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Linda Robinson
Council Special Report No. 66
The Future
of U.S. Special
Operations Forces
The Future of
U.S. Special Operations Forces
Linda Robinson
The Future of
U.S. Special Operations Forces
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Contents
Forewordvii
Acknowledgmentsix
Council Special Report 1
Introduction3
Special Operations Forces and the Strategic Context 5
Special Operations Forces Organization and Missions 8
Shortfalls in Special Operations Forces 13
Recommendations20
Conclusion26
Appendix28
Endnotes30
About the Author 33
Advisory Committee 34
Foreword
U.S. special operations forces are doing more things in more places
than ever before. They are now active in some seventy countries and,
since 2001, have seen their combined budget nearly quintuplea trend
that seems likely to continue. As the United States seeks ways to tackle a
range of security threats worldwide, shore up the resilience of its friends
and allies against terrorist and criminal networks, and minimize need
for large-scale military interventions, the importance of special operations forces will grow.
Yet, writes Linda Robinson in this Council Special Report, the strategic vision for special operations forces has not kept pace with the
growing demands for their skills. Most peopleand, indeed, many
policymakersassociate the special operations forces with secret
nighttime raids like the one that targeted Osama bin Laden: tactical
operations against a particular individual or group. The abilities of
special operations forces, however, extend much further, into military
training, information operations, civilian affairs, and more. As the
United States shifts its focus from war fighting to building and supporting its partners, Robinson argues, it will become critical to better
define these strategic capabilities and ensure that special operations
forces have the staffing and funding to succeed. Robinson further calls
on the Pentagon to remove bureaucratic and operational obstacles to
cooperation among the special operations forces of each service, and
between special and conventional forces. She also recommends that all
special operations forces commands work to develop a pipeline of talented, motivated officers with expertise in these issues, and that the role
of civilian leadership in budget and operational oversight be reinforced.
The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces is a timely report on
the future of what may become the militarys most important troops.
It offers a broad set of recommendations covering institutional,
vii
viii
Foreword
operational, and intellectual reforms that could improve the versatility and effectiveness of the special operations forces. As the Pentagon
seeks new ways to exert American power in an era of lower budgets and
higher aversion to wars on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan, this report
argues that expanding the role of special operations forces canand
shouldbe high on the agenda.
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations
April 2013
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The United States has arrived at a critical inflection point in the development and employment of its special operations forces. Budget pressures and exhaustion with large-scale wars now place a new premium
on small-footprint operations and partnering with allies to provide
cost-effective defense. Special operations forces are uniquely designed
to play both of those roles. Therefore, given the likely ongoing heavy
reliance on special operations forces, it is imperative that national
security policymakers and defense officials ensure that these forces
are prepared to perform their full range of missions. The strategic context is now shifting, and adjustments are in order. Al-Qaeda has been
degraded severely, although offshoots remain potent threats. Unless
another major war erupts, U.S. special operations forces are unlikely to
continue the intensive pace of raidsoften a dozen or more a nightas
they have done in recent years in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Over the past decade, special operations forces have honed their
counterterrorism manhunting ability and notched significant operational successes, most prominently in the mission that killed al-Qaeda
founder and leader Osama bin Laden. These unilateral manhunting
skills represent only one of their two basic capabilitiesalbeit the one
that has understandably received the most attention and resources in
recent years. Their other capability is developing and working alongside
indigenous forces to combat terrorists, insurgents, and transnational
criminal networks through an orchestrated set of defense, information,
and civil affairs programs. Special operations leaders often say that the
unilateral or direct approach buys time for the longer-term indirect
approach to work, and that the latter is decisive in addressing a threat.
This indirect approach has been successfully applied over the past
decade in Colombia and the Philippines, where small numbers of army,
navy, air force, and marine special operators have worked with indigenous counterparts to greatly diminish the threats in both countries,
3
the total comes to 4 percent of defense spendinga fairly small percentage in relation to the contribution of special operations forces to
national security objectives. Though the special operations budget has
more than quadrupled from $2.3 billion in 2001, the growth leveled off
with a budget request of $10.4 billion for the 2013 fiscal year.2
The other reason to expect a high demand for special operations
forces is the continuing prevalence of irregular threats to U.S. national
security, the types of threats that these forces are designed to address.
The defense strategic guidance and other intelligence assessments
forecast ongoing irregular threats by nonstate actors such as terrorists,
insurgents, and transnational criminal networks that are increasingly
empowered by technology and other forces of globalization. Though
the core al-Qaeda organization has been degraded, its affiliates have
grown and spread to other unstable, ungoverned, or conflict-ridden
areas in the Middle East and Africa. State adversaries are also likely to
resort to unconventional tactics to counter the overwhelmingly superior conventional power of the United States and its allies.3
Though the future portends ongoing high demand for special operations forces, it is important to note that they are a scarce resource.
They constitute less than 5 percent of total U.S. military forces, so
they cannot be employed everywhere. Many U.S. partner-building and
military activities can and should be carried out by conventional forces.
Special operations forces are designed for missions that conventional
forces cannot undertake, such as those that require operating in a lowprofile manner, behind enemy lines, or in politically sensitive places.4
They are also ideally suited to work with other countries special operations forces.
Small-footprint special operations missions will likely run a wide
gamut in the future. Due to the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan and the weakening of the core al-Qaeda organization, unilateral
counterterrorism missions may evolve from high-tempo missions in a
few countries to far fewer but more geographically diffuse operations
conducted against those who represent dire and imminent threats to
U.S. interests. Authorities and procedures for this unilateral application of force beyond declared theaters of war will have to be clarified.
In the absence of another major war, it is likely that special operations
will increasingly focus on enabling or empowering other countries
forces to address threats within their own borders. In many cases, this
2,606
4.0
28,500
45.0
18,000
28.0
9,000
14.0
2,600
4.0
1,519
2.4
1,425
2.2
Total
63,650 100.0
10
11
12
14
Conceptual Shortfall s
The principal conceptual shortfall is the lack of a clear and coherent
lexicon and doctrine that explain what special operations forces do
and how they are to be employed. The ways in which they achieve their
effects have not been fleshed out into a template that can be adapted and
applied to various cases and explained in a way that is readily understood and embraced by policymakers and other partners in government. Special operations forces should also be a fount of innovative
ideas for addressing unconventional and emerging threats. Developing
special operations forces intellectual capital has not been prioritized,
as the focus to date has been on finding and fixing individual targets.
Thus, it is of small wonder that, without this foundation, special operations forces have been characteristically employed in tactical and episodic ways. Over the course of a given year, they are deployed to as many
as one hundred countries, mostly for short periods, but only in a few
of those cases do their activities have a decisive or enduring impact. A
new model for employing special operations forces would follow the
approach used in Colombia and the Philippines, where special operations forces planned ongoing campaigns that use numerous advisory,
civil affairs, and informational activities to assess and address those
governments weaknesses in providing security and remedying underlying sources of conflict. The operators developed these plans in coordination with the Colombian and Philippine governments and integrated
15
16
command over all special operations units are the theater special operations commands. This should be standard for any units operating in a
persistent manner. Even discrete, time-limited operations by special
mission units should be coordinated and their potential effects on the
wider effort assessed. The existence of two separate special operations
organizations with headquarters in the field creates internal frictions
and makes coordination with conventional commanders, U.S. embassies, and host-nation governments even more complex and fraught with
potential misunderstandings.
The third operational shortfall is the lack of a mechanism to ensure
that sustained special operations activities in a given country are funded
consistently. It makes little difference if a coherent special operations
plan is devised if its component activities to achieve lasting effect over
time lack consistent funding. Most special operationseven those conducted in a single countryare funded in piecemeal fashion to support
a given activity with a given partner force for a certain mission or time
period.13 Additionally, proposals for a given training or advisory activity must compete in a lottery for funding each year, creating a degree of
uncertainty that can disrupt operations and partnerships. Some of these
authorities require the approval of the Department of State, which can
take up to two years to secure. Developing and operating with partners
is a long-term endeavor that requires a sustained commitment if it is to
produce the desired results, such as those achieved in Colombia and the
Philippines.
In addition to these internal operational shortfalls, special operations forces and conventional military forces have failed to combine
routinely in ways that would increase the U.S. capacity to conduct
small-footprint operations. Special operations forces lack enablers
(such as airlift, combat aviation, logistics, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, and special functions such as judge advocates and
provost marshals), additional infantry, and command relationships. By
design and doctrine, special operations forces rely on the conventional
military. Conventional forces do not readily provide small, scalable
units because their systems are geared toward providing larger units.
This is a consequence of preparing to fight large, conventional wars and
is a primary impediment to the agility needed in this era of dynamic,
hybrid threats. The problem extends beyond the enabler shortfall. If
a more flexible system could be developed, the two forces could combine in creative new ways. For example, in an experiment under way in
17
18
the lead command for the war on terror, but the geographic combatant commanders resisted what they viewed as an incursion into their
geographic purview. USSOCOM headquarters staff nearly doubled,
and an expensive operations center was built in anticipation of a role
that was never assumed. U.S. Special Operations Command continues
to advocate for a role in addressing global threats that cross these geographic boundaries and avers that geographic combatant commanders
do not understand or employ special operations forces effectively. It is
critical to delineate a workable division of labor and develop mechanisms for ensuring that the four-star commands cooperate with rather
than stymie each other. One core function of U.S. Special Operations
Command should be to ensure that geographic combatant command
staffs, which rotate every few years, understand special operations
forces and how to employ them.
In the Pentagon, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special Operations Commands policy
and resources, as directed by law.14 Relative to the importance of special
operations in current U.S. defense strategy, the office is understaffed
and lacks Department of Defenserelevant policy expertise. Furthermore, the assistant secretary is often seen only as an advocate for and
arm of U.S. Special Operations Command rather than as an independent source of advice and expertise, which undercuts its effectiveness
as the secretarys principal civilian adviser on special operations. One
of two main shortfalls has been in exercising its statutory oversight of
resources: its role in determining resourcing levels and priorities
which is central to executing policy and driving change in any organizationhas been eclipsed by U.S. Special Operations Commands
creation of a three-star vice commander in Washington whose portfolio is resources. The second major shortfall has been in providing adequate policy oversight, advice, and coordination across the full range
of special operations assigned missions. In the past decade, the office
has focused overwhelmingly on counterterrorism and operational and
even tactical matters rather than on policy and strategy for the entire
special operations/low-intensity conflict spectrum. In addition, the
offices portfolio has evolved to include areas other than special operations/low-intensity conflict, which has drained scarce staff attention.
Counternarcotics and a variety of other responsibilities have been
given to this office, which has been reorganized in every presidential
19
Recommendations
20
Recommendations
21
22
Recommendations
23
24
Congress should amend U.S. law (Title 10, Section 138) to strengthen
the budget approval authority and other oversight functions of the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/
Low-Intensity Conflict, and to make clear that this office is to provide independent advice to the secretary of defense on policy options
for employing special operations forces. Additional staff and other
measures are needed for this office to keep pace with the policy and
oversight responsibilities demanded by a historically large and heavily employed special operations force.
The assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict should shed other functions unrelated to his/her statutory
duties and focus on policy and resource matters while maintaining
sufficient visibility of military operations to provide independent
Recommendations
25
Conclusion
Conclusion
27
Appendix:
List of Special Operations Forces Units
Pilots (1st and 27th Special Operations Wings, 352nd and 353rd Special Operations Groups)
720th Special Tactics Group:
Combat Controllers
Pararescue Jumpers
Special Operations Weather Teams
Tactical Air Control Party
28
Appendix
SEALs
Note: Numbers include military and civilians. Numbers approximate as of August 2012.
29
Endnotes
1. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, p. 3. The
document was accessed on September 13, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
2. See U.S. Special Operations Command FY 2013 Budget Highlights, p. 6. Accessed
October 4, 2012, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_
Budget_Highlights.pdf.
3. See the Global Trends reports by the National Intelligence Council, including Global
Trends 2025: A World Transformed, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/
national-intelligence-council-global-trends.
4. For example, during the Cold War, the presence of fifty-five advisers in El Salvador in
the 1980s was highly controversial but was subsequently credited with playing a
significant role in that countrys counterinsurgency and the eventual professionalization
of its military. Their advisory role was complemented by diplomatic, development, and
intelligence assistance.
5. An excellent history of the formation of U.S. Special Operations Command is
Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Command by Susan
Marquis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). Senators William
Cohen (R-ME) and Sam Nunn (D-GA), along with Senate Armed Services Committee
senior staff member James R. Locher III, were instrumental in crafting and passing the
legislation known as the Cohen-Nunn amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act.
6. In addition to Africa Command, Pacific Command, and European Command, there is
Central Command, which is the geographic combatant command for the Middle East
and South Asia, and Southern Command, which oversees activities in Latin America.
Pacific Command has two TSOCs, one of which is dedicated to Korea and located in
South Korea.
7. Foreign internal defense (FID) is one of the most common but least known missions
of special operations forces. It is officially defined in Joint Publication 1-02, the
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as participation
by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken
by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is usually undertaken in
support of the host nations plan, which is often referred to as an internal defense and
development (IDAD) plan. The eleven activities undertaken by special operations
forces are specified in the current doctrine for special operations, Joint Publication
3-05, II-519. A slightly different list of special operations missions is specified in Title
10 USC, Section 167.
8. For example, direct action and special reconnaissance are tactical military
activities that may be conducted as part of the operations included in this list (e.g.,
30
Endnotes
31
32
Endnotes
15. This discussion of special operations draws on Colin Grays definitions of strategic
impact of special operations. See Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 1996). For further discussion of the strategic utility of special operations
forces, see Philip Mahla and Christopher Riga, An Operational Concept for the
Transformation of SOF into a Fifth Service (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, 2003), pp. 1534, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2003/Jun/
03Jun_Mahla.pdf.
33
Michele L. Malvesti
Science Applications International
Corporation; Yale University
H. R. McMaster
U.S. Army
James F. Dobbins
RAND Corporation
David E. Potts
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Jeffrey W. Eggers
National Security Council
Theodore Roosevelt IV
Barclays
Andrew Exum
Center for a New American Security
Nadia Schadlow
Smith Richardson Foundation
Sherri Goodman
CNA
Sarah Sewall
Naval War College
Lee H. Hamilton
Indiana University
This report reflects the judgments and recommendations of the author(s). It does not necessarily represent
the views of members of the advisory committee, whose involvement in no way should be interpreted as an
endorsement of the report by either themselves or the organizations with which they are affiliated.
34
36
37
38
39
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For more information, email publications@cfr.org.
1777 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
tel 202.509.8400
fax 202.509.8490
www.cfr.org
Linda Robinson
Council Special Report No. 66
The Future
of U.S. Special
Operations Forces