense of evolu- tionary change driven by domestic forces. The countries negotiating with Iran cannot find the proper mix of isolation and cooperation. and inducement. he argues. if they do not take into account the divisions within Iran and the divergent interests they reflect. Chubin adeptly describes the ambivalence of Western policy that. Germany. . To achieve such a balance. the Euro- pean states and Russia and China must demonstrate a greater willingness to exert stringent political and economic pressure on Iran in cooperation with the United States. preferring embattlement and isolation in order to keep their hold on power. reflecting differences between the United States and France. Understanding this proposition suggests a substantial broadening of Western policy concerns. Chubin argues that the distinction between engaging with Iran and seeking to change its government is false and therefore part of the problem.” constructive engagement.*ch0 . Focusing on the Iranian people and their welfare and human rights is therefore an important ingredient of a successful non-prolifera- tion policy. sanctions. while the United States must show that it is genuinely prepared to establish positive rela- tions with the constitutional government of Iran. and the United Kingdom. He argues forcefully that Iran will be unmoved as long as the international community does not employ a more balanced policy that both neutralizes Iran’s threat and provides incentives for evo- lution and accommodation. It is this element that the Iranian elite fears and resists. and regime change on the other. has been torn between promot- ing “critical dialogue. and worldview shape the country’s decision mak- ing regarding nuclear technology. Opening up Iran by embracing it. engagement is not an alternative to regime change but a precursor and stimulant to it.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page ix Foreword | ix regional interests. pressure and reward. The result is a uniquely well-rounded treatment of the Iranian nuclear challenge. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions integrates this comprehensive analysis with an assessment of the international community’s attempts to bring Iran into compliance with its non- proliferation obligations. on one side. will liberate pent-up dynamics for change.

At the same time. scholars. Mathews President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page x x | Foreword This work is a welcome new baseline from which policy mak- ers. journalists. Iran will not be bul- lied into submitting to policies that do not fit the country’s history. self-image. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions offers insights into how this can be done. and students can acquire deeper under- standing and better ideas for addressing the interests of the Iranian people as well as the international community. Jessica T. the international com- munity’s legitimate interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is enormous and must be vigorously—and intelligently—pursued.*ch0 . and policy prescription. contemporary analysis. It is a model blend of historical knowledge. and interests.

frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xi Acknowledgments am indebted to many colleagues for discussions on this issue over ITony the past years. Thérèse Delpech. which he has made possible. I express my appreciation for making a difficult job more bearable. Paul Stares. and Pal Sidhu. Bob Ein- horn. Vladimir Orlov. Scott Sagan. and Gary Samore. None is responsible for any errors or shortcomings. I am grateful to Paul Clark and especially to Katya Shadrina. The team at Carnegie who edited and tightened the manuscript also have helped the author immeasurably. Ariel Levite. Finally. I am grateful to George Perkovich. For their encouragement I would especially single out Geoff Kemp. who improved the draft with suggestions to make it more readable and guided it to publi- cation. Rob Litwak. They are too numerous to mention but include Cordesman. Harald Muller. xi . Joseph Cirincione.*ch0 . John Simpson. facilitating the completion of the book. To all of the above. who have helped with indispensable research assis- tance.

Germany. Iranian opposition group NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFZ Nuclear-free zone NMD National Missile Defense NNWS Non-nuclear-weapons-state xii . and Russia (also known as the G7+1). Canada.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xii Acronyms AP Additional Protocol AEO Atomic Energy Organization of Iran EU European Union EU-3 Grouping consisting of Great Britain. GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GPS Global positioning system IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ILSA Iran and Libya Sanctions Act IRI Islamic Republic of Iran IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (or Pasdaran) IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies MOK Mujahideen i-Khalq. and Ger- many FAS Federation of Atomic Scientists G-8 Grouping of top industrialized nations of the world: United States. UK.*ch0 . Japan. France. France. Italy.

*ch0 . derived from the German World War II V-2 rocket SNSC Supreme National Security Council UCF Uranium Conversion Facility UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission WMD Weapons of mass destruction WMDFZ Weapons of mass destruction free zone WTO World Trade Organization .frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xiii Acronyms | xiii NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NW Nuclear weapon NWS Nuclear weapons state P-5 Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council PSI Proliferation Security Initiative SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq SCUD Ballistic missile.

xiv .S. allegations of Iran aspiring to develop a nuclear weapons capability. September 1 Russian technicians start construction of nuclear reactor at Bushire. amid strong U.” reject- ing U. December 13 U. 2003 January 10 North Korea withdraws from the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). and Iran is a signatory to the [nuclear] Non- proliferation Treaty and does not seek nuclear arms.” releasing satellite images of sites at Natanz and Arak.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xiv Iranian Nuclear Chronology 2002 August 14 Alireza Jafarzadeh of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reveals to IAEA that Tehran not only possesses its declared nuclear power plant at Bushire but also two undis- closed nuclear facilities: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. Iran notifies the IAEA that it is building new facilities as a step toward developing a nuclear fuel cycle. objections.*ch0 .S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher con- cludes that Iran is “actively working to develop nuclear- weapons capability. December 18 Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami states that “Iran is work- ing under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.S.

although admitting to uranium conversion experiments in the 1990s. February 13 U. Plants are to be set up at Isfahan and Kashan for this purpose. Al Baradei reports being “taken aback” by the advanced state of Iran’s program. April 24 Al Baradei urges Iran to sign Additional Protocol allowing inspections of undeclared suspected nuclear sites.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xv Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xv February 9 President Khatami announces Iran’s intent to exploit uranium mines in Savand region. following several postponements of such a visit by the Iranians. suggests it must have acquired contaminated centrifuge components .S. June 19 IAEA reports that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the report- ing of nuclear material. March 11 Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) Deputy Director Assadollah Saburi announces Iran’s opposition to signing Additional Protocols to the NPT that would allow unan- nounced inspections due to already imposed sanctions. February 25 IAEA Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei inspects Natanz and Arak. March 20 U. invasion of Iraq commences.” although it stops short of referring Iran to the UN Security Council. the subsequent processing and use of the material and the declaration of facilities where the mate- rial was stored and processed. Iran issues a report about construc- tion of a heavy water production plant at Arak. A readiness to sign if sanctions are dropped is expressed. despite agreement for Russia to provide all necessary uranium fuel for lifetime of Bushire reactor. Secretary of State Colin Powell warns Congress to be prepared for a “fairly long-term commitment” in Iraq. Iran.*ch0 . Khatami asks: “Why do countries possessing such [civilian atomic energy] technology not respect the principles of the non- proliferation treaty by not helping us acquire it?” June 6 IAEA issues report to thirty-five member countries on nuclear safeguards in Iran. IAEA requires Iran to produce a report divulging all nuclear and nuclear-related capabilities and technology with a complete chronology. describing breaches of NPT on several accounts by Iran.S. Iran agrees to discuss additional protocols in future negotiations. with ambitions for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. in preparation for the IAEA Board of Gov- ernors meeting in Vienna. IAEA report mentions several finds of highly enriched uranium in Iranian centrifuges at various sites. Inspection team detects breach of NPT.

according to Hasan Rowhani. and cessation of uranium enrich- ment–related activities by October 31. Secre- tary General of Iran’s Supreme National Secretary Council. United States disagrees. October 10 Hasan Rowhani is officially appointed as head of Iranian nuclear “dossier. allowing for unannounced inspections.. November 10 IAEA report issued suggesting that despite clear breaches to its obligations according to the safeguard agreements. nor will be. sparking new investigations into Iran’s foreign connections. all requirements and outstanding [IAEA] issues.*ch0 .” U.” October 21 France.” Resolution includes trigger mechanism for immediate IAEA meeting if “any further serious Iranian failures come to light.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is “very satisfied” with the resolution. . albeit temporarily. November 29 Iran has “voluntarily and temporarily” suspended uranium enrichment program. which is welcomed by the IAEA. He adds that the program was “not in question and never has been.. November 26 IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted “strongly deploring Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement.” November 21 Iran proposes signing the Additional Protocol to the NPT. September 12 IAEA resolution calls for Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA investigations.” December 18 Iran signs the Additional Protocol to NPT. transparency.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xvi xvi | Iranian Nuclear Chronology from abroad. Iran also agrees to “address and resolve . and Germany (EU-3) broker deal with Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. call- ing IAEA conclusion “impossible to believe. United States announces that this resolution is Iran’s last chance before referral to UN Security Council.” as well as sign and ratify addi- tional protocols (known as Tehran agreement). Great Britain. there is no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program follow- ing Iranian nuclear confessions. although its par- liament needs to ratify the protocol before it enters into legal force.

He accuses the EU-3 of violating the October 2003 agreement. urging a more forthcoming approach by Iran. Pakistan suspected of providing both centrifuge and nuclear weapon designs to Iran. June 18 IAEA resolution adopted condemning Iran’s failure to comply with inspectors. sanctions. March 9 NCRI’s former spokesman Alireza Jafarzadeh alleges that Ira- nian leaders have recently ruled on acquiring nuclear weapons “at all costs. August 17 U. clarifies that Iranian advances toward nuclear fuel cycle technology were an attempt to overcome U. effectively canceling the October 2003 agreement. He adds that Iran is in favor of banning WMDs. February 24 Al Baradei issues report noting Iran’s continuing failure to resolve IAEA’s concerns about its nuclear program. April 6 Al Baradei and Iran agree on joint plan to resolve IAEA con- cerns by disclosing information about its centrifuge program by the end of April. Iran would decide on whether to resume its uranium enrichment pro- gram. Under Secretary of State John Bolton claims that Iran admitted to the EU-3 that it was able to enrich enough ura- nium within a year to produce a nuclear weapon.” September 20 IAEA requests suspension of Iranian uranium enrichment program at the IAEA’s 48th General Conference. August 31 Iranian Information Minister Ali Younesi announces the arrest of several Mujahideen i-Khalq (MOK) members for “transfer- ring Iran’s nuclear information (out of the country). . ensuring self- sufficiency.S. March 13 Iran bans inspectors in protest of IAEA resolution condemn- ing Iranian failure to disclose all its nuclear activities. June 24 Iran informs the EU-3 of its intention to resume its uranium enrichment program.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xvii Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xvii 2004 February 12 Previously undisclosed centrifuge designs found by IAEA.*ch0 . Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Hasan Rowhani responds by informing the IAEA that in the following days. following AQ Kahn admissions about proliferation ring on February 4.” by the end of 2005 at the latest. February 13 Hamid Reza Asefi. May 10 Nuclear site at Lavizan that was under investigation by the IAEA is destroyed by Tehran.S. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman.

Iran will never give up its rights to peaceful nuclear technology. Visit limited to one of four areas identified to be of interest.S. although highlights that no new evi- dence of illicit activities has come forth. According to Hasan Rowhani. March 1 Al Baradei expresses concern about Iran not fully cooperat- ing with inspections. August 3 Official U.” suspending uranium enrichment and related activities following talks with the EU- 3. 2005 January 6 Iran agrees to allow IAEA visit to Parchin military site. July 26 President Khatami issues statement declaring Iran’s intent to resume part of its nuclear fuel cycle program.*ch0 .S. block on Iranian World Trade Organization membership as an incentive for Iran to comply. Iran is warned of being referred to the Security Council if this occurs. February 10 North Korea admits to having nuclear weapons. study puts Iranian nuclear capability a decade away. follow- ing transparency issues. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elected to succeed him. April 30 President Khatami states that a complete halt of uranium enrichment is unacceptable. Iranians agree to suspend ura- nium processing in lieu of new European proposal due at the end of July. although he is willing to nego- tiate or compromise. February 9 According to President Khatami. offering to lift U. May 24 EU-3 officials meet with Iranian counterparts in Geneva.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xviii xviii | Iranian Nuclear Chronology November 15 Iran agrees to the “Paris agreement. August 2 President Khatami steps down. this is done “to improve relations with the West. Iran is reported to still be in compliance with the Paris agreement. pending Iranian intentions of recommencing uranium pro- cessing at Isfahan.” Al Baradei reports to the IAEA that all known Iranian nuclear material has been accounted for but added that the IAEA cannot rule out any undeclared material. March 12 Bush backs EU negotiations with Iran. . regardless of European proposals.

September 6 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) dossier on Iran estimates Iran is several years away from a nuclear capa- bility. October 13 Iran agrees to resume talks with EU-3. August 23 Independent research reveals that weapons-grade uranium found mid-2003 was due to contaminated equipment from Pakistan. Europe cancels further negotiations. stating it does not meet Iran’s minimum expectations.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xix Iranian Nuclear Chronology | xix August 5 Europe proposes economic and political cooperation if Tehran relinquishes nuclear fuel aspirations.” November 24 IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting addresses verification of Iran’s nuclear program. August 6 Iran rejects European proposal. unless measures are taken to increase transparency measure.*ch0 . September 15 President Ahmadinejad reaffirms Iran’s right to nuclear energy at a speech held at the UN 60th Session. August 11 IAEA adopts resolution expressing concern over Iran’s August 1 notification to the IAEA of resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan. and reconsider heavy water research reactor. September 20 North Korea agrees to give up its “existing nuclear weapons” and return to the NPT after talks with the United States. August 8 Isfahan facility resumes uranium processing. The United States dismisses this report. given technical problems. September 24 IAEA resolution warning Iran of referral to the UN Security Council. September 2 IAEA Board of Governors reports progress over Iranian nuclear issue but calls for improved transparency and coop- eration from Iran. not Iranian activities. August 15 President Ahmadinejad appoints Ali Larijani to replace Hasan Rowhani as head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Coun- cil. reestablish suspension of enrichment-related activ- ity. August 27 Larijani states that Iran respects its commitment to the NPT. Agency reiterates it cannot be sure there are no undeclared sites. North Korea announces plans to commence a peaceful nuclear energy program. September 25 Iran rejects IAEA resolution. . October 26 Iranian President Ahmadinejad declares in a speech that Israel should be “wiped off the map.

Russia.frontmatter 7/28/06 9:24 AM Page xx xx | Iranian Nuclear Chronology 2006 January 3 Iran informs IAEA of its intent to resume research and devel- opment of peaceful nuclear technology. calling for IAEA Director-General to refer Iran to the UN Security Coun- cil with a 27 to 3 majority (5 abstentions). February 4 Resolution adopted by IAEA Board of Governors. January 25 Hamas wins Palestinian parliamentary election. . China. and the United States). March 8 IAEA submits report on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. January 10 Iran removes IAEA seals at enrichment sites. March 1 Negotiations on Russian proposal begin in Moscow. February 2 IAEA Board of Governors meets to consider a draft resolution calling for Iran to be referred to the Security Council (sup- ported by EU-3. January 16 P-5 (permanent five members of the UN Security Council) meets in London to discuss the Iranian nuclear crisis. February 9 U. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accuses Iran and Syria of inciting violence over the Mohammad cartoon con- troversy.*ch0 . January 18 IAEA decides to hold a special meeting on Iran on February 2.S. February 17 Iranian foreign minister calls for the United Kingdom to leave Iraq.

Iran’s drive for specific nuclear technology that could be used for weapons purposes raises a number of questions for the interna- tional community. The more specific issues relate to Iran’s particu- lar case as a revolutionary state. it appears doubly so when faced by the threat of a revolutionary Iran seeking a nuclear capability.*ch0 .introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 1 Introduction n its twenty-seventh year. Iran’s nuclear aspirations appear incompatible with the maintenance of the current regional system. it is not clear whether the government Isystem of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) still rejects the international and seeks to overturn it. In the U. 2001. accused of sponsoring terrorism and located in a sensitive geopolitical zone that has seen three wars in the past decade and a half.S. The stakes are compounded because since September 11. the relationship between terrorism and proliferation—and rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—has become the foremost security issue. This question is posed starkly with respect to Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability. or is striving to improve its posi- tion within the system. The Middle East in particular and the global order more generally are thus challenged by Iran’s quest for nuclear status. Important as it is to keep the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) intact. view 1 . Given the nature of the Iranian regime and its past behavior.

terrorism. The broader issues include the possible breakdown of the non- proliferation regime through further proliferation and recognition that the NPT may allow a state to get perilously close to acquiring nuclear weapons. but at this juncture terror- ism was still seen as largely a law enforcement issue rather than a priority—a nuisance rather than a strategic threat. Now the outlaw states became potential enablers of terrorist groups and potential suppli- ers of WMD to those who sought to inflict the maximum destruc- tion on the United States. These same states sponsored terrorism as well. Particularly in the Middle East. but the possibility that it might be married to WMD elevated it to a priority consistent with the risks it posed as an existential threat.S. Global Context The 9/11 attacks on the United States changed U. ter- rorism was transformed into a major threat. was followed by a determination to prepare against any future surprise.S. based on the trauma of 9/11. After 9/11. the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq attest to the fact that pro- liferation. strategic prior- ities. were now clearly assimilated into the War on Terror- ism. response has been forward defense. the U. These states. preemption. North Korea and Pakistan had . The United States’ dark view of the world. and regime change. The need to plug gaps in the treaty and to strengthen enforcement poses enormous political problems in the international system. dubbed the “axis of evil” in January 2002. the “nexus of extremism and technology” suggests massive-scale danger from actors that may not be deterrable. and the role of rogue states constitute threats that must be dealt with urgently and firmly. It soon became apparent that the rogue states had indeed coop- erated in the area of WMD. In the 1990s non-proliferation and its link to rogue states had been identified as a priority in the post–Cold War era. In this view.*ch0 .introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 2 2 | Introduction at least.

at best. Buttressed by record oil rev- enues and leverage afforded it by a tight oil market.5 In dealing actively with the proliferation threat posed by Iraq in 2003. and in the IAEA it has used the nonaligned states’ sympathy to slip out of . The United States reacted by hardening its policy. It saw no need to get permission from others to see to its own defense or to require weak and elusive multilateral consensus in order to act.*ch0 .4 Therefore. And it is this current malaise that has led to the invocation of the image of a cascade of proliferation if current trends persist. the United States has gone from a high point of regional power to a position in which its credibility is damaged and it is embroiled in an internal conflict whose outcome looks. could further proliferation unconstrained by the legal instruments that had been devised for states. the political context has become less conducive to effective and legitimate (that is. The regional context has therefore improved for Iran since 2003. collective) responses. Iran has played on these divisions to cover its programs. Iran has acted more confidently. albeit unofficially through the AQ Khan network.3 This move away from a rules-based global order underlies the deeper crisis of legitimacy the NPT regime faces. Pakistan had provided. Iran has challenged the United States’ creation of a new regional order. unsure. The United States thus moved away from the reciprocal obligation that had been the core of the WMD order in the Cold War era toward a hegemonic order based on coercion rather than consensus. technology and weapons designs to Libya and Iran.2 Now nonstate actors. whether motivated by profit or ideology. As the military threat has passed. while the threat posed by nuclear proliferation has increased because of its possible link with terrorism and because of the diffusion of technologies and knowledge.1 What was referred to as a “nuclear Wal-Mart” reflected the global diffusion of technology and the porousness of borders in a globalized world. North Korea and Iran had cooperated in the devel- opment of missile and possibly nuclear technology as well.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 3 Introduction | 3 exchanged expertise on nuclear and missile technology and weapons plans. In Iraq it has become a clear influence.

cooperating with the IAEA. Negotiations have focused on what would constitute reassurance for the West and still enable Iran to access the technology. measured policy. The United States and the EU-3 seek to constrain Iran’s access to this technology or to induce it to forgo it in exchange for privileged access to less sensitive technol- ogy.*ch0 . France. the West has concluded that it cannot give Iran the ben- efit of the doubt. Assuming that Iran’s technical capabilities remain limited in the next five years. confident in its ability to deflect or manage a referral to the UN Security Council (UNSC).introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 4 4 | Introduction constraints imposed by the EU-3 (Great Britain. Negotiations have revolved around this issue. and brandish- ing a military option (but refusing direct involvement) does not amount to a policy. and gearing its acts to limited measures insufficient to justify a major punitive response. Given Iran’s past record of nondeclaration of activities and dissimulation and the accompanying distrust of Iran’s intentions. with incomplete results. avoiding major provocations. But Iran insists on full fuel cycle autonomy. the issue will remain whether Iran will persist in its attempt to acquire a nuclear capability by stages. Despite concern about terrorism and non-proliferation and ful- minations about the nature of the regime in Tehran. and Ger- many) negotiations. which would put it within months (if not days) of a weapons capability. if selectively. The United States has yet to adopt a formal policy toward Iran. Iran also encour- . Iran has sought to minimize its exposure to concerted international pressure. The basic issue is one of trust: The West does not trust Iran with the technology. Washington has an attitude rather than a considered. The key issue concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions is Tehran’s quest for the full fuel cycle. and Iran refuses to relinquish it. insistence on referral to the Security Council (without a strategy once there). Iran has sought to appeal to the developing states by depicting pressures on it as discriminatory and a denial of its rights under the NPT. Luke- warm support for European diplomacy. Since August 2005 Tehran has moved to con- solidate its mastery of the fuel cycle. By for- mally.

The spread of nuclear tech- nology.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 5 Introduction | 5 ages and cultivates divisions among the major powers to continue on its course.”7 This sentiment was echoed by U.S. Hurricane Katrina. Without diversion and “with- out plainly violating their agreement. Tehran counts on U.S. The difficulty posed by states seeking technology that brings them close to a bomb is not simply one of evil outlaw states. it believes that the out- come of such a referral is uncertain. and second. is willing to pay to get close to a nuclear weapons capability.”6 It is no wonder that thirty years later President Bush can remark that “we must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under cover of civilian nuclear programs. legitimate and even encouraged by NPT rules.*ch0 . at once promoting nuclear technol- ogy (Article IV) and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. can bring states close to a weapons capability. either secretly or with explanations that cannot withstand scrutiny. Afghanistan.. By demonstrating division the Security Council would signal its impotence but a united council might only be possible by showing a different form of weakness— watering down its demands. distraction (Iraq. In the absence of a smoking gun and its expressions of willingness to negotiate. The problem. EU referenda) to derail any momentum for sanctions. We dare not look the other way. such as Iran. Iran expects the incentives for referral to the Security Council to be reduced for two reasons: first. as Albert Wohlstetter remarked in the 1970s. its threats to react strongly if the matter is referred to the Security Council have raised the stakes considerably. terrorism. We must . energy prices. is that the technologies are essentially the same. Iran. The NPT was always Janus-faced. officials in the 2005 NPT review conference with specific reference to Iran: “Some countries. It remains unclear what cost the major powers are willing to impose on a suspect proliferant and what price that state. and elections) and EU divisions and preoccupations (elections..” states “can come within hours of a bomb. are seeking these facilities (uranium enrichment or plutonium repro- cessing plants). immigration and economies..

However. what its motivations are.*ch0 . which may indicate the revival of nuclear power. as well as analyze international responses. and on what criteria?9 The problem is compounded by the possibility of future energy crises and environ- mental concerns about global warming. I assume this issue will not be neatly solved in the near future and . I am principally concerned with what Iran is doing. The purpose of this study is first to assess the motivations driv- ing Iran toward a nuclear capability all but indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. how it is going about it. who is included and who excluded.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 6 6 | Introduction close the loopholes in the Treaty that allow the unnecessary spread of such technologies. I discuss reasons why this should be of concern for the international community and assess Iran’s tactics in the cur- rent negotiations and its intentions. there is the issue of drawing the line: Who is to decide where the line on such technologies is drawn. and adopting the language of a victimized non-nuclear-weapons- state simply seeking its due under Article IV of the treaty—Iran tests both the treaty and its supporters.”8 The problem is that tightening the treaty without renegotiating it will be difficult. and what it hopes to achieve. If ad hoc approaches are taken. not least in light of the discontent with the treaty on the part of many non-nuclear-weapons states. for example. Iran’s ambiguous quest for nuclear technology thus unfolds at a time and place of great sensitivity. Iran’s achievement of a nuclear capability would increase its confidence and reinforce its tendency to block Western initiatives and seek a more prominent regional role. devising an effective policy requires understanding Iran’s ambitions and perspectives. A policy to deal with Iran’s specific motives and circumstances should not entail rewarding proliferation or derogating from the provisions of the NPT. Necessarily the study is based on analysis and inference involving a discussion. of negotiating style and tactics. By seeking this technology— while claiming formal adherence to the treaty. using diplomacy. Increased interest in nuclear power would make controlling technologies more controversial politically.

Tehran sought to revive the project. Reliance on Soviet and later Chinese assistance became features of Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s. When Germany. however. especially with regard to self-reliance and pre- . Iran’s view of nuclear weapons was influenced by the lessons of its war with Iraq.*ch0 . arguments.10 The accelerated drive came at a time when Iraq was tightly contained. Despite the fact that the unfin- ished Bushire reactor had been abandoned by German technicians and bombed by Iraq. The argu- ment for this at that time was based on the costs already sunk in the project. and tactics will continue to be essential. the Islamic Republic of Iran rediscovered an interest in nuclear power in the midst of the Iran–Iraq war (1986). This changed after 1999. whatever new developments may occur in the next few years. Iran turned to the Soviet Union.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 7 Introduction | 7 that a good understanding of motivations. By this time Iran had articulated a new and ambitious long-term program for nuclear power plants. when the nuclear effort was intensified. declined to resume construction and finish the project. The untested idea was to try to marry Soviet technol- ogy and nuclear core to the existing German-built foundations. with the stated rationale of energy self-sufficiency. With declining oil income (in real terms after 1986). Iran could not give the program the highest priority. and when the Clinton administration was making overtures for normalization to Tehran. Setting the Stage: The Background to Iran’s Nuclear Program After explicitly targeting and criticizing the Shah’s nuclear program as an example of the monarchy’s corrupt taste for megaprojects. at the behest of the United States. It is now known that already in the 1980s Iran had been in contact with the AQ Khan network to give its sputtering program new impetus. and extensive war and reconstruction expenses. a rapidly increasing population. when reformists were in office in Iran. The program hitherto had therefore been characterized by persistence and incrementalism.

Put on the defensive by these revelations (occurring when the United States was planning the Iraq war). The con- tinuing impulse for that program stemmed from a prudent though vague desire to hedge against an uncertain future. Tehran sought an accommodation with the EU-3. Iran had sought to create a fait accompli on the Korean model but was derailed by the public revelations of its undeclared activities in mid-2002.*ch0 . And along the way it picked up domestic interest groups. But Saddam Hussein’s nuclear threat had essentially been eliminated or contained by 1991. as the Islamic revolution lost its luster for its supporters at home and abroad. efforts to halt the transfer of tech- nology to Iran’s allegedly civil nuclear program met with only mixed receptivity in Moscow and Beijing.S. Iran accelerated its nuclear program in 1999. which showed that Iran had built undeclared fuel cycle facilities. accusations about its nuclear program stemmed from a bilateral feud with Tehran appeared plausible to some. The undeclared drive for enrichment or a nuclear capability or option within the treaty was upset by the revelations of mid-2002. U. In a sense the nuclear program was in search of a ration- ale. Iran’s nuclear program was initially influenced by security issues. well before Iran’s program took off. which evolved from insurance against Iraq to energy indepen- dence and from regional status to deterrence against the United States. whose economic rationale was debatable and whose value for producing nuclear weapons was great. In the 1990s. a point around which to rally nationalist opinion and to legitimate the regime. which included constraints on its . Close observation of the international reaction to the North Korean case in 1994 yielded yet another lesson. the nuclear option appeared to offer a way out. Throughout the 1990s Iran’s insistence that U.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 8 8 | Introduction paredness (hedging against surprise). Nothing in the Security Council response to that crisis suggested inordinate risks associated with developing nuclear weapons or any inevitability about a united front in that chamber. This brief synopsis of Iran’s nuclear program suggests the follow- ing. Reactivated in the midst of war under adverse conditions.S.

the Tehran agreement of September 2003 was followed by the Paris agreement of Novem- ber 2004. suspending enrichment (for the duration of negotiations) and signing and implementing the AP. In June 2005 Iran served notice of its intention to resume . The additional distrust created by the negotiations themselves were a result of Iran’s negotiating style and tactics. Revelations of Iran’s activities saw the IAEA ener- gized and its Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei visit Tehran in February 2003.S. Under pressure and the threat of refer- ral (and possible U. the negotia- tions succeeded only in exacerbating suspicions. Iran cooperated with the agency but remained adamant about resuming enrichment and maintain- ing opacity about some aspects of its program. Iran accepted an agreement with the EU-3 in Tehran. Tehran sought to have its relations with the agency normalized and its nuclear file speedily dropped. Iran thus moved away from reassuring the international community on its program to a defiant assertion of its rights. When Iran sought to define its rights to include enrichment-related activities deemed suspended by its negotiating partners. It took two years before Tehran regained its confidence to break free from the constraints it had accepted in September 2003. The sketch that follows underscores the negotiations’ principal stages and results (see chronology for a complete list of key events in the timeline). Iran’s negotiations with the EU-3 (and through them the international community and IAEA) proved counterproductive. military action). In return.*ch0 . which closed any loopholes about enrichment-related activities. In the two years between September 2003 and August 2005. In September the IAEA’s Board of Governors called on Iran to ensure full compliance with the safeguard agreement by taking all necessary acts by the end of October 2003. Inspections followed. Iran was told to suspend all further enrichment activities and to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol (AP) for enhanced inspections.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 9 Introduction | 9 activities. Iran acted as if it were a victim rather than a state found in flagrant dereliction of its commitments. Intended to find a balance between the necessity of reassuring others of the peaceful nature of its activities and its ambitions for a nuclear program.

but the nature of the regime in Tehran and its behavior and orien- tation that give the threat a world-historical dimension. would be the object of less concern. Iranian Challenge An Iranian nuclear capability is primarily an issue about Iran and the Middle East regional order. and less bent on cre- ating a different regional order would certainly be less threatening. Shrugging off progressively stronger resolutions from the IAEA threatening referral to the UNSC in the autumn. Therefore. dramatically destabilizing the region. where it is now being considered. A different regime. A nuclear capability would also be an immediate guarantee against forcible regime change. The nature of the regime in Iran and its behavior animate special concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The agency decided to refer Iran’s case to the Security Council in March 2006. It rejected a broad incentives package pro- posed by the European states and resumed its activities in August of that year. power and Western influence in the Middle East. less aggressive toward Israel. or an Iran pursuing more moderate goals in the region. A nuclear Iran would be a dangerous. even if it were pursuing the same nuclear capabilities.*ch0 . Iran resumed enrichment research in January 2006. A nuclear capability would give Iran the confidence to obstruct and challenge U.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 10 10 | Introduction conversion activities. An Iran less hos- tile to the West. Moreover. the new Iranian government adopted a more belligerent tone. destabilizing competitor in a sensitive geopolitical area. a secular democratic one. The conjunction of a nuclear-capable Iran and a weakened. disintegrating Iraq under Iranian influence would com- pound the problem.11 . This study argues that it is not Iran’s acqui- sition of sensitive technologies per se that is of special concern. notwithstanding the enormous impact on the NPT regime.S. the focus on Iran’s nuclear capabilities should not obscure the primary concern: Iran’s regional policies. would not be perceived the same way as Tehran is today. A different Iran.

Chinese.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 11 Introduction | 11 This means that the discussion regarding Iran’s nuclear ambi- tions is at times a discussion of the nature of the Iranian regime and raises the question of whether that regime is likely either to be replaced soon or to change its behavior to an appreciable extent.12 Iran seeks technology related to nuclear weapons and. the motives for investing in a nuclear option stem more from political than security imperatives. Iran uses discontent with the NPT and anti-Americanism in the Middle East to pursue its goals. but in extremis it has no hes- itancy in tempering its ambitions (as in 2002–2003). and Indian interest and indulgence in respect to some of its ambitions (though not necessarily to its preferred spoiler role). While the security rationale has been shifting. This is important in practical terms because . assuming the absence of a large-scale clandestine program. Iran has not yet had to choose between regime maintenance and its regional policies. by determination rather than urgency. And as a major oil and gas supplier located at the cross- roads of the Caspian and the Persian Gulf and the Arab and Asian subcontinent. Iran is without a significant strategic partner or dependable ally. Tehran sees the extension of its influence as an integral part of the regime’s legitimacy. mobilizing diplo- matic coalitions for sanctions. even if its aims have been unclear. and countering its regional initiatives are thus much harder than in the case of countries like North Korea (or Libya). which suits its particular brand of assertive defiance and opportunism. thus generalizing its case and strengthening its diplomacy. Iran is not without potential assets. still has not made a definitive or irreversible decision to acquire nuclear weapons as opposed to an option.*ch0 . the political motive has remained unvarying and fixed. As the absence of a crash program would suggest. Blocking Iran’s access to technology. Tehran can rely on Russian. Iran has invested in its nuclear infrastructure for nearly two decades. Iran’s size and weight make it a more formidable rival than other states identified as pro- liferants. It is thus obliged to pursue its goals alone. The impulse behind the pro- gram has been persistent. The program has been marked by persistence and incre- mentalism.

*ch0 . and a bargaining card. experiences. There is thus still time for an effective international reaction before Iran reaches the techno- logical point of no return of self-sufficiency in its nuclear program. Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability (for “nonweaponized deter- rence”) can be understood by reference to certain key goals: a deter- rent (regime maintenance). The Iranians see it—and the issue of trust and confidence—as a two-way street of reciprocity and respect. whether there exist significant clandestine facilities. while intentions are harder to assess. Disentangling fact from claim and argument from artifice is not easy.introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 12 12 | Introduction it signals that Iran seeks to stay within the treaty—as much for the technical cooperation it needs as for the vindication of its image as a respectable (as opposed to rogue) state. equality. Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability by stealth is not surprising in a region where transparency is not a part of the culture and where opacity and dissimulation are the norm. the nuclear issue is one of symbolism. dependence on foreign suppliers. It is easier to argue that Iran seeks a capability than to assert that this decision has been made definitively. no matter what the cost. and so on. and what time frame this implies. The argument presented here is that while . Above all. It is also diffi- cult to be sure whether the nuclear program has become self- sufficient. an instrument for regional influence. equality of treatment. together with what have become enshrined as semisacrosanct “principles of the revolution. a nationalist card for regime legitimation. reflect- ing Iran’s coming of age as an important power.” inform its nuclear policy as well as its public discourse: independence. and worldviews. Grappling with Iran’s aims needs a reconstruction of motives. The formative experience of the IRI with international politics was in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic Republic when it was challenged by Iraq. Finally it is difficult to be certain whether the decision has been made to acquire nuclear weapons or an “option” short of that. and nondiscrimination. The nuclear question is particu- larly notable for raising all of these issues in terms of access to tech- nology. The lessons it learned from that hard and bitter war.

Iran’s relations with the IAEA and negotiations with the EU-3 since the 2003–2005 period can be characterized as defensive and thereafter as self-confident and assertive. They see the regional balance of power since 2004 and the diplomatic balance of power since 2005 as having increasingly turned in their favor. the motives impelling it to do so and the implications of its achievement become more important. the program is pursued according to what the traffic will bear.*ch0 .” with no irreversible decisions taken and these sensitive to the costs asso- ciated with proceeding. .introduction 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 13 Introduction | 13 Iran has been persistent. it has also been “playing it by ear. Iran’s leaders have antennas very sensitive to the relative balance of power and what they can get away with. As Iran pursues its drive for a nuclear capability. these questions will be addressed throughout this volume. However. In addition there is no strategic urgency arguing for a nuclear weapon as opposed to an option.

*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 14 1 The View from Tehran evolutionary states see the world as a hostile place and tend to R act to make it so. the United States. Normal- ization and routinization of foreign policy necessitates jettisoning revolutionary claims. which are believed to be an intrinsic part of the regime’s legitimacy. The revolutionary reflex competes with a detached pragmatism and often subverts it. A fundamental ambivalence characterizes such states.2 14 . In Iran’s case. They alternately feel impelled to spread their message but feel surrounded by hostile states. Iran has exchanged a relatively tolerable strategic environment. they veer between overcon- fidence and insecurity. The United States figures centrally in Iran’s threat perceptions because Iranians believe that the United States has never reconciled itself to revolutionary Islamic Iran and misses no opportunity to deny it its rightful role and to weaken it. in which Saddam’s Iraq was contained and Taliban Afghanistan was marginalized. Iran’s sense of frustra- tion at being blocked regionally stems as much from its sense of “status discrepancy” as from objective conditions.1 Since September 2001. due as much to its worldview as to its response to the strategic environment. the default position in its for- eign policy has been one of obstructionism. for a new context in which Iran is literally encircled by its old nemesis.

neither state wishes to see Iran acquire nuclear weapons or to have to choose between relations with Tehran and Washington. however. As a non-Arab Shiite state. as the relationship with Syria underlines. With Turkey and Pakistan.4 .3 How far Iran can play on resentment of U. Like Russia. Both states seek to keep the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from establishing a presence in the broader region and are committed to reversing it. but it does not extend to encourag- ing Tehran in the direction of nuclear weapons.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 15 The View from Tehran | 15 Iran lies at a natural crossroads between the Caspian and the Gulf and the Arab world and the subcontinent. Russia) that has held: In exchange for Iranian restraint and stabilization of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran made a Faustian bargain with the Soviet Union (and its successor. and they are set to become more important strategically in the next decade. Iran lacks a natural constituency. but it has been unable to translate its geopolitical assets into political advantage. Iran’s regional relations are otherwise unremarkable. and coop- eration in Tajikistan. policies to encourage a new multipolarity remains to be seen. Afghanistan under the Taliban.S. Iran sees India and China as “rising Asia” and part of its strategy of looking east as a counterweight to offset dependence on Europe and the United States. and Nagorny Karabakh is evidence of this. Iran also lacks dependable friends or strategic partners. posing no threat to Iran even if they are not characterized by uniform warmth and close cooperation. Iran’s relations with these states are growing. either regionally or in the wider Muslim world (Shiites are a minority in Islam). Tehran would gain access to Russian technology and arms. especially in the area of energy. Nor is Iran in any significant multilateral regional institution such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). nor does it out- weigh Russia’s continuing imperative of maintaining good working relations with the United States. Iran retains nor- mal relations without any acute bilateral sources of dispute. Moscow considers Iran an important state and strategic partner. This tacit opposition to the West gives Iran a certain weight in Russian calculations.

retreat would be not without risks.. the reverse side of U.5 If anything. The one exception—U. without which no regional policy can be implemented.S. without friends or influence.6 It seeks to do so from a position of strength and by exploiting its leverage in the region. . not the reverse. although it may be the reason why Iran continues to insist on it in the face of interna- tional opposition. Iran depicts Israel as illegitimate. Iran’s strategic environment does not create the insecurity driving Iran’s nuclear program. The principal threat arises from the possibility that the U. which is driven more by frustration over status and the ambition to be taken more seriously and to play a larger.S. But with this benign scenario from Tehran’s perspective would come problems—the risk of Iraq’s disintegration. encirclement in the region is U.7 Therefore.S. which remains suspicious of Iran’s ambitions.. Further afield. which pro- vides Iran with opportunities. Iran’s neighbors feel threatened. withdrawal with its reputation compromised and inclination to pursue forward defense reduced.S. This scenario will hinge on the out- come of the current struggle in Iraq. threats of regime change since 2002—does not account for the start of the nuclear program or its persistence.”8 To conclude. As former defense minister Ali Shamkhani observed: “Wherever they [that is.S. entanglement. more global role. Iran has yet to normalize diplomatic relations with Egypt. we are also . with threat and opportunity in equal measure. and competitive intervention by regional states. The world viewed from Tehran then is mixed. An alternative scenario would arise from a U. Iran’s regional ambitions are clear enough.S. Iran has formally mended fences. civil war.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 16 16 | The View from Tehran With the Arab states of the peninsula. and wherever they can hit us we can hit them harder. Americans] are. The opportunity to benefit from a U. venomously directing its revolutionary rhetoric at it. Iran seeks to become the indispensable power. Israel poses no threat to the Islamic Republic. but relations are not infused with trust. which would translate into an environment that leaves Iran beleaguered. presence may become permanent. But absent Iranian hostility.

11 A senior offi- cial.10 Iranian officials admit that the crisis around their nuclear program came with revelations of secret activities in August 2002. Since 2003 the level of military alert has been raised. Iranian officials have depicted the issue in terms of rights on the one hand and denial of technology to keep Iran backward on the other. Iran through interaction could maintain its national security and protect its interests and nuclear technology.. because its approach “was to drip feed infor- mation. The Iranian leadership has characterized it as the “most difficult case in the entire history of the country. justifying the negotiations with the EU-3. Iranian leaders have sold the nuclear program as an inalienable right under the NPT... Iran professes a willingness to be transparent to disprove claims that it seeks nuclear weapons.” Rather.9 Iran takes the current pro- longed crisis about the scope and limits of its nuclear program seri- ously. Since 2002 when the nuclear issue became widely publicized internationally. which Iran does not.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 17 The View from Tehran | 17 Iran’s Revolutionary Values and Non-proliferation Some have suggested that Iran may be the key proliferation tipping point in the unraveling of the NPT. in order to be able to maintain some facilities and activities . the justification for the program has been given intense domestic coverage.. and in the end (Saddam’s regime) was toppled.12 Iranian officials deny any resemblance of Iran’s situation to that of Libya or North Korea. and show resistance and reluctance.. Nor do they see Iraq as a model. They see Libya as a case of total capitulation. In play- ing the nationalist card Tehran has unleashed forces more intran- . and North Korea as an inappropriate model as well because it claims to have nuclear weapons. as a means of diver- sifying energy sources and as cutting-edge technology necessary to enter the ranks of scientifically advanced states.” comparable to the acceptance of the United Nations (UN) resolution ending the war with Iraq (SC 598) and even to the oil nationalization crisis of 1953. has observed that “being a revolutionary does not mean that we must discard every- thing and put ourselves on the road to confrontation with the rest of the world.”13 Conversely.

as necessary prudent measures to avoid giving Iran’s enemies pretexts to attack it: “Iran (thus) has its own model and it means that we want to develop nuclear technology in Iran and at the same time gain the trust of the world.. The long and costly war with Iraq early in the life of the IRI has been the principal conditioner of Iran’s approach to national secu- rity ever since. are strong condition- ers of Iran’s nuclear program as well as its diplomacy. a less accom- modating side to Iran’s interaction with other countries. Iranian officials have had to justify Iran’s policies. or want others to see it.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 18 18 | The View from Tehran sigent than its negotiators. such as agreements to negotiate with the EU-3 in 2003 and 2004. There is. as an international pariah. For example. Even if this has some costs .”16 These values and the worldview they reflect. The revolution was forged through martyrdom and unity during the war. stating: “gradually we reached the conclusion that each and every industrial country that had trade ties with Iran wanted us to sign the Additional Proto- col.”15 Iran’s willingness to bow to the cumulative pressure from coun- tries with which it desired to maintain relations differentiates it from other proliferators: It does not see itself. together with the lessons learned over the past quarter century. so it is seen as a golden period marking an epic that should . the nuclear question symbolizes the values and aims of the revolution. it signed the Additional Protocol in October 2003 under international pressure. we are prepared to pay these costs.”14 Iran’s approach therefore has been to reassure the international community by being sensitive to its concerns. above all the defiant assertion of independence: “Iran has made a Revo- lution in order not to be the obedient servant of any country and to act on the basis of its own national interests. nonetheless.. They merit extended examination precisely because they are intrinsic features of the discourse and politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and as such will influence Iran’s strategy and any possible negotiated agreement.17 The war in retrospect is seen as confirming the hostility of the outside world toward the Islamic revolution.

dictation. secularists and religious conservatives. These lessons have now been incorporated into what might be called the revolution’s values. a nationalist glue that unites hard-liners and reformists. Iranians resolved never to be caught unprepared again. International efforts to con- strain Iran’s nuclear activities are seen as technology denial and . equality.) In summary.18 Surprised by Iraq’s attack. or domination by others as well as a desire to be taken seriously. treated without discrimina- tion.20 The lessons of Iran’s war with Iraq and the values of the revolu- tion reinforce each other. even the most dedicated or better armed foe would surely be deterred. and respect.21 Iran believes that it is now—or should be—a major regional power and that no policy in the region should be implemented without taking into account its views. whereas conventional deterrence was more liable to fail. concentrate on the inadmissibility of the use of nuclear weapons.22 This defiance plays out in the issue of Iran’s nuclear energy pro- gram and the U. A clear and overriding lesson surely was that reliance on conventional forces for deterrence was less effective than reliance on nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons. and do not rely on the international rules or community for any favors during crises. which caught Iran with- out equivalent weapons). They militate toward self-sufficiency in arms production. these values can be expressed as independence.19 Iran’s quest for international status is a major element in its outlook. They reflect an extreme sensitivity to any appearance of dependence.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 19 The View from Tehran | 19 inform all subsequent policies. how- ever. and accorded the status that Iran’s importance in the world merits. opposition to it.S. Iranian leaders still believe that Iran constitutes a role model for others in creating an Islamic revolution and siding with the oppressed against global arrogance and an unjust international order. hedge against technological surprises (such as Saddam’s use of surface to surface missiles. The war with Iraq served as both warning and lesson. (Official Iranian statements. Although tempered over the past quarter century.

S. biological.24 As a result both countries. wary of another round in the future. Indian Gen- eral Krishnaswamy Sundarji’s comment—that if you wish to con- front the United States. Nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 passed relatively unscathed by international sanctions and in a short time became accepted as each became U.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 20 20 | The View from Tehran dictation intended to keep Iran backward and subordinate. Iraq’s enforced disarmament through the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) after Desert Storm underlined how advanced Iraq’s nuclear program had been (between six months and two years from realization) and how it had been underestimated. it would be wise to have nuclear weapons—seemed especially relevant to the Iranians. underscoring the vast military disparity in conventional power between Tehran and Washington. North Korea’s Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994 sug- gested that nuclear weapons might serve as a bargaining chip for technology and need not result in automatic sanctions or attack. and nuclear programs.25 The experience with Iraq consequently encouraged Iran to seek self-sufficiency through the establishment of a domestic missile industry (in part to substitute for aircraft) and to maintain a certain ambiguity about its chemical. victory in Iraq in 1991 contrasted with Iran’s eight- year inconclusive war.23 It also plays into the issue of discrimination or “nuclear apartheid” voiced by President Ahmadinejad at the United Nations in Septem- ber 2005. Both Iran and Iraq attributed more importance to the role of mis- siles (and chemical weapons) in the outcome of the war than was warranted. As the unloved victim of chemical weapons.26 Iran’s thinking was influenced by other developments as well. The rapid U. partners or allies. Iran felt even more aggrieved and justified to seek insurance against a future attack. This outlook and its war with Iraq led toward its current empha- sis on missiles and the cultivation of options to avoid surprises.S. continued an arms race and emphasized these programs. the U. attack on Iraq in April 2003 justified by reference to suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs contrasted with . Later.S. Finally.

its worldview. policy toward Tehran. war against Iraq. The war with Iraq was preceded by a further deterioration in relations between Washington and Tehran.27 Iran therefore has reasons. After the 2003 war with Iraq. Iran saw this regional presence as a threat to its interests. will attack.28 Already in mid-2002 a top Iranian offi- cial correctly predicted a U.S. especially on the nuclear issue. Iranian officials were surprised by the U. The war in Afghanistan was indicative of this: Hostility toward the Taliban was matched by a reluctance to see the United States entrenched nearby.S. Iranian leaders saw the War on Terrorism as a pretext for a foreign regional presence.*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 21 The View from Tehran | 21 the restraint and caution shown toward North Korea. pol- icy would target it next. Iran’s response has been to show that it is not vulnerable to regime change and to demonstrate a linkage between Tehran’s influence—for good or ill—in Iraq and Afghanistan and U. administration’s new policies. stating that “even if Saddam lets the weapon inspectors in.S. policy from dual containment in the 1990s to regime change after 2001. and its reading of events. which appeared to underscore Sundarji’s comment about the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. even after Saddam’s demise. Additional incentives came with the change in U. the U.”29 In both cases Iran formally opposed the acts but remained neutral.30 Initially Iran was concerned that the new U.S. This environment may have reinforced Iran’s motivation to pursue its nuclear program.S.S. The Bush administration’s identi- fication of Iran as a terrorist state and with an “axis of evil” (January 2002) and the announcement of a future strategy of preemption and regime change where necessary increased Iran’s perceptions of threat. supporting democratic change in the region rather than the status quo at all costs. Iran’s initial reaction to 9/11 mixed sympathy with wariness. to consider whether nuclear weapons would add to its security. a self- confessed nuclear power. based on its own direct experience. the United States became both a regional state (a neighbor on two sides of Iran) and a revolutionary state. They understood the discussion about a new draft nuclear .

*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 22 22 | The View from Tehran posture review as an implicit threat to make nuclear weapons more usable against potential (nonnuclear) adversaries. Already in mid- 2002.34 In addition Iran has justified building its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz underground by reference to the threat of a U. forces in the region. that Iran would itself consider preemption.S. Always sensitive to power realities.33 When the possibility of a U. and that the United States could ill afford the subsequent regional instability. proximity and encouragement to call on external assistance. military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities became topical in 2004. with the prospect of a rapid political vic- tory fading. Iranian reformists might have been emboldened by the U. that a response would not be limited to the region. gave Iran’s leadership pause: Regime change had become a real threat. Iran regained its confidence.S.36 . Hashemi Rafsanjani.32 By mid-2003. Chairman of the Expediency Discern- ment Council of Iran.S. Tehran’s response was to seek an accommodation. attack. as it had in Afghanistan. pointing out the political repercussions. However. Washington terminated discussions between Iran and the United States in Geneva upon learning of Tehran’s provision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda elements involved with terror- ism in Saudi Arabia. that such a response would target U. Iranian officials responded by dismissing the reports as part of a psychological cam- paign.31 The appropriation of U.S. as the United States became more entangled in Iraq in 2003.S. if it were treated as an equal. together with the initial stunning military success of the United States in Iraq. had offered Iran’s cooperation with the United States. funds to support the Iranian opposition in mid-2003. Iranian leaders now talked of the failure of regime change and the fact that the United States was now bogged down in Iraq as well as Afghanistan.35 Iran also threatened retal- iation and in numerous statements suggested that an attack on Iran would not be considered limited or elicit a limited response. given lack of sup- port for this in Europe or elsewhere. Washington’s interest in smaller nuclear weapons (mini-nukes) made the threat of nuclear use against alleged proliferators more worrisome to Tehran.

This response has entailed playing a spoil- ing role to assure at least a delay in the stabilization of Iraq (and the cultivation of local actors as possible conduits for policy.38 The question of whether the United States is willing to compromise on Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for assistance regionally has not been definitively answered—in part because the evolution of events in Iraq remains unpredictable and in part because the impli- cations of nuclear Iran are so serious as to make such a tacit exchange a losing proposition in the longer term. especially over the long term. Moreover. As the United States has looked to establish a base structure around Iran (includ- ing Central Asia).*ch1 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 23 The View from Tehran | 23 To prevent a possible resort to force by the United States. to keep it entangled.S. and thus to prevent a speedy success and with- drawal that would enable the United States to concentrate on the next issue: nuclear Iran.37 Iran’s response to the enhanced U. that the United States is now militarily stretched by its commitments in these two countries gives Iran breathing space to delay or blunt what might otherwise be a credible military threat on its nuclear facilities. The implicit linkage between Iran’s regional policy and Tehran’s relations with the United States is clear enough.39 .S. Iran also pursued a complicated regional diplomacy. Iran has stepped up its spoiling strategy. military presence in the region has been to treat the United States as a potential hostage. which has parallels in Afghanistan as well). the U. military presence. is considered a threat. Although Iran’s interests in Afghanistan and Iraq are largely similar to those of the United States.

2 Iran currently envisages the production of 7. The rationale was that the partially built Bushire reactor represented a “sunk cost” that should be recouped.000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear energy and initial 24 . The argument for nuclear energy was then strengthened by the prudent need for diversifying energy sources. Its arguments in support of this claim are both eco- nomic and strategic. the Iranian nuclear program was restarted in the mid-1980s. Secretary of the Expediency Dis- cernment Council. and Decision Making Energy Diversification and Self-Sufficiency Iran argues that it is developing nuclear energy to generate electric- ity and to master the fuel cycle to become a supplier of nuclear fuel in the future. put it. “The important issue is that Iran’s energy basket must be a mixture of all kinds of energy.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 24 2 Nuclear Energy Rationale. and it justifies its interest in nuclear technology by reference to the need to diversify its energy sources and keep abreast of a technol- ogy that it identifies as modern and synonymous with being an advanced scientific state. Initially cancelled by the Islamic Republic. Iran is a major producer of oil and soon gas.”1 The argument is further reinforced by the fact that Iran’s rapid population growth and domestic oil consumption are reducing Iran’s oil export revenues. Abandoning the nuclear program will harm our national interests. As Mohsen Rezai. Domestic Politics.

That Iran emphasizes enrichment (Natanz) and a heavy water plant (Arak) at this early phase in its program when not a single reactor is yet functioning rings alarm bells. that the nuclear issue is not just a question of energy but of science and technology and self-sufficiency. and as such an issue of great prac- tical and symbolic significance. In the meantime.5 Iran is thus determined to avoid dependency on others for its future fuel supply and wants to be among the top fuel producers and suppliers within the next fifteen years. however. most have not sought such a capabil- ity because it is not economical. Iran will buy fuel. There are several reasons why the self-sufficiency . including facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. And we will do this at any cost. The Iranians insist. Indeed.”7 Iranian leaders are unapologetic about their goals: “We want to have enrichment and all other parts of nuclear technology to use this valuable science for the good of our people and the country.3 This program implies “self sufficiency in all aspects of using the peaceful use of nuclear energy” from extraction through enrichment. The Iranian arguments for energy diversification are more plau- sible than those justifying the program on grounds of self- sufficiency.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 25 Nuclear Energy Rationale.4 Therein lies the problem: By insisting on acquiring the full fuel cycle. Iran is being tested by the inter- national response. Domestic Politics.”8 Because there are doubts whether these constitute Iran’s real goals. According to one expert. it will take Iran ten years before it will be able to generate good quality reactor fuel domestically. claiming that “all parts of the centrifuges used in the Natanz com- plex are manufactured by Iranian experts” and that it has broken into the “monopolized nuclear fuel market.6 Iranians are proud of their efforts. and Decision Making | 25 construction of ten nuclear reactors. Iran would acquire the ability to fabricate the mate- rials necessary for nuclear weapons with little difficulty. Furthermore most countries with reactors do not go into enrichment. Much of the world questions Iranian arguments on the need for self- sufficiency in all aspects of the fuel cycle and on the energy justifi- cation for the scale of the program.

. Domestic Politics.. Atomic energy has become the glue that has reinforced the solidarity of the nation.”9 The nuclear issue has thus. gives Iran greater weight internationally. First. Just imagine. The regime’s depiction of Iran’s achievement is vague at best and deliberately distorted at worst. (Iran’s vast indigenous gas reserves are discounted from the equation. and peaceful nuclear power is said to give Iran entry into an “exclusive club. will not begin to address this demand. Science. second. like the “sacred defense” of the country against Iraq. if we could link the glories of the sacred defense with the people’s national soli- darity in the area of the inalienable right we are entitled to regarding atomic energy. so majestic and glorifying. even states like Sweden. what immense power would be forged and what a great epic it would create. with reference to increased domestic energy consumption. Second. Third. nuclear power generation plants. and Decsion Making argument is problematic. and power are equated.. Iran will remain dependent on imports of uranium because it lacks adequate indige- nous supplies. which only produce electricity.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 26 26 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. do not feel the need for enrichment facilities and instead buy their fuel on the open market.) Nuclear Power and Nuclear Status Iran’s depiction of its accession to the ranks of states mastering nuclear technology as enormously significant has two functions: First. As reported in the Iranian press. it legitimates the regime domestically and. which has ten reactors. become a rally- ing point around which all can agree. Therefore. Iran’s domestic consumption of heavily subsi- dized and thus wasted gasoline is costly and growing in line with the population. technology.10 . which is less expensive. the problem for Iran is the growing demand for gaso- line. according to some. not electricity. even with possessing the full fuel cycle.

the efforts of the world of arrogance will lose their effect. in this mind-set. Domestic Politics While the nuclear issue is depicted by the Iranian leadership as a burning national issue. “has advanced nuclear technology” including enrichment and “this is very impor- tant in the world. who is more concerned about employment. Iranian scientists. are united in pressuring Iran to abandon enrichment “because enrichment is a way forward to scientific advancement and if a country is able to succeed in doing so. including the nuclear question. “guarantee[ing] the Islamic republic’s presence in the international scene” and giving the Europeans pause as they “real- ize they could not embark on force when talking to Iran. and prospects for self-betterment.” The West’s stance against Iran “indicates that Iran has access to this very exclusive and sensitive technology.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 27 Nuclear Energy Rationale.” Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. referral to the UN . it is said. the reality is different. have now made the world admit that Iran is a scientific and technological power. Domestic Politics. one leader insisted. Foreign policy. and Decision Making | 27 Ambiguities about the nature of Iran’s programs and ambitions are underscored by these claims.”14 In short. However what has made them anxious is the Iranian nation’s access to nuclear technology. it is questionable whether they would seek the nuclear fuel cycle at the cost of con- frontation with the international community. infla- tion. While most Iranians favor an Iran that is independent and has status. Iran.”13 Iranian officials suggest that nuclear technology has enhanced Iran’s power. in an address to prayer leaders. stated that “the bullies of this world know full well that we do not have nuclear weapons.12 The United States and Europe.”11 Iranian pride in its “amazing” progress in technology is palpable and attributed to the regime. is generally far from the mind of the ordinary Iranian. Iranian leaders attribute a great deal more significance to the attainment of an enrichment capability than potential energy self- sufficiency.

The June 2005 presidential elections reflected this broader debate. the regime hopes to reinforce itself.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 28 28 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. as the regime insists. framing the issue in . The debate has been manipulated by the regime. Even so. The nuclear issue is a metaphor for Iran’s quest for greater respect and a wider regional and global role. Iranians are not duped by the way the issue has been depicted. As mentioned earlier. however. Iranian leaders consequently invoke national demand in their international nego- tiations. the nuclear debate in Iran is more complicated. it is more importantly a surrogate for a broader debate about the country’s future—about what model Iran should adopt and how it should interact with the wider world. and Decsion Making Security Council. which has been selectively invoked.16 By tapping into and exploiting nationalist sentiment. and questions began to be raised domestically about its course. flexibility is possible but requires determined leadership. national unity on Iran’s right to enrich- ment. Polls consistently show some 80 percent of the population sup- porting Iran’s access to nuclear technology as a right that reflects and contributes to Iran’s advanced scientific status. Domestic Politics. which precludes any policy adjustment? Domestic Nuclear Debate Iran’s principal motive for developing nuclear technology appears to be domestic legitimation of the regime. and sanctions. The nuclear issue is only partly about technology and status. which has failed to open up the facts or issues to public scrutiny. Although no one supports technology denial as such. Iranian stock and real estate markets plummeted. has left the regime with less room for compro- mise. This national consensus.15 How has domestic politics influenced Iran’s nuclear program? Is there. When the new government adopted a more confrontational course in August 2005. It has certainly oversold the notion that possessing the full fuel cycle reflects cutting-edge technology that no self-respecting nation can afford to forgo.17 In reality. a broad spectrum of views on the nuclear program exists.

They wish to avoid confrontation and international isolation. current differences on the nuclear issue today are emblematic of different views on the way Iran ought to develop and engage internationally. the results change.23 Iranians see that their priorities concerning jobs. equality. isolation versus engagement. The conservative . where the people have a low standard of liv- ing but are making the atomic bomb.20 This muted debate over the value of nuclear weapons extends to the regime itself and is reflected in its uncer- tainty about whether to continue to seek sensitive technology in the face of U. Iran should forgo it.22 Differences do not fall strictly along factional lines but nearly so.”19 One difficulty in analyzing the Iranian debate is the fact that Iran denies having intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. Some conservatives openly argue for leaving the NPT and seeking nuclear arms. or to settle for less controversial technology and improve relations with the international community. Self-sufficiency versus interdependence.S. Domestic Politics.21 In the broader con- text of political flux and change in Iran. and normal- ization internationally are connected to the struggle between their government and the international community over the nuclear pro- gram. and respect.18 When the debate is framed differently. The reformist candidate (Mostafa Moin) took the clear posi- tion that if seeking enrichment poisoned relations with the international community. international affairs were linked to domestic issues for the first time. and Decision Making | 29 terms of denial. Iranians do not want to pay a high price for the program given their domestic economic needs. Certainly the nuclear issue figures into politics and factions seek to use it politically. then we don’t want that. ideology ver- sus pragmatism—all are at play in Iran today. In the recent presidential elections. whereas reformists emphasize political deterrence (democracy and unity) and peace- ful technology. investment. and European Union (EU) objections. so offi- cials do not discuss the strategic or other rationales for seeking the capability to make or use them. whatever the price. The extreme case was well put by one forty-five-year-old Iranian man who preferred to remain anonymous: “If the result would be sim- ilar to North Korea. rights.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 29 Nuclear Energy Rationale.

widely admired as a wily politician who might be able to actually deliver what more admirable candi- dates (like Moin) could only promise. Hasan Rowhani. it was not what he said on the nuclear issue but what he said on Iran’s international relations that was significant. concluding that continued diplomacy offered the best hope of developing technology and building confidence with others. the chief nuclear negotiator. His dis- course reflected the broad shift away from the conservative view of the world: He embraced globalization enthusiastically and pledged “positive and constructive interaction with the international arena: renewing bonds and links with the rest of the world in order to remedy the country’s vulnerabilities on the international stage and speeding up the process of foreign investment in Iran. encouraged Rafsanjani’s candidacy.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 30 30 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.24 More interesting was the position of another strong candidate with a security background. the rural and urban disadvantaged. conservatives ran a “stop Rafsanjani” campaign. reborn as a reformer.28 In the election Rafsanjani lost to the hard-liners.” 27 In response. he invoked his special relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei for being able to achieve results. depicting it as an issue of self-respect and scientific neces- sity. calling into question his ties with Khamenei and casting aspersions on his foreign support. Outsiders find it difficult to distinguish among Iranians or to identify significant differences among them on the nuclear issue. Strikingly. . More significantly. Brigadier General Mohammad Bager Qalibaf. and Decsion Making (former military) candidates (notably Ali Larijani and Mohsen Rezai) were equally clear: They favored acquisition of the full fuel cycle. also promised more diplomacy on the nuclear issue. His indifference to international affairs and opinion reflected his constituency. who presented the issue as the need to balance between Iran’s rights and the people’s desire to avoid hostilities and avoid disturbing the peace. Domestic Politics.26 Rafsan- jani. arguing that without Rafsanjani the conservatives would certainly win.25 This theme was echoed by former president and can- didate Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s populist victory was a triumph for what he promised domestically: less corruption and more attention to social equality.

32 In practice. and a broader regional role. and independence as linked and desirable. Most Iranians accept the proposition that the nuclear issue reflects a general discrimination. The nation- alist consensus in turn has been used by negotiators to argue that domestic constraints prevent Iran from forgoing sensitive technolo- gies. respect. together with the resentment over discrimination. While this is true up to a point. it is also very much self- imposed and vague. The Iranian public has not judged whether a nuclear weapons option is desirable on its own merits but only on the proposition that Iran should not be denied technology to which it is entitled. The default setting in the council has been hard-line. Role of Conservatives in Nuclear Policy In Iran. has been fanned by the regime to expand the nuclear program.”30 One reformer suggested that the nuclear issue raised still more fundamental questions: What kind of state does Iran seek to be? What sort of role does it aspire to play? And what kind of relations does it seek with other states?31 It is in this con- text. involving not just nuclear. Most Iranians support the quest for status.29 Some see the issue as symbolic of “the way that world powers view the nature of Iran’s regime. This nation- alism. neither the Holy Grail nor a panacea. Domestic Politics. but all advanced technology. scientific progress. The reformists generally support the nuclear program but see nuclear as one among several technologies. that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are bound to be judged by other states. They see advanced technology. however. and Decision Making | 31 And it is true that this issue has become a litmus test of national- ism from which there are few dissenters. with the reformists marginal- ized whatever their standing in the Iranian parliament (Majles). nuclear policy issues have . the political elite determines national security policies in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). They do not wish to see its pursuit lead to Iran’s estrangement from the international community and hurt relations with neighbors. it could be argued.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 31 Nuclear Energy Rationale.

known as the IRGC or Pas- . They pursued a nuclear option within the NPT.33 The pragmatists who controlled negotiations during the 2003–2005 period were under constant pressure from the ideolog- ical faction. and sought to limit the fallout from Iran’s program. independence. A strong mil- itary and security constituency (notably the militia Basij and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Domestic Politics. The Ahmadinejad presidency represents a throwback to the early days of the revolution. since the ideologically conservative faction took control of nuclear policy in August 2005. and export of the revolution).*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 32 32 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. whereas the ideological conservatives shun a deal and want power to be able to impose themselves on the region and beyond. and Decsion Making been decided between conservatives of two types: pragmatic (like Rafsanjani and Rowhani) and ideological (like Ahmadinejad and Larijani). It is worth noting the similarities and differences among the various factions and groups. While seeking to enhance power they were unwilling to do so in a confrontational mode. Both types of conservatives appear to agree on the need for a nuclear weapons option but differ on means or the price to be paid to achieve this. For economic and strategic reasons. Both groups seek a larger regional role for Iran and see the United States as an obstacle to that goal. leaving open the possibility of a “grand bargain”—an across-the-board accommodation that would see Iran’s interests and security guaranteed in exchange for a normalization of relations and moderation of its behavior. with its emphasis on first principles (social justice. this faction is more open to engage- ment and sees globalization as an inescapable reality. they were willing to suspend activities (enrichment) and under pressure to accept constraints (the Addi- tional Protocol) to keep up the appearance of reasonableness and cooperation. This policy stance has changed. In reality they seek different ends: The pragmatic conservatives seek power to be able to cut a deal and normalize relations. were open to compromise when necessary (Tehran and Paris agree- ments). however. Sensi- tive to international opinion and to the potential costs of a disruption of relations.

and Decision Making | 33 daran) supports this administration as do some conservative clergy.” Larijani has also suggested that foreign sensitivity toward Iranian nuclear activities “is partly because of Iran’s geopolitical sit- uation and its inspiring position. You have to find a way to be able to take the country’s level and status to a point so as to automatically solve your national security problem.38 Rather than shunning confrontation.” Iran in this view does not need either technology or status conferred on it: It is prepared to seize them by its own efforts. reflect and ratify the balance of power but add nothing to it. The best articulation of this view comes from Larijani.34 The world. sooner or later.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 33 Nuclear Energy Rationale. Negotiations.”36 This perspective translates into an approach to negotiation that aims at acquiring technology.. . they see Iran’s geopolit- ical position giving it a number of important cards to play. any more than they can be acquired through nego- tiation. Domestic Politics. is a Hobbesian one of unremitting struggle.” What he has in mind is clear: “If Iran becomes atomic Iran. What is known by Ahmadinejad as active diplomacy describes a policy that seeks to increase power not just to survive but to impose Iran on the international community. as it has North Korea’s. Second. who observes that to resist U. Power. First. where predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate and where the only currency is military power. pressure Iran has to use its “prominent geopolitical position. in this view. in this mind-set. the ideological conserva- tives welcome it for several reasons. the West will have to concede Iran’s nuclear status. he believes. it sees possible offers of security guarantees as demean- ing.S. not goodwill. is the indispensable element for survival and for the extension of the regime’s values beyond its borders. no longer will any- one dare challenge it..37 Larijani sees North Korea’s impla- cability as a model for Iran. in the view of this group. “Iran does not need these kinds of condescending guarantees and it is fairly capable of protecting itself. and influence and must not be bartered away. because they would have to pay too high a price. values..35 Power and military strength thus ensure the regime’s survival. other- wise this pressure factor will always weigh upon you. notably Ayatollah Taghi Mesbahi Yazdi of the Haggani seminary at Qom.

iso- lation. they have very different visions of the role Iran should play and the kind of relations Iran should have with the world.40 In the wake of the Ahmadinejad team’s confrontational tactics and rhetoric and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) vote on September 24 that put Iran on notice of referral to the UNSC.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 34 34 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. their ideological counterparts welcome the oppor- tunity to purify the regime and society by limiting contamination from the outside and asserting the revolution’s values of self- reliance and authenticity. Where the pragmatists seek eventual normalization. As much as a deliberate provocation. Rafsanjani has called for serious prudence and sensitiv- ity. is the more prone to overestimate Iran’s power and centrality and misjudge the external world. largely self- absorbed and insular. Domestic Politics. the ideological faction. the statements reflected the new president’s complete and studied indifference to and contempt for international opinion. and China. Despite the fact that the ideological and pragmatic conservatives are agreed on the goal of increasing Iran’s power and influence and using nuclear technology to do it. In the Iranian polit- ical context. Russia. and Rowhani noted that in a matter of months the new govern- ment had already provoked serious discussions of referral to the Security Council on two occasions and had once been the object of a critical Security Council statement. Ahmadinejad only voiced what the most extreme ele- ments in the regime had long felt. Third. Rafsanjani led the rebuking voices. and sanctions differentiates the ideological from the prag- matic conservatives. this approach will successfully divide the West from the nonaligned states. They did him no harm on the “Arab street” that sees its governments as too timorous or corrupt to defend Palestinian rights.39 Ahmadinejad’s comments on Israel (and the Holocaust) are indicative. The pragmatic conservatives have sought to put a brake on this approach. Of the two. He argued against slo- gans and for the more difficult task of delicate diplomacy: “Our main task is to prove that we are not the sort of people to utilize . Indifference to costs. and Decsion Making Iran’s increased oil income serves as a buffer against possible sanc- tions.

This outcome apparently vindi- cates their approach. They therefore have sought a practical accommodation on domes- tic issues with their ideological counterparts. the broad consensus on the nuclear issue obscures very real differences that exist among the elite on overall foreign .42 The pragmatists are unwilling to risk division. They are thus unwilling to push an issue that could put them at a disadvantage in terms of nationalist opinion.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 35 Nuclear Energy Rationale. The critical issue remains the domestic power struggle for control over finances and sources of income. Thus. then. if the costs of the crisis increase appreciably for Iran with the involvement of the Security Council. Larijani and Ahmadine- jad feel they have a free hand in their approach to the nuclear issue. who prefers consensus. The pragmatists are fighting a rearguard action to main- tain their control over lucrative areas of the economy such as energy and banking. however. which seems set to continue. Domestic Politics. the pragmatists will be in a position to point to the ineptitude of the ideological faction and the need for less haste in the program. polar- ization. So far their approach has gained benefits (for example.43 Supreme Leader Khamenei. in part because the leadership has painted itself into a corner from which it will be difficult to exit. However. Ahmadinejad charged that critics of his foreign policy are attempting to create a diversion to continue their corrupt domes- tic practices. or resigned. and Decision Making | 35 nuclear weapons” and to prove to Iran’s opponents that “Iran will not use the technology for military purposes.”41 Critics of the Ahmadinejad mind-set face self-imposed limits. especially as the other side appears uncertain. with no domestic force acting as a constraint. divided. closer to the ideologists on it. Whether this will change as the costs of this approach increase is a critical ques- tion. They continue to see the benefits of brinksmanship. In sum. but it appears unlikely. these limits have more to do with domestic political- economic issues than nuclear strategy. least of all on this issue. has been unwilling to take sides on the nuclear issue and appears. if any- thing. and destabilization of the regime. resumption of conversion and research) without paying a tangible price. For example.

if one group sees capabilities and policies as bargaining chips. This division corresponds to those who are willing to consider a grand bargain with the United States and to adjust their regional policies in exchange for recognition and security guarantees and those who reject compromise in favor of pursuit of regional hegemony and self-reliance. There is little dispute on making Iran a more important power. more belligerent element. Differences exist. and on taking an independent position in interna- tional affairs. Khatami. on how to pursue these goals and whether Iran should not adjust its aims in exchange for the achievement of some of them. Decision Making Policy reflects politics as well as narrower institutional considera- tions. to take sides. Domestic Politics. In nuclear policy this translates into a divi- sion between those who emphasize confidence building and are willing to compromise and those for whom a nuclear capability is indispensable and compromise unthinkable. Thus. The broad political context and climate necessarily affect decisions. The Supreme Leader will find it harder to paper over these differences in a continuing ambiguous consensus and may need. The contrast between the two is captured in the differences in the diplomacy of Rowhani and Larijani described below. Rowhani) and those who wish to challenge it by adopting the course of the Islamic Republic circa 1979 (Ahmadinejad. if possible by acquiring a nuclear capability. the basic division in foreign policy is between those who seek an accommodation with the West from a position of strength (Rafsanjani. which has aggra- vated these differences and given rise to what amounts to a strug- gle for power between these two tendencies. and Decsion Making policy. on seeking independence. however. Ayatollah Taghi Mesbahi Yazdi).*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 36 36 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. Hard-line newspapers such as Keyhan have quasi-official . President Ahmadinejad’s election has given voice to a harder. In essence. Larijani. for once. then the other seeks the determined pursuit of goals without reference to the costs or consequences.

Domestic Politics. and the costs of a long suspension of activi- ties in terms of morale and attrition of scientific personnel. the long-standing secretary and pragmatist as chief nuclear negotiator. which looks to its institutional interests and strongly sup- ports the nuclear program. decisions taken by the Supreme Leader reflect a rough-and-ready consensus. there- fore. the composition of the leadership of the SNSC has changed. Iran’s nuclear decisions reflect institutional inputs and interest group biases. The SNSC is not monolithic and reflects all tendencies. Decisions reached in the SNSC provide the leadership with a sort of consensus safety net. Among the inputs into decisions are interested parties such as the Atomic Energy Organi- zation. as Ali Larijani has now replaced the pragmatic Hasan Rowhani as principal negotiator (see Figure 2). Since August 2005. the appointment of Hasan Rowhani. experience acquired. one could note the Supreme Leader’s soundings among his clerical network (in Qom and elsewhere) and the primacy of informal networks. Figures 1 and 2 schematically and approximately reflect the nuclear decision-making structure in Iran. to give leverage to the negotiators who will have “to answer to the people” . The For- eign Ministry and SNSC can argue the costs of estrangement and confrontation with Europe and the IAEA and international obliga- tions. in 2003 was in itself a significant choice. In addition to the decision-making structure diagrammed in Figure 1. and Decision Making | 37 status and more leeway than their dwindling reformist counter- parts. It can argue in terms of sunk costs.44 Rec- ognizing that these informal contacts and procedures are as influ- ential as the formal organograms. with policies emerg- ing that are not a product of a unitary system.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 37 Nuclear Energy Rationale. enabling it to avoid taking the heat for controversial decisions. Effects of Domestic Politics on Negotiations Iranian negotiators’ and politicians’ insistence on a national consen- sus behind the nuclear program serves two functions: one. which sets the tone for—as well as skews—the public debate.

Rowhani’s deputy’s position (Mousavian) has been split into two: one covering international security. “Iran Restarts ‘Eyes’ Work at N Plant. The preceding team has been terminated. Reza Aghazadeh. National Security Security & Foreign & Foreign Policy Policy Committee) (SNSC) (SNSC) Committee) Special Special committees committees AEO. Domestic Politics. Larijani.” International Herald Tri- bune. National (Head. and Arab Times (Kuwait).Atomic Energy Organization Pirooz Hoseyni Pirooz Hoseyni Supervisory role Supervisory through role throughinvestigative mechanisms investigative AmirHossein Amir HosseinZamani -Nia Zamani -Nia Foreign Ministry IAEA (Vienna): NPT safeguards UN (NY) UN (Geneva) AEO experts/technicians Experts/technicians IRGC(plant IRGC (plantsecurity) security) AEO AEO Chief. Velayati 1. has significantly changed the personnel. the Foreign Ministry with their foreign ramifications. Figure 1. Ali AliLarijani: Larijani: Leaders Leader’s Personal Personal Representative Representative onon SNSC SNSC Hashemi Hashemi Rafsanjani IRGC SNSC H. May 20–21. 1995. Akhoundzadeh serves as Ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna. p. and Decsion Making Nuclear Decision Making: Institutions and Key Players Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s was split into two parallel streams: a civilian program under the AEO. Khatami / M. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). seeking to put his own imprint on foreign policy. The AEO has dealt with technical issues. The two streams were consolidated in early 2000. “Tehran Grants a Glimpse of a Nuclear Site Reborn. May 15. Velayati: International Relations Advisor Supreme Leader 2. President Ahmadinejad. nuclear “czar” Hasan Rowhani. 2005.Islamic Revolutionary Guards Alaedin Alaedin Borujerdi Borujerdi Corps (Pasdaran) Ali Agha Reza Mohammadi Agha Mohammadi (Head. . Mustafa Mustafa Mohammad Committee Mohammad NajjarNajjar / Defence : Defense Minister Minister Hasan Rowhani) ((Hasan Rowhani) (Khatami/)M. In replacing Rowhani. The nuclear negotiating team has also changed. Sources: Elaine Sciolino. After September 2003. Rowhani:Secretary / Chief SNSC/Chief Negotiator. 1/5. Rowhani (Secretary SNSC H.Supreme National Security n Sirus SirusnNaseri Naseri Council Mohammad JavadZarif Mohamma Javad Zarif Majlis Majles d Alborzi Mohammad Reza Alborzi Mohammad IRGC. Negotiator.” International Herald Tribune. “Iran’s Push for Nuclear Arms and a Small Airstrip in Germany. March 16.” International Herald Tribune. The new Defense Minister replacing Shamkhani is Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar. Larijani has in effect become National Security Advisor.” August 2.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 38 38 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.isisVice Vice President President & Cabinet CabinetMember Member Mohamma Mohammad SaidiSaidi (International Affairs) (International Affairs) . and another covering political and foreign affairs (Ali Monfared). Since June 2005. 1995. rather than the Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. coordinated nuclear issues. Institutional Flow of Decision Making Supreme Leader Office Representatives Khamenei 1. and special units of the Revolutionary Guards with the security of facilities. RezaAghazadeh Chief. p. Decision making on nuclear issues in Iran has tradition- ally been confined to three institutions coordinated by the leadership. Chris Hedges. Elaine Sciolino. n Gen. including the nuclear dossier (Javad Vaidi). “Iran Plans a Vast Nuclear Build Up. 1/6. Supreme SupremeLeader’s Leader’s Representative) Representative Mousavian/:Secretary Mousavia Secretary to toForeign Foreign Policy Committee Policy Negotiating Teams Br. Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad: / President (Acronyms): Hosey Hossein Mousavia Mousavian President SNSC. 1995. and a military program under the Revolutionary Guards. p. In August 2005 he was replaced by Ali Larijani as Secretary of the SNSC. but no clearly designated replacements have been named as yet. Rowhani remained on the SNSC as the Supreme Leader’s Personal Representative. 1/8. will have principal responsibility for the nuclear issue.

Javad Vaidi Deputy Head of International Affairs of SNSC and Head of Delegation. 2005). Foreign Ministry (until December 23. Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh Deputy Director-General for political and international Affairs. replaced General Ali Shamkhani (2005). and Decision Making | 39 Figure 2. Source: Rowhani. Keyhan Interview. Mustafa Mohammad Najjar Defense Minister. Then IAEA representative. . 2005). Abdol Reza Rahmani-Fazli Deputy Secretary of SNSC. The reconstruc- tion with names is the author’s and reflects informed guesswork. Domestic Politics. Report to President Khatami. Mohammed Mehdi Akhoundzadeh Permanent Representative to IAEA (until December 23. Mohammad Saidi Deputy Head of AEO for International Affairs. Ali Hossein Tash Deputy Head of SNSC for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Nahavandian Deputy for Economic Affairs of SNSC. Key Decision Makers New Negotiating Team and Ministers: Changes for 2006 Ali Larijani Replaced Rowhani as Secretary of the SNSC.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 39 Nuclear Energy Rationale. replaced Mousavian. replaced Kharrazi. Manuchehr Mottaki Foreign Minister. Ali Monfared Deputy to the SNSC Secretary.

policy will remain the same. Iran has sought to impose deadlines and sometimes to manufacture an air of crisis about the urgency for an accord. with reason. in a system that has manipulated the issue of nuclear energy by depicting it as an issue of denial and dis- crimination.47 The Majles is also invoked to argue that Iranian negotiators can- not be flexible.50 The cost of a cessation (of a small . in return. with people and the media demanding results from the negotiations. they entered into an asymmetrical commitment that gave the Europeans an incentive to prolong the discussions and thereby impose serious costs on Iran’s nuclear program. that by accepting a freeze on enrichment activities during negotiations with the EU-3.” 45 However. For example. Rowhani has said that “any Iranian government that wishes to stop uranium enrichment will fall. tell them that we shall not abandon the peoples’ right and we shall not sub- mit to bullying. To try to win back some of the ground it feels it lost. the passage of a bill by the Majles in mid-2005 calling for a resumption of the enrichment program was quickly approved by the hard-line Guardian Council. Negotiators also say that the government is under heavy pressure.” Hashemi Rafsan- jani echoed this saying that “they are telling us blatantly that we should not acquire nuclear technology: and we. The result is the kind of brinksmanship just short of rupture. though with- out any legal standing.49 Iranian negotiators feel. skepticism is in order when Iranian leaders insist that public opinion would or would not tolerate a certain path or that it forces them to do such and such. For example.46 Related to this is the assertion that no matter who is president.48 In response Iranian negotiators have sought to use this domestic pres- sure to pressure their European negotiating partners. This pressure is said to stem from the hard-liners who shun any compromise and want to provoke an international crisis to strengthen their own grip on power. and Decsion Making if they are too soft in negotiations and two. to stiffen the spine of politicians who might be tempted to weaken support for the proj- ect. Suspension is resisted for several reasons. The AEO opposes a freeze because of its impact on the retention and employ- ment of scientific personnel. Domestic Politics.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 40 40 | Nuclear Energy Rationale.

as well as a . Domestic Politics. which has been successfully depicted as a nationalist issue around which all Iranians can rally. In August it sought to depict its predecessors as “soft” in defending the “nation’s rights. The issue of the right to technology has elided almost imperceptibly into the “right to the fuel cycle. could be sold domesti- cally by a determined leadership. The nuclear issue has been used to buttress the regime’s legitimacy. with delay.” In this there have been a few dissenters. are disproportionately powerful.52 The hard-liners. From a technical standpoint. vehement. a symbol of modernity and independence. less contentious and thus susceptible to compromise—in effect that prolonged suspension would become cessation by another name. while not the only forces in Iran’s politics. the argument is that the elimination of one of the five phases of nuclear production “will render all other phases and the efforts of scientists in past years ineffective.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 41 Nuclear Energy Rationale. They fear that periodically rolling over the suspension will make the nuclear issue. Every effort was made to mobilize against this in the negotiations and to insist that suspension served no good purpose since Iran will not.”51 Hard-liners are also skeptical about where the suspension will lead. and vocal. the Iranian government may find it dif- ficult to walk away from the contest without some compensation.53 What difference does this prevailing hard line make to decisions on the nuclear issue? Having hyped the subject domestically and put the prestige of the regime on the line.55 These revelations have not enhanced Western faith in Iran’s bona fides. Reformists’ crit- icisms of this extremism are mild but trenchant. the earlier team revealed that they only used the negotiations to buy time and stall while continuing with conversion as long as possible. under any conditions. relinquish its rights. And this does not seem to be the intent of the new Iranian gov- ernment. But such a leadership would have to first sideline the extremists and then retreat under a smoke- screen of strong rhetoric. A decent compromise package.56 The hyping of the nuclear issue as a right. is a minimum $5 billion and the failure of fifteen years of effort. one expert argued.”54 But in their defense. and Decision Making | 41 pilot project). however.

approach.” Specialists have concluded that it would be “difficult if not impossible to verify that Iran was not secretly making nuclear weapons under any deal that allowed Iran to enrich uranium. the international negotiators insist that “none is easier to monitor than some. for example. while a freeze or the forgoing of future capabilities would be easier to swallow.or ten-year moratorium on enrichment. and Decsion Making consensus issue on which there is little scope for disagreement may have bound Iran’s hands and narrowed the scope for an eventual agreement. not technical.57 Because the issue is fundamentally political. Iran has objected to multinational or regional enrichment facilities or to a five. At the same time the lack of trust on all sides makes a technical fix that might otherwise be an option less acceptable to all sides. which is to limit enrichment to those countries .S.”58 Another possibility that looks more feasible is one in which Iran mines and processes uranium to gas (at the Isfahan facility) but then ships the uranium hexafluoride gas to Russia. might be acceptable. Domestic politics limits Iran’s ability to forgo enrichment or the dismantling of any facilities. But both of these proposals are less objectionable than the U. Schemes that take the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle out of Iran to Russia.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 42 42 | Nuclear Energy Rationale. while the Europeans could claim that they stopped Iran from the enrichment process that would have given them the ability to make fissile material for nuclear weapons. this Russian proposal is unlikely to fly as it is just another way of denying Iran enrichment. proposed by Al Baradei. and because it hinges on trust. if Iran retains the right (even limited to principle) to the full fuel cycle. This would enable Iran to claim that it is using uranium from Iran to power Iranian reactors. Russia would then convert it into fuel rods and ship it back to the reactor in Bushire.59 However. Iran insists on access to the full fuel cycle but under extreme pressure might set- tle for the interim acceptance of the principle of enrichment and a limited or pilot project reflecting this. Domestic Politics. The inspection burden would either be unacceptable to Iran or provide inadequate assurance for the rest of the world [emphasis added].

as discussed in chapter five. while any formula assuring them runs up against Iran’s red- lines regarding enrichment. the regime has used the nuclear issue for domes- tic legitimation and is now limited by it. in Iran’s view. insis- tence that Iran forgo enrichment. Iran’s negotiating strategy with the EU-3 and its behavior with the IAEA have not enhanced its goal of gaining acceptance of its right to the full fuel cycle. there is leeway for choice by the leadership. Iran’s insistence on self-sufficiency and right to the full fuel cycle is difficult to square with the EU-3 and U. In sum. exacer- bated by a lack of trust on both sides.60 This constitutes. Ironically. and Decision Making | 43 already possessing it. another set of discriminations within the NPT.S. Domestic Politics. It also depends on being offered a package that can be used as a cover for compromise. In short.*ch2 8/3/06 8:38 AM Page 43 Nuclear Energy Rationale. . then. and it accounts for why Iranian officials have sought to depict Iran’s nuclear know-how as irre- versible and insist that Iran has already achieved the requisite capa- bility. Any formula that leaves Iran with a capability would be unacceptable to the United States and the EU-3. negotiations that might have helped by buying time have only underscored the dif- ferences. Compromise appears difficult. This in turn depends on the leadership resisting the temptation to provoke a crisis for narrow partisan and regime rea- sons and on a realistic estimate of Iran’s relative power and lever- age. Although Iranian decision making reflects a broad consensus. Nevertheless.

All of these traits are evident in the areas discussed below. As was shown in Iraq. Iran’s combination of a sense of grievance and a sense of entitle- ment is not reassuring. This deliberate ambiguity facilitates activities that can be disclaimed (deniability). Though a threat to Western interests.2 Moreover. the nature of that threat is dif- ficult to categorize. and there is evidence of pluralism and some debate within the country. particularly when deal- ing with already limited intelligence. it has not denounced arms control treaties to which it formally adheres. Iran has demonstrated a powerful streak of opportunism—seizing tactical openings with- out reference to other concerns and being unfussy about its tacti- cal alliances to promote its interests. not being able to read a state’s nature can lead to faulty assessments. the closed nature of the regime breeds secrecy. 44 . increasing the risk of miscalcu- lation. Related is the closed nature of the regime that is often self-absorbed to the point that it can grossly misread or ignore others’ concerns. and deception.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 44 3 Fear of a Nuclear Iran ran is difficult to read and Iranian society is hard to categorize. Though pragmatic.1 I Iran is not a typical outlaw state in that it has at least some redeeming qualities: It is not overtly confrontational or given to wild swings in behavior or to delusional goals. dissimulation.

the infrastructure being developed is itself a cause for concern. scale. undeclared activities. Iranian officials appear to delight in obfuscation. If so. the West) treat us in accordance with that .*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 45 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 45 Nuclear Infrastructure and Program Iranian leaders insist that their nuclear infrastructure is intended for peaceful purposes. which is normally associ- ated with a weapons program. the way in which revela- tions of Iran’s sensitive facilities (the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and the heavy water plant at Arak) surfaced and the reluc- tant and contradictory method in which Iran has dealt with them— through half truths. The nature. and erection of obstacles to hinder and render inspections useless—all suggest the body language of a state with something to hide. psychologically it is as if we have a nuclear bomb now and they (i. To these are added the question whether Iran—like Libya—received nuclear weapon designs through the AQ Khan network.6 Finally.e. these centrifuges would shorten the time needed for Iran to build a weapon.5 The pattern of Iran’s clandestine procurement over the past decade has long convinced the United States in par- ticular of Iran’s weapons ambitions. Furthermore. which raises questions about the exclusively peaceful and civil nature of program. and sequencing of the program suggest a weapons program. slipping from discussing nuclear technology to a weapons capability and back again: Believe me.4 In addition there are unanswered questions about whether Iran acquired P2 centrifuge technology on offer from Pakistan. lies. There is also the issue of orga- nizational links and contacts between the AEO and the military. activities in Lavizan and Iran’s interest in polonium. there are ample grounds for suspicion. Whatever the merits of a large-scale nuclear program for a state well endowed with oil and gas deposits.3 Together with Iran’s failure to disclose certain activities to the IAEA until they were exposed and the possibility that other such activities remain in a clandestine undeclared program. there are still some troubling questions pending with the IAEA: namely. inconsistencies.

. it is only a matter of time until enough fissile material is amassed for a nuclear weapon. Its missile program is highly political. They are always worried that something may happen and they may have to deal with a nuclear Iran with nuclear weapons. The development of the missile industry in paral- lel with the quest for nuclear technology suggests they may be linked and that the missiles are intended as delivery systems for nuclear or other WMD warheads. if the country embarks on a determined nuclear weapons program. self-sufficient in nuclear technology will determine how effective international pressure and sanctions will be.11 It initially developed missiles with assistance from North Korea (from Soviet-era SCUDs together with Korean NO DONG technology). We truly want to produce fuel. It has nothing to do with us if technically the system for the production of fuel through enrichment is such that we are able to produce something else. Given the uncertainties of intelligence. There are both certainties and uncertainties about this program. We want to produce fuel.10 Tehran has placed emphasis on missiles since 1988 and believes they will be decisive in future conflicts. however. and much publicity and fanfare attend its various milestones. they treat us like this because they think we have such a thing. is that Iran relies on missiles and wants their development to reflect its sta- tus as a regional power. or is close to being. estimates of Iranian achievement of a nuclear capability range from five to ten years.8 Missiles Alongside the nuclear infrastructure. Today its missiles take the form of .9 This may indeed be the expla- nation. but it is not the only one. What is clear. Iran’s missile program is espe- cially troubling.7 Whether Iran is. The point of no return is reached when a coun- try is no longer technologically dependent on other sources.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 46 46 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran belief ..

in particular. which would increase the range of mis- siles and improve their accuracy and stability. Iran has recently announced the testing of a ballistic missile with multiple warheads as well as high-speed underwater missiles. and Afghanistan) compounds this threat. Given the short distances and the cross-cutting alliances in the region. Given limited reaction time and the narrow margin for error. Iran is preparing to send a satellite into orbit. allegedly for peaceful purposes. 16 Israel. Similar to the SCUD-C (or Pakistan GAWRI). while largely a self-sufficient domestic industry.12 Guidance can also be improved through generally available technology like the global positioning system (GPS). So far. And.14 It attrib- utes to missiles an almost mystical quality from the experience of the war with Iraq and seeks to make political capital from its tech- nological breakthroughs. The range of Iran’s mis- siles (reaching Israel). A multistage missile will certainly have military implications. this missile is liquid fueled and has a range of approximately 1. finally. the introduction of more missiles could make for hair-trigger responses and mistakes. Iraq. Israel has to treat any incoming missile “as if it carries WMD warheads” and react accordingly.15 While trumpeting the successes of its mis- sile program. whose existence Iran considers illegitimate. Iran’s missile pro- gram is relatively constrained. together with the anti-Israel slogans painted on missiles at parades.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 47 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 47 the SHIHAB-3. The missile culture of the region (missiles have been used in Iran. does nothing to reassure Israel about Iranian intentions.13 It is clear that Iran has ambitions as a missile power. Yemen.17 It would be imprudent to assume that Iran will lag technically indefinitely or that its missile program has no relationship to the . has been the most concerned. Iran continues to seek cruise missiles from states and on the open market. Iran has not been very sensitive to other states’ con- cerns. deployed since July 2003.000 kilometers with a one-ton warhead. Iran also seeks to develop the more technically demanding solid fuel propulsion for its missiles. with rather limited guidance and precision systems and several delays and failures. but this would imply a multistage missile that Iran has yet to master.

one could make exactly the same argument in justification of a nuclear weapons program. But it would be imprudent to assume no relationship. In both cases. missiles can act as a crude deterrent. mobile). Iran has sought to avoid reliance on outside arms suppliers since 1988 when U. and cheaper over their life cycle. Closed System The Iranian political system even after twenty-seven years still functions more like a conspiracy than a government. pilots. they decouple destructive capacity from military capability (or skill). sanctions virtually grounded its air force. survivable (hidden. As such. Both programs could have other uses. the domestic political dimension—Iran as a technologically developed state—is as important as the quest for regional status.S. Ever since. and training) and creates dependency. but both also constitute options or investments in what could become an integrated nuclear weapons and delivery sys- tem.19 This in itself is a cause for concern because it is not clear if the handful of decision makers are familiar with the lessons of the nuclear era or have given serious thought to the implications and responsibilities entailed in the possession of nuclear weapons materials. Never mind that they are less accurate. missiles are assured of pene- tration. missiles have been seen as a substitute for airpower. and carry less payload. most notably where the nuclear program is concerned. They are thus the ideal weapon for an ambi- tious and status-hungry state limited in military capacity. In contrast. Safety of materials and integrity of command and control are areas of con- . Unfortu- nately.18 That said. which is costly (spare parts. dispersed.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 48 48 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran development of a nuclear infrastructure. It would be wrong to assume any automatic relationship between a missile pro- gram and a nuclear program. less flexible. Unlike airpower. Decision making for national security has been concentrated in a few hands. avionics. it is important not to infer an automatic relation- ship between Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.

as custodians of Iran’s most sensitive weapons sites. by inadvertence through leakage from poorly secured facilities. besides Ahmadinejad. the Guards could have disproportionate influence on how Iran looks at nuclear weapons and behaves with them once acquired. their zealotry has certain risks. In a regime with radical elements. and a fur- ther 34 former Guards officers now hold senior-level posts in the government. The parallels with the Pakistan expe- rience suggest that the “insider” problem may be even more serious in Iran. Yet these same Guards have been in charge of liaison. there were three other candidates from the Guards. The increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s politics is another source of concern. . Because the Guards are recruited and chosen for their ideological commitment to the regime. Technology transfer could be done by a freelance insider. The dominance of the Guards and intelligence officials could open the country to a new militarism. Of 152 new members elected to the Majles in February 2004.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 49 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 49 cern as is vetting of officials for political reliability. the possibility of unreliable elements pass- ing on materials is very real. training.21 These elements may become a law unto themselves. where there are several factions within the ruling establishment. the Guards may contain unsta- ble elements willing to transfer sensitive nuclear or biological tech- nology to terrorist groups.22 As a hard-line interest group.23 Whether the regime’s penchant for secrecy is compatible with accountability is worrisome. perhaps unhappy with a government in a crisis.20 In the June 2005 presidential elections. Moreover. the Guards are in a critical posi- tion to assure safety and to prevent leakage of dangerous materials to terrorists. the risk will continue to exist. Without strong civilian control and a clear chain of com- mand that takes very seriously the threat of leakage or transfers. and running of terrorists. having interfered twice in recent months on issues about which they felt strongly. or as a result of an institutional policy decided by the Guards leadership. 91 had Guards backgrounds. Vetted only for regime commitment (rather than psychological stability).

Given the motivation to inflict major destruction.24 The cultivation and exploitation of ultranationalism is a two-edged sword that leaves regimes as much a captive as a driver of the phenomenon (note the recent parallels with China and Japan). so far successfully. there is a more general risk from ultranationalists. thinking. which may reflect much deeper currents. the limiting factor in terrorists’ capacity to do so has become technological.26 In U. increasing the risk of miscalculation and conflict. the most likely source for WMD technology for terrorists is supply from outlaw states seeking to damage the United States by waging proxy wars through asymmetrical strategies. Reliable barriers to prevent the diffusion and leakage of technology to groups determined to target states has become a strategic priority. the aims of terrorists can no longer be assumed to be limited. a major concern has been to close off any paths by which this destructive technology might reach hostile terrorist groups.S. This is the tenor of the discourse of the current government. But reliance on technology denial in an age of globalization is a thin reed on which to base security. but with one clear result: It has narrowed its own room for maneuver. military or civil- ian.25 Terrorism As terrorism has evolved. Iran’s grandstanding on Palestine as a Muslim issue is analogous to Arab states using it as an Arab issue—as a way of accruing domes- tic capital for their minority regimes deficient in political legiti- macy.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 50 50 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran Besides transfer and leakage from sources within the regime. In this view such states by definition seek WMD and consort with ter- rorists: Why would they not transfer WMD to terrorists who share their animosity toward the United States? The first thought of the . The danger here is that in crises such regimes losing con- trol become the captive of mobs and emotions. After 9/11. The regime has played the nationalist card in the nuclear issue.

”31 Nuclear proliferation. The former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati has . supports the crossover to Sunni Hamas and Islamic Jihad.”29 This record and reputation.33 Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah and its militia at a time when Lebanon is in flux and Syria is in retreat also exposes Tehran to crit- icism as a spoiler.S. while keeping its options open. Although it is no longer used routinely as an instrument of state policy.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 51 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 51 president after 9/11 was to wonder whether Iraq or Iran had some- thing to do with the attack. Iran’s support of terrorism is in fact a mixed record. make it a potentially dangerous adversary as well as a major threat as a supplier of such weapons to terrorists groups. homeland. Iran still actively supports Hezbollah. Pre- venting proliferation to such states became a means of preventing their transfer to terrorists.”28 Since 1984 Iran has been labeled a state sponsor of terrorism. As President Bush said in a 2005 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy. Iran has by no means dispensed with terrorism completely. together with its WMD ambitions and its—at best—ambiguous nuclear pro- gram.34 Characteristically. and in recent years it has been promoted to being “the most active state sponsor of terrorism. a serious enough matter in itself. is doubly so when the potential prolifera- tor has the profile of Iran. government reports esti- mate that “only Iran appears to have the possible future motivation to use terrorist groups in addition to its own state agent.32 Such sup- port is now focused on the Middle East in general. to plot against the U.27 Since 9/11 the idea is that because of these relationships and their possible role as enablers of terrorists’ WMD ambitions. As Sena- tor Richard Lugar (R-IN) put it. “The possibility of a nuclear weapons capable Iran is particularly grave because of the Iranian regime’s connections to terrorists.”30 U. “We’re determined to deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their ter- rorist allies who would use them without hesitation. rogue states need to be dealt with severely. the regime in Tehran seeks to have it both ways: to show that terrorism is a thing of the past. and (allegedly) through it and on its own.S.

Currently Iran is sus- pected of arming Sunni and Shiite groups in Iraq.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 52 52 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran argued that even terrorism in the past was “not in the interest of the country. with Europe. any more that Sad- dam Hussein earlier. Iranian officials initially denied providing safe haven to Al Qaeda and later suggested that they would be repatriated on a selective basis or tried in Iran. The aim is to bleed the United States and Great . Iran has used any group that can further its interests.”36 Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have had contacts and cooperated before 9/11.S. providing them with arms. technology (through the cut-out and conduit of Hezbol- lah). irrespective of sectarian affiliation or polit- ical orientation. the Mujahaddin (Islamic guerrilla fighters).”35 Hezbollah is also a political party in Lebanon with members sitting in Parliament. control of the Iranian opposition force. which clearly seeks WMD.S.” attributing responsibility to “those who were against bal- anced and active relations . interests throughout the world would be attacked and that “we can build an atom bomb and we should have [atom bombs].37 Iran gave the impression that it was holding on to Al Qaeda operatives as a bargaining card. would transfer WMD technology to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not normally considered comparable to Al Qaeda. possi- bly for trading against U. and training. in Iraq. as well as sensitivity to Israel’s capacity to retal- iate and to its own position in Lebanese politics. however. is Iran’s pro- vision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda elements escaping from Afghanistan in 2002–2003 and inconsistent statements about whether or not Al Qaeda elements were in Iran. The most serious development. from Al Qaida to Hezbollah to various doomsday cults. as evidenced by its link with Al Qaeda and through Hezbollah with Islamic Jihad and Hamas. which raised questions about Tehran’s motivations. who would have the motive and capacity to seek out nuclear weapons.” At the same time Iran reports comments from the Secretary-General of Hezbollah saying that if Iran were attacked. U..38 There is no reason to believe that Iran today. but such statements raise doubts and give credence to one analyst’s observation that “there are numerous groups.. As a result Hezbollah has shown restraint.

signal Iran’s regional leverage.S. might feel emboldened by its sponsor’s new capabilities and act in ways expecting support from Tehran. Iran has never paid a price for this involve- ment dating from the Marine bombing in Beirut 1983 through Al Khobar in 1996. In the process Iran is abetting the diffusion of technology (such as shaped charges and infra-red bombs) in precisely the way it did from Lebanon to the West Bank and Gaza.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 53 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 53 Britain. strikes in the future cannot be discounted. however. or an insouciance about the ability to get away with it through calculated ambiguity and indirection. is only one of the ways that links with terrorists might increase dangers from proliferation.39 Relations with such groups are essentially tactical.42 Neither explanation— ignorance or brinksmanship—is reassuring about Iran’s use of terror- ists and its likely policies once it has a nuclear capability. This opportunistic attitude is quite consistent with Iranian oper- ating style. together with the cur- rent policy of ambiguity toward that group. for example.41 Using ties with terrorists as deterrence against U. Iranian links with Al Qaeda. Analysts differ on whether nuclear weapons would have a sobering effect on . and the over- lap of interest is not total. suggest either a degree of ignorance about the intensity of feeling on this issue in the United States. No government that wanted to survive would hand over to such groups the means and the decisions that could affect its own vital national security interests. Direct transfer. Impact of a Nuclear Capability on Iran’s Behavior Would possessing a nuclear weapons capability lead to greater restraint or more aggressive policies in Iran? How would the acqui- sition of nuclear weapons affect Iran’s goals or behavior? Even a risk-averse state might be emboldened by a new capability.40 In the past Iran has used its ties with Hezbollah (armed with Katushya missiles) as a threat to deter Israeli strikes against Iran. Hezbollah. Simply put. and keep the United States bogged down and unwilling to consider targeting Iran.

by widening the dispute by stirring regional instability. At the least. Iranian officials have made some characteristically veiled threats: If the United States continued its (diplomatic) pressure.43 Broadly speaking. perhaps by seeking to extend deterrence to them. Islamic Iran has made it a prac- tice in crises to destabilize the region by threatening hor- izontal escalation. new capabilities might stimulate more radical elements (especially in the Guards) to argue for a more ambitious set of policies.46 In the current impasse between Iran and the United States and the EU-3. Iran would . the threat coming from an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is multifaceted and could include the following elements: • Iran might be tempted to support terrorist groups such as Hezbollah more openly. neither eventuality can be completely discounted. its decision-making culture. irrespective of orientation. • A more activist belligerent Iran might seek to use its nuclear weapons to sanctuarize its homeland from reprisal. and on the degree of risk- taking states would be willing to run given the heightened stakes.44 • Iran’s strategic culture (its experience of Iraq’s surprise attack in 1980.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 54 54 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran all states. and its oper- ating style) is likely to determine the command system it sets up for its nuclear capability. or by threatening states friendly to the United States.45 • Iran’s track record. even without a nuclear capability. is not a model of restraint. there are grounds for concern. but in light of its opportunism and given the uncertainties as to how a new major military capability might influence behav- ior. Given the likelihood that the Revolutionary Guards will be the custodians of this new capability and that they see WMD as offensive weapons rather than deterrents. Iran has tended to be conscious of its own mili- tary weakness and has avoided running risks.

In assessing the 1993–1994 North Korean case. Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Option? Iran has been clearly influenced by other proliferators. Iran may have asked itself: “Do . and research and development of WMD. • Despite its far-flung borders and more than a dozen neighbors. That Iran’s conventional capabilities have remained limited and barely developed since 1988 therefore has dangerous implications. 48 Emphasis on missiles and possibly nuclear weapons might give Iranian leaders the false impression that such weapons are somehow more elastic in their uses than is warranted by the experience so far. and in stretching their uses. domestic production of arms. Iran has invested heavily in missiles. there is room for doubt about what a nuclear-capable Iran would threaten. even though none of the regional threats it faces are likely to be unconventional. In looking for new and novel uses to compensate for their conventional inad- equacies. Iran would thus leave itself with no other practical option except threat or actual use of such weapons.”47 In light of current and past threats to hold the region hostage. This threat would be reinforced domestically by a consideration of sunk costs: Of what use are these weapons if they cannot be applied practically in all contingencies? A balanced conventional force in Iran would be more reassuring to Iran’s neighbors and the international community. Iran runs the risk of lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 55 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 55 have “no choice but to agitate conditions for America and to endanger its interests.” Iran has indicated that a refer- ral to the UNSC could result in regional repercussions: “The region needs stability and the smoke of any escala- tion in the region will hurt their own eyes.

51 Periodically. However.” suggesting (like Saddam Hussein) that uncertainty about Iran’s capabilities serves as a deterrent.50 There are grounds for assuming Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons. the military in the form of the Revolutionary Guards appears to revive this thinking. This implies that it is not a bargaining chip but an insurance policy unlikely to be given up. is the perceived centrality of nuclear weapons as the guarantor of regime security. the need for deterrence vis-à-vis the United States.” such comments have since been repudiated.53 Former Guards commander Mohsen Rezai criticized the negotiators for reducing Iran’s deterrent capability by cooperating with inspectors and “turn- ing over our country’s top intelligence documents. which may or may not be applicable to Iran.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 56 56 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran you get international cooperation by cooperating with safeguards or do you get cooperation by high-powered confrontation and bar- gaining?”49 What is striking about the North Korean case. and the possible political benefits domes- tically in shoring up the regime are all possible reasons for seeking nuclear weapons. when Iranian officials made several statements about the necessity for WMD and specifically references to chemical weapons as “the poor man’s atomic weapon. Iran’s quest for status and regional influence.55 . by extension. Iran’s own statements are at best contradictory and reflect the aim of exploiting ambiguity for strategic purposes.52 There are also reports that the Guards and military strategists are convinced that only a nuclear Iran can assume its place as a major regional power and adequately deter a possible attack from the United States or Israel. how- ever. After a rocky start in the 1980s. In 1998 secret comments by the Guards Commander General Safavi—to the effect that Iran needed to reconsider its participation in international conventions banning WMD in light of the threat posed by Israel—were leaked and never convincingly repudiated.54 Some conservatives have also noted the importance of cultivating or simulating “irrationality” in bargaining and. deterrence. a nuclear weapons option might meet these needs equally well without the costs associated with overt pro- liferation.

which in their view means that “stability cannot be achieved” in the region. not just in terms of regional influ- ence. We are confident that our possession of these weapons will force these countries to seek the support of big powers. but also “their production would block our progress in other scientific and technological fields. national security.58 They further allege that Islam forbids nuclear weapons and that Supreme Leader Khamenei has issued a fatwa banning them. As proof of their intentions. even when a victim of Iraq’s chemical weapon attacks between 1983 and 1988.59 Rowhani has put the case more practically: Our decision not to possess weapons of mass destruction is strategic because we believe that these weapons will not pro- vide security for Iran. This will not serve our national security. Iranian leaders point to their refusal to countenance the development or use of chemical weapons.) Former defense minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani also opposed nuclear weapons. regional security will worsen. they will create big problems. They claim that Iran opposes WMD on principle. stating that “the .*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 57 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 57 Iranian officials insist that they have no nuclear weapons ambi- tions but also note Israel’s “dangerous” possession of nuclear weapons. nonetheless. that their own nuclear ambitions are peaceful. We absolutely do not want to blow up those bridges by mobi- lizing our resources to produce weapons of mass destruc- tion.57 They maintain that WMD have had no place in Iran’s defense strategy. and defense doctrines—a stance they argue is reflected in Iran’s adherence to all the relevant arms control treaties.”61 (Presumably this refers to the sanctions they would trigger. On the contrary. Iran exerted huge efforts during the past few years to build bridges of confidence with the states of the region. Consequently. with statements like “nuclear weapons do not solve any problems” because power comes from morale and unity.60 Earlier Rowhani argued that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms would come at too high a price.56 They insist.

given their concentrated power. gave the most detailed argument against nuclear weapons. It seems that the only thing that atomic bombs are capable of doing is to kill innocent people and incite public opinion against the country using these weapons. there is little discussion about the limited value of Israel’s nuclear weapons in dealing with the Arab states’ conventional threat or the two intifadas.” He saw no threats on Iran’s periphery necessitating nuclear weapons and believed that any such weapons Iran acquired would not be able to deal with either Russian or Israeli nuclear weapons. He argued that possession would not enhance a state’s prestige. defended the NPT despite its discriminatory nature. nor is there reference to the specificity of the Israeli case given the existence of an existential threat and the legacy of the Holocaust. not assure security. Curiously. and noted that for Iran nuclear weapons “would raise more threats against it. whereas. noting that Japan would not have been attacked if it had possessed nuclear weapons and that possession does not necessarily mean use. we follow a strategy of not having such a dangerous weapon. and the lit- tle discussion that exists is characterized by an alarming degree of ignorance or oversimplification.63 Iranians consistently emphasize Israel as a strategic alibi. Hard-line newspapers tend to argue for nuclear weapons on deterrence grounds. there is no public debate in Iran about the wisdom of acquiring nuclear weapons.64 As was discussed in chapter two.”66 There is a curious absence of serious con- sideration of the specific costs and benefits of nuclear weapons and no discussion of the relative cheapness of nuclear weapons.65 Oth- ers argue that nuclear weapons are of doubtful utility: “In fact it is not clear what the value of having atomic bombs is. Ali Akbar Salehi. by having nuclear weapons.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 58 58 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran problem is that we enjoy advanced technical know-how and the enemies develop a perception that we are after nuclear arms.”62 A former representative to the IAEA. to divert accusations from Iran’s own program and to defuse any potential regional criticisms. or that the costs of such programs typi- .

a missile program.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 59 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 59 cally come in spikes with modernization cycles. val- ues. Deterrence is discussed as a catch-all rather than relational concept. particularly the United States. and a quest for recognition as a member of the nuclear club. Iran’s own domestic politics. In the absence of strategic urgency. which has seen leaders exaggerate the program. may inhibit Tehran from appearing to halt or reverse it. So there is no detectable grand strategy but rather a determined push to get as close to a weapons capabil- ity as possible within the treaty and then see what happens.67 Nor is the util- ity of nuclear weapons for Iran’s specific security needs post- Saddam and post-Taliban discussed. Even more questionable is Iran’s intentional muddying of the issue of fuel supply security (which in principle is soluble with guarantees) and the issue of the fuel cycle itself.” making it “harder to resolve. It appears doubtful that Iran has decided definitively in favor of nuclear weapons. the discussion appears more to be about morale and status than defense. Miscalculation on both sides is thus a real risk. as if it were easily achieved and absent associated costs.”68 The arguments for a nuclear option (or nonweaponized deter- rence) are at least as strong as those for nuclear weapons. No clear distinction is possible in a country that emphasizes possessing the full fuel cycle. and its nuclear drive has been consis- tent with either. And the unwillingness of Iran’s inter- locutors.69 But Iran’s determined incrementalism can be upset by the dynamics of interactions. It makes a difference for policy whether Iran seeks nuclear weapons or just the option. Iran hopes to avoid paying too high a price for achieving a near capa- bility. . to give Iran space or cover for a retreat could further narrow options. the costs of getting nuclear weapons outside the treaty do not appear commensurate with the benefits for Iran. for their own dif- ferent reasons. “exaggerated Iran’s nuclear capability. In general. In playing the issue by ear with no irreversible commitments. Both goals would be consistent with the aims. and lessons of the regime. both the United States and Iran have. In an unhealthy dynamic.

71 Iran’s attempt to position itself to acquire a nuclear option is a classic case of nuclear hedging. which has been the focus of nego- tiations and the crux of the differences. ensures a close capability to produce weapons should such a decision be made. In its most advanced form. As Ariel Levite has noted: Nuclear hedging refers to a national strategy of maintaining. a viable option for the rel- atively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons. which once crossed. the Iraq model (covert weapons activities within the treaty).*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 60 60 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran Nuclear proliferation is traditionally visualized in terms of a threshold. Conceptualizing it as a continuum enables one to see vari- ous stages in the process of proliferation—a spectrum of possibil- ities comprising elements of various capabilities. or at least appearing to maintain. Iranian leaders have denied even seeking a capability. Given gradations short of a full weapons capability. unassem- bled. claiming that they “do not want to be close to producing them [weapons]. dramatically changes the status of a state.”70 Yet insistence on the fuel cycle. nuclear hedging involves nuclear fuel cycle facilities capable of producing fissionable materials (by way of uranium enrichment and/or plutonium separation) as well as the scientific and engineering expertise . the Japan model (a full civilian capability easily converted to weapons capability within the treaty). The possibilities are often referred to in shorthand as models: for example. change of status (nuclear/nonnu- clear) is less dramatic and more shaded. and the Israel model (weapons capability. in effect a Japanese model of a full spectrum of capabilities short of weaponization within the treaty—precisely what the EU-3 and the United States seek to deny it. outside the treaty) (see Figures 3 and 4 for details on these models). based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a rel- atively short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years. This so- called breakout option is implicit in what Iran seeks.

.S. security umbrella] . especially undeclared sites/facilities. security guarantees _ “declared capability” (2005) _ so far: no test of NW material from reactors. technology _ A. materials or _ uranium enrichment 2002 _ NWS option [“threshold”] Bargaining chip? _ withdrawal from NPT _ U. etc. How flexible is ultimate decision on NWS? Figure 4. Pathways. Security umbrella _ Virtual capability NORTH KOREA ISRAEL _ High demand / medium capability _ High demand/high capability _ Plutonium diverted _ Did not join NPT _ Enrichment – fissile material _ No inspections / safeguards _ No safeguards / inspections _ Declared withdrawal NPT _ Missile programs/submarines _ Declared NWS capability.. applied _ Space/missile programs _ Missiles _ Fuel-cycle ambitions _ Energy rationale _ U. Motivation and Capability Contrasted IRAN JAPAN _ Low demand / high capability _ High demand / medium capability _ NPT safeguards / inspections _ Peaceful use of N.e. missile _ Unassembled weapons capability _ Opaque nuclear doctrine _ No test [so far] _ Weaponization? _ [U.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 61 Fear of a Nuclear Iran | 61 Alternative Models Figure 3.” i. ready for “breakout” Iran uncertainties: state of nuclear capability.S. Thresholds.S.P. and Positions of Selected Nuclear-Capable States Unsafeguarded NWS Pakistan IRAN Declared outside treaty Tested Declared or virtual//opaque NPT safeguards capacity doctrine AP signatory Seeks full fuel cycle Missile/space program (Covert parallel fuel program?) Accepts constraints on fuel cycle ? Does not accept fuel Potential for “breakout” cycle constraints North Korea Japan model = (inside NPT) _ sign treaty _ develop nuclear infrastructure _ no safeguards _ energy rationale (diversification) _ no inspectors _ space/missile program Essential for _ “breakout”/expel inspectors _ plutonium economy state survival? _ plutonium 1994 _ “virtual capability.

74 This does not preclude a willingness to meet international concerns (that is.*ch3 8/3/06 8:37 AM Page 62 62 | Fear of a Nuclear Iran both to support them and to package their final product into a nuclear explosive charge. is how close to a weapons option Iran can prudently be allowed to get. to use its claimed capability as a bargaining card).72 IAEA Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei has suggested that “countries look at know-how as a deterrent. the weapon part is not far away. Iran can still take its time and drive closer to a fuel cycle capability by legally and gradually acquiring and building up under inspections its “nuclear know-how technology and materiel necessary to produce nuclear weapons some day if a dire strategic threat should arise. to maximize its opportunities within the NPT. but it does seek to drive a hard bargain that includes regime security guarantees.” Taking the thought one step further.73 The implication is that the appear- ance of full fuel cycle capabilities can itself achieve some of the functions or benefits of a nuclear deterrent. including neighbors. intelligence official has noted that a deterrent value need not come from a successful nuclear program but from convincing others. one U. Iran’s quest for a virtual capability is consistent with an inclination to hedge against an uncertain security future. Alternatively.S.”75 The critical question. and to brag about (and exaggerate) its technological and sci- entific progress at home. then. . of the existence of such a program. If you have nuclear material. and what can be done about it.

far from reassuring the interna- tional community. s tactics and negotiating style. Thus.S. It came at a sensitive time. Tehran swiftly sought to limit damage and decided to deal with the revelations and attendant inquiry from within the treaty. have exacerbated the problem of trust. sense of confidence that was manifest in planning the next phase of the war against terrorism and prolif- eration of WMD in Iraq. From Damage Limitation to Confrontation The surprise revelation of its undeclared nuclear activities in 2002 caught Tehran unprepared. Iran’s policy has been conscious of developments elsewhere. with victory in Afghanistan feeding a U.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 63 4 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy IIran’ran has improvised a strategy to deal with the “outing of its nuclear facilities” undeclared to the IAEA for nearly two decades. questions remain as to the extent and peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. as a way of gaining time to devise a strategy. Libya’s decision to give up its WMD activities in 2003 on the one hand and North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT and claim possession of nuclear weapons on the other clearly contrasted 63 . four years after the issue first surfaced.

• Iran’s receptivity to the EU-3 and cooperation with the IAEA has varied with Tehran’s sense of vulnerability or confidence. and redefine obligations put tactics before strategy. negotiators tied their own hands in the negotiations. paral- leled its behavior toward the IAEA inspectors. • Iran saw concessions as dangerous.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 64 64 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy with Iran’s course. • Domestic divisions also led to counterproductive grand- standing by negotiators. Iran’s tendency to seek to win every round of negotiations. starting a slippery slope to more (U.) demands. reluctantly and partially confirming only what was uncovered. culminating in regime change. • A certain narcissism (“how am I doing?”) is evident in Iran’s approach to the world. Iran’s approach has several defining elements. • Having “talked up the issue” domestically after 2002. leading to misjudgments about other states’ likely reactions. which is somewhere between the two. legalistic and hair-splitting. revelations of the extent of the activities of the AQ Khan network in sales of nuclear equipment and designs to Iran put Tehran under further pressure to admit the totality of its program. formally correct but unhelpful. renegotiate agreements. Taken together these attitudes sug- gested that Iran had something to hide. • Iran’s negotiating style. Tehran continued to cooperate with the IAEA and the EU-3. At the same time. manufacture crises. negotiations reduced trust rather than built confidence. weakening any advantage Iran might have gained by the process of formal cooperation with the IAEA and the EU-3. while insisting on its rights to technology as an NPT member. • In the end.S. . Unwilling to imitate Libya or North Korea.

Nonetheless. without crossing the threshold of actual conflict. Tehran accepted inten- sified inspections and signed the stiffer Additional Protocol. gave Iran reason for increasing self-confidence.S. giving inspectors increased access to sites. Iran was seeking to reassure the international commu- nity of its benign intentions and to “remove the pretext” for U. also increased Iran’s sense of its own leverage (not least with new con- sumers India and China). position in Iraq and the resurfacing of the North Korea crisis. So far Iran’s policy has been to push the door open as far as it can.S. The rise of oil prices and the geopolitical sensitivity of the region.S. Iran’s officials argued that they had only been guilty of acts of omission (a failure to report activities). sanctions imposed . aggression. if necessary. Iran and the Negotiations Once its undeclared activities were revealed. International negotiators have sought to force Iran to choose between the full fuel cycle and confrontation. giving Tehran the cushion of windfall revenues. diverting resources away from Iran. In extenuation they argued that required declarations had not been made because U. Against the backdrop of unwelcome revelations about the AQ Khan network and Libya’s capitulation came the deterioration of the U.S.1 Iran believed that its intrinsic importance would enable it to divide the EU–U.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 65 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 65 The evolving strategic context after 2003. and Russia through native shrewd- ness and skill. Iran feels more secure and confident in 2006 than it did in 2002 and is thus willing to take the initiative in rejecting a freeze on all enrichment activities and more willing to risk confrontation. however. not the commission of impermissible activities.2 In acting to demonstrate its good faith. Iran also expected support from the non-aligned countries in the UN and IAEA. Having spent over a decade of diplo- macy depicting the denial of technology as a North–South issue.

4 Iran saw the crisis in autumn of 2003 as a possible pretext for the United States “to carry out a new Iraq in Iran.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 66 66 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy much earlier would have been extended to those entities cooper- ating with Iran. with only mixed success. (This agreement essentially suspended enrichment-related activities as well as enrichment itself. which had dealt with it when it had been a routine issue. Iranian negotiators accepted confidence-building measures. this time accepting the Paris agreement with the EU-3.3 To buy time to devise a strategy. we should .”5 Iran sought a way out and grasped the lifeline thrown by the EU-3 initiative in the Tehran agreement. As one reformist noted. Causing other countries to have concerns means closing the paths to interaction” and hence failing in devel- .7 Iranian officials defended the EU-3 negotiations domestically by noting that without them there would have been a crisis with the Board of Governors (BoG) of the IAEA and “the great contracts that Iran signed with their [IAEA] countries in the field of oil and gas would have been impossible. As chief negotiator Rowhani stated. The scenario repeated itself in autumn 2004. when Iran reacted again to its isolation and the ultimatum of the IAEA. the principal organ on security.”8 More broadly.) Since then Iran has been trying to bal- ance and reconcile access to the full fuel cycle and avoidance of an international crisis. Iran has often acted as if it wants to cheat—to be a party to the NPT but not abide by all its rules and to claim its benefits but be ambiguous about its responsibilities. accept the concomitant restrictions as well. Iran needed to have “constructive and positive interaction” with the world for its economic development.. if such declarations had been made. In not wishing to choose between the two.”6 To bridge the gap between its quest for technology development (that is. as the chief negotiator. “We have no other choice. the Secretary of the SNSC.. This action effectively took the dossier away from the Foreign Ministry and the AEO. Iran should either accept or reject the NPT: “If we accept it. Iran designated Hasan Rowhani. “not give up their rights”). and its desire to avoid a crisis with the rest of the world.

Nobody can end it.13 Fur- thermore. dismantling facili- ties).”12 At the same time. consisting of threats to resume enrichment and reminding the EU-3 of their stake in a successful outcome and the dangers of a breakdown.14 Iranian negotiators have tried to show that their hands are tied domestically.15 By cooperating with the IAEA. As suggested earlier. Iran was aware of the constraints on Europe. and both its cooperation and progress on answering various questions relating to its nuclear activities ensured continuous pressure on Tehran.11 In an interview. These periodic reports (eight between mid-2002 and October . because some in Iran would prefer a cri- sis. it will be a great failure for Europe and multilateralism as a whole. at least postponing the crisis while probing to see what benefits it could extract in exchange for renouncing the controversial technology.9 The message was clear: Iran should not cause a crisis over the issue of enrichment that would impair its overall develop- ment prospects. Russia. These regular reports put Iran on notice.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 67 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 67 opment.” This implies that Iran cannot renounce the right to it in principle and would have extreme diffi- culty reducing its current capacity (for example. which negotiated with the United States looking over its shoulder.10 Iran thus used the EU-3 channel to try to avoid making a stark choice between the two goals. Iran’s leverage has been limited. Therefore the red line of uranium enrichment is not negotiable because it is the “national will and is the establishment’s decision. Rowhani stated that “if the talks break down and the issue goes to the Security Council. this Rowhani/Rafsanjani view is not universally shared. although freezing it in place would be politically more feasible. enabling them to make a point of principle and stopping inter- action with others. and the United States on these issues—only differences in approach— so there was little room for creating or exploiting division. Iran wanted to puncture the sense of crisis and close the special nature of the inspections and cyclical periodic reporting and accounting to the IAEA Board of Governors. Iran was aware that little separated the EU-3.

and infor- mation from other sources. or the most recent on plutonium. In the course of these inspections. Ostensibly because of the failure of the EU-3 to close the nuclear dossier in the IAEA (an unrealistic expectation given the number of unanswered and new questions appearing almost daily). The smoking gun remains elusive. work on laser enrichment. Iran did not declare Natanz enrichment. Iran threatened in March 2004 to begin testing its uranium production facility at Isfahan.19 Iran also shrugged off the IAEA’s June 2004 report critical of Iran. no activity as such that is proscribed) with which Iran can be for- mally charged.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 68 68 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy 2005) ensured that Iran had to get its story straight or risk contra- diction from technical analyses. and whether it bought weapons plans from the AQ Khan net- work as the same time as Libya. it is possible that late declarations about activity in tunnels and air defense around Natanz might have an innocent explanation. With the United States embroiled in Iraq. purchases from the AQ Khan network. numerous anomalies. . Iran argued that this facility had not been covered by the Tehran agree- ment. The Tehran agreement with the EU-3 in October 2003 soon became a subject of contention. So. there is little (that is. apart from the noncompliance with safeguard obligations. as might the contam- ination of the imported P2 centrifuge from Pakistan. It also left open questions about the source of highly enriched uranium. But despite these inspection problems. Tehran felt freer to harden its terms. incon- sistencies.17 Iran later announced its intention of resuming “the manu- facture and assembly of components”18 while affirming interest in continuing discussions for a long-term agreement with the EU-3. and late or partial declarations were noted. whether and when Iran obtained and used P2 centrifuge technol- ogy.16 Negotiating Style and Confidence Building Iran’s tactics have exacerbated problems of trust and reassurance. environmental swipes.

24 Iran’s tendency to seek a foot in the door by exempting some centrifuges or preenrichment was now becoming a stop-and-go strategy that saw periodic crises and . Reflecting how disconnected Tehran was from international realities. This resulted in the adop- tion of a milder resolution in the IAEA the same month. looked for a more comprehensive solution. the agreement was depicted as a big victory. which specifically covered enrichment-related activity. Tehran’s negotiating style was again in evidence.22 Then. To improve its negotiating position. In March it indicated it wanted to expand quality control checks and maintenance of nonessential enrichment cen- trifuge parts to essential centrifuge parts that had been sealed by the IAEA under the suspension agreement. Faced with a solid EU-3 front and the threat of referral to UNSC. at the last minute. a move that was rejected by the EU-3.”20 Iran and the EU-3 came to a new agreement in November 2004 in Paris. economic.S. and security context and implying U. Iran responded: “We are not satisfied because we believe this was the time to close the file. presidential elections. it sped up its uranium enrichment program leading up to negotiations. Iran insisted that twenty centrifuges be excluded from the suspension. Finally. This Paris agreement. embedding the nuclear issue in the broader political. reached during the U.21 Iran agreed to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment pending a final agreement. Resumption therefore was inevitable—only the date was uncer- tain.S. This interpretation was not supported by the letter of the Paris agreement. By May Iranian negotia- tors told their EU-3 counterparts that their understanding was that conversion of uranium to gas (preenrichment) does not amount to enrichment and hence was not covered by the Paris agreement. Iran again sought to expand the area of permis- sible activity.”23 Much the same pattern was repeated in 2005. Iran stepped back from the brink.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 69 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 69 calling for more proactive cooperation by Iran as well as asking Iran to reconsider its heavy water and uranium conversion facility (UCF) programs. involvement directly or indirectly. in which Iran “managed to defuse the threats against [it] and to defend [its] rights.

its nego- tiators say. and making last-minute demands is tactically impressive but strategi- cally counterproductive. comments made to Japan TV by Deputy Head of the AEO Moham- mad Saidi come across as petulant and self-serving: “The Japanese have never shown us the pictures of their centrifuge machinery.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 70 70 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy new agreements. inconsistencies. “We have one principle: for mass destruction weapons. nothing more. For example. the basis is conventions. exploiting or ingen- iously creating loopholes. The result is that the EU-3 is disinclined to give Iran the benefit of the doubt and feels that Iran bears the burden of proof to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions. Iran has done little to increase either its popular- ity in the UN or its credibility with its interlocutors. Iran’s insistence on reciprocity and nondiscrimination evokes little sympathy. and grudg- ing corrections).”27 In light of this record of obstructionism and legalistic nitpicking. not to suspend ura- nium enrichment permanently.26 Together with tactics similar to those used with the IAEA (delay.25 In essence this is what occurred after August 2005 when Tehran resumed conversion while insisting on its continued interest in negotiations. The EU-3 concluded from this that Iran’s negotiating behavior would need to be revised if progress were going to be made. the way these negotiations have been handled has only accentuated mistrust.” or “We are not bound to put forward solutions beyond what international reg- ulations and IAEA safeguards require from us. half-truths. Iran’s negotiating style of reopening agreements. The danger of this was that Iran might slice away at understandings by proceeding with conversion before an inter- national response and then agree to another suspension. Thus. nothing less.29 Iran’s unwillingness to suspend work on the heavy water reactor at Arak (suggested by the IAEA) and its insistence on resuming centrifuge production in .”28 While Iranians argue that the objective of the negotiations was to create trust. If they do we will show you ours. Iranian behavior has not been reassuring. in each case advancing its program further without incurring a response. manufacturing crises and deadlines.

31 Director-General Al Baradei. the IAEA. but Iran remains con- vinced that compromise or weakness is self-defeating because the United States will be unwilling “to take yes for an answer. It “chipped away at the confidence issue” and the legal- istic approach “created needless suspicions. razing the entire facilities at Lavizan (2004). Iranian offi- . Kelayeh. Dissatisfied with the wording of an IAEA resolution.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 71 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 71 mid-2004 further eroded trust.” Iran’s problematic reporting raises questions about its motives.34 Iran’s activities delaying access to sites (2004). a con- fidence deficit has been created. cuts both ways.”32 The result was that Russia joined the consensus on Iran’s suspicious behavior. in Javier Solana’s words. however. Iran has. and it is therefore essential that Iran works closely with the agency in a proactive manner. which it con- sidered too critical.35 Iran’s tactics match this obstructionism.36 Later in 2004 as part of its brinksman- ship with the EU on the question of suspension of enrichment and possible referral of Iran’s case to the Security Council.” Iran’s restrictions on the inspections of Parchin. explicitly linking the two. One explanation for its contradictory. The French president too appeared exasperated with Iran. and threatening behavior is that it fears a true accounting of its past activities would betray the fact that those activities breached the fundamental injunction against acquiring nonexclusively peaceful nuclear know- how and capability. and then refusing to answer questions are inconsistent with any attempt to reassure the international commu- nity about its program. Statements after the failure to give the right dates for experimentation with plutonium—to the effect that the activities were not the same as earlier reported—simply stretch credulity. initially barring access alto- gether to Parchin (2005).30 From the view of the international community. Iran delayed a visit of the inspectors to Tehran. and Lavizan fed this distrust. “a lot of ground to make up” in building trust.33 This question of trust. Iran’s behavior has managed to drive the EU-3. and many non- aligned states closer to the United States. noted that the onus was on Iran: “In view of the past unde- clared nature of significant aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. Russia. grudging. a neutral figure.

accounts for the schizo- phrenic nature of Iran’s response. together with domestic divisions. Iran’s record of deceptions leaves open the possibility that there may in fact be less to the program than meets the eye. Salehi has observed that “the success of the diplomatic authorities will depend on reducing the suspension period. Suspension of enrichment activities was tied to the duration of the negotia- tions.37 Iran also tied the timing of its ratification of the AP to the resumption of “full operations” (that is. It is notable that Iran uses its safeguards agreements and inspections explicitly as lever- age.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 72 72 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy cials threatened to remove IAEA cameras at some sites and start a series of steps commencing with the “nonratification” of the Addi- tional Protocol that they had provisionally signed. Iran might cease cooper- ation and leave the international community even further in the dark about its programs and aims.39 This. yet these were open-ended. Assuming the absence of a covert program.”42 AEO head Reza Aghazadeh noted the “imbalance in com- . enrichment at Natanz). was frozen by the Paris accords. Iran has had to balance two considera- tions: how to maintain (and develop) its nuclear program and how to do so without creating an international consensus against it. As long as negotiations contin- ued until July 2005. Another tactic was Iran’s periodic deadlines for “progress” and accusations of the EU-3 “dragging out” the talks deliberately.41 Essentially Iran could end the negotiations and be referred to the UNSC or try to resume enrichment while continuing negotiations and risk being referred to the UNSC (something the new government chose to do in August by resum- ing conversion activities unilaterally). Iran’s enrichment program. including conversion activities.40 Iran’s periodic deadlines for ending the negotiations stem from a basic asymmetry in the structure of the negotiations. which implies that if pushed too far. the total freeze on enrichment proved painful.38 While asserting inalienable rights and alleging conspiracies to deny it the means for development. Iran tried unsuccessfully in the 2003–2005 period to narrow the areas cov- ered by the term enrichment.

security guarantees.S. in effect. For the EU-3 the aim has been to get Iran to commit to a permanent cessation of all fuel cycle activities in exchange for a package that would include proliferation-resistant nuclear tech- nologies (light water reactors). the EU-3 served as a buffer and intermediary. For Iran. even if subjected to military strikes. which alone could provide the guarantees that Iran seeks.44 In judging success (at least until July 2005) one can agree with Rowhani that delaying the crisis is not necessarily its avoidance: “If the danger is not removed com- pletely. then one cannot label this delay a success. refusal to go beyond public threat. It is not to dispar- age the potential importance of the EU as a strategic commercial partner to note that in the final analysis. guaranteed fuel supplies at reason- able prices. and threats of open-ended crises. For Tehran the indispensable goal has been recognition of the right to the full fuel cycle.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 73 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 73 mitments. To that end. .”45 The negotiations with the EU-3 were. including brinksmanship. Iran would need to deal with the United States. Iran sought to establish the principle of the right to enrichment and to demonstrate that this right is irreversible in that Iran has mastered the full fuel cycle and cannot unlearn it.” saying that negotiations might last several years and the freeze is “affecting the process of our activities. a holding action and a substitute for direct contacts with the United States. Iran resorted to many of the same tactics it used with the IAEA.46 Constructive ambiguity has led to differences on precisely how enrichment is defined or what it constitutes and so enrichment has been left to the IAEA to define. given the U. injured pride. In its negotiations with the EU-3. Iran has offered to voluntarily suspend enrichment (with the defi- nitional uncertainty noted) for a limited time to enhance confi- dence.”43 The negotiations bought time for both sides. of course unless in the end we sit down at the negotiations table with the first rate power [United States]. it was an opportunity to set into motion diplomacy that was lack- ing. and trade and diplomatic incentives. For the EU-3.

calling a possible failure a setback for the EU in specific and mul- tilateralism in general. It rec- ognizes the EU link with the United States but is uncertain how to use this bridge.52 One part of the negotiations after November 2004 focused on how to reassure the international community of Iran’s peaceful intentions.50 This attitude can spill over into Iran’s overestimation of its posi- tion: “Politically the Europeans need us. they argue.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 74 74 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy Iran has sought to depict its right to technology under Article IV of the NPT as an issue for all developing countries. they are not acceptable for the EU- 3 in this case. hangs the future weight of Europe in international affairs. “If we manage to succeed and finish this issue. They have called on Europe to stand up more to the United States.48 Iran has also been unsure how to treat the EU countries. enhanced inspections.49 Iranian officials have noted the EU’s stake in the success of the negotiations. who would be affected by any denial of Iran’s rights. and the EU-3 is convinced that any level of activity could be used to shield . should they reach an impasse. In light of their suspicions about Iran’s aims. On the success of the negotiations.47 However. Although technical fixes are theoretically possible. the EU-3 was convinced that the phrase objective guar- antees (which figures in the Paris agreement of November 2004) could have only one meaning: complete abstention from the fuel cycle including the dismantling of existing facilities. especially at Natanz and also the heavy water plant at Arak. As Rowhani noted. Iran’s tactics have left it with few defenders among the nonaligned states. seeking to divide the EU-3 (and Russia) and even the United States by dangling the enticing prospects of participa- tion in Iran’s future economic and nuclear development. important ties with Europe will follow. Iran argued that this could be managed by monitors. But there is a recognition of Iran’s stake in the outcome as well.”51 At the same time. thus jeopardizing the NPT itself. and the like but that it would not budge from the use of the full fuel cycle.” insisted negotiator Sirus Nasseri. Iran threatened to go public with its own “reasonableness” in the negotiations. The necessary level of trust does not exist.

*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 75 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 75 a covert program. It also believes that any level of activity in any agreement would soon be the subject of reopened negotiation by Iran. pressure and hostility as long-standing and not exclusively or principally tied to the nuclear issue. There is little likelihood that this will be acceptable to Iran. Iran sees it as seeking to internationalize its dispute with Tehran. Former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati articulated the slippery slope argument against any concessions: “They are bully- ing us and if we surrender and retreat in the face of blackmail. Iranians recognize that “the Europeans and the Agency [IAEA] are what we see on the surface. Iran sees U. claiming that “nuclear technology is only a pretext. Iran is unwilling to deal with the United States because Tehran believes that enter- ing any negotiations with the United States would be a trap in which open-ended discussions would destabilize Iranian society while U.54 Regarding the nego- tiations.S. If the Americans could not use this pretext. approach. this is in effect shutting down Iran as a country. manipulation of the media would make it impossible for Iran to terminate them.56 Therefore an Iranian unwillingness to engage without upfront concessions from the United States paral- lels the U.S. they . Iran’s View of the U.”55 Nevertheless. Iran has little leeway domestically to forgo technology that has been depicted as indispensable for its development. Cessa- tion meaning no activity is thus much easier to monitor than some activity. The EU-3 backed by the United States will find it difficult to accept Iran’s access to the fuel cycle without very firm assurances. which would creatively reinterpret it to its advantage. “help could be positive from our point of view.S.S.S. The Americans are the ones we really have to deal with” and that U. “act- ing first and thinking later.”53 In addition.”57 Iranian leaders believe that the issue between the two countries goes beyond access to particular technology. Role in the Negotiations Iran sees the United States today as an unpredictable power.

S. . The Libyan model means following the path of recog- nizing Israel.S. reliance on relative bargain- ing position and overall power is bound to take priority.”58 They believe that even if Iran adhered to the AP and resolved its problems with the IAEA.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 76 76 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy would resort to other excuses such as support for terrorism and violation of human rights.S. Given the mutual distrust and lack of flexibility.63 The U. The notion of a slippery slope inhibits any Iranian concession. aims of regime change. Tehran is convinced that granting concessions is the thin end of the wedge for the United States to multiply its demands. aims: “The enemies of Iran are bent on changing the regime in Iran as they had in the eastern and western states.”61 Iranian diplomats insisted that negotiations could not precede a policy change by the United States: “A country that expresses an interest in negotiations can not at the same time talk of regime change.”65 For Iran to embrace the Libyan model then is for Iran to cease seeking to be an Islamic revolutionary role model and to relinquish its aspirations for regional leadership.60 Army Com- mander Mohammed Salimi was in no doubt about U. Rowhani observed trenchantly that the Libyan model “does not mean that they would only assem- ble all their centrifuges and put them on a ship and send them to Washington. Iran’s nego- tiations with the EU-3 (with the United States present but not vis- ible) hinges on trust between both Iran and the EU-3 as well as Iran and the United States... giving Iran little reassurance that compro- mise would be rewarded or alter ultimate U. U.59 A similar view is reflected in Iran’s hesitancy about giving access to military sites (not covered by the AP)—that allowing access to military sites would constitute the thin end of the wedge to open-ended inspections of all sites. means [cutting] off relations with liberation move- ments in the world. But as has been noted repeatedly.. pressure would continue. Iran’s behavior and negotiating style have not been conducive to build- ing that trust and may even have eroded it. aims in Iran remain opaque at best.64 It is clear that Iran does not want to follow the path of Libya in its relations with the United States.”62 Ultimately.S.

This . including President Ahmadinejad. During the 2003–2004 period. Iran believed it could take a tougher line and did so by reject- ing the EU-3 package offered in late July as insufficient and resuming conversion activities. but by mid-2005 Tehran had adopted a more militant and confrontational approach. Iran sought to induce key states such as India and China to consider the advantages of cooperation with Iran.S. Iran intended to buy time and deflect an attack by showing a cooperative spirit and using a moderate tone.66 Iran’s resumption of conversion in August 2005 ended the nego- tiations with the EU-3. A new ultranationalist government and swollen oil rev- enues together with Iran’s sense that the United States and the EU had become distracted and weakened had turned the tide. Two IAEA resolutions in September did little to change Tehran’s position. Iran’s harder line reflected a new ultranationalism in Tehran among some elements.67 Tehran has sought to widen the negotiations to include the nonaligned and other members of the IAEA board rather than limit them to the EU-3. hoping to pre- vent such a referral. Iran also increased its cooperation with the IAEA in October by granting access to Parchin and allowing inter- views with some officials.–EU line on forbidding enrichment as an encroachment on the rights of NPT members—an argument that resonates with Brazil and other nonaligned states. Accord- ingly. The second reso- lution (September 24. Iran indicated its willingness to resume negotiations with the EU-3 “without preconditions” (that is. with- out prejudice to its continuing conversion activities). Iran has offered international participation in its nuclear program. 2005) threatened eventual referral to the Security Council for “noncompliance” but gave a mixed message in that it was adopted by vote rather than consensus. but the precise meaning of this offer is unclear. which considered conversion termination a precondition for further discussions.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 77 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 77 Iran’s negotiating behavior changed in mid-2005. Iran intensified its diplomacy especially with the nonaligned states. Iran also stepped up its campaign to depict the U. By leveraging the tighter oil market.

Ahmadinejad’s speech on the UN’s sixtieth anniversary and his statement in Tehran on Qods (Jerusalem Day) that Israel should be “wiped off the map” reflected insensitivity to international opinion and diplomacy. This meeting left open the next phase but showed considerable support for the resumption of negotiations with the EU-3.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 78 78 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy hard-line stance is evident in the tougher diplomatic policy and the more reckless rhetoric. with the precondition of Iran halting enrichment- related activity. Iran invested hopes in divisions between Europe and the United States and the nonaligned movement (NAM). The only prospect was in the Russian proposal backed by the EU-3. which was intended to discover whether there was any basis for a resumption of negotia- tions cut off since August. industrial-scale enrich- ment (for which there is no evidence that Iran can actually accom- plish technologically). Advocating the elimination of another state also did little to dampen concerns about the implications of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. showing some progress but pointing to continued unanswered questions. Iran also resorted to the usual threats: suspending cooperation with the agency on inspections and the “voluntary implementation” of the Additional Protocol and invoking a Majles bill requiring suspension in the event of referral. but Iran’s position toward this pro- posal appeared equivocal. It is doubtful whether either of these speeches gained Iran any new votes. Iran announced the resumption of research on enrichment. Al Baradei’s report on Iran’s compliance was mixed. was another step on the road to Iran’s referral to the Secu- rity Council. but playing for time. going beyond a toughening of terms. On January 3. meaning small-scale experimentation and development of a pilot project. neither embracing nor rejecting it. Tehran followed this up with the repeated threat to end voluntary cooperation with the agency in the event of referral and to move to full. though calmer.68 The IAEA Board of Governors meeting of November 24.69 . But Iran showed no signs of recognizing this in the December Vienna meeting with the EU-3. 2006.

to convince the Europeans to accept small-scale enrichment in Iran for an indefi- . with the president threatening withdrawal from the NPT only to be contradicted by the Foreign Ministry. Iran’s bottom line was encouragement of international cooperation in enrichment abroad. Iran’s faith in support from Russia and China had proven to be. leaving the pre- cise date for decision after the Director-General’s report on March 6. a mirage.”72 (Al Baradei’s report for the March meeting noted that Iran was testing centrifuges and had plans to begin installation of the first of 3.000 centrifuges could be operational. in Rowhani’s critical assessment. Iran’s threat to move to enrichment from the current limited 164-centrifuge capa- bility to an industrial scale appeared to be yet another bluff. its ambiguity toward the Russian proposal con- tinued in various meetings.000 centrifuges later in 2006.73 A last-minute attempt to keep the diplo- matic option alive came on the eve of the March Board of Gover- nors meeting.) The Iran- ian position appeared to be in disarray as well. Larijani sought.71 Iran pressed ahead regardless of the fact that it was digging itself a deeper hole by immediately declaring the resumption of enrich- ment activities and the limitation of cooperation with the agency.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 79 Iran’s Negotiating Strategy | 79 Iran sought but failed to get the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to agree to production cuts that would increase its leverage on threats to cut off its oil supplies. Iran was still surprised to see that the IAEA Board vote later that month on February 24 was convincingly in favor of reporting Iran to the Security Council (27:3 with 5 abstentions).70 Playing on the IAEA’s fears that Iran might leave it blind as to inspections. The threats of noncooperation and burying the Russian proposal appeared to have backfired. Iran sent a formal letter to the IAEA on February 2 noting that political pressures and threats of reporting Iran to the Security Council would lead Iran to “suspend all the voluntary measures and extra cooperation with the Agency that have so far” been in effect. but not at the price of transferring enrichment out of the country. At the same time. without success. Iranian officials admitted that they needed time “before 60.

and equity). the victim. and reopened or reinterpreted agreements. In the event of referral. Tehran has played on ambiguity about its inten- tions and about the scope of its program.”76 This tendency toward self-deception stems from Iran’s rapt self-absorption and its tendency to convince only itself with its rhetoric. Iran has dissembled. and obfuscated in its dealings with the IAEA in respect to information and access. Far from reducing opacity.77 None of this is calculated to reassure other states about Iran’s behavior if it had a nuclear capability.75 But true to form and Iran’s particular brand of self-deception. its overesti- mation of its own importance. . and its miscalculation about the impact of its various threats. to resume enrichment. it has cajoled and scorned. the referral of Iran to the Security Council is “not the end of the story but the beginning of a new chapter. to withdraw from the NPT itself. Iran has threatened destabilizing linkages.74 Iran approached negotiations as a contest of wills rather than an opportunity to reach common ground through reciprocal compro- mise. A rhetorical emphasis on the legal nature of the dispute only served to blind Iran to the political nature of the problem and to convince it that it is.*ch4 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 80 80 | Iran’s Negotiating Strategy nite period. to end inspections and cooperation with the IAEA altogether (including application of the Additional Protocol). the threat of referral did not check its rhetoric. again. to aggravate regional instability. rights. By elevating differences into issues of principle (justice. to interrupt oil shipments. Self-deception accounts for its misjudgment about others’ reactions. With the EU. with a freeze on larger-scale activity for a period over which the sides would build confidence. According to one SNSC official. Iran made them nonnegotiable. Inside and outside the negotiations Iran has shown a proclivity for brinksmanship and managed crises. stonewalled. and. threatened and pleaded. more ambigu- ously. Consistent with its behavior as a spoiler. Iran has threatened in recent months to cut off oil supplies.

which have been on the best way to accomplish this goal. The IAEA has lent its weight to buttress the EU-3 initiatives. The differences. and the threat of Iran’s referral to the UNSC has increased the IAEA’s leverage on Tehran. and the D IAEA all agree on the need to prevent the emergence of a nuclear Iran. the EU-3.” offering incentives and dialogue to temper U. pressure has energized the IAEA.S. The agency’s prominent role as an international institution has made its medicine more palatable politically for Tehran (and Russia and China) and defused any notion that the issue is primarily a U. The cases of Iraq and North Korea may be 81 . In assessing the success of the international community in the Iran arena. The IAEA and the EU-3 in turn considered the U. critical of the IAEA’s failure to quickly and unequivocally condemn Iran. U. the United States. while the latter has acted as a “good cop” to the United States’ “bad cop.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 81 5 The International Response espite initial differences. The United States. response of quick referral to the UNSC as premature and probably counterproductive. showed ambivalence about the EU-3 diplomatic initiatives. threats and sanctions.S. have not posed an obstacle to policies.–Iran feud. it is important to underline criteria for comparison and continuing uncertainties as to ultimate outcomes.S. which have been largely mutually reinforcing.S.

unpersuaded that it would be successful.S. possibly followed by a condemnation and sanctions.S. Approach After 9/11 the United States intensified its concentration on rogue states. be more successful in freezing or reversing Iran’s program than the diplomatic route? And could it be contemplated realistically without first exhausting the diplomatic route? The IAEA had its own reasons for pursuing a policy of “steady engagement and robust” inspections: to deal with the first serious case of non-proliferation after Iraq (and North Korea) and to demonstrate (and test) the value of the Additional Protocol. Reluctantly the United States supported the EU’s diplo- matic approach. At the same time the U.S. which led to a change in U. position was weakened by a lack of clarity about its goals. North Korea is a testimony to the ineffectuality of the UNSC in a clearcut case of noncompliance. too.S. to demonstrate the benefits of multilateralism and the 2003 EU security strategy in action.S.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 82 82 | The International Response instructive about the chances of success in the approaches in Iran. Overreaction in 2003. U. policy did little to convince Rus- sia (and by extension China) of the wisdom of following its lead. The incoherence in U. 2 The EU-3. U. following initial underestimation of Iraq’s WMD program (1990-1991) has weakened the case for muscular responses divorced from international consensus. had its own motives: to deal with an important issue of international security. which wavered between non-proliferation and regime change. concerns about Iran’s proliferation fluctuated between an inclination to deal decisively with an emerging regional threat and the reality of military and diplomatic constraints on a unilateral solution. non-proliferation policy.1 Why would Iran’s more ambiguous case yield greater success in the UNSC? Would a referral. Prior- ity shifted from a focus on the spread of weapons technology to the . and to prevent a recur- rence of the transatlantic rift that had appeared over Iraq.

” In answer to questions on this issue. viewing it as ill-suited for dealing with the serious cases of proliferation. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave the philosophical underpinning of the administration’s policy shift. Later the emphasis shifted back to diplomacy.-dominated regional order. warning that “a non- transparent society that is the world’s premier sponsor of terror can- not be allowed to possess the world’s most dangerous weapons. while other systems are opaque... the secretary noted that “Iran is pursuing policies in the Mid- dle East that are.”6 Iran uses terrorism.S. but the focus on the nature of the regime in question has persisted. stating that “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power . pro- liferation now became a problem not of weapons but particular states or regimes). U. with Rice calling Iran “destabilizing” and the “biggest strategic challenge. anti-Americanism. This in turn led to a diminution of the reliance on international instruments and diplomacy and an increased emphasis on a unilateral posture (2002-2005). which seeks to substitute Iran’s rev- olutionary Islamic model. 170 degrees counter to the kind of Middle East that we would build. democracy is the only assurance of lasting peace and secu- rity between states.3 This shift entailed a downgrading of the impor- tance of the NPT regime (the instrument for dealing with prolifer- ation in general). model.” observing that “no one wants to see a Middle East that is dominated by an Iranian hegemony. and instability (in Iraq and elsewhere) to promote its preferred regional order.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 83 The International Response | 83 identity of states seeking weapons of mass destruction (that is.”4 One feature of democracies is openness.”5 In the case of Iran. if not 180. the issue is not simply confined to that state’s opaqueness and nuclear ambitions but extends to its challenge to the U.S. for that of the U. Iran’s quest for a nuclear capa- bility magnifies that challenge. because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within states. particularly one that has nuclear technology. with Iran in a dominant position.S. President Bush has emphasized this aspect of democracy in relation to Iran. The nuclear . officials underlined this broader con- text to Congress.

the basic policy aim is clearly regime change.” Care was taken to show respect for the Iranian people and their democratic aspirations—a distinction echoed by Vice Presi- dent Richard Cheney and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. Consistent with the belief that the regime itself as much as its policies are the problem.7 Acting on this premise. a specific distinction was made between nation and regime. which implies living with some level of capability though limiting its growth but dealing with it through some com- bination of deterrence and defense. 2. which necessitates that U. the United States has widened the stakes. scholarships. .” In Iran’s case. who both emphasized the gulf between the regime and the people. however. is another matter. policy consider the nuclear issue in this overall context. and interceptions that seek to impose a cost on the continuation of the program and to delay it. overlapping choices in its policy response to Iran: 1.S. with President Bush describing Iran as “a nation held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its people. through sanctions. Rollback or reversal. Intended to encourage the development of an opposition within Iran. export controls. This response could have military elements (strikes. and support for Iranian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and increased funding ($75 million extra).8 In principle the United States has five broad. A special office for Iranian affairs has been set up.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 84 84 | The International Response issue is thus one of several issues of contention between the two states. 3. the United States has increased its invest- ment in democracy promotion in Iran. Prevention . denial strategies. with more broadcasting. President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union address again focused on a policy of “ending tyranny in the world. which implies a decision to prevent the emergence of a capability through its coercive elimina- tion. Whether the funds or the means are ade- quate for the task. Containment and freezing the program at a certain level.

U. How effective an instrument of non-proliferation this can be over time is uncertain. Assessment of U. covered by the term regime change. the most that can be hoped for is delay. Preven- tion was the strategy attempted by the United States throughout the 1990s.S. Regime change may or may not lead to a reversal of poli- cies. security of materials. There are drawbacks associated with all five approaches. the emergence of nuclear “grey markets. Co-option attempts to minimize the damage for future proliferation or instability (for example. moves . policy toward Iran today consists of a combination of elements: continuing efforts at prevention. Response U. Regime change. policy has not been as coherent or as focused as the strategic stakes might dictate.” the coopera- tion among pariah states. as Libya in 2003 and South Africa in 1990 demonstrate. 5.S. Contain- ment is a policy choice in parallel with prevention or when preven- tion fails. doctrine. But because of globalization. Both imply acceptance of some level of capability. living with a nuclear Iran is something that must be prepared for but not advertised). but containment attempts to deny a proliferator any strategic benefit from its capability and to ensure no further progress (with the possibility of a reversal in the future). the seepage of knowledge and technology.S intervention in Iraq.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 85 The International Response | 85 invasion. Co-option. but policy reversals do not need regime change. accepting the inevitable and trying to influence safety. and commerce. and the reluctance of some nuclear weapons states (notably China until the late 1990s). as in the case of Iraq in 1981 and 2003) and a political dimension. 4. Eventually the question reemerges: What to do about it? Containment is similar to co-option but at a differ- ent stage of nuclear technology.S. which entails the removal of the regime by force on the model of U.

As the number of members partici- pating increases. The relatively low-level representation in the U. the United States has used multilateral institutions fitfully and erratically.11 This position was aimed at Iran and North Korea but was opposed by Brazil.10 In a speech in 2004 President Bush suggested that no additional states should be allowed to enrich uranium. not an institution.12 The United States failed to use the review . among others. Japan). with bilateral agree- ments now concluded with over sixty states. the need to make it consistent with international law becomes more evident. Washington managed to have the UN pass a resolution requiring states to enact national legislation to imple- ment the NPT and prevent materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.” The United States refused to fashion its diplomacy accordingly or to define what Iran should or should not be allowed to do as encapsulating the broader chal- lenges facing the treaty. This initiative. An administration that sees regimes. and some consideration of rollback or rever- sal through regime change or policy change.” seeks to ensure enforcement of non-proliferation agreements by intercepting sen- sitive and illegal cargos at sea. not the multilateral mecha- nisms to constrain them—a point that is confirmed by the U. To this end. face- tiously labeled “an activity.S. delegation reflected the degree of U. UNSC Resolution 1540 was a landmark in dealing with the possible access to nuclear materials by terrorists.S. By getting states to take national responsibility for inter- national commitments. Instead of focus- ing on the lacunae in the NPT. in effective freezing the line at those who could already do so (Germany. failure to use the NPT Review Conference of May 2005 effectively. the United States sought to brand Iran (and North Korea) as noncompliant.S.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 86 86 | The International Response toward containment. For success. Another success outside of the UN is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by the United States. not weapons. interest in the process. the review conference would have needed more give-and- take reflecting the NPT’s “grand bargain. as the prob- lem tends to focus on individual states.9 At present interceptions can only take place on the high seas (as opposed to territorial waters).

assets of any foreign com- pany that provides or attempts to provide financial. Congress. Several measures strengthening these existing measures are before the U. U. the goods lack .17 This array of sanctions has imposed an economic cost on Iran and has clearly hurt the Iranian oil industry. Black market prices in Iran are exorbitant. material. which were increased in the late 1980s and supplemented by the 1996 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) that forbids foreign investment above $20 million per year in the energy sector and the Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (P.S.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 87 The International Response | 87 conference to strengthen the norm against proliferation.14 Such declarations. These secondary sanctions deter most companies that trade with the United States and have certainly discouraged investment in Iran’s oil sector by Japan and others.15 In its prevention strategy the United States has long concentrated on unilateral (including secondary) sanctions. including the Ros-Lehtinen bill that would fund Iranian opposition groups. are useful in rein- forcing the international dimensions of the issues raised by Iran and continuing public exposure and pressure on Iran.L.S.16 In July 2005 the United States threatened to seize all U. diplomacy has been more effective in getting strong statements opposing Iran’s deceptions and nuclear ambitions. In more restricted gatherings such as the annual G-8 meetings. 102-484) banning dual-use items. Since the mid-1980s sanctions were imposed for terrorism. The United States has imposed secondary sanctions on companies and countries (includ- ing China and Russia) that trade or invest in Iran. tech- nological.S. the United States also failed to get a tough statement from the P-5 countries that could be built on to pressure Tehran on future referral to the Security Council. however. or other support to Iran’s AEO. Though it claimed to be speaking for a strong international consensus in what was generally considered a debacle of diplomacy.13 The United States allowed Iran to define the issue as one of technology denial rather than noncompliance. but whether these are translated into support for strong measures in the UNSC is another matter. which has been unable to develop or modernize with indigenous capital and technology alone.

because distrust and ideology have forced the United States to an all-or-nothing approach. might have been more effective had they been international (as was the case with Libya).S. containment. For Libya. sanctions alone are not likely to arrest Iran’s nuclear pro- gram.S.19 The Libyan case suggests that effective sanctions may encourage regime evolution. because they have cast a wide net with their ban on dual-use technology. eventually culminating in regime change. Regime change has dominated U. in being forced to develop indigenous nuclear technology. Sanctions may have delayed Iran’s nuclear program as well.S. If U. however. the United States was willing to accept a change in regime policy rather than hold out for a change of regime itself. In addition. and there is a premium on deception and evasion of sanctions through front companies.18 Largely punitive. and the like. and other sanctions. UN sanctions bit over time and affected the regime’s cost calculus. the United States has not been willing to take yes for an answer in the case of Iran. false invoices. Iranians have tended to see the nuclear issue as a pretext and U. with each demand likely to generate another. However. It is no wonder that President Bush observed in December 2004 that the United States was “all sanctioned out” in respect to Iran. they remain of symbolic impor- tance today because Iran’s nuclear program has nearly reached the point of no return. Iran has nativized the technology and has come close to the mastery of the fuel cycle even in the face of two decades of U. what other means of prevention. sanctions.S. In addition. therefore.S. U. or better still reversal are there? Short of regime change there is the possibility that the regime could be prevailed upon to reconsider its policies . In the case of Iran. because they cause proliferators to reconsider the costs and benefits of a particular course. Nor has the United States offered Iran the kind of inducements it did to Libya. hostility as general and open ended. although there are now some signs that this may be changing. policy until very recently (2002-2006).*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 88 88 | The International Response manufacturers’ guarantees. the bilateral sanctions have been painful but not unbearable.

Iran’s rebuff of the Clinton administration’s overtures was followed by 9/11. The United States and Europe have done a poor job of stim- ulating such a debate and making clear that the issue is not denial of technology in general but objection to the regime as such and opposition to specific policies.20 Offering inducements as well as ending sanctions would help. Cooperation in that war might have led to more formal discussions. including discussion of a possible grand bargain. Tehran sensed that the U.21 Far from rewarding proliferation. this time because of revelations that Iran was hosting Al Qaeda ele- ments. Convincing demonstration that there will be no benefits coming from a nuclear capability (which will be offset militarily) and that the costs (sanc- tions. the United States promoted Iran into the axis of evil. never the preferred choice. But direct discussions in Geneva in May 2003 were again torpedoed.23 Ironically.S. inducements are a means of making renunciation of technology more palatable.S. has also failed. Strengthening the incentives for states not to rely on nuclear weapons seems self-evident. .24 By the autumn of 2003. Imposing economic costs could stimulate a domestic debate in Iran about the wisdom of continuing on a collision course with the West. regional exclusion. Tehran’s fear that the United States might target Iran next led it to a more accommodat- ing posture. as evidenced by John Bolton’s comment: “I don’t do carrots. Iran was confronted by U. this was a lost opportunity when everything would have been on the table because Iranian leaders sensed a real threat to the regime and were willing to negotiate when the United States enjoyed maximum leverage. condemnation) will remain high is one way. thus lessening the incentive for Iran to make far-reaching concessions.”22 Engagement. In this new context. power next door. how- ever. how- ever. The United States has resisted this approach.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 89 The International Response | 89 as a result of domestic and international pressure. military threat had subsided because the United States was bogged down in Iraq. After the Karine A affair in December 2001. but it was aborted by the dis- covery of a shipment of Iranian arms destined for Palestinians fight- ing Israel. especially after Afghanistan.

26 The election of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in June 2005 served to confirm Wash- ington’s skepticism about any form of engagement strategy. and intended to appease its conservative supporters.27 U. U.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 90 90 | The International Response From 2003 to 2005. Iran is the very embodiment of evil.”30 Behind his concerns were serious issues: Could Iran be brought around to renounce nuclear capabil- ities through a combination of diplomacy and threats? How durable or reliable would such an agreement be? Would not the act of direct negotiations (and possible agreement) confer legitimacy on the “repressive theocracy. NGOs.29 U.S.S. policy toward Iran is characterized by a special antipathy going beyond distrust or the legacy of past events such as the hostage crisis and Beirut bombings.S. which saw expression in simulta- neous calls for regime change and negotiations. in part. and its controlled elections is a constant refrain. This theme—that the United States could not deal with an unrepresentative and repressive government—continues.S. Focus on the regime’s tyranny. policy weakness. can be attributed to rivalries within the U.28 Ulti- mately. encouraging student demonstrations and giving declaratory sup- port to opponents of the regime and reformers. and unions under consider- ation in 2005 is now policy. giving voice to its ideology. which may be explained by Iran’s opposition to Israel.” which would be a repudiation of the kind of . its loathsome human rights record. and the gap between rhetoric and worked out policy is noticeable with regard to Iran. From mid- 2003 the United States resorted to reliance on regime change. or the lack of a domestic con- stituency or congressional support in the United States. characterized by attitude and posturing. the regime’s shifty behavior.25 More concrete assistance through radio broad- casts and support of activists. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) alluded to these divisions evident in policy toward North Korea and Iran in criticizing the “ambiguity that was neither constructive nor intended. administration. For a certain category of Amer- icans. the United States has had less difficulty in supporting diplomacy with Pyongyang than with Tehran. policy toward Iran was incoherent. more so than North Korea or even Iraq.

The U.”32 By the end of 2004. something the IAEA was unable to confirm. policy had hit a brick wall. even token.S.S. But there is little indication that the United States had prepared the diplomatic groundwork for a successful application of sanctions if the matter were taken to that body.” while neoconservatives still argued that “only democracy in Iran will finally solve the nuclear and terrorist problems.S. saw Washington as too unilateralist. the U.S. aim in agreeing to support the initiative was to stiffen the EU-3 . in turn.35 Another consideration for the United States was the unhappy experience with the 1994 Korean Agreed Framework. intelligence.” a formula it adapted to the case of Iran. Even more problematic was the U. Moreover.34 By default. which Washington embraced skeptically and conditionally in March 2005. approach during the 2003–2005 period consisted of attempts to get the IAEA to refer Iran to the UNSC for its various failings and deceptions.S. Given doubts about U. especially after Iraq.” the United States needed to get involved more directly. the United States still saw the Europeans as “wobbly. So the U. with little prospect that unilateral sanctions could be tightened much further. verifiable. While there was a need for a common front. this meant supporting the EU-3 initiative. even friendly states gave priority to seeing whether a diplomatic solution was possible before referring the issue to the UNSC. amounts of enrichment. U.” and the EU. and unwilling to engage Iran directly. and irreversible. the United States equated permanent cessation and objective guar- antees and refused to countenance any. Therefore. decision to embrace diplomacy was hedged.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 91 The International Response | 91 Middle East that the United States was now seeking? Would it be a betrayal of Iran’s democratic opposition?31 Some politicians such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ) preferred “rogue state rollback. Unable to count on regime change in time to affect the nuclear program. insistence on its certain knowledge that Iran had a nuclear weapons program.S. the United States had to reconsider its policy. 33 Instead of being “an excited bystander. The United States now insisted that any agreement be “complete.

the EU-3 also committed to follow through with sanctions and referral to the UNSC in the event of diplomatic failure.36 The United States and the EU-3 easily came to an agreement on what to ask of Iran: complete and permanent cessation of its fuel cycle activities as the only basis for confidence that technology would not be diverted to weapons uses. there is still much room for divi- sion and disunity in their positions. The United States was particularly concerned to ensure that having committed to diplomacy.40 Thus. .38 Such an agreement would have to include security assurances.” whereas the United States was keen to be con- vinced that the Europeans and others were prepared to take the proliferation threat seriously enough to take “risks and make any sacrifices to avert it. if Iran refused. how this would be implemented and inspected and. what would constitute the trigger for referral to the Security Council remained to be defined. but there is a dif- ference of nuance between the two: The Europeans are less focused on the nature of Iran’s regime and would prefer the diplomacy to “succeed. inclusion of Iran in a regional security structure.” and the United States is not.”39 The United States and Europe both see diplomacy as a necessary first step if the matter is to be settled by coercion.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 92 92 | The International Response resolve and ensure that the terms of any agreement were clear and rigorous. while the allies agree on what to demand of Iran. as well as economic and technology assistance. More important from the EU-3 perspective was the need for the United States to be involved in the incentive as well as the punishment side of the package.37 However. Washington was unwilling to consider the kind of comprehensive package that the Europeans considered necessary if Iran were to be convinced to forgo nuclear technology. Although these divisions were largely narrowed after Iran hardened its approach in mid-2005. Europeans emphasized the need to acknowledge Iran’s “legitimate security concerns. Although the United States showed a willingness to make sym- bolic gestures by lifting objections to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and to the supply of civilian aircraft parts.

S.S.43 The U. the administration still had not clarified its Iran policy in a convincing way. support for the EU-3’s “lead” in a diplomatic solu- tion. should be dismantled). the United States did in fact become more involved.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 93 The International Response | 93 the issue of sanctions (and military strikes) and the refusal of the United States to contribute to an incentives package could see divi- sions resurface and widen again. The official position announced by President Bush in 2003 is that the United States “will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon. shift was aided by two factors in mid- 2005. the United States invested more effort in diplomacy from September 2005 on by intensively lobbying key . the arrival of Ahmadinejad and his behavior made the argument that Iran was an “irresponsible” state easier. it was important to demonstrate that there remained time for this (and a sanctions) policy to be viable. A graduated.41 The latest formulation is that “a process which permits Iran to develop nuclear weapons is unacceptable. due to come on- stream in 2006-2007.” More recently. switch to support for diplomacy and support for the March 2005 EU-3 initiative implied a recognition of the trade-off between obtaining a broad international consensus and the need for haste. Making up for lost time.”42 After Iran’s rejection of the EU-3 package in mid-2005.44 Second. The U. the reference has been broadened to the intolerability of a “weapons capability.” suggesting opposition to any activity that involves sensitive technologies that could be diverted to weapons uses. First. facilitating a broader coalition.S. which may have accounted for the “new intelligence estimate” in August 2005 that assessed Iran to be technologically further away from a nuclear weapon than many had assumed. split as it was between those who emphatically rejected dealing with the “mullahs’ regime” and those who saw the risks of proliferation as requiring a workable policy. For those advo- cating regime change. The United States no longer insists that Iran has no need for any nuclear energy (that is. that the reactor in Bushire. deliberate approach that took along all the major powers was preferable to a rush to judgment that left many unconvinced. President Bush emphasized U.

even if not mandatory or universally applied.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 94 94 | The International Response states including India.S.47 The military option has been made more credible by domestic polls in the United States that indicate considerable public support for both sanctions and military strikes against Iran. however unattractive. preferring a settlement within the IAEA (Iran’s resumption of enrichment under the label of “research” in January 2006 changed this). Russia. these two states have reluc- tantly agreed to referral in order to brake any momentum and pre- vent giving the United States the pretext for unilateral action. absent a major new trans- gression. or it may be the inability to hammer out a clear policy acceptable to all elements within the administration. Mul- tilateral sanctions. labeling Iran’s nuclear ambitions a “global menace” and a “universal” interest to prevent it.46 U. and China. None of these states ini- tially supported Iran’s referral to the UN. Though averse to the change in forum from the IAEA to the Security Council (and to sanctions). This reluctance may be due to the press of other events.48 The veiled threat of recourse to a military option if diplomacy is not seriously attempted has spurred Russia and China to action. Washington still lacks a convincing answer to the question of what happens after referral. . The official formulation that all options are on the table has been consciously repeated. Certainly. the United States still shows reluctance about getting directly involved. there is a decided policy preference for the more general approaches of regime change and Security Council referral and sanctions. first with IAEA resolutions threatening action in the Security Council and now with the threat of sanctions in that body. diplomacy has also benefited from the sense abroad that the military option. was by no means unthink- able even if the image of a trigger-happy United States gave allies pause. a Security Council condem- nation of Iran as an internationally certified pariah would in itself be a serious sanction that would hurt the regime domestically.49 Therefore.45 Washington sought to counter the idea that the nuclear issue is a continuation of a feud with Tehran. While seeking to maintain pressure on Tehran.

clear. The U. To do so.50 Second. which may or may not be . which creates budgetary and other tensions. It is clear that after a series of missteps the United States is deter- mined to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. and that reduces U. stance has evolved unac- knowledged from a policy of regime change along the Iraqi model to policy change along the Libyan model. the Bush administration has had no agreed. nor is it empowered to enforce NPT compliance. or consistent Iran policy. Its position on nuclear technology has a similar evolution from no nuclear technology to some as long as it is not sensitive. then. which may buy time for reconsideration since the nuclear program may not be as far advanced as Iranians claim. IAEA Approach The IAEA labors under several inherent constraints in its mission. To summarize.S. from initially disparag- ing diplomacy. First. the IAEA is not the secretariat of the NPT. options accordingly.S. Multilateral diplomacy may result either in Iran’s acquiescence in the terms offered or eventually in the imposition of sanctions by a coalition of the willing or through the Security Council. The Bush administration has insisted that a nuclear-capable Iran is unacceptable and has kept the military option in play. It has now settled on a method that takes its allies and P-5 with it and stands a better chance of increasing the pressure on Iran. Constrained by its ideologues from diplomacy. resist- ing any direct diplomatic discussions on this issue. it would need the backing of the UNSC. Washington now relies on it for international sup- port. Similarly.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 95 The International Response | 95 would impose more costs on Tehran. The result is a stance that reflects a set of attitudes rather than a considered policy that holds diplomacy hostage to ideology. the agency has a twin mandate—to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and to promote the use of that technology with an extensive technical assistance program. the administration has been unable to test Iranian intentions.

thereby shortening the gap between being a member of the NPT and being a nuclear weapons state.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 96 96 | The International Response forthcoming. in all recent cases of proliferation. the agency’s only recourse is to go to the UNSC. if special inspections are refused. delay.54 All of these issues dictate caution. though modest.52 There are still other more specific problems with verification.56 He sees Iran as one of a class of problems that needs to be tackled by political as well as technical means. And. third. the agency found Iran in material breach of its safeguards agreement but made a distinction between a technical infraction (failure to report) and a substantive one. and the system can be manipulated through deception. and denial. at most it can only report that nothing has been found to indicate a weapons program. the agency should be judged by its achievements. the agency has only acted after strong U.S.51 In addition.55 Despite these limitations. His approach has been informed by . violations are rarely clear-cut. noncompliance with NPT obligations. It assumes all is well until proven other- wise.53 Verification itself has inherent limits because it can never clear a state or prove a negative. The IAEA policy has been shaped by Director-General Mohammad Al Baradei. A strong criticism of the IAEA is that having ascertained that Iran failed to declare inter alia the construction of its enrichment facilities. By their nature. who defines noncompliance narrowly as the diversion of materials to nuclear weapons uses. which the agency itself lacks. and against the feasible alter- natives. should it withdraw. Undeclared facilities cannot be inspected or located without specific intelligence. however. there are also problems with IAEA’s corporate cul- ture. which necessarily complicates responses. ranging from a penchant for compromise and the assumption of cooperation to a general reluctance to adopt an aggressive approach to verification. One is the problem of the technology: States can legally acquire all the technology and techniques necessary for the production of fis- sile materials without actually producing them. The quest for a smoking gun is thus a chimera. political pressure. Furthermore. that is.

”59 By positioning the agency as an independent and objective interlocutor. Al Baradei has given the agency credibility. The way to minimize security risk. is not through technology denial. political. the challenge posed by Iran is not unique. used in conjunction. which cannot work over time.58 At the same time Al Baradei sought to assure Iran of his bona fides in posing the issue in terms of a “need to strike a balance between the right of Iran to use nuclear technology and the concern of the international community that any nuclear program is a peaceful one” and going to some lengths to assure Iran that he would not act as “an instrument of harassment. or by creating new distinctions among states inside the NPT. given the gaps in the treaty that allow for acquisition of sensitive technologies that bring states close to a weapons capability.” At the same time.57 This approach to a category of problems posed by holes in the treaty appears to be gaining ground as the alternatives (coercion and sanctions) prove elusive and uncertain in their results. especially with the nonaligned states on which Iran has counted and has made it harder for Iran to escape from its assessments and requests. can be effec- tive. not in narrow terms of technology. arguing that a nuclear program is the tip of an iceberg masking other security. sensitive facilities might exist and how to respond to what was clearly (at the least) a breach of the safeguards agreement. the MOK. and political pressure to widen the scope of its operations to dig deeper into the program. Rather. it must be handled first by a moratorium on all enrichment activities and then by the internationalization of the fuel cycle under multilateral con- trol. The IAEA responded by using the revelations. This revelation raised the issue of what other undeclared. The director-general sees the issue of proliferation broadly. revealed the existence of nuclear facilities that Tehran had failed to declare to the agency as it was bound to under its safeguards agreement. Al Baradei argues. if not of the NPT itself.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 97 The International Response | 97 recent experience: “The most important lesson is the confirmation that verification and diplomacy.60 This . and eco- nomic issues. IAEA’s response dates from August 2002 when an Iranian oppo- sition group. resultant publicity.

the EU-3 and the IAEA made clear their common approach and the consequences of a breakdown..” The Board of Gov- ernors’ meeting in February produced a tough resolution recalling that Iran was a “special verification case” with “its many failures and breaches of obligations” and noting that “full transparency is .” Iran’s resumption of conversion and enrichment activities. reflecting the sense of urgency and new determination of the EU-3 and the United States to report Iran to the Security Council.S.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 98 98 | The International Response approach was complemented and reinforced by the subsequent agreement reached between Iran and the EU-3 in October 2003 (Tehran agreement). First. and by the firm demand of the agency’s Board of Governors in September 2003 that Iran demonstrate cooperation or face the consequences.” It noted that “there is a lack of confidence in Iran’s inten- tions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran’s record on safeguards. Again in the spring of 2005 when Iran threatened to restart some of its enrichment activ- ities. the resolution asked for the director-general to report on the imple- . This is where matters stood before Iran unilaterally restarted conversion activities in August 2005. government’s attempt to have the matter referred to the UNSC. position and take the issue to the UN.” “despite repeated calls. The result of this new pressure was a tighter agreement in Paris in November 2004 between Iran and the EU-3. The resolution also asked that Iran “recon- sider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. after Iran’s resumption of “research related to enrichment. Diplomacy moved into higher gear in January 2006. and it “deeply regretted.S. with the IAEA mak- ing clear its support for the EU-3 demands. forcing Iran to back down from the threat. This in turn built on the pressure exerted first by the U.” Finally. overdue. The same pattern emerged once Iran sought to escape from its Tehran agreement by reinterpreting it in the spring and summer of 2004.” The resolution asked Iran to suspend “all enrichment and reprocessing activities including research and development” and be subject to IAEA verification. the EU-3 and then the IAEA threatened to side with the U..

This meant that Iran was in dispute not with three states but the wider international community. Second. who consider the issue to be both political and technical. this suggestion has been received coldly by the United States. Not surprisingly. Al Baradei suggested pragmatically that Iran should be allowed some enrichment capability. calls for moving the issue (prematurely) to the Security Council. making mon- itoring more difficult.63 First. found itself moving away from the center.S. reflecting this.61 For the first time.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 99 The International Response | 99 mentation of this resolution at the next board session. together with the accompanying Board of Governors’ resolution in March. and Great Britain. the threat of reporting the case to the Security Council and taking the issue from the technical-legal agency to the political-security Security Council forum had been made. The IAEA used Iran’s . any enrichment capabil- ity could serve as a cover for a clandestine program. Assessment of IAEA Response The IAEA’s role has been notable in its ability to ratchet up the pressure on Iran. France. Al Baradei’s February 2006 report examined developments since November 2005 and then made a critical overall assessment. which underesti- mates the distrust fostered by Iran’s tactics. allowing a compromise now would send the wrong message: rewarding Iran’s deceit and cheating. with no guarantee that it would not be repeated in the future. an Iranian freeze on large-scale (industrial) enrichment would not be a meaningful concession because Iran currently lacks such a capability. would then be conveyed to the Security Council. while resisting U. Finally. This report. The IAEA.62 Among his findings. Also “some enrichment” could serve as a means for perfecting the technology for a broader program in the future. The director-general put the agency’s weight behind the EU-3 in resisting attempts by Iran to define the activities covered by the voluntary suspension narrowly enough to exclude preenrichment or the assembly and production of centrifuges.

The director-general was “pushing the envelope under transparency.” The agency therefore asked for widespread inspec- tions to make up for the confidence deficit. The IAEA was able to do this by adopting a neutral stance while cajoling and dispensing a mixture of friendly advice and implied threat.65 Requests for special inspections that Al Baradei termed “transparency visits” were expanded to examine military sites not covered by the Additional Protocol (such as Parchin and Lavizan) that might have been used for the weaponization of nuclear materials.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 100 100 | The International Response breach of its safeguards obligations to improve operating proce- dures. Its officials differentiate the IAEA’s stance from that of the United States as follows: “The American statement is not very important for us. as Hasan Rowhani observed: The agency and Al Barade’i are international legal entities.” pressing the Irani- ans on the need to rebuild confidence. For example.” it was a “special case.”67 That said. Al Baradei argued that “the ball is in Iran’s court” and that the deficit in confidence could only be restored by transparency. What is important to us is the fact that our activities are based on laws and treaties that are approved by the IAEA. there is no illu- sion about the IAEA’s role.66 The success of the agency to date can be measured in part by ref- erence to Iran’s goals and achievements. He asked that Iran restore full suspension of “all enrichment-related activities” with no time limit. Iran values the agency for its technical assistance and independence. and that we are fully cooperating with the IAEA and will continue to do so. the situation was reversed: Now Iran was told to make up for its past transgressions and demonstrate its good will by confidence-building measures that went beyond any legal requirement. they are forced to adopt multifaceted . and given that within these institutions an eye is always fixed on the great powers. Because Iran had had a “clandestine program for almost two decades. Instead of putting the burden of proof on the agency (to find any illegal activities).64 His approach was based on the proposition that Iran had “tried to cheat the system” and that it now had to take the consequences.

68 The IAEA remains an important buffer against U. link- ing signature with the ending of the embargo of technical materi- als on its nuclear program. The only victory that Iran could claim (domestically) was that it avoided being referred or reported to the UNSC between 2002 and 2005.71 The IAEA has dealt with the Iran case with considerable success.600 man/days of inspec- tions. Al Barade’i makes one positive remark followed by a negative one. It has conducted by one estimate over 1.70 Iran has also found itself opposed by the agency in its efforts to stretch the meanings of what is and is not excluded from its suspension of enrichment activities. pressure and a sign that Iran takes its international commitments seriously. and the nonaligned states. with the international spotlight focused on its nuclear program and the agency’s reports on the quality of its coop- eration. Con- sequently. Through the agency’s inspections much more is known about Iran. as a confidence-building measure to rebuild trust and has done so as a “voluntary measure.. it has been under pres- sure to give access to military sites not covered by the AP.. This cooperation has been costly in terms of Iran’s stated aims.S. and ignoring its recommendations can alienate the nonaligned states on which Iran relies for diplomatic support. while at the same time he wants to please the world powers. Iran has not been able to achieve its aim of having its relation- ship with the IAEA normalized and its nuclear file closed. Furthermore.69 Prior to 2003. and the international community has “made good . averaging three inspections per day. Iran has signed the AP and is under pressure to ratify it.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 101 The International Response | 101 positions . Tehran cannot accuse the agency of bias or afford to antagonize it. At the insistence of the IAEA.” and has been commended for it. its Board of Governors. Iran had resisted accepting the Additional Protocol. He does so because he does not want our cooperation with the agency to be severed. Demonstrating cooperation with it becomes an earnest of its intentions.72 Iran’s dossier remains very much open. two negative ones followed by a positive.

the case of Iraq makes it harder to fault an approach that seeks to build the case slowly through inspections without closing down a source of information that would leave the agency and governments in the dark.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 102 102 | The International Response strides in understanding the nature and scope of its program. decided to define Europe’s policy proactively and robustly. It has large Muslim populations who could be upset .75 The major criticism of the agency that can be made is to question whether a “diplomacy at any price” approach is always the right answer. Proximity makes Europe and the Middle East virtu- ally part of the same neighborhood.”73 Iran’s signature and application of the AP provisions complicates and makes more risky (though not impossible) any clandestine activity it might engage in. determined to avoid a repetition of the transatlantic rift opened up by Iraq.74 The IAEA’s support has also strengthened the EU-3 diplomatic initiative. The pressure on Iran to suspend its enrichment program (broadly defined) amounted to a freeze on Iran’s develop- ment of sensitive technologies for the past two years. It is within missile range of any proliferators. The EU-3. especially running an elaborate parallel nuclear program. However. EU-3 Approach The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and the Iraq war have galvanized the EU to define its position on WMD prolifera- tion. taking it out of the narrow technical realm toward the broader motivations under- lying the program. They in turn have used the agency to validate their con- cerns and implement their queries. Al Baradei’s big picture approach to the question of proliferation (not strictly a part of his professional mandate) parallels the EU-3 initiative. The agency’s role as an international institution has made it easier for Iran to retreat from established positions and also for others like the non- aligned states or Russia to appeal to Iran to meet the agency’s demands. European interests in this issue were clear enough on several fronts.

78 In reality they constituted three-way negotia- tions. For example. it has a more general inter- est to tackle an important security issue to demonstrate the EU’s international role and effectiveness. and. For the EU-3.S. the United States. A major difference with the U. the United States believes the .77 The EU-3 negotiations with Iran. Differences arose. Both agreed that the underpinnings of security are most assured where there has been a spread of freedom and democracy. This triangular set of interactions raised a number of prob- lems and questions in the negotiations. between the EU-3 and the United States. albeit indirectly. were more than negotiations between Europe and Iran. it was nec- essary to coordinate positions with the United States. first in the Tehran agreement (September 2003) and then with the more detailed Paris agree- ment (November 2004). there was and still is a need for an interlocutor. between Iran and the United States. after this point. the EU defined its strategy on security and WMD as envisioning a transatlantic partnership (which came to embrace the PSI and cooperation in the G-8) with the use of force. finally.76 A non-proliferation clause was added to agreements with countries seeking relations with the EU. To meet new threats preventively and if necessary through for- ward defense. by the use of force. between the EU-3 and Iran. approach is the EU focus on the regional sources of motiva- tions for nuclear weapons acquisition and thus on addressing the legitimate security concerns of proliferators. how- ever. The EU-3 and the United States started from similar points: the imperative to block Iran’s nuclear aspirations. if necessary. if neces- sary. despite different approaches and the skeptical and lukewarm attitude of the United States toward the diplomacy. and the EU-3 was the best it could “afford. It depends on the region for energy security. For Iran.”79 Iran sought to play on possible differences between Europe and the United States but failed to use the EU-3 to build bridges with the United States. And. The EU-3 was negotiating with its ally. as much as with Iran.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 103 The International Response | 103 by further crises or radicalization of the region. They shared a broader perspective as well.

if one accepts that the regime is illegitimate. they would refer Iran to the Security Council.83 Before the United States decided to support the EU-3 indirectly in 2005. which implied the need for more forceful measures to see the Iranian regime exit the scene. condemnation.80 The United States prefers sanc- tions and isolation of a regime that equates regime maintenance with the national interest. and isola- tion would entail—or acceptance of a package of inducements to forgo the fuel cycle. Therefore. the EU-3 has given Iran a structured choice: continuation of the development of the fuel cycle and referral to the Security Council—with all that sanctions.81 On the one hand. While Iranian suspension of enrichment is voluntary (rather than legally binding) pending agreement or col- . it sought to get a commitment from its allies that. in the event of failure. there remained the question of the point of the negotiations. as European leaders have done?82 On the other hand. Both agreed on what Iran should not be permitted to retain.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 104 104 | The International Response Iranian regime to be the primary problem. however. In its negotiations.85 After the Paris agreement the EU-3 tightened the terms of its negotiations. yet differences remained on the best means to that end. For the United States. whereas the EU-3 sees Tehran’s nuclear program as the key issue. limiting the nuclear pro- gram was the aim and diplomacy the preferred means. Whereas key elements in the United States see engagement and diplomacy as endorsement of the regime and a sellout of its opponents. the United States taking a morally inspired passive posi- tion of disengagement amounted to a “nonpolicy” that threatened to exacerbate differences between the two. diplomacy appeared to be the means to demonstrate that no agreement was possible. if the EU-3 were to devise a package of incentives for Iran to forgo its nuclear ambitions. For the EU-3. the EU-3 sees it as the best means to effect regime change. how can one argue for its legitimate security interests. it had to not only coordinate with Washington but also gain its active support. These different assump- tions lead to different approaches.84 Even with the EU-3 accepting agreement on referral to the UNSC and the indirect involvement of the United States.

Iran in turn defines its suspension as voluntary. the EU-3 would guarantee its fuel supply from more than one source (EU and Russia). not even a few. assembly. In addition the question of security guaran- tees was also broached. position because it would be tech- nically difficult to monitor and assure peaceful uses. and the only technical solution we have found is cessation. guarantees through enhanced inspections). the United States made clear that cessation meant none.88 The EU-3 agreed with the U. agree that Iran’s acquisition of enrichment was their redline. which it is not prepared to forgo. however. evaluate.S. stipulating that in exchange for Iran giving up its fuel cycle ambitions. which it defines in practice as cessation of fissile mate- rial production. bolster investment and trade ties.86 The EU- 3 and the United States.89 Keeping the talks going assumed importance not because a breakthrough was in sight but because of the risks of a crisis that would accompany a breakdown in the talks. and increase Iran’s involvement in regional security discussions and possibly institutions.000 centrifuges). It was clear to the EU-3 that there was little room for maneuver: “The problem is political but the solution is technical. and a confidence-building gesture. this suspension (including preenrichment.”90 While there was no difference between the . offer Iran proliferation-resistant nuclear technol- ogy (light water reactors).87 The United States saw its role as stiffening the spine of the EU- 3. The EU-3 prepared a package to propose to Iran. Iran insists that its redline is enrichment. This did not imply weak diplomacy however. lim- ited in time. the EU-3 insisted on objective guarantees regarding Iran’s program. The EU-3 approach was diplomatic—not to reject but to study. or production of centrifuges) would continue. For example in response to Iranian attempts to get acceptance of its retention of a pilot project of centrifuges that it argued was sym- bolic (numbers vary between 500 and 3. and suggest alternatives. For this.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 105 The International Response | 105 lapse of the negotiations. Iran sees objective guarantees as equivalent to the provisions of the Additional Protocol (that is. The aim of the agreement was to ensure Iran’s peaceful uses of nuclear technol- ogy.

the board agreed to report the Iranian dossier to the Security Council. after which the director- general would present an agency report prior to definitive action. the EU-3 convened a special meeting in Berlin. and on February 4. and the United States rejected the suggestion of allowing Iran to retain some enrich- ment capabilities.94 In a statement after the meeting. the states agreed to report Iran to the Security Council. China. At the same time the EU-3 did not hesitate to threaten Iran with immediate referral to the UNSC when Tehran made moves toward resuming conversion activities in June 2005.93 In response to Iran’s resumption of enrichment research in January. At the urging of Al Baradei and Russia.91 Relations between the EU-3 and Iran steadily deteriorated after Tehran’s brusque rejection of the EU-3 offer of a package deal in July 2005. Both rejections effectively narrowed the scope for compromise. 2006. “We believe the time has now come for the Security Council to become involved to reinforce the authority of IAEA resolutions. The Iranians rejected the sugges- tion of suspending activities for a period of years. At this milestone gathering.”95 This meeting was followed at the end of the month by another meeting in London of the EU-3. The November meeting of the IAEA delayed a decision on whether to send the issue to the Security Council to give the Russian proposal a chance.92 Nonetheless. but between Iran and the whole international community. which the United States dubbed a serious escalation. Within a week.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 106 106 | The International Response EU-3 and the United States on the need for cessation as such. in a vote of 27 to 3 (with five abstentions). the member states noted that the dispute was not “between Iran and Europe. there was more give in the EU position. hinting at diplomatic sanctions. and Russia. . an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors was convened. that meeting showed that the votes existed in the Board of Governors for such a trans- fer. The following month the EU “unreservedly condemned” the comments made by Iran’s president on the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist.” While still committed to a diplomatic solution. the United States. it was agreed to give diplomacy another month.

while seeking a solution that could meet Tehran’s security interests and demonstrate the success of Europe’s diplomatic strategy. bringing it closer to the U.S. But Iranian actions and attitude after mid-2005 hardened the European position. The Russian proposal has floundered as it is not con- sistent with Iran’s quest for an indigenous enrichment capability. As things currently stand with the breakdown of negotiations due to Iran’s resumption of conversion activities and enrichment research. the Europeans have a stake in a successful outcome and in demonstrating that they can fly solo. The March 2006 agency meeting thus agreed to report Iran to the Security Council. As the Iranians have observed. trying to build confidence. can offer Iran enough carrots to give up its insistence on the full fuel cycle. view that a nuclear Iran is intolerable and must be prevented. But while the United States has shown some willingness to associate itself with this diplomacy. and brinksmanship. as has been seen. 96 Playing for time. in particular. Iran’s belliger- ent statements about Israel in October. or whether Russia or China can do more than delay a crisis. is a report that provides an overview of the issue. refus- ing to be harassed by Iran’s self-imposed deadlines. made it eas- ier for the Europeans and Americans to agree on the need to take a harder line with Tehran. but taking a firm line on essential points are tactics in the service of a diplomacy that is practical and nonideological—classic realpolitik. It remains unclear whether the EU-3 even with the direct and active input of the United States. it contin- ues to sharpen the sanctions at its disposal by extending its sec- ondary sanctions. Assessment of EU-3 Response The EU-3 has taken an unhurried approach to negotiations. ultimatums. the threat of mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 in the UNSC appear to be the greatest leverage for the resumption of diplo- .*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 107 The International Response | 107 The result.

In the Yeltsin era. where plants lie idle. whether through official or semi- .97 Diplomacy—and the need to reinstate suspension prior to negotiations—may resume. despite U. Moscow considers Iran an important stabilizing element in the region. Russia has cooperated with Iran in Tajikistan. but it may need a broader bargain to stand a chance of success. The agreement in 1989 to build a nuclear reactor at Bushire had a similar commer- cial rationale. since diplomacy has not necessarily run its course.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 108 108 | The International Response macy. unilateralism and acquisition of bases in the region. Russian Approach Since the breakup of the Soviet Union.S. even partial sanctions and a drawn-out crisis are bound to impose costs on Iran. It has brought the United States on board. Russia has had good rela- tions with Iran. For although sanctions may be difficult to realize or implement. This quasistrategic relationship has been cemented by the two states’ opposition to NATO enlargement eastward and since 9/11 by similar concern about U. not least because Tehran has not encouraged radical forms of Islam or fomented troubles in Russia’s south (for example. Its negotiations have at least retarded Iran’s nuclear program. at least indirectly. in Chechnya). pressure. Afghanistan (anti-Taliban). It has given Iran a choice between a crisis and a negotiated settlement. It has bought time. precisely because the alternatives are unpalatable to all parties. What then has the EU-3 accomplished? It has demonstrated that there is little dividing the United States and Europe on this issue. The EU-3 threw Iran a lifeline that Tehran rejected. giving the negotiations more chance of success.S. and Armenia (against Azerbaijan). In addition to being Tehran’s major arms supplier since 1989. the arms and nuclear technology relationship grew. Iran’s arms purchases in hard currency have been wel- come in post-Soviet Russia.

Russia is interested in cooperation . Russia appreciated Iran’s potential as a regional ally and its stubborn. changed somewhat with the arrival of President Putin. technology.”103 From 2003 forward. supporting its initiatives. “Economically.99 Russia’s relationship with Iran. but the reactor deal on Bushire (initially valued at $800 million) continued and Iranian technicians were trained in Russia. Russia aligned its position with that of the EU-3. as Putin put it. and since then Russian policy has attempted to bal- ance the need for good relations with its “old and stable partner” and the imperative of preventing Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. As Putin put it. however. In 2000 Russia repudiated the Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement and revived the arms relationship with Iran.102 As non-proliferation concerns have grown during the 2003–2005 period..98 In 1995 through the Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission. Russia continues to see Iran as an important state that it would prefer to accommodate if possible. closely consulting with the EU-3 in . or diplomatic support.. Russia has found itself using the IAEA as the reference point for policies that Tehran might find unpalatable and in the process moving closer and closer to the position of the EU-3. the United States and Russia agreed to limit further arms sales to Iran. Iran’s strategic importance was initially given new importance. This was in part a reflection of the continued zero-sum thinking vis-à-vis the United States typified by the Soviet- era Middle East expert Yevgeni Primakov.101 Balancing strategic and non-proliferation interests. and there is less apparent concern about losing Iran as a commer- cial or strategic partner. “to infringe upon a coun- try like Iran is counterproductive and could lead to quite compli- cated and serious consequences. In reality Iran has few strategic alternatives for arms. as well as commercial and political interests. defiant independence regarding the United States.”100 This view shifted with the revelations of Iran’s nuclear activities in mid-2002. and politically Iran should be a self-sufficient state that is ready to protect its national interests.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 109 The International Response | 109 official channels. Nevertheless. Russian policy has become clearer.

. and conducting its own contacts with Tehran in parallel.109 Russian diplomacy took a slightly different turn after the failure of the EU-3 package proposal in June 2005. Balancing between the desire to keep Iran friendly and to play a leading role in the international coalition (and G-8).*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 110 110 | The International Response their negotiations with Iran.S. including the security issues in the region can be solved . none of the problems confronting Iran. hiding behind . For example. insistence Russia concluded an agree- ment with Iran to ensure the return of spent fuel from Bushire. Russia insisted that its proposal to carry out enrichment on Russ- ian soil constituted a logical way out of the diplomatic impasse and some form of Security Council sanctions.”105 Putin and his experts (like those in the EU-3) have extended this opposition to Iran’s develop- ment of the full fuel cycle: “Our Iranian partners must give up development of nuclear (fuel) cycle technology.. In general Russia sought to hew closely to the international consensus. that might “aggravate things. Russia appeared to rel- ish the defeat and the opportunity it presented for Moscow to play a more prominent role. Russia has given priority to preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran and exerting diplomatic muscle to that end.110 On the one hand. Both the date of completion and the dispatch of fuel for the reactor were geared to the outcome of this diplomacy. Russia agreed to sell Iran $1 billion in air defense missiles and argued against any precipitate act. “With the possession of nuclear weapons.108 And Russia tied the completion of the Bushire project to a satisfactory outcome of the discussions with the EU-3. Moscow’s traditional ambivalence became more pro- nounced.107 In support of the EU-3 in 2004. We are categorically opposed to the enlarge- ment of the club of nuclear states.104 At the same time Russia made clear its oppo- sition to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.”106 While insisting on the continuing validity of the partnership between the two countries. As Putin put it force- fully. at U. Russia warned Iran that failure to arrive at an agreement would lead to the end of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. such as sanctions.”111 On the other hand.

It remains to be seen whether Iran will consider Russia a more reliable supplier of fuel than the West- ern countries. The proposal. a point that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov noted explicitly. and second. In any case. and European support—is a clear attempt to take enrichment out of Iran’s hands for a consider- able period of time (ten years perhaps) while possibly allowing it to retain some parts of the fuel cycle. the sort of problem that exists with Iran today would not occur.”114 Although Russia may be acting constructively for the interna- tional community. in the nuclear diplomacy that has unfolded.112 In its negotiations with Iran.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 111 The International Response | 111 the IAEA and the consensus therein. the existence (to some extent) of a Russian formula and a leading role in the crisis. The principal explanation for the evolution from a lukewarm response to Iran’s resumption of conversion activities in August to Russia’s greater support for the coalition after November 2005 seems to have been twofold: first. which is by no means complete (and which might include other states such as China).113 The Russian proposal—which still provides a last chance for Iran to avoid sanctions and which has U. and arms supplies) gives Moscow considerable future leverage over its unpredictable neighbor. doing little to strengthen or weaken it. . is seen by the Russians as a step toward the development of international centers for nuclear fuel production. Russia has been tough in arguing that Iran has violated its obligations to the IAEA and that for diplomacy to work Tehran should resume its suspension of enrichment for an indefinite period and accept inspections. it is clear that its proposal is not attractive for Iran economically and that control over Iran’s fuel supply (as well as its reactor programs.S. and avoiding a conspicuous or forward role. which Iran can reject at its own risk. the desire to embrace diplomacy to forestall a possible military alterna- tive from an exasperated United States. technical training. it is the only currently active proposal. Russian experts stress their global per- spective: “If such a network (of international fuel centres) existed.

.*ch5 8/3/06 8:39 AM Page 112 112 | The International Response At the same time Russia’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Iran in the Security Council serves to underline Moscow’s independence from the United States and its privileged ties with Tehran. At what point Moscow’s support for diplomacy without teeth is exhausted remains to be seen.

the exploitation of Islam. Iran’s determination to have a dominant role in the region stems from Iranian nationalism in general. which are seen as rivals having a different vision of the regional order—a vision that is antithetical to Iranian interests and aspirations. A nuclear capability would help to counter and compete with that influence and demonstrate the arrival of Iran as a regional great power. Its efforts have focused on reshaping this order to it more conducive to Iran’s interests.S. but it clearly includes the elimination of the Western presence and a reduction of its influ- ence. and the zero-sum approach to the Western powers are specific to the Islamic Republic of Iran. but the empha- sis on revolutionary Iran as a role model. The con- tent of the order Iran envisions—beyond being Islamic and ratify- ing Iran’s leading role—is fuzzy. U. 113 . This objective implies a correspondingly diminished role for the United States and the West. Iran is motivated by both offensive and defensive considera- tions.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 113 6 Iran and Regional Security ran seeks a leading role in the Muslim world and the Middle East Imake regional order. encirclement is relatively new and was pre- ceded by Iran’s export of the revolution and determination to stymie the various efforts at a Middle East peace process. After all. but its aims correspond more to its ambitions than to its fears.

2 Turmoil in Iraq is clearly another source that feeds the opposition of many to a U. Tajikistan. which makes its ambitions for greater status and power more problematic regionally. Al Qaeda. Islamic Jihad.S. Iran is in the minority in the largely Sunni Middle East with no natural ally or constituency upon which to rely. So. discontent. among others. regional presence. This has led to cooperation on Azerbaijan. At the same time Iran hopes to exploit the political instability in the region taking shape in the form of Islamist movements and parties (for example. These groups are less disposed toward compromise or moderation in the achievement of their political objectives.S.3 Iran seeks to cultivate states in formal relations as well. which can be done most effectively on the Palestine issue—the “Achilles’ heel” of the United States in the region. preventing a united Arab front against it is an additional incen- tive for Iran to assume a leading role.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 114 114 | Iran and Regional Security The defensive aspect of Iran’s ambitions stems from structural conditions in the region rather than hostility toward the West. Iran appeals to the Arab street and embarrasses and puts the Arab states on the defensive. The spoiler needs leverage. As a Persian Shiite state. with periodic peace offensives. to weaken the United States in the region. and Iran cultivates its sources with little regard for ideology: for example. and Taliban Afghanistan. Iran has relied on Russia as a strategic partner. Iran shares few bonds with its Arab Sunni neighbors. Hamas. By out- bidding the Arab states in its extremism (or support for the resis- tance in its terminology) on Palestine. Iran tries to exploit existing crises. The specter of Iran–Arab polarization and Iran’s containment is thus dealt with by an activist policy that redefines issues such as Palestine as Muslim rather than simply an Arab or national/territorial question. and anti-Americanism. As a Persian. In the north.1 Sunni Arab nationalism is a potential rival and certainly a constraint on Iran’s leadership pretensions. Moscow values Iran’s silence on the Chechen . Iran cannot rely on any other state for automatic sympathy or support. Shiite state with an important pre-Islamic past. Hamas). Muqtada al Sadr. power in the region. based on a common interest in excluding or reducing U. Similarly.

6 This suggests an Iranian view that is zero-sum. and Western policy in the Persian Gulf can be encapsulated by the terms access and denial: access to the region’s . Russia has been unwilling to see Iran acquire an enrichment capa- bility and has broadly supported the EU-3 attempts to constrain it.4 Iran’s reliance (actually dependence) on Russia for arms. Russia. The convergence in interests is not per- fect. In the context of a substantial U. has become a permanent goal of the Islamic Republic. a “founding myth” of the revolution. As discussed in chapter 5. who rely on U.-dominated world order.S. They entail using whatever issues and conflicts exist to dilute and weaken U. regional presence. for example. It also stems from the Iranian leadership’s perception that a U.S. Moscow has argued for more patience and diplomacy.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 115 Iran and Regional Security | 115 issue and its willingness to forgo any attempt to exploit Islamic extremism in the Caucasus. Therefore. opposition to the United States.S. and diplomatic support reflects a strong current in Iranian thinking that seeks to align itself with a “rising Asia” behind China. however. power.S. In the process Iran has aggravated the suspicions of its neighbors.S. influence can only translate into Iran’s disadvantage. tech- nology. preferring to follow rather than lead any international sanctions that might result. Similarly on the issue of nuclear technology.S. and has been reluctant to lead any sanctions or condemnation. the two have differed on the division of the Caspian’s resources.5 Islamic Iran’s preoccupation with the United States is not simply a result of the United States’ dominant role in international affairs.- dominated region and the regime’s own survival are not compatible. U. Iran’s objectives are largely defensive. in which even com- mon interests cannot be built upon because an increase in U. characterized by a combination of hedging strategies and a spoiler role. influence and increase Iran’s. hidden behind the IAEA.S. and India to challenge the U. United States as Threat and Strategic Rival Since 1945.

S. the region. and weapons of mass destruction. and submarines. when U. the Iranian leaders believe. the Persian Gulf. But the exclusion transcends the bounds of commerce: Washington and its allies. At the same time the stakes in the region increased as the issue of energy supplies became mixed with those of terrorism. with bases in Afghanistan. Since 1990.10 The decline in U. and continued access to. military presence in the region—after 9/11. mines.”9 In countering U. the United States enlarged its strategic objectives to include a makeover of the Middle East. our national security and territorial integrity” and have sought to “change the conduct and nature of the Islamic republic.S. Iran attempted to counter dual containment by offering to cooperate with the Persian Gulf states on security issues.S.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 116 116 | Iran and Regional Security oil supplies and denial of the region and its resources to a hostile power.S. After the Cold War the threats to these interests have come from regional states. forces were first placed in large numbers on the Arabian peninsula. encouraging democratic reform and change and speaking of its goals as a “task for a generation. especially naval. in Iraq—increased Iran’s sense of insecurity. Islamic extremism. including antiship missiles.S.”8 Iran sees the U. Iran’s military.7 The extension of U.” This rhetoric implied a continuing determination to play a major role in. influence. greater Mid- dle East plan as a “project for a sustained presence in the region. role in trying to exclude Iran from regional politics and by way of sanctions to prevent it from cooperating in energy with the Caspian states has imposed significant costs on Iran. Central Asia.S. and after 2003. have never accepted or acknowledged “the rule of the Islamic system. Iran has gained some advantages in that its defiant stance and insistence on independence evokes a certain admiration. credibility and moral stature as a result of the war in Iraq and revelations at Abu Ghraib has given Iran an opening to exploit the ambivalent relationship . sug- gested an intent to develop a sea-denial capability to counter the United States. As it became embroiled in Iraq. The U. Iran has sought to reverse the trend toward forward presence. pro- curement.

He said that “Iran is following a path aimed at making others.11 A second set of obstacles for Iran with regard to the Arab states arises from the nature of the regime in Tehran. Tehran has become emboldened. ran for president arguing that the United States sought to exclude Iran from regional groupings and that Iran ought to leverage . Iran is seen as a potential threat and has dif- ficulty in piercing the automatism of Arab solidarity and rank clos- ing in disputes. “That is right. Similarly. another senior negotiator. Iran itself suffers from certain disadvantages.” Shamkhani earlier noted that Iran was “prepared to sign non-aggression pacts and pacts to pre- vent the use of bases by a third force with all regional states. making cooperation with a profess- edly reformed Tehran problematic. have left a durable legacy of distrust. despite their will.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 117 Iran and Regional Security | 117 between the Arabs and the United States.” Mousavian. any Iranian influence in Iraq is seen as undesirable by the Arab states.” and Iran has “always sought such regional pacts against the wishes of outside powers. observed. but there is another side to it. as in the case of the islands contested with Abu Dhabi. Active export of the revolution and covert interventions in the Arab states.13 In reply to Rowhani’s comment that “wherever Iran goes. Thus a dispute with one becomes a dispute with all. accept Iran as a regional power. Wherever the US goes.”15 President Ahmadinejad’s chief security advisor.”14 Outgoing Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani referred to Iran’s missiles as giving the country regional deterrence. This includes Iraq. Ali Lari- jani. One is structural: As a large non-Arab state. whatever the nature of the regime in Iran or Iraq and what- ever the status of Iran–Arab ties. Iran’s Regional Ambitions Iran wants to make itself the indisputable regional power without which no regional issue of any importance can be addressed. it faces the United States.12 As the United States has become bogged down with Iraq. thus reducing its threat to Iran. it faces Iran. together with Iran’s support of terrorism. At the same time.

which ended the Iran–Iraq war. there is the ongoing disagreement over the name of the waterway: Persian or Arab? Iran’s arms programs come under criticism as well. allowing Iran the possibility to use this as a basis for an alliance. For example. Many in the region share Saudi King Abdullah’s fears about the emergence of a “Shia crescent” stretch- ing from Lebanon through Iraq to Iran and south toward Bahrain and beyond.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 118 118 | Iran and Regional Security its regional power into geostrategic power. entertain few illusions about Iran’s aims. however cordial. Iran’s possible exploitation of their often significant Shiite popula- tions (varying from 5 percent in Saudi Arabia to 30 percent in Kuwait to nearly 60 percent in Bahrain and Iraq) is an additional cause for concern.”19 Iran’s conception of a regional security arrangement for the Gulf involves building confidence through practical bilateral cooperative measures (extradition agreements on terrorists) and tying an even- tual agreement to the allusions to it in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 598.20 The GCC states. Some of the smaller states have sought the inclusion of Yemen and Pakistan in any eventual agreement. This fear is amplified by the prospect of the first Arab Shiite state emerging in Iraq. he pointedly observed that “considering the power it enjoys in the region.” Iran need not fear Security Council measures. This might embolden other restive Shiites in the Gulf.17 When faced with the threat of referral to the Security Council. Iran’s size and its past record make them suspicious.”16 Larijani has suggested to his counterpart in Iraq that the two coun- tries could be the nucleus of a new regional security system. After the election Larijani defined Ahmadinejad’s policy as creating strategic relations with neighbors and creating “new regional arrangements and coalitions.22 .21 Iran’s border dispute with Iraq and a territorial dis- pute with the United Arab Emirates continue to upset relations periodically.18 Iran’s reduced sense of vulnerability (and shift in perceived relative balance of power) between 2003 and 2005 was exemplified by nuclear negotiator Sirus Naseri’s comment that “Iran is not Iraq and the US is not the self- appointed policeman of the world anymore.

S. failure there could translate into regionwide instability (and Sunni–Shiite polarization) or should Tehran set aside competition with the United States and build on the convergence of interest in Iraq? That overlap in interest is substantial: Both states want a unified. Its bellicose policies are clearly intended to divert regional attention from Iran’s own missile and nuclear programs. On the issue of Palestine. and as long as Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain ambiguous. to oppose Israel and any compromise peace. given its record of indirect conflict with Israel.23 Iran is the only state in the Middle East that denies Israel’s right to exist. Tehran seeks to discredit those states close to the West. undermin- ing cease-fires and sabotaging peace processes by aggravating ten- sions and preventing peacemaking. This stance requires a spoiler strategy. which would be tantamount to surrender.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 119 Iran and Regional Security | 119 There will be no great enthusiasm for exploring new security arrangements until the outcome in Iraq (and U. . the duty of all Middle East countries. Iran faces another choice: Should it seek to weaken the United States by bleeding it and taking the risk that a U. training. so the thinking goes. Its strategic rationale goes as follows: The United States seeks hege- mony in the region and its natural resources and wants to achieve it as a first step through the roadmap foisted onto the hapless Pales- tinians. than before? At the very least. a nuclear and more confident Iran might not choose to con- front Israel more directly. the risks of a misjudgment increase considerably. Given the limited scope for replacing the United States as the region’s security guarantor in the Persian Gulf states. Iran achieves this through providing arms. On Iraq. including Iran.S. The ques- tion posed is whether. At the same time. or take greater risks through its proxies. Tehran outbids the Arab states in its support for rejectionism. and funding to proxies—directly to Hezbollah (with Syria) and indirectly to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It is therefore. standing) becomes clearer. putting them on the defensive and inhibiting any criticism of Iran’s other regional policies. Iran has sought to use two current conflicts to improve its position in the region and weaken that of the United States.

and democratic (and therefore Shiite-dominant) state. The reality is that neither has the ability to determine outcomes but each can probably harm the other and its own interests in the stub- born competition. and other Shiites (such as Prime Minister Jafaari of the Dawa Party) are naturally suspected of nefarious aims. moderate. the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI) with its Badr Brigade militia—were given sanctuary. There are also reports that Iran is funding Sunni insurgent forces. while maintaining ties with the Dawa Party.24 Iranian leaders say that Iraq “is a turning point in [the] region.S. and trained in Iran. On a visit to Iraq in mid-2005 the Ira- nian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was received by Ayatollah Sistani (which no ranking U. SCIRI (and its Badr Brigade militia). As a neighbor Iran has a considerable stake in the stability of Iraq. Kharrazi pointedly reminded his hosts that Iran would remain a neighbor long after the United States has departed. The differences arise from mutual suspicions that each seeks to dominate the future Iraq at the expense of the other’s interest. official has yet managed).26 . Iran has sought to reassure the Iraqi govern- ment of its goodwill by offering assistance. The eight-year war between the two states in the 1980s left a number of issues unresolved (border agreement. In addi- tion a number of groups—notably the Iraqi Shiite grouping. and Ayatollah Sistani. Tehran seeks to maximize its options in the fluid circumstances.”25 Unable to predict Iraq’s future. funded. With a majority Shiite population in both countries and major Shiite shrines located in southern Iraq. compensation or reparations). or an extremist Islamist state. there has long been inter- action between the two countries. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also have a presence and retain con- tacts and influence in Iraq. Muqtada al Sadr. because they target U. Iran retains some influ- ence with this group. In the current near-civil war in Iraq. Neither Tehran nor Washington wants a weak or disintegrat- ing state. which means creating multiple contacts and links across the spectrum of opposition and government forces for possible leverage.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 120 120 | Iran and Regional Security stable. forces.S. prisoners of war. an Arab nationalist state.

While seeking to deflect mili- tary pressure and limit U. concerns that Iraq remain intact. the differences between Tehran and Washington preclude any cooperation to that end.”30 Iran may find it difficult to calibrate the correct balance among maintaining links with various groups. Iran’s strategic priority has been to ensure that the United States remains bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire while maintaining its own options (and contacts or proxies) as to how it will play the endgame.S. which have been inconsistent: “The Bush administration has vacillated between two very different approaches. Iran seeks to outdo the Arab states in support for the Palestinians while inhibiting their . are suspicious of Iran’s intentions and issue frequent warnings to Tehran.S. Agreement to discuss Iraq will not change this. but not at the price of continued U.] at other times it engaged in direct discussions with Tehran over Iraq and Afghanistan.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 121 Iran and Regional Security | 121 Although Iran shares U.31 Iran wants stability in Iraq. and avoid becoming a radical Arab nationalist or Islamist state.S.S.S. 27 This strategy has entailed a complex set of policies. mixing disruptive behavior with offers to the United States to help stabilize the country. Reports of Iran providing insurgents with shaped charges for explo- sives and increased assistance could lead. stabilization of these countries in exchange for greater tolerance of Iran’s nuclear program. to an Iranian–U.S. Above all. if sufficiently blatant.29 In effect Iran holds regional stability hostage to U. bases in that country or its own con- tainment by U. Iran is developing a sea-denial capability and missiles while cultivating the GCC states with confidence-building meas- ures and talk about a new security arrangement. and its intention to deny the United States a success or honorable exit. policies on the nuclear issue. At times it sig- naled support for regime change[. Iraqi Sunnis and others. confrontation. Iran has offered to use its influence to assist the U. regional presence and to the future of Iraq and Afghanistan.28 Iran links the nuclear issue to the U. its desire for stability. become democratic by giving increased power to the majority Shi- ite. includ- ing the United States.32 In sum. options.S.S. power.

sensitive and unstable. The unanticipated U. it is Islamic and independent.33 It is this approach that colors policy toward Iran today. involvement in the region reflects and shapes the strategic context of the contemporary Middle East. interests. supporting allies. clients. policy goals to rationalize the costs of the deeper engagement.S. were one of the cri- teria that made the United States so implacable and hostile to Ira- nian proliferation. and encouraging . Although the shape of the regional order that Iran would like to see is unclear. Iran in the New U.S. opposed to U. This context.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 122 122 | Iran and Regional Security reactions to its own policies. Iran is cultivating its ties with Shiite populations in the region and hedging its bets on the future of Iraq. it has certain identifiable features: it is hostile to the United States (West). and Iran has a leading role in it.S. A nuclear-capable Iran would be better placed to bring such an order into being. Strategic Context: From Regime Change to Democratization Iran’s bid for a nuclear capability is of inherent political impor- tance. The United States elided from a policy of regime change to the more ambitious and open-ended one of democratization.S.34 U. which Tehran would like to have as a strategic ally. Tehran enjoys special relations with Syria and Hezbollah and exploits anti-Americanism and the sensi- tivity of regimes being labeled U.and long-term stability.S. The United States has become a regional player and revolutionary state with a long-term commitment to promoting change. Furthermore Iran’s policies in the region and beyond.S.S. The implicit trade-off is among short. The new rationale for a generational commitment in the Middle East became the necessity of democratization that alone could guarantee an end to radicalism and proliferation. has been made the more so by U. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. entanglement in Iraq gradually saw a shift in U. but it is magnified by both the kind of regime it is and the regional context within which its proliferation is taking place.

36 The intelligence debacle surrounding Iraq has made tackling Iran more difficult.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 123 Iran and Regional Security | 123 democratic opposition and reform. the United States is also overextended militarily. which remains unaffected. and competition for Persian Gulf oil has increased. Deeper U. A strike would need to cover enough targets to destroy the infrastructure but not enough to constitute an act of war against the Iranian people or to strengthen the regime. forces a form of hostage to Washington’s good behavior). It would need the full support of the interna- tional community. Together with its long-standing com- mitment to Israel. the United States overexposure in Iraq surely constitutes a liability (with U. In this context. where it has access to an arc of military bases.S.S. discussions of a military option to prevent Iran’s nuclear ambitions have an air of desperation and bluff. following prolonged attempts toward a diplo- matic effort. Iraq and Afghanistan will provide access facilities to the United States for the foreseeable future. where the pressures for polit- ical reform have grown. Iranian responses would have to be antici- pated.35 An attack would need to destroy all sites and be able to assure that the nuclear program would not resume or accelerate outside of the NPT. While militarily present and politically active in the region. notably Bahrain and Qatar. In the south. involvement comes at a time of transition in the region. Although this course can never be totally discounted as a last resort or pru- dently devalued in diplomacy and negotiations before that stage. oil incomes have risen. the United States has assumed a greater role in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this context. and demonstrate incontrovertibly that Iran was seeking or in possession of nuclear weapons. the United States has diversified its base structure among the smaller Gulf states. whether they be missile strikes or terrorism against the United States or its regional allies. which makes it vulnerable to crises and demands on its forces elsewhere and to reverses that could call into question whatever progress has been made in Afghanistan and Iraq so far. Some have argued that the United States . in practical terms it is an unattractive and probably counterproductive option.

S.S.S. that count. at least temporarily. But senior U. perspective. Iran’s withdrawal might serve as a catalyst and even a model for others—the “tipping point” analogy. . at other times they claim posses- sion of a regionwide deterrent. Response to the Regional Implications of a Nuclear-Capable Iran Iran has sent mixed signals about its nuclear intentions.S. and further proliferation. rogue states and WMD are indistinguishable from terrorists and WMD. Iran filled more of the criteria than Iraq. A long-standing member either leaving the NPT or openly flouting it would create doubts about the regime and set a precedent for others. An official and comprehensive report underscoring this suggested to professionals the need for greater caution where Iran was con- cerned. actionable) intelligence on Iran means U. Iran’s status as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world” makes its move toward a nuclear capability particularly threaten- ing.37 Today. Sometimes its leaders have argued that a nuclear capability would only com- plicate relations with neighbors.40 Where the United States is concerned.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 124 124 | Iran and Regional Security invaded the wrong country. Since Iran’s policies “directly threaten US interests in the region and beyond. the lack of good (that is. not the weapons.42 Weakening the NPT regime by defecting from it and setting the stage for others to do so would unravel the most important and universal arms control treaty in existence and could result in regional arms races.39 From the U.”41 Iran would constitute a challenge on several levels. The most abstract threat is to the non-proliferation regime itself.”38 U. most especially its secret programs. officials argued that this should not lead states to “underreact” and that “there are no guarantees where intel- ligence is concerned. and it is the nature of the regimes proliferating. discredited. What Hans Blix calls “faith-based intelligence” has been. shifts in alliances. policy is flying blind on most issues affecting Iran.

“Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and defense.. suggesting that Israel’s possible use of nuclear weapons was less a source of con- cern.” Bolton. use Hezbollah to do so.” A nuclear Iran would inhibit cost-free interventions.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 125 Iran and Regional Security | 125 Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel and its opposition to the peace process puts it in a special category of states.”46 John Bolton noted. because it was less likely to do so as a democracy and ally of the United States. Whether they would use it directly as the government of Iran or whether they would trans- fer it to a terrorist group leaves us very concerned. argued the opposite in the case of Israel.”47 U. while shel- tering behind its nuclear capability.43 A more direct threat would be the impact of a nuclear Iran on U... how- ever. “Their repeated support for terrorism makes it particularly dangerous if they were to acquire a nuclear weapon .S.S. security commitments.44 The United States has been clear that an Iranian nuclear capa- bility would throw a shadow over the area not least because Iran’s policies “directly threaten US interests in the region and beyond.S.48 U. and this would be magnified by a nuclear Iran. or more likely. “We share the view that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would be destabilizing and threatening to all Iran’s neighbors. officials also underlined that a nuclear Iran is destabilizing not only to Iran’s neighbors but “for peace and security internation- ally”. .. creating uncertainty and acting as a deterrent. Iran might seek to confront Israel. fixed bases in the region as well as access are already put under threat by missile proliferation. As John Bolton put it. to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.”45 President Bush observed. that the “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and deliv- ery systems makes Iran less secure and the region more unstable”. As President Bush suggested before 9/11. proliferators “seek weapons of mass destruction .

even a moderate and satisfied state would cause concerns in seeking a nuclear capability. the visit of John Bolton to the Persian Gulf in January 2005. U.51 The most visible effort. This was to change. While their implications are not well understood. if rent by domestic disorder. and that money would be better spent on conventional means of offsetting superior US forces in the region. and national— combined with the short distances involved. however. Sunni–Shiite. Given this reality. The United States’ asso- ciation with Israel (which possesses a large weapons inventory) also made denunciation of the still embryonic Iran program prob- lematic for the Arab states. the Bolton visit underlined the liabilities of being asso- ciated with a state that has lost moral authority as a result of Abu Ghraib and credibility as a result of Iraq. none of the GCC states publicly denounced Iran’s nuclear program or actively lobbied against it at the Review Conference. competition. Given the intersecting rivalries—Arab–Iranian. concerned by Iran’s activities in Iraq. Though concerned (especially about possible environmental consequences). diplomacy has been slow and largely failed in mobilizing Iran’s immediate neighbors. A nuclear Iran.49 Another problem caused by a nuclear Iran is the context in which this proliferation would take place—a region of instability. it would be difficult to identify the source if any weapons are used. by the end of 2005 as the protracted crisis over Iran’s nuclear program inten- sified with the arrival of a more hard-line government in Tehran. was illustrative. might seek to burnish its leadership credentials through nuclear brinksmanship. the states most directly affected by an Iranian nuclear capability.S. were more . Coming rather late. The Gulf states.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 126 126 | Iran and Regional Security that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons might invite an attack from another regional state. the imperative to arrest any further movement in that direction seems evident. and recent conflict.50 All of these are considerations that arise from the prospect of a nuclear Iran. The risks of cat- alytic war and indeed of the end of the taboo against nuclear weapons use are most likely where extremism in the name of reli- gion has become an identifying feature. intra-Arab.

and inherently cautious. the regimes of the region have not taken a very active role in response to Iran’s current programs. and about how to assure Gulf security is mixed with the recognition that regional solutions are needed and that political exposure vis-à-vis the United States is dangerous. Riven by wars.53 . the reputation of the United States has suffered. largely dependable regional state—has demurred.52 Regional Responses The most direct impact of a nuclear Iran will be on its immediate region. it is marked by reluctance or by the absence of choice rather than enthusiasm. Its neighbors will have to adjust to living in the shadow of a nuclear-capable and missile-equipped Iran. other more urgent issues like Iraq preoccupy them. The United States has also tried and failed to impress on its new strategic partner. about Iran’s intentions. silence cannot be taken for consent. Uncertainty about Iraq. is currently negotiating a gas pipeline from Iran. New Delhi—which is increasingly dependent on the Gulf for energy supplies. and considers Tehran an important. Saudi Arabia’s and Turkey’s relations with the United States are lacking their earlier warmth. the need to avoid major economic agree- ments with Iran. Rather. and although reliance on the United States may continue.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 127 Iran and Regional Security | 127 receptive when Secretary Rice undertook a similar (and this time locally well received) visit to the Gulf in February 2006. Nonetheless. In every state in the region. transnational terrorism. This is not because they are not concerned. India. These military capa- bilities will aggravate already existing geopolitical disparities— Iran’s demographic and geographical weight and the possible polit- ical ascendance of the Shiite in the Gulf region. The follow- ing gives the broad outlines of likely regional responses rather than detailed country-by-country reactions that are available else- where. This comes at a time of change in relations with the United States.

56 Equally significant. A nuclear Iran will seek to cash in on its new status to seek hegemony and leadership in the wider Muslim world. the members refused to emphasize the Israeli threat. if not end. The Secretary-General of the GCC criticized the program. Initially careful to focus on the environmental risks and on Israel’s nuclear weapons. raising questions about the wisdom of relying on the United States exclu- sively. nor does it represent a counterbalancing lever against Israel’s nuclear capabilities. U. Saudi Arabia has been less bashful about its concerns.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 128 128 | Iran and Regional Security A flavor of the reactions to Iran’s programs is captured by two responses in the Persian Gulf. focusing instead on Iran. in effect separating the Gulf–Arab states from those further afield. It will challenge and complicate. Signifi- cantly. A nuclear Iran will tilt the balance of the region away from the Arabs. they are no longer inhibited from expressing concern about Iran’s pro- gram. hegemony. A Saudi newspaper in 2003 observed that nobody could believe that Iran sought nuclear weapons against Israel or the United States: “The real target is the neighboring coun- tries.”55 Since late 2005 the GCC states have become more vocal in their opposition to the Iranian nuclear program. Such an Iran may also seek to increase its influence in its immediate neighborhood. the GCC now emphasized a Gulf WMD-free zone (WMDFZ) as a first step toward a wider Middle East zone. it must necessarily be a card for non-Arabs and Shiites.”54 A Gulf Research Center report concluded that the GCC and Arabs generally do not see Iran’s nuclear weapons program as constituting “an instrument of deterrence. with both the crown prince and the foreign minister clearly promoting a Gulf WMDFZ without making Israel’s disar- mament a precondition. . A nuclear Iran would seek to inhibit pro-Western-inclined Arab states. and at the GCC summit in December 2005. apart from that which might come from the Security Council.57 This recent vocal opposition to Iran’s nuclear program by its neighbors serves notice on Tehran of the regional costs to be paid for continuation of the program.S.

mollify it. Such a decision would be more attractive if Iran were considered a serious threat and if there were confidence in a U. Moreover. First. and procure security by joining it. This might include seeking to entan- gle Iran in regional arrangements including trade and security. which considers itself the natu- ral leader of the Arab world and puts considerable weight on its sta- tus.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 129 Iran and Regional Security | 129 Broadly. the GCC states have several options. the GCC states could seek to balance Iran (that is. Saudi Arabia might also seek to buy or lease nuclear warheads from Pakistan for its existing missiles or have them sta- tioned on Saudi soil under Pakistani control (technically legal). and internationally (with the EU and the United States). domestically. It is open to question whether Pakistan would be willing to guaran- tee Saudi security or accept the costs of offending the United States. meet its needs. they could seek to appease Iran. Second. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran for over a decade. regionally. This option accepts the limitations involved and prefers to rely on rather than counter Iran. look to a proximate or distant balancer). bandwagon. the GCC states could acquire a countervailing capability (that is. but few states in the region have such a capability.58 Turkey’s response in this scenario is also uncertain given its weak nuclear infrastructure. Choosing this option would also risk relations with the United States. Third. guarantee. The alter- native might be to seek nuclear weapons or the stationing of nuclear weapons from a friendly power. Egypt. . Saudi Arabia is sometimes cited as following this model with an assist from Pakistan and already follows a policy of opacity in regard to IAEA safeguard inspections. Fewer still have a nuclear infrastructure they could set into motion to acquire such a capability within even a decade.S. including a theater missile defense system. This would entail tightening ties with the United States and seeking security guarantees and military links. Turkey’s political evolution is uncertain. The United States is the only contender for such a role. This may be an attractive option. a national nuclear option).

whereas the GCC states focus on Iran’s program). The success of either of these. But while Iran’s Arab neighbors are less reticent in voicing their concerns about Iran’s program. appears unlikely. whether diplomatic or military. Also Cairo’s ties with the United States (and Israel) would complicate any overt attempt to seek nuclear weapons. depends on political solutions that are not apparent (for example. Increased reliance on the United States (though not welcome) may be the most practical.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 130 130 | Iran and Regional Security Any suggestion of the achievement of nuclear status by another regional state—especially Iran—is bound to give rise to pressures on Egypt to follow suit. A fourth possible approach for the GCC might be one of arms control and attempts to realize the long-discussed WMDFZ. but none are well placed to do so in the short term. Some states may position themselves to develop nuclear options. A grand bargain between the United States and Iran in parallel with serious movement on the peace process front. the most likely short-term response of regional states will be a tendency to hedge. Israeli Response Iran refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist. while examining all these options. None of these options look attractive to the states of the region. however. In general. Israeli strategists and the Israeli Air Force first talked of military strikes against Ira- . a joint or regional response. This may be difficult given Egypt’s lack of significant nuclear infrastructure. leaving the United States and Europe to do the heavy lifting. For the past decade and a half Israel has been aware that the proximate existential threats it faced have been displaced to the East. how- ever. Egypt prefers to emphasize Israeli nuclear weapons. could make at least progress on a regionwide approach to tack- ling WMD more likely. The implications of a nuclear-capable Iran are serious but are not seen as an imminent threat in a region beset by immediate crises.

shows no sign of reducing support for hard-line Palestinians. The 2002 revelations of Iran’s nuclear pro- gram therefore served as confirmation of Israel’s own estimates and warnings over the previous decade. posing an international rather than bilateral threat. An obvious feature of the Iranian program that causes particu- lar concern for the Israelis has been its development of long-range missiles configured apparently for specialized warheads. Although reformists in Iran have questioned Iran’s policy of being “more Palestinian than the Palestinians. and believed that with Baghdad contained. aiming to act preventively before Iran became self-sufficient instead of waiting for Iran’s pro- gram to reach the point of no return and become less subject to influence from outside.59 In the 1990s Israel saw Iran rather than Iraq as the more serious threat. Even the war with Iraq in 2003 took the spotlight off the greater threat that Iran was beginning to represent. Its alarmism was deliberate. Throughout the 1990s. A nuclear Iran raises a host of questions for Israel ranging from Iran’s propensity for risk-taking to its attempts at extending deter- rence to Hezbollah to its behavior and posturing in crises to its possible attempts to sanctuarize itself with nuclear weapons while continuing to support or upgrade support for rejectionist elements and terrorists. Yet few Iranians consider the Palestine issue one of national interest. unpredictable and shrewd. Iranian slogans against Israel on missiles do nothing to reassure Israel about Iran behaving responsibly. and the new government in particular. Israel sees Iran as an implacable foe. which might become more pronounced if Iran were to acquire a nuclear capability. Iran would be free to pursue its programs unobserved.60 Also of concern is Iran sup- plying missiles to Hezbollah together with funding and the overall strategic relationship.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 131 Iran and Regional Security | 131 nian nuclear installations in 1992. Of equal concern has been Iran’s attempt to deploy its Russian-built submarines outside the Gulf and to pro- ject power throughout in the region.” the regime. Israel was in the forefront of those seeking to sensitize President Yeltsin’s Russia to the dangers from transfer of nuclear technology to Iran. at most it is an issue of .

there will not be proportional responses).61 Unable to deal with it unilaterally. first and foremost. which lends credence to allegations of an Israeli presence in Northern Iraq and Israeli use of Turkish airspace. devastating response about which there should be no doubts (that is. A move from ambiguity to quasi- public acknowledgment. Tehran finds it expedient to magnify the issue and demonize Israel. and to that end it coordinates its diplomacy closely with the EU-3. Israel therefore must anticipate the worst. Dolphin class submarines that can reach and navigate the Persian Gulf are now part of a second-strike capability that makes Israel’s deterrent more robust and survivable. Israel may consider moving from its opaque doctrine on nuclear weapons to a more overt stance. sabotage. Iran will need to know that Israel cannot accept the concept of limited strikes. Israel’s main concern has been to keep the international spotlight . in the event of a military attack on Ira- nian facilities. It takes seriously Iranian threats of retaliation inter alia against Dimona.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 132 132 | Iran and Regional Security Muslim solidarity. an international problem. Still. Given the experience of the Holocaust. any attack on Israel will be met by a full-scale. The ARROW antimissile system con- stitutes the other part of this upgrade. Iran needs to be disabused of any notion of using numerical superiority or the geographical asymmetries of the region to advantage. Israel has also responded by moving its deterrent to sea. For example. Israel has insisted that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are. could have the effect of putting greater (domestic political) pressure on states like Egypt to follow suit. sharing intelli- gence and estimates. Israel must necessarily consider and plan for the possible need for preemption against facilities if all other alterna- tives (diplomacy. It insists that Iran is an international issue first and foremost. Israel will have to initiate a strategic dialogue with Iran to clar- ify redlines and avoid misunderstandings. given regular exercises. Israel has responded to this threat in several ways. intended to act as a deterrent to Iran. assassination) fail.

which will be in the front line in the event of an Iranian nuclear capability. A nuclear Iran will complicate the regional strate- gic landscape by raising the risks of major conflict at a time when most instabilities in the region are transnational and domestic. This means close and frank coordination with Washington. As the country most affected and most able to respond quickly. This “point of no return” will make Iran less vulnerable to sanctions and embargoes and will come before the date of actual production. is bound to influence policy and calculations. Israel’s response to Iran’s nuclear program is the most important in the region. It is this earlier date that is salient for diplomacy.*ch6 8/3/06 8:36 AM Page 133 Iran and Regional Security | 133 and pressure on Iran. Israel must consider Iran’s refusal to recognize its right to exist together with proxy war waged with it over two decades as an existential threat. Israel’s primary concern is that focusing on esti- mates of the dates at which Iran will be able to produce fissile material (3 to 5 years) will obscure the point at which Iran will have effectively achieved self-sufficiency regarding the fuel cycle. . Israel.

In joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (as an observer). Iran gives priority to its relations with Russia and China. presence and influence in the region.”4 His principal security advisor boastfully noted the linkage between the nuclear issue and regional politics: “They [the United States] are also con- 134 .-inspired regional order. which is seen as domineering. “They [the United States] want to silence us on the important issues that are going on in the region and the world of Islam. Per- sian Gulf and broader Middle East.S. It provides the means to block a U.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 134 Conclusion I have argued that Iran’s nuclear ambitions reflect a broader Iranian challenge to the Middle Eastern regional order. They want us to follow their discipline in our foreign policy.2 In seeking to block it. this strategy entails a reduction of the U. and parts of South Asia.3 Iran seeks a regional order in which outside powers are excluded and in which it plays a leading role in the Caucasus. President Ahmadinejad observed.1 Such an order is seen as a threat to Iran and its pretensions to manage regional security. and imperial. A nuclear capabil- ity symbolizes Iran’s quest for regional leadership. Iranian leaders are in no doubt about the competition for regional influence under way. As a starting point. Iran joins an implicitly anti-NATO and anti-Western grouping. hegemonic.S.

The United States is bogged down in Iraq. or will be. Moreover.”9 The smaller Gulf states are preoccupied with terrorism and are not reas- sured by Iran’s careless diplomacy. combined with the prospect of a Shiite- led state (in which Iran has significant influence and which emboldens Shiites in neighboring Arab states) feeds a sense of regional insecurity. An Israeli analyst succinctly (and accurately) notes that “Iran is striving to become an Islamic super- power with hegemony over the greater Middle East. and the future shape of the EU. terrorism. In this context Iran’s ambiguous policies in Iraq and strident rhetoric about Israel are amplified. the high price of oil reduces the likelihood that any sanctions on Iran will include the oil sector. while Turkish analysts noting Iran’s “activism” and grab for regional influence see a “new danger. . economies. which they believe takes the military option off the table. there is no way that Iran can be wor- ried about the threat of the Security Council. immigration.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 135 Conclusion | 135 cerned that if Iran acquires nuclear technology the situation in the region will be altered. preoccupied with internal matters: elections.”5 He has already hinted how: “With the power it enjoys in the region. The tight energy market has given Iran a buffer of approximately $15 billion in extra oil revenues for 2005. insurgency in Iraq with attendant uncer- tainty about the outcome. Relations with Saudi Arabia are strained over Iraq. They are bol- stered by a belief that Iran should align itself with Asia and are not interested in the West or Western inducements.8 Accordingly Iran’s looming nuclear ambitions appear menacing. The new team is more confronta- tional by nature and more prone to brinksmanship.”7 Turmoil in the region.” which drives the development of ballistic missiles and a nuclear capability. The EU is.10 Since the arrival of the Ahmadinejad presidency.”6 Meanwhile the Guards Commander warns that Iran cannot be excluded from the region and that Iran is “not merely a regional power” but “a major power in the Middle East and the world. The strategic pic- ture seen from their perspective has changed for the better over the past two years. Iran’s policy on the nuclear issue has hardened.

interest. Iran’s ambiguity on terrorism only increases suspicions about its reliabil- ity. may take too long to be relevant as an answer to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. the tenu- ousness of any Russian–Chinese tilt toward Iran. the regime will not be threatened by opposition. if not the United States. while fragile. Iran’s challenge to the international order is not a conventional one that can be contained militarily or susceptible to easy co- option. The wild cards in Iran today are the ultranationalists/Islamists who would welcome a return to a state of siege and embattlement and believe a nuclear capability is an answer for the lack of respect afforded Iran. Territorially. With strong repressive institutions it can counter threats but cannot generate enthusiasm and popularity except in the constituencies it favors with patronage. Tehran has yet to make the choice between radicalism and being accepted (and treated) as a normal state.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 136 136 | Conclusion An alternative analysis would be less sanguine about Iran’s posi- tion. At the same time. and the necessity for good relations with the EU. regime insecurity. yet it is of marginal importance in terms of national. the growing alienation of regional states. The challenge it poses is civilizational and ideological. Regime evolution. but who now have to debate the issues on the conservatives’ terms. where hurting the United States risks a destabilization of the country and a prolonged civil war. They are a minority of the elite. Yet its opportunism. Iran is a status quo power. not an adventurist state. who see interaction or engagement with the world and the West as inevitable and neces- sary for development. its principal ally. could see the emergence of less restrained policies. . but they have intim- idated the more internationalist leaders. as opposed to regime–factional. unless it comes from within the system. the knife edge on which Tehran is poised in Iraq. and tolerance of ideological militants. together with the shift in power to the Revolutionary Guards. inevitable with generational change. focusing instead on the weakening of Syria. Iran continues to exploit hostility toward Israel for leverage in the Muslim world and for bargaining with the United States.

a nuclear capability necessarily assumes more importance. and its self-absorption do not give rise to regionally responsible behavior. at least a weapons option. but with weak conventional forces and missiles.”11 But this begs the question whether Iran can be accommodated within the existing system or whether it seeks to overthrow the system. regional status. its lack of a natural regional constituency. Iran has no grand strategy to achieve this and has been impro- vising tactically and defensively since its nuclear program was . there are elements currently in office in Iran that appear to expect to achieve this on their own terms without significantly changing their policies.S. regime change. These policies are disruptive of regional order and could become more so with a nuclear capability. It wants to be taken seriously and its quest for nuclear sta- tus reflects this impulse. Does it seek greater recognition within or against the system? That depends on which Iran you are speaking about. maximizing options and leverage for bargaining. Iran’s anti- Americanism and hostility toward Israel are heartfelt and tactical. As a deterrent against U.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 137 Conclusion | 137 Whether it can be accommodated and whether its behavior and goals can be tempered and changed remains unclear. similarly as a bargaining chip in any grand bargain. Some scholars have suggested that the starting point for a nuclear agreement with Iran is “according Iran a guaranteed lead- ing place in a Middle Eastern security order. does little to reassure its smaller neighbors. Iran’s regional policies in the Arab world are that of a spoiler or dis- rupter. I have argued that Iran seeks to be recognized as a regional and even global power. which leaves it blocked diplo- matically. and a greater voice in international relations. However. to be exploited to promote Iran’s version of a regional order. a nuclear capability has certainly increased in value since 2002. and nurtures and cultivates a pop- ulist nationalism. the benefits of which it sees as prestige and domestic legitimation. The strategic aspects are not principal. rarely consulting or acting through institutions. Iran is seeking a nuclear capability. Iran’s sense of grievance. Iran exploits strategic ambiguity.

Most Iranians are concerned about bread and butter issues but do not like being dictated to or discriminated against.12 Influencing the debate in Iran a decade ago might have been more useful. The nuclear issue is an attempt by Iran to force the world to deal with it on its own terms. Since Febru- . then its current capabilities are still limited and rudi- mentary and vulnerable to sanctions. On the other hand. U. hostility to the United States and recognition/status. acting as if sanctions could work in an era of globaliza- tion. policy has been largely incoherent. In essence.S. but some may have convinced themselves that a fait accompli would force others to accept it or that it has an “Eastern” option. Seeking to moderate Iran’s behavior through engagement (and inducement) has been the approach of the European states.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 138 138 | Conclusion uncovered. that it is not weapons per se that are the prob- lem but. Neither con- tainment nor sanctions have worked very effectively. So far Iran has held out for both. certain regimes.S. but there is still time to point to the difference between sensitive and other technologies and to underscore that it is the government’s behavior that raises concern. Iran after all is not Japan or Swe- den. rather than accommodate the terms demanded by others. On the one hand. the aim of some in Washington seems to be to get Tehran to choose between radical policies and sensitive technology. The United States has handled the nuclear issue badly for over a decade. consisting of bluster and bile mixed with opti- mism about a spontaneous. U.. Its policies have left Tehran free to depict the issue as one of technology denial. policy has fluctuated unclearly between regime change and policy change. The current U. administration has insisted. Iran wants technology and independence. stubbornly but with some reason. Iran does not want nuclear weapons capability at the cost of international isolation and setbacks for development. if Iran does not have a parallel clandestine program of any significance (which is not the same as undeclared facilities).S. not the rights of the Iranian people. imminent regime change. rather. isolation and sanctions will only reinforce its interest in a nuclear capability.

and to make moves that restart its program with- out providing enough justification for a strong or united international response.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 139 Conclusion | 139 ary 2005. however. perhaps in a different mode or forum. One defect of such an agreement. Would Iran accept such an agreement? This depends on both its immediate nuclear ambitions and its perception of the threat involved in Security Council sanctions. its permitted conversion activities would unwittingly fuel its program. Iran’s calculation is that its continued cooperation with the IAEA (however imperfect) is preferable to the international community than the continuation of . which is to provide the fuel for Iran’s first reactor at Bushire on these lines). Iran has already reduced cooperation with the inspectors. however. In the absence of such an agreement. aims (and a temporary sense of leverage) and U. Such an agreement would cer- tainly defuse the current crisis and give the international commu- nity some breathing space. to slice away at exist- ing constraints. the EU.S. This limited agree- ment could take the form of giving Iran access to some parts of the fuel cycle (such as conversion but not enrichment on any scale). which would deal with all the issues of concern on either side. given Iranian fears about U. and on its cooperation with the IAEA. when the United States joined its European allies in sup- porting diplomacy. is that if Iran has clandestine enrichment facilities. with the bulk of enrichment and return of spent fuel outside of the country (possibly Russia. a limited or technical agree- ment on the nuclear issue appears more likely. Iran will insist on its willingness to continue negotiations. political constraints. At the same time. and the United States might be difficult to reject because China and India would find it much eas- ier to associate themselves with it.S. the chances of settlement have increased. A larger package deal or an across-the-board agreement is unlikely. Iran’s summary rejection of the EU package offer in July may have had more to do with the contents of the package than with distaste for an overall settlement. Iran will continue to push for advantage. with possible withdrawal from the NPT hinted at as a last resort. Such an agreement sup- ported by the IAEA. Russia.

lies at the heart of international reluctance to allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Tehran’s mantra about being discriminated against obscures the degree to which Iran is the victim of its own behavior. however wel- come. The pri- mary aim of the regime is to stay in power. It is sensitive to power. Iran’s behavior and its regional ambitions are concerns that will not necessarily change. It will use the nuclear issue and foreign policy to shore up its legitimacy.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 140 140 | Conclusion its program without any inspections or monitoring.” I have suggested that a fix for the nuclear issue. Absent an external threat. In turning down the EU-3 offer of technology and a long-term relationship and insisting on an accel- erated drive for enrichment. Playing to a domestic audience. A state that refuses . it scored an “own goal. It may believe a tight oil market increases its leverage. Iran’s irre- sponsibility. including unwillingness to assume responsibility for its own acts. it will continue as in the past. it will deal. while failure to do so could jeopardize its economic prospects and development. A nuclear capability would certainly see Iran’s penchant for brinksmanship elevated to new levels. Iran still acts more like a revolution- ary clique than a responsible government that recognizes respon- sibilities as well as rights. but in this it may prove mis- taken. and when vulnerable. A state that has elevated deniability to a new art form cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons. Iran is now in a trap of its own making. A state deficient in a sense of responsibility cannot be allowed control over dual-use technology. is not the end of the story. while pushing for advantage. finding it difficult to give up what it has convinced its domestic audience is essential to science and development. A state that harbors and promotes terrorists cannot reasonably be allowed WMD. It will be regionally and globally ambitious without the means to achieve such status. has brought Iran into direct conflict with the international commu- nity. opportunistic and reflexively hostile to the United States and Israel. Iran may have underes- timated the degree to which its behavior has antagonized its inter- locutors and overestimated its own ingenuity to devise ways of having its cake and eating it too.

To do so. any solution to the nuclear issue is necessarily a partial one that needs. The United States had also embraced the need for diplomacy. Therefore. revolutionary rhet- oric. The Iranian government is still so insecure in its legitimacy that it is unsettled by the prospect of normalization with the United States. A state with a rather vague and fluid sense of international responsibilities in relation to international treaties cannot reasonably be trusted with technology that needs to be lim- ited by legislation to state parties.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 141 Conclusion | 141 other states’ right to exist should not be permitted to acquire weapons that may allow it to act on its rhetoric or encourage (or enable) others to do so. Policy choices to deal with the nuclear issue are further constrained by the debacle in Iraq and the consequent imperative to maintain an international consensus. Washington had accepted Moscow’s proposal to take enrichment from Iran to Russia as a potential means of keep- ing Iran from the full fuel cycle. By early 2006. It wants to claim democratic attributes without trusting democracy. the United States had recaptured the diplomatic initiative. while outsourcing this to its European allies. Above all the United States had . Nuclear ambition is only part of a broader strate- gic challenge posed by Iran. the contrast between its tight control of elections and its rhetoric of the people’s participation (and choice) is stark. In its refusal to dispense with the cult of victimhood. in time. Policy Options Iran’s nuclear program presents difficult policy choices for all the players involved. and subversive acts and in its unwillingness to assume normal relations with others lies the origin of the reluctance of others to see Iran acquire a nuclear capability. to encompass the broader threats posed by Iran’s ambition for regional hegemony. it had accepted Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology (including the Bushire reactor) and perhaps even some parts of the fuel cycle on Iranian territory.

that is. rather than by ad hoc arrangements conceived individu- ally (for example. However. and if not. decision in March 2005 to back diplomacy has been mixed. the Iranians may reconsider their policies or another government might do so. Supporting a broader multilateral consensus since September 2005. giving Iran time to reverse its course (ceasing conversion and research activities and reinstating Additional Pro- tocol inspections) pending a strategic decision to forgo the full fuel cycle. slow pace. The United States needs to do two things to strengthen the coalition to prevent Iran’s momentum toward a nuclear option. between its desire to achieve the second without the first. The U. Some believe that by freezing the program and buying time.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 142 142 | Conclusion accepted the need to maintain an international consensus among the Security Council members (and the IAEA Board of Governors) on the issue. Support for the EU-3 has been a little grudging and skep- tical but inevitable given Washington’s refusal to engage directly. in fuel assurance provisions). in which the responses are graduated and pressure is ratcheted up and taken sequentially. First. the United States has accepted a more leisurely pace. This approach implies a deliberate. The question remains whether multilateral diplomacy and the authority of the Security Council will be enough to get Iran to renounce its nuclear ambitions. which relies on diplomacy first adopted . Second.S.13 Broadly there are two policy options—engagement and regime change—each with limitations: Engagement Policy along these lines is designed to stop. it has to choose between nonengage- ment and non-proliferation. the United States needs to couch any offer to Iran in general terms. to deal with the lacuna of the NPT. leaving the military option conspicuously on the table has been useful in concentrating the minds of the UNSC members on the need for diplomacy. and reverse poli- cies. This policy. delay. what the policy options would be thereafter.

however attractive for the immediate problem. First. relations. But an ad hoc technical fix. Iran would be eligible for nonsensitive nuclear and other dual-use technology and be given trade and other opportu- nities. Sanctions are part of this dialogue. but it comes up against several obstacles.S. In principle this appears the most logical solution. however. In exchange for renouncing sensitive technology and increasing its transparency.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 143 Conclusion | 143 by the EU-3 and then continued by a broader coalition. it is not self-evident that the driving force behind the nuclear program is national security in the narrow sense and therefore susceptible to security assurances. does nothing for the broader issue posed to the NPT regime by the potential proliferation of enrichment capabilities. It implies a strategic decision in Tehran to forgo a nuclear weapons option. could be part of a sequence of steps that leads to a broader agreement that encompasses all aspects of Iran–U. this approach depends for success on a willingness of both parties to engage with a view to an eventual grand bargain. a package now being renewed. A technical fix. Like others suggested. it does not address the key strategic issues of which the nuclear question is a part: Iran’s broader role as a destabilizing force in the region opposed to the United States. So are the incentives offered by the EU-3 in August 2005 in the pack- age summarily rejected by Iran. More important. seeks to convince Iran that the price for continuation of the quest for a nuclear option is too high. For success this approach requires U. It also requires a combination of pressures and incentives that make such a decision more compelling. such as building on the overlapping interests of Iran and the United States in Iraq.S. The Russian proposal currently exemplifies the strengths and limitations of this approach. engagement and an Ira- nian government sensitive to costs and isolation and willing to make compromises and build trust. The current Iranian government does not wish to bargain but seeks to attain its capa- bility to deter while accentuating its leverage vis-à-vis the United .

but a perceived change in the balance of power and leverage. demand follows another. progress on Iraq (where interests objectively converge) would be contingent on Iran being reassured about U. but they will soon run up against the fact that everything in U. • Provision of access to technology (including dual use.S. including the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of assets. and . Iran feels threatened by the United States and seeks global recognition and domestic legitimation—and its quest for a nuclear capability reflects all three of these considerations—then the answer to its program is not technical or partial but comprehensive. makes a rep- etition of this in the near term improbable. intentions toward Iran after Iraq is stabilized. • Security guarantees. If. Moreover.S. The United States might offer Iran the following incentives through an engagement policy: • Full normalization of relations. like the government that preceded it. together with a new ideological government. In May 2003 Iran was willing to negotiate such a grand bargain. in which one U. conventional arms. it is con- vinced that any negotiation with the United States entails a slippery slope. as well as forgo nuclear weapons. the United States would need to be reassured that Iran would change its pol- icy against Israel and its support for terrorism. as I have argued.S. this implies recogni- tion of the Islamic Republic as a legitimately constituted state. with appropriate controls). Similarly. It is worth sketching out what such a bargain might comprise. ending only with regime change.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 144 144 | Conclusion States. Thus. both against regime change and neg- ative security assurances regarding nuclear weapons use. and investment. Discussions dealing with specific issues of mutual concern such as Iraq could be used as icebreakers.–Iran relations is related to everything else.

• Initiate discussions with neighbors about mutual security. formulated as policy change on the Libyan model. and • Perform better on human rights.S. policy. indirect engagement is an uncertain recipe. the United States would insist that Iran: • Renounce the closed fuel cycle and ratify the Additional Protocol. Current U. A grand bargain is unlikely as much due to U.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 145 Conclusion | 145 • Recognition of Iran’s legitimate security and political interests and an end to efforts to contain Iran or otherwise block its regional relationships. reluctance as to Iran’s. is in fact to support regime opponents by extending radio broadcasts and assistance to NGOs and students.S. This may reflect a decision to increase pressure on Tehran rather than any realistic assessment of the regime’s vulner- ability to externally assisted destabilization. • End support for terrorists of whatever stripe. Regime Change If a technical fix only covers a narrow band of issues. If so. for what- ever cause. including arms control with emphasis on missiles. which implies any actions or rhetoric stimulating violence or hatred going beyond the accepted practice of diplomacy. Washington today is unwilling to engage an “evil regime. and direct engagement is unac- .” giving it an undeserved legitimacy. • End hostility toward the peace process and Israel. In exchange for offering these measures. it is a renuncia- tion of a policy that has some chance of working for one that has virtually none. • Cooperate on the stabilization of Iraq.

position in Iraq improves and . Second. Broadly. then a different regime. blinding the international community as to its dimensions. although mil- itary strikes might delay the program. which could in turn drive an accelerated program further under- ground. its moderation in foreign policy would give it less reason to seek a weapons option or for others to fear it. However. this approach is ideologically convenient and conceptually attractive. other issues arise. what remains? Regime change. they may also act to solidify nationalist support and international sympathy for the regime. However. If the U. would certainly be an improvement. pluralistic. but it also needs international encourage- ment. if the problem is as much one of regime as technology. In the event that current diplomacy fails. the United States will have to take the lead in containing Iran diplomatically and deterring it from gain- ing any benefit from an embryonic nuclear capability. Accentuating Iran’s regional isolation through the weakening of Syria and the margin- alization of extremist groups depends on the United States’ broader diplomacy. The military option can be seen as a policy midway between engagement and regime change in that it could result in either delaying the program or acting as a precursor to regime change. Such a regime may emerge in Iran spontaneously.S. even if the regime were destabilized or changed.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 146 146 | Conclusion ceptable. First.S. policy choices for the immediate future revolve around the diplomacy of persuasion. Furthermore. in one fell swoop repressive extremists are removed and with them the whole range of problems between Iran and the United States. U. and trans- parent. such a regime would be more sensitive to its international standing and less insis- tent on acting as an Islamic revolutionary role model. This role might entail a range of measures from security assurances to the GCC states to theater missile defenses (TMD). there is no guarantee its successor would be less inclined to seek a weapons option. if more accountable. or Iran persists in its program.

. Washington should seriously consider a grand bargain. Even if this were proposed unilaterally and rejected by Tehran.*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 147 Conclusion | 147 with it its leverage. it would serve to educate American and other citizens to the fact that the United States had gone as far as it could to settle the broad range of contentious issues peacefully.

*ch7 conclusion 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 148 .

” New York Times. Albert Wohlstetter. 370 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS.” Washington Quarterly. This appears to confirm Brad Roberts’ comment a decade earlier: “The inher- ently discriminatory character of non-proliferation mechanisms is incompatible with an era in which technology. 15. and expertise are slowly spreading throughout the world. pp. 2005. p. 25. “Turning a Blind Eye Again?” Arms Control Today. 3. 7. 15. 28. Permanent firebreaks between the haves and the have-nots will only fuel the ambitions of the have-nots to acquire what they have been denied.” See Brad Roberts.” Foreign Affairs. 145–79. 2. 6. p. 5. vol. 45. “Bush Seeks to Ban Some Nations from All Nuclear Technol- ogy. 12–8.” Washington Quarterly. Winter 1976/1977. May 13. “Arms Control and the End of the Cold War. March 2005.” Financial Times. vol. no. “Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order. See Leonard Weiss. industrial capability. May 2005. no. “Unravelling the AQ Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.” Adelphi Paper no. 3. 67. no. pp. p.” Foreign Policy. pp. 84. http://www. The phrase is used by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats. 4. and Change that reported in 2004. vol. March 15.com. It is repeated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan.nytimes. David Sanger. Philip Stephens. 149 . “In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN. 2004). See William Walker. “Breakdown in the Nuclear Family. Autumn 1992. 111–28. Challenges. 88–96. May/June 2005. also David Albright and Corey Hinderstein. 2. “Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 149 Notes Introduction 1. 2005.

10. in BBC Monitoring. Kurt M.” Policy Watch no. http://www.” September 18. Campbell. 2. 2005. 2006. Shahram Chubin.com/the- hindu/holnus/001200509181428. Problems.S. and Mitchell Reiss. September 25. 54. 5. 12. Foreign Issues. 2006. February 26. DC: Brookings Institution. The Nuclear Tip- ping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington. p.hindu. See. 2004). eds. 2005. 15. 2005. February 23. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. vol.” Middle East Journal..htm. for example.state. Einhorn and Campbell emphasize that the threshold to a decision to acquire technology for the nuclear weapons option is high. 2005. Septem- ber 7. Antoine Dudalu. 1 (2000).htm. Indian Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh commented at the UN that another nuclear power in the neighborhood was not desirable. . see Lawrence Scheinman. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran’s Strategic Predicament. September 27.” Iran (Tehran). This was admitted by Hasan Rowhani recently in a speech at the Strategic Studies Center of the Expediency Council in his reflections on his experience as well as in the background of the crisis subsequently published as an article in the Iran- ian quarterly journal Rahbod and the newspaper Etem’ad (Tehran). October 6. Stephen Rademaker. “Asia’s Alliance with the Middle East Threatens America.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/45518. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control. 2005. 4. “Nuclear Dangers in the Middle East: Threats and Responses.” and that for this reason its pressures must be resisted res- olutely to safeguard the revolution and the country. New York. “Iran Downplays Manmohan Singh’s Remarks. http://www. 15. May 2. 2005). 995 (Washington.org/files/ No5. no. opposition to Iran’s nuclear program lay in its hostility to “the essence of the Islamic revolution. see Ephraim Sneh and Graham Alli- son. See also Daniel Vernet. See Hindu.wmdcommission. Some Prospects. Quoted in “Qom Ayatollahs Advise Minister on Domestic. For an excellent recent discussion. http://www. who observed that the basis for U.” in The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 150 150 | Notes 8. “Faut-il avoir peur de la bombe iranienne?” Le Monde. p. June 2005.pdf. 9. no. For a striking comment to this effect. 3. p. “Article IV of the NPT: Background. May 18. Robert Einhorn. the senior Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani. requiring determination and real effort. 2005. 11.” Financial Times. 345. Chapter One 1. Statement to 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

2005. 2004. March 10.jpost.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 151 Notes | 151 5. quoted in “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT.” Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (Tehran). October 14. 1996). 2005. April 28. . p.” Iran (Tehran).Hossein Mousavian also notes that far from feeling encircled Iran was given leverage. “Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order. See Najmeh Bozorgmehr. See. 9.” Jerusalem Post Online. in BBC Monitor- ing.” May 9. May 19.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). July 27. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. Ambassador to the IAEA. and senior negotiator Hossein Mousavian. 2005. Jon B. September 20. p.” Quoted in “Iran Wants to Settle Its Nuclear Dossier at IAEA: Security Chief. 6. 2005 11.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=1116 383. February 24. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. 7. Deputy Director for Planning of the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) for the Nationaliza- tion Comparison. quoted in “Most Difficult Case. Joseph Cirincione. See Hasan Rowhani. 2003.” “Khamene’i Tells Commanders No Policy Made in Region without Iran. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 12. For background. 6. Hasan Rowhani. George Perkovich. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani (until August 2005) quoted in Amir Taheri. 304 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Wash- ington.” Iran. The new chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani is a believer in raw power poli- tics. 1. October 13. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” Quoted in “Iranian Negotiator Gives Press Conference on Nuclear Issue. March 2005). in BBC Monitoring. May 10. 6. see Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement that “no policy can be implemented in the region without taking account of Iran’s views. April 27. http://www. and Mohammad Saidi. quoted in “Iran Adopted Best Approach to Nuclear Issue. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. DC: Carnegie Endowment. Wolfsthal.” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Network (Tehran). arguing that threats to Iran can only be removed “when Iran is powerful. Thus. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). 13. 2005. July 28.” Financial Times.” Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) (Tehran). September 22. Information Committee Director of the SNSC Ali Agha Mohammadi. 169. March 12. Ali Akbar Salehi. February 3. 8. 2005. 10. see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp. 2005. and Jessica T. 2005. The rest is small talk. Mathews. stated: “Being a revolutionary does not mean we must discard everything and put ourselves on the road to confrontation with the rest of the world. Rowhani Tells Governors. quoted in “Iran to Resume Nuclear Activities in Esfahan—Atomic Official. See Hasan Rowhani. respectively. Rose Gottemoeller. vol. “Eye of the Storm: The Buzz in Tehran. quoted in “Official Says EU Aims to Delay Nuclear Talks until After Iranian Elections. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 2004. in Bozorgmehr.” Adelphi Paper no.” p. Febru- ary 21.

Hashemi Rafsanjani referred to “the vast and powerful Iran” that can “find a distinguished and lofty standing among the nations of the world. See Khamenei. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. Shahram Chubin. Iran has become . 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Hemayat (Tehran). 2004. Quoted in “Iran: Khamene’i Tells Scientist Iran Should be Self-Sufficient. and Hasan Rowhani.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). The quote is from the former envoy to the IAEA. 2005. See “Ex-envoy Says Iran to Make Own Decision on Pos- sible Nuclear Deal. May 8. Hashemi Rafsanjani told Hans Blix that “the mere signing of a ban on nuclear weapons is not enough.” 15. 2002). 2004. in “Iran Adopted Best Approach. Iran’s National Security: Intentions. May 14.” Adelphi Paper no. February 23.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran).” Quoted in “Iran Press: Rafsanjani’s Statement Outlines Reasons behind Candidacy Decision. in BBC Monitoring. September 3. 20. November 19. 21. See Hasan Rowhani. 14. 50–1. in BBC Monitoring. I have elaborated on these issues at greater length in the following sources. November 5. March 10. For a recent expression of this.” Iran. Security Chief Says. 2005. Statement made by Rowhani.” Iran (Tehran). see Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. who alludes to the war with Iraq as a reason for Iran’s quest for military self-sufficiency. May 11. November 6.” while former foreign minister and advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati asserts that since returning to its Islamic identity. February 21.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 152 152 | Notes November 18. Capabilities. November 7. 2005. Shahram Chubin. Says Iranian Defence Minister. Quoted in “Maximizing National Strength Is Our Agenda. 18. quoted in “Iran Wishes to Continue Peaceful Nuclear Activities. 2004. 2005. In light of Iran’s experience with Iraq it was evident that wherever the vital interests of a country were threatened. May 9. 22. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. DC: Carnegie Endowment.” Iran (Tehran). 2005. quoted in “Iranian Leader’s Friday Sermon Praises Country’s Progress. 17. February 24.” Other leaders share this view as well. and Impact (Washington. 2004. Supreme Leader Khamenei more colorfully argues that the blanket denial of technology has led to Iran becoming self-sufficient and standing on its own two feet. March 8. “Khamene’i Tells Commanders. an MIT- educated nuclear physicist. in BBC Monitoring. a status and standing which befits the civilized nation of Iran. “Whither Iran? Reform. Denounces Israel. Ali Akbar Salehi. 16. 2005. pp. See Khamenei’s Friday lecture for all of these and related points. August 31. states could not obey international regulations. Former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezai says that in the next twenty years Iran would be the “centre of international power politics in the region.” Voice of the IRI Network. 19. 2004.” As summarized in FBIS-NES-90-216. 1990. Domestic Politics and National Security. In running for president in May 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 1994) and citations therein. 2004. February 24. “Iran’s Security Chief Presents Report on NPT Protocol.

This was a lesson allegedly drawn by the North Koreans. and “Velayati: Iran Most Powerful State in Middle East. Respected experts such as Lawrence Freedman also suggested that this was the les- son of Iraq for other proliferators: “The only apparently credible way to deter the armed forces of the U. See also Shahram Chubin. 1993). March 6. vol. November 1991. 2003. including the use of terrorist proxies against the United States and France in Lebanon. in BBC Monitoring. September 8.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 153 Notes | 153 “the most powerful country in the Middle East.” ILNA (Tehran). October 6. “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival. in BBC Monitoring.S.” IRNA. “Inspector Says Saddam Wanted to Bluff Iran on Arms. p. http://www. 2003. “A Strong Incentive to Acquire Nuclear Weapons.” International Herald Tribune. is to own your own nuclear arsenal.” See Lawrence Freed- man. p. 23. and “Iran’s Guards Commander Stresses .” IRNA (Tehran). October 8. August 1. This is a continuing theme of the military. 2005.. Iran’s emphasis on morale and improvisation in the Iraq war also led to the cultivation of asymmetrical strategies. 68.” Quoted in “Ex-president Says Iran Can Launch Missiles with 2000-km Range. 15. Rafsanjani stated: “We thought of building missiles only after we were hit by them. respectively. Quoted in Geoffrey Kemp and Selig Harrison. What has this got to do with you? What right do you have to determine whether or not a nation has the right to use nuclear energy?” Quoted in “Leader Says Iran Will ‘Punch’ Anyone Who Threatens Its National Interests. 2003.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004. 2004. 30 September 2004. David Johnston.” IRNA. in BBC Mon- itoring. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. Among many such statements..” Financial Times. 2004. March 5.cia. no. We then started to build them from scratch. 27. 2003. 26. May 1. Iran’s National Security.” New Yorker. “Letter from Korea: Alone in the Dark. 2004. December 15. “Saddam the Deceiver: A Phoney Arms Threat. May 25.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). 20. December 16. and Evelyn Leopold. in BBC Monitoring. India and America after the Cold War (Washington. DC: Carnegie Endowment. “Iran: The Lessons of Desert Storm. Charles Duelfer. 2004. The arrogance [of the United States] is so impudent that it says that Iran does not need nuclear energy. 24. Spring 1995. October 5. August 2. See Philip Goure- vitch. 28. report for corroboration of the lessons drawn by Iraq. Revolutionary Guards Commander Rahim Safavi quoted in “Iran: Guards Commander Says the Corps Is to Receive More Research Funding. See Shahram Chubin. 2004. May 3.. 25. April 9.” Reuters AlertNet. See.” unpub- lished paper prepared for Los Alamos National Laboratory. Khamenei said: “They are against progress in any backward country. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. for example. Iran has been saying much the same thing for the past ten years. 2004.. p. 2005. 1. 37. “Iran to Play Key Role in Regional Power Politics—Expediency Council Secretary.” See. 2005. See also Chubin.

http://abcnews. “Iran: Rafsanjani says Tehran Ready to Cooperate if There Is Change in U.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran).” Fars (Tehran). 2005. August 2. 2005. 31. August 2. 34. January 13. January 10. Policy.A. 35. 2002. 2002. Also Admiral Abbas Mohtaj. For a report on U. 2005.” Quoted in “Iran: Former President Rafsanjani Says U.” ILNA (Tehran). Febru- ary 3. 2005. June 27.. June 22. the comments of the Deputy Guard’s (IRGC) commander. 2002. June 28. Shamkhani stated that even a limited attack “will be regarded as an attack against the existence of the Islamic republic of Iran. 29. 2004. January 11. March 25. “Iran: Uranium Enrichment Plant Underground. see “Plans for Nuclear Bomb Proof of U. 2005. March 12. March 10. quoted in “Commander Says Iran Will Not Tolerate U. 2002. 2005. in BBC Mon- itoring.S. Will Attack Iran— Financial Times. 2005. August 1. 2005.S. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC .” Quoted in “Minister Says U. quoted in “Maximizing National Strength Is Our Agenda. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Says Iranian Defence Minister.S. in BBC Moni- toring. and Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. 2004. See the discussion by a hard-line Iranian paper: “Iran Says American Nuclear Policy Threatening World Peace. 33. August 2. January 12. 2002. 30. In June 2002 Rafsanjani observed that “America is now talking very arrogantly to the world and by creating an ‘axis of evil’ order. 2002. in BBC Monitoring.S.” Resalat (Tehran). June 21. 32. January 6. July 22. March 29.” IRNA (Tehran). February 2. in BBC Monitoring. See Ali Akbar Dareini. June 21.S. appropriations of $27 million for mini-nukes. 2002.A. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says U. 2002. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 2002. Israel Will Not Attack Nuclear Installations. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says Washington Changing Tone after Failure of U.” ISNA (Tehran). and “Iran: Raf- sanjani Says Circumstances Will Change If Israel Accepts Arab Decision. June 22. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. Commander of the Iranian Navy.S. Could Use Nuclear Weapons against 7 Countries. 2002. is threatening any adverse country with nuclear bombs. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” IRNA (Tehran). ‘Hege- monic Policies’ Would Fail.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). March 16. May 9. in BBC Monitoring.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). for example. in BBC Monitoring. Mohsen Rezai. 2002. 36.S. Says Navy Chief.go. quoted in “Iran Senior Official Says U. quoted in “Foreign Forces in Persian Gulf Present Threats to Iran. and Hashemi Rafsanjani. Presence in Region.S.” ISNA (Tehran).” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). quoted in “Iran: Senior Official Sure U. Hossein Mousavian. 2003. See. Incapable of Military Attack against Iran. in BBC Monitoring.” ISNA (Tehran). January 7.” Associated Press. March 30. 2004.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 154 154 | Notes Importance of Persian Gulf Security. 2002. 2005. Brigadier General Mohammed Bager Zolgadr. May 8.com/International/wireStory?id=558596.-Inspired Riot.S.S.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). New Outlook to Global Security—Iran TV.

S. p.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 155 Notes | 155 Monitoring. 2004. threatened U. May 3. June 14. See “Official Says Iran Energy Waste Five Billion Dollars. Al Hayat report noted the threat to target U. in BBC Monitoring.com/2005/05/3/politics/03 mil- itary. Threat.” Website (Tehran). It is clear that Iran seeks to use the vulnerability of the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq as a pressure point on the nuclear issue. 2005. See Christopher Adams and Roula Khalaf. 37. 5. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. March 3. Iran’s UK Ambassador.” FARS (Tehran). 2003. p. 2004.. and Christopher Adams and Edward Alden. the Commander of the IRGC.” Financial Times. 2004. See British allega- tions of Iran’s supply of explosives to anti-British forces in southern Iraq through Hezbollah.” New York Times. see Ali Shamkhani’s comments reported in “Iran Warns of Preemptive Strike to Prevent Attack on Nuclear Sites. Secretary of the Expediency Council. June 13. in BBC Mon- itoring. June 19. August 18.” See “Commander Says Attack on Iran Will Not Stay within Iranian Borders. “U. and Associated Press.S. See Sarah Chayes.S. a March 29. January 27. 2004. October 6. Accord- ing to one Iranian official.” Financial Times. bases in the region (translated by Middle East Media Research Institute. May 27. http://nytimes. 2005.net. June 19.S. forces.S. 8.000 and 10. 2005. 13. August 20. p. January 26. See Mohammad Hossein Adeli. July 23. February 18. 2004. 2005. “UK Accuses Iran over Iraqi Rebels. Nuclear Program.” DOHA.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). quoted in “Iran: Senior Official Comments on Ties with U.and will come down on the aggressor anywhere that it wills.” Financial Times. See Thom Shanker. in BBC Monitoring. August 18. 39. 2004. 5. in Al-Jazeera. On the United States having no monopoly on preemption.. 2005. 5. Chapter Two 1. “Iran Hints at Preemption over U.org/). 2005. 2005. http://memri. 2004.. unchecked domestic consumption is caused by price sub- sidies that entail waste on the order of $5 billion annually.000 megawatts of electricity and ten to twenty reactors. Mohsen Rezai. Chairman of the Majles Energy Committee quoted in “Majlis . 2005.” International Herald Tribune. See “Iran Experts Say Nuclear Power Necessary for Electricity Gen- eration.” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1.html. 3. 2. p.” International Herald Tribune. “Pentagon says Iraq Effort Limits Ability to Fight Other Wars. August 18. Majlis Polls. “The Riots in Afghanistan: With a Little Help from Our Friends. 2003. October 7. and UK Warn Iran and Syria on Terror. Yahya Rahim Safavi. quoted in “Iran Has a Right to Develop Nuclear Power. 38. Brigadier General Mohammed Bager Zolgadr is quoted as saying that “Iran will not recognize any limit on defending itself. The figures vary between 7.

and “Iran Majlis Studying Proposals on Construction of 20 Nuclear Power Plants—MP. p. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Septem- ber 8. March 15. September 29. 2003. Decem- ber 3. 2005. 10.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). October 7. 5. See Hasan Rowhani.” IRNA (Tehran). Ready to Negotiate. 2005. Ali Akbar Salehi. quoted in “Iran: National Security Council Secretary Calls for Greater Global Interaction. Iran’s former IAEA envoy. quoted in “Khamene’i Tells Prayer-Leaders Iran Does Not Possess Nuclear Weapons. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.’” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran).” International Herald Tribune. 2004. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. and Elaine Sciolino.” IRNA (Tehran). Deputy Head of AEO Mohammad Saidi. 4. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. 2005. September 9.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). October 7. 2004. quoted in “Ex-President Says Iran Not Seeking War.isop. Los Angeles. 2005.” Vision of the IRI Network 2.” IRNA (Tehran). p. March 7. 2005. March 8. 2004. 2005.asp?parentid=24561.” ISNA (Tehran). March 13. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 8. quoted in “Natanz Complex Achievement of Iranian Experts. April 29. and “Raf- sanjani Says Iran Expected to Join Club of Nuclear States. April 30. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 156 156 | Notes Deputy Says Iran Needs Nine More Nuclear Power Plants.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). in BBC Monitor- ing. 2003. December 4. 2003.” Afarinesh (Tehran). 2003. 2005. 2003. http://www. Quoted. in “World Must Accept Iran’s Entry into the Nuclear Club—Hasan Rowhani. March 31. May 14. 2004. “Iran and the US Have One Thing in Common. January 30.ucla. 2005. Deputy Head of the AEO.edu/ article. 6. and “Iran Press: On West’s Opposition to Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle. May 25. respectively. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran). 4. March 22. while Rafsanjani has said that Tehran expects to become a member of the club of countries possessing nuclear technology. Not all observers are unsympathetic. 2003. 1. October 25. Hashemi Rafsanjani. 2005. 2005. “UCLA Chancellor Carnesale on the Risks of Nuclear Attacks on the United States. 2004.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). September 27. in BBC Monitoring. Rowhani has said the world must accept Iran’s entry into the global nuclear club. University of California–Los Angeles Chancellor and nuclear expert Albert Carnesale has asked: “If you were building a nuclear power plant would you want to rely on Russia to provide the fuel for the next thirty years regardless of what your diplomatic relations were?” Leslie Evans. October 6. quoted in “Nuclear Energy Top Pri- ority in Iran’s Nuclear Program—Official. 11. 2004. 9. .” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). Mohammad Saidi. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. “Iran Press: Linking Nuclear Case and ‘Holy Defence Week of Iran-Iraq War. and Ali Khamenei.” UCLA International Institute. quoted in “Envoy Says Iran Needs 10 Years to Produce Good Nuclear Fuel. February 1. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Says Iran Does Not Want Nuclear Weapons. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. October 7. 7. March 23. March 30. May 18. March 23. October 26.

“Iran Made ‘Impressive’ Progress in Nuclear Technology. 1.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). For hard-line Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran) reaction. 14. October 13. March 4. For three such poll references. March 2. 2005. March 5. in BBC Monitoring. Deceiving Public. “Dealing with Iran 11. in BBC Monitoring.” October 10. 13. 2003. November 8.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 17. see also the interview of Ray Takeyh by . “Iran’s Stocks Plunge after Vote for UN Review of Nuclear Program. March 1. in BBC Monitoring.” See Bennett Ramburg. 2005. 18. Ali Khamenei. There was a 20 percent fall in stocks between mid-July and October of 2005. March 9. January 14. in BBC Monitoring. Says Spokesman.” IRNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. On the same theme of pride in the achievements. March 6. one Iranian commentator stated: “Today the same nation that was called barbarian by the West is proud and dignified and is one of the ten to fifteen countries that can run their native nuclear technology. May 11. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. see “Iran Commentator Says ‘Enemies’ Will Accept Iranian Demands over Nuclear Issue. 2005. Quoted in “No Government in Iran can Forgo Nuclear Technology—Senior Negotiator. The first comment is that of former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati.” IRNA (Tehran). 2004. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. October 18. which might welcome confrontation as “political salvation. January 15. Europe Aim to Hinder Iran’s Scientific Devel- opment.” Keyhan (Tehran). Jan- uary 30. and the second is that of current Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. Bennett Ramburg argues that nuclear tension generates support for a failing regime. 2005. 2005.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). Iran is eighth in a list of thirteen states capable of manufacturing equipment needed in producing nuclear fuel. 16. “Leader Says US. November 29. According to Rowhani. p. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. March 3.” Aftab-e Yazd Website (Tehran). 2004.” New York Times. see “Iran: Editorial Urges Government Action over ‘Ailing’ Stock Exchange. 2003. A Western source put the plunge at 30 percent since late September 2005. October 20. 2005. Blair ‘Bankrupt. March 8.” See “Iranian Commentary Says Fundamentalism Part of Anti-Globalization Movement. February 2. Hasan Rowhani referred to access to nuclear technology as a “national demand” to his Japanese counterparts.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). October 9. May 12. 2005. 2005. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 157 Notes | 157 12. 2005. March 24. and “Iran’s Kharrazi Says America ‘Wise Enough’ Not to Attack Iran. Quoted in “Former Iranian Foreign Minister Says Europe Not to Be Trusted. 2005. Quoted in “US Should Not Terrify World over Iran’s Nuclear Activities—Security Chief. 2004.” International Herald Tribune. “Daily Says IAEA Case Aimed at ‘Preoccupying’ Iran. 2004. 2005. November 8. 2005. December 14.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). see “Iran Daily Urges Government to Inform Public on Nuclear Dossier Talks. in BBC Monitoring.’” Jomhuri- ye Eslami Website (Tehran). For a critique on lack of information. 2003. 15. See Nazila Fathi.

respectively. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations.” Foreign Affairs. Going Critical: The First North Korean Crisis (Washington.com/atimes/printN. Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride.yale.asp?ArchiveNews=Yes&NewsCode=32367&NewsKind=Cur- rentAffairs. http://www.php? section=int&page=news_inhalt&news_id=5868315. DC: Nixon Center. see Joel Wit. 21.iranmania.” Iran Mania. Council on Foreign Relations. http://yaleglobal.swisspolitics. see Farideh Farhi. pp. 20. as the lamentable exchange of “candy for a pearl. Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh. . 2005. no.com/News/ ArticleView/Default. “Tough Nuclear Choices Face Iran’s Next Pres- ident. 24. For a discussion. 2005. “For Tehran. Autumn 2003.edu/article. For intraregime differences. March 2. Geoffrey Kemp (Washington. see also George Perkovich. June 2. June 5. “Presidential Candidate Larijani Calls for Nuclearization of Iran.atimes.org/20050301faessay84204/kenneth-pollack-ray-takeyh/taking-on-teh- ran. 2005. March/April 2005. Mohsen Rezai. 19. Ali Larijani. DC: Brookings Institution. In the view of reformist Mohammad Reza Khazemi. see “Taboo of US Relations Turned on Its Head.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran).” Washington Quar- terly.html. “Iran. 23. and Robert Galluci. quoted in “Moin: If Elected as President.” Yale Global Online. 2005. http://www. in BBC Monitoring. 4. http://www. http://www. June 8. pp.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). which postponed referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the UNSC in exchange for suspension of fuel cycle activities. Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak.” 25. leader of the main reform party and brother of outgoing President Khatami. see Safa Haeri. 26. on the national pride in the program. “To Have or Not to Have? Iran’s Domes- tic Debate on Nuclear Options.” Key- han. June 4. June 4. 2005. 2005. US: Fissures within Fis- sures. Mohammad Bager Qalibaf. Daniel Poneman. I Will Stop the Uranium Enrichment. Lar- ijani characterized the Tehran agreement between Iran and the EU-3 in October 2003.” June 14. For striking parallels with Iran between conservatives and realists in North Korea divided at the time of the Agreed Framework. ed. 75–6. vol.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). quoted in “Iran Presidential Candidate Reza’i Says He Will Resume Nuclear Enrichment.html. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.html. See. 2005.cfr. June 6. April 21.org/publication/7885/takeyh. 35–54.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 158 158 | Notes Bernard Gwertzman. 22. June 5. 2005.print?id=5448.org/en/news/index. 2001).for- eignaffairs.” Asia Times. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. http://www. quoted in “Iran Election Program: Qalibaf Hints at Developing Ties with USA. 2004). Mostafa Moin’s speech to the Ghazvin Medical University. March 21. Interview by Edmund Blair. April 19.” in Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analy- sis. 2005. 2005. “Taking on Tehran. 2005.

Summer 2005. 29. 2006. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.. December 15.” Iran (Tehran). 2005. January 5. For the evolution of Hashemi Rafsanjani toward pragmatism and national interest. see Sana Vakil. December 28. 33. “Foreign Policy: Active or Inactive?” Keyhan.” Financial Times. December 16. 4. May 15. Quoted in “Iran’s Regional Standing Is Source of Concern to USA—Former Security Chief. For some.” Survival. Ali Larijani referred to the desire to keep Iran an industrial backwater and a pattern of denial of advanced information as well as biological and nanotechnology. On the impact of an advanced nuclear program in the region. see “The Nature of Political Crises and Iran’s Nuclear Problem. noting that Iranians need to define “what is it that [they] require from the outside world and . in BBC Monitoring. p. 30. 2005. 2005. 2005. pp.” some- thing they wish to prevent. 2005. February 2. June 1. which is seen as the renunciation of the export of the revolution. pp.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 159 Notes | 159 26.1–2. the interlude between the Iran–Iraq war and the current period has resulted in backsliding in foreign policy. 2005. 31. 2005. 2006. May 31. 2005. The conservatives believe that an enhanced nuclear capability would affect this regional role and that “the enemy would not like Iran to play such a role.” Aftab-e Yazd. in BBC Monitoring. Financial Times.” Iran Fars News Agency (Tehran). 2005. 2. . See Naser Bahramirad. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. vol. Ari Larijani. quoted in “Iran Needs to Counter ‘Multi-Dimensional’ Threat from West. no. For the five postelection pledges to the nation. December 14. Reformist Ahmad Shirzad presents a thoughtful discussion along these lines. in BBC Monitoring.. For a hard-line newspaper view. December 21.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). “Reformed Rafsanjani Could Be Force for Change. see Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr. “Conservatives Will Win Iranian Presidency if Rafsanjani Does Not Run— Rowhani. in BBC Monitoring. January 23. June 2.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran).” IRNA. interview. December 1. For back- ground on the new conservative government.” E’temad (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. 32. May 18. 2005. 2005. 13. “Iran Press: Daily Says Next President Must Promote Nuclear Technology Firmly. 2005. 2006. See “Critics of Nuclear Policy Must Be Allowed to Express Views.” See Hasan Rowhani. 47. 34.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). 2005. 28. January 14. 2005. what sort of system and regime do [they] wish to be?” Quoted in “Iran Press Criticizes Government’s Use of ‘Threats’ in Foreign Policy. see “Iran Press: Rafsanjani Outlines Five Post-Election Pledges to Nation. 27. February 3. p. Rowhani comments: “They [the United States] believe that Iran’s stand- ing will change in the region if it acquires the capability to enrich uranium. and “Iran Election Program: Rafsanjani Announces Man- ifesto. “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran. December 3. 2005. 2005. 2005. December 18. December 25.” Vision of IRI Network 2. June 16. May 31.

January 11. See Ali Larijani.” See “President Calls on ‘Monopolizers of Power’ to Step .” Third World Quarterly. 2005. Indicative of this was Larijani. quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Explains Tehran’s Nuclear Strategy in TV Interview. January 3. 2006. January 1. December 21. December 14. 2005. On Iran’s geopolitical position. 2006.’ Calls for Prudence. Larijani was clearly and explicitly corrected by Russ- ian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. 2005. no. that the government is ignorant of con- ducting foreign policy. “Rafsanjani Warns US against Military Attack on Iran.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). “We Have Preconditions. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. who pointedly rebutted this assertion. “Daily Says Iran ‘Great Opportunity for Europe’ in Nuclear Talks. 4. see “Iran Daily Supports Ahmadinejad’s ‘Active’ Diplomacy. noting that for Russia non-proliferation took precedence over any bilateral considerations or economic advantages in relations with Iran. who argued that Iran was the key to the area for Russia. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. For the back- ground to the Isargaran. 2005. December 12. see “Iran’s Security Chief Explains Tehran’s Nuclear Strategy in TV Interview. Also Kazem Alamdari. 37. November 17. January 11.” Tehran Times. 2005. 40. December 30. “The Changing Landscape of Party Politics in Iran—A Case Study. the political party supporting Ahmadinejad.” Keyhan. “Iran’s Rafsanjani Defends Nuclear ‘Right.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). 26. vol. Quoted in “Larijani— Now Is the Time for Resistance.1. in BBC Monitoring. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. January 1. Larijani made these comments to IRGC commanders. 2006. January 3.. pp. December 29. 2005. President Ahmadinejad is quoted as saying: “Some individuals are disgrun- tled because they can no longer gain access to the State Treasury. in BBC Monitoring. and “New Government Depicts ‘Harsh Image’ of Iran—Rowhani.” Farhang-e Ashti. 2006. December 13.” Fars News Agency (Tehran). vol. see William Abbas Sami’I. in BBC Mon- itoring. September 30. p. January 7. 35. in BBC Monitoring. “US Firms Not Welcomed to Join Iran’s Enrichment Plan—Larijani. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 160 160 | Notes 175–90. 41. 2006.” International Herald Tribune. December 21. 8. For press analysis sympathetic to this view. January 12. “EU Nations Want Iran Taken to the UN. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami. “Iran’s President Rolls Back Clock. 2005. 2006. 2005. They therefore seek excuses by raising other issues [alleging] . November 30. Larijani in September 2005 press conference. 2005. December 20. See International Herald Tribune. unattributed commentary. October 1. Winter 2005. 2006. no.” January 13. 38. quoted in Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman. pp. which has other more important regional concerns than nuclear prolif- eration. 42. 2006.” Voice of the IRI Net- work (Tehran). 1285–1301..” Vaseteh: The Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies. “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 39. in BBC Monitoring.” Mehr News Agency.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran).1. 2005. 36.1–4. in BBC Monitoring. November 15.

p. . http://www. 2005. 1001 (Washington. 2004. “Iran Says Nuclear Plans on Hold: Leaders Are Frustrated. April 18. Financial Times.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 161 Notes | 161 Aside. 49.” MEMRI.” Hossein Mousa- vian. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2005. Feb- ruary 3. interview by Najmjeh Bozorgmehr and Daniel Dombey.” Resalat (Tehran). p.” Washington Post. and Mohsen Sazegara. and Karl Vick.thar- waproject. See Michael Slackman. “Iran: Toward a Fourth Republic?” Policy Watch no. 2005. 2005. 46.” Voice of America.php?option=com_keywords&task=view&id=2017&I temid=0.” See “Iran Press: On Characteristics Required of Next Pres- ident. “EU Diplomats: Iran Risks Sanctions for Nuclear Activity. 1. April 13. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times. 2005. 2005. April 14. See Gareth Smyth. One Iranian commentator said that “one must accept that the nuclear file is one that is entirely national and ultimately related to the country’s national security. 2005. “Iranian Paper Views Delay to Nuclear Deal with Russia. 43. 2005.” International Herald Tribune. 253. Septem- ber 16. in Dafna Linzer. 2005. “Iran’s Foreign Pol- icy and Its Key Decisionmakers. 2005.com/English/index. p. A22. March 27. May 1. ‘Snub’ to UK.com/english/archive/2005-05/2005- 05-10-voa34. Hashemi Raf- sanjani. For a British diplomat’s observa- tion on how hard-line pressure translates into tough rhetoric in the negotiations. p. 2006. quoted in “Ex-President Rafsanjani Says Iran Will Not Submit to Bullying on Nuclear Issue. For a useful if broad discussion. March 21. April 6. December 1.” Washington Post.” Aftab-e Yazd Website (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. p. May 10. 4. in BBC Monitoring. “EU3 Warns of ‘Managed Crisis’ over Iran Ambitions. negotiator Hossein Mousavian commented: “Now it is time [for Europe] to deliver something to Iranian public opinion and nation. May 22. no. in BBC Monitoring.” See “Iran Press: Commentary Says Iran’s Nuclear File ‘National Challenge. 2005. See Foreign Minister Kharrazi’s comment on May 4. and Gareth Smyth and Daniel Dombey. 2005. 2004. See also A. A11. An article in Resalat asserted that “Anyone who takes over in this election will not want to move against the peoples’ interest and the people will not allow him to do so either. “In Iran. 2006. Legislator Comment on Nuclear Dossier. 48. see Roger Wilkison. see Amir Ali Nourbaksh.” ISNA (Tehran). 10. 47. For example. February 28. Hossein Mousavian. “The Second ‘Islamic Revolution’: Power Struggle at the Top. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. February 27. Dissenting Voices Rise on Its Leaders Nuclear Strategy.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). 2005. p. April 14. 7. 45. May 25. 2005. But Still Hope for Progress in Talks. “Nuclear Dispute Boosts Critics of ‘Great Satan’ in Iran Poll. Even Some on the Right Warning against Extremes. December 2.” Tharwa Project. 2005). Savyon. May 5. 2005.voanews. quoted in “Iranian Negotiator. November 17.” Financial Times. 44. March 16. Conservative Factions Fear Radicalism.cfm?CFID=46290374&CFTOKEN=56257987. in BBC Monitoring. September 15.” Iran (Tehran).’” Iran (Tehran). http://www. 2005. “In Iran.

2005. http://financialtimes.html.printthis. 2005. On the retention of personnel indispensable for further progress in the nuclear area. February 22. October 16. such technical fixes might include fuel guarantees. in BBC Monitoring. see Reza Aghazadeh.” Aftab-e Yazd (Tehran). in order to suspend our activities as little as possible. August 19. December 12. in BBC Mon- itoring. 2. October 18. December 12. in BBC Monitoring. 51. “Iranian Officials Discuss Ways to Retain Nuclear Scientists. see Farideh Farhi. October 14. 2005. 2003. 55.” See Robert Nolan. and “Daily Urges Iranian Officials to Make Prompt Nuclear Decision. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 57. pp.” Baztab Website (Tehran).” Middle East Report Online. see “Iran Reformist Criticizes Iran Officials for Policy toward EU. see “Iran to Definitely Resume Part of Its Nuclear Activities in ‘Near Future. August 4.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). “Iran and the EU-3. 2004. 2005.csmonitor.” Die Welt. and Mohammad Khatami. October 24.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt+%F+W. 2005.org/ mero/mero102405. Berlin.fpa. These revelations were picked up in the West. March 31. 2005. see Gareth Smyth.com/ 2005/0614/p06s02-wome. 2004. April 1.” Financial Times. “Mixed Signals on Iran’s Nuclear Program. June 14. 2005.” Aftab-e Yazd (Tehran). May 12. or multinational schemes for enrichment.” Christian Science Monitor. December 20. 2004. See . 2005. limited numbers of centrifuges in stages. For Rowhani’s take on the unbalanced nature of the commitments.’” IRI News Net- work (Tehran). 2005. For a critique of Iran’s dysfunctional rhetoric and negotiating style.” And the right wing prefers to with- draw from the NPT altogether. On the costs of suspension and technical problems caused. 52. For example. See Mousavian’s comments about a “dual strategy” reported in “Iranian Ex-Envoy Says Country Used ‘Dual Strategy’ in Nuclear Talks with EU. 2005. April 1. Hossein Shariatmadri is quoted as saying: “Whatever is going to happen after five years of suspension is going to happen now. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 53. in BBC Monitoring.html.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 162 162 | Notes 50.htm?section=Iran %20and%20the%20EU-3. and Rowhani’s statement about “cooperating to a mini- mum extent.merip.clickabil- ity. May 14. see AEO head Reza Aghazadeh. “President Khatami Says Iran Ready to Produce Fuel for Nuclear Plant. quoted in “Cessation of Iran’s Enrichment Program Not an Option—Agency. 2003. For an exception.” ISNA (Tehran).org/newsletter_info2583/newsletter_info_sub_list.” Foreign Policy Association. http://www. See Scott Peterson. March 30. See the discussion of one nuclear expert. August 18. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “Iran’s Atomic Energy Chief Says Suspension of Uranium Enrichment Problem- atic. 2005. “Call for Openness over Nuclear Pro- gram. http://www. 56. For a useful analysis.” Sharq website (Tehran). 54. http://www. 2004.1. 2005. December 16. “Iran’s Nuclear File: The Uncertain Endgame. Febru- ary 21.

“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control. pp. Council on Foreign Relations. June 6. 59. Iran’s current urgent insistence on an enrichment capability for its power generation program is by no means a necessity. The fact that the program was undeclared also suggests an illegal intent. President Ahmadinejad’s speech to the United Nations in September 2005 seemed to be intended for a domestic audience and showed a misreading of what General Assembly speeches are about. see http://www. For more details on the intrusiveness of the inspections that would require “anyplace. anywhere” access. http://www. 2005. June 27. .” Finan- cial Times. Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. 2005. interview by Bernard Gwertzman. 4. 2004.cfr. Bush.org/Gary/sfr-milhollin-051905.org. Iran is also known to have sought high-precision switches that can trigger a nuclear explosion. especially when the first reactor at Bushire is not yet operational. speech delivered at the National Defense University (NDU). http://www. that the Bush approach is selective.S. “An Offer That Iran Cannot Refuse. 2005. p. See also the evidence compiled in Bureau of Verification and Compliance. 2005. and Tim Guldiman and Bruno Pellaud. Note. U. Chapter Three 1. p. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” (Washington.htm.iranwatch. 60. May 19. May 19. need to import the raw uranium. The IAEA has documented Iran’s experiments with polonium. however. Sen- ate. State Department. DC: U. 2. DC. Notably. 13. anytime. 15. U.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 163 Notes | 163 Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman.S. This narcissism is visible in debates in Iran that often appear to reflect the belief that the whole world is concentrated on watching Iran and its development and to exaggerate the importance of Iran to others. testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 72–80. 2005). it tolerates new enrichment by Brazil but not by Iran. “A Plan to Bring about Nuclear Restraint in Iran. 2005.” Financial Times. Senate. a specialized material that can serve as a neutron initiator in fission bombs.org. in any case. March 9. February 11. which it does not possess in any quantity. 58.” See Gary Milhollin. Iran’s insistence on the full fuel cycle makes little sense if it is intended to avoid dependence. This proposal has floated around the negotiations and is well presented by Joseph Cirincione. for Iran will.S.S. Gary Milhollin. I am indebted to Shai Feldman for emphasizing this. President George W. U.iranwatch. testimony before Committee on Foreign Relations. 3. A second 40-megawatt heavy water reac- tor in Arak is “larger than needed for research but too small to make electricity and just right for producing bomb-quality plutonium. Washington.

officials are all but certain that Iran received the same bomb designs as Libya: “We assume that the Iranians got what the Libyans got. June 3. See William J. p. see Sharon Squassoni. June 2.5 percent. Iran can turn the enriched uranium into tablets that will be used as fuel for reactors. the most authoritative and com- prehensive analyses include those by the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) and Tony Cordesman (2004). [Iran has] obtained the nuclear fuel cycle. In the zirconium plant in Isfahan.” New York Times.” See IAEA Director-General. “Implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Besides the IISS dossier. 2004. February 27. 2004.cfr.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). 11. “Taking Stock of Iran’s Nuclear Program. we would also have tried to attain the design for the bomb. The clear implication is that if proof of Iran’s acquisition of these bomb plans comes to light. paras. 2004). from the ore stage to turning the enriched material into tablets and inserting them into fuel . 2004. for the first time the IAEA noted unanswered questions about the “role of the military” in this peaceful program and documents “related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments. Iranian leaders have carefully distinguished their purchases from that of Libya. 128. There are many summaries of Iran’s nuclear program apart from the eight IAEA reports (since February 2003). Therefore. http://www.html. http://nytimes.” Rowhani said that Iran has the capacity. “Had we attempted to develop nuclear arms. 2005). to convert the yellowcake into UF4 and UF6. in BBC Monitoring. “U. U.org/publication/8075/iran. Seven of these reports can be found in the British Foreign Office document.” David Sanger. “Iran: European Nuclear Negotiations” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. For periodic assessments. December 27. March 4.com/2005/05/03/ international/middle east/03npt. Broad and David E.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 164 164 | Notes 5. 6. 19. Demand Deepens Gulf with Iran over Nuclear Facilities. 18.” Tel Aviv Notes. and to enrich the UF6 through centrifuges to a level of 3.S. relying on its own uranium mine and resources. Sanger. if Iran wants to produce fuel for a reactor. “Unraveling Pakistan’s Nuclear Web: Inquiry into Khan Hobbled by Discord and Concern over Ally. it has all the means.” stated Hasan Rowhani. Quoted in “Chief Negotiator Says Iran Has Not Imported Nuclear Parts. 2005.” CRS Report for Congress (Washington. it would constitute the smoking gun regarding Iran’s weapons intentions. April 14. March 8. Hasan Rowhani.S.html. Board of Governors. JCSS no. See also Ephraim Asculai. See also the interview with Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator. who stated.” GOV/2006/15 (Vienna: IAEA. DC: Congressional Research Service. Besides the questions relating to origin of the contamination of some sites and full history relating to P1 and P2 centrifuge technology. Can we prove it? Not yet. “Technologically. 2006). to turn the ore into yellowcake.” International Herald Tribune. and 38. Apparently it was the first time there was a bomb design available on the open market. saying that Iran sought only the parts but not the design for the production of bombs. Esther Pan.

http://mem- ritv. See MEMRI. p. February 27. vary among analysts: see International Institute for Strategic Studies.voanews. 7. May 20. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 165 Notes | 165 rods.” ILNA (Tehran).S. 2005.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3. and Steven Weissman and Douglas Jehl. May 5. U. 4. see Dafna Linzer.” Adelphi Paper no. August 2.” New York Times. 2005.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). October 6. March 13. Shamkhani has suggested that Iran would mass produce missiles like a popular automobile (the Peykan) and that “the production of the Shihab-3 will never stop. 2005. Sirus Naseri. Tony Cordesman has said that “there is virtually no technical justification for building them unless you are going to put a nuclear warhead on them. March 9. quoted in “Missile Technology Most Impor- tant Part of Iran’s Military Deterrent—Minister. May 6. 2004. See the discussion in Shahram Chubin. Domestic Politics and National Security. Shares Details on Efforts to Intercept Weapons Technology. Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment (London: Routledge.S. Panel Says.whitehouse.S. http://www. Feb- ruary 26. in BBC Monitoring. http://www.html.html. March 16.asp?P1=412.S. 2005. Power Facilities. . For a later dis- puted estimate of a longer. February 16.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran).org/Transcript. “scandalously” so.S.S. 2005. June 1. Bush. See the report on U. then. 2005.S. 2005.” New York Times. VOA News. August 3. A01. 9. intelligence on Iran’s program is known to be deficient. 2005).. Director of Defense Intelligence Agency. Sometimes missile technology is used as a metaphor. “Iran Is Judged Ten Years from a Nuclear Bomb. 8. “Data Is Lacking on Iran’s Arms. 412. quoted in “Iran to Put For- ward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator.” Quoted in “Minister Says Iran Not Targeting U.nytimes. 2002). 2005. TV Monitor Project. U. ten-year period. http://www. “Estimate Revised on When Iran Could Make a Nuclear Bomb. 11. Davis Sanger. 2005.” testimony before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the U. 2005. sources indicate their interception under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of dual-use missile technology bound for Iran. in BBC Monitoring.” Washington Post. “Whither Iran? Reform.com/eng- lish/2005-05-20-voa62. “U. intelligence by Laurence Silber- man and Charles Robb. Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that U. 2005.cfm. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. speech delivered at National Endowment for Democracy.” International Herald Tribune. p. Clip no. December 7. There is [a] Shihab-3 missile embedded in every Iranian. intelligence had information that Iran sought to adapt its missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons (December 2004).S.com/2005/03/09/international /09weapons. See President George W. 10. in BBC Monitoring. U. President Bush alluded to a dozen interceptions of missile-related technology to Iran under the PSI. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. 2005. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby.” Interview with Tony Cordesman. according to one source.S. U. Iranian nuclear negotiator. Estimates. interview.

June 6.” Quoted in “Iran Wants Sanctions Lifted before ‘Rigorous’ Inspections of Nuclear Sites. 16. October 11. See also “Iran Reports Gain in Test of Missile Fuel. 15. 2005. 10. p. 6. October 7. has suggested this response. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 6. which would increase their range and improve their shelf life.” Janes Defence Weekly. 2003. “The Military-Mullah Complex: The Militarization of Iranian Politics. 2005). July 22. June 1. 2005.” Weekly Standard. 13. June 4. 13. Iran has not joined the Hague Code of conduct regarding missiles. 2005.” McNair Paper no. in BBC Monitoring. 18. DC: National Defense Univer- sity. Dov Raviv. “we still do not know what has been going on in Bushire for the past thirty years.com/2005/06/01/international/middleeast/01iran. Gives IAEA Info on Iranian Missile Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead.” April 3. p. Iran has indulged in diplomatic ploys deflecting pressure away from its mis- sile program by asking the UN Secretary-General for reports on “missiles in all their aspects” for two consecutive years. A3.” Wall Street Journal. p. 11. See International Herald Tribune. p. Quoted in Judith Yaphe and Charles Lutes.” Mardom-Salari (Tehran). p. “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Iran. 20. father of the Israeli Arrow project. observed that after many years and repeated questions about the technological situation and after the expenditure of millions of dollars. See Robert Hewson. Iran is reported to have purchased cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2004.S.nytimes. 17. p. 2005. July 27. Nur Pir-Mozen. February 25. “Whither Iran?” Iran also emphasizes short-range missiles such as anti-ship missiles for defense in the Gulf. 69 (Washington. “Iranians Test Missile with Multiple War- heads. 2005. June 1.html. Iran reported success in a test of a solid-fuel missile.” Star (Johan- nesburg). See “U. “The New . July 22. and Mohsen Sazegara. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi justified Iran’s need for missiles for defense purposes but added that “ours are not for first use. government reportedly has documented evidence suggesting that Iran is attempting to develop a nuclear weapon payload for its medium-range Shi- hab-3 missile. 21. October 5. 2005. See also Bill Sami’i. 19. May 31. May 14. a Majles Deputy and nuclear specialist. http://www. The U. See Chubin. 2004. 1998. The United States shared this information with the IAEA. 14.” IRNA (Tehran). 1998.” April 2006. p.” Le Monde. See “Iran Tests New Missile Using Solid-Fuel Technology—Agency.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 166 166 | Notes 12. 2005. 2003.” Quoted in “Majles Deputy Questions Spending on Nuclear Power Plant. See also “Washington accuse L’Iran d’etudes sur un charge nucleaire pour missile. in BBC ME/3246MED/7. 2006. Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv). in BBC Monitoring. and “Iran Claims New Success with Underwater Missile. Iran acknowledges possessing a maritime cruise missile program. “Iran Ready to Field Cruise Missile. 5.” New York Times.S.

html. reminiscent of the U. Global Stability and Regional Peace.whitehouse. For speculative comments on chain of command and “safety culture. for example. 11.S. “Aum Shinrikyo.) 22. Matthew Levitt. April 28. April 1. “A Rosier View of Terror-List Nations. referring to Iran and Syria. 33. 27.senate. and James Wirtz (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). Al Qaida. and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combat- ing Nuclear Terrorism” (Santa Monica. speech to the National Endowment for Democracy. see “Iran’s Terrorist Sponsorship: Winding Down?” IISS: Strategic Comments. 110–11. Norton.org/ . Terrorism and Democracy. “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear. 2000). For a recent discussion. Later they closed a new airport that they believed should not be under contract to a Turkish company that might have had ties with Israel. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.pdf.” testimony before Joint Hearing of Com- mittee on International Relations. 23.” see Gregory Giles. See Sara Daly. ed. 334. Jan- uary/February 2000. Notably. 24. 2005). Summer 2005. 2005. See The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. esp.” Washington Quarterly. 108. vol. March 2005. no.. “U. 28. Robert McMahon. embassy hostages. and William Rosenau.W. who had allegedly strayed into Iranian territory in a provocative manner. 79. October 6.washingtoninstitute. The quote from a Homeland Security report is found in Eric Lipton. 25.org/featuresarti- cleprint/2005/04af8904ce-0073-4cf4-bb19-aad24016373. p.S. See. 1013 (Washing- ton. 2004).” RFE/RL.” in Planning the Unthinkable. 2005.” Policy Watch no.rferl. For a discussion and citations. DC. see Chubin. 98–103. vol.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 167 Notes | 167 Iranian Government: Resurrecting Past Errors.” Foreign Affairs. http://foreign. 32. http://www. House of Representatives. CA: RAND Project Air Force. see Daniel Byman. 2005.S. 29. pp.gov/testimony/2005/ LugarStatement050519. http://www. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia and Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation.101–03. 31. 1. 99–113. John Parachini. U. 30. “Whither Iran?” For a similar view.” opening statement of Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing. Bush. blindfolded. 26. they paraded captured British troops. 2. 2005. Secu- rity. Paul Bracken.S. “The Second Nuclear Age. “Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U. Wash- ington. 28. http://www.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3. Peter Lavoy. pp. p. Biological and Chemical Weapons. 3. February 16. vol.” International Herald Tribune. Scott Sagan. 2005. “Confronting Syrian-Backed Ter- rorism. no. 1. Bush said that the United States would make no distinction between those who committed acts of terrorism and those who supported them. no. Says Iran ‘Most Active’ State Spon- sor of Terrorism. 5. p. “Iran: Weapons Proliferation. July 2005. May 19.

2005.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 36. “Whither Iran?” See also Paula DeSutter. 2005. 2005. DC: National Defense University.rferl. p. Hezbollah official Seyyed Mohammad Bager Kharrazi. May 2005.” McNair Paper no.pdf. Goss. “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy. 2005. 41. See Economist. 240–1. 41. pp. pp. Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. See Christo- pher Adams and Roula Khalaf.S. May 1. and Alan Cowell. Iranian officials argue that this was not their aim and that the decision to keep Al Qaeda members under house arrest and close surveillance in Iran was meant to keep them as hostages and a warning to Al Qaeda not to target Iranian cities.W. January 31.” Porter J. 2003). the excellent discussion between Scott Sagan and Ken Waltz. http://www. E’temad Website (Tehran). Geneva.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 168 168 | Notes html/pdf/Iran-Testimony-2-16-05. together with the strong influence of hard-liners in the Security apparatus.cia. No Place Safe for Americans.” http://www. Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons (Washington. pp.” Farhang–e Ashti. “Lebanon: Time for Syria to Go. “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Iran.” February 26. 34. See also Economist. DC: National Defense Univer- sity. “Iran continues to retain in secret important mem- bers of Al-Qai’da—the Management Council—causing further uncertainty about Iran’s commitment to bring them to justice. According to Porter Goss. 39. “Still Haunting America. 2005. 43. See Judith Yaphe and Charles Lutes. Febru- ary 1. “A Look at Iran’s Spon- sorship of Terror Groups.html. British allegations echo one by the United States a month earlier. p. Norton. p. 69 (Washington. DeSutter suggests that a U. Velayati was personally indicted by a German court in the Mykonos case. See also. for example. 42. 2005). “Blair Suspects Iran Aids Insurgents. 120. 1997). Bill Sami’i. More plausible in my view is the explanation noted earlier of “keeping options open” for bargain- ing. 38. response should be to “deny Iran ambiguity”. See. 2005. Center for Non-Proliferation Research. 5. Allison Graham.” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence. October 6. in BBC Monitoring. 67–8. . 47–70. 4. See 9/11 Commission Report. February 16.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/01/ 347a2c5f-088a-408-a632-d5fc648046.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/ Goss_testimony_02162005.” Financial Times. 2004. “UK Accuses Iran over Iraqi Rebels. 40. 2004). 2005. p. 38–9. 10. 35. 37. p. Author’s interviews with Iranian officials. quoted in “Iran’s Hezbollah Leader Warns to Set World Ablaze. See Chubin.” July 24. Director of Central Intelligence. see pages 85–6. October 7.

. May 20. Pakistan’s tacit support for Kashmiri terrorist attacks on India seems to have increased with nuclear weapons. p. September 10. “Islamic Republic of Iran. Top Nuclear Official.” Quoted in “Iran’s Aghaz- adeh says UN Referral Would Escalate Mideast Tensions. Chung Dong Young. The South Korean Min- ister of Unification. 1/4. there is no reason to possess a single nuclear weapon. They were echoed by AEO head Reza Aghazadeh. 103. p. In 1993. 19–24 46. only to be interrogated by reformist parliamentarians about the wisdom of threatening neighbors that Iran was seeking to cultivate as friends. Iran’s Defense Minis- ter Akbar Torkan observed that Iran’s defense budget of $850 million was one- twentieth of that of Saudi Arabia. 1994 (not a bargaining chip but insurance for the regime).” IRNA (Tehran). Giles contrasts the offensive view with that of civilians in Iran who see them as deterrents. 35. 45. in BBC Monitoring. pp. October 3. pp. see Chubin. 2005. “North Korea Isn’t Playing Games. 2005. The comments were made by Ali Larijani. 1993. vol. in BBC Monitoring.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). 183.” Survival. who threatened escalation in the region. September 27. Another case occurred in 2002 when General Zolgadr of the Guards threatened to destabilize the Persian Gulf if the United States threatened Iran. Giles. in BBC Monitoring. Planning the Unthinkable. 2005. Paul Bracken. September 28. 49. 50. 2005. and Wirtz. warning that referral to the UNSC “initiates a chain of actions and reactions that escalate tension and adds volatility to an already vulnerable situation in the region. “Expert: Iran Nukes Replace Old Military. pp. Dis- honesty on Nuclear Issue Clear for Iran.” IRNA (Tehran). 1.” p. 1993. Joseph Bermudez Jr. quoted in “Iran Accepts Negoti- ation Offers from Any Country. “The Kims Obsession: Archives Show Their Quest to Preserve the Regime. 1994. no.” International Herald Tribune. See Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran). in BBC ME/1664A/8. September 27. 48–51. A question posed by a Western official vis-à-vis Iran in relation to this case. June 27. It Wants the Bomb. 2005. Sagan. and “Nuclear Chief Says U. 47. June 3. For an example. Quoted in Steve Coll. The view of the IRGC as an aggressive element is supported by Paula DeSutter. 189–90.” Wash- ington Post. See also Andrew Mack.” See Stefan Nicola. 48.” International Herald Tribune. Autumn 1993.” in Lavoy. 2005. B01. Denial and Jeop- ardy. April 16. April 14. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 169 Notes | 169 44.” See . p. Tony Cordesman makes the point directly. 137–153.S. See DeSutter. June 12. 2005. “Nuclear Crisis Extends Well Beyond Korea. 3.” United Press International. see Rob Litwak and Kathryn Weathersby. Septem- ber 26. For sources specifically relevant. “The DPKR and Unconventional Weapons. suggesting that Iran’s conventional capabilities are “obsolescent. quoted Kim as saying: “If the regime secu- rity is guaranteed. “Whither Iran?” pp. “Nuclear Weapons and State Sur- vival in North Korea.

ed. remarks given at Second Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference. November 24. February 7. 57. 2003. “Iranian Security Chief Interviewed by Al-Jazeera on Nuclear File. August 8. http://carlisle-www. quoted in “Iran’s Top Security Official Warns U. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: We Are Not Building a Bomb. This newspaper often refers to the existence of a “nuclear apartheid.htm. August 6. 53.org/files/projects/ npp/resources/moscow2003/soltaniehremarks. 2003. 2004. Director-General. Rowhani also noted that while WMD had no place in defense doctrine. against Attack.” in Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analysis. 60. DC: Nixon Center.” Hasan Rowhani. Amir Mohebbian of the Resalat newspaper.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 170 170 | Notes Norimitsu Onishi. See also Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. Foreign Ministry. Moscow. The principle that any directive can be reversed on the grounds of expedi- ency or necessity (maslahat) undermines the strength of this argument. there is a place for such detailed discussions and that “these discussions have been held. 2004. quoted in International Crisis Group. 2005.” International Herald Tribune. Geoffrey Kemp (Washington. p. 2005.A. “Kim Jong Il Signals Readiness to Resume Nuclear Arms Talks.” Al- Jazeera TV (Doha). “Iran in Iraq’s Shadow: Dealing with Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Bid. Feb- ruary 9. 3. p. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 2005.mil/usawc/Parameters/ 04autumn/russell. in Richard Russell. February 5–6. 10. See Ali Asghar Soltanieh.” Para- meters. September 12. However. in BBC Monitoring.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). 55.army. p. 2003. For references.” 56. 2001). 59. June 22.’” ISNA (Tehran). 2004. 2004.” International Her- ald Tribune. June 19. Autumn 2004. Iranians focus on Israel’s nuclear capability but curiously do not note that the “massive imbalances in military capabilities” come not from nuclear weapons but disparities in conventional capabilities. Ali Khamenei.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). 54.S. in BBC Monitor- ing.ceip. 51. 4. September 13. November 24. Iraq. http://www. p. “Former Guards C-in-C Says Cooperation with EU Undermined Iran’s ‘Deter- rent. in BBC Monitoring. “To Have or Not to Have? Iran’s Domestic Debate on Nuclear Options. September 20. June 18/19.” Middle East Briefing. General Shamkhani made a similar argument earlier: “The existence of nuclear weapons . 2004. see Chubin. November 25. See quote from an anonymous policy advisor to a senior cleric. 5. See Kamal Kharrazi. 58. in BBC Monitoring. Farideh Farhi. the argument does appear rather carefully crafted for his regional audience. 2004. “Whither Iran?” 52. quoted in “Iranian Spokesman Says Use of Nuclear Weapons Religiously Forbidden.htm. “Iran: Where Next in the Nuclear Standoff. quoted in Voice of IRI Network (Tehran).

2. and 20 percent of the equipment portion of the defense budget. in BBC Monitoring. Fall 2003. “Iran: Rowhani Says Leader Opposed to Acquiring Nuclear Weapons. “Nuclear Arms Detrimental to Iran’s National Interest: Defence Minister.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran).” Iran Daily (Tehran). quoted in “Iran Security Official Says Nuclear Talks Eased Concern of Possible Conflict. June 9. Mousavian’s comment appears apt because by talking up the issue. 65. 2003. “Iran: Cultural Values. pp. For a valuable discussion.” Keyhan.” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).” International Security. 2005. 2004. 2004. “For Many Iranians. and “Iran: Editorial Says Nuclear Weapons Best Deterrence against Nuclear Powers. October 25. 64. nationalism. November 10. 2003. 7. in BBC Monitoring. “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy. vol. Geneva. 57. in BBC Monitoring. December 13. 2004. August 8. arguing that most of the advantages of nuclear weapons come from having the capacity to produce them rather than their actual possession. no.” International Herald Tribune. the time and space left for compromise are decreased and misused. October 26.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 171 Notes | 171 will turn us into a threat that could be exploited in dangerous ways to harm our rela- tions with the countries of the region. November 8. 66. This is consistent with Iran’s strategic culture and approach to negotiations. See Hossein Mousavian. and wants a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the Middle East. Shamkhani added that Iran signed the NPT.” p. “Iran Builds a Bomb. 2002. “A Short History of the Nuclear Bomb and Nuclear Parity. December 24. 69. 2004. 63.” quoted in Takeyh. 2002. Ali Akbar Salehi. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. 2004. December 30. November 9.” p. 2005.” Iran (Tehran). 2005. 61. For an example. 2004.” paper presented to the workshop on “Governing Nuclear Weapons. August 10. Top Offi- cial Says. 70.” ISNA (Tehran). “Nuclear Weapons Will Not Bring Prestige to Iran. Others disagree.” Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran). Bruno Tertrais. Nuclear Power Is an Issue of Pride. 15. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. see Shmuel Bar.” IRNA website (Tehran). Since the mid-1990s. See Hashemi Rafsanjani. 2003.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). May 30. in BBC Monitoring. the United States and Israel have exaggerated how advanced Iran’s capabilities are in order to limit it before it reaches the point of no return. 62. November 10. February 8. “Case Study on France. and gar- nering domestic capital. 2004. 2004. For a counterconventional and persuasive discussion. 44–77. in BBC Monitoring. Nuclear weapons account for 10 percent of France’s overall defense budget. 2004. “Hardline Daily Says Iran Must Complete Nuclear Plant. p. “Iran Has Mas- tered the Fuel Cycle and This Cannot Be Turned Back under any Circumstances. see Zeev Maoz. December 21. see Sirus Naseri. 67. February 7. June 10. Iran has exaggerated its progress for reasons of pride. respects the safeguards agreements. See . quoted in Neil MacFarquahar. 28. 68. October 3.

27.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 172 172 | Notes Hamid Hadian. March 9. 71. http:// www. 2005. no. no.” International Security. http://memri. http://foreign.” Diplomatic Hamshahri. 69.nytimes. vol. 2005. see Ayelet Savyon. Panel Says. U. quoted in Steven Fidler. Spring 1995. The key criterion becomes the cushion of time between a given stage of nuclear technology and a deployed nuclear force. Michael Mazarr discusses how a nuclear option might be used for arms control purposes: “For most developed and a few developing states the ques- tion is not whether they could have nuclear weapons but how long it would take to deploy them.e.gov/testimony/2005/PerkovichTesti- mony050519. 3. 14. 11. p. vol. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. pp.” Michael J.pdf. no. For an early discussion of the dangers within the NPT.” Survival. p. testimony before the U. 2.senate. 18–24. 229.com/2005/03/09/international/09weapons. “Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals.cgi? Page=archives&ID=1A20905. “Nuclear Weapons as the Central Focus of International Politics.” Foreign Policy. In the autumn of 2003 (Tehran agreement) and again in the November 2004 Paris agreement. February 23. George Perkovich notes that this scenario. 1. “Virtual Arsenals. “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival. “a variant of the Japanese model is very difficult to counter. Mohammad Al Baradei. May 19. “Iran Seeks EU Consent for Modelling Its Nuclear Program on the ‘Japanese/German model’: i. 37. 3. 2005. “Non-Proliferation Treaty. 74. “Data Is Lacking on Iran’s Arms. 37. see Avner Cohen and Joe Pilat. 129–44. 2004.” Financial Times. no. For a generally sensible set of comments on Iran and nuclear weapons. 40. no. p.org/bin/opener. Spring 1998.html?th=&pagewanted=p. see Christopher de Bellaigue. See also Ariel Levite. Chapter Four 1. Iranian officials had to explain to their domestic audience the need . 148. quoted in Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt. Carol Rodley.S. 72. For discussion. Virtual arsenals would aim to create such a cushion for the nuclear weapon states and extend it for non-nuclear weapon states. 75. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capa- bilities Three Months Short of the Bomb. May/June 2005. vol. Shahram Chubin. 20.. “Iran: Think Again. Mazarr. September 2004. May 23. Testing Times: How the Grand Bargain of Nuclear Containment Is Breaking Down.” See George Perkovich. 1.” Survival. State Department’s second top intelligence official. vol.S.” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) no. and could be a model for other states beyond Iran. 73. no. Winter 2002/03. “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.” New York Times. pp. Autumn 1995.

in BBC Mon- itoring. 2003. and Hashemi Rafsanjani. 2003. 2003. November 21. November 2. Iran has not reported its activities. 2003. September 19.” . 7. July 14. 6. September 15. BBCTV interview. in BBC Monitoring. see Hasan Rowhani. September 25. At the time Supreme Leader Khamenei defended the agreement in similar words: “They [the United States] had come close to forming an international consensus against the Islamic republic on the issue of nuclear weapons . 2005. Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee of the Majles. 2003. sanc- tions as cause of nondeclaration.S.” ISNA (Tehran).” Sharq website. November 17. China.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). see interview with Ali Akbar Salehi..” CBS News. quoted in “Security Chief Tells EU Iran Didn’t Reveal Nuclear Information due to Sanctions. “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours.cbsnews. 2005. December 24. Hasan Rowhani. 8. 3.” IRNA (Tehran).” Iranian Labour News Agency (Tehran). July 17. Negotiations helped create the atmosphere for long-term gas contracts with India.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). Pakistan.” Hashemi Rafsanjani. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.” ISNA (Tehran). On U. 2004. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. November 17. quoted in “Iran’s IAEA Envoy Insists Tehran Not Seeking to Become a Nuclear Power. 9. 2003. See Hossein Mousavian. See “Iran Security Official Says Nuclear Talks Eased Concern of Possible Conflict.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 173 Notes | 173 for prudent diplomacy to defuse pressures. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. September 26. Iran acted adroitly to clarify the situation. http:// www. On omissions. Hasan Rowhani.” Quoted in “Iran’s Khamenei Defends Decision on Nuclear Protocol. See Figure 2 on nuclear decision making. 2003. quoted in “Iran: Rafsanjani Delivers Friday Prayers on Qods Day. and the United Arab Emirates. 2005. 4. in BBC Monitoring. Hossein Mousavian depicted the 2004 agreement as part of strategy of “preventing the formation of an interna- tional consensus against the Iranian nuclear program” (and possible referral to the UNSC). “Iran’s Security Chief Rejects IAEA Demand to Suspend Enrichment. 2004.. December 21. Hashemi Rafsanjani has said that “it was possible that. September 27. November 21. Iran’s representative at the IAEA. 2003. 2005. July 15. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in “EU Waiting for New Iranian Government to Proceed with Talks— Official. July 18. September 20. Rowhani. at times. 2004. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resigna- tion. 5. “Iran Admits Expanded Nuke Work. 2003. June 15. suggesting that a domestic constituency existed for confronting the international community. in BBC Monitoring.” Der Spiegel.shtml. quoted in George Jahn. Mohsen Mirdamadi. November 4. quoted in “Prominent Reformist Says Iran Should Main- tain US-EU Rift over Nuclear Programme.” IRI News Network (Tehran).com/stories/2005/06/15/world/printable702166.

4.” Financial Times. Hasan Rowhani observed that if the negoti- ations failed “the region would come up against serious obstacles and regional secu- rity will be jeopardized. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” Iran (Tehran). 2005.” See “Iran Press: Iranian Negotiator Says Nuclear Talks Reaching Dead-End.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). “The Americans say that we should force Iran to abandon the program.” Jomhuriy-eh Eslami’. 16. For criticism of Europe as the mouthpiece of the United States and “Zionists. Ali Akbar Salehi. July 20. For a convenient source for all of these reports. Hasan Rowhani. 2005. The Europeans say no. February 27. For text of the Tehran agree- ment. April 7. 14. 2004. April 21. January 2005). 11. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. March 28. 2005. March 5. 2005. 17. AEO Head Reza Aghazadeh. “Iran Threatens to End Nuclear Talks if Its Agenda Is Not Accepted. in BBC Monitoring. The Russians too. May 30. Inquiry and Analysis Series no. 2004.” See Rowhani. 218. See Roula Khalaf. February 28. “Interview with Hasan Rowhani.globalsecurity. “The Europeans want to find a solution but their ability to manoeuvre in their political relationship with America is limited. 2005. Rowhani noted. 2005. 2005. 2004. the Secretary of the Expe- diency Council. is that they all agree that Iran should not have this technology. Najmeh Bozorgmehr.” The bottom line. 218. 2005. As one Iranian negotiator noted.org/wmd/library/ report/2005/cm6443. may have an opinion similar to the Europeans. 15. in MEMRI. April 7. quoted in “Failure to Close Iran Nuclear File at IAEA Risks Paris Deal—Iran Official.” ISNA (Tehran). 2005.” IRNA. in BBC Monitoring. Representative of this viewpoint is Mohsen Rezai. May 26. in BBC Monitoring. July 14.” International Herald Tribune. 2004. Quoted in “Iranian Paper Views Delay to Nuclear Deal with Rus- sia.” insisted Rowhani. November 24. April 19. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. See also Reuters. in MEMRI. 2005. March 9. November 21.pdf. quoted in IRNA. Inquiry and Analysis Series no. quoted in “Iran: Atomic Energy Chief Says Test Production of Uranium Begins in 20 Days. however. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Collection of Documents (Norwich: HMSO. Iran’s Nuclear Program. .” Sharq website. 12. in BBC Mon- itoring. we should encourage Iran and gently convince it that it is to its benefit to abandon the program.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 174 174 | Notes 10. quoted in “Europe Should Understand That Its Security Is Closely Linked to Iran’s Security. “Any Iranian government that wishes to stop uranium enrichment will fall. and Gareth Smyth. 2005.” see “Iran Press: Editorial Says Europe ‘Not to Be Trusted’ in Nuclear Talks. p. in BBC Monitoring. http://www. For text. see Secretary of State for For- eign and Commonwealth Affairs. 2005. July 15. March 29.” Siyasat-e Ruz (Tehran). 13. 2005. Iran’s Nuclear Program. July 18. 18.

in BBC Monitoring. 2005. 27.com/2005/05/ 12/politics/12diplo.” Survival. in BBC Monitoring. For this episode.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). March 30. in BBC Monitoring. There are interesting paral- lels between North Korea’s negotiating style for the Agreed Framework 1994 and that of Iran.” IRNA (Tehran). no. 80. p. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. see Hasan Rowhani’s comments. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 61. There are parallels with North Korea. Evelyn Leopold. vol. in BBC Monitoring. See Joel Witt. May 11. 21. 26. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. 25. Hamid Reza Asefi. “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator. 2005. 2004.aljazeera. 2004. Soon of Nuclear Work—Europe Envoy. which is based on interviews with senior Iranian negotiators.” IRI News Net- work (Tehran). Going Critical: The First Nuclear Crisis (Washington. 2005. Octo- ber 24. March 13. 3. See “Iran Refuses to Show Centrifuge Machinery. Daniel Poneman.N. quoted in “Foreign Min- ister Foresees Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Issue. DC: Brookings Institution. 2004. 2005. is credible. May 11. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. May 9. 45. senior negotiator and IAEA delegate. “Seeing North Korea Clearly.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran). The report. 2005. quoted in “Security Chief Says Iran Resuming Manufacture of Nuclear Components. http://www. See Daniel A.” Financial Times. December 10. For text.php?storyid=2070. Pinkston and Phillip C Sanders. May 10.” ISNA (Tehran).com. March 16.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran).’” Al- Jazeera. 2004. see also “Iran: Threats of SC over Nuclear Plans Are ‘Propaganda. Steven Weisman. and Robert Galluci.com. Autumn 2003. Hossein Mousavian.html?. See “Iran’s Nukes Program Was Speeded Up. 22.nytimes.” Reuters. 28. 2004. 2005. 23.” IRNA (Tehran). 2004. 2005. June 27. Iran’s Nuclear Program. June 19.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 175 Notes | 175 19. This raises interesting questions about Iran’s strategic culture or myopia. 20. “Atom Agency May Be Asked to Meet if Iran Resumes Ura- nium Work. . 2005. “Iran to Tell U. May 8. 2005.com/mod- ules/news/article. quoted in “Iran Foreign Min- istry Preparing Additional Bill. June 27. Hasan Rowhani. quoted in “Nuclear Spokesman Says Resolution Not ‘Major Threat’ to Iran in Actuality. 75–6.iranfocus. June 18. May 12. May 11. 24. 2005. Gareth Smyth.” Al-Jazeera. 2005). It has been suggested that North Korea has a distorted worldview and warped expectations about how countries will respond to its actions. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. http://www. 2005. pp. December 12. March 31. quoted in “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says Iran Nuclear Crisis Over. http://www. and Sirus Naseri. 2004. December 12.” New York Times.

3. 2005. 2005. June 18. “Chirac Holding to a Multipolar World. noted this in March 2005. 3 (159). “Prod Putin on Freedoms. 2004. and USA Today. 2004. 2005. March 4. quoted in “Hasan Rowhani Reacts to IAEA Resolution on Iran. June 28. 37.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring.” International Herald Tribune. respectively. and it was repeated by Director-General Al Baradei in June 2005. This is clearly the implication of the comments of two parliamentarians with expertise in the nuclear field. 2004. “New Challenges for NATO and the EU.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). See the report of Iran IAEA delegation in response: “International Atomic Agency Delegation Will Visit Iran to Resolve Plutonium Issue. Gareth Smyth and Guy Dinmore. 33. 2004. 2005. In reference to Iran. p.com/2005/02/28/international/midleeast/28nuke. 34.” ABC News Online.” Quoted in “Iran Says Wording of Resolution behind Delay in IAEA Visit. IAEA Deputy Director-General for Safeguards.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran). February 9. 35. Javier Solana. Iran Admits It Discussed Nuclear Technology. June 19. August 9. “IAEA Confirms Iran’s Halt to Nuclear Activity.” speech delivered at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy.htm. 2005. 30.html?page- wanted. March 16. President Chirac told a gathering: “You can deal with the Sunnis but not with the Shi’ites.” Financial Times. 2005. June 11. 36. In the words. 38. quoted in “IAEA Chief Says Trust Would Improve if Iran Stopped Centrifuge Production. This was repeated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi: “We would never allow anyone to talk to us using such language. 2005. 2004. quoted in “(Corr) Rafsanjani Says Iran Will ‘Definitely’ Not Give Up Nuclear Technology. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. See “Iran Denies Monitors Access to Military Site.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring.” See Anton Khoplov. http://www. Mohammad Al Baradei. Hashemi Rafsanjani. May 2005. 2005.” Quoted in Elaine Sciolino. 2004. See “Iran’s Majles Debates Suspension of Additional . 3.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 176 176 | Notes 29. March 13. 31. March 2.” International Herald Tribune. March 15. February 12. 32.net. of an unnamed British diplomat and Washington- based expert David Albright. March 5. 2004. 2005.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). Pierre Goldschmidt. in BBC Monitoring.abc. quoted in Elaine Sciolino and David Sanger. “Pressed. “Will the Iranian Atom Become a Persian Carpet for Russia?” PIR Center: Arms Control and Security Letters.au/news/newsitems/200506/ s1389877.” February 23. in BBC Monitoring. is not appropriate in relations with Iran. March 13. February 28. Hasan Rowhani. “Iran Threatens Tough Measures in Event of Sanctions. “Trustfulness. but Don’t Isolate Key Ally. p. no. and Reuters. http://www. sometimes bordering on naiveté.” New York Times. June 27. Reference to the Shiites may be to the practice of dissimulation (taqiiyah) authorized in extreme circumstances.nytimes.

” Etemad website. “Iran Agrees to Continue Freeze on Nuclear Work. see Sirus Naseri.” International Herald Tribune.” Voice of the IRI Network (Tehran).*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 177 Notes | 177 Protocol. whenever it decides in the future it can divert .” See Smyth.” Quoted in “Iran Needs Nuclear Activity Resumption—Warning to EU. April 27. Elaine Sciolino.” Vision of IRI Network 1 (Tehran) in Persian. December 13. 2005. 44. quoted in “Europe Is After Strategic Relations with Iran—Security Chief. 41. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours. “Iran Says That Its Nuclear Skills Not for Sale. Septem- ber 30. or yellowcake. in BBC Monitoring.muslimnews.co. May 9. May 14. sites. May 8. 6.uk/news/print_ver- sion. March 5. 2005. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. Iran will be capable of reconstructing all its nuclear installations in a year (but would end inspections).” Hasan Rowhani. We have the minds. into uranium hexofluoride.. quoted in “Iran May Negotiate Several Years. Also. in BBC Monitoring. On invulnerability to military strikes that cannot destroy know-how. 43. Iran already has the capability. 2004. April 26. 2004.. Hossein Mousavian has stated that “the European concern is that when Iran has the capability of enrichment.” 46. These divisions need not concern us here but they account for the ambiva- lence of some of Iran’s statements. p. Rowhani. for example. http://www. scientists. February 21. See former IAEA Representative Ali Akbar Salehi.” IRNA (Tehran). Nuclear technology is something that needs constant research and the knowledge needs to be completed. we have the yellowcake process [the process for converting uranium ore. 26 May 2005. Rowhani noted that some European politicians “told [him] explicitly in Brussels that they are not only after resolving Iran’s nuclear case peacefully but also making strategic relations with Iran. May 12.” Financial Times. the feeder material for enrichment]. in BBC Monitoring. 42. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian.” Muslim News. 2005.” Quoted in “Nuclear Negotiator Says Iran Ready for Agreement. Tehran. 2005. February 3. March 6. We have centrifuges. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation.. Prepared for Confrontation. in BBC Monitoring. December 14. See also Aghazadeh’s comment about Isfahan’s 700 experts: “We cannot keep them idle for a long time. 28 September 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.” Sirus Naseri also commented on the issue: “We have mastered the technology .” Voice of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). 45. See.. in BBC Monitoring.php?article=8852.” Mardom Salari website (Tehran). This is clearly put by Hasan Rowhani. 2005. 2005. 2005. 39. and its set- ting and then ignoring deadlines.” 40. the grandstanding by its negotiators. See also Deputy Head of the AEO Mohammad Saidi. 2005. 2005. we have what is required for a fuel pro- duction program. who stated: “If an attack is made. quoted in “Ex-Envoy Says EU Should Meet Iran’s Demands. Reza Aghazadeh. “Interview with Hossein Mousa- vian. 2005.” Quoted in “Iran Will Resume .

” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). quoted in “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT. Rowhani noted that the United States “is trying to internationalize its sanc- tions on Iran and change its enmity toward Iran into an international one. Rowhani calls it the “biggest test for Europe. while the other half was from nonaligned states. warning that “should Europe fail . 2004. Rowhani. in BBC Monitoring.” Iran (Tehran). 50. 47. 2005. February 25. Naseri echoes this line of thought. “If you take article IV out of the NPT.” suggesting that “it would be a great failure on the part of Europe .*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 178 178 | Notes Nuclear Fuel Production if Europe Breaches Commitments. “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal”. and “Iran’s Nuclear Negotiator Says US Role in Talks Would Be ‘Positive. 2003. in BBC Monitoring. January 30. it may not be able to play a fundamental role in another political situation in the world. 56. This was recognized by Iran’s IAEA representative in 2003. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. See. 57.S. March 5.” Quoted in “Iran Ready to Repel Likely US Attack. January 6. 2005.” Financial Times. all the nonaligned countries will leave.’” IRNA (Tehran).’” 53. Says Security Chief. 2005.’ Says Iranians Not Like Afghans or Iraqis. “Iran Offers to Let US Share Its Nuclear Program. “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion. 2005. Jan- uary 27. Geneva. March 16.” IRI News Network (Tehran). 2005. 2004.” Quoted in Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth. 55.” Sharq website (Tehran). June 24. 49.” ISNA (Tehran). “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion.. quoted in “Iran in the Club of 10 Leading Nuclear States. July 27.’” 52. Quoted in “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Dis- cussion’ of Ending Uranium Enrichment. Rowhani. “Top Iranian Official Says ‘No Discussion. 48. “Official Rebuffs US ‘Hollow Threats. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times. 2005. as in the offer to the United States.” Sirus Naseri. 2005. 2005. Of a Board of Governors of 35. “Iran Turns Up Heat on Europe Ahead of Talks. February 5. quoted in “Iran to Put Forward Final Nuclear Proposal in Less than Three Months—Negotiator.’” 54. 2005. 2005. 2005. September 30. 2005. March 16. October 2. March 7. and multilateralism as a whole.. in BBC Monitoring. Advisor to the Supreme Leader on International Affairs.” ISNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. 2. Rowhani saw two U. 2005. 2005. April 19.” Ali Akbar Salehi. March 13. Kevin Morrison.” Vision of IRI Network 2 (Tehran). Interview with senior Iranian official dealing with this issue. Hasan Rowhani. respectively. Ali Akbar Velayati. February 4. 18 were from Western countries or those inclined to the West. 2005. 51. and Rowhani. Naseri. July 28. who noted the good relations with the agency until 2002. in BBC Monitoring.. 2003. . p. February 26.” commented Hasan Rowhani.. But Salehi noted that “even many of them are inclined to support the West. January 8. This offer is sometimes half serious and for public relations reasons.

co.” This sentiment is echoed by Foreign Minister Kharrazi. In the new world order we can do little better than rely on candour and open- ness.” ISNA (Tehran). The US wants to weaken Iran.” IRNA (Tehran).” Financial Times. 2005. 2005. EU. W6. “Interview Transcript: Hasan Rowhani. p. March 19-20. February 23. Salehi. 2005. See “Iran Foreign Minister on Relations with US. An unnamed senior Iranian official told a journalist. June 19.guardian. 5. “The US is using the nuclear issue as a pretext for regime change. Quoted in “Candidate in Iran Presidential Election Says US Hostile to Islamic World. February 26. 7.” Hasan Rowhani. 62. quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Says Careful Plan- ning Stopped Nuclear Dossier Reaching UN.’ Urges Continued Nuclear Work.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). given or frittered away. “Atomic Clock Ticks Down to Fallout with Iran. “ Le Monde.” IRNA (Tehran). June 9. 2005. 63.uk/print/ 0. 2005.html. “L’Iran doit avoir l’assur- ance qu’on ne songe pas a l’attaquer ou provoquer un changement de regime. and Smyth. quoted in “Iran’s Supreme Leader Rejects US ‘Lies. “British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms. Apposite here is the proposition advanced in a recent study of British diplo- macy that notes that “the cliché about rebuilding trust will not do: for trust is not a commodity.” Vision of the IRI Network 1 (Tehran). January 28. It can only be earned. June 20. This was echoed by presidential candidate Hojat-el Eslam Mehdi Karrubi. March 15. in Stolz. 2005. March 21. Janu- ary 27.” See Simon Tisdall. quoted in “Iranian Army Commander Calls US. in BBC Monitoring. who saw concessions by Iran on the enrichment issue as leading to more U. in BBC Monitoring. See Sirus Naseri. 61. 64. pretexts—first terrorism and later human rights—that could be exploited by the regime’s opposition abroad. “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium. 59. March 23. 2005. March 22. 2005. 2006. Israeli Threats Serious. 65. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. March 18. . June 8. Iraq. 58. Khalaf.” Etemad website (Tehran) (in Persian). March 16. The issue is a diversion. “L’AIEA reclame. See Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 179 Notes | 179 aims: “to deny Iran access to peaceful technology” and “to prepare the ground for its other plans.” 60. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. p. Election. http://www. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Even if the nuclear issue was solved. “Colour of Culture No Longer Black or White. 2005 (weekend edition).” review of Mark Leonard and Martin Rose. Army Commander Major General Mohammed Salimi. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” See Peter Aspden.3858. Iran’s view was supported by Director-General Al Baradei. These excerpts are from the Rahbod Quarterly: Journal of the Strategic Research Cen- tre of the Assembly of Experts based on a speech in Autumn 2005.5150908-103390. 2005. It cannot be built.S. or rebuilt. “Former Nuclear Negotiator Quoted on Talks Background. Bozorgmehr.00. they would want another thing and another thing.” p.” Guardian.

“Iran Negotiator Assesses Cost of Referral to Security Council. “Les negociateurs iraniens et europeens ne parvient pas a s’accorder sur le dossier nucleaire. Hasan Rowhani. 2006. March 5-6. 4. 67. There were reports that Larijani gave the impression to Europeans in March of disassociating himself from the president. Joel Brinkley. March 2. 1. “Congress Irate over Talks with India.” Financial Times.” Iran (Tehran). 2006. 2005. 2006. November 1. . 2006. see Associated Press. See Natalie Nougayrede and Laurent Zecchini. 2006. Iran reportedly threatened India with withdrawal of a major gas pipeline agreement if it voted against Iran in November at the IAEA.” Etemad website (Tehran). See “Iran Threatens Jump in Atom Work: A Final Proposal to Keep the UN at Bay. in BBC Mon- itoring. Mohsen Rezai.” Farhang-e Ashti (Tehran). 2005. See Carolo Hoyos and Dan Dombey.” Financial Times. 75. 4. February 15. 72. “Iran’s Plan for Oil Cuts Is Snubbed by OPEC. Respectively. March 6. on January 12 and 22. 2006. 69. 76. 71. “Les negociateurs iraniens et europeens ne parvient pas a s’accorder sur le dossier nucleaire. The for- eign minister has talked of state-owned and private companies helping to develop Iran’s nuclear program. Whether this was inadvertent or an attempt to play “good cop. See. “ownership super- vision over Iran’s nuclear installations which is a step higher than technical and legal supervision”—in effect. 13. For an overview. February 28. p. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran Tries to Burnish Image. a confidence-building measure.” International Herald Tribune. quoted in “Comment Sees Possible Lose/Lose Outcome from Nuclear Impasse. 2006. February 14. p. 2006.” Le Monde. p. 68.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 180 180 | Notes 66. 4. October 13. Par- ticipation appears to mean. March 3. p. “Iran Dashes Hopes for Russian Nuclear Deal. President Ahmadinejad on February 11 and the Foreign Ministry spokesman on February 12. p. who is typical in insisting that the issue is a legal one for the agency but that the United States and Europe seek to make it a “political” one. 4. 2006.” International Herald Tribune. Quoted in “Expediency Council Secretary Says Tension between Iran and America Serious. 2006. according to a senior nuclear official. 70. p.” 74. President Ahmadinejad referred to this offer of participation at the UN. February 1. Ali Hoseyni Tash.” International Herald Tribune. for example. Nougayrede and Zec- chini. p.” Etemad website (Tehran). March 3. bad cop” is unclear. November 7. Mohammad Saidi. 73. October 12. 2006. 1/8. and Jan Mouawad.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. See Deputy Secretary of the SNSC Javad Vaidi’s comments quoted in “Iranian Daily Calls on Government to Consider Russia’s Proposal. 2006. quoted in Gareth Smyth. 2005. 2006. “OPEC Agrees to Maintain Current Production. January 31. 2005. February 14.

focusing on weapons rather than states. pp. 3 (Washington. vol. address to American Legion. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Louis Charbonneau. 3. 15. if something is amiss regarding verification. At a press conference earlier. http://www. 2005. Even skeptics of the IAEA role acknowledge the uncertainty of a UNSC response given the record in Iraq and Korea. June 2004). December 11. June 27.alertnet. See George Perkovich. “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Non- Proliferation. 2005. “Iran Threatens to Stop Abiding by Additional Protocol—Foreign Minister. President George W. See Chen Zak. January/February 2004. 83. October 13. 4. 2004. Yahoo News. the Security Council is not required “to take any action or even debate the matter. “Iran Threatens to Resume Enrich- ment. Mohammad Al Baradei noted the risk that if referred to the UNSC. 2.html. “Iran Attempts to Backtrack from Oil Supply Threat.. 2005. Bush put it more simply: “I don’t believe that non- transparent regimes that threaten the security of the world should be allowed to gain . “In Shift.” September 26.org/printable.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). 82. Bush.” Reuters. Chapter Five 1. pp. 2005.” New York Times. See Gareth Smyth. “Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. opinion-editorial. Condoleezza Rice. “A Duty to Prevent. 2. 2005. vol. October 17. pp.” Washington Post.” Reuters Foundation Alertnet. pp.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 181 Notes | 181 77. report it to the UNSC. no. 2005. 2–8. October 2.” Foreign Affairs.1. is that its opening proposition is to treat North Korea as if it were Norway. 2006. 2002). and Nazila Fathi. The problem with this approach. RFE/RL. the IAEA may. October 16. “El Baradei Wary of Taking Iran to the Security Council. March/April 2003. “Confrontation Won’t Fix Iran Nuke Issue—El Baradei.” October 7. “Iran Threatens to Stop UN Nuclear Inspec- tions.. October 2. of the Security Council.” New York Times.” Financial Times. but is not obligated to. February 24. 2005.” Foreign Affairs.” Military Research Papers no. As Ephraim Asculai notes. no. 70 (Tel Aviv: JCSS. July 8. 18.” Memorandum no.” Ephraim Asculai. if a state withdraws from its safeguards agreement and declares an intention to withdraw from the treaty (under Article X).” See Louis Charbonneau. Reuters. Iran Agrees to Resume Nuclear Talks. 2004. 5. For a defense of the Bush approach. “The Promise of Democratic Peace.htm?URL-the_news/newdesk/ LO8157593. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2. 70–1. the coun- cil might not act and Iran might opt out of the NPT: “North Korea in many ways has revealed the limitations . “Iran Hints of Reductions of Oil Sales over Nuclear Dispute. 2005. Similarly. 143–4. in BBC Monitoring. see Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126. p. p. May 2. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad agrees that Iran is “an influential player seeking regional pre- eminence”(hegemony). February 21. 2006. 2005.whitehouse. Joseph Cirincione. June 1. see Associated Press. p. Shares Details on Efforts to Intercept Weapons Technology. February 11. 2006.” International Herald Tribune.” International Herald Tribune. p.com/2005/05/03/international/ middleeast/03npt.” Le Monde. Jan- uary 26. Bush. DC. DC. March 15.html?th=&pagewanted=print&po. http://www. India is a highly democratic. DC: Carnegie Endowment. see “Bush et l’Iran. February 14.” New York Times. 2006. A5. Pakistan and China are not members of the PSI. Mathews. “Rice Asks for Funds to Buoy Policy in Iran.S.html?pagewanted. 2. Jon B. 12.” New York Times. 2006. May 3. A10. A01.” Steven Weisman. “Iran Plans Defense of Nuclear Program. 2006. 2006. George Perkovich. speech delivered at the National Defense Univer- sity (NDU). James . “The comparison between India and Iran is just ludicrous.. “U.” New York Times. 9.nytimes. David Sanger. See David Sanger. State of the Union address to Congress. 2005. and Jessica T. 2006. Bush.S.” New York Times.’” 11. http://www. March 8. “Iran Is Said to Start Enriching Fuel on a Very Small Scale. Washing- ton.html. http://www. Rose Gottemoeller. Dafna Linzer. 2005. Andrew Semmel. The distinction between types of regimes was emphasized in the contrasting approach of the United States toward India.com/ 2005/03/15/politics15treaty. See especially David Sanger. See Condoleezza Rice. 2005. Wolfsthal. “Dissenting on the Atom Deal. See also Elaine Sciolino and David Sanger. 8.nytimes. p. 6.S. 10. U. Iran is an autocratic state mistrusted by nearly all countries. For a skeptical view. February 16. “Bush Seeks to Ban Some Nations from All Nuclear Activity. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns noted. State Department press release. January 31. 13. March 3. peaceful.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 182 182 | Notes the technologies necessary to make a (nuclear) weapon.S. February 25. March 2005). U. Sanger reports that “so far the administration has not declared publicly that its larger goal beyond Iran is to remake a treaty whose intellectual roots date back to the Eisenhower adminis- tration. 2005. 4. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. “U. 4. statement to NPT Review Conference. President George W.” Washington Post. Reports suggest that U. Demand Deepens Gulf with Iran over Nuclear Facilities. May 25. President George W..S.S. under the cold war banner of ‘Atoms for Peace. 2006. efforts to lobby the G-8 to agree to sanctions on Iran should the EU-3 offer to Iran be rejected by Tehran were unsuccessful. 7. Washington.” International Herald Tribune. “U. 2004. p. testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee. p. See John O’Neill. Bureau of Non- Proliferation. stable state . 6. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. Accuses Iranians of Aiding Iraqi Militia. 14.” See press conference.

‘Results Mixed’ on Iraqi Troops.S. Robin Wright. edi- torial. 21. transcript of White House conference. 2005. March 31. http://www.” p. 23. for example. See.” Financial Times. Council on Foreign Relations. p.S. For a useful summary of U. inter- view with Bernard Gwertzman. 17. http://www. 4. State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (London: Free Press. See Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak. 24. which called for Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to ratify the Additional Protocol without delay. Concerns. 2006. p. It Has Detained Ter- ror Suspects.cfr.S. May 13.S.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=ccdbfb92d6605f50&ex=1132203600&o ref=login. For a summary of past efforts along these lines. 2003. “For Bush.pdf.” New Yorker.org/ wmd/library/report/2005/cm6443. 26. “Comment: Boltonism. Flynt Leverett. For this suggestion. This followed a determination by Secretary Rice that Iran was acting to con- tribute to nuclear proliferation under U. see Kenneth Katzman.nytimes. Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Guy Dinmore.S. See.S. . June 14.cfr. Autumn 2003.-Iran Opportunities. 2005. For text of statements at Evian and Sea Island G-8 meetings. “Back to Arms Control.” Washington Quarterly. who argues that ideologues in the administration did not use the opportunity to engage Iran. Al Qaida.org/publication/10326/leverett. 23. http://www.org/pdf/Iran_TF. 7. March 21. Concerns and Policy Responses. For the Gleneagles declaration.S. see Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 19. March 5. January 19.globalsecurity.” Financial Times. p. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 183 Notes | 183 Harding and Hugh Williamson. 10. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Collection of Documents (Norwich: HMSO. 22. 215–7. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspira- tions. February 24. 1. See also “U.” January 20. “Most analysts seem to agree that sanctions would have had a far greater effect on Iran if they were multilateral or international. p. “Iran Tells U. 20. 12. CRS-26. former official Flynt Leverett. 2004.” December 20. 2006).” Financial Times. legislation (PD 12938). “Iran: U. p. “Iran: U. July 8. see Guy Dinmore. no. p. This is corroborated by James Risen. Samantha Power. 16. sanctions in place. vol. 13.com/2004/12/20/politics/20web- ptext. 3. Guy Dinmore. “Fears Grow of New Chapter in Story of Missed U.pdf. Lawmakers Take Aim at Foreign Firms in Iran. 15.” See Katzman. pp. 2003. Two presti- gious institutes advocated engagement as a strategy: the Atlantic Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.” Los Angeles Times.” International Herald Tribune.” Financial Times.” Congressional Research Service no. Bush. 2003. “Bush to ‘Think About’ Europe’s Iran Strategy. especially. see Payvand Iran News. May 23. February 17. “Rafsanjani Offers Threats and Olive Branch. p.html. January 2005). http://www. 2005. in ‘Useful’ Talks with Iran. 2005. 18. quoted in New York Times. 2005. 2003. International Herald Tribune. RL32048. “U. see President George W.S.

May 6.” International Herald Tribune. Caroline Daniel. “U. June 15. 2005. 2005.” Financial Times. 30. The second senator was Joseph Biden. 2005. especially. “Bush Targets ‘Tyrants’ in Human Rights Report.S. March 28. pp.” February 19. May 19. 13. “Critics Pour Water on U. “Bush Condemns Tehran’s ‘Rule of Suppression. June 24. see also Finan- cial Times. 4. Offers Grants to Opponents of Iran’s Clerics. 2005. See. like that of Congressman Kurt Weldon and Kenneth Timmerman. p. July 8.S. 28. 2005. 2005. December 3. 2005.” Financial Times.” Financial Times. “Try Diplomacy.” Financial Times. and Guy Dinmore. appear more curious.” February 11. Economist. See Senator Joseph Biden (D- Del.” see Associated Press. “U. 4. May Aid Iran Activists. which notes that “it is the very nature of the regime—its refusal to recognise Israel. The phrase is attributed to Philip Stephens.). See reference in President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union address: “And I say to the Iranian people: ‘As you stand for your own liberty. Hawks Rooting for Hardline Can- didate. see Javier . editorial.” Los Angeles Times. Demonizing Iran is current practice. p. Policy on Korea. http://www.S. 6. vision of a Middle East remade.’” Financial Times. Weisman notes that “conservatives in Congress are demanding that [the United States] pro- mote dissident groups within Iran. it serves a purpose.” Inter- national Herald Tribune.” Financial Times. February 5. 12. that engagement equals endorsement. Steven Weisman. 1. “Two Key Senators Assail U.” Financial Times. 31.html. 7.” Among many references to the Bush administra- tion perception.S. 2005. and Guy Din- more. see Guy Dinmore. May 25. February 21. editorial.S. p. “Iran’s Nuclear Tactics Send Delegates into Interactive Dystopia. 2005. on the elec- tions. and “Iran Turns Right. 7. pp. see also Financial Times.’” On the State Department’s human rights report. “U. “Bush Lacks a Plan to Back Up His Middle East Pledges.” February 9. 14. Faces Prospect of Diplomacy Failing.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 184 184 | Notes 25. 2005. See Guy Dinmore and Roula Khalaf. thus hesitancy. 2005. p. 2005. http://www.S.” Financial Times. “On Iran and Korea Few Options: U. 26. p. 9–10. other cases. p. 4. p. 2004.php?file=/articles/ 2005/02/04/news/. 27.S. See also Guy Dinmore.S. p. “Iran’s Weapons Proliferation.” International Herald Tribune. 29.tehran. March 1. March 4. for Secretary Rice on Iran’s “loathsome record. 2005.” Financial Times. editorial. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings. Foreign Policy’s Fiery Vision. 4.latimes.iht. “Books Add to Rightwing Campaign to Demonise Iran.com/bin/print_ipub. In the case of an Israeli lobby such as AIPAC. See Guy Dinmore. See Brian Knowlton. “Rice Reaches Out to Europe. 12. 2005. 4. p. June 17.” Sonni Efron and Mark Mazzetti.” opening statement to U. Bush Goes to Belgium. 2005. “Rice Deflects Talk of Strike on Iran. p. America stands with you. “Mr. 2005.com/news/ nationworld/world/la-fg-usiran4mar0407066840. June 27. p. or to respect human rights—that makes it antithetical to the U. who made the same criticism regarding Iran policy.

“EU’s Solana Remains Pessimistic. pp. February 25. In a statement to the IAEA. Note that the distinction between “reporting” and “referral” of an issue to the Security Council is ambiguous and disputed. Ambassador Jackie Sanders put the U.” International Herald Tribune. vol. p. They cannot get engaged because it means legitimating them.S. pp. pp. only the full cessation and dismantling of Iran’s nuclear fissile material production can begin to give us any confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons.S. p. Can’t Stay on the Sidelines. vol. Vienna.” Financial Times. 4. Reporting is simply a transmittal of an IAEA report. “U. Says.it/file2005_03/alia/ a5030204. and Reuel Marc Gerecht.S. 2004) 35. July/August 2005. March 2.S.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 185 Notes | 185 Solana. or move to mandatory measures requiring states to follow a cer- tain course.” statement to the IAEA Board of Governors. For a discussion. “A Transat- lantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program.” International Her- ald Tribune. both terms have been used loosely and interchange- ably. In the case of Iran. condemn a policy. 37. 66–78. 36. 21–32. make a hortatory appeal (call upon). See Robin Wright. see also Geoffrey Kemp.” Washington Quarterly. The Iranian government has noted that it makes no distinction between the terms in its evaluation of its own response. who stated: “President Bush has said very clearly they don’t want to legiti- mate the regime. 4. in effect endorsing the EU-3 approach. see Robert Einhorn. Jim Dobbins. “President Faces Tough Task Talking Congress Round to New Iran Stance. 2005. His exact phrase was “Washington is no more than an excited bystander offering advice from a safe distance. “In Iran. U. “Who Is John McCain?” June 18.S. 6. see Richard Haass. He also notes that regime evolution through “opening up” (that is.htm. Haass. U. See also Guy Dinmore and Hubert Wetzel. sees delay and drift in policy and argues that regime change is a complement to diplo- macy and deterrence.” Jackie W. 32. 33. “Regime Change and Its Limits. 27. “Iran Deceives International Nuclear Inspectors. http://www. See Economist. while a referral is transmittal of a report with the expectation of action. 2004. 4.S. March 8. Sanders. engagement) is a more viable strategy.” Washington Post. 84. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. December 2. Next Steps (Washington. U. “Going Soft on Iran. 8.” See Judy Dempsey. no. DC: Nixon Center. 2005. 2005. 2005.S. and Iran: The Nuclear Dilemma. at least from mid-March 2006. 34. 44. 1. the Security Council has simply been given a report. U. “U. 2004. and EU Forge .” For- eign Affairs.” For background. For early advocacy of such an approach. 2005. no. (and allied) case clearly: “Given the history of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and its documented efforts to deceive the IAEA and the international community.usembassy. The assumption is that initially.” Weekly Standard. Autumn 2004. a former official. Feb- ruary 21. See also David Sanger and Steven Weisman. the U. Wants Guarantees on Iran Effort. p. The UNSC can take note or endorse a report.S. March 4.

see Philip Stephens.co. 2006. March 12-13. China. 12.” May 27. might well be tainted. “Return of the Axis of Evil. pp.” New York Times. August 2. “On Iran. p. p. http://www. can hit Iran and I don’t think the Europeans would accept this.” See Paula Wolfson. which opened a new phase in diplomacy. After the successful vote to report Iran to the Security Council.html. see “Les européens s’interrogent sur les intentions nucléaires du nouveau gouvernement iranien. February 28. For the latest definition of what is unacceptable.S. 2005. and . http://www.S. February 5. “Atomic Clock Ticks Down to Fallout with Iran. March 18. see Geoffrey Kemp.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 186 186 | Notes Joint Strategy on Iran Talks. http://fpc. 41.cfm?renderfor print. The Supplementary Act 12938 (I as amended) Presidential Directive blocks the assets of foreign governments and private companies and institutions having technical or financial cooperation with the Iranian AEO. 4. “U.” May 14.3858. Dafna Linzer. Officials Cool on Iran’s Hot Response. and oth- ers. 40. 2005. “A Grand Bargain with the Great Satan?” March 12. 44. 2005. India. Bush. 2003. 2005. This estimate. Nicholas Burns acknowledged the change in U. 2005. “Europe Cannot Retreat from the World. however. June 10. 53–6. March 14. and Financial Times. pp. “Iran Is Judged Ten Years from a Nuclear Bomb. 39.gov/fpc/60433. The phrase referring to Europeans and China is from Economist. A more recent formulation by the president is that “the development of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable and the process which would enable Iran to develop a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.com/english/2005-06-27-voa41. 2005. p.” International Herald Tribune. A01. 12. 2005. June 27.” This included reaching out to Russia.guardian. Bush Weighs a Joint Strategy with the Europeans. 9–10. 2005.uk/print/0.htm. See Nicholas Burns.” Le Monde. “Bush Calls for Tough Stand on Iran’s Nuclear Program. U. The phrase “legitimate security concerns” is repeated in Financial Times. 2005. “U. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.S. 38.” Guardian. statement at the White House. Brian Knowlton. Tisdall quotes a diplomat as saying: “The Americans are trying to create an environment so that the U.S. editorial. 2005. p. pp. Steven Weisman. 43. p. pp. Summer 2005. 1.” See President George W.” Voice of America News.S.” For less skepticism.” National Interest.” International Herald Tribune. See Simon Tisdall. 3. 6. editorial. 12–3. “Desperate Times.” New York Times.voanews.5150908- 103390. June 18.” January 28. Reviewing European Proposal for Iran. and Steven Weisman. “Wanted: Iran Policy. 2005. See also Economist. “A Useful Pause in the Iran Talks.00.” Financial Times. Half Measures. President Bush stated that “the international community must come together and make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of nuclear weapons. March 4. p. June 29.state. 2005. pol- icy: “We began supporting the European Union negotiating effort back on March 11th of 2005 and we patiently supported that set of negotiations all the way through until just this week. 42. 2005.” Washington Post. 13.

no. See Joel Brinkley. 50. see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein. remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.indiatimes.05918171.S. A13.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/30/ AR2006013001247. Perhaps the most reliable estimate put Iran. 2006.” Financial Times. DC: Institute for Science and International Security.washingtonpost.com/news/printedition/ asection/la-na-fornpoll27jan27. 2005. December 19. 15. Bush.” Financial Times. This “schizophrenic mission” is a perennial source of criticism. p. 46. 48. January 31. According to an LA Times/Bloomberg poll. August 3. In Europe in February 2005. “Most Americans Back Sanctions on Iran. 2005. “US Warns Iran against Pulling Out of NPT. For a succinct and persua- sive argument against the military option. “if unobstructed. March 7. see Dennis Ross.S. Claudia Dean. 45. August 8. “Rice Fails to Win Support for Iran Referral to Security Council. U. October 4. DC: Carnegie Endowment. “U. 4. No Military Options (Washington.latimes. Washington. 2005. to take options off the table. “commitment to the diplomatic approach. DC. “Intelligence Assessment and the Point of No Return: Iran’s Nuclear Program.whitehouse. 2005.” New York Times./news/releases/2005/12/print/2005/219-2html.” three to five years away. September 19.” Vice President Cheney repeated the formulation a year later. 2005.” Financial Times.” Washington Post. 47.143. p. “Nuclear Watchdog under Fire. Before this National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). See Vice President Richard Cheney. Guy Dinmore and Najmeh Bozorgh- mehr.com/articleshow/1411960. Having said that. see. October 17. “Estimate Revised on When Iran Could Make a Nuclear Bomb. For a view that sees the administration as overloaded and unable to take on much more. all options are on the table. “The Practical Realities of the Bush Foreign Policy in the Second Term. 2006. Another poll gave the figure as 42 per- cent. http:// timesofindia. estimates.” Tel Aviv Notes.” February 13.cms. some 57 percent of Americans favor a strike if Iran persists in its program. Invested Political Capital against Iran. Greg Miller. President Bush put it thus: “This notion that the United States is getting ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous.” added: “People shouldn’t want the President of the U. President George W.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 187 Notes | 187 Steven Weisman and Douglas Jehl.cfm?fa+print&id+17922. Jane Martinson. 4. 49. 2006. http://www. 2006). p. http://www. http://ww.” International Herald Tribune. respectively.gov. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.story?coll+la=news-a section. September 28. “57% Back a Hit on Iran if Defiance Persists.S. p.” Times of India. see Ephraim Asculai. see Joe Cirincione. January 27. .” For a dissent from the ten-year estimate.org/ publications/index. press conference. were “within five years. March 27. while emphasizing the U. 2006. 2006. for exam- ple. “The Clock Is Ticking” (Washington. 2005. such as that by Defense Intelligence Agency Direc- tor Lowell Jacoby in February 2005.carnegieendowment.” Los Angeles Times.S. http://www. See.

Regarding the “iceberg. Ephraim Asculai. “Insecurity Drives WMD Motivation. 70–1. Washington. p. November 8. 70 (Tel Aviv: JCSS.” Interview with Roula Khalaf.” Quoted in Economist. June 2004). March 23. 57. “L’Iran doit avoir l’assurance qu’on ne songe pas a l’attaquer ou provoquer un changement de regime. Al Baradei has said that “we can continue to act like a fire brigade but we need to look at the big picture.” p. Al Baradei had made considerable headway on this proposal in getting major actors’ support. December 2005. 7. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy. The U. see Asculai. The Director-General supports the European initiative that takes into account the broader issues in the nuclear. security.. p. February 2. Tehran. “U. pp. 3 (Washington. See Guy Dinmore. for whatever reason. For trenchant observations along these lines.” Mem- orandum no. most experts believe it could produce nuclear weapons within a matter of months. political. Al Baradei remarks on Iran website. p. June 21. “By Invitation.” Arms Control Today. 30. Author interview with senior IAEA official. “Enabler.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 188 188 | Notes 1995. 2003. Chen Zak. 37. p.S. “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director Gen- eral Mohamed El-Baradei. 2005.org/ files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/elbaradei. etc.” Financial Times. “Seven Steps to Raise World Security. and economic “baskets” discussed in various committees. July 23. 17–8.” Le Monde. p. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing World. Al Baradei observed: “Should a state with a fully developed fuel cycle capability decide. Economist. p. 52. 41. . London. 53.” Financial Times. By late 2005.” speech delivered at the Carnegie International Non- Proliferation Conference. government also took the position that the distinction is meaningless and the failure to declare should be put in the larger context of the covert program that it was intended to cover. 2002). and Chen Zak. 56. “Rethinking. 2003. http://www. 33. 67–8.” Military Research Papers no. 2003.ceip. pp. “Rethinking”. October 18. to break away from its non-proliferation commitments. 2005. pp. Mohammad Al Baradei. and Al Baradei. 13.doc. 3.” see Paul Kerr. 4.” pp. “Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times.” 55. MIT. Asculai. 16–7. 36. “Rethinking. 44. Asculai. and Russia Back Establish- ment of International Fuel Bank. October 6. 54. See also var- ious Al Baradei speeches at Carnegie. 43–4. all accessible on the IAEA web- site. 2003. 2004. 2005. p. March 2005.S. IISS. DC. Asculai sees this as part of the IAEA’s tendency to trespass into the political rather than confin- ing itself to the intended technical area. 2003.” October 18.” New Republic. 58.2003.” October 18. 37. 51. October 21. see Michael Levi. 5. “By Invitation. “Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. It is also accused of being an “unwitting enabler”. DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 44. Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini.

The same tactic has recurred after every dispute arising from Iran’s rather free interpretation of its commitments. resolution adopted February 4. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2004. March 2. Ear- lier reports were made in 2004 and 2005. Censure of Iran. http://www. “UN Agency Says It Got Few Answers from Iran on Nuclear Activity and Weapons. 2003. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. 2004.” March 3.S. 71. 2004. December 9. http://news. See. See Mousavian’s comment on Iran’s aims in “IAEA Resolution Amendment Possible—Iranian Spokesman. 2003.1507134. 106–114. November 29. See Gillian Tett. 2005. p. Report of the Director-General.” ILNA (Tehran). January 6.2144. “U. interview by Roula Khalaf.” GOV/2006/14.dw-world.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). “UN Concern over Iran’s N-Technology. pressure to get enhanced access but resisted immedi- ate referral because the agency wanted to get a better idea of the scope of the pro- gram. and GOV/2005/67 paras. Deutsche Welle.” ISNA (Tehran). 66.” Financial Times. “Al Barade’i: Ball Is in Iran Court. in BBC Monitoring.html. 2005. July 28. in BBC Monitoring. “UN Nuclear Chief Presses Iran and North Korea. IAEA Board of Governors. and Roula Khalaf. 2005. 2004.” Financial Times. Al Baradei. Mohammad Saidi. 2003. 62. March 1.” GOV/2006/15. 61. 69. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agree- ment in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” New York Times. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. 70. 2004. quoted in “IAEA Spokeswoman Welcomes Iran’s Deci- sion to Allow Inspection of Military Site. The quote is from the Deputy Head of the AEO.00. November 2.ft. Ali Akbar Salehi. Al Baradei. 2. This was Tehran’s line initially in 2003 when it feared UNSC referral and speedily concluded the first agreement with the EU-3. A11.de/dw/ article/0. Al Baradei used U. November 28.S. quoted in “Iran: Rowhani Outlines Views on IAEA Resolu- tion in News Conference. interview by the BBC. 68. June 16. 2006. 10.com/ cms/s/6c3ca1f2-4a2a-11d9-b065-00000e2511c8. November 28. p. in “Iran Says IAEA Report Had to Be Presented Prior to Board of Governors’ Meeting. 2004.” Inter- national Herald Tribune.html. 60. 64. January 7. paras. See Melissa Fleming.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 189 Notes | 189 59. “Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Enriching Uranium Takes ‘Positive View’ of NPT. . 42–52. interview by Paul Kerr. respectively.S. GOV/2004/83. June 15.. 2005. July 27. Europe Aligned on Iran Nuke Incentives. 2006.” Iran (Tehran). November 30. 2005. p. in BBC Monitoring. 2003. 4.” IRNA (Tehran). The technical assistance reportedly amounted to $1 billion a year. p. February 28. June 19. 67.” IRNA News Agency (Tehran). See Elaine Sciolino. 63. “Alleged Noncompliance: Nuclear Watchdog Fails to Back U. February 27. 65. in BBC Monitoring. Hasan Rowhani.

no. For example.” See “Non-Aligned Movement Views Iran’s Signing of NPT Additional Protocol as Positive. RFE/R Liberty.nytimes. 2005. 2005). Can Your Diplomacy Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program? Working Paper. 78. “Engaging Iran. Mohammad Al Baradei. December 12. February 14. 3. February 2.” paper presented at Conference on Transat- lantic Security and Nuclear Proliferation. 72. 77. see Shannon Kile of SIPRI. p.13–8. in BBC Monitoring. “Status of EU-Iran Nuclear Talks.. 2003). pp. 2003. 76. “Status of IAEA Safeguards Inspections in Iran. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. President Putin urged Iran to stop enrichment activities and meet IAEA demands. SIPRI Research Report no. “Countering Iranian Nukes. 6. 21. 2004.” IRNA (Tehran). Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge.” IRNA (Tehran).000 by June 2006). 75. in BBC Monitoring.” Non-Proliferation Review. February 15. “Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations with EU-3.” May 16. October 3. Gerard Quille. http://www. Spring 2004. http://www.rferl. 2006. November 2005 pp. Sean Smeland. Al Baradei said. 2005. February 3. its a security issue. For the EU’s WMD strategy. The source is Deputy Head of the SNSC for International Affairs Javad Va’idi.html?pagewanted= . See also Shannon Kile.org.com/cfr/international/slot3_051605. December 18.” IRNA (Tehran). 2003. September 25. Europe and Iran: Perspec- tives on Non-Proliferation (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- tute.” Working Paper (London: Center for European Reform. November 25. see “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)” (Brussels: EU.” Strategic Assessment. Emily Landau and Ephraim Asculai. “Prospects for a Common Transatlantic Strategy to Deal with New Trends in Nuclear Proliferation. 2005).” Al Baradei interview by Khalaf. 2003. 8. New York Times. 73. December 18. the NAM viewed Iran’s signature of the AP as “positive” and encouraged Iran “to facili- tate access to sites requested by the agency.S. http://europa. Similarly. Rome.700 man/days of inspections is quoted as of March 2006 (2. Quoted in “West Responsible for Adverse Atmosphere against Iran. George Perkovich. June 2005. quoted in “UN Watchdog Calls on U.” background paper for Moscow Conference. in BBC Monitoring.euint/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_04/decl_wmd. 74. 40–72. This is not just a technical issue. 2003. Mark Leonard. March 2004). Other sources include Steve Evert. and “Text of Draft Resolution Pro- posed by the Non-Aligned on Iran’s Nuclear Dossier.pdf. The figure of 1. November 24. London: Center for European Reform. 2005. ed. quoted in “Chairman of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Welcomes IAEA Resolution.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 190 190 | Notes See Hasan Rowhani. Proliferation Papers (Paris: IFRI. 2003. to Join Europe in Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Issue. For an excellent summary of these negotiations.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). 2006. November 2005). “I hope that in the discussions [between Iran and the EU-3] everyone puts their cards on the table. November 26. in BBC Monitoring. vol. November 26. 2004.” IRNA (Tehran).

2005. p. 2005. and Neil Buckley. no. 2005. as German Chancellor Schroeder has done. 2005.S. July 15. 7. 2004. 83. 80.” Sharq (Tehran).” Financial Times. .S. See the report of Secretary Rice’s visit to Paris where all these issues arose. However. guarantees on fuel deliveries for Iran and so on) need no further elaboration in the current discussion. But. “Europe Should Be Careful What It Wishes for in Iran. 2005. July 15.”IRNA (Tehran).. p. quoted in “Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Rumours of Resignation. In the discussions with the EU-3.. 2005. U. 7. 13. See Christopher Adams. whether and when suspension becomes “cessation.” International Herald Tribune. “For 26 years . March 9. See Francois Heisbourg. p. See Elaine Sci- olino. 79. 81. I owe the phrase to Robert Litwak.” whether “objective guarantees” are weaker or stronger than those in the AP. p. quoted in “EU Seeks Long-Term Relationship with Iran—IRNA. 13.S. 84. and EU Tensions Remain. See Louis Michel. March 1. July 14. 87. Rowhani likened the United States to a Mercedes-Benz and the EU-3 to the locally built and inexpensive Paykan car: “There are those who ask us why we did not choose the bicycle because Paykans are useless. Regarding the EU-3.” 85. Secretary Rice promoted Iran from “authoritarian” in 2004 to “totalitarian” in 2005 (due to faulty parliamentary elections) and responses of experts.” Financial Times.” Hasan Rowhani. 86. p. there are some who say a Mercedes- Benz would have been better. For example. Paul Kerr. in BBC Monitoring. an EU diplomat stated: “A green light from the U. February 9. the ruling mullahs have compromised economics at home and abroad to fortify a clerical dictatorship.” Financial Times. pp. would add a lot of leverage to our capacity to negotiate with the Iranians.” On the other side. and we agree with them. “A Common Iran Policy is Essential. 2. “U. 7–32. 34–5.” See Weisman. see his “Non-Proliferation and the Dilem- mas of Regime Change. and how to assure that these and other guarantees are reciprocal (that is.” Financial Times. Winter 2003–2004. March 8. Roula Khalaf.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 191 Notes | 191 print. 4. 2005. there is the carrot of a possible long- term relationship with Europe. 45. and we say to them that a Paykan is still superior to a bicycle. “Beneath the Bonhomie in Munich. we tell them that we could not afford to buy a Mercedes.” Survival. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. “EU-3 to Offer Iran Help with Nuclear Power if It Agrees Not to Make Fuel. February 2. “Europeans: Iranians Honouring Agreement.” See Marc Ruehl Gerecht. 82. Reviewing European Proposal for Iran. “‘Madame Hawk’ Ruffles Some Paris Feathers. EU Commissioner for Develop- ment. “The fear is that there will be a windup but no pitch. February 14. Debates about whether unlimited suspension or indefinite suspension mean “permanent” or not. at the same time.” Arms Control Today. March 2005. vol. one congressional source commented. See Peter Spiegel and Daniel Dombey. pp.

May 13. .” Financial Times. p. 2005. “Iran Threatens to Quit Nuclear Talks if Its Agenda Not Accepted. 2005.” Quoted in “EU Rejects Iran’s Call to Accelerate Nuclear Talks. “EU Trios Relief over Tehran Nuclear Offer May Prove Short Lived. It offered Iran a method of stepping back from insistence on having the fuel cycle on Iranian soil. 2005.” April 21. p. p. Gareth Smyth. January 2. “Battle to Keep Iran Nuclear Talks Alive. 2005. 2005. http://www.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060110-4. 2005. March 26.html. 2005. responding to Iranian criticism of EU-3 lethargy. Daniel Dombey. and Najmeh Bozorgmehr. 6. Iran feigned interest in this proposal to buy time. January 10. 97.” Al- Jazeera.” Finan- cial Times. 95. May 20..uk/servlet/Front?page- name=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KAr- ticle&aid=1136903810989.asp?service_ID=6912. A21. they have accomplished a great deal.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 192 192 | Notes 88. 93. http://www. 2006.fco. 3. “Europeans Open Talks with Iran on Nuclear Program. December 17/18. April 21.” Financial Times. 96. May 2.. This is assuming that there is no parallel covert nuclear program in opera- tion. “IAEA Criticizes Iran Cooperation. “EU Warns Iran over Denial of Holocaust.” Tony Cordesman. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. January 12. p.gov. 90.” Financial Times. Scott McClellan. “Pakistan Offers Nuclear Clues on Iran.” Washington Post. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian. quoted in Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth. 8.” International Herald Tribune. 94. 3.” April 2005. 8. White House press briefing. pp. 34–5. 2005. 4.The issue is not pace but substance.” Le Monde. p. March 26/27. Roula Khalaf. p.” Financial Times.” Financial Times. http://www. 3. One expert has observed that “if the Europeans’ negotiations do nothing more than keep Iran from being overt in deployment and testing. 6. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 92. 2005. quoted in Stefan Nicols. 2005. “EU-3 Warn of ‘Managed Crisis’ over Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. 2006).aljazeera. December 19. The Russian proposal sought to take enrichment from Iran to Russia. 2005. An EU spokeswoman.. “Expert: Iran Nukes Replace Old Military. “E3-EU Statement on Iran” (London: FCO. “Les Européens font une concession sur le dossier Nucléaire Iranien. 91. p. International Herald Tribune. and Laurent Zecchini. p. An unnamed EU diplomat.” United Press International. and Dan Bilefsky. Febru- ary 3. Farhan Bokhari and Roula Khalaf. stated the EU’s goal: “The main challenge is to find what we call the objective guar- antees that the Iranian program is of a peaceful nature. “EU Gives Ahmadi-Nejad Toughest Warning Yet over Anti- Israel Remarks. Gareth Smyth and Daniel Dombey. p. 2005. and Arms Control Today.com/me. see also Dafna Linzer.whitehouse. which would then supply the product to Iran. 3. p. May 25. 89.

44. See also “Iran Must Prove It Has No Nuclear Weapons—Putin. 2005. 2. March 13. 51–70. Spring 2005. June 9. 3.” Washington Quarterly. “Russia Hails Coordination with Europe over Iran as ‘Important. Putin noted: “Our level of understanding (with the EU) on the Iranian problem is rather high . See “Nuclear Executive Describes Training for Iranians in Russia. “Russia Backs Initiative from Europe on Iran. “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb. 2002). 101. and Katrin Benhold. we follow one indisputable principle—the non-prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons. p. 103.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). vol. 2004. “Russia and Iran Affirm Ties. no.” Survival. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House. March 18. The Rosatom website (www. For background of Russia’s cooperation with Iran. no.” IRNA (Tehran).” International Herald Tribune.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). September 28. See Vladimir Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov. Russian President Putin. Sep- tember 24. Putin has said that Rus- sia is “categorically opposed to enlarging the club of nuclear states.” Interna- tional Herald Tribune. 2004. February 28. 5. “Looking More Closely at the Mes- sage of Sochi. 2. January 22–23. 49–66.” ITAR-TASS. 2004. 2004.kremlin. 2004. 2005.minatom. 2005. 100. 28. December 21. 2004. The figure of 700 Ira- nian experts trained at Novovoronezh is confirmed by Russian news agency ITAR- TASS. pp. Quoted in “Putin Says Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 193 Notes | 193 98. in BBC Monitoring. making for a total of 707 for Bushire. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. December 20. 99. 2005.’” RIA News Agency (Moscow).ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/04/201149_ type82916_87008_shtml.” May 18. and two more groups are to be trained at Novovoronezh in 2005. 2. September 26. EU Share Stance on Iran Nuclear Issue. March 2. http://www.ru) says that 620 specialists were trained as of December 23. September 25. .” See President Vladimir Putin. p. 2004.” Quoted in Richard Bernstein. in BBC Monitoring. quoted in International Herald Tribune. in BBC Monitoring.. in BBC Monitoring. Quoted in Michael Wines.. June 10.” Quoted in “Putin Says Russia. 2004. p. “The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue. Sum- mer 2002. 105. 2005. vol. Estimates on the number of technicians trained in Russia vary but one esti- mate suggests there were some 300 technicians trained over a period of five years (between 1999 and 2004). 2005.” International Herald Tribune. 104. 2004. see also Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. April 20. 102. See Strobe Talbott. interview by Israeli Television Channel One. in BBC Monitoring. see Robert Einhorn and Gary Samore. March 20. including the addition of Iran.” ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow). Putin has said that “a country like Iran and the Iranian people must not be humiliated. pp. 2001. 2005. See “Iranian Engineers Complete Training at Russian Nuclear Power Centre. September 3. “Russia to Resume Arms Sales to Iran.

“A Colder Coming We Have of It. 2006. See also “Russia Advises Iran against Creating Its Own Nuclear Fuel Cycle. http://latimes.” IRNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring.shtml.1apr291. See Paul Kerr. 2003. 2005. February 28. “Iran. “On Visit Putin Criticizes Iran’s Nuclear Program. 2005. 2006.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fq-briefs29. Reuters. 2005 107. 2004. Some analysts consider Russia part of the problem rather than solution. February 27. 29.” Interfax–AVN military news agency (Moscow). December 24. Russia’s caution led to slowing the move to sanctions. May 18. 110. they would stop cooperating with us. in BBC Monitoring. “Iran Unhappy with Russia’s Pro- posed Time-Scale for Nuclear Plant. 2005. Decem- ber 2. December 21. February 28. 2005. September 29. Los Angeles Times. The Russian arms deal comprised 30 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems valued at between $700 million and $1. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. but Warns on Errors.” January 21. saying that if we reached a stand- still.4 billion. http://www. March 1. David Sanger. “Russia Delays Nuke Fuel Shipments to Iran—Source. See “Russia to Supply Surface-to- Air Missile Systems to Iran. Russia Reach Nuclear Agreement. quoted on ISNA website (Tehran). p. pp. See Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). p.” New York Times. 35–6. in BBC Monitoring. The agreement was finally concluded on February 27. GA.” International Herald Tribune. and “Russia to Fulfil Its Contract to Supply Air Defence Systems to Iran. May 12. For Russian efforts to slow down the momentum for sanctions.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 194 194 | Notes 106. 2005. 2005. see Putin’s comments warning against “abrupt erro- neous steps. in BBC Monitoring. p.” Arms Control Today. December 3. April 11. Sea Island. February 10. 2005. “Russian Atomic Energy Chief Details Plans for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran. 2005. “Russia Won’t Abandon Reactor Pact with Iran. 2005. 2006.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/06/11/1401_72690. January 17. 8.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). February 28. Steve Weisman reports that “the West’s incremental approach is . Putin committed Russia to halt nuclear cooperation if Iran refused to be transparent and cooperate with the IAEA. “Putin ‘Close’ to Iran Critics. 1/8. 2005. 2005. pp.kremlin. Brian Knowlton. 2004.” Vremya Novostey (Moscow). in BBC Monitoring. “Russia Will Give Iran Fuel for Reactor. 111. in BBC Monitoring. pp. 25355554.” April 29. January 18.” Hossein Mousavian. 109. 3. February 9.prnt. 1–8. This is echoed by his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in “Russian Minister Counsels Extreme Caution in Handling Iranian Dispute. January 17.” RIA Novosti (Moscow). Transcript of press conference following the G-8 Summit. 2006. An Ira- nian negotiator subsequently said: “Our talks with the Europeans were reaching a standstill and the Russians sent a message to us.” International Herald Tri- bune.” International Herald Tribune. February 2.” Elaine Sciolino and Alan Cowell. April 2005. 108. See Economist. Others see a Russian interest in “controlled tensions” that increase Russia’s leverage. At the Sea Island G-8 summit. 2006.” Interna- tional Herald Tribune. 2004. 2006. “Russia’s Sweetheart Deal for Iran. June 11.

” Keyhan (Tehran). Rosatom chief Sergey Kiriyenko. “Russian Defence Minister Hopes Iran Problem Will Not Turn into Armed Conflict. 2006.” Le Monde. See “Russia to Supply Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to Iran. Some arms and technology issues are crucial in the current crisis over the nuclear program.” New York Times. December 2. See Associated Press.” Quoted in “Iran’s Security Chief Says Iraq Is Natural Ally. 2006. 2005. 14. The violation was underlined by Russian representative Grigoriy Berden- nikov at the IAEA.” Interfax-AVN military news agency (Moscow). January 25. while Muqtada offered “Islamic support” for Iran if it were attacked.” See his article “West Tells Russia It Won’t Press to Penalize Iran Now. January 9.nytimes. 2006. February 2. where the Shiite are in the ascendancy. 5. 2006. The phrase is attributed to Hossein Agha. see his interview in. Chapter Six 1. 2006. p.” RTR Russia TV (Moscow). in BBC Monitoring. Ali Larijani has recently called Iraq.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). with only one reactor operating in the near future. Alexandr . See “Russian Representative Says Iran Violated Agreement with IAEA. p. quoted in “Russian Official Clarifies Pro- posals to Resolve Iran Nuclear Problem. January 26. in BBC Monitoring. January 22. January 15-16. January 25.com/2006/01/19/politics/19diplo. 2. 2006. in BBC Monitoring. should find it uneconom- ical to seek the full fuel cycle at this stage. 5. “a natural ally. 2006. January 19. in BBC Monitoring. notably 30 Tor-M1 air defense missiles. 114. See “Iraq’s Moqtada Sadr Offers ‘Islamic’ Iran Support in Case of Attack. January 10.html?page- wanted print.” International Herald Tribune. January 23. in BBC Monitoring. 2006. “Ariel Sharon aura. Ali Larijani met Muqtada Al Sadr and pledged Iran’s support for him. http://www.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 195 Notes | 195 a response to Russian and Chinese reluctance to press for immediate sanctions. February 3. January 23. 112. 4.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). 2006. 3. 113. Russia has argued on practical grounds that Iran. December 3. “Russia Offers Terms to Iran. 2006. Foreign Minister Lavrov insisted on an indefinite freeze on enrichment as a precondition for talks (not enforced) as indicative of Moscow’s desire to show its toughness. 2006. Russia has sought to balance strategic and commercial relations with Iran with its commitment to non-proliferation.” IRNA (Tehran). 2006. Significantly. peu fait. in BBC Monitoring. 2006. peu promis. 2005. February 16. mais énormément réalisé.

2005. Domestic Politics and National Security.com/Description.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 196 196 | Notes Kolesnichenko. 2005. See comments by Shamkhani on “deterrence. 2002). 2005. 12. November 3.jtml?itemNo60=610492. See. Reza Djalili uses the phrase in his excellent article. August 9. August 29. quoted in “Iran Undisputable Regional Power—Defence Minister. December 20. “Defence Minister Says Iran Has Nuclear ‘Counter- Attack’ Capability. p. October 30. October 15-16. 11. “Leader’s Advisor Says Enrichment ‘Imperative’ for Iran’s Progress. 15. Rami Khouri. 2004.” ISNA (Tehran). Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advisor Ali Akbar Velayati and many others have echoed this theme. 2005. August 17. The phrase is from Ali Shamkhani. 2004. in BBC Monitoring. 2004. August 29. Shahram Chubin. See. August 14.” Keyhan (Tehran). 2005.” Adelphi Paper no. July 31. Hasan Rowhani. in BBC Monitor- ing.asp?12/2/ 2004&Cat=2&Num=7.158. August 13. for example.” Daily Star (Beirut). in BBC Moni- toring. quoted in “Commander-in-Chief Criticizes US. 8. “Iran: War Is Postponed. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. in BBC Monitoring.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArti- cleEn. “Whither Iran? Reform. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. See also “Iran Seeks Regional Non-Aggression Pact: Defence Minister. 2004. 2004. See “Iran’s Chief Negotiator Presents Khatami with Report on Nuclear Activities. 2004. http://www. General Yahya Safavi. 2005.” Financial Times. 6. February 3. December 2. 2005. See also “Iran Press: Bush Using Military Bases for ‘Long-Term Control’ of Iraq. 5. “Interview with Hossein Mousavian.” Resalat (Tehran). http://www. August 3. “Others Will Have to Accept Iran as a Regional Power—Defence Minister. June 11. See Roula Khalaf. .asp? art_ID=17482&cat_ID=5. December 23. Details Naval Preparedness. in BBC Monitoring. 9. 7. “Arab Countries Look to Play a Role Countering Iranian Influence in Iraq.comlb/printable. Region. 2005. p.” quoted in Yossi Melman.” ISNA (Tehran). Decem- ber 21. p. for example. “Russia Joins International Community. This statement was made by a moderate leader. in a report before his resignation as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. 2005. August 14. ‘Le Paradoxe Iranien.dailystar. in BBC Monitoring. December 18.” Financial Times.” Enjeux Diplomatiques et Strategiques.haaretz. 2004.” Argumenty i Fakty (Moscow). 2005. June 8. 2005.” IRNA (Tehran). “Monitor Iran’s Centrifuges and Its Honor. the Arab states have stirred themselves to offset Iran’s influence in Iraq.” Tehran Times.” Ha’aretz. See the comments of the Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). 13. 14.” Fars News Agency (Tehran). 2005. in BBC Monitoring. 10. http://www. Calls on Iran to Cease Enriching Uranium. Belatedly.tehrantimes. August 10.” Keyhan (Tehran). 2005. 2005. 6.

23. Terrorism in Iraq. “Le President Ahmadinejad defend devant l’ONU le droit au nucleaire et attaque les ‘puissants. 2005. 19. http://www. Iran will use its potential in the region.” IRNA (Tehran). 20. in BBC Monitoring. November 16. February 1. 2005. 3. 2005. June 15. 2005. June 13. June 28.” Sharq (Tehran). 2005. p.” Quoted in “Iranian Min- ister Says Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s Role ‘Very Valuable’ in Iraq. Another concern was indicated by a newspaper. November 28.” Quoted in “Saudi King on Efforts to End Syrian Crisis.S. Larijani repeated the threat when the reality of sanctions came closer.” Mehr News Agency (Tehran). 2005. For an excellent discussion. “Iran Rejects UN Nuclear Concerns as ‘Absurd.’” Inter- national Herald Tribune. (Clearly. in BBC Monitoring.” Saudi Gazette (Jeddah). For Saudi security perceptions in this context. 2005. July 23. June 3.’” Le Monde. Quoted in “Iran Press: Editorial Praises Declaration by Minister Visiting Iraq. 5.” IRNA (Tehran). 2005. 2005. Searching for Security Is a Priority. 2005. 2005. Pakistani participation would dilute Iran’s influence.asp?art_ID=15853&cat_ID=5. p. in BBC Moni- toring.” but Iran was Iraq’s permanent neighbor. 2005. 2005. Kharrazi observed that the U. “Iran Election Program: Larijani Says US ‘Propaganda. 2005. 5. 2005. President Ahmadinejad expressed this rationale in New York in 2005. The Saudi King Abdullah noted that the war in Iraq had “served Iran’s inter- ests.” ILNA (Tehran). May 21. “Iran. Iraq Assert Security Depends on Regional States. in BBC Monitoring.” Financial Times. p. November 17. presence would end “sooner or later. in BBC Monitoring. 6. 17. in BBC Monitoring. September 20. “Russia and China Put Pressure on Iran. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. See Corinne Lesnes. May 20. “For Saudi Arabia and Iran. See Abdulaziz Sager. August 26. 22. November 27. 18. See Thomas Fuller. “Iran Negotiator Says President to Propose New Nuclear Solution. see Flynt Leverett. May 25.” IRNA (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. 2005. p. 2005. “Prince Turki Comes to Washington. 2006. see Geof- .*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 197 Notes | 197 16. 2005. July 27. “Iran’s Rowhani Wraps Up Five Nation Tour. in BBC Monitoring. saying that “if these countries use all their means to put Iran under pressure. See Muwaffaq al-Rubay’i. May 22.dailystar.” Daily Star (Beirut). August 27. 2005.comlb/ printable. On Iran’s new for- eign policy see “Larijani Who Could Become Iran’s Next Foreign Minister Explains His Principles. June 26. June 16.” Al- Hayat (London).’ Policy Different. It is a very different argument from the usual one that the Palestinians have been dispos- sessed by the Israeli interlopers and that it is the duty of every Muslim to support the Palestinians and not recognize Israel. Kharrazi called Sistani’s role in Iraq “very valuable. 2005. August 12.” International Herald Tribune.” IRNA (Tehran). June 7. 2005. July 22. see “Saudi Paper says Ahmadinejad’s ‘Religious Fer- vour’ Might Influence Iraq.” Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth.) 21. 24.

“US Warns N. 2005. in BBC Monitoring.” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” R. Quoted in “Iranians Shall Benefit from All Gains of Nuclear Science Soon: Rafsanjani. 2005. September 12. 3. “Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?” ICG report no. See Brian Knowlton.” Quoted in “Iran’s Rafsanjani Criticizes US on UN Iraq Role. September 2005.. and Abbas William Sami’i. and help in the restoration of peace and calm in the region. 2003. “The Nearest and Dearest Enemy: Iran after the Iraq War. Soft Power and the Nuclear Fac- tor.” New York Review of Books..” IRI News Network (Tehran).” Voice of the IRI (Tehran). 26. p. 29.. DC: U. See Gareth Smyth. Revolutionary Guards Commander General Yahya Rahim Safavi referred to the “swamp” in which the United States finds itself in Iraq. 2005. 52–7. 2005.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 198 198 | Notes frey Kemp. They are suffocating. 7. 2005.” See “Iran’s Rafsanjani Says Continuation of Iran- . 2005. pp. February 11.” Siyasat–e Ruz (Tehran).” International Herald Tribune. 6–9. Rafsanjani’s admonition to the United States to recognize Iran’s right to nuclear technology. September 13. p. While running for president. now the Americans have become bogged down in Iraq.. Institute of Peace. 2005.” Voice of IRI Network (Tehran). “Iran and Iraq: The Shi’a Connection. May 20. 7. 2005). July 21.. “Iraq: Bush’s Islamic Republic. “Iran Agrees to Extend Iraq $1bn Credit. Novem- ber 2005). no. p. pp. August 11. May 29. Nicholas Burns. 2005. International Crisis Group (ICG). see Seymour Hersh. See. in BBC Monitoring.” MERIA. The United States sees “continuing troubling indications of Iranian interfer- ence in Iraqi internal affairs. May 16. claiming that the United States seeks to “stay in Iraq and . 27. 25. 2005. if the Americans do not abuse public rights and entrust regional affairs to the people themselves. May 14. Peter Gal- braith.” Al Furat (Baghdad and Paris). More broadly. 28. May 21. December 16. in BBC Monitoring.” New Yorker. December 17. 4. and to adopt a policy of compromise. “Iraqi Papers Attack Iranian ‘Mullahs’ for Meddling in Iraq’s Affairs.” USIP Special Report no. 38 (London: ICG. National Security Advisor Steve Hadley also expressed concern about Iran’s attempts to increase its influence in Iraq.” Financial Times.. See also. “Get Out the Vote.” Quoted in “Iran Press: Guards Commander Says USA Will Not Create Problems for Iran. February 12. create disagreements between the Shi’ites and Sunnis. Under Secretary of State for Polit- ical Affairs.. Hashemi Rafsanjani. 2005. 2005. March 21. notably. May 19. in BBC Monitoring. to accept that the revolution is permanent. quoted in “Senior Cleric Says Iraqi Elections a Victory. July 25. Hashemi Rafsanjani stated: “You see. vol. 2003.S. 156 (Washington. “US Policy Toward Iran. 2005. 9. 2005. he noted that Iran was in a position to influence regional issues like Iraq and Afghanistan “very well”: “We can prevent extremism in the region . Korea on Atomic Test. in BBC Moni- toring.

p. Terrorism and Democracy. 119. in BBC Monitoring. 2005.php?menu_2005=&menu_kon feren. August 20. 7.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 199 Notes | 199 EU3 Dialogue ‘Best Option.securityconference.S. “Bush May Weigh the Use of Incentives to Dissuade Iran. intentions regarding future bases in Iraq remain cloudy. see Robert Litwak. 2005. “End This Evasion on Permanent Army Bases in Iraq. 2. January 18. Of a volu- minous literature. vol.” Financial Times.13. 36. confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” speech delivered at Munich Security Conference. (D-Del. December 2004.” See Elis- abeth Bumiller.” Condoleezza Rice. President Bush called reports of a military attack on Iran “simply ridiculous.” Survival. U. “Curbing the Iranian Military Threat: The Military Option. Senator Joseph Biden Jr. no. Regime Change: Through the Prism of 9/11 (Baltimore. 30. Summer 2005. January 4. overstretch. and Mouna Naim. Iran has moved to put some of its facilities underground. 83.” International Herald Tribune. See also Senator John McCain (R-AZ). 2006. p. January 2–31. 2005. 33. “The ‘War on Terror’ in Historical Perspec- tive. http://www. 2. The U.’” IRNA (Tehran). vol. For indications that the United States is considering the military option. See “Iran Is Said to Build Atom Stor- age Tunnels. Richard Betts. 2005. no. Secretary of State Rice stated that “in the Middle East. forthcoming 2006). 35. May 12. policy since September 2001. 2005. “Security in the Middle East: New Challenges for NATO and the EU. pp. 32.). no.de/konferenzen/rede. p. 3. 31. 2005. The arguments in favor of forward defense and regime change led. March 4. .S.” New York Times. While in Europe. “Les Accusations d’inger- ence en Irak s’aggravent contre l’Iran.” National Interest. February 24.” adding “having said that all options are on the table. p. The stakes could not be higher.S. See Adam Roberts. 2005. Spring 2006. For a thorough and excellent discussion of U. see especially Ephraim Kam. 47. “Roadside Bombs in Iraq Still Taking Heavy Toll on US Forces.S.” opening statement to the U.S. “The Coming Wars. May 11. See Gary Hart.” New Yorker. 2005. “The Osirak Fallacy. 2005. suggestion in November that Ambassador Khalilzad was ready to engage Iran on Iraq was met by a rejection from Iran. August 19. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger [it] will produce extremists and movements that threaten the safety of Amer- icans and their friends. p. May 19. 3. easily enough. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- tions. see Seymour Hersh. p.” Strategic Assessment. 3. 2005. February 12. For U. “Iran: Weapons Proliferation.22–5. Munich. 3.” Financial Times. President Bush has bro- ken with six decades of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing stability at the price of liberty. Peter Spiegel. 34. to the proposition that the lack of democracy was the principal cause of ter- rorism and extremism and that forcible intervention could bring about a stable democratic system.” Le Monde.

March 9.com/archives/2005/03/09/news/12303.” New York Times. “More Reasons to Invade Iran than Iraq. http://www.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 200 200 | Notes see Thom Shanker. Senate. For original Secretary of State Rice quote. 38. Jon B. March 29.” 41.irannukes22jun22. p. http://www.reuters. The press has been more blatant: “Colum- nist Says Nuclear Fuel Cycle Needed for Strategic Superiority. quoted in Ray Takeyh. December 18.” IRI News Network (Tehran). Burns. 40. “Blix Criticizes Bush Non-Proliferation Policies.” Keyhan (Tehran).0. June 22. “Data Lacking on Iran’s Arms.com/news/article. 2005. 2005.” 42. On complication. Burns.shtml?type= printable. The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses (Washington.html.” New York Times.baltimoresun. “Panel Report Assails CIA for Failure on Iraq Weapons. 30.com/newsArticle. For a report critical of U. 2004.” Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. p. 2005. 2005. 37. “I believe that the power of our regional influence stretches from Quds [Jerusalem] to Kandahar. p. 2003.” March 9. Robb. Lugar (R-IN). March 31. 169. December 21. August 4. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington.nytimes. Silberman and Senator Charles S. http://www.dailyprincetonian. May 3. July 29. and Joseph Nye. 2005. . August 7. 2005. Wolfsthal. “Deterring Iran. see Judge Laurence H.S. and nobody can deny our power. 15.rferl. http://www. quoted in “Iran Says Self-Sufficient in Producing Solid Fuel. intelligence.” Financial Times.” ISNA (Tehran). see Ali Shamkhani. For example. “Pentagon Says Iraq Effort Limits Ability to Fight Other Con- flicts. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. and Jessica T. in BBC Monitoring.org/featuresarticle/ 2005/02/A5423980-B287-4DB9-811E-9D84DDE5D06B. Matthews.” Quoted in “Defence Minister Says Iran Has Nuclear ‘Counter-Attack’ Capability. DC: U. “US Policy toward Iran. Shamkhani is also quoted as saying. see Ali Shamkhani. DC: Carnegie Endowment.story. 2005. For press reports on parts related to Iran. On deterrent. 2005. See also Senator Richard G. 39. “US/Iran: For- mer Weapons Inspector Says US Must Avoid Mistakes of Iraq. Joseph Cirincione.jtml?type=topNews&storyID=5372497. Andrew Tully.mytellus. see especially Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt. 2005. US Panel Says. George Perkovich.html?th=&emc=th&pagewante. Rose Gottemoeller. see Associated Press (Paris). http://asia. DC: White House. in BBC Monitoring.do?viewType=print&articleID=1890267. and David Sanger and Scott Shane. 2005).S.7381263. March 2005). “US Policy toward Iran. February 8.” Reuters. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. Richard Clarke. which reported that Iran and North Korea were listed by experts as the second most important priority in pro- liferation after loose nukes in the former Soviet Union. See Daily Princetonian. June 2005).” New York Times. July 28.com/2005/05/03/poli- tics/03military. “Heed Iraq Lessons to Avoid Disaster in Iran. 2004.” Baltimore Sun. http://www.com/bal- op. March 31.

” International Herald Tribune. January/February 2000. 2005. Burns.” Foreign Affairs. Among other sources for background discussion about the regional reper- cussions of an Iranian nuclear capability.comnews?tmpl=story&cid=1521&u=/afp/ 20050302/pl_afp/usiranabi. Bush. 50.yahoo. Burns. vol. DC: Carnegie Endowment. 2002). 44. p. 7.shtml. 2005. January 27.” 46. 201. 52. 2004. Waltz. “Rice Uses Europe Trip to Get Tough with Iran. 8.cbsnews. March 24. President Bush’s speech. . Washington. President Bill Clinton observed that if Iran developed nuclear weapons. This is the theme of several of Bracken’s works.com. includ- ing its brinksmanship. See Paul Bracken. “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival. p. See Bennett Remberg. p. See Christopher Adams and Hugh Williamson. Sagan and Kenneth N.” Eric Lipton.” MSNBC. February 11. quoted in Scott D. 146–56.W. February 2005). see George Perkovich. January 30. 2005. 1.” International Herald Tribune.” CBSNews. 2005. June 24. Bolton.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 201 Notes | 201 43. “The Sec- ond Nuclear Age.” March 2. The United States apparently is not interested in assessing whether a major Iranian investment could give it an incen- tive to maintain regional security. see Richard Russell. to plot against the US homeland. 2005. 49. Naomi Koppel. p. 51. Policy Brief no. “A Way to Break the Nuclear Impasse. See Associated Press. A Homeland Security report argued. 2005. “US Policy toward Iran”. 1.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 4. quoted in “US Commander Warns Iran Nukes May Invite Attack by Other Regional Power. 2.” Financial Times. speech delivered at the National Defense Univer- sity (NDU). it would find it tough to use them./id/6887724/print/1/display- mode/1098. February 5-6. 2. 2004. Kathleen McInnis. 69–79. pp. and General John Abizaid. pp. “US Official Rips into Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. “US Policy toward Iran. “How America’s Interests Collide in Asia. Head of US Central Command. no. no. http://www. 43. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. 47.msnbc. p. 53. pp. For a suggestion of a possible strategy. 45. http://news. See also Philip Bowring. 2005. 34 (Washington. for domestic benefits is a model. 144–53. “Only Iran appears to have the possible motivation to use terrorist groups. 2005. Iran Is Not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbors. testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. 48. in addition to its state agents. John R. “A Rosier View of Terrorist-List Nations. 79.com. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W. Summer 2001.” International Herald Tribune. Amelia Gentleman. One could argue that the Iranian leadership’s use of the nuclear issue. “Rice Tells India about US Worries on Iran Deal. April 1. Norton. vol. DC. President George W. http://www. March 22.com/sto- ries/2004/01/23/world/printable595350. March 17. “Clinton Urges Diplomacy for Iran.

June 12. December 19. 51–88.” Policy Analysis (Dubai: Gulf Research Center.” Washington Quarterly. DC: Strategic Studies Institute. vol. Washington. Ellen Laip- son. 55.” leading it to argue for regional cooperation and arms control.” pp. 2005. 169–86.” pp. and Reiss. Lippman. 2005. Iran and Nuclear Risks. Carnegie Endowment. “The Global Consequences of Iran’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons. together with Thomas W. 2005. as well as Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson. “Probable Attitudes of the GCC States toward the Scenario of a Military Action against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. DC: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.” Gulf Research Center Report on GCC Attitudes toward Iran’s Nuclear Program. “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course. 56. 2003.” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Recon- sider Their Nuclear Choices. 3. Einhorn. Mustafa Alani. 111-44.” pp. Army War College. in BBC Monitoring.. see Anwar al-Khatib. and Reiss.” Policywatch.1065 (Washington. in BBC Monitoring. November 30. November 28. in BBC Monitoring. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. “Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained without Nukes?” pp. pp. In addition. 54. 2005. “Gulf States Declare Iran’s Nuclear Program ‘Worrisome. December 21. eds.” all in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. “Turkey: Nuclear Choices amongst Dangerous Neighbors. 89–112. Wyn Q. December 21. November 2004). Summer 2005. For a GCC official’s critique of Iran’s nuclear program. “Turkey. Al Quds al-Arabi web- site (London). Policy Analysis (Dubai: Gulf Research Center. 2005). DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. see George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero. The same newspaper noted that “Iran is not a peaceful country” and it “con- tinues to occupy Arab land. “Editor Says Neighbours Fearful of Iran’s Drive to Acquire Nuclear Weapon. Leon Fuerth. “Probable Attitudes of the GCC States toward the Scenario of a Military Action against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities.” Al Sharq Al Awsat (London). both chapters in Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. April 2004. 2005. “Taking a Stand on a Nuclear Iran: Voices from the Persian . and Robert Einhorn. 83-110.” Al Sharq Al Awsat (London). Bowen and Joanna Kidd. “The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Washington.” draft. ed.” Al-Rayah. Campbell. pp. 2005). Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington. “Al Attiyah: Iran’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons Causing Apprehensions in the GCC States. “Editorial Says Gulf Summit Signifies Tougher Stand against Iran” [text of edi- torial headlined “Important Gulf Summit by Any Yardstick]. Decem- ber 18. in BBC Monitoring. See “Gulf Fears Being Scorched by Iran’s Nuclear Activities. ed. November 2004). 2005. Emily Landau.’” Al-Jazeera satellite TV. 2005. ed. December 20. 28. Mustafa Alani. no. 48–82.S. 2004). October 10. See also Ian Lesser. Campbell. no. 2003. See also Simon Henderson.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 202 202 | Notes “Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East. June 15. DC. “Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty. Einhorn. “The Elephant in the Gulf: Arab States and Iran’s Nuclear Program. October 8.

2001. in a London inter- view. 2006.” Inter- national Herald Tribune. 2005. August 3. January 16. “Saudi FM says West Partly to Blame for Nuclear Stand-off with Iran. See.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 203 Notes | 203 Gulf. 2005. October 26.” SPA (Riyadh). in BBC Monitoring. 61. in “Ira- nian Leader Says International Relations Should Not Be Selective.” BBC. 6. January 17. they are going to kill Palestinians. November 1. Where is the gain in that?” See Frank Gardner. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal asked of Iran: “Where are they going to use these weapons? If they hit Israel. “Whither Iran?” 60. asp?ID=18994. in BBC Monitoring. Iranian First Vice President Parviz Davudi noted that “Russia and China are ‘priority’ countries for Iran’s policy. October 28. 2005. http://news. 59.frontpagemag. 2.” Voice of IRI Net- work (Tehran). 2005. “India’s International Oil Ties Risk US Displeasure.” ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow).” Policy Review. “Defusing the Mullah’s Bomb. Novem- ber 8. 57. November 9. 2006. for example. Conclusion 1.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4615832. For full references. December 25. p. 2005. January 16. 3. . See Pramit Mitra. and text of report by Iranian news agency. “Saudi FM Opposes Iranian Attempts to Build Nukes.] domineering policies in the region. they are going to hit Saudi Arabia or Jordan.” Tel Aviv Notes. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. See “Rafsanjani Warns of High Cost of US Support for Israel.” Keyhan. December 15.” Voice of IRI (Tehran). 2006). 2005. October 30. 2001. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has said that Iran is “strongly oppos- ing [U. respectively. in BBC Monitoring. the Persian Gulf. 2005. 2005. December 26. China Policy Priorities. 2006. and North Africa. For a brief discussion.stm).” Voice of IRI (Tehran). in BBC Monitoring. no. Terrorism.” quoted in “Iranian Vice-President Says Russia.” IRNA website (Tehran). January 16. in BBC Monitoring. December 14. 2005.” Quoted. They want domination over the whole world. 2006.” and that the United States is “build- ing an empire. October 22.157 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. in BBC Monitoring.S.com/Articles/Printable. “Saudi Crown Prince on Iranian Nuclear Plans. 2005. If they miss Israel.co.” Jerusalem Post online. http://www.bbc. see Chubin. April 7. “Iran Nuclear Bid Fault of West. America has plans for the Middle East. 2005. see Henry Sokolski. and “Regimes Destroyed by Nations’ Resistance Not Nuclear Weapons—Iran’s Leader. This was implicit in Hashemi Rafsanjani’s controversial comments on this issue. 58. October 21. “Dangers the Outsiders Pose to the Region. January 16.

“Iran Envoy Insists on Pursuit of Enrichment. Says Wants Justice in Foreign Policy.” See “Daily Criticises Iranian Government for Causing World Tension. “Lessons of Iraq: If You Can’t Lick ’em. October 30.’” IRNA (Tehran). 9. 342 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS. Try Diplomacy.” September 28. Ephraim Sneh. November 3. 2005. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 2005. 2005.” Novem- ber 4. 2005. Anatol Lieven.” Inter- national Herald Tribune.” Istanbul Milli Gazette. Mathews.” Jerusalem Post. 8.*ch8 notes 8/3/06 8:35 AM Page 204 204 | Notes 4. 2005. September 24. “Most Iranians concern themselves far more with the price of meat and onions than with the Arab-Israeli peace process or uranium enrichment. testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. November 3. quoted in Mehr News Agency (Tehran).” Financial Times. 2005.” International Herald Tri- bune. October 31. March 22. “Whither Iran? Reform. 2005. Iranian families “are interested in first and foremost in how to ensure their livelihood. . Domestic Politics and National Secu- rity. 2005. September 22. 6. August 21. Ambiguous or incoherent. 2005. September 23. February 1. 2005. “Speak to Iran in One Voice. 15. p. See Jessica T. Sami Kohen. “No Time to Abandon Our Natural Allies.” See International Herald Tribune. 2005. 5. 7. Whether the two are compatible is not self-evident. 2006. Iran seeks at once a stabilized Iraq and an Iraq free of foreign forces. See “Middle East Split over Iraq.” Milliyet website. “Iran Raises the Bar.” International Her- ald Tribune. July 14. 2005.” IRI News Network (Tehran). October 5. “Engage Muslim Support or Lose the War. September 10-11. 2006. p. See also “Turkish Columnist Notes Iran’s Growing Influence in the Region. Ali Larijani has resorted to a favorite Iranian tactic. in BBC Monitoring. 12. linking Iran’s security to regional security and implicitly threatening to destabilize the region if threatened. August 27. “Between North Korea and Iran. see also Anatol Lieven. 6. “Iran’s President’s Remarks on Israel Signal ‘New Danger’— Turkish Paper. 13. 2005. August 22. 2005. in BBC Monitoring. and George Perkovich. 10. November 1. 2005. 11.” and Nasuhi Gungor. see regional chapter above and Shahram Chubin. in BBC Monitoring. 6. November 1. in BBC Mon- itoring. For earlier examples.” Mardom -Salari (Tehran). 2002).” Adelphi Paper no. Afshin Molavi writes. Ali Larijani. p. quoted in “Iranian President Addresses Parliament. See “Iran Guards Chief (General Yahya Rahim-Safavi) Says ‘Political Pressure Will Prompt Strong Reaction. p. Saudi Arabia canceled a visit of the Iranian foreign minister to the kingdom in October to express disagreement over Iran’s interference in Iraq. 8. Associated Press. 2005. “Iranian Nuclear Chief Says No Alternative but to Resist Pressure by Big Powers. 2005.” Al-Jazeera. in BBC Monitoring.

it has veto power over the Iranian parliament. Although it is not a leg- islative body. Badr Brigade Armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI). 2001. Aum Shinrikyo Japanese religious sect (Hindu and Buddhist mix). numerous. AQ Khan network Network engaged in the proliferation of nuclear information. intended to deal with civil unrest. Hamas Palestinian Islamist (Sunni) paramilitary orga- nization and political party. whose task is to interpret new laws passed by parliament and determine if they are consistent with Islamic law or the constitution. and dispersed throughout country. Guardian Council Consisting of clerics and lawyers. lightly armed.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 205 Glossary Al Qaeda Islamist terrorist group headed by Osama bin Laden. responsible for the attacks on the United States on September 11. 205 . responsible for sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway system in 1995. Basij A paramilitary organ affiliated to IRGC. Umbrella orga- nization for terrorist groups worldwide.

assuming the position of president of Iraq in 1979. Islamic Jihad Syrian-based Islamist group. responsible for 1983 U. They control the missile program and sensitive WMD sites. under direct supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader.S. founded to oppose Israeli insertions into southern Lebanon. Accessed power through the secular Baath Party. who sheltered Al Qaeda during their five-year reign in Afghanistan. Saddam Hussein Former president of Iraq. Ibrahim Al-JJafaari Prime Minister of Iraq January 2005–May 2006. Karine A Freighter intercepted by Israeli Defense Force in December 2001. Mohammad Al Baradei Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1997. IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (aka Pas- daran).S. Majles Iranian parliament. which was carrying weapons loaded in Iran and destined for Palestinian areas. The parallel military organization set up by revolutionary Iran to assure internal or domestic security primarily. Recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005. John R. Embassy bombing in Lebanon. Bolton U.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 206 206 | Glossary Hezbollah Islamist (Shiite) political party. . Keyhan newspaper Most conservative Iranian newspaper. Former Mayor of Tehran. Taliban Fundamentalist Islamist group. ambassador to the UN since August 2005. People Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Succeeded Mohammed Khatami when elected President of Iran August 2005. Considered to be a religious conser- vative.

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979. 1997. Kamal Kharrazi Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs from August 20. Secretary of Expediency Council. Ayatollah Khamenei Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Supreme Leader of Iran. succeeded Ahmadinejad as mayor of Tehran. Supported by the Islamic Iran Partic- ipation Front. Kim Jong-Il Chairman of the National Defense Committee and General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party. Yahya Rahim Safavi Revolutionary Guards Commander. Mohammad Bager Qalibaf Former head of police.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 207 Glossary | 207 AQ Khan Abdul Qadeer Khan. Former president of Iran from 1989 to 1997. Lost election for a third term to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 elections. Ali Larijani Conservative Iranian politician. Sirus Naseri Senior nuclear negotiator (until August 2005). Hasan Rowhani Hojjat-el-Eslam Former Secretary of the SNSC acting as chief negotiator with the EU-3 over Iranian nuclear program. North Korea’s leader since 1994. Placed sixth in Ira- nian presidential elections of 2005. to August 24. Hossein Mousavian Former senior Iranian nuclear negotiator. 2005. “Godfather” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. . Mostafa Moin Iranian reformist presidential candidate in 2005 elections. resigned in order to run for president in 2005 elections. Hashemi Rafsanjani Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council of Iran. Iranian repre- sentative at the UN from 1989 to 1997. Replaced Hasan Rowhani in August 2005 as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Admiral Ali Shamkhani Iranian Defense Minister replaced by Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar. Mohsen Rezai Former Guards Commander (IRGC) from 1981 to 1997. Pres- ident of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) from 1994 to 2004.

Bushire Site of nearly completed reactor on the Persian Gulf. Advisor on interna- tional affairs to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Ali Akbar Velayati Former foreign minister. Repre- sentative of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Lavizan/Parchin Sites and barracks with some nuclear-related activity. Natanz (near Isfahan) Uranium enrichment facility. . Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani Senior Shiite cleric in Iraq. Places Arak Heavy water production plant.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 208 208 | Glossary Hossein Shariatmadri Editor of hard-line Keyhan newspaper. Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. Javier Solana High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

U. 108.S. 70. 3. value of. 25. 180n67. 90. Arak heavy water reactor. 36. 9. nuclear issues under. 126 opinion. 118. See Additional Protocol (AP) 177n43 AQ Kahn network. 11. Agha. 32. 32–33. 77–78. 65. 32–33. 35.S. of. promoting pre- 123 ferred regional order of Iran. Iran’s threats to on political corruption of foreign suspend. 169n47. marginalization anti-Americanism: Iran’s exploitation of Taliban in. port for administration of. 160n42. 7. 34. 114. election of. 72. 112. 163n2. 115–16 on nuclear discrimination against Additional Protocol (AP): acceptance Iran. 72–73. 20. 197n23. See Atomic Energy Organization influence of U. on regional AEO. Mahmoud: administra.S.. Abu Dhabi. 117 indifference toward international Abu Ghraib. pressure from policy critics. Kofi. of. bases in. 134–35 of Iran (AEO) AIPAC (Israeli lobby). Agreed Framework (North 164n6 Korea/U.). military sup- access and denial: as security policy. 163n3 ary days. 64. pop- IAEA to ratify. 18. 20. 122. Reza. on duty of Armenia: Russia/Iran cooperation in. 149n5 in. Muslims to oppose Israel.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 209 Index Abdullah (King of Saudi Arabia). 184n28 Afghanistan: Iran/Russian cooperation Annan. 82 ulist victory of. 158n22 Arab–Iran polarization. 30. 90. tion as throwback to revolution. 78. 45. 14. 35. 116–17. 195n2 83–84 Aghazadeh. 45. Hossein. 91. 108 209 . AP. 114 Ahmadinejad. hard- 197n21 line stance of. 114. 101.

countries supporting terrorism. on axis of evil. 181n5. on U. 89. visit to Tehran (2003). EU- centrifuge testing in Iran. on Iran’s confidence deficit. 7.: on axis of evil. on interception of missile- (AEO): decision making and. 32. positions in Iran negotia- report on Iran compliance. on regimes and nuclear arms sales: AQ Kahn network and. 181n1. 110. Mohammad: on credibility ing of technicians for. 31–36. 164n6. Russian train- Al Baradei. John. Cheney. on referral of Iran centrifuge technology: acquisition to UNSC. Russian air Bush. 71. 164n5. 159n31. on limiting uranium enrichment. 108–9. 136. limits on. 24. 84. on tions. nuclear program.S.S. 123 deterrent. 20 198n28. 5–6. bases in. support of EU negotiations. role in. 78. 188n58. Proliferation Secu- Blix. 37. 163n3. 15. opposition to enrich. 183n23 to rogue states. 120 of project. Russian. lack of infor- mation about. 154n31 unacceptability of nuclear Azerbaijan: Iran/Russian cooperation weapons for Iran. 21.. restarting Badr Brigade. 152nn21 rity Initiative and. 51. differentiation atomic energy. Hans. Iran’s ment. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 84. Joseph. support for Burns. 79 restoration of credibility by Iran. military contacts 86. 159n33 . 190n75. 187n47. on denying WMDs Atlantic Institute. 188n53. 64. 83. 84. sibilities. 45. technology. 89. 109.S. on noncompliance. 188n55 Iran. on nuclear capability as Caucasus: U. Kurt M. Richard. George W. report on from Pakistan. proliferation treaty. 109 of IAEA. denial of plans to attack Asculai. 114 Bushire reactor. 156n5 189n60. 31–32. elimination of negotiating respon. 166n19. 173n8. Campbell. Ephraim.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 210 210 | Index arms race: of Iran and Iraq. See nuclear technology between Iran as nation and regime. 105. 99. 181n1. 165n9. role in nuclear policy practice of. on defense missile sales to Iran. 21. 97. 40–41. gas contracts Biden. 3/U. 126 conservatives: openness to engage- brinksmanship: benefits of. 162n50 ness of democracy. 89. related technology for Iran. 45. Nicholas: on Iranian interfer. Iran’s testing of. 181n5. Central Asia: U. to Palestine by Iran. 123 102. 126. 62. 186n43 history of. 2. 194n111. 45. 201n50 debate. on loopholes in nuclear non- with. 195n113 Iran. 66. 9 China: as foreign relations priority for Berdennikov.S. 150n12 96–97. 7. 134. Grigoriy. 187n47 99. 79. ence in Iraq’s internal affairs. Carnesale. 182n9 Bolton. Albert. on proliferation. 110.S. 123 fuel to Russia. 35. 3. return of spent Bahrain: U. 186nn41–42 in. 184n30 with. 196n5 167n28. 135. on open- ment freeze. role in.

185n33 fuel cycle: as breakout option for enrichment. EU-3 proposal to egy of. 106–7. 91–93. 141–42. energy diversifica- with. engagement. 15. Iran’s quest for. 153n27 of. IAEA support strengthening democracy: openness of. 183n23 192n96. military option 203n3. 169n45 by Iran. See uranium enrichment nuclear proliferation.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 211 Index | 211 containment. Lawrence. vs. 4. 146. 22. 136–37. 90. 185n43 Egypt: response to nuclear Iran. 85 agreement to report Iran to Cordesman. promotion in Middle East. 104–5. 143. 184n31. 106. 83. and the West. 115–16 diplomatic initiative. U. as regime countries.. 135. See also regional as tool of. vs. 124 24–25. 24–26 lenge to international order. EU-3 atti. 103 Iran. distrust of Davudi. change as complement to. 178n50. security strat. 62. diplomatic. 169n48. as buffer and intermediary. 38f–39f 3–4. negotiating strategies with. 142–45. 60. 85 European Union Group of 3 (EU-3): co-option. 150n12 electricity: nuclear production of. 102. 62. 104. sanctions nature of. chal- energy diversification. security tudes toward. 74. diplomacy in. Paula.S. Tony. 84. nuclear. 134. 192n97. 44 on Iran. 89. Iran’s U. 138. 59. Parviz. 155n3 foreign relations of Iran. as 23. renewal of deterrence: full fuel cycle as. tion and. 181n5. support of dual containment. 136. nuclear program denial and access: as security policy. IAEA policy. as European Union (EU): Iran’s relations deterrent. 122. package offer. regime port of initiatives. diminished role for U. 62.S.S. 103–6. rejection of package deal DeSutter. unremarkable endorsement. Expediency Discernment Council of 129–30 Iran. Council on Foreign Relations.S. 109–10. 143. 16. 24. 113. U. Robert. Russian sup- nuclear weapons as. . 203n3 Iran’s negotiating tactics. 115–16 103–4. 139. 8–9. 58. conservatives’ openness to. 199n33 66–68. 36–37. 165n9. diplomatic initiative.S. as threat to neighboring as alternative to. assessment of 192n97 response to Iran. 143. faith-based intelligence. 32. three-way negotiations with Iran 185n33 and U. 150n3. viability Freedman. IAEA decision making. regime in negotiations. reduction of constraints on Iran. 120 fuel cycle proposal. 104–5. 60. 107–8. 183n23. 24 Einhorn. 68–70. UNSC. 73. Dawa Party (Iraq). priorities in. 84. negotiation of constraints deniability. 82. failure of.

40 (IAEA): approach to nuclear pro- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 130 Iran’s violation of obligations to. 150n3 Gore–Chernomyrdin agreement. 51. as right under NPT. notice to Hezbollah: Al Qaeda vs. rela- lenges. See International Atomic Energy 30. 119 straints on Iran. 128–30 pendent agency. tions.S. 46. 169n45 istani support for terrorist attacks globalization. 119. 34. zone (WMDFZ). IAEA. 182n14 International Atomic Energy Agency Guardian council. rejection of Iran’s threats. 67. 3–4. Richard. 42–43. 189n71. 165nn8–9. 111. between Iran and U. 173n8. 32–34. 149n5 181n1. 195n3.. 8 ing Iran. 63–80. Iran sup. 194n108. 123–24 against Iran. 99–102. 114. 163n3. Saddam. relations with Goldschmidt. and Change (United tions of Iran with. 100. 4. 169n44. 82. 185n33 enforcement powers. Pierre. Gregory. nuclear issues 85 linked to. 137. electricity. 15. 26 incentives for negotiation. 47 with Iran. 127. 128. 180n66. non- Hamas: Iran’s support of. 114. Group of 8 (G-8): EU security and 83–84 cooperation with. 95–99. 100–101. 45. Pak- Giles. lobbying for sanctions 186n44. 109 inspections of nuclear facilities. lack of NPT Haass. Agency (IAEA) 73–74 ideological conservatives. 51–53. Iranian Gulf weapons of mass destruction free cooperation with. 52. 4. corporate response to Iran’s nuclear pro. 139. 118. Nations Secretary General). regime compared global positioning system (GPS). 168n42 instability of region: exploitation of. 160n39 gasoline: demand for vs. as political tool. nuclear program. 103. as buffer distrust of Iran’s regional ambi. Hadley. 110.. reporting obligations to UNSC. 198n28 negotiations policies of. capability. inadequacies of. as political issue. Russian support . 143 GCC. 95–96. 97. 71 Goss. per- support of. aligned states’ sympathy for con- port of. High-Level Panel on Threats. liferation. See Gulf Cooperation Council India: gas pipeline agreement with (GCC) Iran. 195n113. 101. 15. 122. Russian intelligence: estimates of Iran’s nuclear participation in. 96. Iran’s Iran of referral to UNSC. 176n35 Iran. 121. Steve. 131 formance assessment of. grey markets: nuclear technology and. Peter. U. 79. Chal. 181n5. credibility as inde- grams. 52. 85 on. 98–99. culture of. resolution (2006) regard- Hussein.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 212 212 | Index 66.S. Iran’s confidence. concerns about Iran’s building measures toward.

118. pragmatic 150n2. strategic partner. strategic environment in. 135. relations with U. mandate of. Iranian influence in inter- of. assets of. Iran–Iraq War (1986): Iranian interest 99. 7. values of. 119–20. policy toward tions (See foreign relations of Iran. (IRGC). 118. differences. negotiat- Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)). Iran–U. 87 tional weapons capabilities of. Iran’s Iran: ambition as regional power. UN resolution and anti-Western orientation of. 44. 136–37. relations: anti-Americanism 169n48. as victim of its Iraq War (1991): Iraqi disarmament own behavior. ating strategy of (See negotiating U. 136. 15. 11. defense budget of. Iran). 103–6. 136. sense of vulnerability. 77. insurgency power. 76. 204n8. geopolitical intermediary in.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 213 Index | 213 for nonproliferation policies. 96 in nuclear power and. Islamic regime in (See nation vs.S.S. 12. 153n24. 191n79. U. 48–50. 119. Iran–Arab polarization. 203n1. 131. 91. 44. 17. ending. border dispute with Iran. 152n18. 75–76 Iraq). in. relations with Iraq (See and.. 83–84. as sponsor of terrorism. closed nature of political sys. nal affairs of. 134. 18. 156n5.S. 25. 118. 138. 199n33. 90. 151n12. 108. difficulties in resolving nomic costs of sanctions on. 102. dependence on regional order.S.-inspired exist. 95. strategies of Iran). anti-NATO for regime. 90. 120 tem. 143–45. 184n28. 122. attempts 169n48. See Revolutionary Guards tance to Iran. incoherence of U. 183n17. 84.S. Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (1996). 3–4. regime minority Shiite state. 195n1 114–15. 189n67. 100. 14. verification problems of.S. 17–19. revolutionary 135. 1. 83–84. negoti.S. twin Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. role in negotiations 197n18. 134. 198n28. as ing behavior and. 166n19. 20. change and (See regime change). 196n5. 95. 163n2. 140–41 after. international rela. unresolved issues in.S. 83–84. (See Iraq: ambiguous Iran policies toward. 81. policy shift to opportunism of. 78. demonizing of. 84. 130. pressure for 87 referral of Iran to UNSC. 16. 114 strengthening EU-3 diplomatic Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps initiative. 83. EU-3 as 87–88. 55.S. 66. to divide Europe and U. natural ally of Iran. security strategies and. 109.S. 15. 159n34. 117. 113. technical assis. 114. U. conven. 114. regime in. U. 20 . denying right of Israel to challenge to U. 122. disarmament 51–54. 82. Iran–U. political lessons 152nn20–22. uranium imports. as threat to Iran. 151nn6–8. convergence of Iran/U. reduced democratization. risk-taking behavior of. 19. interests in. eco. relations). 19. 14. 14. as status quo after Desert Storm. 20. as Arab Shiite state. 116.S. as ship with Russia. 53. models for.

See Revolutionary Guards Isfahan uranium enrichment facility. threat to Iran. 124–25. reducing U. 113.S. 150n2 ties of. 203n1. on and legitimization of regime. of hostility toward. 136.S. U. credibility and moral ing. government and nuclear ambi. 47. 140. 23.S. 117. duty of Middle East tion of full fuel cycle. 131. U. 170n56. 76.S. regime dis. pres. 110 for. Iran’s denial of right to chief nuclear negotiator. 169n50 goal. trust limiting acceptance of nuclear decision making and. 198n27. demonizing of Larijani. on acquisi- Iran. Sergey. . Iran’s regional ambitions. 197n24 remaining in power as regime Kim Jong Il. Kamal. 166n16. 57. weapons of mass destruction. 137. 132. 126. nuclear program. U. 119. 44. 152n22. Lankarani. strike concept. 126. approach to nuclear issues. regional standing. 116–17. 130–33. 166n19. 27. 135. 130. Ali. 89 68. 102–3. WMDs as justification Ivanov. nature of. Hojat-el Eslam. 123. and United to.S. countries to oppose. 119 Kelayeh (Iran). U. 35. 120 Corps). 37 nuclear ambitions. 7. on Iranian access to issues for. response to tive of. 123. 77–78. 184n28. 119. warnings about Iran’s Kingdom vulnerability in. hardline and self-sufficiency. 71 Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI): closed Khamenei. 121. on intentions of U. 30. Iran vs. rejection of Libyan model regard- loss of U. to invade sons for. 30. 116. nuclear capability nuclear technology. limitations of nuclear Iran.. outcome affecting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. on denial of technology Gulf role model. 119. India regime vs. Iran’s intelligence debacle of. 52. threat from Iranian missiles. 37. 131. toward. 164n6 Karrubi. 135. Ibrahim.S. 26–27. 36 Iran support for. 152n18. uncertainty about Korea. 114. commitment ence and. Fazel.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 214 214 | Index Iraq War (2003– ): EU position on exist. history of. refusal to accept limited makeover of Middle East as objec. authority. Iran’s exploitation WMD proliferation and.. 114. 195n3. 138. 173n5. 20 IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Al-Jafaari. Iran-Iraq War les. 132. 151n6. interest in nuclear power.S. 35. Kharrazi. 79. Karine A affair.S. ultranationalist attitude regional opposition to U. 179n58 Islamic Jihad: Iran’s support of. response to threat from Iran. 12.S. 10–11. 41–42. neutrality on nuclear issues. 114. 48–50. Keyhan (newspaper).. See North Korea international goals of. fatwa banning 181n5. 51. Iraq as threat to. 131 155n39. as 153n23. as 197n23. Ali: on arrogance of U. on empire-building by tions. 43. 1 Israel: conventional weapons capabili.

Ariel. 127.S. 88.S. threat of. 45 U. confidence build- post-9/11 extension of. technology as metaphor. nuclear activities. power politics. 135. 197n23. 55.S. 47–48. 74. on Korean assistance in. 64. 160n39 146 Lavizan (Iran). sales to Iran. 22. Russian Iran’s regional ambitions. 73. 123. demonstrations . 168n35 obtained from Pakistan. 29 Lavrov. linking Iranian and 196n5. 51. divide Europe and U. 123. 20. 160n39. on shifting balance of power. on politi- Middle East: duty of Muslim countries cal importance of Iran to Europe. 78. zation). Segey.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 215 Index | 215 38f–39f. 78 narcissism of Iran. 195n1. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organi- icy and democratization of. U. 48. disso.S. as substitute for air power. 91 bilities. 195n113 Mousavian. recognition of Israel. reputation in. U. attempts to reducing threat to Iran. 3. 62 opinion. 165n11. negotiating strategies of Iran. Mujahideen i-Khalq (MOK). 175n26. 17–18 9/11 attacks. on destabilization and missiles: domestic industry and Iran nuclear capability. 118 strategic context of. Iran’s 151n8 view of. ian. 204n6. 151n6. to oppose Israel. 110. See also regional security. on raw 48. on designs. 2–3 Lugar. 131. 117. 134 199n33. pol. 122–23. regional security. 119. 195n3 policies. 71 Moin. 23. 164n6. on Iran and 165n9. buy- 123. sanctions affecting regime Muqtada al Sadr. 33. 116. North Iraq as natural allies.S. Iran’s 180n73. encirclement of Iran. 46. 122. 17. ing time in. 90. 15. 153n26. 200n42 NAM (nonaligned movement). 120. John. Richard. 60. weapons technology Mykonos assassinations. 40. Hossein: on Iranian public Levite. on rela. 172n2. self-sufficiency. 25. 166nn12–18. 74–75. Mostafa. 63. 45–46.: Iraq War intentions. 197n18. 63–80. 97 76. 117–18. 190n74 Majles.S. defining mini-nukes. 22 elements of. 172n74 Naseri. tionship with Russia. 78. Iranian. 194n111. 163n2 Mazarr. give up WMD activities. decision to U. theater missile defenses. 68–73. loss of U. creation of new regional order. on foreign sensitivity to nuclear program and.. Iran- ciation from Ahmadinejad. Sirus: on Iran’s nuclear capa- McCain. on signing Libya: acquisition of nuclear weapons of 2004 agreement. Middle East bases. military presence following nationalism. 49. 177n46. 114. U. individual countries assuring other nations of peaceful military presence. 22. Michael. 161nn46–47. 45. 45.S. 169n47. 116 ing and. Natanz uranium enrichment project.

dealing with. enrichment). 11–13. limited agreements on. 77–78. 96–97 157n12. (NATO). 134 181n5. 17. custodians of. 177n40.S. Russian approach . 44–63. 65. 172n2. liferation clause. 180n73. 119. discriminatory character of tions against. 10. regional and (See nuclear capability). 84 nationalism and. 45–46. rorism. 179n63. 17–18. support for. 82. 169n47. 31–36. 123. obstructionism in. and. 72. of. 158n22. political impor- ultranationalism and. 95–99. 93. approach to. 63–80. 10–11. U. 60. 54 rogue states. 20–21. 175n26. withdrawal from NPT. links with ter- NPT. priorities for nuclear ambitions of Iran: capabilities containment.S. (NPT) 187n47. parallels with North Korea’s policy toward. 61f.S. Revolutionary Guards as North Korea: Agreed Framework. 103. EU-3 program and.S. 149n5. 15. (NGOs): U. 153n27. 68. 75–80. fuel cycle (See fuel cycle). 1. 68–75. terrorism weapons technology with other support by Iran and. 135. influence of style. nuclear proliferation: as continuum. 122.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 216 216 | Index of good faith. 141–47. See Treaty on the Non. 175n26. regional role in negotiations. strategic context of. use of EU-3 nuclear capability: behavior of Iran channels to postpone crisis. regional stability structure (See nuclear technol- linked to nuclear issues. ogy). military options Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for limiting. 55. nongovernmental organizations 186n44. full inconsistencies and late declara. 17. 2–3. 169n45. destabilization and. tance of. 78. Iran as tipping point for. IAEA parallels with Iran’s negotiating approach to. 134 179n58. as inappropriate nuclear hedging. policy options and. 4–5. mates of. 57. 54. justification for. infra- style. 94. 200n42. 60 model for Iran’s nuclear program. 53–55. 132–33. 165nn8–9. international response to. 17–18. 56. 126. 46–47. 170n56. nations. 79. models for. 58. nuclear pro. 66–68 54–55. intelligence esti- nonaligned movement (NAM). 65–66. 150n10. spoiler tactics in. 102–8. 6–8. enrichment projects (See uranium ure of tactics. 190n74 Iran’s self-image of. ineffectiveness of UNSC sanc. restraint in other proliferators on Iran. steps 91. 80. 179n63. 63 51. 71. 17. 137. 81–112. 60. context of. 171n68. schizophrenic nature of. Iran’s missile constraints on. tics causing mistrust by other 139. as pro- North Atlantic Treaty Organization tection against regime change. 140. 177n46. U. EU nonpro- liferation influence on Iran. 20. 128. goals tions in. aspects of. ineffectiveness of U. cooperation on toward achieving. tac. noncompliance: definition of. 186n44. 149n2. 3. 199n35. fear of. 124. 80. 138–39. 46. 200n42. fail.

157n15. eration Security Initiative and. 164n5. 108–12. U. 45. possession vs. 20 accelerated nuclear program. Operation Iraqi Freedom. 165n9 objective guarantees. 140 approach to. U. relations with. 183n17. lack of polarization. 45. 17. 150n12. infrastruc. 14 preemption: as U. See Iraq domestic debate over Iran’s right War (2003– ) to. restrictions as discrimination. Organization of Petroleum Exporting tion. nuclear technol- unacceptability for Iran. 87–88. 12–13. 172n75 nuclear weapons: acquisition of petroleum: access to. 4. 73–74.S. 32. 189n67. 83 nuclear technology: acquisition by Operation Desert Storm: Iraqi disar- Iran. 164n6. 34. 3. 172nn74–75. 21 oil nationalization crisis (1953). policy. 114. gas NPT and right to. Iran–Arab. 169n44 activities. 45. for. 69 regarding. Guards and. as Muslim issue. 137. 182n9. 100. 46. 45–46. option negotiations. 11. 35 obstructionism. 155n2. tight energy market Tehran agreement on. derailing of Iran’s mament after. 8–9. 163n3. IAEA technical outlaw states. 135. Iran’s centrifuge weapons program. Pakistan: exchange of nuclear technol- ture in Iran. 60. in France’s Pir-Nozen. technology and. IAEA man. and. Parchin (Iran). 58–59. 181n5. 98. 49. 171n67. revelation of Iran’s secret rorist attacks on India. Revolutionary Palestine: Iran’s support for. 164n5. domestic: effects on nuclear ing. 41. verification of. 163nn2–3. contracts with. 95. Achilles heel. transfer of. 74 pragmatic conservatives. 166n19 defense budget. 37. See also fuel cycle Perkovich. 115–16 of. 131. Iranian. 7. ogy with rogue states. 96 openness of democracies. 163n4 Powell. as energy diversifica. 114 Iranian public debate on acquir. 89. 173n8. 160n39. Paris agreement on uranium enrich- 96. 85. 95. 78 dates on. 71 session of.S. 2–3. 114. peaceful use vs. 28–29. 27–36 186nn41–42 polonium. ogy and. sanctions contracts with IAEA countries. 114. 173n8. 24–26. 31. hardline. Western distrust of Iran ment (2004). Prolif- 150n12. as in. Nur. 28. verification oil supplies: access to. Colin. 115–16 designs for. 24. 40–43. See rogue states assistance to Iran. 93. 66. George. type of regime and pos. 8. 195n2 149n2. 82–95. Iran 84 . Countries (OPEC).*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 217 Index | 217 to. incrementalism in. against. 63. and reduction in. support for Kashmiri ter- 159n31. Iranian 178nn47–48. self-sufficiency 131–32. politics. 55–62. 17 preenrichment of uranium. 155n3. 15. 69 oil revenues: domestic consumption prevention: as policy response to Iran.S. 182n14.

Yevgeni. interests in cooperation with. Iran’s gence of Iran/U. 67. linked with 154n31. 136.S. 134–35.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 218 218 | Index Primakov. spoiling strategy toward Rahim (Revolutionary Guards com. 21..S. 165n9. 108–9 185n33. 95.S.S. 179n64. ing. on nuclear 9/11 extension of U. 76. See diplomacy and deterrence. Iranian: on nuclear choice. 23. presence. 115–16. fac- Qatar: U. access and Putin. 113. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): 145–47. 153n26. 119. 86. 31–32 state. bases in. 199n33. 85. denial in.. outcome of Iraq international status of Iran. sea-denial capability. politics and nuclear negotiations. 104. 146. defensive objec- 114. 182n9 against. EU endorsement of. 115. U. Iraq. 30 instability. 88. 10–11 Iran. 187n47 regional security. 89. as regional gram. 157n12.S. on Ameri. nonpro. 157n16 undesirability of Iranian influence reformists: support for nuclear pro. 84. Iran’s cans bogged down in Iraq. EU-3 views of. inevitability liferation enforcement by. call for diplomacy on Iran’s security. 116. revolu- to U. 135.S. 181n5. U. military option for. 94. conver- Al Qaeda: Hezbollah vs. 137. nuclear nuclear issues. sanctions encourag- technology as a right. on nuclear technol. exploitation of political Qalibaf. U. U. 52. Bennett. Hashemi. mander). 121. 161nn46–47 policy shift to democratization. policy of. 30. exclusion of Iran regime change: as complement to from regional politics. 119. Iranian Rafsanjani. 34–35. 113–33. on arrogance of U.S. Vladimir. 103. 22. fear of Shi- ite state in Iraq. 123 tors in insecurity. 115. offering Iranian support to nuclear Iran. post- 152nn20–21. on tionary Iran as role model for. conception of. 194n108 putes and. 198n27 structural conditions in. 118. on 54–55. 195n3. as policy public opinion. Pakistan and China not nuclear capability as protection members of. 118. 88–89. 40. of. competition for influence in. 118. dual containment vs. Iraq as turn- 198n27. 22. 135. U. regional responses ogy. tic missile program. War affecting. 156n9. military Iran..: support for sanc. public opinion. 4. on domes. 168n38.S. 198n29. 10. ing point for. 114. 114. 120. 122. 155n39. 116. 21. 109–10. also security policies of Iran . U.S. 52–54. Mohammad Bager. 204n6. 85.. Ramburg. Western tions and military option against desire for. diplomacy effecting. 116. 127–30. 190n74.S. 27–28. 16. 138. 90. 169n47. 193nn103–5. in Iraq. border dis- 193n99. 168n42 tives. 40 121. in Afghanistan. ambitions and. skepticism regarding. 117. capability and destabilization of. 119–20. 117–22.S.

training of Iranian techni- Roberts. pub- tactic.S. ment alternatives proposal. on sea-denial capability of Iran. 135 weapons of mass destruction and. 183n17. restrictions on nuclear Iran. 167n22. 177n46 2–3 Salehi. 21. 121 right to nuclear technology under security policies of Iran: insecurity NPT. 54. 160n39. as. 110. tives. cerns of. technology 108–9. 94. on EU-3 role Sanders. support for tions. 57. Safavi. 76. Condoleezza. strained relations with relations with IAEA. ues of. arms sales to Iran. See also Iran.S. 108. 88–89. 182n14.S. 109. on Iran. fear of. 178n47. on diplomacy and con. 73. SCIRI (Supreme Council for the on Iran’s regional ambitions. ineffectiveness against chief nuclear negotiator. 106. on Iran tions. 152n22 strategic vs. 2. enrich- revolutionary states: U. 183n17. . political role of. 44. val. 70. 49 negotiating behavior. Ali Akbar. 120 on Libyan model for Iran. Brad. 185n37 as negotiator. 150n10. 143. 191n80. 114. 131. strategic relationship with Iran. 111. 159n33. influence in Iraq. 114–15. Yahya Rahim. 84 sanctions: economic costs of. approach to Iran’s nuclear ambi- shift in power to. Islamic Republic of Iraq). Saudi Arabia: cooling relations with 156n9. Ros-Lehtinen bill (U. 75 to Iran. 56. 204n9 Iran’s nuclear technology. Mohammed. 5. revolutionary values of 15. on Iran’s nuclear ambi- nuclear program. 117. destruction. 191n79. 87 116. 71. Mohammad. Ahmadinejad. Iran’s lack of 38f–39f. Mohsen. 135. 149n2 cians. 199n33 195n4. on pos. 24. as engagement nuclear technology. 164n6. 14. 143. 196n5. Jackie. session of nuclear weapons. on global Sanger.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 219 Index | 219 Revolutionary Guards: aggressive lutionary state. independent actions of. 58. on delay as negotiating ation. on security of revo. 83. Iran not typical of. Hasan: on acquisition of evolution. 157n12. as custo. on weapons of mass 169n45. 134. 82. actions of. 127. 128. North Korea. 100–101.S. as tools. dians of nuclear capability. 194nn108–10. 37. 116. 30. 182n10 acceptance of nuclear Iran. 66–67.S. 192n92. 56. 51.. distrust of Iran’s transfer and. 49. against nuclear prolifer- 174n14. 136. 72 rollback (reversal): as policy response Salimi. David.). 187n47 fidence building. 109–10. 16. Russia: alignment with EU-3 initia- 120. Saidi. 169nn45–46. 32–33. nonproliferation con- Rice. U. 56. 108–12. 87–88. 42–43. 30. on intensification of U. 170n58 49. 174n11. on U. 127. encouraging regime Rowhani. 87–88. 193n99 rogue states: as enablers of terrorism. and nuclear ambitions. 109. tile place. Rezai. view of world as hos. lic’s support for. 151n12. 19.

on Taliban: in Afghanistan. Republic of Iraq (SCIRI). 57–58. as Islamic minority. response to. negotiating strategies security links to.S. exploitation of ambigu- issues in. opposition to nuclear toward. 80. 15. 122. 6. 31. 16. 114 self-sufficiency: as justification for Supplementary Act 12938 Presidential nuclear ambitions. 134 nuclear proliferation and. 102–3. 71. on Iran–Iraq War in. 169n48 SNSC (Supreme National Security Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Council). full fuel cycle as right of status discrepancy of Iran. 14. Iran/Russian missiles as deterrence. 16 83–84. Hussein. 163n2. Ali strategic environment. 186n42 September 11. threat to Iran. post-9/11 Iranian hostility 165n11. 108. Kenneth. 73–74. 159n31 theater missile defenses (TMD). 2001. Akbar.). Ali. Gulf. 136 ing. impact on Iran’s Supreme Leader. 31. 156n5 Directive (U. See also Russia with. U.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 220 220 | Index Iran–Iraq War and. See Khamenei.S. missile technology as metaphor. 38f Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 50–51. Ahmad. 117. 120 Torkan. and France. U. 92. 175n26 Sunni Arab nationalism. Ali. 53. 21 weapons for Iran. in Sundarji. 136–37. 170n60. 20. weapons of mass 114 destruction and. legitimate and. 95–96. 1. Iran’s use of proxies Shanghai Cooperative Organization. 15. 14 participants. U. 65. 114. 50–51 Shirzad. on U. 136. 14 regional security submarines: Iran’s deployment outside self-deception: exaggerated self. tacti- Shariatmadari. Iran’s potential exploitation of. diffi- Solana. 152n18. 184n28 Sistani. 1. 1. 186n39. 116. strategic priorities following. 51–54. 50–51. 150n3 Timmerman. strategic environment of Iran: culture 152n18. 2–3 Tajikistan: Iran/Russian cooperation Shamkhani. 38f presence in Middle East follow. 204n6. Iranian claims of . 118. initial Supreme National Security Council Iran reaction to. 21. 2. Syria: Iran relations with. Iran desire to and. on cooperation against. 15. 20. Javier. Krishnaswamy. terrorist attacks: Supreme Council for the Islamic EU position on WMD prolifera. 184n31 culties in tightening. 24–26. 108.S.S. 114 and security policy. Shiites: Iran cultivating ties with. See also and. terrorism: Iran’s support for. 122. 21 negotiating strategies. 7. since 9/11 attacks. 11. 135. against U. 17–19.S. 37. 12. 54. 120 tion and. 2. 153n24. 146 Singh. 14. 162n52 cal relations with terrorist groups. Manhoman. 157n15 stay within. 28. 37. regional ity. discontent Soviet Union.S. 131 importance of Iran. IAEA rela- stock market: hardline negotiations tionship to. 167n28. technology transfer and. 153n24. 31. military (SNSC).

9–10. 181n5. See also Iran–U. materials by terrorists. incoherence of tives to. Res. 185n35. referral of issues to. referral of facilities for. 138. 191n86. response to nuclear North Korea. suspension of.S. 105. cooling relations to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. regime type and possession of 63. 118. 77–78. IAEA 86. tions in Iran negotiations. resumption of research on. regime 182n10. 93–94. 106–7. 83. 149n5 141–42. tive strategy in. 4–5. 82. 67–70. need for. unilateral posture of.S. 81.. 104. and Change. 122–23. of new Middle East regional 72–73. 103–6. with U. 155n39 priorities following 9/11 attacks. 20–21. U. 2–3. 105. Iran. 139. 189n60. 5–6. 4. 129 shift from regime change to democratization. Iran’s quest 104. nology transfer limits. 136 199n33. response influence. pressure for limitation of access to nuclear referral of Iran to UNSC. 25–26. 84. relations reporting obligations to.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 221 Index | 221 discrimination under. strategic context of Mid- United Arab Emirates. See United Nations Security ineffectiveness in dealing with Council (UNSC) North Korea.S. 181n1. 22. 127. 95. 135. 4. United Nations Security Council 191n84. 82. negotiations on. Russian proposal for alterna- Iran. 8. 122. 29. Iran disrespect uranium enrichment: clandestine for authority of. 178nn47–48 requirements for resolving differ- Turkey: concerns over Iran’s regional ences with Iran. 91–93. (UNSC): EU-3 agreement to use of multilateral institutions in. dual containment as. preemp- 17. Challenges. ultranationalism. 68. United Nations Secretary General 1. lack domestic support for leaving. 98–99. policy toward Iran. 143–45. 86. 192n92. 184n31. Iranian Iran as nation vs. 15. posi- Iran to. nuclear reactor technology order. support for EU-3 diplo- High-Level Panel on Threats. 98. 3. 99. regime. toward Iran. 86. 91. EU-3/U. 173n8 dle East and. 106. 2. 98. strategic United Kingdom. . 153n27. Iranian relations 82–85. loopholes in. vs. report Iran to. 111. North Korea’s withdrawal from. formal policy vs. 90. restraint in dealing with with. 139.S. 25–26. 191n80. 81. on fuel cycle for 99. attitude as cover for weapons program. 189n60 for. IAEA support for some for referral of Iran to. 4. historical distrust of 78. right to nuclear technology nuclear technology. of international support for tech- Iran’s threats to withdraw from. reporting vs. pressure ties. failure to declare activi- olution 1540. 90. matic initiative. 50. 4. change as (See regime change). United States foreign policy: creation 163n3. justification for. Iran. 5. 84. 42–43. under. 21. Janus-faced nature of. 185n43. UNSC. 143. peaceful use 115–16. 93–94. capability by Iran.

S. 162n50. as justifica. 51–52. 2–3. Yeltsin. weapons of mass destruction free zone 190n74. Weisman. 172n74 WMD. 92 Iran claims of opposition to. 5 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): World Trade Organization (WTO). 169n46 . See weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD) War on Terrorism. 57–58. Boris. 130 resume. technology transfer to terrorists. 194n111 152n22. missiles. Albert. 168n35 Weldon. 191n86. yellowcake. threats to (WMDFZ). See arms sales. Yazdi. 20. 164n6 of Iraq program. 164n6 rogue states’ cooperation regard. 21 Wohlstetter. 75. 104–5. Kurt. 82 Zolgadr (General). 102. Ali Akbar. 108 ing.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 222 222 | Index 40–41. 1. attack on Iraq. 50–51. 184n28 virtual arsenals. underestimation zirconium plant (Isfahan). 128. 68. nuclear technology Velayati. 68 weapons technology. Steve. 33 tion for U. 170nn58–60. Taghi Mesbahi. 86.

He was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1994 and served as Direc- tor of Regional Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 223 .*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 223 About the Author hahram Chubin is Director of Studies at the Geneva Centre for S Security Policy.

creating new insti- tutions and international networks. Taylor Reveley III William W. Debs Jessica T. Richard A. Officers Jessica T. Mathews. Through research. Vice President for Studies George Perkovich. which reaches readers in more than 120 countries and in several languages. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations between governments. Vice President for Studies Peter Reid. Tilghman Jamie Gorelick . The Endowment publishes Foreign Policy. Chairman Stephen D. Executive Vice President and Secretary Thomas Carothers. Craig. international organizations. Vice President for Studies Mark Medish. Otunnu Donald V. political. Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. President Paul Balaran. Founded in 1910. Donaldson Zanny Minton Beddoes Roger Ferguson Olara A. Vice President for Communications Board of Trustees James C. Through its Carnegie Moscow Center. Vice Chairman Donald Kennedy Bill Bradley Robert Legvold Robert Carswell Stephen R. Lewis. on occasion. one of the world’s leading journals of international politics and economics. Carnegie is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Jr. and civil society. Cohen William M. Jerome A. Gaither. the Endowment helps to develop a tra- dition of public policy analysis in the states of the former Soviet Union and to improve relations between Russia and the United States. business. publishing. nonprofit orga- nization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Fites W. Lewis. focusing on the economic. Mathews William H. convening and. and technological forces driving global change. Harlan Gregory B. Jr. George Stapelton Roy Richard Giordano Shirley M.*ch9 backmatter 8/3/06 8:34 AM Page 224 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful