IR3140 Vle

Security in international
relations
J. Jackson-Preece
IR3140, 2790140
2011
Undergraduate study in
Economics, Management,
Finance and the Social Sciences
This subject guide is for a 300 course offered as part of the University of London
International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences.
This is equivalent to Level 6 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications in
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ).
For more information about the University of London International Programmes
undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see:
www.londoninternational.ac.uk
This guide was prepared for the University of London International Programmes by:
Jennifer Jackson-Preece, Senior Lecturer in Nationalism in Europe, European Institute and
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.
This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to
pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising
from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable,
please use the form at the back of this guide.
The University of London International Programmes

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Published by: University of London
University of London 2011
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Contents
Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
Aims ............................................................................................................................. 1
Learning outcomes ........................................................................................................ 1
How to use this subject guide ........................................................................................ 2
Structure of the guide .................................................................................................... 2
Essential reading ........................................................................................................... 4
Further reading.............................................................................................................. 4
Additional resources ...................................................................................................... 7
Online study resources ................................................................................................... 7
Useful websites ............................................................................................................. 8
Examination structure .................................................................................................. 10
Examination advice...................................................................................................... 10
Syllabus....................................................................................................................... 12
List of abbreviations used in this subject guide ............................................................. 12
Chapter 1: The idea of security............................................................................. 13
Aims of the chapter ..................................................................................................... 13
Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 13
Essential reading ......................................................................................................... 13
Further reading............................................................................................................ 13
Additional resources .................................................................................................... 13
The value of security .................................................................................................... 14
Key assumptions of security ......................................................................................... 15
Security of the state and security of the person............................................................. 17
Three paradigms of security ........................................................................................ 19
A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 22
Sample examination questions ..................................................................................... 22
Chapter 2: The state as a security arrangement .................................................. 23
Further reading............................................................................................................ 23
Origins of the state as a security arrangement .............................................................. 24
Security of the prince ................................................................................................... 24
Security of the people .................................................................................................. 25
Nation states and national security .............................................................................. 26
Chapter 3: National security: current issues and contemporary application ...... 29
Further reading............................................................................................................ 29
National security as a reciprocal arrangement .............................................................. 30
National security policies ............................................................................................. 30
i
140 Security in international relations
iNational security and deterrence .................................................................................. 31

National security and the war on terror ........................................................................ 31
National security in authoritarian states ....................................................................... 32
Security in weak, failed or quasi-states ......................................................................... 33
Chapter 4: International society as a security arrangement ................................ 35
Further reading............................................................................................................ 35
International society and the problem of disorder ......................................................... 36
International security ................................................................................................... 37
The balance of power and the concert of great powers ................................................. 37
Chapter 5: International security: current issues and contemporary application 41
Further reading............................................................................................................ 41
The international security paradigm in operation .......................................................... 42
Military intervention .................................................................................................... 42
Nuclear non-proliferation ............................................................................................. 45
Climate change ........................................................................................................... 46
Why international security is difficult to achieve ........................................................... 47
The problem of hegemony ........................................................................................... 48
Weak, failed and quasi-states ...................................................................................... 49
Chapter 6: Human security as an alternative to national and
international security ........................................................................................... 53
Further reading............................................................................................................ 53
State-centred approaches to security ............................................................................ 53
A person-centred approach to security ......................................................................... 54
Instruments of human security ..................................................................................... 55
Chapter 7: Human security: current issues and contemporary application.......... 57
Further reading............................................................................................................ 57
Achievements of human security .................................................................................. 58
Problems with human security ..................................................................................... 59
Overcoming the problems of human security ................................................................ 60
Responsibility to protect (R2P) ..................................................................................... 61
ii
Contents

Chapter 8: Security paradigms in conflict: the problem of intervention ............. 63
Further reading............................................................................................................ 63
Different paradigms, different priorities ........................................................................ 65
Origins of the problem of military intervention ............................................................. 65
Current justifications for military intervention ............................................................... 66
Intervention for international peace and security: Iraq................................................... 68
Intervention for national security: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan ....................... 69
Intervention for human security: Kosovo ....................................................................... 72
Intervention after R2P: Darfur ...................................................................................... 76
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper .............................................................. 79
Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentary ...................................................... 81
Specific comments on questions................................................................................... 81
Key steps to success in the examination ....................................................................... 89
iii
Notes
iv
Introduction
Introduction
140 Security in international relations is a 300 course offered
on the Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences
(EMFSS) suite of programmes. It is a subject which provides insights
and understanding of order and stability both within and between
states. Many students when they approach this course think that
security is only concerned with states and their armed forces. A common
misunderstanding is to equate security with defence. But the security
agenda is much broader than this and now includes questions of force
and military preparedness problems and policies to do with human and
minority rights, migration, poverty, the environment and other societal
issues. Following on from this wider agenda, security in international
relations is increasingly concerned not only with the safety of states
but also of the peoples within them. What students take away from this
course is an understanding of security as a core value of human life and
an awareness that security policies will vary depending upon how one
answers the key questions: security in (or of) what; security from what;
and security by what means.
It is a particularly relevant course for those of you who want to go on to
careers in law or public administration, politics, international and nongovernmental organisations, or journalism as the way it looks at security
addresses issues of immediate concern to those engaged in a range of
advocacy, policy and media roles. A very similar course is offered at the
LSE as a third-year course. My own research addresses problems and
practices of ethnic diversity in a world of nation states including selfdetermination, boundaries, human and minority rights, ethnic cleansing,
genocide, and humanitarian intervention. Questions of security and
insecurity are integral to all of these issues, which yet again underscores
the broad significance of security in international relations. I hope that you
enjoy studying this course.
If taken as part of a BSc degree, you must have passed 11 Introduction
to international relations before this course may be attempted.
Aims
This course aims to:
introduce you to the central concepts in security studies
develop your comparative skills of analysis of differing security policies
in practice
promote critical engagement with the security policy literature and
enable you to display this engagement by developing your ability to
present, substantiate and defend complex arguments.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this course, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to demonstrate:
a critical understanding of the issues involved in security policy
decision making
an understanding of the contexts, pressures and constraints with which
security policymakers have to deal
1
an ability to engage in comparitive analysis of security policy without

losing a sense of historical context.
How to use this subject guide

The aim of this subject guide is to help you to interpret the syllabus. It
outlines what you are expected to know for each area of the syllabus and
suggests relevant readings to help you to understand the material. As with
many of the courses available on the International Programmes there are
only four set textbooks which you must read for this course; much of the
information you need to learn and understand is contained in examples
and activities within the subject guide itself.
I would recommend that you work through the guide in chapter order,
reading the essential texts when asked to do so in the syllabus and then
when you have understood the material complete the relevant activity. You
may also wish to supplement your studies by some of the Further reading,
in which case you should refer to the additional readings listed for each
chapter.
Having said this, it is important that you appreciate that different topics
are not self-contained. There is a degree of overlap between them and
you are guided in this respect by the cross-referencing between different
chapters. In terms of studying this subject, the chapters of this guide are
designed as self-contained units of study, but for examination purposes
you need to have an understanding of the subject as a whole.
At the end of each chapter you will find a reminder of your learning
outcomes, which is a list of the main points that you should understand
once you have covered the material in the guide and the associated readings.
Structure of the guide

Chapter 1 identifies security as a core value of human life. To be secure
is to be undisturbed by danger or fear. The desire for security is a defensive
and self-protecting response to the fact or threat of harm from other
human beings. If there were no threatening people, the need to guarantee
security would disappear. The four key assumptions underlying the idea
of security security in (or of) what, from what, for what, and by what
means are each discussed and analysed. Normative and instrumental
methodological approaches to security are compared and contrasted.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine security from the perspective of the state.
As these chapters will reveal, the state was, in its origins, a security
arrangement and it remains so today. A well-governed nation state is a
formidable security organisation. It is for this reason that the nation state
ultimately replaced clans, tribal societies, fiefdoms, free cities, medieval
guilds, duchies, dynastic states and even empires, among others, to
become the basic form of modern political organisation. The term national
security has thus come to refer to all those public policies through
which the nation state ensures its survival as a separate and sovereign
community and, in so doing, the safety and prosperity of its citizens. The
reciprocal security obligation between the nation state and its citizens is
the normative basis upon which the nation states claim to be a protector
of the people is justified and this will be discussed in some detail. For the
national security paradigm to hold true, however, the coercive power of
the state should be used as a last resort and as rarely as possible. But that
is not always the case. Even in liberal democracies, what Barry Buzan
terms a defence dilemma may arise as the examples of nuclear deterrence
2
Introduction
and counter-terror measures make clear. The experience of totalitarian

and weak, failed or quasi-states will also be recalled to demonstrate the
limitations of the national security paradigm.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine security from the perspective of international
society. The international security paradigm aspires towards a general
condition of peace, order and lawfulness within the society of states.
The history of international society will thus be presented as an ongoing
struggle with the problem of disorder and its concomitant insecurity. In
practice, primary responsibility for providing international security has
come to rest on those states we refer to as great powers. Their role will
be assessed in terms of the balance of power and the concert of great
powers. A recurring problem of international security is that of ensuring
that all of the great powers remain good international citizens who act to
support and not to subvert international law and the balance of power.
On those occasions when a great power begins to act as an international
bully or outlaw, international security is put at risk and the potential
for catastrophic war increases. These dilemmas will be interrogated as
fundamental limitations of the international security paradigm in the
context of military intervention, nuclear non-proliferation and climate
change.
Chapters 6 and 7 examine security from the perspective of the
individual. The search for a global human community, which would
transcend international frontiers and trump the rights and interests of
particular communities be these states or indeed the society of states, has a
noble pedigree in international relations. This history will be summarised
with a view to analysing its basic normative content. We see evidence
of the human security paradigm at work post-1945 in the universal
protection of human rights, humanitarian law, the idea of crimes against
humanity, and in the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). The
significance of each of these key developments will be assessed. Finally, we
will consider the unavoidable limitations of the human security paradigm
which are a direct consequence of the fact that international relations
up to and including the present time remain, for better or for worse,
organised on the basis of state sovereignty and plural values.
Each of the three main security paradigms surveyed up to this point in
the syllabus national security, international security and human security
prioritises different security objectives. Ultimately, these paradigms
represent what Isaiah Berlin has called a collision of values to which
there can be no permanent resolution; these paradigms may be equally
compelling but nevertheless remain mutually incommensurate. At a
certain point, the requirements of one paradigm will conflict with the
requirements of another and we will be forced to choose between them.
Should the national security of the state come first? Or are there instances
where a general condition of peace and stability within the society of
states may reasonably necessitate an infringement of the national security
of one of its members? And what if human suffering of a serious kind
persists irrespective of a general condition of peace and stability within
the states system and national security among its members? In such
circumstances, should human security trump these other considerations?
Chapter 8 will explore these contradictions and dilemmas in the context of
recent debate on the problem of intervention with reference to five cases:
Iraq (1991); Bosnia (1995); Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001); and
Darfur (2008).
Essential reading
You should purchase:
Bain, W. (ed.) The empire of security and the safety of the people. (London:
Routledge, 2006) first edition [ISBN 9780415380195].
Buzan, B. People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in
the post cold war era. (London: Pearson, 2004) second edition
[ISBN 9781555872823].
Hough, P. Understanding global security. (London: Routledge, 2004) first edition
[ISBN 9780415296663].
Economides, Spyros and Mats Berdal (eds) United Nations interventionism,
19912004. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) first edition
[ISBN 9780521547673]. This text is essential only for Chapter 8.
Each chapter of the subject guide commences by identifying the

appropriate chapters from these textbooks. In instances where these
textbooks are inadequate or simply do not cover a particular topic,
additional or supplementary readings will be listed as activities in the
chapters. Finally, it should be noted that this subject builds on previous
knowledge and understanding you will have gained in studying for the
prerequisite units if you are studying this course as part of a BSc degree.
Detailed reading references in this subject guide refer to the editions of the
set textbooks listed above. New editions of one or more of these textbooks
may have been published by the time you study this course. You can use
a more recent edition of any of the books; use the detailed chapter and
section headings and the index to identify relevant readings. Also check
the virtual learning environment (VLE) regularly for updated guidance on
readings.
Further reading
Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free
to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You
will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by
thinking about how these principles apply in the real world. To help you
read extensively, you have free access to the VLE and University of London
Online Library (see below).
Other useful texts for this course include:
Books
Bain, W. Between anarchy and society: trusteeship and the obligations of power.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) first edition [ISBN 0199260265].
Bull, H. The anarchical society. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003)
third edition [ISBN 0231127634].
Buzan, B. The United States and the great powers. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) first edition [ISBN 0745633757].
Hoffman, S. The ethics and politics of humanitarian intervention. (New York:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997) first edition [ISBN 0268009368].
Jackson, R. The global covenant. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) new
edition [ISBN 0199262012].
Jackson-Preece, J. Minority rights. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) first edition
[ISBN 0745623956].
Mayall, J. (ed.) The new interventionism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) first edition [ISBN 0521551978].
Schelling, T. The strategy of conflict. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2006) reprint edition [ISBN 0674840313].
4
Introduction
Vincent, R. Human rights and international relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge
Walzer, M. Just and unjust wars. (New York: Basic Books, 2000) fourth edition
[ISBN 0465037070].
Wheeler, N. Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) new edition [ISBN 0199253102].
Articles
Ayoob, M. The security problematique of the Third World, World Politics 43(2)
1991 pp.25783.
Baldwin, D. The concept of security, Review of International Studies 23(1)
1997 pp.526.
Booth, K. Security and emancipation, Review of International Studies 17(4)
1991 pp.31326.
Buzan, B. Peace, power and security: contending concepts, Journal of Peace
Research 21(2) 1984 pp.10925.
Dunne T. and N. Wheeler We the peoples: contending discourses of security
in human rights theory and practice, International Relations 18(1) 2004
pp.923.
Hendrickson, D. The curious case of American hegemony: imperial aspirations
and national decline, World Policy Journal, Summer 2004, pp.122.
Herz, J. The security dilemma in international relations: background and
present problems, International Relations 17(4) 2003 pp.41116.
Kaldor, M. American power: from compellance to cosmopolitanism,
International Affairs 79(1) 2003 pp.122.
Kennan, G. Morality and foreign policy, Foreign Affairs 64(2) 1985 pp.205218.
Mandelbaum, M. A perfect failure: NATOs war against Yugoslavia, Foreign
Affairs 78(5) 1999 pp.28.
Rothschild, E. What is security? Ddalus 124(3) 1995 pp.5398.
Newman, E. Humanitarian intervention, legality and legitimacy, International
Journal of Human Rights 6(4) (2002) pp.102120.
Rudolph, C. Globalization and security, Security Studies 13(1) 2002 pp.132.
Simpson, J. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: back to the future? UNIDIR
Disarmament Forum 1 2004 pp.112.
Srensen, G. Individual security and national security, Security Dialogue 27(4)
1996 pp.37186.
Williams, M. Identity and the politics of security, European Journal of
International Relations 4(2) 1998 pp.20425.
United Kingdom, Terrorist Act, 2006, www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2006/20060011.htm
United States Congress Uniting and strengthening America by providing
appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct Terrorism Act (US Patriot
Act), 2001, http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/
hr3162.pdf
Works cited
Assessing the new normal: liberty and security for the post-September 11
United States (Washington, D.C.: Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 2003). www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/
AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf
Bailyn, J. The ideological origins of the American Revolution. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 1992) first edition [ISBN 0674443020].
Bain, W. Between anarchy and society: trusteeship and the obligations of power.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) first edition [ISBN 0199260265].
Berki, R. Security and society. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986) first edition
[ISBN 031270920X].
5

Berlin, I. The crooked timber of humanity. (London: John Murray, 1990) first
edition [ISBN 071954789X].
Bull, H. Society and anarchy in international relations, in M. Wight and H.
Butterfield (eds) Diplomatic investigations. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968) first edition [ISBN 0674210018] pp.3550.
Bull, H. (2003) The anarchical society. New York: Columbia University Press,
Commission on Global Governance Our global neighbourhood: the report of the
Commission on Global Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
first edition [ISBN 0198279981].
Donnelly, J. Universal human rights in theory and practice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, first edition [ISBN 0801423163].
Gong, G. The standard of civilization in international society. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984) first edition [ISBN 0198219482].
and national decline, World Policy Journal 22(2) (2004) pp.122.
Hobbes, T. Leviathan. Edited by M. Oakeshott. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1946).
Jackson, R. Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the third world.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) reprint edition
[ISBN 0521447836].
Mayall, J. Nationalism and international society. (Cambridge: Cambridge
Mayer, A. Islam and human rights. (New York: Westview Press, 1995) fourth
Musgrave, T. Self determination and national minorities. (Oxford: Clarendon
Parsons, A. From cold war to hot peace. (London: Penguin Books, 1995) first
Pollis, A. and P. Schwab Human rights: a western construct with limited
applicability, in A. Pollis and P. Schwab (eds) Human rights: cultural and
ideological perspectives. (New York: Praeger, 1979) first edition.
Rohde, D. Endgame: the betrayal and fall of Srebrenica. (New York: Westview
Roberts, A. NATOs humanitarian war over Kosovo, Survival 41(3) 1999
pp.102123.
Schelling, T. The strategy of conflict. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2006) reprint edition [ISBN 0674840313].
Shrivastava, B.K. and M. Agarwal Politics of intervention and the BosniaHerzegovina conflict, International Studies 40(1) 2003 pp.6984.
Simpson, J. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: back to the future?, UNIDIR
Disarmament Forum 1 (2004) pp.112.
Southern, R. The making of the Middle Ages. (London: Hutchinson 1993) [ISBN
0300002300].
Sanctioned bias: racial profiling since 9/11 (New York: American Civil Liberties
Union, 2004).
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) eleventh
edition [ISBN 9780198610472].
Vincent, J. Grotius, human rights and intervention, in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury
and A. Roberts (eds) Hugo Grotius and international relations. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2002) reprint edition [ISBN 0198277717] pp.241256.
Wight, M. Power politics. (London: International Publishing, 1974)
[ISBN 0826461743].
Wight, M. and H. Butterfield (eds) Diplomatic investigations. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) first edition [ISBN 0674210018].
6
Introduction
Additional resources
Periodicals
The following are a list of recommended periodicals that are relevant to
this course:
Adelphi Papers
American Political Science Review
Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
European Journal of International Relations
Global Society
Human Rights Quarterly
International Affairs
International Security
Journal of Peace Research
Millennium
Nations and Nationalism
Peace and Conflict Studies
Political Studies
Prospect Magazine
Review of International Studies
Security Dialogue
Survival: The IISS Quarterly
The Economist Magazine
World Politics
Online study resources

In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading, it is crucial that
you take advantage of the study resources that are available online for this
course, including the VLE and the Online Library.
You can access the VLE, the Online Library and your University of London
email account via the Student Portal at:
http://my.londoninternational.ac.uk
You should have received your login details for the Student Portal with
your official offer, which was emailed to the address that you gave
on your application form. You have probably already logged in to the
Student Portal in order to register! As soon as you registered, you will
automatically have been granted access to the VLE, Online Library and
your fully functional University of London email account.
If you forget your login details at any point, please email uolia.support@
london.ac.uk quoting your student number.
The VLE
The VLE, which complements this subject guide, has been designed to
enhance your learning experience, providing additional support and a
sense of community. It forms an important part of your study experience
with the University of London and you should access it regularly.
7
The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses:

Self-testing activities: Doing these allows you to test your own
understanding of subject material.
Electronic study materials: The printed materials that you receive from
the University of London are available to download, including updated
reading lists and references.
Past examination papers and Examiners commentaries: These provide
advice on how each examination question might best be answered.
A student discussion forum: This is an open space for you to discuss
interests and experiences, seek support from your peers, work
collaboratively to solve problems and discuss subject material.
Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject,
interviews and debates and, for some courses, audio-visual tutorials
and conclusions.
Recorded lectures: For some courses, where appropriate, the sessions
from previous years Study Weekends have been recorded and made
available.
Study skills: Expert advice on preparing for examinations and
developing your digital literacy skills.
Feedback forms.
Some of these resources are available for certain courses only, but we
are expanding our provision all the time and you should check the VLE
regularly for updates.
Making use of the Online Library

The Online Library contains a huge array of journal articles and other
resources to help you read widely and extensively.
To access the majority of resources via the Online Library you will either
need to use your University of London Student Portal login details, or you
will be required to register and use an Athens login:
http://tinyurl.com/ollathens
The easiest way to locate relevant content and journal articles in the
Online Library is to use the Summon search engine.
If you are having trouble finding an article listed in a reading list, try
removing any punctuation from the title, such as single quotation marks,
question marks and colons.
For further advice, please see the online help pages: www.external.shl.lon.
ac.uk/summon/about.php
Useful websites
The following are a list of websites which may be useful in essay preparation.
Unless otherwise stated, all websites in this subject guide were accessed in
April 2011. We cannot guarantee, however, that they will stay current and
you may need to perform an internet search to find the relevant pages.
International organisations
United Nations
www.un.org is the main homepage
www.un.org/Docs/sc/ is the site of the Security Council
Introduction
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

www.nato.int is the main homepage
www.kforonline.com is the site of the NATO operation in Kosovo
www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html is the site of the NATO
operation in Afghanistan
www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html is the site of the NATO mission in
Bosnia
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
www.osce.org is the main site of the OSCE
www.osce.org/kosovo is the site of the OSCE Mission to Kosovo
www.oscebih.org is the site of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia
Organisation of American States
www.oas.org
Organisation of African Unity
www.oau.org
Non-governmental organisations
End Genocide
www.endgenocide.org
Human Rights Watch
www.hrw.org
International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent
www.icrc.org
Independent International Commission on Kosovo
www.kosovocommision.org
International Crisis Group
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm
Minority Rights Group
www.minorityrights.org
Prevent Genocide
www.preventgenocide.org
Research centres, projects and online documentation

Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs
www.cceia.org/
Center for Defence and International Security Studies
www.cdiss.org/
Center for Peace and Human Security
www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/
Center for Military and Strategic Studies
www.cmss.ucalgary.ca/index.html
Human Security Center
www.humansecuritycentre.org/
International Institute for Strategic Studies
www.iiss.org/
International Relations and Security Network
www.isn.ethz.ch/net/prin/hsc.cfm
9
Institute for War and Peace Reporting

www.iwpr.net/
Institute on Global Cooperation and Conflict
http://igcc.ucsd.edu/
Terrorism Research Center
www.terrorism.com/
Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
www.trudeaucentre.ca/
Web Genocide Documentation Centre
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide.htm
Yale University Avalon Project
(for international treaties from the sixteenth century to the present)
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
Wikipedia
Wikipedia can be useful as a freely accessible online encyclopedia. But
you must always remember that the quality of entries varies enormously.
Accordingly, you should not rely on Wikipedia as a sole source of
information. Instead, Wikipedia must always be used in conjunction with
other, more reliable sources (e.g., academic books and journal articles such
as those listed in the subject guide). This cautionary note also applies more
generally to other information available on the web.
Examination structure
The examination paper for this course is three hours in duration and
you are expected to answer four questions, from a choice of twelve.
The Examiner attempts to ensure that all of the topics covered in the
syllabus and subject guide are examined. Some questions could cover
more than one topic from the syllabus since the different topics are not
self-contained. A Sample examination paper appears as an appendix to
this guide, along with a sample Examiners commentary. The Examiners
commentaries contain valuable information about how to approach the
examination and so you are strongly advised to read them carefully. Past
examination papers and the associated reports are valuable resources
when preparing for the examination. You should ensure that all four
questions are answered, allowing an approximately equal amount of time
for each question, and attempting all parts or aspects of a question.
Examination advice
Important: the information and advice given here are based on the
examination structure used at the time this guide was written. Please
note that subject guides may be used for several years. Because of this
we strongly advise you to always check both the current Regulations for
relevant information about the examination, and the VLE where you
should be advised of any forthcoming changes. You should also carefully
check the rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and follow
those instructions.
Answer the question asked
Your answer needs to address the question asked and not another that you
have seen on a past exam paper or that you would prefer to answer. To
10
Introduction
avoid this mistake, it is useful to clearly identify the precise question you
are answering from the outset. Similarly, you should also define the key
terms relating to that question. It is helpful to the examiner if, in the first
paragraph, you briefly indicate what your answer to the question will be,
the main points you will put forward in support of this position and the
order in which these will be discussed (this is often called signposting; for
more on this tactic see also the answer structure below).
Develop your own ideas
Remember, you are asked to put forward your own ideas in answering the
examination questions, so do not confuse analysis with description (i.e.,
the aim is not merely to identify what happened but to explain how it
came about, why these particular events, decisions, policies, people were
important, etc.). Similarly, you should not simply repeat what you have
read in the course. The examiner wants to know what you think and why
and so the aim is not to provide a summary of what various authors on the
reading list have argued but to discuss your own perspective in relation to
the issues surveyed. Finally, be sure to fully explain your ideas rather than
simply identify them in passing. To avoid this pitfall, always ask yourself
why do I think this point is important and then make sure to say precisely
that in your answer.
Support ideas with examples
Wherever possible, provide concrete examples and illustrations so that
your answer is based upon solid, empirical evidence. This evidence can
be provided by, among others: defining key terms and concepts; citing
a particular event, decision, policy, etc., to back up a generalisation;
providing dates whenever possible.
Structure
To the examiner, the structure and coherence of your argument are just
as important as your knowledge and understanding of the syllabus. To
help organise your thoughts quickly, it is always sensible to start with an
essay plan before you begin the actual writing. That way you will know
in advance what you are going to say and in what order, which will make
the writing easier. Your answers should always include an introduction
which identifies the question, defines key terms or concepts, and provides
signposts so that the examiner can follow your argument in the main
body; a main body which develops your answer by discussing the key
points on which it is based and supporting these with examples; and a
conclusion which recaps your answer and offers final reflections (why the
question is important, further implications of your answer, etc.)
Remember, it is important to check the VLE for:
up-to-date information on examination and assessment arrangements
for this course
where available, past examination papers and Examiners commentaries
for the course which give advice on how each question might best be
answered.
11
Syllabus
This course will interrogate the key concepts and dilemmas involved in
security policy by a careful examination of the leading security paradigms
national security, international security and human security. In each
case, we examine the historical circumstances out of which the paradigm
originates, the political problems it seeks to address, the constraints it
imposes upon policy makers, and its significance within contemporary
international society.
The principal themes to be addressed are:
What does it mean to be secure and why does it matter?
Does security for some automatically imply insecurity for others?
How have changes in domestic and international society influenced the
ways in which we respond to security dilemmas?
List of abbreviations used in this subject guide

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States Of America
12
Chapter 1: The idea of security

Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the idea of security as a core value
of human life and the key assumptions which underlie it:
security in (or of) what
security from what
security for what
security by what means.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential readings
and activities, you should be able to:
explain where the desire for security comes from, and how this desire is
reflected in everyday life
describe the kind of human activities we associate with security
discuss and compare the main international relations approaches to the
problem of insecurity
discuss the relationship between personal security and state security
describe and evaluate security policies in response to the threat of
international terrorism.
Essential reading
Bain, W. The empire of security and the safety of the people. Introduction and
Chapter 1.
Buzan, B. People, states and fear. Introduction.
Hough, P. Understanding global security. Chapter 1.
Morality and foreign policy, George F. Kennan Foreign Affairs Vol. 64 (2)
(1985), pp.20518 (article consists of 14 pages)
Further reading
Baldwin, D. The concept of security, Review of International Studies 23(1)
1997 pp.526.
Berki, R. Security and society (1986) Chapters 1 and 2.
Buzan, B. Peace, power and security: contending concepts, Journal of Peace
Research 21(2) 1984 pp.10925.
Jackson, R. The global covenant. (2000) Chapter 8.
Huysmans, J. Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier,
European Journal of International Relations, 4(2) 1998 pp.22655.
Rothschild, E. What is security?, Ddalus pp.124(3) 1995 pp.5398.
Additional resources
International Relations and Security Network www.isn.ethz.ch/ Center for
Security Studies, ETH, Zrich, Switzerland.
13
The value of security

Security is a core value of human life. To be secure is to be untroubled by
danger or fear.1 As Thomas Hobbes reminds us, without security there is
no place for industry no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.2
Citizens of developed Western states routinely take their security for
granted until it is challenged by some extraordinary event like the
September 11 attack on the World Trade Center or the July 7 bombings
on the London Underground. Sadly, many people around the world do not
live in such peaceful or prosperous circumstances. For them, insecurity is
a fact of everyday life just as it was for Hobbes during the English Civil
War of the seventeenth century. Such profoundly insecure conditions
are particularly evident in circumstances of war where the fundamental
preoccupation of everyday life becomes safety and survival.
Recall for a moment television images you have seen about life in states
which have experienced violent conflict. Do you remember the image of a
bombed street market in Sarajevo during the Yugoslav wars of secession?
The daily routine of buying and selling is disrupted by shelling. Men,
women and children run for shelter. Those who do not make it to safety
lie injured or dying in the streets. Scenes like these have, at various times,
also occurred in Baghdad, Beirut, Gaza, Mogadishu, Grozny, Belfast and
many other cities around the world. Insecurity is associated with war and
the threat of war; security is associated with peace and stability. Because
security is a necessary precursor for human life it is a fundamental good
in itself, both a personal good and a political good. Hobbes and others like
him who have experienced first hand the tragedy of war remind those of
us in more privileged circumstances, lest we forget, that security is the
most basic of all human values. It is the foundation upon which we build
our individual and collective lives.
Activity
Can you think of a moment when you felt threatened or insecure? What were the
circumstances? What were you afraid of? How did you respond to these feelings of
insecurity?
For example, I was afraid to walk to my car at the railway station. It was
dark and raining and no other people were in sight. I was afraid of being
mugged or worse. So I waited by the train platform until a group of people
came along and walked into the car park with them on the assumption
that there was safety in numbers.
The desire for security is a defensive and self-protecting response to
the fact or threat of harm from other human beings. If there were no
threatening people the need to guarantee security would disappear.
Natural disasters like the hurricane and consequent flooding in New
Orleans in 2005 would still occur and would require emergency planning
and responses. But there would be no problem of looting, shooting, rape,
murder or other forms of predatory and violent behaviour with which
to contend. Disruption and loss of life would probably still occur but it
would not be a result of violence or attack from other human beings.
Unfortunately, human history to date powerfully supports the proposition
that there will always be some people who will pose a threat to others.
Consequently, the problem of security remains.
14
1
The Concise Oxford
Dictionary (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, eighth
edition 1990), p.1093.
Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan. Edited by
Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1946), esp. Chapter. 13.
Activity
Read Buzan, introduction, Hough, Chapter 1, and Bain, Introduction, then answer the
following questions.
1. How is the desire for security reflected in social life?
2. What sort of human activities are associated with security?
3. How does international relations approach the problem of insecurity?
Key assumptions of security

There are four key assumptions underlying the idea of security: security in
(or of) what, from what, for what, and by what means?3
Security in (or of) what?

This assumption recognises the vulnerability of humans who live in social
circumstances. An isolated individual is inviolable from attack by other
people: Robinson Crusoe knew no fear of this kind until Man Friday
arrived on the island. The idea of security is directed at the problem of
harmful acts by other people, either fellow citizens or foreigners and not
the forces of nature. The crux of security for our purposes is captured by
Hedley Bull: Security in international politics means no more than safety:
either objective safety, meaning safety which actually exists, or subjective
safety, meaning safety which is felt or experienced.4 Safety is a condition
of human relations. Safety is order and predictability in our relations with
other people.
Security from what?
Robert Jackson, The

Global covenant: human
conduct in a world of
states (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000),
pp.19092.
Hedley Bull, The

anarchical society
(second edition)
(London: Macmillan,
1995), p.18.
4
In Hobbes state of nature every human being is a potential threat

because the struggle for survival in a world of limited resources is war
of all against all. One human being may be stronger, another more
cunning, but each in his or her own way is capable of inflicting harm
upon another. Accordingly, there can never be complete trust and mutual
security between human beings. The human condition is precarious even
in the most hospitable of circumstances because we are all unavoidably
exposed at least to some degree to others who are at best careless
and unreliable and at worst mean and malevolent. It is precisely because
human nature is flawed that perfect security cannot exist in any human
society. Some measure of insecurity, however large or small, is always
present or possible. People who live in stable and generally peaceful and
prosperous societies nevertheless install burglar alarms to protect their
homes. And they may also avoid certain areas at certain times of the day
where they calculate that a reasonable risk of being mugged, raped or
even murdered exists. For example, even though I live in a prosperous
English market town with a low crime rate, I avoid going into the railway
station car park late at night. On such occasions, if at all possible, I try to
take a taxi rather than drive myself. Behaviour like this discloses prudence
rather than paranoia. And it is a further reminder that each and every one
of us is, to some extent at least, insecure.
Security by means of what?

Our safety is protected by creating barriers, bulwarks, ramparts, police
forces, armed forces, etc., to keep us out of harms reach. The opposite
of safety is vulnerability being exposed to danger, in peril, at risk, etc.
Safety requires only that everybody respect everybody elses freedom and
leave them alone. Security is achieved wherever and whenever men and
15
women do not threaten or harm one another. Unfortunately, not everyone

is prepared to forgo their own desires or ambitions if these infringe the
well being of others. We put locks on our doors and alarms on our houses
to keep out those who would otherwise take our possessions or in other
ways rob us of that which we hold dear (be this life, liberty, property or
whatever). Insecurity arises when some people will not restrain themselves
and cannot be restrained by others.
Security can be achieved in two ways: through deterrence on the part of
the would-be protector or diffidence on the part of would-be attacker.5
Some theorists, like Thomas Schelling, prioritise the credibility of
deterrence as the key component of security policy.6 Other theorists,
like Thomas Hobbes, prioritise diffidence, which is a mental condition
that disables people who otherwise would be a threat.7 Deterrence and
diffidence are not unrelated ideas far from it, diffidence is the desired
consequence of deterrence. Providing security is thus all about instilling
fear in the mind of a would-be attacker with a view to preventing an attack.
Security for what?

The answer to this question should now be clear: so that people can
enjoy the advantages of living in society with others while limiting the
risks. Isolated individuals like Robinson Crusoe are in a perfectly secure
condition with respect to attack from other human beings because there
is nobody around to attack them. But few of us would find the life of a
sole shipwreck survivor appealing. All alone, there can be no interaction,
no communication and no cooperation. This is a life devoid of human
kindness, compassion, companionship, love or family. And I think most
people would agree, the loss of human society is too high a price to pay for
complete freedom from harm by other people.
As a result, security is a core value of human relations. The necessity of
security arises from the fact that people do want to live together and are
thus vulnerable to each other. Security makes possible what otherwise
probably could not be achieved: a flourishing society that is relatively
safe from would-be attackers. Of course, within society, one can never
be completely safe. That is precisely why we need security policies. Such
policies usually involve creating and maintaining police and military forces
that are prepared and equipped to carry out that essential job for the
public good.
Normative vs instrumental approaches to security

There are two very different approaches to security evident within
international relations: one normative and the other instrumental.
A normative view of security is one predicated upon values, ideas and
identities. The clear implication of this subject guide is that security should
be regarded as fundamentally normative because without it human life is
reduced to a basic struggle for survival. This normative view is also evident
in the Buzan, Bain, Economides and Berdal and, to a lesser extent, Hough
essential texts. When we approach security in this way, our analysis tends
towards hard choices between competing values (e.g., as between security
of the state and security of the person). These choices are concerned not
only with the ends or goals of security policy but also with the means
used to pursue them. Thus, security policy itself comes to be regarded as a
series of moral dilemmas to which there can be no easy solutions.
But much of the wider literature on security (e.g., many of the leading
journals cited at the end of the introduction to this subject guide) takes
a rather different view, one constituted by instrumentalism or the belief
16
Global covenant,
p.192.
See T. Schelling, The

Strategy of conict
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press,
1980).
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan p.81.
that policies should be judged only by their outcomes. Neo-realism is

a case in point. Neo-realism is a material approach informed by power
capabilities and quantifiable risks (see the reference to Schelling above
for an example). Moral dilemmas are not only absent from such analyses
but tend to be regarded as deeply inappropriate because of their ability to
distract us from the rational pursuit of our interests.
You should be aware that the ongoing debate between normative
and instrumental approaches to security is part of a much larger
methodological controversy within international relations, and indeed the
social sciences more generally. Each approach has its advantages as well
as its disadvantages. It is up to you to decide which view you find most
convincing and on what basis.
Activity
Read the following article by George F. Kennan. Then consider whether and to what
extent security policy should have a normative dimension. Write your points down under
two separate headings: Advantages of a normative approach and Disadvantages of a
normative approach. Now re-read your list and ask yourself which view you find most
convincing and on what basis.
Morality and foreign policy, George F. Kennan Foreign Affairs Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter,
1985), pp.20528 (article consists of 14 pages)
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
www.jstor.org/stable/20042569
Security of the state and security of the person

The study of international relations is fundamentally concerned
with relations between states. The state was, in its origins, a security
arrangement and it remains so today. A huge amount of state resources
is directed towards maintaining effective police and armed forces,
implementing anti-terrorist measures, ensuring civil and emergency
defences, using intelligence to detect and counter external attack and
internal subversion, using diplomacy to strengthen alliances and isolate
threats and using economic power to encourage cooperation and isolate or
weaken political rivals.
Hobbes solution to the problem of personal security is the creation of
a political order or sovereign which he terms leviathan to protect the
people. Leviathan can only come about if individual men and women
are prepared to exchange their personal freedom to individually protect
themselves for protection by the sovereign. The state for Hobbes is
essentially a collective security arrangement. But as he famously indicates,
that statist solution to the problem of personal insecurity simultaneously
gives rise to a new threat of insecurity between states:
kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their
independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and
posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their
eyes fixed on one another and continual spies upon their
neighbors; which is a posture of war.8
So, paradoxically, at the very moment that leviathan resolves the problem
of personal security within the state, it creates a new problem of insecurity
between states. That security dilemma between states is a defining feature
of international relations up to and including the present time. It is the
consequence of the existence of a plurality of independent sovereign
states, which Hedley Bull describes as an anarchical society.
Hobbes, Leviathan,
Chapter. 13, p.83.
8
17
There is, however, an important distinction between security of the state

and security of the person. Personal security is an essential precondition
for human flourishing. It frees people to pursue their own interests, goals,
ambitions etc. without the fear of harm by others provided they, in turn,
do not violate the harm principle by causing deliberate injury to others.
Personal security is our individual protection from harm by other people.
In a nutshell, personal security means peace of mind.
It is of course impossible to remove all possibility harm by others. My
house in England has a burglar alarm. Even the most sophisticated burglar
alarm may be overcome by those determined to do so. But if a burglar
alarm is installed many burglars will be deterred, others will be thwarted,
and those that do manage to get through will be pursued by the local
police force, and hopefully apprehended, charged and convicted. For
this reason, I sleep soundly in my house at night even though I know my
burglar alarm is not foolproof.
Security of the state refers to a states ability to protect itself from external
dangers and menaces: for example, intervention, blockade, invasion,
destruction, occupation, or some other harmful interference by a hostile
foreign power or terrorist group. The methods of state security are
analogous to the burglar alarm on my house. The goal of state security is
to deter, prevent or defeat attacks against the state and its population.
The ideas of state and people are closely related. Indeed, a classic
definition of sovereignty (which is the key attribute of a state) is effective
control over territory and population. Nevertheless, it is crucial not to
collapse the distinction between state security and personal security as
some liberal political theorists try to do. In liberal political theory, the state
not only belongs to the people but is in fact a creation of the people; it is
the peoples government, the peoples law, the peoples army, the peoples
police, the peoples courts and ultimately the peoples prisons and even
the peoples gallows. Therefore, in theory at least, the state cannot pose a
threat to its own citizens whose personal interests are synonymous with
state interests. For that theory to hold true, however, the coercive power of
the state should be used as a last resort and as rarely as possible. In other
words, the state is legitimate only in so far as its coercive power affects
most people marginally, negligibly, and indirectly, while its full might is
meted out to a relatively small (and in principle) indefinite group of lawbreakers.9
In practice, however, security of the state does not always translate into
security of the people in the way that liberal theory would like it to do.
There are many states which are unable to provide personal security for
their populations because they do not exercise effective control over all
the territory within their jurisdiction we often refer to these as weak
or failed states. There are also states which directly and purposefully
threaten their own peoples in order to maintain control or fulfil
ideological or economic goals we often refer to these as totalitarian
or police states. If we collapse the distinction between security of the
state and security of the people we will not be able to adequately analyse
circumstances like these.
Activity
Consider a state of your own choosing, then answer the following questions.
1. Is the government answerable to the people (i.e., through free and fair elections)?
2. Does the government exercise effective control over all the territory of the state?
18
R.N. Berki Security and

society. (London: J.M.
Dent and Sons, 1986),
p.53.
3. Are the human rights of the entire population of the state generally respected?
4. Based on your answers to questions 13, does this state protect the security of the
people?
Three paradigms of security

There are three main paradigms of security within international relations:
national security, international security and human security. The first two
approaches give moral primacy to the state as a necessary precondition for
human flourishing. In contrast with these two state-centred approaches,
a third perspective on security gives moral primacy to human beings and
the community of humankind over and above the interests of states or the
international society to which they belong. These three security paradigms
may be briefly summarised as follows.
National security
The proponents of national security, who we often refer to as realists,
generally assume that we live in a world where states are both the
main sources of security and the main security threats. You will recall
from 11 Introduction to international relations that realism
envisions a world of mutual fear, suspicion and conflict in which states
must constantly struggle for survival. The problem of national security
arises out of this anarchical world view, that is, a world of independent
and armed states which are capable of inflicting harm upon one another.
National security policies are directed at creating and maintaining armed
forces for national defence and deterrence. They also involve measures
designed to deal with internal threats to security such as criminals,
rebels, terrorists, etc. The national security paradigm is well equipped to
address circumstances like those of the Cold War where two rival states
are actively opposing one another. But it is less well placed to interrogate
problems of weak, failed, or totalitarian states because of a tendency to
collapse the distinction between state security and personal security. Thus,
for example, realists like Schelling produced convincing accounts of the
arms race between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War but were
largely silent on the security dilemmas confronting civil rights proponents
in Jim Crow states of the American South or political dissidents in
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Activity
Compare and contrast the security objectives of Canada: www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.as
p?Language=E&Page=publications&Sub=natsecurnat&Doc=natsecurnat_e.htm and the
United States: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
1. What are the similarities?
2. What are the differences?
3. Can you think of any reasons which might explain these differences?
International security
The proponents of international security, who we often refer to as
pluralists or rationalists, see a world characterised by a mixture of conflict
and cooperation. From this perspective, relations between states constitute
an anarchical society. Thus although it is true that there is no single
source of authority or government, international relations nevertheless are
reasonably orderly and purposeful, and subject to mutual regulation and
constraint stemming from a shared interest in survival and coexistence.
19
Following on from this, pluralists differ from realists in their assumption

that states are not the only actors responsible for providing security.
Instead, pluralists believe the responsibility for providing security also
extends to international society.
This way of conceptualising security became prominent during the
twentieth century as the idea of a global and increasingly institutionalised
international society gained ground. One of its earliest embodiments is in
article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was intended to
preserve the territorial settlement created at Paris in 1919 following the
end of the First World War.
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of
the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter
of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any
action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations.
A similar endorsement of international security was embodied as Article 1

of the United Nations Charter in 1945:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace
The international security paradigm operates somewhat differently

than either the national or human security paradigms. Whereas both
national and human security imagine insecurity as an external threat,
there is no similar external dynamic within international security. Since
international society is global, unless or until we encounter extraterrestrial
beings capable of threatening human life, insecurity in this context must
necessarily come from within and not from without; it is an internal
dynamic arising out of the condition of anarchy. Usually insecurity is
consequent on the action of other members of international society (i.e.,
states) but it can also be created by non-state actors like terrorist groups.
It is this non-state dynamic which gives the so called American-led War
against terror which followed the September 11 attacks its global extent.
International security is thus an internal problem for international
society as a whole. In this context, the use of armed force is directed at
what may in essence be thought as the problem of internal subversion
by those who would threaten the plural and cooperative character of
international society. Secession, irredentism, aggressive war, conquest,
illegal occupation, mass expulsion, genocide and other actions which
violate international law all threaten to disrupt the general condition of
peace, order and lawfulness within international society. International law
and enforcement directed at such transgressions are akin to domestic law
enforcement within state that is, they are intended to preserve a general
condition of peace and stability within society (in this case international
society) so that the members of that society (principally states) can go
about their daily lives.
In practice, however, such enforcement is often highly controversial
precisely because it would potentially sacrifice the national security of one
state member of international society for the good of the whole society.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq by US-led forces is a case in point. The military
attack and consequent occupation of the independent and sovereign state
of Iraq was not authorised by the United Nations Security Council and,
for that and other reasons, many experts in international law consider
these acts to be illegal. In contrast, the so-called Gulf War of 199091 is
20
usually cited as one of the few examples of legitimate international law

enforcement both because it was done with prior UN Security Council
authorisation and because it received almost universal support by the
members of international society.
Human security
The proponents of human security, who we often refer to as solidarists or
revolutionists, consider personal security to be a fundamental problem
of international relations and not merely a matter for the domestic
politics of the state concerned. Human security is often presented as a
new perspective on security questions. To describe human security in
this way is somewhat deceptive because there are historical precedents
for assigning moral primacy to individuals. Immanuel Kant, for example,
believed in universal duty towards other human beings without exception
of place or jurisdiction. Kant describes a universal right of mankind by
which he means the legitimate claim of all men and women to recognition
and protection by public authorities as individual human beings. Similarly,
human rights law, the doctrine of crimes against humanity, the rights of
non-combatants under international humanitarian law (the laws of war)
and the prohibition of genocide, to name only a few issues, existed in
order to protect personal security over and above the security of states
long before the term human security was coined.
The core idea embodied by human security is essentially that the security
of the person, the security of the state and the security of the society of
states are fundamentally interconnected you cannot have one without
the others. If any one man or woman or child in the world is unsafe, then
nobody else can be safe either. To tolerate personal insecurity in one state
risks spreading insecurity to other states, and by extension, international
society itself. For example, human or minority rights violations in one
state may spark refugee flows that cross frontiers, which in turn create
a problem of asylum seekers in other states and a consequent matter
of concern for international agencies like the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. A similar chain effect might be seen with
regard to terrorism, or civil war, or other threats which threaten to overrun
international frontiers.
The criticism that human security proponents direct at contemporary
security arrangements exactly follows on from this principle of human
interconnectedness which continues to exist regardless of juridical
boundaries. Torture, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, genocide and other gross
human rights violations within states cannot be tolerated if the safety
of all human beings is to be achieved. Something must be done to stop
them, and states should not hide behind the international legal principles
of equal sovereignty and non-intervention to evade this fundamental
humanitarian obligation. The human security paradigm is becoming
increasingly influential in international relations. Nevertheless, for the
time being at least, with a few notable exceptions like Canada, it remains
disproportionately a subject of non-governmental organisations rather
than the foreign policies of states. And it is still far from universally
accepted.
21
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 1. Then consider each of the three security paradigms we have just
summarised and answer the following questions.
1. Which of these three do you find most appealing and on what basis?
2. Are they equally important in international relations?
3. Or do you think one security paradigm dominates and, if so, why?
The subsequent chapters will more fully interrogate the core content
and practical implications of these three security paradigms for our
understanding of international relations.
A reminder of your learning outcomes

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential readings and activities,
you should be able to:
explain where the desire for security comes from, and how this desire is
reflected in everyday life
describe the kind of human activities we associate with security
discuss and compare the main international relations approaches to the
problem of insecurity
discuss the relationship between personal security and state security
describe and evaluate security policies in response to the threat of
international terrorism.
Sample examination questions

1. Security in international politics means no more than safety. Discuss.
2. What is deterrence and how has it featured in security policy?
3. Does security of the state always translate into security of the people?
22
Chapter 2: The state as a security arrangement
Chapter 2: The state as a security

arrangement
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to examine the origins of the state as a security
arrangement. In so doing we will discuss:
the security of the prince in dynastic states
the rise of popular sovereignty and the security of the people
nation states and national security.
Learning outcomes
describe and examine why the state is viewed as a formidable security
organisation
describe and analyse the relationship between popular sovereignty and
the security of the people
explain what conditions must be satisfied for the ideal of national
security to be achieved.
Essential reading
Bain The empire of security and the safety of the people. Chapters 5 and 9.
Buzan People, states and fear. Chapters 1 and 2.
Further reading
Cohen, Y., B.R. Brown and A.F.K. Organski The paradoxical nature of statemaking: the violent creation of order, American Political Science Review
75(4) 1981.
Jackson-Preece, J. National minorities and the European nation states system.
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) first edition [ISBN 0198294379] Chapter 2.
Jackson-Preece, J. Minority rights, (2005) Chapters 2 and 5.
Krause, K. Insecurity and state formation in the global military order: the
Middle Eastern case, European Journal of International Relations 2(3) 1996
pp.31954.
Mayall, J. (ed.) Nationalism and international society. (2003) pp.569 and
pp.11125.
Neocleous, M. From social to national security, Security Dialogue 37(3) 2006.
Walker, R.J.B. Security, sovereignty and the challenge of world politics,
Alternatives 15(1) 1990: pp.327.
Williams, Michael C. Identity and the politics of security, European Journal of
International Relations 42 1998 pp.20425.
Works cited
Southern, R. The making of the Middle Ages. (2003).
Bailyn, J. The ideological origins of the American Revolution. (1992).
23
Origins of the state as a security arrangement

The modern state was, in its origins, an important security arrangement
and despite the many other roles we now attribute to states (for instance,
providers of welfare, justice, prosperity and so forth) security remains
a primary consideration. The medieval Europe out of which the first
states emerged was characterised by profound insecurity. The so-called
pax romana of the Roman Empire (the long era of peace in Europe that
characterised the first and second centuries AD) was long gone and
in its wake existed a series of competing authorities, secular as well
as ecclesiastical. Europe in the Middle Ages was thus more or less in a
condition of deep disunity and political chaos. A variety of strong and
weak rulers jostled for control over territory and population. Political
jurisdictions were fluid and as a result usually too ineffectual to create
much stability. As R.G. Southern notes:
Areas of authority shaded into each other and overlaid each
other with little relation either to geography or history. No
political boundaries survived in their entirety the death of a
ruler; they were all subject to the chances of domestic change,
marriage, dowry, partition, death and forfeiture.1
Even the law itself was uncertain. Instead of a unified legal order there
existed a jumble of competing and frequently contradictory laws and
customs some of it based on the remnants of Roman law, some on
ecclesiastical law, some on ancient barbaric codes. Justice was largely a doit-yourself affair and therefore frequently arbitrary. For example, the blood
feud whereby the family of a murdered person could exact revenge on
the family of the murderer persisted in penal law (albeit with increasing
restrictions) until it was finally extinguished by royal prerogative in the
twelfth century. Violence was commonplace and, as Thomas Hobbes so
eloquently put it, the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.
The state emerged as a way of imposing order and control on this hitherto
chaotic social condition.
Security of the prince

In its earliest form, the state was a dynastic possession quite literally
the personal property of the prince. By claiming sovereignty or final
and absolute authority in the political community, the princes of early
modern Europe were able to impose a single, unified political will
namely their own. The idea of sovereignty thus gave legal authority and
moral purpose to the state-building endeavours of these dynastic princes:
rex est imperator in regno suo the king is emperor in his own realm
became the motto of the age. At the beginning and throughout their
history, the great dynastic families of Europe Tudor, Valois, Bourbon,
Hapsburg, Wittlesbach, Hohenzollern, Savoy, Romanov, and so forth.
were motivated by territory, wealth, prestige and power. Their political
purpose was to consolidate and wherever possible extend their dynastic
possessions. This objective they accomplished through war, conquest,
purchase, inheritance, marriage, diplomacy, duplicity, and the legal and
illegal confiscation of feudal vassals property.
In this world view, security of the state was synonymous with security
of the prince. The state was the personal property of the prince, and the
prince would use violence to defend and indeed extend that property.
Accordingly, dynastic princes were prepared to act ruthlessly against those
who challenged their new-found sovereign authority.
24
R.G. Southern, The

making of the Middle
Ages. (London: Pimlico
1993), p.18.
The so-called Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain (1479

1516) expelled 170,000 Jews who refused their order to be baptised.
Henry VIII of England (14911547) imprisoned and executed those who
would not sign his Act of Supremacy establishing the English monarch as
head of the Church of England, including even his good friend Thomas
More. Louis XIV of France (16381715) repeatedly resorted to internal
violence (repressive taxation, pillage, military subjugation, etc.) against
those provinces that opposed his centralising policies. Thus security for the
prince did not always translate into security for the people over whom he
ruled and might in fact cause them profound insecurity.
Security of the people

For the security of the people to take precedence over security of the
prince, a new understanding of political authority was required. The
principle of popular sovereignty began to emerge in England in the
late seventeenth century but was not fully formulated until the second
half of the eighteenth century. At about this time, the medieval theory
of authority and its concomitant political identities of sovereign and
subject were increasingly questioned by political theorists and reformers.
Initially, this challenge came from English parliamentarians and political
philosophers in the context of the Civil War of the 1640s. This new way of
conceptualising political authority led to the conclusion that such power
could not safely be entrusted to just one man, or even to a few men,
because the temptation to abuse it would be too great. Instead, it was
argued that sovereignty should properly be vested in parliament which
was neither one nor few.
It was this view of political authority which triumphed in England in
what has become known as the Glorious Revolution of 168889. At
that time, the English Parliament deposed the reigning Stuart monarch
(James II) and replaced him with the Dutch Prince William of Orange
and his wife Mary Stuart (daughter of James I), who jointly acceded
to the English throne as William III and Mary II. The only justification
which could convincingly be made for such a radical act was that ultimate
sovereignty resided in the people not the prince and thus Parliament as
representative of the people could transfer it from one prince to another
when circumstances required. A century later, the American and French
revolutionaries explained themselves in precisely these terms. As James
Madison wrote in 1792:
In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power.
America has set the example and France has followed it, of
charters of power granted by liberty.2
It is at this point in the history of political ideas that the concept of the
nation achieves political salience. Who are the people in whom sovereignty
ultimately resides? The people are the nation and the state exists as an
expression of the national will. The principle of all sovereignty rests
essentially in the nation. No body and no individual may exercise authority
which does not emanate from the nation expressly (Article 3, 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).
2
J. Bailyn, The
ideological origins of the
American Revolution.
(Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press, 1992),
p.55
Activity
Read either the 1789 French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen,
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm, or the 1776 American Declaration of
Independence, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/declare.htm, and then answer the following
questions.
25
1. On what basis do these revolutionary declarations criticise the security of the prince?
2. How do they characterise the security of the people?
3. Is this characterisation still valid today?
The security implications of this new formulation of authority are
immense. Henceforth, the state would belong to the people and not to
the prince. Consequently, the people were no longer the object of security
policy but instead its central subject. Nowhere is this transformation more
apparent than in the idea of a popular right of rebellion against tyrannical
government.
For a nation thus abused to arise unanimously and to resist
their prince, even to the dethroning of him, is not criminal but a
reasonable way of vindicating their liberties and just rights.3
It was just such a right which the American and French revolutionaries
claimed as justification for their actions.
Activity
Read Bain Chapters 5 and 9, then answer the following questions.
1. What view of security is reflected in the doctrine of self-determination?
2. Have demands for self-determination supported or subverted the national security of
existing states?
3. What kind of national security policies have been directed at problems of ethnic and
cultural diversity within states?
4. Is the personal security of the majority compatible with the personal security of the
minority? Why or why not?
Nation states and national security

As a result, from the time of the American and French revolutions
onwards, the dominant security paradigm has viewed the state, now styled
the nation state, to reflect its popular basis, as the fundamental source of
social belonging and ergo also personal well-being. The nation state in the
Western liberal tradition is understood as an extension of the will of the
individual citizens who comprise it and thus becomes the supreme moral
association within society. Its raison dtre is to preserve and promote just
relations among the citizenry, thereby ensuring that they remain free and
equal.
A well-governed nation state is a formidable security organisation. It is for
this reason that the nation state ultimately replaced clans, tribal societies,
fiefdoms, free cities, medieval guilds, duchies, dynastic states and even
empires, among others, to become the basic form of modern political
organisation. The nation state performs this central task by acting as an
effective and impartial arbiter within society.
In all of this, it is crucial to remember that according to liberal political
theory the state not only belongs to the nation but is in fact a creation
of the nation. In other words, the state is not meant to be a remote
entity separate from and imposing itself upon the nation. Far from it,
it is through the nation state that citizens guarantee their own security,
individual as well as collective. Personal security thus becomes dependent
upon and even analogous to national security. In contrast, insecurity
is understood as an external threat located outside the state/citizen
relationship: therefore in theory (if not in fact) the state cannot pose a
threat to its own citizens whose personal interests are synonymous with
26
Jonathan Mayhew,
1750, as quoted in
Bailyn, p.93.
state interests. This ideal is captured by the Latin expression: ubi bene, ibi
patria: where it is well with me, there is my country.
For the national security paradigm to hold true, the coercive power of
the state should be used as a last resort and as rarely as possible. In other
words, the state is legitimate only in so far as its coercive power affects
most people marginally, negligibly, and indirectly, while its full might
is meted out to a relatively small (and in principle) indefinite group of
law-breakers.4 That is the ideal, and in many states it closely corresponds
to historical reality. We might even go so far as to say that the history of
such countries in the period since 1945 bears out the liberal idea that a
secure state is the ultimate foundation for the good life. Citizens of such
states examples include the member states of the European Union, the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, among others
enjoy the highest standards of living in the history of humankind. These
are of course highly internationalised nation states, whose populations
benefit greatly from common security arrangements (NATO, etc.) as well
as economic unions (like the European Union and the North American
Free Trade Association) and internationally institutionalised free trade
(GATT, WTO), etc. This enviable condition owes much to the states ability
to create and maintain a secure society in which individual freedom is
protected.
Berkhi, p.53
Activity
Read Buzan Chapters 1 and 2 and then answer the following questions.
1. What does the state exist to do?
2. What is the states relationship to the society which it contains?
3. How does the maximal state differ from the minimal state?
4. Is either kind of state more conducive to personal security and, if so, on what basis?

describe and examine why the state is viewed as a formidable security
organisation
describe and analyse the relationship between popular sovereignty and
the security of the people
explain what conditions must be satisfied for the ideal of national
security to be achieved.

1. Should citizens have a right of rebellion against governments who do
not protect their personal security?
2. Under what circumstances does popular identity become a focus of
security policies?
3. Do you agree with the suggestion that it is in practice impossible to
distinguish between national security and the security interests of
political leaders?
27
Notes
28
Chapter 3: National security: current issues and contemporary application
Chapter 3: National security: current

issues and contemporary application
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to examine the paradigm of national security and
current issues associated with its application. In so doing we will discuss:
the reciprocal security obligation between the nation state and its citizens
the kinds of policies associated with national security
national security and deterrence
national security and anti-terrorist measures
national security in totalitarian states
national security in weak, failed or quasi-states.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential readings and
activities, you should be able to:
describe the relationship between popular identity and national security
identify what conditions must be satisfied for the ideal of national
security to be achieved
give examples of states that do not satisfy the ideal of national security
and describe how they fall short of this ideal.
Essential reading
Hough Understanding global security. Chapters 2 and 3.
Further reading
Ayoob, M. The security problematique of the Third World, World Politics 43(2)
1991.
Ayoob, M. Subaltern realism: international relations theory meets the Third
World, in Stephanie Neuman (ed.) International Relations Theory and the
Third World. (New York: St. Martins Press, 2005) first edition
[ISBN 0312177062] pp.3154.
California Senate Office of Research, The Patriot Act, Other Post 9/11 Enforcement
Powers and the Impact on Californias Muslim Communities 2004,
www.sen.ca.gov/publications/subject/IMMIG.txt
Enriquez, Juan Too many flags? Foreign Policy 116 1999 pp.3049.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia: the impact of 7 July bomb
attacks on Muslim communities in the EU. (2005). http://eumc.europa.eu/
eumc/material/pub/London/London-Bomb-attacks-EN.pdf
Human Rights Watch In the name of counter-terrorism: human rights abuses
worldwide. http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf (2003).
Srensen, G. War and state-making: why doesnt it work in the Third World?
Security Dialogue 32 (3) 2001 pp.34154.
29
Works cited
Assessing the new normal: liberty and security for the post-September 11
United States (2003). www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/
AssessingAssessing theNewNormal.pdf
Sanctioned bias: racial profiling since 9/11 (New York: American Civil Liberties
Union, 2004).
United States Congress Uniting and strengthening America by providing appropriate
tools required to intercept and obstruct Terrorism Act (US Patriot Act), 2001,
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/hr3162.pdf
National security as a reciprocal arrangement

The nation state defines the standard of acceptable conduct within which
citizens can pursue their own ends free from outside interference. This
is often presented as a reciprocal arrangement. To understand national
security in this way draws our attention to the fact that the nation state,
and specifically its agents and representatives, is given a monopoly on
the use of force only insofar as it is necessary to protect against harmful
intervention and punish those who violate the common legal framework.
In other words, the underlying rationale here is one of force used only for
the public good and not for personal power or aggrandizement. Public
officials are therefore responsible for providing both national security
and personal security and they can be held to account for neglecting or
failing to fulfil their security mandate. At the same time, citizens can be
condemned for ignoring or violating any reasonable security demands
placed upon them.
That reciprocal security obligation between the nation state and its citizens
is the normative basis upon which the nation states claim to be a protector
of the people is often justified. From this perspective, the nation state is the
provider of peace, order and by implication good governance. The term
national security has thus come to refer to all those public policies through
which the nation state ensures its survival as a separate and sovereign
community and, in so doing, the safety and prosperity of its citizens.
National security policies

Policies taken to ensure national security may be of an economic, political
or military nature. And they may be either internally or externally
directed. National security measures thus include, among others:
maintaining effective armed forces; implementing anti-terrorist measures;
ensuring civil and emergency defences; using intelligence to detect and
counter external attack and internal subversion; using diplomacy to
strengthen alliances and isolate threats; and using economic power to
encourage cooperation and isolate or weaken political rivals. For example,
the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America
singles out defending our [American] Nation against its enemies as the
the first and fundamental commitment of the [US] Federal Government.
To do that, the US government says it will make use of every tool in our
arsenal military power, better homeland defences, law enforcement,
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.1 In a
similar vein, the United Kingdoms Home Office acknowledges that it
is responsible for keeping the UK safe from any threat to our national
security. We work with the police and security agencies to ensure we do
all we can to prevent any harm coming to our country or our people.2
National security statements like these may be found in the public
documentation of most Western states.
30
www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nssintro.html
www.homeoffice.gov.
uk/security/
Activity
Read Buzan Chapters 3 and 6 and Hough Chapters 2 and 3, then answer the following
questions.
1. Explain the distinction between domestic security and external security.
2. Why is this distinction crucial to an understanding of national security?
3. How does non-state violence differ from state violence?
4. What type of violence constitutes the gravest threat to national security today?
5. Does the same answer hold true for developed states and developing states? Why or
why not?
National security and deterrence

As we noted in Chapter 1, deterrence is one of the key means of achieving
security. Policies of deterrence are commonly employed by states as part of
their national security strategies. A deterrent is a threat of retaliation such
that would-be aggressors are dissuaded from attacking in order to avoid
subsequent damage to themselves. Economic sanctions, conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction or any combination of these
may be used as deterrents. Such an approach to security is epitomised in
Cold War policies like mutually assured destruction whereby both the
US and the USSR knew that a nuclear attack by one side would result in
immediate retaliation and annihilation by the other.
However, deterrence theory also has its weaknesses. Deterrence assumes
that would-be attackers are keen to avoid harm to themselves. But this
rationale may not always apply. Some governments (e.g., of totalitarian
states) may be less concerned than others (e.g., liberal democracies) with
keeping their military personnel and civilian populations safe. Similarly,
perceptions of threat may vary according to other influences unrelated
to the deterrent (e.g., diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing
political ideologies). Finally, policies of deterrence may lead to an arms
race between rival states, which in turn may increase rather than decrease
the risk of actual war. In this way, policies of deterrence may produce what
Barry Buzan calls a defence dilemma (see Chapter 6 of People, states
and fear) wherein military power subverts rather than supports national
security.
Activity
Read the 1967 Mutual deterrence speech by then American Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara at www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml and then
abswer the following questions.
1. How does McNamara characterise the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the United
States at that time?
2. Why does McNamara believe mutual deterrence is an appropriate response to that
threat? Do you find his reasons convincing. Why or why not?
National security and the war on terror

In extreme circumstances (war or threat of war), even liberal democracies
may restrict the civil liberties of resident aliens and sometimes also their
own national citizens. We see evidence of such policies in the American
response to the threat of international terrorism after 9/11. A 2003
report by the Washington-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
documents post-September 11 restrictions in several key policy areas,
31
including government openness, personal privacy, immigration and

security-related detention.3 Most notorious of these are perhaps the set of
extra-legal institutions established by executive order to bypass the federal
judiciary in cases relating to the war on terror. In such circumstances, the
nation state may single out certain individuals for security-related reasons.
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union claims that security
screening of immigrants and refugees since 9/11 has disproportionately
targeted males who fit a specific racial or ethnic profile (i.e. of Arab
origin).4
Activity
Read the US Patriot Act, 2001, http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/
terrorism/hr3162.pdf and the California Senate Office report on its impact on Californias
Muslims, 2004, www.sen.ca.gov/sor/reports/REPORTS_BY_SUBJ/PUBLIC_SAFETY_
JUDICIARY/PATRIOTACT.PDF.
Then reflect on the following: Are anti-terrorist measures which
disproportionately affect particular groups in society justifiable? Why or
why not?
3
Assessing the new
normal: liberty and
security for the postSeptember 11 United
States (Washington,
D.C.: Lawyers
Committee for Human
Rights, 2003). www.
humanrightsfirst.org/
pubs/descriptions/
AssessingAssessing
theNewNormal.pdf
Sanctioned bias: racial

profiling since 9/11
(New York: American
Civil Liberties Union,
2004). www.aclu.
org/Files/OpenFile.
cfm?id=15101
In other words, even where its function more or less corresponds with the
liberal ideal, national security comes at a price. Citizens must pay for their
security. They do that in their taxes, in their obligation to obey the law, in
the requirement to perform military duty in times of war or threat of war,
and in accepting certain incursions into their usual civil liberties when
circumstances require it.
The price of security is not without its controversies. In a liberal
democracy there will always be those who claim the price is too high
because the perceived gain in national security does not justify the
necessary infringement of individual freedom needed to sustain it. We see
exactly this sort of argument at work in public criticism directed at post9/11 anti-terrorist measures in the United States, the United Kingdom
and elsewhere. For example, the United Kingdoms 2006 Terrorism Act
allows groups or organisations to be banned for glorifying terrorism or
distributing publications that advocate it.5 Human rights campaigners
argued the law was drawn far too widely and as a result it faced stiff
opposition in the British House of Lords. Members of the House of
Lords were worried that such restrictions constituted an unjustifiable
infringement on the freedom of speech and rejected the proposal five
times before finally voting it through in March 2006. Liberal Democrat and
Conservative Members of Parliament also voted against the 2006 Terrorism
Bill, arguing that existing legislation already covered the glorification
offence.
National security in authoritarian states

Outside Western liberal democracies, the potential incompatibility of
national security and personal security is arguably even greater. In
authoritarian or police states like the German Democratic Republic
(communist East Germany) or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) or
the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (communist North Korea),
security for the rulers may translate into profound insecurity for the ruled.
Communist rule in the German Democratic Republic was only sustained
by the very real possibility of military intervention by the Red Army.
The threat of such intervention effectively prevented any democratic
opposition from arising. And it was only after the Brezhnev Doctrine
32
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
politics/4905304.stm
(which made it an obligation of communist countries to intervene in

support of communist rule elsewhere) was publicly repudiated by the
Soviet Union in 1989 in favour of the so-called Sinatra Doctrine (they do
it their way) that communist rule in Eastern Europe came to an end.
Activity
Read the 1968 speech by then Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev www.fordham.edu/halsall/
mod/1968brezhnev.html and then answer the following questions.
1. Is Brezhnev responding to a threat of state violence or non-state violence?
2. Is Soviet policy as described by Brezhnev representative of a maximal state or a
minimal state?
3. On what basis did Brezhnev justify Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia?
4. Do you think this intervention was conducive to the national security of
Czechoslovakia? Why or why not?
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is another authoritarian state in
which the Chinese Communist Party continues to rule by maintaining
a tight grip on society. Chinese Communist Party members hold almost
all top government, police and military positions. Continued rule of
the Chinese Communist Party and its hierarchy relies on the control of
public officials, the media and the security apparatus, and the continued
improvement in the living standards of most of the countrys citizens.
In theory, the constitution guarantees an independent judiciary; but , in
practice, the ruling Chinese Communist Party frequently intervenes in the
judicial process, and even direct verdicts in many high-profile political
cases. The net result of all this is that the Chinese people lack the freedom
to express political opposition and the right to change their political
leaders or form of government. Nowhere is this fact more powerfully
revealed than in the brutal suppression of the Tiananmen Square
demonstrations of 1989.
In a similar vein, the communist government of North Korea has long
used rationing as a means to control its population. By banning people
from buying and selling grain, it has forced them to rely on the state for
their most basic needs. This policy has proven very effective at ensuring
the political survival of Kim Jong-il and the Korean Workers Party. But
the price for their security has been a widespread famine and consequent
suffering for the people of North Korea.
Security in weak, failed or quasi-states

Alternatively, in what are variously referred to as weak or failed or quasistates, there is in effect no civil rule and instead circumstances closely
approximate what Thomas Hobbes referred to as the state of nature
which is a war of all against all in an unending struggle for survival.
States are generally deemed successful when they are able to maintain
effective control over territory and population through a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force indeed, this was the classic, nineteenth-century
definition of sovereignty. Conversely, when states cannot satisfy these basic
criteria, their statehood becomes suspect. States may fail when rival actors
such as warlords or popular militias usurp some of their governmental
powers, in particular the monopoly of force. States are also said to fail in
those circumstances where they are rendered ineffective because of high
crime rates, extreme corruption, a powerful black (unregulated) market,
judicial ineffectiveness, military interference in politics, or in cultural
33
situations where traditional leaders have more authority than the state in
a certain area of competency or regional jurisdiction.
Domestic circumstances in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia,
Sierra Leone and the Sudan have in recent years all been characterised by
conditions of armed conflict, famine, disease and refugees. Consequently,
these are widely acknowledged to be failed states.
Activity
Read the following article on the 2006 Failed States Index: www.globalpolicy.org/nations/
sovereign/failed/2006/0502failedindex.htm and then answer the following questions.
1. What criterion was used by the Failed States Index to rank the relative success and
failure of states?
2. What paradigm of security is reflected in this criterion?
3. Why was Sudan identified as the most failed state?
Significantly, these four are far from being isolated cases: according to
the 2005 Failed States Index compiled by Foreign Policy and the Fund
for Peace, about 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying
degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict.6 In other words,
for somewhere in the region of 2 billion men, women and children
worldwide, national security has failed to guarantee personal security. This
statistic is a very damning indictment of the national security paradigm.
And it calls into question the very basis upon which security is understood
in the liberal tradition the nation state is a tremendous boon to personal
security in some places, but in very many others it is tremendous liability.

describe the relationship between popular identity and national
security
identify what conditions must be satisfied for the ideal of national
security to be achieved
give examples of states who do not satisfy the ideal of national security
and describe how they fall short of this ideal.

1. Are the security requirements of maximal states fundamentally
different from those of minimal states?
2. Does the current security focus on international terrorism reinforce or
weaken personal security?
34
6
www.foreignpolicy.
com/story/cms.
php?story_id=3098
Chapter 4: International society as a security arrangement
Chapter 4: International society as a

security arrangement
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to examine the origins of international society
as a security arrangement and describe how the paradigm of international
security functions to preserve order within it. In so doing we will discuss:
what constitutes an international society
the problem of disorder within international society
the main features of international security.
Learning outcomes
explain how anarchy gives rise to problems of international security
describe how international society operates as a security arrangement
describe and evaluate the role of the great powers in maintaining
international security
critically discuss the application of the balance of power and concert of
great powers.
Essential reading
Bain The empire of security and the safety of the people. Chapter 4.
Further reading
Buzan, B. International security and international society, in Rick Fawn,
Jeremy Larkin and Robert Newman (eds), International society after the
Cold War. (London: Macmillan, 1996) first edition [ISBN 0312161042].
Buzan, B. The United States and the great powers.
Cerny, P. The new security dilemma: divisibility, defection and disorder in the
global era, Review of International Studies 26(4) (2000) pp.62346.
Jervis, R. Security regimes, International Organisation 36(2) 1982.
Jervis, R. From balance to concert: a study of international security
cooperation, World Politics 38(1) 1985.
Mayall, J. (ed.) The new interventionism. (2003).
Sheehan, M. International security: an analytical survey. (Boulder Col.: Lynne
Rienner, 2005) first edition [ISBN 1588262731] Chapter 3.
Wendt, A. Why a world state is inevitable, European Journal of International
Relations 9(4) (2003) pp.491542.
Works cited
Bull, H. Society and anarchy in international relations, in M. Wight and H.
Butterfield (eds) Diplomatic investigations. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968) first edition [ISBN 0674210018] pp.37.
35
International society and the problem of disorder

As you will recall from Introduction to international relations,
international society can be defined in different ways. What distinguishes
this approach to international relations from others is the belief that
relations between states are subject to mutual regulation. Thus, although
proponents of this view readily acknowledge that there is no single,
global source of authority analogous to a government within a domestic
state, they nevertheless insist that international relations remain subject
to rules which give rise to some degree of order and certainty. States
which form an international society agree to conduct their sovereign
affairs in accordance with specified normative standards; these include,
for example, non-intervention, pacta sunt servanta, the procedures of
international law, the customs and conventions of war and the practice of
diplomacy. The common objective of these various rules is the preservation
of international order defined as the continued existence of international
society as a whole although not necessarily the independence of
particular states.1
Significantly, from the outset, international society has struggled with the
problem of disorder and its concomitant insecurity indeed, international
society itself is seen as a response to the breakdown of order within early
modern Europe. Accordingly, it is said to originate in the:
disintegration of a single community [the imperium of Pope and
Emperor], the waning on the one hand of central authorities,
and on the other hand of local authorities, within Western
Christendom, and the exclusion of both from particular
territories by the princely power.2
The Thirty Years War (161848) began as an internal dispute within

the Holy Roman Empire with Protestant princes asserting the right to
determine religious policy within their territories despite opposition from
the Catholic Emperor. Rex est imperator in regno suo (the king is emperor
in his own realm) became the rallying cry of those who would assert the
sovereign power of the princes. The demand for what we would today
describe as sovereignty and non-intervention was a fundamental challenge
to the previous political order of medieval Catholic Christendom and for
this reason, the Thirty Years War quickly spread to become the first panEuropean conflict. The war was essentially fought to ensure that Europe,
and eventually the rest of the world, would henceforth be organised on an
anti-hegemonial basis. Thus, it is at this time where we first see what has
come to be know as the balance of power in operation Catholic France
allied with Protestant Sweden and in opposition to Catholic Spain.
War on a continental scale unavoidably creates intolerable insecurity for
mass numbers of people. Many lost their lives due to atrocities committed
by mercenary soldiers. Many more perished because of the disease and
famine which followed in the wake of the fighting. When it was finally
over, as much as 1520 per cent of the pre-war population of what is
now Germany was dead. This, then, was exactly the war of all against
all which Thomas Hobbes had warned was unavoidable in the absence
of sovereign power. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia restored order to
Europe after the Thirty Years War. In so doing, it also gave final form
to the international society that had been slowly developing over the
previous century. The Peace of Westphalia enshrined the principle of cuius
regio eius religio (like sovereign, like religion) so as to prevent religious
diversity being used as a pretext for war. Since then, non-intervention has
remained the basic norm of international society and the balance of power
36
Hedley Bull The

anarchical society.
(London: Macmillan,
1977), pp.1617,
Bull, Society
and anarchy in
international relations,
in Martin Wight and
Herbert Butterfield,
(eds), Diplomatic
Investigations
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press,
1968), p.37.
its basic political principle. From 1648 onwards, international society has
sought to preserve an always precarious international security by ensuring
that the foundation principles of international law are respected and the
balance of power is maintained.
Activity
Read the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm and
then answer the following questions.
1. What features, if any, of the international security paradigm are apparent in the 1648
Peace of Westphalia?
2. Why do you think the Peace of Westphalia is widely cited as the origin of
contemporary international society?
3. Does it deserve this reputation? Why or why not?
International security
The international security paradigm aspires towards a general condition of
peace, order and lawfulness within the society of states. The preservation
of international security is an obligation incumbent upon all states which
are members of international society. Nevertheless, in practice primary
responsibility for providing international security has come to rest on those
states were refer to as great powers. It is precisely their disproportionate
power which gives these states their unique position within international
society. Disproportionate power can be used for good or ill. For example,
only a great power has the potential to become a hegemony. But at the
same time, only a great power will have the capability to take effective
measures, including ultimately military intervention, against those states
whose actions threaten international security. A recurring problem of
international security is that of ensuring that all of the great powers
remain good international citizens who act to support and not to subvert
international law and the balance of power. On those occasions when a
great power begins to act as an international bully or outlaw, international
security is put at risk and the potential for catastrophic war increases.
The great powers more or less acted in concert for most of the nineteenth
century following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 although not without
a few notable exceptions such as the Crimean War between Britain,
France and Russia (185356) and the Franco-Prussian war (187071).
In contrast, for most of the twentieth century (roughly 191489), the
great powers were divided. Some powers sought to preserve the status quo
(United Kingdom, France and the United States) while others at various
times wanted to revise the rules of international relations in their own
favour (Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union). International security
could not be maintained in the presence of this great-power rivalry, and
so it degenerated into two world wars (191418 and 193945) and an
armed stalemate that we refer to as the Cold War (194789).
The balance of power and the concert of great powers

There are two related political principles which are intended to preserve
international security the balance of power and the concert of the great
powers.3 The balance of power is a political and not a mechanical idea, as
the famous definition by Vattel makes clear: a state of affairs such that no
one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the
law to others.4 The balance of power is designed to protect the pluralist
values of international society from the threat of would be hegemonies
Global covenant,
pp.20105.
Bull, The anarchical

society, p.97.
37
bent on creating a world empire or imposing their own view of global

governance. The idea of a concert of great powers follows on from this:
it envisions that the great powers will cooperate to preserve international
peace and security.
Both the balance of power and the concert of the great powers have a long
history in international relations: there are intimations of them as far back
as the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and they are readily apparent in the
so-called nineteenth-century Concert of Europe system that was created
to preserve the post-Napoleonic peace. Both ideas were deliberately
incorporated into Second World War proposals for a new international
order to preserve the eventual peace. The subsequent United Nations
Charter of 1945 was created by the victorious Allied powers under the
leadership of the United States and with the support, or at least the tacit
acceptance, of all sovereign states. The United Nations, like its predecessor
the League of Nations, was an attempt to formally institutionalise the
key tenets of international society. Great Power responsibilities are
defined in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter: The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall decide what measures shall be taken
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Here we see
all the key elements of international security. The Security Council is
effectively a permanently institutionalised concert of great powers. The
five great victorious powers of 1945 are the permanent members of the
Security Council and the intention is for them to act together in defence
of international law and the balance of power. The pre-eminence accorded
to the Security Council reflects the basic premise that international peace
and security are a special responsibility of the great powers. The remit
of the Security Council includes any actions which threaten or violate
international peace and security. It is up to the Security Council to restore
international peace and security when it has been disrupted. Finally,
Articles 41 and 42 give the Security Council the power to decide on
international security policies, including the use of military force against
another state.
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 4 and Buzan Chapters 4 and 5, then answer the following questions.
1. How does international anarchy define the basic framework of international security?
2. What is the difference between immature anarchy and mature anarchy?
3. Why do the great powers occupy a special position within international society? Is
this justified?
4. Do you agree with the suggestion that the balance of power is no longer relevant?
Why or why not?

explain how anarchy gives rise to problems of international security
describe how international society operates as a security arrangement
describe and evaluate the role of the great powers in maintaining
critically discuss the application of the balance of power and concert of
great powers.
38

1. Is international security simply the watchword of the status quo
powers?
2. Does international security require a balance of power? Or can it be
maintained even in the presence of a hegemony?
39
Notes
40
Chapter 5: International security: current issues and contemporary application
Chapter 5: International security: current

issues and contemporary application
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to examine current issues associated with
international security. In so doing we will discuss:
evidence of success, failure and ambiguity in the application of
various reasons why international security is difficult to achieve.
Learning outcomes
outline the policies associated with international security
distinguish between status quo and revisionist powers
define hegemony and discuss its significance for international security
explain how international security may be a proximate cause of
personal insecurity in weak, failed or quasi-states.
Essential reading
Hough Understanding global security. Chapter 6.
The lessons of Somalia not everything went wrong by Chester A. Crocker,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.3 (1995) available online at www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html
The lessons of Somalia not everything went wrong by Chester A. Crocker,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.3 (1995) available online at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html
Further reading
Bodansky, D. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a post-mortem,
American Journal of International Law (2010), available online at
http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:dwsH6D5JBzwJ:scholar.google.
com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2001&as_ylo=2009&as_yhi=2010&as_subj=soc
Economides, S. and M. Berdal (eds) United Nations interventionism,
19912004. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) first edition
[ISBN 9780521547673]. Chapter 3.
Giddens, A. Politics of climate change. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) first
edition, [ISBN 074564693X].
and national decline, World Policy Journal, Summer 2004 pp.122.
Herz, J.H. The security dilemma in international relations: background and
present problems, International Relations 17(4) 2003 pp.41116.
Holsti, K.J. Peace and war. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) first
edition [ISBN 0521390486] Chapter 6.
Ignatieff, M. Empire lite, Prospect 83 2003 pp.3643.
41

Ikenberry, G.J. (ed.) America unrivaled: the future of the balance of power.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002) first edition
[ISBN 0801488028].
Jackson, R. Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) first edition
[ISBN 0521447836] pp.50109.
Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C. (1982) Why Africas weak states persist: the
empirical and the juridical in statehood, World Politics 35(1) pp.124.
Kaldor, M. American power: from compellance to cosmopolitanism,
International Affairs 79(1) 2003 pp.122.
Mallaby, S. The reluctant imperialist: terrorism, failed states and the case for
American empire, Foreign Affairs 81(2) 2002.
James Mayall, (ed.), The new interventionism 199194: United Nations
experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Morgan, P. International security: problems and solutions. (CQ Press, 2006) first
Simpson, J. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: back to the future? UNIDIR
Disarmament Forum 1 2004 pp.112.
Simpson, J. Nuclear non-proliferation: an agenda for the 1990s. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009) [ISBN 0521127106].
The international security paradigm in operation

There are several contemporary examples one can point to which
demonstrate the basic features of the international security paradigm
in operation. In some of these cases, the great powers acted in concert
to maintain the balance of power and preserve international order.
Other examples are less straightforward and instead reveal the potential
limitations of the international security paradigm.
Military intervention
The (first) Gulf War: a success?
The international response to the (first) Gulf War of 199091 is
representative of the way in which international security was intended
to operate.1 The first Security Council resolution on the crisis (Resolution
660) acknowledged that there exists a breach of international peace
and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 660
demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally
from Kuwait, and urged Iraq and Kuwait to resolve their differences
through negotiations. All subsequent actions by the UN followed on from
resolution 660, including the authorisation of armed force (resolution
678. A coalition of states was formed under American military leadership
to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait. This military action to defend the
sovereignty of Kuwait and punish Iraq for its unlawful aggression against
Kuwait received widespread support from the members of international
society. In sum, on this occasion the great powers acted in concert and
according to the principles laid out in the United Nations Charter. As a
result of the American-led military campaign (itself duly authorised by the
United Nations and supported and assisted by the international coalition),
Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait and the political and territorial status
quo in the Middle East was restored.
42
For a more extended

commentary on this
example, see the
discussion in The global
covenant, pp.26063.
Somalia: a failure?
In contrast, the international response to civil war in Somalia during the
early 1990s discloses some of the pitfalls associated with international
security.2 In this case, great-power involvement was rather more tentative
and the outcome more limited. Whereas the First Gulf War is universally
hailed as a success, international involvement in Somalia is generally
considered to be a failure.
The downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a
power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. The hostilities
resulted in widespread death and destruction. As a result, almost one
million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring states. The political
chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting,
and extent of physical destruction compounded the crisis and severely
constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid. Moreover, the conflict
threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation
occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.
For more on Somalia,

see James Mayall, (ed.),
The new interventionism
199194: United
Nations experience
in Cambodia, former
Yugoslavia and Somalia
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
In 1991, the UN Secretary-General dispatched an envoy to Somalia

in the hope of brokering a peace agreement. The United Nations also
became engaged in providing humanitarian aid in cooperation with relief
organisations. In April 1992, the UN Security Council established the
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The relief effort was
hampered by continued fighting and insecurity, so when in November
1992 the United States offered to organise and lead an operation to ensure
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the UN Security Council accepted
the offer and authorised the use of all necessary means to establish a
secure environment for the relief effort. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF),
made up of contingents from 24 countries led by the United States,
quickly secured all major relief centres, and by years end humanitarian
aid had resumed. UNOSOM remained in Somalia to protect the delivery
of humanitarian aid and to encourage political efforts to end the war.
But in 1993, the security situation in Somalia began to deteriorate once
more. Renewed efforts by the UN Secretary-General to broker a lasting
cease-fire failed and so in March 1993 the Security Council revised the
original peacekeeping mandate to include the use of force, if necessary, to
ensure a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance
(UNOSOM II). In June 1993, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were
killed in an attack in Mogadishu. Further clashes between UNOSOM and
Somali militiamen in Mogadishu resulted in casualties among civilians
and UNOSOM. In October, 18 United States soldiers of the Quick Reaction
Force deployed in support but not part of UNOSOM lost their lives
in Mogadishu. The United States immediately reinforced its military
presence, but later announced that it would withdraw early the next
year. Belgium, France and Sweden also decided to withdraw. In 1994, the
Security Council revised UNOSOM IIs mandate, stressing assistance for
reconciliation and reconstruction, and setting a March 1995 deadline for
completion of the mission.
With faction leaders still not complying with the 1993 and 1994
agreements, the Security Council extended UNOSOM for a final period.
It urged factions to enact a cease-fire and form a government of national
unity. As no further progress was made, UNOSOM withdrew in March
1995. During the three-year effort (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II), 157
United Nations peacekeeping personnel were killed. Yet even though
international involvement in Somalia did not resolve the conflict, these
efforts brought relief to millions facing starvation, helped to stop the
large-scale killings, assisted in the return of refugees and provided massive
43
humanitarian aid. Thus although the requirements of international

security may not have been fully satisfied, the human security of many
individuals caught up in the conflict was nevertheless improved somewhat.
Activity
Read The lessons of Somalia not everything went wrong by Chester A. Crocker, Foreign
Affairs, 74, (3) 1995 available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
ambush/readings/lessons.html, then reflect on the following: Is failure the right term to
describe the US and UN military intervention in Somalia? If so, what is it that failed?
Former Yugoslavia: a mixed bag?

A more ambiguous case neither a complete success nor a complete
failure of international security is the international response to the
19921995 Bosnian War.3 International involvement here was apparent
even before the war began, during which time the European Unionsponsored Badinter Arbitration Commission of international jurists set
forth the criteria for recognition of successor states. The war itself was
of course a subject of widespread international concern. In 1991, the UN
Secretary-General appointed Cyrus Vance, a former United States Secretary
of State, as his personal envoy for Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the SecretaryGeneral and his personal envoy maintained constant contact with all
the parties to the conflict and with other international actors involved in
various diplomatic activities intended to bring about a peaceful settlement
to the dispute, including the President of the European Union, and the
Chairman of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Chairman of the European Unions Conference on Yugoslavia. As the war
dragged on, a United Nations peacekeeping operation was established
by the Security Council (UNPROFOR I for Croatia and UNPROFOR II for
Bosnia-Herzegovina) in the hope of creating conditions in which political
negotiations for a peaceful settlement might occur. Ultimately, such a
settlement was negotiated with the direct involvement of a concert of
great powers under the leadership of the United States, but only as the
outcome of more determined force by NATO under US leadership as well
as by the Croatian and Bosnian armies that the US had helped to arm. The
terms of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement between the warring parties
rump Yugoslavia (subsequently Serbia-Montenegro), Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina were set forth and guaranteed by a group of major powers:
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia.
Article I summarises the basic idea of international security:
The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the
principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as
the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the
Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another,
shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from
any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or any other State.
Article X reiterates the principle of inviolability of borders and the

territorial integrity of existing states which underscores the pluralist
architecture of international society: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other as
sovereign independent States within their international borders. The
agreement was enforced by NATO with Russian participation.
44
For a more detailed

discussion, see
Economides and
Berdal United Nations
Interventionism.
Chapter 3.
Activity
Read the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/
daytonframework.html and then answer the following questions.
1. What features, if any, of the international security paradigm are apparent in the
Dayton Agreement (1995)?
2. Do you think the Dayton Agreement was conducive to international peace and
stability in the Balkans? Why or why not?
Nuclear non-proliferation
From the beginning of the nuclear era, it was apparent that nuclear
weapons technology was a fundamental threat to and thus appropriate
subject of international security. The American nuclear attack on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 led to the unconditional surrender
of Japan and, in so doing, ended the Second World War. Paradoxically,
this nuclear attack simultaneously restored a condition of peace to
international society while also opening up the possibility for future
nuclear conflicts between states. Indeed, by the early 1950s a nuclear
arms race was underway between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nuclear proliferation refers to the acquisition and spread of nuclear
technology and especially weapons among states. Non-proliferation is
an omnibus term used to describe all those policies intended to halt or
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
As early as 1946, efforts began to create an international monitoring
system for nuclear technology. These efforts came to an abrupt end in
1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear bomb. In 1953,
US President Dwight D. Eisenhower called for the United Nations to
take the lead in safeguarding against the spread of nuclear weapons. In
1957, this proposal culminated in the establishment of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was given the dual responsibility for
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology while also controlling its
application to weapons.
The idea of nuclear non-proliferation gained support in the 1960s and
a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) was agreed
in 1968 and came into effect in 1970. The NPT has as its purpose the
prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear states
recognised by the treaty (United States, United Kingdom, France, China
and the Soviet Union), international cooperation for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, and the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament. The NPT
provides, in Article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its
entry into force to decide whether it should continue in force indefinitely,
or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Accordingly, at
the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, signatory states
unanimously agreed on its indefinite extension, and decided that review
conferences should continue to be held every five years. The most recent
review conference took place in May 2010.
The NPT, with 189 signatories, is the foundation of the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime and, as such, a core instrument of international
security. But the problem of proliferation persists not least because certain
states known to have nuclear capabilities remain outside the NPT regime.
North Korea famously withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and (as of 2010)
had yet to rejoin. India, Israel and Pakistan are not currently signatories
and show no willingness to sign in the foreseeable future. Those who
argue that nuclear non-proliferation contributes to international security
45
view the control of nuclear weapons as essential to prevent their tactical

use by states. Critics counter that instruments of control and detection are
mostly ineffective, and instead of acting to prevent the spread of nuclear
technology and weapons manufacture they merely encourage states to be
clandestine in their nuclear programmes.
Activity
Read John Simpson (2004), The nuclear non-proliferation regime: back to the future?
UNIDIR Disarmament Forum 1, available online at www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdfart2015.pdf . Then go to the BBC news page on nuclear non-proliferation for an overview
of current controversies, available online at www.bbc.co.uk/search/nuclear_nonproliferation_treaty.
Based on what you have just read, is the NPT a source of or a threat to international
security?
Climate change
Climate change, also commonly known as global warming, is now widely
recognised as a fundamental threat to humanity and therefore also an
important subject of international security. Scientists believe that climate
change is already causing more frequent occurrences of drought, flooding
and rises in malaria. Other phenomena attributed to climate change are
increased incidents of hurricanes and forest fires. Among the potential
long-term consequences of climate change are rising sea levels and
damage to crops, which could precipitate widespread famine. Some of
the most serious effects of climate change are occurring in states least
prepared to counter them. For example, African states are among the
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. These environmental
concerns may threaten peace and stability between states by, among other
things, precipitating mass population movements across frontiers, creating
circumstances that facilitate the global spread of disease (pandemics) and
engendering conflict between states over access to and control of ever
dwindling resources (food, clean water, etc.).
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was adopted as the basis for an international response to
the problem. With 192 signatory states, the convention enjoys nearuniversal membership. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will
prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.
The UNFCC is augmented by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which has 184
signatories. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the Third Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3) in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December
1997. The Kyoto Protocol has the same goals and mechanisms of the
UNFCC. The main distinction between the two, however, is that whereas
the convention encouraged industrialised countries to stabilise carbon
emissions, the protocol requires them to do so. As part of their Kyoto
undertakings, 37 industrialised countries and the member states of the
European Union have committed to reducing their carbon emissions
by an average of 5 per cent by 2012 against 1990 levels. The UNFCCC
and its Kyoto Protocol are also designed to assist developing countries
in adapting to the inevitable effects of climate change. They facilitate
the implementation of technologies that can protect against the adverse
consequences of climate change for example, the creation of saltresistant crops and encourage the exchange of best practices with regard
to adaptation measures.
46
The Kyoto Protocol is widely regarded as an important first step towards

an international carbon emission reduction regime that will stabilise
greenhouse gas concentrations. As a result of the protocol, governments
are enacting and implementing legislation to meet their commitments. At
the same time, an international carbon market to trade emissions quotas
has been created. In sum, the protocol provides much of the essential
architecture for any new international agreement or set of agreements on
climate change.
Unfortunately, the way forward from Kyoto has not been easy due to
conflicting state interests. According to the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, a
new international framework on climate change must be negotiated and
ratified by 2012. It was hoped that such an agreement would be reached
at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference, commonly known
as the Copenhagen Conference.After much controversy and recrimination
between industrialised and developing states, an accord reached between
the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa (now referred to as the
Copenhagen Accord) was recognised but not formally approved by the
193 states represented at the Copenhagen Conference.4 It was also agreed
by European and other industrialised countries. The Copenhagen Accord
is noteworthy as the first international recognition of climate change as
one of the greatest challenges confronting the members of international
society. It calls upon states to take actions necessary to keep any
temperature increases to below 2 degrees Celsius. But due to opposition
from China and other countries such as the United States and India
this figure is not a formal target. As a result, the final accord states that
mitigation actions taken by non-Annex 1 Parties will be subject to their
domestic measurement, reporting and verification and guidelines will
ensure that national sovereignty is respected.5 The Copenhagen Accord
is a declaratory statement and not a binding international document.
Consequently, it does not contain any enforceable provisions. States will
therefore need to continue to try to put more substance on the outlines of
the Copenhagen Accord.
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/sci/
tech/8422307.stm
www.iiea.com/
blogosphere/
copenhagen--a-newframework-for-climatechaos
Activity
Read Q&A: The Copenhagen Climate Summit, available online at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8278973.stm and Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal,
available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8422133.stm.
Then reflect on the following:
1. Is there a fundamental contradiction between national interest and the requirements
of international security with respect to climate change?
2. Did the great powers (e.g., the United States, China, the European Union) support or
subvert international security at the Copenhagen Conference?
3. In your opinion, was the 2009 Copenhagen Conference a success or a failure and
on what basis?
Why international security is difficult to achieve

International peace and security are a basic value of international society.
It is the responsibility of all states, great and small, to respect that
fundamental value. But it is the special collective responsibility of the great
powers to ensure that the requirements of international peace and security
are enforced. The United Nations Security Council exists to give legal
form and practical effect to the idea of a concert of great powers acting to
preserve international law and the balance of power for the common good
47
of international society as a whole. But there are a number of problems

associated with the international security paradigm.
Great-power rivalry
For starters, the great powers do not always act in concert. Far from it,
they are frequently divided to such a degree that cooperative efforts to
protect and promote international security do not occur. This limitation
was especially apparent during the Cold War when the permanent
members of the Security Council abused their veto power to prevent any
action proposed by their Cold War adversaries. Following the end of the
Cold War, this deadlock was overcome and the early 1990s saw a number
of international security measures sanctioned by the Security Council;
several of these were discussed previously. Unfortunately, this new-found
willingness to act in concert appears to have been short-lived, and so by
the end of the 1990s we once again saw evidence of great-power disunity
and obstructionism. In 1999, for example, NATO acted without explicit
UN Security Council authorisation to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Unilateral action was taken because of a threat of veto in the Security
Council by Russia and China. Paradoxically, NATO later claimed it was acting
in support of the Security Council and by extension international security
even though its actions were not specifically endorsed by the Council.
The priority of national security

Similarly, the great powers often allow their own national interests
to take priority over their international responsibilities. For example,
Russia and Chinas opposition to intervention in Kosovo resulted from
an unwillingness to establish an international precedent that might one
day apply to them. Russias policy in Chechnya and Chinas policy in
Tibet could be open to similar international condemnation and reprisal.
Perhaps even more controversially, the United States and the United
Kingdom intervened in Iraq in 2003 even after attempts to get a UN
Security Council resolution authorising military action failed. Such action
was ostensibly to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction, which
contravened international law. But it soon became apparent that the Bush
administration saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as a key component
of its post-9/11 war on terror.
The problem of hegemony

Moreover, the (re)emergence or renewal of a single, global superpower
the United States could put an end to the balance of power. Under the
presidency of George W. Bush, American military pre-eminence combined
with a new strategy of pre-emption and unilateral action. In stark contrast
with the principle of non-intervention, the Bush administration claimed
a right, and perhaps even a duty, to impose democracy by force against
tyrants.6 Such a duty would of course be a direct challenge to the basic
norm of non-intervention and the basic tenets of international law which
follow on from it all of which the international security paradigm is
intended to protect. As John Bolton, whom George W. Bush nominated as
US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, once remarked:
it is a big mistake to grant any validity to international law
even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so
because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that
international law really means anything are those who want to
constrict the United States.7
48
6
David Hendrickson,
The curious case of
American hegemony:
imperial aspirations and
national decline, World
Policy Journal, Summer
2004, p.3.
As quoted in
Hendrickson, p.4.
And the key threat associated with a hegemony is precisely that the
overthrow of the pluralist international order and the establishment of a
solidarist empire in its place. The extent to which we are now witnessing
the emergence of an American hegemony is, of course, the subject of much
debate among international relations scholars.
Activity
Read David Hendrickson, The curious case of American hegemony: imperial aspirations
and national decline, World Policy Journal, Summer 2004, available online at http://
personalwebs.coloradocollege.edu/~dhendrickson/Essays/WPJ_Curious_Case_of_Amer_
Hegemony.pdf, then reflect upon the following.
1. What is the Bush Doctrine?
2. Does it represent a rejection of international security, and if so how?
3. In your opinion, will the United States continue to act as a hegemony for the
foreseeable future? Or will American foreign policy return to the constraints of
international law and multilateralism? Why or why not?
Weak, failed and quasi-states

Finally, in certain circumstances, international security may be a proximate
cause of personal insecurity. Since the end of colonialism international
society has reinforced the external security and survival of many weak
and failed states. Under the United Nations Charter, all states possess a
virtual guarantee of non-aggression and non-intervention regardless of
their ability to carry out the responsibilities of sovereignty, among which
is the provision for peace, order and good government for the peoples
within their jurisdictions. The possibility that states might exist as fictions
of international law (juridical statehood) in the absence of substantive
governing capabilities (empirical statehood) became a noteworthy
feature of international society in the second half of the twentieth
century. As Robert Jackson has pointed out, that unusual condition is a
direct consequence of changes in norms of state recognition connected
with the right of self-determination and the abolition of colonialism. It
is unprecedented and has no clear parallel with any previous period of
modern international history.8
Weak, failed and quasi-states rely upon the general prohibition against
aggression and armed intervention underwritten by the UN Charter and
reaffirmed by regional organisations like the Organisation for African
Unity (OAU). In many of these states the military is more concerned with
protecting the political leadership from the people than in protecting
the people from external attack. This perverse situation largely results
from the universal guarantee of state security underwritten by the United
Nations.
For an extended
analysis of this
development, see
R. Jackson Quasistates: sovereignty,
international relations
and the third world
(Cambridge: CUP, 1990).
Before 1945, the understanding was that states would have to take care
of their own security needs. Small or weak states could try to enter into
alliances with great powers, but there was no automatic guarantee of
their sovereignty or territorial integrity. As a result, many states lost
territory and eventually their political independence to great powers
with revisionist intentions towards the post-First World War territorial
settlement. Examples of such losses include the Japanese occupation
of Manchuria (1931), the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1935) and the
German and Hungarian partition of Czechoslovakia (1938/39). As Robert
Jackson notes, the security dilemmas experienced by small or weak states
during the pre-1939 era is in stark contrast to circumstances post-1945.
49
The equal state sovereignty of small and weak states was by and large
upheld after 1945. The underlying ethos of international security was
directly repudiated by many great powers during the inter-war period, and
for this more than any other reason, the League of Nations was unable
to function as it had originally been intended. No such direct repudiation
has occurred after 1945 neither of the Cold War superpowers nor the
would-be post-Cold War American hegemony has clearly or categorically
broken with the international security paradigm. And, for all its various
shortcomings, the United Nations has not received the same degree of
contempt that was heaped upon the League of Nations.
The result of these developments has generally been to maintain the
integrity and survival of quasi-states and failed states that otherwise may
have ceased to exist. On the surface this might seem to be a good thing
weak states are protected from international predators but it has also
been the proximate cause of much human suffering. Weak, quasi- and
failed states are fundamentally flawed in two key respects: there is no
effective, central government control over the jurisdiction instead,
the territory is usually ruled by various and often competing regional
warlords and, on many occasions, this rivalry degenerates into civil war;
governments are generally corrupt and therefore concerned first and
foremost with their own personal interests and aspirations. The people
in power who possess the guns and in so doing control the wealth and
resources are thus relatively secure. But the rest of the population over
whom they (mis)rule are fundamentally insecure. This perverse, albeit
unintended, consequence of the international security paradigm post-1945
has prompted solidarists to argue that both national and international
security are fundamentally flawed because of their inability to protect
millions of men, women and children in places like Sudan or Sierra Leone
or the Congo, to name only a few examples.
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 3 and Buzan Chapters 6 and 7 and then answer the following
questions.
1. Do you agree with the suggestion that force is essential to order in a situation of
anarchy?
2. How does collective security differ from national security?
3. Is there a fundamental contradiction between the idea of defence and the idea of
security?
4. Does a struggle between status quo and revisionist powers continue to dominate the
issue of international security?

outline the policies associated with international security
distinguish between status quo and revisionist powers
define hegemony and discuss its significance for international security
explain how international security may be a proximate cause of
personal insecurity in weak, failed or quasi-states.
50

1. Is war becoming a less important threat to international security?
2. Can international security be achieved in the absence of great power
cooperation?
3. Under what circumstances does international security create personal
insecurity?
51
Notes
52
Chapter 6: Human security as an alternative to national and international security
Chapter 6: Human security as an

alternative to national and international
security
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to introduce human security as an alternative to
national and international security. In so doing we will:
compare and contrast state-centred and person-centred approaches to
security
identify and analyse the main instruments of human security.
Learning outcomes
distinguish between state-centred and person-centred approaches to
security
identify the main characteristics of human security
provide examples of human security policies
discuss the relationship between human security and globalisation.
Essential reading
Buzan People, states and fear. Chapter 9.
Further reading
Booth, Ken Security and emancipation, Review of International Studies 17(4)
1991.
Srensen, Georg Individual security and national security, Security Dialogue
27(4) 1996 pp.37186.
Suhrke, Astri Human security and the interests of states, Security Dialogue
30(3) 1999 pp.26576.
Works cited
Our global neighbourhood: the report of the Commission on Global Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.84.
State-centred approaches to security

Both the national security and international security paradigms reflect
the classic liberal assumption that the state, properly understood, is
protector rather than oppressor of its own citizens (although, as previously
indicated, the same reasoning does not necessarily apply to non-members
including those on the territory of the state who should otherwise be
eligible for the rights and protection consequent upon citizenship). For
example, in Hobbes vision of Leviathan, once the state is coopted by
particular, private interests as in civil war the social order can no
longer be said to exist. In such circumstances, the individual is, once again,
53
in the state of nature and therefore subject only to the laws of nature and
not to those of the pre-existing social order. Thus, what today is termed
a failed state (e.g., Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, etc.) is in Hobbes
rendering not a state at all but a reversion to the (violent) natural order.
The insecurity of those individuals who find themselves in such places is
simply the natural circumstances of humankind without the social artifice.
Their plight may be worthy of sympathy from those more fortunately
placed within a social order, but it does not present any serious moral
challenge to the idea of Leviathan (or the state) as such. Nor does it pose
any immediate dilemmas for those who espouse a national or international
security perspective unless it threatens the political order existing
elsewhere.
A person-centred approach to security

It has recently been suggested that a human security paradigm offers a
better way of conceptualising the problems that arise in circumstances like
those noted above than the more traditional approaches already discussed.
From this perspective:
security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites,
and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people.
To confine the concept of security exclusively to the protection
of states is to ignore the interests of people who form the
citizens of a state and in whose name sovereignty is exercised.
It can produce situations in which those in power feel they have
the unfettered freedom to abuse the right to security of their
people All people, no less than states, have a right to a secure
existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those
rights.1
Our global neighbourhood, the Report of the Commission on Global
Governance
The search for a global human community, which would transcend

international frontiers and trump the rights and interests of particular
communities be these states or indeed the society of states, has a noble
pedigree in the historic search for an alternative to international anarchy.
Suggestions of this kind, which one can trace back to Kant, accept the
description of international society while nevertheless insisting that such
circumstances can, and should, be overcome. Kant argues that national
security and international security in the fullest sense cannot be realised
unless or until human security is also protected. In so doing, Kant
effectively repudiates the basic premise of non-intervention in favour of
an overriding duty of all states and of international society as a whole to
defend human security. Contemporary advocates of human security like
the Commission on Global Governance do much the same thing.
Activity
Read the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 1994,
Chapter 2, New dimensions of human security, available online at http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf and then answer the following questions.
1. What are the main characteristics of human security?
2. What is the relationship between human rights and human security?
3. What is the relationship between human development and human security?
4. Do you agree that there are two major components of human security: freedom from
fear and freedom from want? Why or why not?
54
Our global
neighbourhood:
the report of the
Commission on Global
Governance (Oxford:
Oxford University Press,
1995), p.84.
Chapter 6: Human security as an alternative to national and international security
Instruments of human security

We see evidence of the human security paradigm at work post-1945 in the
universal protection of human rights, humanitarian law and the idea of
crimes against humanity. All three of these concepts accord moral primacy
to the well-being of men, women and children over and above the rights
and interests of states or of international society.
Human rights are embedded in every individual human being by virtue
of their humanity and thus are not contingent upon political membership
within any particular community; they attach to us as humans and go
with us wherever we go. The idea assumes that there are certain core
requirements which every human needs in order to survive and flourish
as an individual and that these requirements are universally valid. Human
rights are prior to rights of citizenship and indeed may be considered to
trump domestic legislation which is contrary to the human rights idea. In
this way, neither time nor place can alter or diminish the validity of human
rights.
In large part, the international codification of human rights after 1945 was
a reaction against the widespread human rights abuses evident in Nazioccupied Europe. Human rights thus became a key component of efforts to
create a new world order post-1945 in which it was hoped such atrocities
would never happen again. The first key human rights texts including
both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (1950) were drafted with precisely
this aim in mind. Many other human rights documents followed in the
years since 1945 such that now every international regional organisation
includes some endorsement of human rights, albeit with somewhat
different formulations.
The 1948 Convention on the Elimination and Punishment of Genocide
follows on from the same never again ethos. This convention is intended
to prevent and to punish acts committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Signatories
to the convention are thus required to take preventive measures, including
even the use of force, in circumstances where a genocide is officially
recognised as under way by the United Nations Security Council.
Humanitarian law refers to that body of international law which is
concerned with protecting individuals in times of war. For centuries, war
was the classic method for settling disputes between states. Once war was
over the motto was vae victis or woe to the conquered because the victors
could treat them as they saw fit. There were no universally agreed limits to
the rights of victors to punish those who had fought against them and no
definition of war crimes (although there was of course a discourse of the
laws and customs of war). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the
originally Christian ideas of the natural laws and customs of war began
to be codified as positive international law (e.g., the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 setting out the laws of waging war and the Geneva
Conventions of 1864 and 1924 outlining the treatment of prisoners).
After 1945, these provisions were extended and reinforced by the Geneva
Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War
(1949) and its Additional Protocols I and II (1977) to better protect noncombatants.
The idea of crimes against humanity differs from that of war crimes in
that crimes against humanity may be committed in peace as well as in
war and against a states own citizens (as for instance when the majority
55
ethnic group in a state targets its minority citizens). Moreover, the fact that
a particular action was sanctioned in domestic law prevailing at the time
it was committed or was authorised in military orders is not a defence
where crimes against humanity are concerned. This concept, then, extends
the human security paradigm to domestic, peacetime circumstances such
as those pertaining in Germany during the Nazi period and removes the
legitimacy of domestic laws sanctioning gross human rights violations.
Article 6 of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT
Charter) adopted to assist in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals
defined crimes against humanity as murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian
population before or during the war. The IMT Charter was acceded to by
nineteen states in addition to the original signatories Great Britain, the
United States, France and the Soviet Union. Moreover, both the United
Nations General Assembly and the Convention on the Nonapplicability of
Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (1968)
ultimately affirmed the principles of international law recognised in the
IMT Charter and the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal thus further
confirming crimes against humanity and the inclusion of mass deportation
under this rubric as customary law. Most recently, the 1998 Rome Statute
of the International Criminal court also recognised crimes against
humanity as falling within its area of competency.
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 8 and Buzan Chapter 9 and then answer the following questions.
1. To what extent is the human security agenda a product of globalisation?
2. Is human security an example of what Buzan terms a holistic concept of security,
and, if so, on what basis?

distinguish between state-centred and person-centred approaches to
security
identify the main characteristics of human security
provide examples of human security policies
discuss the relationship between human security and globalisation.

1. Are human security and human rights distinct concepts?
2. Should security policies focus on the safety of states or the safety of
persons?
56
Chapter 7: Human security: current issues and contemporary application
Chapter 7: Human security: current issues

and contemporary application
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to examine current issues associated with human
security. In so doing we will discuss:
evidence of success, failure and ambiguity in the application of human
security
various reasons why human security is difficult to implement.
Learning outcomes
evaluate the success and failure of the human security paradigm
describe how human security is constrained by state sovereignty
discuss the relationship between human security and environmental
policy
discuss the relationship between human security and international
political economy
discuss the potential contradiction between human security and plural
values.
Essential reading
Hough Understanding global security. Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 11.
Further reading
Bellamy, A. Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention
and the 2005 World Summit. Ethics and International Affairs, 20(2) (2006)
pp.14370.
Bellamy, A. Responsibility to protect. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) first
Bellamy, A. and M. McDonald The utility of human security: which humans?
What security? A reply to Thomas and Tow, Security Dialogue 33(3)
(2002) pp.37377.
Crawford, B. The new security dilemma under international economic
interdependence, Millennium 23(1) 1994.
Dunne, T. and N. Wheeler We the peoples: Contending discourses of security
in human rights theory and practice, International Relations 18(1) 2004
pp.923.
McInnes, C. HIV/AIDS and security, International Affairs 82(3) 2006
pp.31526.
Rudolph, C. Globalization and security, Security Studies 13(1) 2003 pp.132.
Thomas, N. and W.Tow The utility of human security: sovereignty and
humanitarian intervention, Security Dialogue 33(2) 2002 pp.17792.
57
Works cited
J. Vincent, Grotius, human rights and intervention, in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury
and A. Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), p.255.
A. Pollis and P. Schwab, Human rights: a western construct with limited
applicability, in Pollis and Schwab (eds) Human rights: cultural and
ideological perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1979, p.14.
J. Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), p.114.
A. E. Mayer, Islam and human rights (London: Pinter, 1995), pp.98100.
Garret Gong, The standard of civilization in international society (Oxford:
Clarendon 1984), p.55.
Achievements of human security

The great achievement of the human security paradigm as embodied
since 1945 in humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and human
rights is that it has created a normative discourse in which those
who abuse their power, regardless of who or where they are, may be
condemned. The rapidly expanding body of international norms post-1945
that reflect this human security perspective is certainly dramatic, and
perhaps even revolutionary.
Take, for example, the various provisions outlining the rights of
combatants which can be found in the Geneva Convention III Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), Geneva Protocol I Relating
to the Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1979) as well as the
Convention Against Torture (1984) and the UN Resolution on the
Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any form
of Imprisonment or Detention (1988). The widespread international
condemnation of American practices towards detainees held at Camp
X-Ray in Guantnamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib in Iraq underscores the
normative authority of these provisions even if the fact of abuse itself
points to the ongoing problem of enforcement.
Another example is the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1948), which authorises contracting parties
to call upon the UN to take appropriate actions for the prevention
and suppression of acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The term
appropriate recognises that any such actions are a matter of judgment
for the state signatories, which allows for a wide latitude of discretion
in implementation of the provisions. As a result, not a single act of
genocide has ever been recognised under the terms of the convention.
So the convention on genocide is not the radical humanitarian charter
that it might seem to be at first glance. Nevertheless, it is significant.
International condemnation of the killing fields of Cambodia under the
Khmer Rouge (19751979), of the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994,
and the Janjaweed attacks against the non-Arab population of Darfur
between 2003 and 2006 are tangible evidence that the idea of genocide as
a crime of crimes is now widely accepted.
According to John Vincent, developments like these are testimony to the
spread of a global cosmopolitan culture. As the number of declarations
and conventions in the area of human rights, humanitarian law and
crimes against humanity increases, the distinction between domestic and
international politics continues to erode.1 Since 1975, non-governmental
organisations Helsinki Watch, Human Rights Watch, Minority Rights
58
John Vincent Grotius,

human rights and
intervention in H.
Bull, B. Kingsbury
and A. Roberts (eds),
Hugo Grotius and
international relations
(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990), p.255.
Group, Amnesty, etc. have emerged as moral custodians or guardians

of the human security paradigm and their main function is to scrutinise
the conduct of states. As a result of all of these developments, the moral
approbation of public opinion is now directed as much towards the
international as to the domestic.
Activity
Read the overview of the 2005 Report on Human Security available online at www.
humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005_PDF/Overview.pdf and then reflect on the following.
Do you agree with the reports findings that the dramatic decline in armed conflict worldwide
is due to the increasing significance of the human security paradigm? Why or why not?
Can you think of any other factors that might account for this change?
Problems with human security

Despite its many laudable achievements in championing the rights of
oppressed individuals wherever they might be, the human security
paradigm nevertheless remains highly problematic with an international
system that, for better or for worse, continues to be organised on the basis
of state sovereignty and plural values.
Any ethic that seeks to apply universal values to all circumstance
irrespective of differences in time, place, culture or circumstance is
potentially open to the charge of chauvinism. This tendency is apparent
in the recent criticism of human rights by representatives of nonWestern states and cultures who have alleged that these provisions
disproportionately reflect a Western, Judeo-Christian morality. According
to this perspective, to impose on non-Western societies norms taken from
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights involves moral chauvinism and
ethnocentric bias.2 Often, such criticisms are made by non-Western states
in the deliberate attempt to deflect criticism away from domestic human
rights violations and can therefore be dismissed as rhetorical political
posturing. However, those cases where the controversy involves practices
that are internally defensible within the cultural system but unacceptable
by external standards ought properly to be taken seriously as hard choices
between competing values.3 For example, the legal requirement within
many Islamic countries for women to wear the veil in public as stipulated
in the sharia may be in that context a legitimate restriction of the
universal right to gender equality guaranteed in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.4 Thus, the potential for controversy regarding cultural
diversity remains within the context of the human security paradigm.
Indeed, to the extent that human security is inherently solidarist whereas
the existence of cultural diversity is an undeniable reminder that the
human condition is, in this respect at least, fundamentally pluralist, the
two are logically at odds.
The idea of a moral duty to militarily intervene in foreign countries to
protect civilians raises fundamental normative issues which the proponents
of human security tend to ignore. Throughout its history, international
society has endeavoured to abolish holy wars and limit the justifications
for going to war. The original version of the norm of non-intervention,
cuius regio, eius religio (like sovereign, like religion) was intended to
prevent military intervention on religious grounds. The modern, secular
version of this norm can be found in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which
forbids intervention in a sovereign state on any grounds except those of
national self-defence and international peace and security.
Admantia Pollis
and Peter Schwab
Human rights: a
western construct with
limited applicability
in Pollis and Schwab
(eds) Human rights:
cultural and ideological
perspectives (New York:
Praeger, 1979, p.14.
Jack Donnelly,
Universal human rights
in theory and practice
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989),
p.114.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer

Islam and human rights
(London: Pinter, 1995),
pp.98100.
59
There are good reasons for restricting military intervention. Prior

experience has shown that military intervention in the name of
purportedly universal values can be abused by great powers whose real
motivations are fundamentally self-interested. During the nineteenth
century, for example, the so called standard of civilisation was used as a
purportedly objective and universal yardstick against which the progress
of humanity could be assessed. Peoples were hierarchically classified
as civilised, barbarous, or savage depending upon their degree of
conformity with European practices and values.5 This classification scheme
provided a basis on which to accord differential rights and entitlements
within international relations. Such arrangements preserved the original
principle of equality among European states while at the same time
responding to those differences Europeans postulated between themselves
and the rest of humanity. The sacred trust of civilisation was intended to
limit the potential for European hegemony over non-European peoples
to degenerate into blatant abuse and brutality. In practice, however, such
international undertakings did little to constrain those European powers
bent on the exploitation of non-European peoples and their territories. As
E.D. Morel remarked of the Congo Free State,
from the ashes of an international conference has sprung
a traffic in African misery more devilish than the old, more
destructive, more permanently ruinous in cumulative effect.
Setting aside the wisdom of armed intervention for humanity, the

proponents of the human security paradigm tend to ignore or at least
downplay those political realities which are likely to complicate, forestall
and potentially preclude any attempt to institute it as a new basic norm
of international society. Such a change would be construed by many Asian
and African leaders as merely another form of Western imperialism. Their
ancestors rebelled against Western imperialism and for very good reasons.
To be a member of what were variously termed backward peoples or
dependent nations was to be denied the right to self-determination on the
basis of purportedly objective criteria extrapolated from European history
and civilisation. Today we readily condemn such criteria as fundamentally
flawed and biased. Why should any future criteria for intervention
and subsequent protectorate status be any different? And how could
such intervention be reconciled with the norms of self-determination,
equal sovereignty, the doctrine of non-intervention, the prohibition of
colonialism, the crime of apartheid, etc.? Any attempt to impose human
rights would constitute a fundamental violation of the value pluralism
which is an essential prerequisite of international society.
Overcoming the problems of human security

The Commission on Global Governance has tried to overcome this
problem by acknowledging that only the most egregious threats to human
security should warrant international action as indicated, for example,
by the number of people affected. At the same time, they are quick to
point out that there is a spectrum of potential options which could be
used to enforce human security. These possibilities include voluntary
rapporteur missions, voluntary mediation, international review of a
states performance, public criticism, mandatory rapporteur or mediation
missions, judicial review, withdrawal of membership of international
organisations, trade sanctions, and, as a last resort, military intervention.
Following the rationale found in the Genocide Convention, they suggest
that it is reasonable to militarily intervene only in cases that constitute
60
Garret Gong The

standard of civilization
in international society.
(Oxford: Clarendon
1984), p.55.
a violation of the security of people so gross and extreme that it

requires an international response on humanitarian grounds. And their
recommendation is that Article 2 of the UN Charter should be revised
accordingly. Doing this, however, make human rights a pre-emptive
principle of international law and once again the value pluralism essential
for the preservation of international society would be compromised.
There are also a number of important practical difficulties that would
need to be overcome before such a radical revision of Article 2 could be
effected. Would the great powers, and in particular the United States and
its allies, be prepared to accept a universal duty to militarily intervene
even when their national interests where not directly involved? The United
States may appear to be more inclined towards intervention in defence of
democratic values post-9/11. But George W. Bushs fondness for regime
change was never intended to create a universal duty to intervene. Far
from it, this is an old-fashioned discourse of national security designed to
secure American interests.
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 6 and Hough Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 11 and then answer the following
questions.
1. Is the environment best thought of as a subject of national security, international
security or human security?
2. To what extent is the human security paradigm a consequence of the operation of a
worldwide market economy?
3. Are human security and societal security the same thing?
Responsibility to protect (R2P)

The most compelling attempt yet to overcome the serious practical
obstacles to implementing human security is the doctrine of responsibility
to protect (R2P). In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the
failure to intervene there, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan provocatively
asked the question when does the international community have the right
to intervene for the sake of protecting populations?
The Canadian government responded to this challenge by establishing the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
In 2001, the ICISS issued its report The responsibility to protect. This
report recognised that although the primary responsibility for its people
lies with the state itself, nevertheless where a population is suffering
serious harm and the state concerned is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it then the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility
to protect. R2P is thus directed at four of the most egregious crimes
under international criminal law genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. According to the ICISS, the responsibility
to protect applies to all members of international society and includes
obligations to prevent the causes of internal conflicts and other man-made
crisis, to react to situations of compelling human need with appropriate
measures, and to rebuild post-conflict or emergency. A reference to R2P
was included in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit of
United Nations member states. That same year, R2P was endorsed by the
Founding Charter of the African Union. In Resolution 1674 (2006) the
United Nations Security Council reiterated the R2P principles recognised
by the World Summit, and in 2009 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
released his report on Implementing the responsibility to protect.
61
Following on from these various developments, R2P is now widely

recognised as an international norm. The great achievement of R2P is that
it affords a framework for action which brings together already existing
but otherwise disparate international instruments such as mediation,
early-warning mechanisms, economic sanctioning and Chapter 6 powers.
However, the authority to militarily intervene for human security remains
a preserve of the United Nations Security Council and thus the problem of
great-power selectivity, bias and rivalry persist notwithstanding R2P.
In sum, the post-Cold War experience on human security is both complex
and contradictory. But one thing at least is clear: there has, to date, been
no consistent application of human security around the world. That is
because the great powers lack both the political will and probably also
the military capability to intervene in all states where personal insecurity
exists.
Activity
Read the ICISS report, The responsibility to protect (2001), available online at www.iciss.
ca/report2-en.asp and then answer the following questions.
1. What is the intervention dilemma?
2. How did the intervention dilemma manifest itself in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo?
3. Does R2P offer a convincing way out of the intervention dilemma?
You may wish to revisit these questions after you have completed the readings and
activities in Chapter 8: are your initial views still the same or have they changed in certain
respects?

evaluate the success and failure of the human security paradigm
describe how human security is constrained by state sovereignty
discuss the relationship between human security and environmental
policy
discuss the relationship between human security and international
political economy
discuss the potential contradiction between human security and plural
values.

1. Human security will never be achieved in a world of states. Discuss.
2. Do you agree with the suggestion that human security is just another
form of Western imperialism?
3. Is the environment a human security issue?
62
Chapter 8: Security paradigms in conflict: the problem of intervention
Chapter 8: Security paradigms in conflict:

the problem of intervention
Aims of the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to explore the contradictions which arise
when one tries to apply the national, international and human security
paradigms to the problem of military intervention. In so doing we will
discuss:
the different priorities of national, international and human security
the origins of the problem of intervention
current justification for intervention
intervention for international peace and security: the case of Iraq
(1991)
intervention for national security: the cases of Bosnia (1995) and
Afghanistan (2001)
intervention for human security: the case of Kosovo (1995)
intervention after R2P: the case of Darfur (2008).
Learning outcomes
define intervention
identify and assess the justification for intervention within
contemporary international society
discuss the current controversies associated with intervention using
evidence from the five case studies surveyed here
compare and contrast the divergent priorities and practices which
follow on from the national, international and human security
approaches to the problem of intervention.
Essential reading
Bain The empire of security and the safety of the people. Chapters 7 and 10.
Economides, Spyros and Berdal, United Nations interventionism.
Chapters 1, 3 and 8.
Tait, A. The legar war: a justification of military action in Iraq, Gonzaga
Journal of International Law 9(1) 2005.
Further reading
Bellamy, A. A responsibility to protect or a Trojan horse? The crisis in Darfur
and humanitarian intervention after Iraq Ethics and International Affairs
19(2) (2005) pp.3154.
Chomsky, N. The new military humanism: lessons from Kosovo. (Monroe, Me.:
Common Courage Press, 1999) first edition [ISBN 1567511767].
Crilly, R. Saving Darfur: everyones favourite war. (London: Reportage Press,
2010) first edition [ISBN 1906702195].
Damrosch, L. and Scheffer, D. Law and force in the new international order.
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992) first edition [ISBN-10: 0813313570].
63

De Waal, A. Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect, International
Affairs 83(6) 2007 pp.10391054.
Dorma, A. and T. Otte (eds) Military intervention: from gunboat diplomacy to
humanitarian intervention. (New York: Dartmouth Publishing Group, 1995)
first edition [ISBN 1855215799].
Falk, R. The complexities of humanitarian intervention: a new world order
challenge, Michigan Journal of International Law 17 (1996).
Flint, J. and A. de Waal Darfur: a new history of long war. (London: Zed Books,
2008) second edition [ISBN 1842779508].
Hoffman, S. The ethics and politics of humanitarian intervention. (New York:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997) first edition [ISBN 0268009368].
Hoffman, S. Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: emergent norm, moral
duty or the coming anarchy? International Affairs 77(1) 2001 pp.113128.
edition [ISBN 0199262012] Chapters 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15.
Mandelbaum, M. A perfect failure: NATOs war against Yugoslavia, Foreign
Affairs 78(5) 1999 pp.28.
Murphy, S. Humanitarian intervention: the United Nations in an evolving
world order, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series 21.
(Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
Newman, E. Humanitarian intervention, legality and legitimacy, The
International Journal of Human Rights 6(4) 2002 pp.102120.
Verwey, W. Humanitarian intervention under international law, Netherlands
International Law Review 32 1985.
Vincent, R.J. Non-intervention and international order. (Princeton N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1974) first edition [ISBN 0691056528].
Walzer, M. Just and unjust wars. (New York: Basic Books, 2000) fourth edition
[ISBN 0465037070].
Walzer, M. Thick and thin: moral argument at home and abroad. (University of
Notre Dame Press, 2006) reprint edition [ISBN 0268018979].
Wheeler, N. Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) new edition [ISBN 0199253102].
Williams, P. and Bellamy, A. The responsibility to protect and the crisis in
Darfur, Security Dialogue 36(1) 2005 pp.2747.
Works cited
Berlin, I. The crooked timber of humanity. (London: John Murray, 1990), p.13.
Bull and Vincent (eds) Intervention in world politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984)
Wight, M. Power politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p.191.
Parsons, A. From cold war to hot peace (London: Penguin Books, 1995),
pp.6869.
Shrivastava and Agarwal , Politics of intervention and the Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict, International Studies 2003; 40: 6984
Rohde, D. Endgame: the betrayal and fall of Srebrenica (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1997).
A. Roberts, NATOs humanitarian war over Kosovo, Survival 41 (Autumn
1999), p.106.
Mayall, J. Nationalism and international society (Cambridge, 1990)
Musgrave, T. Self determination and national minorities (Oxford, 1997).
Human Rights Watch report (2004), Darfur Destroyed, available at
www.hrw.org/en/node/12133/section/1
64
Different paradigms, different priorities

Each of the three main security paradigms surveyed thus far national
security, international security, and human security prioritises different
security objectives. National security gives moral primacy to the nation
state as guarantor of the safety and well-being of its citizens. International
security gives moral primacy to peace and stability within the society of
states. And human security gives moral primacy to the personal safety
of individual human beings wherever they might be, irrespective of
jurisdiction. Ultimately, these paradigms represent what Isaiah Berlin
has called a collision of values to which there can be no permanent
resolution;1 these paradigms may be equally compelling but nevertheless
remain mutually incommensurate. At a certain point, the requirements
of one paradigm will conflict with the requirements of another and we
will be forced to choose between them. Should the national security of
the state come first? Or are there instances where a general condition of
peace and stability within the society of states may reasonably necessitate
an infringement of the national security of one of its members? And what
if human suffering of a serious kind persists irrespective of a general
condition of peace and stability within the society of states and national
security among its members? In such circumstances, should human
security trump these other considerations?
The prospect of intervention by a sovereign state, group of states or
international organisation involving the threat or use of force or some
other means of duress, in the domestic jurisdiction of an independent
state against the will or wishes of its government clearly discloses
precisely this collision of values.2 Admittedly, this is the hardest test one
can apply to these arrangements but as a result it arguably most clearly
discloses the priorities, ambiguities and tensions implicit within each
security formulation. As Martin Wight observes, the problem of military
intervention raises questions of the utmost moral complexity: adherents of
every political belief [and security paradigm] will regard such intervention
as justified under certain circumstances.3 But equally, one may add, each
will also vehemently and passionately condemn military intervention
whether as crime or misadventure when the circumstance do not satisfy
their own political and moral beliefs. In such situations, the key question
is whether one state or group of states ought to forcibly transgress the
sovereignty of another, assuming they are practically equipped to do so.
Questions of military preparedness and logistical capability obviously
feature prominently in such debates. But the central focus is not on such
practicalities but the deeper moral choice of whether or not and on what
basis an act of intervention may be justified.
Origins of the problem of military intervention
Isaiah Berlin The

crooked timber of
humanity. (London: John
Murray, 1990), p.13.
2
Similar definitions are
employed in Hedley
Bull and John Vincent
(eds) Intervention in
world politics (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1984),
p.1., R. Jackson, The
global covenant: human
states (Oxford: OUP,
2000), p.250., and R.J.
Vincent Non-intervention
and international order
(Princeton, N.J.: PUP,
1974), p.13.
Martin Wight Power

politics (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1974),
p.191.
The existence of a plurality of equal sovereign states that together form

an international society creates the circumstances out of which the
problem of military intervention emerges. If there were only one sovereign
political community for all humankind, the question of intervention per
se would not arise for there would be single authority with a global remit
for action. In the absence of such a single authority, each nation state is
free to decide how to run its own affairs. This is what is meant by the
term equal sovereignty; states may be profoundly unequal in wealth or
military power but they possess the same sovereign rights irrespective of
these differences. International society is based upon on a sovereign states
fundamental right of non-intervention; it is this right of non-intervention
65
which ensures the continued existence of a plurality of states and, by

extension, an international society. If the reverse held true and there was
instead a generally recognised right of intervention, states would no longer
be equal under international law and would not enjoy any pre-emptory
right of non-intervention apart from the limitations placed on that right by
the UN Charter.4 In such circumstances, the most powerful states are likely
to become so dominant that a global international society would cease to
exist in favour of some type of hegemonic or imperial system.
Global covenant,
p.251.
The principle of non-intervention was enshrined as Article 2 of the United

Nations Charter with a view to preventing precisely this type of scenario.
You will recall that at the time the Charter was created in 1945, much
of humankind lived as what was variously termed subject peoples or
dependant nations within European overseas empires. Subject peoples
and dependent nations were not sovereign and therefore were not free
to determine their collective political existence. In the period since 1945,
international society has expanded rapidly to include approximately
200 states, the majority of which were formerly subject peoples. These
developments are a consequence of decolonisation in Africa and Asia,
which is, in turn, representative of a fundamental rejection of imperialism
and consequent affirmation of equality. Indeed, the explicit purpose of
the United Nations (as stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter) is to ensure
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Article 2 goes on to affirm
quite categorically that: All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Nonintervention is the norm and any actions which deviate from this are a
deviation from the norm and must therefore be justified.
Current justifications for military intervention

The current justifications for overriding the norm of intervention are
threefold: (1) international peace and security; (2) at the request of the
recognised government of the target state who considers this external
involvement necessary to preserve its national security; and (3) to protect
the population of the target state (or segments of it) from gross human
rights abuses.5 The first two justifications are, for all intents and purposes,
universally accepted among states. We can find these criteria enshrined as
Chapter 7 and Article 51 of the UN Charter as the only legitimate grounds
for overriding the Article 2 guarantee of non-intervention. Chapter 7
authorises the Security Council to identify any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39) and, if such a threat is
determined by the Council, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security (Article 42). Article 51 adds that Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But
the third criterion for military intervention human security remains
highly controversial and accordingly there is no clear international legal
provision one can cite in justification of it.
The human security justification for military intervention is controversial
because it not only violates the principle of consent by the target state but
also seems to call for a degree of action which goes beyond the pluralist
rules of international society. The UN Charter clearly endorses human
rights as a primary objective of the United Nations but at no point does
66
Global covenant,
p.252.
it identify gross human rights violations as a valid reason for military

intervention in state sovereignty. The proponents of human security,
including armed intervention for humanity, point out that the UN Charter
enshrined human rights and the responsibility of the Security Council for
international peace and stability as well as the more traditional guarantees
in favour of sovereignty and non-intervention. And they frequently cite
the Genocide Convention as a legally binding obligation to prevent and
punish the destruction of peoples even while they acknowledge that the
exact meaning of this obligation remains unclear.
Controversy of this kind arises because armed intervention for
humanity seems to conflict with the idea of sovereignty. For this reason,
humanitarian intervention is especially controversial among authoritarian,
weak, failed or quasi-states that are the most likely targets of such action.
Their opposition may seem opportunistic and indeed such states are
clearly self-motivated in their vociferous endorsement of sovereign rights
but the idea of sovereignty and the many benefits it has secured for
millions of men and women around the globe is not something which can
or should be easily dismissed. People listen when someone like Robert
Mugabe or Slobodan Miloevi or Saddam Hussein defends the principle
of sovereignty despite rather than because of the political record of the
person invoking it and that fact, in and of it self, speaks volumes about
the continued significance of the sovereign ideal and the national and
international security paradigms which follow on from it.
Finally, it should be stressed that there are moral and practical difficulties
associated with each of these three justifications for military intervention.
Regardless of whether we are debating an international security concern
for international peace and stability, a national security concern for state
consent or a human security concern for personal safety, ambiguities
and contradictions will remain such that we are still confronted with a
very difficult policy decision. That is true even in circumstances where
an intervention is requested by the government of a sovereign state.
For example, valid consent must come from the legal government of a
sovereign state and it must be freely given. Thus very serious questions
may still arise about whether and to what extent the government in
question has a legitimate popular mandate or is acting of its own accord
rather than as a result of coercion from another interested party, such
as a local strong man or another, more powerful state. Similar questions
will also arise in connection with self-defence. Is the national security
threat to the state real or contrived? And who should decide? The state
or the intervening powers? Even with regard to human security, questions
of judgment remain. How much human suffering is required to warrant
action? And who shall decide? Neighbouring states who are on the
receiving end of mass migrations? Aid agencies responsible for sheltering
the sick and the homeless? Or the great powers without whose operational
support such action is unlikely to be forthcoming?
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 7 and Economides and Berdal Chapter 1 and then answer the
following questions.
1. What do international relations scholars mean when they refer to intervention as the
grundnorm of international society?
2. Why is the human security justification for intervention more controversial than the
national or international security justifications?
3. Who do you think should be responsible for the uncivil and unsafe conditions in
war-torn or failed states, and on what basis?
67
Intervention for international peace and security: Iraq

One of the clearest examples of military intervention for international
peace and security is the United Nations Security Councils response
to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Under the Ottoman Empire,
Kuwait was administered as a constituent unit of Iraq, albeit one with
autonomous provisions. After the First World War, the United Kingdom
assumed responsibility for both Iraq and Kuwait as part of the League
of Nations Mandates system applied to the colonial territories of the
defeated Axis powers. Crucially, the United Kingdom governed Iraq and
Kuwait as separate emirates and, as a result, the subsequent process
of decolonisation eventually created two states, a sovereign Iraq and
a sovereign Kuwait, instead of one. Iraq, however, never recognised
the independence of Kuwait and maintained irredentist claims over its
territory. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 following a dispute over
Iraqi debts to Kuwait and allegations that Kuwait was illegally slantdrilling oil across the border between the two countries.
Within hours of the Iraqi invasion, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 660 condemning Iraqi actions and calling for an immediate
withdrawal. Very quickly thereafter (on 6 August) the UN Security Council
applied economic sanctions to Iraq (Resolution 661). Then in November
1990 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 demanding that Iraq
withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 and authorising all necessary
means (which in the language of diplomacy means military force) to
ensure compliance. With this end in mind, a coalition of military forces
from 35 UN member states (Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands,
Niger, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States) was assembled. A
day after the withdrawal deadline had passed, Operation Desert Storm
was launched against Iraq. By the end of February, Iraqi forces were
retreating from Kuwait and on 27 February 1991 then American President
George Bush declared that Kuwait had been liberated and announced a
cease-fire.
The 1991 intervention in Iraq was a classic example of action taken in
the interest of international peace and security. Iraqs invasion of Kuwait
was an act of aggression and as such violated a fundamental norm of the
United Nations Charter. Through this act of aggression, Iraq became an
international outlaw and could therefore legally be subject to punitive
measures by the UN Security Council. Coalition action against Iraq,
including both the air campaign and the ground attack which followed,
were entirely in keeping with international law. Moreover, such action
was carried out in order to defend the sovereignty of Kuwait and not, in
the first instance, to subvert the sovereignty of Iraq. The coalition was not
assembled with the purpose of invading Iraq and not only stopped short
of doing that by only temporarily entering Iraqi territory but also made no
attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Admittedly, after Iraq had been
defeated, the UN broke new ground by requiring the destruction of all
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons or facilities in Iraq. Resolution
687 created an instrument of international inspection to enforce Iraqs
obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of poisonous
gases, the convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, and the
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Resolution 687 has
68
been characterised as one of the most intrusive and wide-ranging array

of demands made on a sovereign state since the creation of the UN in
October 1945.6 But here it is important to recall that all five permanent
members of the Council supported Resolution 687 indeed it could
not have been passed without their express agreement. In other words,
Resolution 687, although innovative in substance, was nevertheless within
the procedural remit of the UN Security Council.
Anthony Parsons From

cold war to hot peace
(London: Penguin Books,
1995), pp.6869.
The weapons inspection programme persisted for several years after

the end of the Second Gulf War and was intended to last until the
destruction of all offending military capabilities had been carried out to
the satisfaction of the United Nations weapons inspectors. But in the end,
this process was cut short by another American-led invasion of Iraq in
2003. The 2003 military intervention was also ostensibly carried out in
the interest of international peace and security. But in this case, no explicit
United Nations authorisation was forthcoming. Instead, the Security
Council remained deeply divided on the issue. The American and Britishled coalition of 2003 claimed that military action at this time followed on
from earlier Security Council Resolutions, including not only Resolution
687 (1991) but also Resolution 1441 (2002), which offered Iraq a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. Critics, however,
condemned the 2003 invasion as an unprovoked attack on a sovereign
state and a breach of international law. The salient point here being that
regime change as such is not a legitimate basis for intervention.
Activity
Read Adam Tait, The legal war: a justification for military action in Iraq, Gonzaga Journal
of International Law 9 (1) (2005), available online at www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume9/
Tait/Tait%20-%20Iraq%20Paper.pdf, and then reflect on the following.
1. Was the American-led coalition justified in its 2003 invasion of Iraq on the basis of a
collective right to self-defence?
2. Should Article 51 of the UN Charter be redefined to include pre-emptive self-defence?
Intervention for national security: Bosnia-Herzegovina

and Afghanistan
Examples of military intervention for national security are less clearcut. Because intervention involves the use of force by external agents,
international security considerations always play a part in such decisions.
This is especially true at the start of any such mission, when the question
of whether or not and in what way external agents should become
involved is paramount. Intervention is a costly affair not only in time
and money but potentially also in human lives. Thus any state or group
of states contemplating intervention would need to provide convincing
justification for it both in terms of international law and military
preparedness. Not surprisingly, therefore, intervention in both BosniaHerzegovina (19921995) and Afghanistan (2001 ongoing at time
of writing, December 2010) began in response to international security
considerations.
In July 1991 the EU imposed a freeze on arms and aid for the former
Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. In September the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 713, which proclaimed a complete arms
embargo and called for an immediate end to hostilities and a peaceful
and negotiated settlement of the conflict. In the same month an EU peace
conference declared that the borders of the successor states cannot be
69
changed by force and that the rights of minorities must be guaranteed.

In June 1992, the United Nations Protection Force which was originally
deployed in Croatia (UNPROFOR I) had its mandate extended into
Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR II), initially to protect Sarajevo airport.
In September 1992, the role of UNPROFOR II was expanded in order to
protect the delivery of humanitarian relief. As a result, a UN humanitarian
force was on the ground in war zones throughout Bosnia and NATO
provided fighter aircraft to patrol air exclusion zones. The Security Council
responded to the humanitarian crisis by enacting various resolutions
including Resolution 824, which created safe areas for civilians in
designated towns and cities, and Resolution 827, which established
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with
a mandate to prosecute those responsible for serious violations of
humanitarian law and crimes against humanity.
Up to this point, intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very much in
keeping with the principles of international security.7 Indeed, so much so
that the requirements of international security trumped those of national
security to such an extent that the right of self-defence of the breakaway
Yugoslav republics was fundamentally compromised by the arms embargo.
Activity
Shrivastava and
Agarwal Politics of
intervention and the
Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict, International
Studies 40, 2003
pp.6984
Read Paul R. Williams, Why the Bosnian arms embargo is illegal, Wall Street JournalEurope, 1995, available online at www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/
Bosnian%20Arms%20Embargo.htm and then reflect on the following.
1. Did the arms embargo violate Bosnias right to self-defence?
2. Did it contribute to a balance of power in the Balkans?
3. Was this policy a success or a failure, and on what basis?
In 1995, however, international involvement began to change and
was increasingly determined by the national security requirements of
the fledgling state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Crucial to this development
was international repugnance towards the growing evidence of mostly
Serbian atrocities. Most notorious of these was the so-called Srebrenica
massacre of July 1995 when several thousand Bosniak men and boys were
murdered after what had hitherto been a UN safe haven in the Yugoslav
wars of secession fell to Serbian forces under the command of general
Ratko Mladic.8 In August 1995 a transformation from UN peacekeeping to
NATO peace enforcement took place following a request for assistance by
the Bosnian government. So began Operation Deliberate Force, a NATO air
campaign to undermine Serbian military capability within Bosnia territory.
Following on from this, NATO made it clear that there would be no
partition of the Bosnian state. NATO, and especially American, involvement
altered the military situation by changing the strategic calculations of the
warring factions. As a result, the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia and Serbia along with the various militias involved in the actual
fighting were persuaded to commit themselves to an American-brokered
settlement: the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Dayton agreement) was signed in December 1995 by the
presidents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of
Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia).9
The so-called Dayton agreement stipulated that in future the signatories
would conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth
in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other
documents of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
70
David Rohde,
Endgame: the betrayal
and fall of Srebrenica
(New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1997).
www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/icty/dayton/
daytonframework.html
They were required to fully respect the sovereign equality of each other,
to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to refrain from any action,
by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State. It
also committed them to comply fully with provisions concerning human
rights and particularly the protection of refugees and displaced persons.
As a result of Dayton, the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SerbiaMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize[d]
each other as sovereign independent States within their international
borders. This agreement provided a novel framework for the maintenance
of a unified and independent Bosnian state consisting of two distinct
entities: the Moslem-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 51
per cent of the territory, and the Republika Srpska with 49 per cent.10 The
Dayton agreement was backed by an international Implementation Force
(IFOR) initially composed of some 60,000 troops under a US commander,
including an all-important US contingent of some 20,000 troops and also
Russian troops. Thus the final outcome of international and specifically
NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to guarantee the national
security of this Yugoslav successor state.
Events in Afghanistan, albeit still ongoing at the time of writing, show
a similar progression from international security to national security
considerations.11 The Taliban government was the subject of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) which followed on from
the terrorist attacks on two American embassies in Africa in 1998. This
resolution called upon the Taliban to give Osama bin Laden to the United
States or a third country so that he could stand trial for his part in these
atrocities. The Taliban government was threatened with trade sanctions
and the freezing of all its assets abroad if it failed to comply. Resolution
1333 (2000) did not authorise the use of force against the country but
it nevertheless discloses a prior history of international security concern
with regard to the Talibans role in aiding and abetting terrorist activity.
The initial American-led intervention in Afghanistan followed on from
the September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. Officially, the
purpose of the invasion was to target al-Qaeda members, and to punish
the Taliban government of Afghanistan which had provided support and
protection to al-Qaeda.
Very quickly, a national security dimension began to emerge. Already by
the end of September 2001, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia
had withdrawn their recognition of the Taliban government, which left
Pakistan the only state that still recognised Taliban rule in Afghanistan
as legitimate. This development was significant because if the Taliban
are not the legitimate government of Afghanistan, then Afghani national
security is not subverted and may even be supported by overthrowing
the Taliban. This rationale explains why local Afghan forces opposed to
the Taliban such as the Afghan Northern Alliance played a vital role in
the Americanled effort to overthrow the Taliban and replace it with a
new Afghan government. In anticipation of this political change, Afghan
political leaders met in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001 to agree new
leadership structures. Under the so-called Bonn agreement they formed an
interim Transitional Administration and named Hamid Karzai chairman
of an Afghani governing committee. A meeting of local Afghani leaders
(the Loya Jirga of 19 June 2002) appointed Karzai interim president of
the Afghan Transitional Administration. Karzai was subsequently reelected President of Afghanistan in both the 2004 and 2009 presidential
elections.12
10
Global covenant,
p.272.
11
For an overview of the
sequence of events in
Afghanistan since 2001,
see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/2001-present_
war_in_Afghanistan
12
For more information

on Karzai, see http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hamid_Karzai
71
Just as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ultimately the officially recognised

government of Afghanistan requested international assistance in defence
of national security. In September 2006 Karzai told the United Nations
General Assembly that Afghanistan had become the worst victim of
terrorism.13 He demanded international assistance to destroy terrorist
sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. Thus NATOs continued presence in
Afghanistan is a key part of the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan
between the government of Afghanistan and the international community,
which sets goals relating to the security, governance and economic
development of the country.14
13
www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/
09/9d5c90e1-de6e4def-a053-9ba2f0aa
4747.html/
14
www.nato.int/issues/
afghanistan/index.html
Activity
Read the International Crisis Group 2006 report Countering Afghanistans insurgency:
no quick fixes available online at www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_
asia/123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf and then reflect on the following.
1. How does the report define the threat of counter-insurgency?
2. How does the report describe the process of nation-building?
3. Do you agree with the reports conclusion that Afghani national security requires both
counter-insurgency and nation-building?
4. In your opinion, did intervention strengthen or undermine Afghanistans national
security?
Intervention for human security: Kosovo

NATOs military intervention in Kosovo was a direct response to
overwhelming humanitarian necessity.15 Not surprisingly, therefore, the
Kosovo case is fundamentally distinct from the sort of circumstances
one can discern at play with regard to the Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Afghanistan examples. Intervention in Iraq in 1990 was a direct response
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and carried out with express security
council authorisation. Intervention in Bosnia (1995) and Afghanistan
(2001) ultimately had the consent of the recognised governments
of the target states whose national security was being threatened by
armed insurgents. In contrast, NATO intervention in Kosovo took place
against the wishes of the sovereign government of rump Yugoslavia
(Serbia-Montenegro) even though the Yugoslav government was
similarly challenged by insurgents.16 Similarly, whereas intervention
in Iraq (1990), Bosnia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001) was intended
to preserve the territorial status quo and restore sovereign control to
legitimate governments (in Kuwait, Sarajevo and Kabul), intervention
in Kosovo (1999) was intended to protect the Kosovar (Albanian)
minority even at the risk of partitioning the (rump) federal Yugoslav
state (Serbia-Montenegro). These facts not only make the Kosovo case
unique but arguably also one of the rare instances of military intervention
for predominantly humanitarian reasons (the Indian intervention in
Bangladesh in 1971, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978, and
the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1979 are often cited as other
examples)17.
Unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo was never a self-governing republic
within the Yugoslav Federation. For this reason, it could not claim
independence on the basis of uti posseditis juris , a key principle of
international law which says that on those rare occasions when empires or
federations break up, only the highest-level constituent units will acquire
sovereignty. However, under the terms of the 1974 Yugoslav Federal
72
15
A. Roberts, NATOs
humanitarian war
over Kosovo, Survival 41
(Autumn 1999), p.106.
Global covenant
p.279.
16
17
See, among others,

J. Mayall Nationalism
and international
society (Cambridge,
1990) and T. Musgrave
Self determination and
national minorities
(Oxford, 1997).
Constitution Kosovo was recognised as an autonomous region within

Serbia. This limited self-government was revoked by Slobodan Miloevi
in 1989 and direct rule from Belgrade was imposed. Kosovos regional
assembly was disbanded and a repressive Serbian-dominated regime was
imposed. Albanian was no longer recognised as an official language. The
only Albanian-language newspaper, Rilindja, was shut down and TV and
radio broadcasts in Albanian prohibited. Kosovar Albanians were denied
jobs in the public sector at a time when most industry was state-owned, as
a result poverty and unemployment reached catastrophic levels.18
Not surprisingly given these circumstances, Kosovar nationalism, and in
particular a desire for secession from rump Federal Yugoslavia, increased
significantly during the 1990s. The Democratic League for Kosovo led by
Ibrahim Rugova began a policy of peaceful resistance to Serbian rule.19
Rugova took the very practical line that armed resistance would be futile
given Serbias military strength and would lead only to a bloodbath in
Kosovo. He called on the Albanian populace to boycott the Yugoslav and
Serbian states by not participating in any elections, by ignoring military
drafts and by not paying any taxes. He also called for the creation of
parallel Albanian schools, clinics and hospitals. In September 1991, the
shadow Kosovo Assembly organised a referendum on independence for
Kosovo. Despite widespread harassment and violence by Serbian security
forces, the referendum achieved a reported 90 per cent turnout and a
98 per cent vote nearly a million votes in all which approved the
creation of an independent Republic of Kosovo. In May 1992, a second
referendum elected Rugova president of Kosovo. Predictably given the
obvious threat to the territorial integrity of rump Yugoslavia (SerbiaMontenegro), the Serbian government declared that both referendums
were illegal and their results null and void.
In 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began an offensive against the
Yugoslav federal army and police. The KLA took control of an increasingly
wide area of Kosovo including Pec, Djakovica, Malisevo, Orahovac, Suva
Reka and even the Belacevec coal pits (which threatened to disrupt energy
supplies in the region). These territorial gains provoked harsh reprisals
by the Serbian authorities. Albanians suspected of supporting the KLA
were rounded up, and Serbian paramilitaries ostensibly formed to defend
ethnic Serb villages from the KLA began to terrorise Kosovo Albanian
villagers instead. KLA attacks and Serbian reprisals continued throughout
the winter of 19981999, culminating in the so-called Racak incident of
January 1999 in which 45 Albanian villagers were killed. This incident
later became part of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia indictment against Miloevi and his top officials. The details of
what happened at Racak are still controversial.20
The UN Security Council passed several resolutions on the Kosovo
conflict acting under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. Resolution 760 (1998)
condemned all terrorist action and called upon Yugoslavia to achieve
a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue. Resolution
1199 (1998) expressed concern about the flow of refugees into Albanian
and Macedonia and called upon both Yugoslav and Kosovar authorities
to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending
humanitarian catastrophe. Once again, it called for a negotiated
settlement while at the same time condemning both Yugoslav repression
and Kosovar insurrection and prompted both sides to facilitate the safe
return of refugees. Finally, Resolution 1203 (1998) demanded that the
government of Yugoslavia comply fully and swiftly with the above
Security Council resolutions.
18
For a description of
the situation in Kosovo
prior to and during the
NATO intervention, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Kosovo_War.
19
For a description of
Ibrahim Rugovas role
in Kosovo, see http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Ibrahim_Rugova.
20
For more information

on the Racak incident,
see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Racak_incident
and www.ess.uwe.
ac.uk/kosovo/KosovoMassacres2.htm
73
These UN demands upon the government of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo

Albanian leadership proved futile. Instead of improving, the political
situation in Kosovo steadily deteriorated throughout the winter of
1998/99. The civil war not only continued but accelerated. By early 1999
there was a massive forced expulsion and flight of Kosovo Albanians into
neighbouring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro (a separately governed
part of Yugoslavia).
NATOs member states became deeply concerned about the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Kosovo. In January the Yugoslav government
and the Kosovo Albanian leadership were issued with a summons by
NATO to attend the Rambouillet peace conference, which involved
Russia as well as the leading NATO powers. In February 1999 a basis for
a settlement of the conflict was laid down at Rambouillet: (1) Kosovo
should enjoy substantial autonomy without violating the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; (2) it should be
based on democratic institutions and guarantee human and minority
rights; (3) all Yugoslav forces would withdraw from Kosovo; (4) security
would be guaranteed by 30,000 international troops, including a core
component of NATO forces; and, finally (5) an international conference
would be convened within three years of the agreement to negotiate a
final settlement of the conflict which would reflect the will of the people
of Kosovo (as distinct from the people of Yugoslavia). These terms were
non-negotiable and so NATO declared itself ready to take military action to
ensure compliance.21
In the event, the so-called Rambouillet agreement was accepted by the
Kosovar Albanian leaders but categorically rejected by Yugoslav President
Slobodan Miloevi. Miloevi rightly pointed out that reference only to
the people of Kosovo in determining the final political status of Kosovo
was a flagrant violation of the principle of territorial integrity of existing
states and the presence of an international monitoring body would
compromise Yugoslavias sovereignty. In other words, Miloevi rejected
Rambouillet because he considered it to be fundamentally antithetical to
Yugoslav national security. The day after Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet
terms, NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia began. On the ground, the
ethnic cleansing campaign by the Serbians accelerated and by the end
of the first week of bombardment somewhere in the region of 300,000
Kosovo Albanians had fled into Albania and Macedonia, with many
thousands more internally displaced within Kosovo. By April, the United
Nations estimated that that 850,000 people the vast majority of them
Albanians had fled their homes.
The proclaimed goal of the NATO operation was summed up by its
spokesman as Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back. That is, Serbian
troops would have to leave Kosovo and be replaced by international
peacekeepers in order to ensure that the Albanian refugees could return
to their homes. The NATO political and military leadership believed that
by weakening Yugoslavias armed forces and infrastructure President
Miloevi would be obliged to accept NATOs terms. They clearly expected
the Yugoslav dictator to capitulate quickly in the face of NATO bombing.
But instead Miloevi held out for over two months. Moreover, once the
bombardment concluded, it was discovered that over 200,000 Serbs and
other non-Albanian minorities fled or were expelled from the province.
So although NATO intervention was ostensibly carried out to protect a
vulnerable minority (the Kosovar Albanians) it inadvertently also made
another minority group equally vulnerable.22
74
Global covenant
p.279.
21
22
For an overview of
the security situation
confronting minorities
9that is non-Albanians)
in Kosovo, see www.
economist.com/world/
europe/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=8116643
Activity
Read the executive summary of the Independent Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo
Report (2000) available online at www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.
htm and then answer the following questions.
1. Why does the Independent Commission on Kosovo conclude that NATO military
intervention in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate?
2. Do you agree with this conclusion?
3. If the Independent Commission on Kosovo is correct, then what are the implications
for human security?
The eventual peace terms were based on principles agreed by members
of the G7 leading industrial nations plus Russia. The agreement was
confirmed and sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
These conditions were basically the same as those of Rambouillet: an
immediate end of hostilities and repression in Kosovo, verified withdrawal
of Yugoslav forces from the province, demilitarisation of the KLA, the
presence of an international security force in Kosovo with Chapter 7
authorisation, return of all refugees and displaced persons, and the
creation of an interim UN civil administration that would re-create an
autonomous regime in Kosovo.
The NATO member states, and especially the United States and the United
Kingdom who led the initiative, evidently considered this outcome as a
vindication of their intervention. As then British Foreign Secretary, Robin
Cook, put it: we have tried repeatedly right up to the last minute
to find a way to halt the repression of Kosovo Albanians through
negotiation We were left with no other way of preventing the present
humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe, than by taking military
action to limit the capacity of Miloevis army to repress the Kosovo
Albanians.23 Other states took a rather different view. As then Russian
President Boris Yeltsin remarked: Russia is deeply upset by NATOs
military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing less than
open aggression.24 In a similar vein, Russias ambassador to London at the
time pointed out that breaking international law leads to catastrophes
Nothing in the UN charter or the North Atlantic treaty can justify taking
military action against the sovereign state of Yugoslavia.25
NATO involvement in Kosovo is controversial because the UN Charter does
not formally recognise gross human rights violations per se as a criterion
for intervention. To recall, the only grounds for intervention in Chapter
7 of the UN Charter are self-defence (Article 59) and international peace
and security (Article 42). Although the Security Council characterised
the crisis in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security in
Resolutions 760 (1998) and 1199 (1998), it stopped short of authorising
all necessary means (i.e. force) to compel Yugoslav compliance. Moreover,
the final outcome of NATO intervention in Kosovo was the creation of a de
facto international protectorate. This development contradicts the main
thrust of international society since 1945, which has been characterised
by the repudiation of all forms of colonialism and trusteeship in favour of
the self-determination of peoples. The question thus arises whether and
to what extent NATOs intervention in Kosovo heralds a return to earlier
practices of gun boat diplomacy and neo-colonialism in which the rights
of sovereignty and self-determination can be revoked by the great powers
in those circumstances where the government in question fails to satisfy
agreed standards of civilisation. The subsequent American strategy of preemption and unilateral action associated with the presidency of George W.
23
As quoted in R.
Jackson The global
covenant: human
states (OUP, 2000),
p.282.
24
Ibid, p.282
25
Ibid, p.282
75
Bush would appear to confirm this development. That at least has been the
claim put forward by critics of the 2003 American-led intervention in Iraq
and the subsequent American policy of regime change.
Activity
Read Bain Chapter 10 and Economides and Berdal Chapters 3 and 8 and then answer
the following questions.
1. Does the necessity of safeguarding national security justify pre-emptive intervention
of the sort that occurred in Iraq in 2003?
2. If intervention occurs with the consent of the target state as it did in Bosnia, is it
really intervention?
3. Should international society intervene to stop gross human rights violations like the
ethnic cleansing which took place in Kosovo during 1999?
4. If a sovereign state is incapable of providing security for its people, should it be
replaced by an international trusteeship or protectorate as arguably happened with
respect to Kosovo?
Intervention after R2P: Darfur

The new doctrine of responsibility to protect or R2P was a direct response
to the perceived failings and inadequacies of the military interventions
just discussed. The express aim of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in advocating this new
approach to humanitarian crises was to ensure that future such conflicts
would not fall victim to the same international wranglings and power
political calculations that had complicated (Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia)
or forestalled (Rwanda) international action. The crisis in Darfur (a region
comprising three states in western Sudan) is often cited as a test case
for R2P because it was the first major humanitarian emergency to be
addressed by the United Nations after recognition of R2P by the World
Summit (2005) and the UN Security Council in Resolution 1674 (2006).
The civil war in Darfur began in 2003 when the non-Arab Muslim Fur,
Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups accused the mostly Arab Sudanese
government in Khartoum of oppressing black Africans and neglecting the
interests of Darfur.26 Since this time, the Sudan Liberation Movement/
Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have been
involved in a protracted struggle with the Sudanese military and police
forces, and the Janjaweed militia recruited mostly from the Arab Abbala
tribes of Northern Sudan.27 Although the Sudanese government publicly
denies that it supports the Janjaweed, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes
(2009), crimes against humanity (2009) and genocide (2010) for his role
in organising the counter-insurgency in Darfur.28
Estimates regarding the number of casualties from the Darfur conflict vary
widely. The UN says as many as 300,000 have died whereas Khartoum
puts the figure at nearer 10,000.29 But it is widely accepted that mass
killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and the deliberate
destruction of villages and food supplies have occurred.30 The violence has
also forced some 2.5 million people mostly farmers and villagers from
non-Arab groups - to flee their homes.31 The majority of the displaced are
living in camps in Darfur, but thousands have also fled across the border
into neighbouring Chad.
In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the SLM/A
and the Sudanese government.32 It provides for the disarmament of the
76
26
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/3496731.stm
27
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/8659037.stm
28
www.hrw.org/en/
news/2010/07/13/
sudan-icc-warrant-albashir-genocide
29
http://edition.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/
africa/04/22/darfur.
holmes/index.
html?eref=rss_
topstories
30
Human Rights Watch
report (2004), Darfur
Destroyed, available
at www.hrw.org/en/
node/12133/section/1
31
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/4978668.stm
32
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/4978668.stm
pro-Khartoum Janjaweed militia, the disbandment of the rebel forces

and the integration of some of their members into Sudanese military
and police forces, as well as the establishment of a Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority under the control of the SLM/A to monitor the treatys
implementation. The smaller JEM did not accept the terms of this deal
and so remained in conflict with Khartoum. The Sudanese government
and the JEM did not sign a cease-fire agreement until February 2010.33
In May 2010, peace talks between the Sudanese government and the
JEM broke down following allegations of Sudanese army raids and air
strikes in Darfur.34 In the summer months of 2010, fighting between the
JEM and the Sudanese army in Darfur became more frequent.35 In May
2010, approximately 600 people died as a direct result of armed conflict
in Darfur, the highest monthly number of violent fatalities since the
beginning of 2008.36
The international response to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur was
mostly ad hoc rather than the systematic approach envisioned in R2P.37
In August 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
1706 calling upon the Sudanese government to accept a UN peacekeeping
mission in Darfur to replace a smaller and less well-organised African
Union mission.38 But a combined United Nations African Union Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) did not reach its destination until January 2008. It was
delayed by protracted bickering between the UN, the AU and the Sudanese
government in Khartoum over whether final authority for the force would
rest with the UN or the AU, the size and resources of the mission, whether
its mandate would be under Chapter 6 (peaceful settlement of disputes)
or Chapter 7 (restore international peace and security) of the UN Charter,
and its financing.
A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNAMID was eventually signed
in February 2009.39 The SOFA set forth provisions for UNAMID funds,
property and communications facilities, as well as the safety and security
of mission personnel, their privileges and immunities, and their ability
to enter and exit Sudan. Yet, irrespective of these formal arrangements,
the UN-AU Mission in Darfur has been repeatedly hampered in its
monitoring activities by the actions of both government and rebel
forces.40 For example, UN sources reported at the end of May 2010 that
18 out of 24 attempts to reach locations in Jebel Mara (where fighting
between government and rebel forces was reportedly taking place) had
failed to reach their intended destination.41 Banditry and attacks on
the peacekeepers and on humanitarian groups have also limited their
movement. In June 2010 alone, three peacekeepers were killed and
two international humanitarian workers were kidnapped.42 Sudanese
authorities routinely fail to prosecute those responsible for such attacks
in Darfur. It is likely that insecurity in Darfur will worsen during the
remainder of 2010 as international attention shifts towards the South
Sudan and the independence referendum scheduled to take place there in
January 2011.
33
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/8659037.stm
34
http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/8659037.stm
35
www.sudantribune.
com/spip.
php?article35667
36
www.ushmm.org/
genocide/take_action/
atrisk/region/sudan
37
Alex de Waal, Darfur

and the failure of the
responsibility to protect,
International Affairs 83:
6 (2007), p.1041.
38
De Waal, op.cit.,
p.1042.
39
www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID
=25619&Cr=darfur&
Cr1=
40
www.hrw.org/en/
news/2010/07/19/
un-strengthen-civilianprotection-darfur
41
www.hrw.org/en/
news/2010/07/19/
42
www.hrw.org/en/
news/2010/07/19/
What do events in Darfur tell us about the norm of intervention postR2P? Are international actors and especially the great powers fulfilling
their responsibility to protect? Sadly, the evidence would suggest that
the same power-political calculations which complicated international
intervention before R2P continue to hamper the path towards human
security after R2P. Military intervention for human security is only likely in
those circumstances where a great power (e.g., United States) or group of
states (NATO, EU, etc.) are prepared to accept the significant political and
military risks involved. Insofar as Darfur is concerned, the United States
77
was hesitant about becoming involved for fear that such actions might
jeopardise the support of the Sudanese government in the war on terror.43
Meanwhile, the EU was already overstretched in Macedonia, Kosovo,
Bosnia, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and therefore
did not have sufficient resources to commit to Darfur.44 Russia and
China remain ill-disposed towards intervention in general because of the
potential implications for Chechnya and Tibet respectively. Finally, a prior
concern for the conflict of longer duration in South Sudan has unavoidably
directed international action away from Darfur. It remains to be seen
whether the outcome of the South Sudanese independence referendum in
January 2011 will improve or undermine human security in Darfur.
Activity
Read De Waal, A. (2007) Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to Protect,
International Affairs, 83 (6): 10391054, and Enough (2010) report Neglecting Darfur,
available online at www.enoughproject.org/publications/neglecting-darfur. Then consider
the following.
1. Is the pursuit of R2P in Darfur a serious international goal?
2. Is it an obtainable ideal? Why or why not?

define intervention
identify and assess the justification for intervention within
contemporary international society
discuss the current controversies associated with intervention using
evidence from the five case studies surveyed here
compare and contrast the divergent priorities and practices which
follow on from the national, international and human security
approaches to the problem of intervention.

1. To what extent are changes in the balance of power responsible for the
increasing post-Cold War incidence of intervention?
2. Do you agree with the suggestion that intervention often exacerbates
insecurity in the target state?
3. Does intervention make the world a safer place?
78
43
Williams, P. and
Bellamy, A. (2005) The
responsibility to protect
and the crisis in Darfur,
Security Dialogue 36 (1),
pp.3738.
44
Williams and Bellamy,

op.cit., p.34.
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper

Important note: This Sample examination paper reflects the
examination and assessment arrangements for this course in the academic
year 20102011. The format and structure of the examination may have
changed since the publication of this subject guide. You can find the most
recent examination papers on the VLE where all changes to the format of
the examination are posted.
Time allowed: three hours
Candidate should answer FOUR of the following TWELVE questions. All
questions carry equal marks.
1. Assess the case for the normative view of security studies.
2. From here on, there will no longer be much difficulty in achieving
successful securitisation in the environmental sector. Discuss
3. How useful is the idea of human security in sub-Saharan Africa?
4. Compare the justification for intervention in any two of the following:
the First Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Darfur.
5. Can China reasonably be described as a would-be hegemon?
6. What is the relationship between military threat and securitisation in
the global war on terror?
7. Are Serbian security and Kosovar security necessarily antithetical?
8. Should international security be a special responsibility of the great
powers? Discuss in relation to the UN Security Council.
9. Does security of the state necessarily translate into security of the
person?
10. Do you agree with Barry Buzans analysis of nuclear deterrence as a
defence dilemma?
11. Will the global financial crisis accelerate securitisation in the economic
sector?
12. Should identity be a referent object for security studies?
END OF PAPER
79
Notes
80
Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentary
Appendix 2: Sample Examiners

commentary
This course interrogates the key concepts and dilemmas involved in
security policy by examining the leading security paradigms national
security, international security and human security. In each case, we look
at the historical circumstances out of which the paradigm originates, the
political problems it seeks to address, the constraints it imposes upon
policymakers, and its significance within contemporary international
society. The principal themes addressed are: what does it mean to be
secure and why does it matter?; does security for some automatically
imply insecurity for others?; and how have changes in domestic and
international society influenced the ways in which we respond to security
dilemmas? The examination paper is a list of 12 questions from which the
candidate answers any four. In answering questions, candidates should
pay careful attention to what precisely is being asked and relate empirical
examples to the relevant concepts and theories. The most common
shortcoming found in examination answers is the tendency to summarise
a particular theory or event without critically assessing it or to write down
everything known about a general issue without actually answering the
particular question.
Specific comments on questions

1. Assess the case for the normative view of international
security studies.
Reading for this question
A discussion of the meaning attributed to security may be found in
Chapter 1 of the subject guide and in Bain (introduction) and Buzan
(introduction). Students interested in a normative approach to security
will find the Jackson chapter (1) in the Bain essential text a useful point of
reference alongside the further readings by Baldwin and Rothschild (see
p.13 of the subject guide). Those who prefer to take a more instrumental
view of security should refer to Thomas Schelling or the Mutual
deterrence speech by Robert McNamara (see p.16 of the subject guide).
Approaching this question
Students should begin by defining what normative means in the context
of security. A normative view of security is one predicated upon values,
ideas and identities. The clear implication of the subject guide is that
security should be regarded as fundamentally normative because without
it human life is reduced to a basic struggle for survival. This normative
view is also evident in the essential texts. When we approach security
in this way, our analysis tends towards hard choices between competing
values, e.g. as between security of the state and security of the person.
Thus security policy itself comes to be regarded as a series of moral
dilemmas to which there can be no easy solutions.
But much of the wider literature on security (e.g., many of the leading
journals cited on p.8 of the subject guide) takes a rather different view,
one constituted by instrumentalism or the belief that policies should be
judged only by their outcomes. Neo-realism is a case in point. Neo-realism
is a material approach informed by power capabilities and quantifiable
81
risks (see the reference to Schelling above for an example). Moral

dilemmas are not only absent from such analyses but tend to be regarded
as deeply inappropriate because of their ability to distract us from the
rational pursuit of our interests.
Which view of security is to be preferred, and on what basis? In answering
this question, you will need to offer an assessment of each approach, and a
clear indication of which you find most persuasive, and on what basis. The
best answers to this question will identify the debate between normative
and realist approaches to security as part of a much larger methodological
controversy within international relations and indeed the social sciences
more generally.
2. From here on, there will no longer be much difficulty
achieving successful securitisation in the environmental
sector. Discuss.
This question draws on Chapter 5 of the subject guide as well as Chapters
1 and 6 of the Hough required text, and the introduction and conclusion
of the Buzan required text.
You will need to begin by explaining what is meant by securitisation. The
term securitisation originates from the so-called Copenhagen school of
security studies (of which Barry Buzan is a founding member) and has
now become commonplace within the discipline of international relations.
Securitisation is a process through which a given policy area is politicised
to such an extent that it is considered essential for survival. In this way,
security policy expands to include topics not traditionally associated with
it. Buzan describes this process in the introduction and conclusion of
Peoples, states and fear.
Examiners will expect more than an overview of environmental threats.
The best answers will interrogate the process of securitisation itself,
outlining what has been achieved by those who believe environmental
problems are essential for survival and want security policymakers to
adopt a similar view. For example, you might discuss the increasing
characterisation of global warming and those foreign policies directed at it
in security terms. The question implies that environmental issues are now
widely regarded as bona fide security concerns. In your opinion, do recent
developments like the 2009 Copenhagen Conference support or contradict
this view? Your answer will benefit enormously from reading current
articles in the Financial Times, the Economist and the academic journals
cited in the subject guide.
3. How useful is the idea of human security in sub-Saharan
Africa?
This question draws on the material and required readings discussed in
Chapter 6 of the subject guide.
You will need to begin by defining the idea of human security. From
this perspective, human security extends beyond the protection of states
to include the protection of people. Human security is a direct response
to the perceived inadequacies of state-centred approaches to security. In
82
liberal theory, the state cannot pose a threat to the people because it is a
creation of the people. In practice, however, security of the state does not
always translate into security of the people. There are many states which
do not have the capacity to protect their people while others directly and
purposefully threaten their people for political, economic or ideological
reasons.
You should then go on to assess whether or not such a view of security
may reasonably be applied to circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa.
Crucially, of course, the states of sub-Saharan Africa are among the poorest
and worse governed in the world hence the use of terms such as weak,
failed or even quasi states. State institutions here are often corrupt,
weak or non-existent (read the failed states index report cited in Chapter
3 of the subject guide) and as a result the state is not capable of providing
security for its people and may even threaten them. Thus, M. Ayoob in
his seminal 1991 article listed under the further readings for Chapter 3 of
the subject guide concludes that the security problem of the Third World
cannot be understood from the classic liberal perspective. Human security
aims to fill precisely this gap identified by Ayoob.
There are many different ways to answer this question. You may agree
with Ayoobs conclusions (in which case you should explain why)
and argue that human security is a useful alternative to state-centred
approaches in sub-Saharan Africa. Or you may agree with Ayoob but
remain sceptical of human security as a convincing alternative and propose
another security reference (e.g., societal security, economic security,
environmental security or some combination thereof). You might even
argue that liberal state-centred approaches nevertheless remain the most
efficacious as a basis for criticism and reform of weak or corrupt regimes.
The best answers will disclose a good knowledge of both the required
and the relevant further readings, and on this basis be able to combine
conceptual with empirical analysis.
4. Compare the justification for intervention in any two of the
following: the First Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Darfur.
This question draws upon the material discussed in Chapters 5 and 8 of
the subject guide and in Chapters 1, 3 and 8 of the required Economides
and Berdal text. It asks you to consider the justification for intervention
and thus the focus of your answer should be on evaluating the political
purpose and legality of these actions rather than summarising what
happened per se. Remember, the Examiners are looking for analysis here,
and not historical description.
Within the literature on intervention, the first Gulf War is generally
portrayed as intervention for international peace and security consistent
with the United Nations Charter. In contrast, intervention in Kosovo is
usually described as an overwhelming humanitarian necessity in the face
of widespread ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population by Serbian
forces. Similarly, intervention in Darfur is frequently referenced to the
doctrine of the responsibility to protect. The Afghan intervention is less
clear cut it began as a subject of international security under UN Security
Council Resolution 1333 (2000) but ultimately the officially recognised
post-Taliban government of Afghanistan requested international assistance
(2006) in defence of its sovereignty.
83
The best answers will establish clear criteria for justification; for example,
what constitutes international peace and security, national security and
human security in this context, and explain how it applies to two of the
cases listed in the question. This evaluation may or may not agree with the
dominant view of the literature.
5. Can China reasonably be described as a would-be
hegemon?
Chapter 5 of the subject guide, Buzan Chapter 5 and, to a lesser extent,
also Hough Chapter 2. You may also find it useful to refer to the David
Hendrickson article listed in the activity on p.46 of the subject guide. The
salient facts with respect to China are not specifically addressed in either
the subject guide or the required readings, but they should be familiar to
you provided that you have remained abreast of current developments in
international relations (i.e., by reading some of the periodicals cited as
additional resources in the subject guide).
You should begin by explaining the term hegemon in the context of
current Chinese power. A hegemon is a state with such a preponderance
of power that it is able to lay down the law to all other members of
international society. In the post-Cold War period, China has often
been described as a potential hegemon because of its geographic size,
population, geostrategic location, and growing economic strength.
Describing China in these terms, however, is only part of what is required.
Examiners will also be looking for an evaluation of whether or not such a
description is justifiable and on what basis.
The best answers will acknowledge that such an evaluation can only be
made in terms of a specific balance of power context. It may, for instance,
be reasonable to conclude that China is already a regional hegemon in
South East Asia but is not likely to become a global hegemon anytime
soon due to the continued preponderance of the United States on the
world stage. Irrespective of the specific argument provided, first-class
answers should demonstrate a nuanced understanding and application of
the concepts hegemony, balance of power and international society, as
well as national and international security, and an ability to relate these to
empirical examples.
6. What is the relationship between military threat and
securitisation in the global war on terror?
This question draws upon the material discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5
of the subject guide and in Buzan Chapter 7 and Hough Chapters 2 and 3.
This question asks you to characterise the relationship between military
threat and securitisation drawing upon evidence related to the global
war on terror. To begin, you will need to explain what is meant by the
global war on terror. The global war on terror is a term coined by former
President George W. Bush both to justify and to characterise United States
foreign policy following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The global war on
terror has thus come to be associated with a range of policies including
84
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, intrusive new policies of homeland

security (e.g., the Patriot Act) and the internment of foreign nationals in
Guantnamo Bay.
You should reflect on what these policies indicate with respect to military
threat and securitisation. For example, you could argue that global
terrorism associated with non-state actors like al-Qaeda constitutes
a new kind of threat that differs in fundamental respects from that
associated with more traditional military threats emanating from other
states. Accordingly, the security response to this new threat has been
equally novel, taking into consideration societal and economic factors,
and involving national, international and human security. To make
such an argument, you will find the Hough Chapter 3 particularly
helpful. Alternatively, you might instead claim that the war on terror
has fundamentally served American military interests, including those of
the military-industrial complex, and thus embodies the powersecurity
dilemma outlined by Buzan in Chapter 7 of his text.
7. Are Serbian security and Kosovar security necessarily
antithetical?
Chapters 2, 7 and 8 of the subject guide. Students will find Chapters 6 and
7 of the Buzan required text and the Jackson-Preece chapter (8) of the
Bain required text particularly useful in answering this question.
You should begin by summarising the relationship between Serbia and
Kosovo. Here you may wish to recall some or all of the following salient
points: (1) that Serbia was a constituent unit within federal Yugoslavia
during which time Kosovo was itself a sub-unit within Serbia; (2)
according to the principle of uti possedits juris (respect for highestlevel constituent units within empires or federal states in the process of
dissolution), Serbia became an independent state but Kosovo did not;
(3) continued rule of Kosovo by Belgrade was oppressive and ultimately
provoked NATO intervention in defence of the human and minority
rights of the Kosovar Albanians in 1999; (4) Kosovo was under a United
Nations administration until 2008, when the Kosovo government in
Prishtina unilaterally declared independence following the breakdown of
internationally led negotiations with Belgrade to resolve the final status of
the province; (5) a significant Serbian minority continues to exist within
Kosovo, whose independence has not been recognised by Belgrade and
many other states including Russia.
You will then need to evaluate whether or not Serbian and Kosovar
security are mutually exclusive. If arguing in favour of exclusivity, you
may find it useful to describe the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo
in terms of that between a revisionist and a status quo state as outlined
in Buzan Chapters 6 and 7 useful. Alternatively, you could argue that
a minority rights and democracy framework applied to both Serbia
and Kosovo would overcome this zero-sum dynamic, as outlined in the
Jackson-Preece chapter.
85
8. Should international security be a special responsibility

of the great powers? Discuss in relation to the UN Security
Council.
Chapters 4 and 5 of the subject guide.
You should begin by explaining the relationship between international
security and great-power responsibility. International security is directed at
the preservation of international order defined in terms of the continued
existence of international society. The gravest threat to international
society is hegemony because it contradicts those pluralist principles of
equal sovereignty and non-intervention on which this society is based.
The so-called balance of power is designed to protect international society
from precisely this threat it assumes that the great powers will act
together to preserve international peace and security from those states
that would otherwise violate its principles. This description of great power
responsibility is only part of what is required of you. The Examiners will
also expect a normative evaluation of great-power responsibility towards
international security (i.e., do you consider such responsibility good or
bad and on what basis?)
The best answers will demonstrate an understanding of the antimonies
or contradictions implicit within great-power responsibility towards
international security. For example, you could point out that great powers
are at one and the same time both potential hegemons and the only
states capable of preventing the emergence of hegemony; as a result, they
are effectively required to police themselves. More than that, you might
suggest that the idea of great-power responsibility itself sits uneasily
with the crucial pluralist principle of equal sovereignty since it not only
recognises exceptional power but also accords special status to those states
which possess such power.
9. Does security of the state necessarily translate into
security of the person?
This question draws on the material and essential readings discussed in
Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the subject guide.
You will need to begin by defining security of the state and security of
the person. Security of the state is first and foremost concerned with
protecting the state from external threats by foreign powers and from
internal threats by criminals, rebels and terrorists. In contrast, security of
the person is first and foremost concerned with protecting individuals from
harm by other actors, state and non-state alike, including even their own
governments. But an answer which stops here would be incomplete. The
suggestion that state and personal security are necessarily linked assumes
these paradigms share a common purpose, and so the Examiners will
expect you to explain why you agree or disagree with this claim.
If you argue in favour of a linkage, you may wish to point out that state
security is only morally justified so long as it translates into the personal
security of the states own citizens. According to liberal theory, the state
cannot pose a threat to its own people because it is a creation of that
86
people. Thus the interests of a state and its population should coincide.
You may even go so far as to suggest that the circumstances pertaining
in liberal democracies such as the member states of the European Union,
Canada, Australia, the United States and Japan, among others, proves the
validity of these theoretical claims.
If you argue against such linkage, then you may wish to focus more on
circumstances elsewhere. There are many other states around the world
which either do not have the capacity to protect their people (e.g., failed
states such as Sierra Leone) or directly and purposefully threaten their
people (e.g., totalitarian states like North Korea) for political, economic
or ideological reasons. These states demonstrate that the assumptions of
liberal theory should not be assumed to apply everywhere. It is precisely
this reality which underscores the new responsibility to protect doctrine
and explains the support it has received from states.
Irrespective of the view taken, a first-class essay answer will locate these
debates in the context of larger developments in international relations.
This question thus underscores the importance of your reading beyond
the required syllabus and making an effort to engage with current
international developments (by reading the various academic journals
listed in the subject guide as well as news publications like the Economist
or the International Herald Tribune).
10. Do you agree with Barry Buzans analysis of nuclearn
deterrence as a defence dilemma?
This question draws on the material and required readings discussed
in Chapter 3 of the subject guide. The so-called defence dilemma was
proposed by Barry Buzan in Chapter 6 of People, states and fear.
You will need to begin by explaining the defence dilemma. As defined
by Buzan, the defence dilemma refers to a potential problem in the
relationship between national security and military power. National
security includes all those policies and practices directed both within and
beyond the state which have as their purpose the continued survival of the
state and, by extension, the well-being of its population. Military power
is the use of armed force (land, naval and air) to protect the state from
external threats and as such is one aspect of national security. It is usually
assumed that military power positively correlates with national security.
Buzan challenges this idea by pointing out various ways in which the two
may fail to coincide. Nuclear deterrence appears an obvious choice here
due to the irony of mutually assured destruction.
The best answers will do more than simply recapitulate some or all of
Buzans argument. The Examiners will be looking for an assessment of
Buzan. For example, you might argue that although nuclear deterrence
itself is a convincing example of a defence dilemma, its exceptional nature
calls into question the more general applicability of the concept. Such an
answer reveals not only an understanding of Buzan but also that ability
for independent, critical analysis which is most prized by the Examiners.
This is an important reminder that you should always incorporate your
own opinions and ideas into your exam answers. As I tell my internal LSE
students, if I wanted to know what Buzan or any other academic thinks on
a given topic I can easily read their books and articles. I read your essays
and exam answers because I want to know about your own informed
ideas.
87
11. Will the global financial crisis accelerate securitisation in

the economic sector?
This question draws on Chapter 4 of the Hough required text, as well as
the introduction, conclusion and Chapter 5 of the Buzan required text.
You will need to begin by explaining what is meant by securitisation. The
term securitisation originates from the so-called Copenhagen School of
security studies (of which Barry Buzan is a founding member) and has
now become commonplace within the discipline of international relations.
Securitisation is a process through which a given policy area is politicised
to such an extent that it is considered essential for survival. In this way,
security policy expands to include topics not traditionally associated with
it. Buzan describes this process in the introduction and conclusion of
People, states and fear.
Examiners will expect you to interrogate the process of securitisation in
the context of the global financial crisis. The best answers will therefore
relate the key features of the global financial crisis to the problems and
possibilities associated with economic securitisation. To do that, you
will benefit enormously from reading current articles in the Financial
Times, the Economist and the academic journals cited in the subject
guide. Only then will you be able to take a view as to whether or not the
global financial crisis is helping or hindering the process of economic
securitisation. For example, you might argue that the financial crisis
is further proof, should any be needed, that economic interests are
increasingly globalised and thus beyond the control of any one state
and its policymakers. Here you might cite the international banking
ramifications of the collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market or the
Madoff investment scandal. To this extent, then, the global financial crisis
proves the case for economic securitisation. Conversely, you might instead
argue that the response to the global financial crisis in fact signals a return
to economic nationalism wherein the interests of corporations or classes
are identified with those states to which they are most closely associated.
Here you might cite the widespread nationalisation of banks to protect
national banking structures.
12. Should identity be a referent object for security studies?
Chapters 2 and 7 of the subject guide. You will find Chapters 2 and 9 of
the Buzan required text, Chapter 5 of the Hough required text and Chapter
8 of the Bain required text particularly useful in answering this question.
These points are also discussed at greater length in my 2005 book Minority
rights (listed in the subject guide as further reading).
This question asks you to consider the purported link between identity
and security. Both Barry Buzan and I, taking a constructivist approach,
argue that security is all about the interaction of collectivities defined by
a shared identity. What matters is not the content of that identity but its
ability to sustain group cohesiveness. When group cohesiveness falters,
the survival of that community is jeopardised. For this reason, we argue
that security is fundamentally about the preservation and promotion of
88
identity. You will need to explain whether or not, and on what basis, you
agree with this perspective.
If you agree with the view that identity should be a referent object of
security, you might reflect on the role of identity politics as a source of or
threat to security. As I argue in my 2005 book, identity is constitutive of
political community and thus both security and insecurity. Minorities are
political outsiders precisely because their identities do not fit the criteria
defining membership within the political community on whose territory
they reside. As a result, the institutions of the state are not directed at
preserving and promoting minority identity and may even be hostile
towards it. Indeed, in circumstances of hostility, it is often claimed that
the existence of alternative identities will be perceived as a threat to
the continued survival of the shared (majority) identity and policies of
discrimination, assimilation, persecution, ghettoisation, forced expulsion
and even genocide towards minorities may follow on from it. You would
then need to consider an empirical example or two in support of this
claim.
If you disagree with this view, you might instead argue that identity only
becomes significant in those circumstances where the material interests
of the dominant (majority) group are threatened, for example when
resources are scarce or when the state is under threat from an external
aggressor. You would then need to consider an empirical example or two
in support of this claim. On this basis you might conclude that identity per
se is not directly relevant to security analyses.
Key steps to success in the examination

1. Try to develop the skill of using your knowledge more to answer the
question directly rather than merely putting down what you know
without reference to the question. Many candidates who clearly have a
good knowledge of the subject nevertheless fail to make use of it.
2. When you are asked to comment on a particular concept or argument,
do not be frightened of using your own critical judgment. You need
to demonstrate that you read and understood the required texts but
you do not need to agree with them. The examiner is much more
interested in your own views as distinct from the authors surveyed in
the subject guide.
3. Although questions are not marked on length, it is difficult to get high
marks from very short answers. But long answers are no guarantee
of high marks. The best answers are always those directed at the
particular question, which define key concepts and provide good
examples to back up the candidates own argument.
89
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Security in international

The University of London International Programmes

140 Security in international relations

iNational security and deterrence .................................................................................. 31

A reminder of your learning outcomes.......................................................................... 62

140 Security in international relations

140 Security in international relations

an ability to engage in comparitive analysis of security policy without

How to use this subject guide

Structure of the guide

and counter-terror measures make clear. The experience of totalitarian

140 Security in international relations

Each chapter of the subject guide commences by identifying the

140 Security in international relations

Online study resources

140 Security in international relations

The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses:

Making use of the Online Library

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Research centres, projects and online documentation

140 Security in international relations

Institute for War and Peace Reporting

140 Security in international relations

List of abbreviations used in this subject guide

Chapter 1: The idea of security

Chapter 1: The idea of security

140 Security in international relations

The value of security

Chapter 1: The idea of security

Key assumptions of security

Security in (or of) what?

Security from what?

Robert Jackson, The

Hedley Bull, The

In Hobbes state of nature every human being is a potential threat

Security by means of what?

140 Security in international relations

women do not threaten or harm one another. Unfortunately, not everyone

Security for what?

Normative vs instrumental approaches to security

See T. Schelling, The

Chapter 1: The idea of security

that policies should be judged only by their outcomes. Neo-realism is

Security of the state and security of the person

140 Security in international relations

There is, however, an important distinction between security of the state

R.N. Berki Security and

Chapter 1: The idea of security

Three paradigms of security

140 Security in international relations

Following on from this, pluralists differ from realists in their assumption

A similar endorsement of international security was embodied as Article 1

The international security paradigm operates somewhat differently

Chapter 1: The idea of security

usually cited as one of the few examples of legitimate international law

140 Security in international relations

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 2: The state as a security arrangement

Chapter 2: The state as a security

140 Security in international relations

Origins of the state as a security arrangement

Security of the prince