Twenty-first century dis-ease?

Habitual
reflexivity or the reflexive habitus

Paul Sweetman
Abstract
While certain theorists have suggested that identity is increasingly reflexive, such
accounts are arguably problematised by Bourdieus concept of habitus, which in
pointing to the embeddedness of our dispositions and tastes suggests that identity may be less susceptible to reflexive intervention than theorists such as Giddens
have implied. This paper does not dispute this so much as suggest that, for increasing numbers of contemporary individuals, reflexivity itself may have become
habitual, and that for those possessing a flexible or reflexive habitus, processes of
self-refashioning may be second nature rather than difficult to achieve. The paper
concludes by examining some of the wider implications of this argument, in relation not only to identity projects, but also to fashion and consumption, patterns of
exclusion, and forms of alienation or estrangement, the latter part of this section
suggesting that those displaying a reflexive habitus, whilst at a potential advantage
in certain respects, may also face considerable difficulties simply being themselves.
I noticed how people played at being executives while actually holding executive positions. Did I do this myself? You maintain a shifting distance
between yourself and your job. Theres a self-conscious space, a sense of
formal play that is a sort of arrested panic, and maybe you show it in a forced
gesture or a ritual clearing of the throat. Something out of childhood whistles through this space, a sense of games and half-made selves, but its not
that youre pretending to be someone else. Youre pretending to be exactly
who you are. Thats the curious thing. (DeLillo, 1997: 103)

Introduction
Various theorists have suggested that identity is increasingly reflexive, and
that contemporary individuals now have no choice but to choose (Giddens,
1991: 81) to actively construct a coherent and viable sense of self-identity
from the various means at their disposal. Whilst in simple- or organisedmodernity identities were relatively secure, and closely tied to core sociological variables such as gender, ethnicity and class, this is no longer the case, and
the increasing fragility and ambiguity of standardised, ideological identities
(Maffesoli, 1991: 15) means that it is now up to contemporary individuals to
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, 02148, USA.

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

construct a sense of identity for themselves. Consumer practices, which once

reflected already existing social identities, are now one of the key ways in
which people go about constructing their identities, making choices on a
day-to-day basis about who they are and how they want to represent themselves. Driving a particular car, or engaging in a particular lifestyle, no longer
reflects our already existing status as members of a particular class, for
example, but says something about who we as individuals have decided
we want to be.
Whilst this position has gained considerable currency amongst contemporary social theorists, however, it is arguably problematised by Pierre Bourdieus concept of habitus, which, in pointing to the embeddedness of our
dispositions and tastes and suggesting that these are closely related to our
material circumstances or class suggests that lifestyle and identity may continue to reflect such structural characteristics, and be less susceptible to reflexive intervention than those such as Anthony Giddens have implied. Indeed
for writers such as Richard Jenkins (1992, 2000), Bourdieus theory is overly
deterministic, and allows little room for agency or reflexivity, instead suggesting that individuals unwittingly go about their lives mechanically reproducing the wider structures of which they form a part.
While less critical in her approach to Bourdieus work, and keen to stress
that the concept of habitus allows for a considerable degree of agency rather
than simply the mechanical reproduction of social structure, Lois McNay
(1999) also suggests that the durability of habitus may render identity less
amenable to self-refashioning than theorists of reflexive modernity imply. It
is not the intention of this paper to disagree with this, so much as to suggest
that, not only does the concept of habitus not, in and of itself, preclude reflexive engagement with the self, but also that certain forms of habitus may be
inherently reflexive, and that the flexible or reflexive habitus may be both
increasingly common and increasingly significant due to various social and
cultural shifts.
Having outlined approaches to identity in late-, high-, or reflexivemodernity, then, the paper moves on to discuss Bourdieus concept of habitus
and the extent to which this may be regarded, firstly, as deterministic, and
secondly as implying that there are limits to the sorts of reflexive selftransformation that Giddens and others have identified. The paper then outlines some of the reasons why it may now be plausible to refer to a flexible
or reflexive habitus, which, far from limiting contemporary projects of identity construction, instead suggests that these may be second nature for some.
In the concluding section of the paper I then address some of the wider implications of this argument, in relation not only to identity projects, but also to
fashion and consumption, patterns of exclusion, and forms of alienation or
estrangement, the latter part of this section suggesting that those displaying
a reflexive habitus, whilst at a potential advantage in economic and/or social
terms, may also pay a considerable price in terms of the difficulties they face
simply being themselves.1
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

529

Paul Sweetman

Reflexivity and identity

Much recent sociological theory has stressed the reflexive nature of contemporary identities, or the way in which individual identities can no longer be
assumed, but have to be actively constructed from a range of available options
(Beck, 1992, 1994; Giddens, 1991, 1994). In pre-modern social contexts identity was taken as given, and even in simple- or organised-modernity identity
was relatively stable a fairly unambiguous reflection of factors such as occupation or familial status. In late-, high- or reflexive-modernity, however, identity is increasingly ambiguous, and has to be individually worked at in the
context of more or less freely chosen possibilities.
Accounts differ, but the essential argument is that in simple- or organised-modernity, identities were comparatively stable, because they were
firmly bound into coherent and integrative social practices (Wagner, 1994:
170):
You were German and a white-collar employee, or English and a worker,
but whatever you were it was not by your own choice. Ambivalences had
been eliminated by comprehensive classificatory orders and the enforcing
of these orders in practice. (Wagner, 1994: 159)
In this sense, simple or organised modernity was only partly modern (Lash,
1993: 5) because identity remained largely ascriptive ones place may have
been less fixed than in pre-modern social contexts, but one still knew who one
was according to the position one occupied in familial, occupational, or
nationalistic terms.
With the continued decline of traditional ties (Warde, 1994: 881), however,
and the rise of individualised patterns of consumption, identity has increasingly become a matter of choice. De-traditionalization means that the monitoring by the other of traditional conventions has been replaced by the
necessary self-monitoring, or reflexivity of late- or high-modernity (Lash,
1993: 5) and individuals must now choose their identities from the range of
possibilities on offer. Self-identity has become a reflexively organised endeavour (Giddens, 1991: 5) and individuals must [now] produce, stage and cobble
together their biographies themselves (Beck, 1994: 13)
As has already been indicated, one of the key ways in which this is achieved
is through consumption. The break-up of organized modernity has involved
a shift from socialised to privatised modes of consumption, which in turn
offers far greater choice in consumer practices and greater diversity and variability in defining and creating ones social identity (Wagner, 1994: 165).
Consumption is increasingly divorced from factors such as class, and individuals increasingly consume in ways which articulate to themselves and to
others a sense of identity which may be autonomous from [their membership
of] traditional status groups (Bocock, 1992: 145):

530

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

Rather than unreflexively adopting a lifestyle, through tradition or habit,

the new heroes of consumer culture make lifestyle a life project and display
their individuality and sense of style in the particularity of the assemblages
of goods, clothes, practices, experiences, appearance and bodily dispositions they design together into a lifestyle. (Featherstone, 1991a: 86)
As this last quotation indicates, such practices are also, increasingly, centred
around the body. In late-, high-, or reflexive modernity, the body is regarded
less and less [as] an extrinsic given, but has itself become reflexively mobilized . . . [through] the pursuit of specific bodily regimes (Giddens, 1991: 7).
No longer accepted, fed and adorned according to traditional ritual, the
body has become a core part of the reflexive project of self-identity (Giddens,
1991: 178; see also Shilling, 1993). Appearance, which once designated ones
social . . . rather than personal identity (Giddens, 1991: 99) now acts as a
means of symbolic display, a way of giving external form to narratives of selfidentity (Giddens, 1991: 62), and we have no choice but to become involved:
although modes of deployment of the body have to be developed from a
diversity of lifestyle options, deciding between alternatives is not itself
an option but an inherent element of the construction of self-identity.
Life-planning in respect of the body is . . . a normal part of post-traditional
social environments. (Giddens, 1991: 178)
All of this involves an element of risk because consumers now have far greater
choice, and as they are deemed to have chosen their self-images . . . they can
[now] be held to account for the end-result (Warde, 1994: 883). At the same
time, however, consumption also offers a certain degree of security in this
respect. For Giddens at least, the adoption of a chosen lifestyle can give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity (1991: 81), and thus stabilise
ones chosen narrative through the confirmation of self-image (Warde, 1994:
882).
According to the reflexive modernisation thesis, then, identity is now both
increasingly flexible and individualised, and must be reflexively constructed
from the various image-sets that are available. Whilst associated with writers
who stress the continuities between simple- or organised-modernity and what
is variously termed late-, high- or reflexive-modernity, this analysis shares
considerable affinities with work on identity in post-modernity. While certain
theorists of post- rather than late-, high-, or reflexive-modernity have adopted
a rather pessimistic tone, however questioning the possibility of stable or
ontologically secure identities forged through consumption (Angus, 1989)
and others have been more ambivalent (Kellner, 1992) certain postmodern
theorists have been more optimistic, stressing the playful and creative freedoms that such a situation of flexibility might be said to afford (see, for
example, McRobbie, 1994).

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

531

Paul Sweetman

Aside from differences in terminology then, perhaps the key difference

between proponents of the reflexive-modernisation thesis and their postmodern counterparts lies in their respective interpretations of the consequences and effects of the flexibility and ambiguity that both identify. For the
latter group this may be seen as cause for celebration, and the implication is
that at least some individuals revel in the creative and/or resistant opportunities afforded by the new-found freedoms on offer. While proponents of
reflexive modernisation also emphasise the choices and potential freedoms
available to contemporary individuals, however, these are also seen to entail
new risks and responsibilities. The implication here is that consumer practices
are less geared towards creative play, and more towards an attempt to ground
ones identity in a coherent lifestyle that accords with the reflexive narrative
one has chosen to adopt. In either case, however, such accounts are arguably
problematised by Bourdieus concept of habitus, which, as has already been
indicated, suggests that identities may be less amenable to reflexive intervention than numerous other contemporary theorists imply.

Habitus
In the broadest terms, habitus refers to our overall orientation to or way of
being in the world; our predisposed ways of thinking, acting and moving in
and through the social environment that encompasses posture, demeanour,
outlook, expectations and tastes. Informing both the smallest and largest of
actions and gestures, habitus also encompasses bodily hexis; the way we walk,
talk, sit and blow our nose (Bourdieu, 1984: 466). Whilst it may appear natural,
habitus is a product of our upbringing, and more particularly of our class. It
is class-culture embodied; an adaptation to objective circumstances that makes
a virtue of necessity through encouraging our tastes, wants and desires to be
broadly matched to what we are realistically able to achieve (Bourdieu, 1984:
175). In this sense, habitus at least partially reproduces social structure; as the
embodiment of social arrangements and material circumstance it ensures
broadly speaking that we fulfil our destiny as members of a particular class.
That said, habitus is also intended to dissolve the structure/agency dichotomy:
as the embodiment of social structure, habitus allows us to act, to participate
effectively in the various social fields in which we play a part. As a system of
durable, transposable dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977: 72, original emphasis),
and the generative principle of regulated improvisations (Bourdieu, 1990a:
57), habitus grants us a certain freedom of movement, albeit subject to various
limitations and constraints.
Habitus is predominantly or wholly pre-reflexive, however; a form of
second-nature, that is both durable and largely unconscious, and which is
disproportionately weighted towards the past (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992: 133). We dont wake up each morning deciding how we are
532

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

going to walk or talk, or what our food preferences are, and as these strongly
reflect our upbringing and the objective circumstances of our class whilst
materially affecting our life chances in the present our waking moments are
spent unintentionally reproducing to at least some degree the structural
arrangements of which we form a part.
Habitus operates or realizes itself (Bourdieu, 1990b: 116) in relation
to field, each field representing a relatively distinct social space occupational,
institutional, cultural in which more or less specific norms, values, rules, and
interests apply. Different forms of habitus are suited to more or less distinct
positions within particular fields, with individuals most able to operate effectively (and be themselves), when there is a clear affinity between their dispositional conduct and their position within the field. Different forms of
habitus have different values in different fields, and individuals have strong
attachments to or interests in particular positions within particular fields.
Place someone in a different position within the field, or in a different field
altogether, and they will behave differently and will be more or less comfortable or ill at ease depending upon their feel for the game (Bourdieu,
1990b: 61).

Determinism, reflexivity and habitus

In spite of Bourdieus intentions, all of this may appear rather deterministic,
and indeed Richard Jenkins, amongst others, has argued that Bourdieus
model is something of a closed loop: Structures produce the habitus, which
generates practice, which reproduces the structures, and so on (2000: 152).
According to Jenkins, It is difficult to know where to place conscious deliberation and awareness in Bourdieus scheme of things (1992: 77), and such
a model constitutes no more than another form of determination in the last
instance (2000: 151).
Others have argued against a deterministic reading, however. Richard
Harker, for example, suggests that the habitus should be regarded as a mediating construct, not a determinate one, and that the habitus . . . is no more
fixed than the practices which it helps to structure (2000: 168). Similar arguments are advanced by writers such as Craig Calhoun (1993), David Couzens
Hoy (1999), and James Ostrow (2000), with Ostrow, for example, pointing
out that habitus should be seen not as the determinant of action, but as its
underlying base:
There is no clear path from dispositions to conduct. What does exist is a
protensional field, or perspective, that contextualizes all situations, setting
the pre-objective framework for practice, without any express rules or
codes that automatically and mechanically tell us what to do. (Ostrow,
2000: 318)
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

533

Paul Sweetman

Conjuring up images of the lads in Paul Willis Learning to Labour (1977),

Nick Crossley, in addition, points out that even if habitus leads to reproduction of social structure in line with peoples understandings of both their material circumstances and prospective life-chances, The agent is wholly active
here in constructing an inductive picture of the world, even if their construction is relatively fatalistic. There is no determinism in any meaningful sense
of the word, just pragmatic adaptation and realism (2001a: 112).
Bourdieu himself is rather impatient with or at least exasperated by
those who accuse him of determinism, stressing the generative capacities of
dispositions (1990b: 13, original emphasis), and arguing that Through the
habitus, the structure of which it is the product governs practice, not along the
paths of a mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and limits initially set on its inventions; the habitus, like every art of inventing, is what
makes it possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are relatively
unpredictable even if they are also limited in their diversity (1990a: 55, my
emphasis). Such limits stem from both the checks upon action imposed by
ones prior experience, and from the structure of the field as it is encountered.
As a feel for the game (Bourdieu, 1990b: 61) habitus both allows for and
demands invention and improvisation (Bourdieu, 1990b: 63), however, whilst
simultaneously respecting the rules of the game. Habitus allows one to
respond to the current state of play, whilst simultaneously limiting ones
responses, and as habitus operates in relation to field, also ensures that
removal from the field or entry into a new game will generate a different
set of responses dependent upon ones feel for the game with which one is
now confronted.
For Bourdieu, then, the conditioned and conditional freedom provided by
the habitus is antithetical both to unpredictable novelty and simple mechanical reproduction (1990a: 55), and indeed the concept is explicitly intended
as a rebuttal of both subjectivism and objectivism, or as Bourdieu puts it
a way of escap[ing] from . . . the philosophy of the subject without doing away
with the agent (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 121). There are times when
Bourdieus framework does appear rather deterministic, as, for example,
when he states that the effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped
with it will behave in a certain way in certain circumstances (1990b: 77), or
when he notes that the habitus, the product of history, produces individual
and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes
engendered by history (1977: 82; see also Margolis, 1999: 75). This is clearly
not his intention, however, and taken overall, I would agree with McNays
point that those who accuse Bourdieu of determinism:
fail to recognize . . . the force of [his] insistence that habitus is not to be
conceived of as a principle of determination but as a generative structure.
Within certain objective limits . . . it engenders a potentially infinite
number of patterns of behaviour, thought and expression that are both
relatively unpredictable but also limited in their diversity. (1999: 100)
534

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

That habitus not only allows for invention and improvisation, but also
demands it is noted by Bourdieu when he points out that while The good
player . . . does at every moment what the game requires, this presupposes a
permanent capacity for invention [which is] indispensable if one is to be able
to adapt to infinitely varied and never completely identical situations (1990b:
63): the feel for the game is what enables an infinite number of moves to be
made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations which no rule,
however complex, can foresee (1990b: 9; see also Bouveresse, 1999: 55).
Whilst allowing for or demanding a certain degree of freedom and improvisation, however, habitus still limits reflexivity in at least two ways. In the
first place, the habitus itself is not amenable to reflexive intervention: The
principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation,
cannot even be made explicit (Bourdieu, 1977: 94; see also Bourdieu, 1984:
466). Second, whilst durable but not eternal, there is, nonetheless, a relative
irreversibility to this process . . . an inevitable priority of originary experiences
and consequently a relative closure of the system of dispositions that constitute habitus (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133, original
emphasis). Habitus thus guides our action and limits what is even considered
certain practices are automatically excluded as unthinkable (Bourdieu,
1990a: 54) and even actions which appear strategic may in fact be guided
by the habitus, and thus should not properly be regarded as such (Bourdieu,
1977: 73; 1990a: 53; 1990b: 1011).
Where Giddens (1991) and others regard contemporary lifestyles as both
manifestations of, and scaffolding to, reflexive projects of the self, for
Bourdieu lifestyle is a product of habitus, a reflection of taste or the embodiment of class culture which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing
and modifying everything that the body ingests . . . digests and assimilates,
physiologically and psychologically (1984: 190). The various practices that go
to make up a particular lifestyle owe their stylistic affinity . . . to the fact that
they are the products of transfers of the same schemes of action from one
field to another, and sytematicity in the various properties . . . with which
individuals and groups surround themselves, houses, furniture, paintings,
books, cars as well as in the practices in which they manifest their distinction, sports, games, entertainments is derived from the synthetic unity of
the habitus, the unifying, generative principle of all practices (Bourdieu, 1984:
173, my emphasis). In choosing to engage in particular sporting activities
or what Giddens (1991) and Chris Shilling (1993) would regard as body
regimes or body projects for example, agents only have to follow the leanings of their habitus in order to take over, unwittingly, the intention immanent in the corresponding practices, [and] to find an activity which is entirely
them and, with it, kindred spirits (Bourdieu, 1984: 223).
Reflexivity is not entirely ruled out by Bourdieu: Times of crisis, in which
the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures is brutally disrupted, constitute a class of circumstances when . . . rational choice may take
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

535

Paul Sweetman

over, at least among those agents who are in a position to be rational (in
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 131). As this quotation also illustrates,
however, reflexivity only emerges in situations of crisis which disrupt the
immediate adjustment of habitus to field (Bourdieu, 1990b: 108), and rational choice, for example, is not necessarily open to all: the art of estimating
and seizing chances, the capacity to anticipate the future by a kind of practical induction or even to take a calculated gamble . . . are dispositions that can
only be acquired in certain social conditions, and which are defined by possession of the economic and cultural capital required in order to seize the
potential opportunities theoretically available to all (Bourdieu, 1990a: 64).
For Bourdieu, then, consciousness and reflexivity are both cause and
symptom of the failure of immediate adaptation to the situation (1990b: 11),
and are limited, for the most part, to periods of crisis, which engender a
temporary disjunction between habitus and field. That said, Bourdieu
does hint that for some such failure of adaptation may be more or less
routine:
the petit-bourgeois experience of the world starts out from timidity, the
embarrassment of someone who is uneasy in his body and his language
and who, instead of being as one body with them, observes them from
outside, through other peoples eyes, watching, checking, correcting
himself. (1984: 207)
There are clear problems with Bourdieus account. While he argues that The
principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation
(1977: 94), for instance, this is surely an overstatement. While we may not
think about such things most of the time, it is possible to change the way we
walk and talk, for example, as Bourdieu himself acknowledges in his brief discussion of charm schools (1984: 206). It should also be noted that at least
part of what Bourdieu attributes to the effects of the habitus and to the relative closure of this system of dispositions (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:
133) which, for Bourdieu, means that certain practices are immediately
excluded, as unthinkable (1990a: 54) may instead reflect the divergent
moralities of different social groups.
Whatever the difficulties and ambiguities of Bourdieus account, however,
accepting even a non-deterministic version of habitus clearly problematises
the reflexive modernization thesis (Hetherington, 1998: 47), and, indeed, this
is partly the point. That the concept of habitus is intended as a rebuke to both
subjectivism and objectivism has already been pointed out. In his objection
to subjectivism, however, Bourdieu also has a more specific target the voluntarism of rational action theory (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992: 123) and to the extent that Giddens (1991) and others reproduce the
ideological notion of consumer choice (Warde, 1994: 884), and re-introduce
the reflexive freedom of subjects without inertia (Bourdieu, 1990a: 56)
536

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

found in rationalist theories of action, their account might also be taken to

represent what the concept of habitus explicitly sets out to reject.
For McNay at any rate, their failure to consider fully the recalcitrance of
embodied existence (1999: 97) means that theories of reflexive identity transformation overstress their case, and that self-identity may be less amenable
to emancipatory processes of refashioning (1999: 95) than such approaches
suggest. Like Bourdieu, McNay argues that reflexive awareness is predicated
on a distanciation of the subject with constitutive structures, and is not an
evenly generalized capacity of subjects living in a detraditionalized era but
arises unevenly from their embeddedness within differing sets of power relations (1999: 110). McNay is particularly concerned with gender and habitus,
or the way in which masculinity and femininity are embodied and thus may
not be subject to easy reflexive transformation, but the point can be made
more generally. I do not intend to question this. What I do want to suggest is
that for some, reflexivity and flexibility may actually characterise the habitus,
and that for those who display a flexible or reflexive habitus, processes of
refashioning whether emancipatory or otherwise may be second nature
rather than difficult to achieve.

The flexible or reflexive habitus

In other words, I want to suggest that for some contemporary individuals
reflexivity and flexibility is itself deeply embedded, or rather that a capacity
for and predisposition towards reflexive engagement is characteristic of
certain forms of contemporary habitus, and that, while a reflexive stance may
be unreflexively adopted, this by no means rules out such a stance but simply
renders it a more durable or stable characteristic of the individuals or groups
concerned. I would also like to suggest that this flexible or reflexive habitus
is increasingly common due to various economic, social and cultural shifts, not
least shifting patterns of work and employment, changing forms of community and relationship, and the impact of consumer culture, which encourages
us all to constantly monitor and improve ourselves (Featherstone, 1991a,
1991b).
Occupational/workplace shifts. On the one hand, reflexivity is increasingly
demanded of employees. The decline in manufacturing, and the concomitant
rise of service industries has arguably led to an increasing demand for emotional labour, or the ongoing management of ones emotions in the context
of what Arlie Hochschild refers to as the commercialization of feeling (1983).
In manufacturing, meanwhile, newer uncertainties in the economic environment, themselves allied to and partly responsible for greater demands for
flexibility, mean that the heteronomous control of the shopfloor characteristic of Fordist production techniques has increasingly given way to calls for the
development of autonomous agency in terms of risk-taking, innovation,
responsibility, [and] commitment amongst employees (Lash, 1993: 18; see
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

537

Paul Sweetman

also Lash, 1994: 119). Nor are such demands confined to those on the
shopfloor. Tony Blairs recent attacks on the forces of conservatism were
nothing if not a demand for flexibility amongst public sector employees (see,
for example, Blair, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Wintour, 1999), and within British
Higher Education, for example, bureaucratic exercises such as Quality Assurance and the Research Assessment Exercise, whilst significantly reducing
autonomy, also have the effect of demanding greater reflexivity amongst academic staff. Whilst reflexivity is increasingly demanded of employees within
particular occupations, however, it is also required in order to negotiate ones
career:
not only have jobs-for-life disappeared, but trades and professions . . . have
acquired the confusing habit of appearing from nowhere and vanishing
without notice . . . and to rub salt into the wound, the demand for the skills
needed to practice such professions seldom lasts as long as the time needed
to acquire them. (Bauman, 1996: 24)
Although there may be an element of hyperbole in this account, the overall
direction of Zygmunt Baumans argument is supported empirically by for
example work within Youth Studies, where it is pointed out that, over the
last three decades, The transition from school to work has become much more
protracted . . . increasingly fragmented and in some respects less predictable
(Furlong and Cartmel, 1997: 27), and that demands for flexibility have led to
a more contingent or flexible attitude on the part of employees towards their
own definitions of work and career (Dwyer and Wyn, 2001: 185, original
emphasis). As one of Peter Dwyer and Johanna Wyns interviewees put it:
You have to have diversity these days if you want to build a successful
career. Going back, looking at the changes in the last 20 to 30 years you
cant just focus on one career anymore, you really have to be able to do a
million and one things these days. (Steve, in Dwyer and Wyn, 2001: 179)
Changing forms of community and relationship. First, as Giddens points out,
the breakdown of traditional social ties means that increasingly, Social bonds
have effectively to be made, rather than inherited from the past (1994: 107).
At the same time, however, to the extent that sexual ties, marriages and
friendship[s] now tend to approximate . . . to the pure relationship (Giddens,
1991: 87, original emphasis), it has been argued that they are themselves contingent, sought only for what . . . [they] can bring to the partners involved
(Giddens, 1991: 90), and reflexively organised, in an open fashion, and on a
continuous basis (Giddens, 1991: 91). Nor can ones role within such relationships any longer be taken for granted. Combined with a series of wider
structural shifts, the active questioning of issues around gender and sexuality
means that it is no longer viable, for example, to simply say: I am a man, and
this is how men are (Giddens, 1994: 107).
538

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

Although Lynn Jamieson (1998, 1999) has questioned Giddens emphasis

on the pure relationship, arguing that structural inequalities and the more
prosaic demands of everyday life mean that, in reality, more traditional
arrangements tend still to apply, she also acknowledges the increasingly
pervasive impact of cultural ideals (1999: 490491), and notes the way in
which couples deploy a range of creative . . . strategies (1999: 477, 485) to
justify an adherence to more traditional forms of domesticity, thereby
suggesting that, even where painstaking efforts have not been made to
achieve greater equality within the household (1999: 485), a greater degree of
reflexive monitoring of the relationship still applies. Whilst considerably less
optimistic than Giddens in her diagnosis of contemporary trends, Hochschild
(1994), meanwhile, provides additional support for the idea that relationships
have become increasingly contingent and subject to reflexive monitoring of
the sort that the former identifies. Whether linked to the increasing contingency of intimate relationships or otherwise, it is also the case that young
peoples movements in and out of different living arrangements have like
their transitions from school to work become increasingly complex and
unpredictable, again suggesting that a reflexive approach to such changes is
required:
The smooth transitions from family of origin to family of destination which
were the hallmark of the 1950s and early 1960s . . . are no longer with us.
Instead, frequent and complex movements back and forth between living
alone or with parents, friends and partners are now increasingly common
amongst young adults, removing any sense of a common linear transition.
(Heath, 2002: 139)
The impact of consumer culture. Not only has consumption become increasingly individualised, but consumer culture demands reflexivity through its
requirement that individuals of all classes . . . harness their rising expectations
to venture along the road to self-improvement (Featherstone, 1991a: 92).
Individuals are increasingly expected to approach their leisure-time with a
calculating frame of mind (Featherstone, 1991b: 186), and alongside the sense
that we are all increasingly on display in a variety of contexts (Featherstone
1991b), this forces us out of our pre-reflective ease, potentially generating
anxiety and an acute sense of self-consciousness (Crossley, 2001a: 158): as
Michel Foucault has pointed out albeit in a somewhat different context
we are now told to Get undressed but be slim, good-looking, tanned! (1980:
57). Neglecting to invest in ones appearance carries various sanctions and
can be regarded as an indication of laziness and low self-esteem
(Featherstone, 1991b: 186) while an investment-orientation towards ones
free-time pays dividends not only in terms of ones social life, but in career
terms too. As Manuela du Bois-Reymond indicates, Active investment in
ones professional future [now] means activating ones leisure time for it
without wanting to sacrifice the fun involved (1998: 67).
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

539

Paul Sweetman

These trends are coupled with the extension of consumerism and ostensible choice into previously less commercialised arenas (healthcare, education and so on), while the rapid turnover of products and the increasingly
eclectic and fragmented nature of contemporary fashions, for example, results
in diminishing shared agreed meanings of styles (Tselon, 1995: 127). Such
ambiguity in turn calls for greater reflexivity. As Scott Lash points out, with
a comment that is equally applicable to fashion and other areas of consumer
culture:
When a community like a football team is functioning, the meaning of signs
like a shout, a nod of the head, is transparent . . . It is only when there is
breakdown that the goalkeeper must confer with his central defenders
about gestures and sounds and take the signifier as problematized. (1994:
148)
In their contribution to the cultural omnivore debate, Alan Warde, Lydia
Martens and Wendy Olsen (1999) suggest that under such circumstances it
may also be the case that consumers respond to a greater degree of choice
and uncertainty by developing a taste for variety in and of itself, the implication being that we are currently witnessing a shift in emphasis from connoisseurship or refinement knowing what is best to having a wide knowledge
of all the alternatives (1999: 120).
Additional factors contributing to the increasing likelihood of a pervasive
and habitual reflexivity include the effects of globalisation and the media,
which ensure that individuals now have access to experiences ranging in
diversity and distance far beyond anything they could [otherwise] achieve
(Giddens, 1991: 169), and that pre-existing traditions cannot avoid contact
not only with others but also with many alternative ways of life (Giddens,
1994: 97). Competing claims to knowledge, meanwhile, ensure that even the
most mundane decisions over what sorts of food to eat, for example must
be carefully monitored and potentially revised. Whilst many forms of knowledge are relatively secure . . . all must be in principle regarded as open to
question and at every juncture a puzzling diversity of rival . . . claims [is] to
be found (Giddens, 1994: 88; see also Beck, 1992, 1994).
Taken together, the various factors sketched out above mean that crises,
understood as situations where one is unable to simply keep on going as
before, become all but ubiquitous and more or less endemic: a normal part
of life, which cannot, however, be routinised (Giddens, 1991: 184). This
sense of continual and pervasive crisis in turn means that nothing can be taken
for granted: nothing goes without saying (Beck, 1994: 21), and living and
acting in uncertainty becomes a kind of basic experience (Beck, 1994: 12, my
emphasis). Adopting a particular lifestyle may lend temporary stability to
ones everyday life and to the narrative that one has chosen to adopt, but such
choices are themselves open to continual revision, and the individual cannot
but be conscious that any such option is only one among plural possibilities
540

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

(Giddens, 1991: 183). The existence of multiple milieux of action also means
that modes of action followed in one context may be . . . substantially at variance with those adopted in others (Giddens, 1991: 83), and that individuals
must now be able to maintain appropriate behaviour in a variety of settings
or locales (Giddens, 1991: 100). In this context it may even be that, for some,
it makes more sense to avoid trying to construct a viable, coherent and sustained sense of identity at all (Bauman, 1996: 24, 2001: 22).
As Giddens has pointed out, Self-therapy is grounded first and foremost
in continuous self-observation (1991: 71). In this sense, self-therapy can be
seen as the exemplary form of the reflexive project of the self (Giddens, 1991:
202). As Giddens also points out, however, and as has already been indicated
above, under conditions of late-, high-, or reflexive-modernity, such continual
self-questioning, or reflexivity, is increasingly demanded of us all (1991: 16,
70). This point has already been made elsewhere. What I am suggesting here,
however, is that for some, the various factors outlined above contribute
towards a continual and pervasive reflexivity that itself becomes habitual,
however paradoxical this notion may at first appear. In Bourdieus terms, this
follows in part from increased movement between and across fields, but it can
also be argued to result from rapid, pervasive and ongoing changes to social
fields themselves.
It may be, therefore, that Bourdieus analysis lacks historical specificity, or
as Calhoun puts it that Bourdieu has not made entirely clear what sorts
of categories should be taken as historically specific and which are transhistorical (1993: 82; see also Margolis, 1999: 69). Although Bourdieu suggests,
in places, that the effects of the habitus may be more significant in traditional
societies (1990b: 65), and as has already been noted allows that the habitus
may be superseded in times of crisis, for the most part his analysis implies that
the concept is universally applicable in much the same way. Reflexivity, for
Bourdieu, is both informed by, and emerges in addition to or in spite of
the habitus, and only during what he appears to regard as temporary disjunctions between habitus and field.
As Bourdieu himself points out, however, as a durable and relatively stable
system of dispositions, habitus only develops through lasting experience of
social position (1990b: 131), and what is being suggested here is that, in conditions of late-, high-, or reflexive-modernity, endemic crises of the sort outlined above can lead to a more or less permanent disruption of social position,
or a more or less constant disjunction between habitus and field. In this context
reflexivity ceases to reflect a temporary lack of fit between habitus and field
but itself becomes habitual, and is thus incorporated into the habitus in the
form of the flexible or reflexive habitus to which the title of this paper refers.
To the extent that Bourdieus non-reflexive habitus depends upon relatively
stable social conditions and on lasting experience of social position, his analysis may thus be said to apply more to simple- or organised- modernity, where
the comparative stability of peoples social identities allowed for a sustained,
coherent, and relatively secure relationship between habitus and field.
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

541

Paul Sweetman

Others who have made similar points include Calhoun, who argues that a
post-traditional context may require a theoretical attitude, and that this
should itself be seen as a variety of habitus . . . reflecting a certain social placement and participation in specific socially constructed projects (1993: 81). In
his discussion of Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, Mike Featherstone,
meanwhile, refers to the new petit bourgeois habitus, suggesting that
whereas the bourgeois has a sense of ease and confidence in his body, the
petit bourgeois is uneasy with his body, constantly self-consciously checking,
watching and correcting himself (1991a: 901). As a pretender, the new petit
bourgeois aspires to be more than he [sic] is, and adopts an investment
orientation and a learning mode to life . . . consciously educating himself in
areas of style and taste (1991a: 901). Where Calhouns theoretical habitus
appears to be limited to those working in quite specific occupational fields,
however, and Featherstones uneasy reflexivity is like for Bourdieu
confined to the new petit bourgeoisie, what I am suggesting is something
rather more ubiquitous, even if as will be considered below certain groups
remain largely outside of its remit.
Perhaps the closest account to that presented here is provided by Crossley,
who argues that Bourdieu is wrong to posit reflection and choice as different
modalities of action to those rooted in habit (2001a: 137). Crossley also
suggests that Late modern societies . . . tend to call for and generate more
reflexive habits amongst their members, in part because of their increased
complexity and speed of change (2001b: 1134), but also because of demands
for flexibility in economic and political life (2001a: 117). Whilst suggesting
that contemporary conditions call for a heightened degree of reflexivity,
however, the main thrust of Crossleys argument is to suggest that the concept
of habitus allows for reflexive action whatever the circumstances, that our
very capacity for reflexivity is rooted in the habitus, and that Bourdieu
underestimates the extent to which rational and conscious calculation,
indeed reflexivity, enter into everyday life as a matter of course (2001b: 113).
What is being suggested here, however, is something rather more historically
and culturally specific than this. In other words that contemporary conditions
do not simply demand a heightened degree of reflexivity, but may contribute
to the development of a particular type of habitus, characterised by a pervasive and habitual reflexivity that differs in degree to the generalised capacity
for reflexivity that Crossley identifies.

Implications and conclusions

Whilst McNay is right to point out that Bourdieus concept of habitus suggests a layer of embodied experience that is not immediately amenable to selffashioning (1999: 102), the idea that, for some, reflexivity itself is now habitual
in turn suggests that certain contemporary individuals or groups may easily
and largely unquestioningly engage in reflexive projects of self (re)construc542

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

tion as a matter of course. And while McNay, following Bourdieu, continues

to posit reflexivity and habitus as distinct with reflexive awareness . . . predicated on a distanciation of the subject with constitutive structures (1999: 110)
the argument presented here is that a reflexive orientation towards the contemporary environment may itself be regarded as a form of habitus, itself the
outcome of an adaptation to rather than a distanciation from the changing nature of the social terrain. Nor should this be regarded as either surprising or coincidental: as Bourdieu himself points out, An institution, even
an economy, is complete and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not
only in things . . . but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to recognize and
comply with the demands immanent in the field (1990a: 58). In this sense it
can also be argued that, in referring to a pervasive reflexivity, Giddens and
others are not so much invoking the reflexive freedom of subjects without
inertia (Bourdieu 1990a: 56) found in rationalist theories of action, as pointing to an habitual reflexivity that itself reflects wider structural demands.
To the extent that we can now talk about an habitual reflexivity, this also
has implications for more specific debates about fashion and consumption.
Although the concept of habitus, as generally understood, suggests difficulties with the idea that contemporary fashion is now entirely free-floating, for
example, and that we can all now wear what we want, picking up and discarding costumes at will in the global jumble-sale that is Jean Baudrillards
carnival of signs (Tselon, 1995: 124), the idea of a flexible or reflexive
habitus would indeed suggest that more and more of us are now able to pick
and mix in what others have referred to as the supermarket of style
(Polhemus, 1995). This, in turn, suggests that there is a link between the
present discussion and accounts of neo-tribal sociality. While Michel
Maffesolis (1988, 1991, 1996) references to the superficiality of the neo-tribal
persona sit uneasily with Bourdieus understanding of the embeddedness of
identity, dispositions and taste, the idea of an increasingly pervasive reflexive
habitus would both allow for and itself help to explain the emergence of the
temporary and largely superficial forms of identification that Maffesolis work
explores.
As Kevin Hetherington (1998) has pointed out, however, we should not
necessarily regard tribal affiliations as temporary and superficial, and
amongst those for whom such forms of identification represent a more lasting
commitment we might regard such attempts towards stability and belonging
(Hetherington, 1998: 29) as a response to rather than an easy acceptance of
the increasing demands for a constant and habitual reflexivity to which the
present discussion refers. The same is true of the adoption of particular
lifestyles, or a lasting involvement with particular forms of body project, for
example, which, whilst dependent initially upon a reflexive engagement with
the various options that are available, may also reflect an attempt to evade
demands for an ongoing reflexivity and to fix, or anchor the self in what can
be regarded as a modernist response to the contemporary social terrain
(Sweetman, 1999, 2003).
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

543

Paul Sweetman

The emergence and increasing prevalence of an habitual reflexivity or

reflexive habitus may be regarded as having a certain liberatory potential,
freeing people from the quasi-traditional modes of action to which Bourdieus understanding of habitus refers. While Bourdieu himself appears to
regard such a standpoint as limited to particular groups such as those who
have studied sociology (1990b: 15) he also points out that, although It is difficult to control the first inclination of the habitus, . . . reflexive analysis, which
teaches us that we endow the situation with part of the potency it has over us,
allows us to alter our perception of the situation and thereby our reaction to
it (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 136). This liberatory potential is, of
course, somewhat paradoxical in the case of an habitual reflexivity, itself
entered into unthinkingly or simply allowed to act, but even where a reflexive orientation is unreflexively adopted, its operation would still imply a
freedom from quasi-traditional modes of action, if not from reflexivity itself.
In suggesting that an habitual and pervasive reflexivity may be becoming
increasingly ubiquitous, however, I am not suggesting either that such a reflexive habitus is demanded of us all, or that the opportunity to develop such a
reflexive orientation to the social environment is equally distributed amongst
different social groups. While a reflexive orientation to the workplace is
increasingly demanded of employees within a variety of contexts and while
this can, in turn, be seen as one of the key factors contributing to the emergence of an habitual reflexivity or reflexive habitus amongst employees in
certain occupations reflexivity is neither required nor desired. Such reflexivity losers (Lash, 1994: 120) may therefore be said to be doubly disadvantaged;
not only are such groups required to undertake menial, routine tasks within
the workplace, but the ensuing lack of opportunity to develop the habitual
reflexivity increasingly required of employees in higher status occupations
may further disadvantage such lower status groups in both social and economic terms.
Whilst an overall premise of this paper is that such demands are becoming
increasingly ubiquitous, Hochschild (1983: 2021) points out that emotional
labour or the reflexive management of ones emotions is demanded less
of working-class than of middle-class employees, and while cultural omnivorousness can be regarded in part as a generalised response to increased consumer choice and an ensuing ambiguity over the meanings of things, it may
also be the case that it functions as a mark of distinction in its own right, and
that the pursuit of variety . . . is a feature of particular social groups (Warde,
Martens and Olsen, 1999: 105; see also Tselon, 1995: 134). As Erickson (1996)
suggests, it may also be the case that a broader rather than more specific
cultural repertoire is both particularly prevalent and of most advantage to
middle-managers and other higher-status occupational groups.
Although there is insufficient space to fully explore such issues here, additional factors contributing to an unequal distribution of habitual reflexivity
would be expected to include core sociological variables such as age and

544

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

gender. Whilst the middle-aged and elderly can be presumed to be more likely
to display the quasi-traditional habitus characteristic of Bourdieus understanding of the term, for example, it may also be the case that certain forms
of masculinity militate against the acquisition of an habitual reflexivity, and
that sons who . . . are unable to find the industrial labouring jobs they were
brought up to do (Lash, 1994: 131), for instance, thereby find themselves
more easily trapped within unemployment or marginal occupations (see also
Dwyer and Wyn, 2001: 1289).
Lisa Adkins (2002: 49) suggests that women, in particular, can be regarded
as reflexivity losers due to a relative lack of mobility within and between
fields, and argues that mobility in regard to gender styles is a privileged position, from which many women are excluded because of the way in which femininity has been naturalised (2002: 6). At the same time, however, others have
pointed out that women tend to be both more skilled in the management of
emotions, and to have entered jobs calling for emotional labour in greater
numbers than men (Hochschild, 1983; see also Duncombe and Marsden, 1993:
234), whilst empirical studies of young peoples experiences of paid employment have suggested that young women tend to be more flexible than their
male counterparts, and that:
In one sense, the fragmented nature of the processes to which they are subjected is less problematic to the construction and maintenance of their
identities than to the young men, whose identities have traditionally been
constructed through their involvement in the full-time workforce and the
pursuit of a defined career choice. (Dwyer and Wyn, 2001: 129)
While studies of fashion and consumption suggest that men have been increasingly and successfully targeted as consumers of fashion since the 1980s,
and that Late twentieth-century promotional culture has been extremely
active in the construction of more plural versions of identity for men (Mort,
1996: 10; see also Edwards, 1997, Nixon, 1996), it should also be noted that
both Susan Kaiser (2001: 87) and Diana Crane (2000: 179) suggest that men
tend to be less keen to experiment with their appearance, with Crane noting
that in the United States at least an interest in fashion and the manipulation of ones appearance is frequently regarded as suspect, particularly by
older men (2000: 179).
None of this is to suggest that those possessing a flexible or reflexive habitus
are the unequivocal winners, however. Despite its liberatory potential, as the
embodiment of wider structural imperatives, an habitual reflexivity is no less
the product of historical and cultural circumstance than the more traditional
habitus to which Bourdieus understanding of the term refers, and to the
extent, for example, that its emergence responds to demands for the perfect
consumer (Featherstone, 1991a: 91), the increasing realisation of such
demands ought not, perhaps, to be greeted with open arms.

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

545

Paul Sweetman

While the institutional price of greater flexibility and reflexivity may be a

corresponding decline in loyalty and commitment when individuals possessing the non-specific forms of capital increasingly demanded of them find
they are no longer tied to a particular field the individual cost may be a sense
of alienation or estrangement that is both lasting and profound. For those displaying a traditional or non-reflexive habitus, acting in accordance with the
habitus implies behaving naturally and in an unselfconscious way (Bourdieu,
1990a: 73), but the idea of an habitual reflexivity or reflexive habitus suggests
that the natural or pre-reflexive state of certain contemporary individuals
is to be definedly ill-at-ease. As has already been indicated, such unease is
partially captured in Bourdieus (1984: 207), and Featherstones (1991a:
9091) accounts of the petit-bourgeoisie. It is also captured, to at least some
extent, in Hochschilds (1983: 220) account of the costs of emotional labour.
While Bourdieu suggests that the world of the petit-bourgeoisie provides
the privileged terrain of interactionists and in particular Goffman (1990b:
134), however, such estrangement is arguably deeper and more profound than
the cynical detachment suggested by Goffmans understanding of the performing self, because while Goffman suggests that it is possible to relax once
one has moved behind the scenes, the notion of an habitual reflexivity or
reflexive habitus implies that, for increasing numbers of contemporary individuals, it is becoming ever more difficult to leave the stage. And while
Hochschilds sense of potential estrangement goes deeper than Goffmans
(Hochschild, 1983: 220), she too implies that the reflexive management of
ones emotions is strongly contextualised and tied up with particular occupational roles.
It may be that some are able to cope relatively easily with the continual
self-monitoring and flexibility that the notion of a reflexive habitus implies.
As Giddens points out, for example, a cosmopolitan person can be regarded
as someone who draws strength from being at home in a variety of contexts
(1991: 190). As has already been indicated, it may also be the case that adopting a particular lifestyle can provide something to hide behind, although as
has also already been pointed out, the security such a strategy offers is likely
to be limited (Giddens, 1991: 183), because whatever lifestyle the individual
chooses to adopt, she or he cannot fail to be aware that other choices both
could have been, and still could be, made.
In this context, certain forms of therapy may be regarded equally as cause,
symptom and attempted cure; at one and the same time encouraging a continual reflexivity, whilst responding to the demand that such a situation engenders, and attempting to offer a solution to some of the difficulties it entails
(see also Hochschild, 1983: 193). Others, however, may seek more immediate
forms of escape, with theme parks, extreme sports, and various forms of drug
use each reflecting a demand for contingency which escapes the governance
of reflexivity (Lash, 1993: 20). In resolving the need, or perhaps even the
ability to choose, addictions of various sorts may be particularly effective in
this regard (Giddens, 1994: 75), suggesting finally that the notion of an
546

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

habitual reflexivity can help to explain why increasing numbers of reflexivity

winners turn out to be reflexivity losers too.
University of Southampton

Received 23 August 2002

Finally accepted 8 September 2003

Notes
I am grateful to Wendy Bottero, Paul Bridgen, David Byrne, Mike Savage, Chris Shilling,
Emmanuelle Tulle, and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this
paper. I would also like to thank Nick Crossley for suggesting additional material to me following the presentation of an earlier version of this argument at the BSA Annual Conference
in April 2001, Helen Thomas for encouraging me to think these issues through more fully following a different conference presentation in April 2000, and Jane Rendell for a very helpful
and enjoyable discussion of the argument before any of it had been put down on paper.
1 This is not to adopt an essentialist position and suggest that those possessing a traditional
rather than a reflexive habitus are somehow closer to their real selves. Rather, it is to suggest
that, for those possessing a reflexive habitus, acting according to habitus or being oneself
is a less comfortable proposition than it is for those possessing the traditional or quasitraditional habitus characteristic of Bourdieus understanding of the term.

References
Adkins, L., (2002), Revisions: Gender and Sexuality in Late Modernity, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Angus, I., (1989), Circumscribing Postmodern Culture, in Angus, I. and Jhally, S. (eds), Cultural
Politics in Contemporary America, London: Routledge.
Bauman, Z., (1996), From Pilgrim to Tourist or a Short History of Identity, in Hall, S. and Du
Gay, P. (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage.
Bauman, Z., (2001), Consuming Life, Journal of Consumer Culture, 1 (1): 929.
Beck, U., (1992), Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage.
Beck, U., (1994), The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization, in
Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics
in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity.
Blair, T., (1999), Extracts from Tony Blairs Speech to the Labour Party Conference, Guardian
Unlimited, 29 September, http://guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,257529,00.html
Bocock, R., (1992), Consumption and Lifestyles, in Bocock, R. and Thompson, K. (eds), Social
and Cultural Forms of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press.
du Bois-Reymond, M., (1998), I Dont Want to Commit Myself Yet: Young Peoples Life Concepts, Journal of Youth Studies, 1 (1): 6379.
Bourdieu, P., (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, (translated by Richard Nice), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P., (1984), Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, (translated by
Richard Nice), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Bourdieu, P., (1990a), The Logic of Practice, (translated by Richard Nice), Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P., (1990b), In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, (translated by
Matthew Adamson), Cambridge: Polity.
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L., (1992), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Cambridge: Polity.
The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

547

Paul Sweetman
Bouveresse, J., (1999), Rules, Dispositions, and the Habitus, in Shusterman, R. (ed.), Bourdieu:
A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.
Calhoun, C., (1993), Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity, in
Calhoun, C. et al., (eds) Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity.
Couzens Hoy, D., (1999), Critical Resistance: Foucault and Bourdieu, in Weiss, G. and Haber,
H.F. (eds), Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture, London:
Routledge.
Crane, D., (2000), Fashion and its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Crossley, N., (2001a), The Social Body: Habit, Identity and Desire, London: Sage.
Crossley, N., (2001b), The Phenomenological Habitus and its Construction, Theory and Society,
30: 81120.
DeLillo, D., (1997), Underworld, New York: Scribner.
Duncombe, J. and Marsden, D., (1993), Love and Intimacy: The Gender Division of Emotion
and Emotion Work , Sociology, 27 (2): 221241.
Dwyer, P. and Wyn, J., (2001), Youth, Education and Risk: Facing the Future, London: Routledge
Falmer.
Edwards, T., (1997), Men in the Mirror: Mens Fashion, Masculinity and Consumer Society,
London: Cassell.
Erickson, B., (1996), Culture, Class, and Connections, American Journal of Sociology, 102 (1):
217251.
Featherstone, M., (1991a), Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, London: Sage.
Featherstone, M., (1991b), The Body in Consumer Culture, in Featherstone, M., Hepworth, M.
and Turner, B. (eds), The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory, London: Sage.
Foucault, M., (1980), Body/Power, in Gordon, C. (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings, 19721977, Brighton: Harvester Press.
Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F., (1997), Young People and Social Change: Individualization and Risk
in Late Modernity, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Giddens, A., (1991), Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens, A., (1994), Living in a Post-Traditional Society, in Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash,
S. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Harker, R., (2000), On Reproduction, Habitus and Education, in Robbins, D. (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu (Volume II), London: Sage.
Heath, S., (2002), Domestic and Housing Transitions and the Negotiation of Intimacy, in Cieslik,
M. and Pollock, G. (eds), Young People in Risk Society: The Restructuring of Youth Identities
and Transitions in Late Modernity, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hetherington, K., (1998), Expressions of Identity: Space, Performance, Politics, London: Sage.
Hochschild, A., (1983), The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Hochschild, A., (1994), The Commercial Spirit of Intimate Life and the Abduction of Feminism:
Signs from Womens Advice Books, Theory, Culture and Society, 11: 124.
Jamieson, L., (1998), Intimacy: Personal Relationships in Modern Societies, Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Jamieson, L., (1999), Intimacy Transformed? A Critical Look at the Pure Relationship, Sociology, 33 (3): 477494.
Jenkins, R., (1992), Pierre Bourdieu, London: Routledge.
Jenkins, R., (2000 [1982]), Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of Determinism, in Robbins,
D. (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu (Volume II), London: Sage.
Kaiser, S., (2001), Minding Appearances: Style, Truth and Subjectivity, in Entwistle, J. and
Wilson, E. (eds), Body Dressing, Oxford: Berg.
Kellner, D., (1992), Popular Culture and the Construction of Postmodern Identities, in Lash, S.
and Friedman, J. (eds), Modernity and Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.

548

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

Twenty-first century dis-ease?

Lash, S., (1993), Reflexive Modernization: The Aesthetic Dimension, Theory, Culture and
Society, 10: 123.
Lash, S., (1994), Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community, in Beck, U.,
Giddens, A. and Lash, S. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the
Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity.
Maffesoli, M., (1988), Jeux De Masques: Postmodern Tribalism (translated by C.R. Foulkes),
Design Issues, IV (12): 141151.
Maffesoli, M., (1991), The Ethics of Aesthetics, Theory, Culture and Society, 8: 720.
Maffesoli, M., (1996), The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society,
London: Sage.
Margolis, J., (1999), Pierre Bourdieu: Habitus and the Logic of Practice, in Shusterman, R. (ed.),
Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.
McNay, L., (1999), Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity, Theory, Culture and Society, 16 (1): 95117.
McRobbie, A., (1994), Postmodernism and Popular Culture, London: Routledge.
Mort, F., (1996), Cultures of Consumption: Masculinities and Social Space in Late TwentiethCentury Britain, London: Routledge.
Nixon, S., (1996), Hard Looks: Masculinities, Spectatorship and Contemporary Consumption,
London: UCL Press.
Ostrow, J., (2000), Culture as a Fundamental Dimension of Experience: A Discussion of Pierre
Bourdieus Theory of Human Habitus, in Robbins, D. (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu (Volume I),
London: Sage.
Polhemus, T., (1995), Streetstyle: From Sidewalk to Catwalk, London: Thames and Hudson.
Shilling, C., (1993), The Body and Social Theory, London: Sage.
Sweetman, P., (1999), Anchoring the (Postmodern) Self? Body Modification, Fashion and
Identity, Body and Society, 5 (23): 5176.
Sweetman, P., (2003), Tourists and Travellers? Subcultures, Reflexive Identities and Neo-Tribal
Sociality, in Bennett, A. and Harris, K. (eds) After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Taylor, R., (1999), Blair urges headmasters to defeat forces of conservatism , Guardian Unlimited, 21 October, http://education.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,5500,94325,00.html
Tselon, E., (1995), The Masque of Femininity: The Representation of Woman in Everyday Life,
London: Sage.
Wagner, P., (1994), A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline, London: Routledge.
Warde, A., (1994), Consumption, Identity-Formation and Uncertainty, Sociology, 28 (4):
877898.
Warde, A., Martens, L., and Olsen, W., (1999), Consumption and the Problem of Variety:
Cultural Omnivorousness, Social Distinction and Dining Out, Sociology, 33 (1): 105127.
Willis, P., (1977), Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids get Working Class Jobs,
Farnborough: Saxon House.
Wintour, P., (1999). Blair to attack conservative teachers, Guardian Unlimited, 17 October,
http://education.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,5500,92931,00.html

The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2003

549