Lorenzo A.

Perez
Latest SC decisions on Family Code
FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, ET AL. v. EDNA C. SEE
G.R. No. 194077, December 03, 2014
FACTS:
The spouses Florentino Leong (Florentino) and Carmelita Leong
(Carmelita) used to own the property located at No. 53941 Z.P. De
Guzman Street, Quiapo, Manila. Petitioner Elena Leong (Elena), sisterin-law of Florentino, had stayed with her in-laws on the property rentalfree for over two decades until the building they lived in was razed by
fire. They then constructed makeshift houses, and the rental-free
arrangement continued. Florentino and Carmelita immigrated to the
United States and eventually had their marriage dissolved in Illinois.
A provision in their marital settlement agreement states that
Florentino shall convey and quitclaim all of his right, title and interest
in and to 540 De Guzman Street, Manila, Philippines . . . to Carmelita.
On November 14, 1996, Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of
Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale,
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a
waiver of interest notarized on March 11, 1996 in Illinois. In this waiver,
Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to
the land. Consequently, the lands title, covered by TCT No. 231105,
was transferred to Edna's name. Edna was aware of the Leong relatives
staying in the makeshift houses on the land. Carmelita assured her that
her nieces and nephews would move out, but demands to vacate were
unheeded. On April 1, 1997, Edna filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong exspouses. The complaint alleged that in 1995 after the fire had razed
the building on the land, Elena erected makeshift houses on the land
without Carmelitas knowledge or consent. In response, Elena alleged
the titles legal infirmity for lack of Florentino's conformity to its sale.
She argued that Carmelita's non-compliance with the proviso in the
property agreement that the Quiapo property may not be alienated
without Florentino first obtaining a clean title over the Malabon
property annulled the transfer to Edna. On April 23, 1997,
Florentino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, title,
and damages against Carmelita Leong, Edna C. See, and the Manila
Register of Deeds, alleging that the sale was without his consent.
Petitioners contend that the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles
does not apply when fraud exists, and respondent was a buyer in bad
faith. Respondent knew at the time of the purchase that Elena had
actual possession of the property, thus, she should have made
inquiries on their right to the property. Petitioners argue the conjugal

nature of the property, evidenced by the title in the names of

Florentino and Carmelita Leong, and the waiver relied upon by
respondent. Petitioners argue that respondent should bear the loss of
her negligence in purchasing the property without Florentinos consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is a purchaser in good faith for
value who exercised the necessary diligence in purchasing the
property?
HELD:
Petitioners raise that actual possession of the property by a person
other than the vendor should put the purchaser in inquiry and absent
such inquiry, he cannot be regarded as a bona fide purchaser against
such possessors. As discussed by the Court of Appeals, respondent
did conduct further inquiry by relying not only on the certificate of title,
but also on Florentinos waiver. Petitioners submit that respondent
bought the property knowing that Florentino and Carmelita were
married. They then invoke Civil Code and Family Code provisions on
the nature of conjugal properties and the prohibition against donations
between spouses. Respondent counters that Florentino and Carmelita
were already American citizens when they executed the marital
settlement agreement. She even presented before the trial court
Florentinos special power of attorney executed on March 25, 1997 to
prove Florentinos citizenship. The trial court disregarded petitioners
argument on the applicability of our civil laws on the validity of the sale
since it already deemed respondent to be an innocent purchaser in
good faith and for value. The trial court added that since Respondent
parted with a substantial amount of P4 Million, equity dictates that she
shall have possession of the property. Nonetheless, Florentino Leong
shall get his one-half share of the purchase price. On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals discussed that Florentino was estopped from
questioning the transfer of the property since he already waived all his
rights, title, and interests over the same. The court also found that the
intercalated proviso in the marital settlement agreement violated the
mutuality of contracts principle.
CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her

husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition

for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage on June 15, 2007, Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008. In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death,
Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere
in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18,
1980. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. Oblesl Ricardo
claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong
Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he
allowed her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment
agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months
after and was never heard from again. Ricardo further alleged that he
exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts.He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it
was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away. Celerina
claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On
November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in
court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune
Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had
been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left
in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that she never
resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency in February
1995. She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent
for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May
2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it
had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not
furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive
death?
HELD:
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting
marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only law
protects a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith. Therefore,
the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also
not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage still applies. If, as Celerina contends,
Ricardo were in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage,
such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances
lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family
Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous
marriages to apply. The provision on reappearance in the Family Code
as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does
not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that filing an action in court to prove the reappearance of
the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage might also terminate a subsequent
marriage." Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also
seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also
the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. Celerina is correct.
Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the
Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." If it
is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent
marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a
defense against prosecution for bigamy. It is true that in most cases,
an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify

the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the

status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy. However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife. This means that
even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or
injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this
remedy is not available to her.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA
M. CADA vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636. July 28, 2014
FACTS:
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed
before the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus,
docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition,
respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ,
directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the
court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada
(Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally,
respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses
where she can be served with summons and other court processes, to
wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2)
118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at the
Ombudsman-Office
of
the
Special
Prosecutor,
5th
Floor,
Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor.
Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of
habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March
28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the
Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the
habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioners Caloocan
residence, as witnessed by respondents counsel and barangay
officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings before the RTC-Caloocan. Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011,
petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda
before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City).
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on
the ground of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3,
2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office
of the City Prosecutor Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondents motion
and dismissed the guardianship case due to the pendency of the
habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the
habeascorpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it
does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and
the person of Criselda.
HELD:
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
proceeding. However, the petition may be filed with the regular court
in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family Court
as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty. In the case at bar,
respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City.
Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial
region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule. Anent petitioners insistence on
the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of
said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to
petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions.
Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found.
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to begin
with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz,
a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a
summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.