Terrorism DA

Stefan Bauschard
Terrorism Disadvantage
Page 1 of 318
FYI --rrorism Defined................................................................................................ 6

Shell........................................................................................................................ 8
Links...................................................................................................................... 11
General Surveillance Restriction Links...............................................................12
Warrant Requirement Links................................................................................ 14
Business Records/Section 2015/Email and Phone Surveillance Restriction Links
........................................................................................................................... 16
Section 702 Programs Necessary to Defeat Terrorism........................................22
Prism Restrictions Link....................................................................................... 25
Reduced Encryption Cracking Links...................................................................27
Increasing Transparency Links............................................................................28
Mass Surveillance Critical to Prevent Terrorism..................................................29
Domestic Anti-Terrorism Key............................................................................... 33
Counterterrorism Generally Effective.................................................................34
Intelligence Critical to National Security............................................................36
Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Genocide......................................................38
A2: Terrorists No Longer Use Email.....................................................................39
Signal Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Terrorism............................................40
Terrorist Threat Increasing..................................................................................... 41
Terror Risk Generally Increasing.........................................................................42
Terrorism Risks Increasing Al Qaeda................................................................56
AQAPTargets the U.S....................................................................................... 64
Threat Africa.................................................................................................... 65
Threat Africa.................................................................................................... 66
Pakistan Terrorist Threat..................................................................................... 67
Threat Middle East........................................................................................... 68
Threat -- Al-Shabaab Strong............................................................................... 70
Terrorism Risks Increasing Al Qaeda Geographically Spread...........................71
Terrorism Risks Increasing Recruiting Up.........................................................72
Terror Risks Increasing/US Counterterrorism Fails..............................................73
Terror Risks Increasing -- Weak Drone Strike Policy Fails....................................75
Terror Risks Increasing A2: Drone Strikes Solve...............................................76
Terrorism Risks Increasing Threats to Nuclear Power Plants............................78
Terror Risks Increasing Maritime Terrorism......................................................80
Terror Risks Increasing Soft Targets.................................................................82
A2: Bergen/Domestic Terrorism Decline.............................................................84
1
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 2 of 318
A2: Terrorism Risk Decreasing............................................................................87

A2: State Sponsorship of Terrorism Decreasing..................................................88
A2: Al Qaeda Threat Decreasing........................................................................89
A2: Al Qaeda Leaders Killed............................................................................... 92
A2: AQIM Divided (General)................................................................................ 94
A2: AQIM Divided (Specific)................................................................................ 95
Answers to Link Turns............................................................................................ 96
A2: Plan Facilitates Global Anti-Terror Cooperation.............................................97
Answers to Other General Take-Outs.....................................................................99
A2: We Can Deter Terrorism.............................................................................100
A2: US Military Intervention Solves Terrorism...................................................102
Terrorism Very Bad.............................................................................................. 110
Terror O/W Prolif............................................................................................... 111
Terror Turns Prolif Advantage............................................................................112
Fighting Terror Moral Obligation.....................................................................113
Bioterror High Probability...............................................................................114
WMD Terrorism Risk & Impacts............................................................................116
Nuclear and Biological Terrorism Risks Increasing............................................117
WMD Terrorism Means Extinction.....................................................................123
Nuclear Terrorism Impacts................................................................................... 124
Terrorists Trying to Get Nukes...........................................................................125
Nuclear Terrorism Toon.................................................................................. 127
(Nuclear) Barrett (US-Russian Nuclear War)..................................................128
(Nuclear) -- Beres............................................................................................. 129
(Nuclear) Easterbrook, Amhed, Haas.............................................................130
(Nuclear) Speice............................................................................................ 131
(Nuclear) Zedillo, Alexander..........................................................................132
(Nuclear) Hannity, Zedillo, Alexander............................................................133
(Nuclear) Ayson............................................................................................. 134
(Nuclear) Global Economy............................................................................. 136
(Nuclear) -- Middle east war.............................................................................137
xt middle east war.................................................................................................. 139
(Nuclear) -- Hegemony Collapse.......................................................................140
(Nuclear) -- Economic Collapse........................................................................142
xt airlines................................................................................................................ 145
(Nuclear) Democracy..................................................................................... 147
2
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 3 of 318
(Nuclear) Ext US-Russian Nuclear War.........................................................148

Africa Nuclear Terror Impact.............................................................................150
General Terrorism Impacts/Turns Case Cards......................................................152
Terrorism Outweighs Rights..............................................................................153
Terrorism Outweighs War................................................................................. 154
Turns Case- Civil Liberties Violations................................................................157
Turns Case- Morality......................................................................................... 159
Turns Case- Biopower....................................................................................... 160
Turns Case- Democracy.................................................................................... 161
Terrorism Outweighs- Generally.......................................................................162
Terrorism Nuke War (Sid Ahmed, Easterbrook).............................................165
Terrorism Nuke War (Alexander)...................................................................166
Economy Module.............................................................................................. 167
US Lashout....................................................................................................... 169
at rationality checks......................................................................................... 172
at no nuclear forensics..................................................................................... 173
at fear --> inaction........................................................................................... 174
Answers to Nuclear Terrorism Answers................................................................175
State Sponsorship Increases Nuclear Terrorism Risks......................................176
Nuclear Terrorism Risk High............................................................................. 178
A2: Terrorists Wont Use Nukes.........................................................................179
A2: Terrorists Dont Want to Kill A Lot of People...............................................183
A2: Empirics..................................................................................................... 184
A2: No Al Qaeda Nukes.................................................................................... 186
A2: Nukes Uneconomical.................................................................................. 187
A2: Tech Barriers.............................................................................................. 188
A2: Cant test gun............................................................................................ 191
A2: Cant design it............................................................................................ 192
A2: Cant Build It.............................................................................................. 193
A2: Livermore test............................................................................................ 195
A2: Uranium Toxic............................................................................................ 196
A2: Uranium Not Enriched Enough..................................................................197
A2: Fear of failure............................................................................................. 198
A2: Deterrence................................................................................................. 199
A2: Cant Transport.......................................................................................... 201
A2: No Space.................................................................................................... 203
3
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 4 of 318
A2: Cant do it Alone........................................................................................ 204

A2: No theft (generic)....................................................................................... 205
fyi about amount needed................................................................................. 207
A2: security...................................................................................................... 208
A2: locked weapons......................................................................................... 209
A2: Cant Get Nuclear Material.........................................................................210
A2: No Theft (research reactors)......................................................................214
A2: No Theft (Russia)........................................................................................ 215
A2: Security (Russia)........................................................................................ 216
A2: No Theft (Black Market)............................................................................. 218
A2: No Theft (Pakistan)..................................................................................... 219
A2: Security (Pakistan)..................................................................................... 223
A2: Deterrence Stops Nuclear Terrorism...........................................................224
A2: Terrorists Cant Build a Bomb.....................................................................225
A2: Terrorists Cant Build a Bomb.....................................................................226
A2: Uranium toxic............................................................................................. 228
A2: Not Enriched Enough................................................................................. 229
A2: Terrorists Couldnt Build a Trigger Device...................................................230
A2: Nukes Too Expensive for Terrorists.............................................................231
A2: Small Cells Couldnt Produce/Detonate a Nuke......................................232
A2: Deterrence Solves...................................................................................... 233
A2: Terrorists Dont Have a Large Sanctuary to Produce a Nuke..................235
A2: Countries Wont Transfer Nukes to Terrorists..............................................236
A2: No Documented Theft Risks.......................................................................237
A2: Economic Growth Solves............................................................................238
A2: Arab-Israeli Peace Solves...........................................................................239
A2: Reducing Poverty Solves............................................................................240
A2: Terrorists Cant Get Materials.....................................................................241
A2: Terrorists Cant Get Materials.....................................................................242
A2: No Black Market......................................................................................... 244
A2: Russian Security Has Improved..................................................................245
A2: IAEA Solves Nuclear Materials Diversion....................................................246
A2: Cooperative Programs With Russia Solve...................................................247
Nuke Terror Attack Will Originate from Pakistan...............................................248
A2: Terrorism Is a Meaningless Term.............................................................249
State Support Critical to Nuclear Terror............................................................250
4
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 5 of 318
Bioterrorism......................................................................................................... 252
Bioterror Risks.................................................................................................. 253
Billions Die....................................................................................................... 254
Bioterrorism Causes Human Extinction............................................................256
at generic defense........................................................................................... 261
at no availability............................................................................................... 263
at no dispersal.................................................................................................. 265
motive generic............................................................................................... 266
motive al qaeda............................................................................................. 267
xt yes motive.......................................................................................................... 269
xt only aq specific evidence................................................................................... 271
xt soviet anthrax.................................................................................................... 272
A2: No Capability.................................................................................................... 273
A2: Islamic Law Prevents it..................................................................................... 276
A2: Authors.......................................................................................................... 277
A2: Frost (Generic)........................................................................................... 278
A2: Frost (Russia Nukes)...................................................................................279
A2: Frost (Tech Barriers)................................................................................... 281
A2: Frost (No Motive)........................................................................................ 283
A2: Levi (Murpheys Law)................................................................................. 284
A2: Mueller (Generic)....................................................................................... 286
A2: Mueller (20 things)..................................................................................... 287
A2: Mueller (threat con)................................................................................... 288
A2: Mueller (Low Casualties)............................................................................289
Nuke Power Impact.............................................................................................. 291
xt solves warming.................................................................................................. 294
xt solves nuke war.................................................................................................. 297
5
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 6 of 318
FYI --rrorism Defined

Ways to define terrorism
Stephen D. Collins, 2014 is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at
Kennesaw State University. His research focuses on terrorism, economic statecraft, democracy and
human rights, conflict resolution, and nuclear proliferation. He is the author of, inter alia, Dissuading
State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against
Libya, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (1): 2004. Stephen D. Politics & Policy. Feb2014, Vol. 42
Issue 1, p131-159
A settled definition of terrorism eludes the literature to date, particularly concerning the elements
differentiating terrorism from conventional warfare or criminal violence. Much nonacademic literature on
terrorism is polemical, rendering definitions subject to ideological predilections. Even within the
academic corpus, an unwieldy number of distinct definitions have been proffered. Alex Schmids (2011,
99-157) noted compilation of terrorism research reveals more than 250 definitions of terrorism expressed
by academics, plus those offered by governments and international organizations.
Despite this lack of agreed starting point, the distinguishing aspects of terrorism, as compared with other
forms of violence, operate on multiple dimensions, but include especially: the nature of the perpetrators,
the tactics employed, the objectives of the operations, and the classification of the targets. Laqueurs
parsimonious definition, for example, merely operationalizes terrorism as the use of covert violence by a
group for political ends (Schmid 1983, 136). Addressing a shortcoming of Laqueur, Hoffman (1998, 43)
includes the construction and manipulation of fear to realize political aims: the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. This
added variable redresses the imprecision of Laqueurs definition, under which all instances of asymmetric
warfare used by resistance movements against the state could be broadly coded as terrorism. Going
further, Jenkins defines terrorism as violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere
of fear and alarmin a word, to terrorize, and thereby bring about some social or political change (cited
in Kegley 1990, 28). In so doing, Jenkins highlights the psychological dimensions of terrorism and, by
including social change as an objective of terrorism, corrects an omission in Hoffmans version.
Terrorism defined
The New Nation (Bangladesh), January 27, 2014
Terrorism affects socio-economic stability
In such a context it would be natural to expect that the fear and threat of terrorism would have a
crippling psychological effect on society. Yet is this the case?Terrorism is the systematic use of
violence as a means of coercion for political, religious and ethnical purposes. Common
definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts, which are intended to create fear
(terror); are perpetrated for a religious, political, or ideological goal; and deliberately
target or disregard the safety of the non-combatant civilians. Some definitions now include
acts of unlawful violence and war. The use of similar tactics by criminal organizations for
6
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 7 of 318
projection rackets or to enforce a code of silence is usually not labeled terrorism, though
these same actions may be labeled terrorism when done by a politically motivated group.
Usage of the term has also been criticized for its frequent undue equating with religion.
Terrorism has been practiced by a broad array of political organizations to further their
objectives. It has been practiced by both right-wing and left-wing political parties,
nationalist forces, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments. An abiding
characteristic is the indiscriminate use of violence against non-combatants for the purpose
of gaining publicity for a group, cause, or individual.
7
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 8 of 318
Shell
A. The terror threat is increasing, domestic surveillance critical to avoid nuclear, biological,
and chemical attacks
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p.
929-30
The real problem with FISA, and even the Patriot Act, as they existed before the 2008 Amendments,
is that they remained rooted in a law enforcement approach to electronic surveillance. They tied the
government's counterterrorism efforts to individualized suspicion. Searches and wiretaps had to target
a specific individual already believed to be involved in harmful activity. But detecting al Qaeda
members who have no previous criminal record in the United States, and who are undeterred by the
possibility of criminal sanctions, requires the use of more sweeping methods. To prevent attacks
successfully, the government has to devote surveillance resources where there is a reasonable
chance that terrorists will appear or communicate, even if their specific identities remain unknown.
What if the government knew that there was a fifty percent chance that terrorists would use a certain
communications pipeline, such as e-mail provided by a popular Pakistani ISP, but that most of the
communications on that channel would not be linked to terrorism? An approach based on
individualized suspicion would prevent computers from searching through that channel for the
keywords or names that might suggest terrorist communications because there are no specific al
Qaeda suspects and thus no probable cause. Searching for terrorists depends on playing the
probabilities rather than individualized suspicion, just as roadblocks or airport screenings do. The
private owner of any website has detailed access to information about the individuals who visit the site
that he can exploit for his own commercial purposes, such as selling lists of names to spammers or
gathering market data on individuals or groups. Is the government's effort to find violent terrorists a less
legitimate use of such data? Individualized suspicion dictates the focus of law enforcement, but war
demands that our armed forces defend the country with a broader perspective. Armies do not meet a
"probable cause" requirement when they attack a position, fire on enemy troops, or intercept
enemy communications. The purpose of the criminal justice system is to hold a specific person
responsible for a discrete crime that has already happened. But focusing on individualized suspicion does
not make sense when the purpose of intelligence is to take action, such as killing or capturing members
of an enemy group, to prevent future harm to the nation from a foreign threat. FISA should be regarded as
a safe harbor that allows the fruits of an authorized search to be used for prosecution. Using FISA
sacrifices speed and breadth of information in favor of individualized suspicion, but it provides a path for
using evidence in a civilian criminal prosecution. If the President chooses to rely on his constitutional
authority alone to conduct warrantless searches, then he should generally use the information only for
military purposes. The primary objective of the NSA program is to "detect and prevent" possible al
Qaeda attacks on the United States, whether another attack like September 11; a bomb in apartment
buildings, bridges, or transportation hubs such as airports; or a nuclear, biological, or chemical
attack. These are not hypotheticals; they are all al Qaeda plots, some of which U.S. intelligence and
law enforcement agencies have already stopped. A President will want to use information gathered
by the NSA to deploy military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel to stop the next attack.
The price to pay for speed, however, is foregoing any future criminal prosecution. If the President wants
to use the NSA to engage in warrantless searches, he cannot use its fruits in an ordinary criminal
prosecution. Al Qaeda has launched a variety of efforts to attack the United States, and it intends to
8
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 9 of 318
continue them. The primary way to stop those attacks is to find and stop al Qaeda operatives, and
the best way to find them is to intercept their electronic communications. Properly understood, the
Constitution does not subject the government to unreasonable burdens in carrying out its highest duty of
protecting the nation from attack.
B. The impact is a global nuclear exchange

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for
Strategic Studies: New Zealand @ The Victoria University of Wellington, July 2010,
After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, Vol. 33 Issue 7)
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare
It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially

an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them .
not necessarily separable.
In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War
years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear
war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early
1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable
amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to
such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States,
it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups.
They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as
how
might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material
used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks ,40 and if for some
reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear
easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example,
material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al.
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its
radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable , and a wealth of information
that while the
can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some
if the act of nuclear terrorism

came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a
terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift
immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France,
and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short
list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at
what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In
particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China , and at a time when threats had
already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be
tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if
indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively,
the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they
were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the
present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a
period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the
pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the
Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia
and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath
of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the
countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In
such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible
attack?
also
9
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 10 of 318
Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to
use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to
preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would
probably still meet with a devastating response . As part of its initial response to the act
of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant
conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist
group and/or states seen to support that group . Depending on the identity and especially the
location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too
close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of
influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might
that
stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided
somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents . . . longstanding interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself
unable or unwilling to provide.
10
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 11 of 318
Links
11
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 12 of 318
General Surveillance Restriction Links

We must keep all intelligence tools to fight terror
John McLaughlin teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International

Studies. He was deputy director and acting director of the CIA from 2000 to 2004,
January 2, 2014, Washington Post, NSA Intelligence-Gathering Programs Keep us
Safe, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsa-intelligence-gatheringprograms-keep-us-safe/2014/01/02/0fd51b22-7173-11e3-8b3fb1666705ca3b_story.html
As our debate continues, the terrorist threat is not receding but transforming. The core leadership
of al-Qaeda has been degraded and remains under pressure, but robust al-Qaeda affiliates have
multiplied. With the decline of central government authority in the Middle East and North Africa
in the wake of the Arab Spring and the war in Syria, terrorists have the largest havens and areas
for operational planning in a decade. If anything, the atomization of the movement has made the
job of intelligence more labor-intensive, more detail-oriented and more demanding. Now is not
the time to give up any tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.
Surveillance is a critical tool needed to defeat terrorism

Alan Dershowitz, Harvard Law School, May 5, 2014, The Atlantic, No one opposes
all surveillance:; false equivalence on the NSA,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/false-equivalence-onsurveillance-from-alan-dershowitz/361694/ DOA: 2-22-15
Ourenemies,especiallythosewhotargetcivilians,haveonemajoradvantageoverus.Theyarenotconstrained
bymoralityorlegality.Wehaveanadvantageoverthem.Inadditiontooperatingundertheruleoflaw,wehave
developedthroughhardworkandextensiveresearchtechnologicaltoolsthatallowustomonitorandprevent
theirunlawfulandlethalactions.SuchtechnologicaltoolshelpedusbreaktheGermanandtheJapanese
codeduringtheSecondWorldWar.Theyhelpedusdefeatfascism.TheyhelpedusintheColdWar.And
theyarehelpingusnowinthehotwaragainstterroristswhowouldbombthistheateriftheyhadthecapacity
todoso.You'regoingtohearagainthatthereareonlyexcusesthatarebeingoffered,thatterrorismisreallynota
seriousproblem,orthatAmericanpolicyisasterroristicasthepolicyofalQaeda.Idon'tthinkyou'regoingto
acceptthatargument.Wemustnotsurrenderourtechnologicaladvantage.
Surveillance is one piece of the puzzle used to catch terrorists

General Keith Alexander, retired after 8 years as director of the NSA, May 15, New
Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greaterrisk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html DOA: 2-20-15
In January, President Obama claimed that the N.S.A. bulk-metadata program has disrupted
fifty-four terrorist plots. Senator Patrick Leahy said the real number is zero. Theres a big
difference between fifty-four and zero. Those [fifty-four events] were plots, funding, and
giving moneylike the Basaaly Moalin case, where the guy is giving money to someone to go
and do an attack. [Note: Moalins case is awaiting appeal.] Its fifty-four different events like that,
where two programsthe metadata program and the 702 programhad some play. I was
12
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 13 of 318
trying to think of the best way to illustrate what the intelligence people are trying to do. You
know Wheel of Fortune? Heres the deal: Im going to give you a set of big, long words to put
on there. Then Im going to give you some tools to guess the words. You get to pick a vowel or a
consonantone letter. Theres a hundred letters up there. Youll say, I dont have a clue. O.K., so
youve used your first tool in analysis. What the intelligence analysts are doing is using those
tools to build the letters, to help understand what the plot is. This is one of those tools. Its not
the only tool. And, at times, it may not be the best tool. It evolved from 9/11, when we didnt
have a tool that helped us connect the dots between foreign and domestic. Around 9/11, we
intercepted some of [the hijackers] calls, but we couldnt see where they came from. So
guys like [Khalid al-]Mihdhar, [one of the 9/11 hijackers who was living] in Californiawe
knew he was calling people connected to Al Qaeda in Yemen. But we thought he was in the
Middle East. We had no way to connect the dots. If you rewound 9/11, what you would have
done is tipped the F.B.I. that a guy who is planning a terrorist attack is in San Diego. You
may have found the other three groups that were with him.
13
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 14 of 318
Warrant Requirement Links

Warrantless surveillance necessary to combat Al Qaeda
903-4
It is al Qaeda's nature as a decentralized network that stresses the normal division between military
and intelligence surveillance and the warrant-based approach of the criminal justice system. The
Constitution vests the President with the executive power and designates him Commander-in-Chief.
The Framers understood these powers to invest the executive with the duty to protect the nation from
foreign attack and the right to control the conduct of military hostilities. To exercise those powers
effectively, the President must have the ability to engage in electronic surveillance that gathers
intelligence on the enemy. Regular military intelligence need not follow standards of probable cause
for a warrant or reasonableness for a search, just as the use of force against the enemy does not have
to comply with the Fourth Amendment. During war, military signals intelligence might throw out a
broad net to capture all communications within a certain area or by an enemy nation. Unlike the
criminal justice system, which seeks to detain criminals, protection of national security need not
rest on particularized suspicion of a specific individual.
Warrant requirement for national security decisions

undermines executive power needed for effective surveillance
904
This approach applies to national security activity that occurs within the United States as well as
outside it. In 1972, the Supreme Court refused to subject surveillance for national security purposes
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. But it has extended this protection to purely domestic
terrorist groups, out of concern that the government might use its powers to suppress political liberties.
Lower courts, however, have found that when the government conducts a search of a foreign power
or its agents, it need not meet the requirements that apply to criminal law enforcement. In a leading
1980 case, the Fourth Circuit held that "the needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign
intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would . . . unduly
frustrate the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities." A warrant requirement for
national security searches would reduce the flexibility of the executive branch, which possesses
"unparalleled expertise to make the decision whether to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance"
and is "constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs." A warrant
requirement would place national security decisions in the hands of the judiciary, which "is largely
inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that lie behind foreign intelligence
surveillance." Under this framework, Presidents conducted national security surveillance using their
executive authority for decades. President Nixon's abuses, however, led Congress to enact the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA replaced presidentially-ordered monitoring of
14
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 15 of 318
national security threats with a system similar to that used by law enforcement to conduct electronic
surveillance of criminal suspects, but with important differences to protect classified information. FISA
requires the government to show "probable cause" that a target is "an agent of a foreign power," which
includes terrorist groups. A special court of federal district judges, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), examines classified information in a closed, ex parte hearing before issuing the warrant.
15
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 16 of 318
Business Records/Section 2015/Email and Phone

Surveillance Restriction Links
Signals intelligence from business records needed to stop
WMD attacks
Stuart Taylor, April 29, 2014, The Big Snoop: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Terrorists, http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/the-big-snoop-print (is
an author, a freelance journalist, and a Brookings nonresident senior fellow. Taylor
has covered the Supreme Court for a variety of national publications, including The
New York Times, Newsweek, and National Journal, where he is also a contributing
editor. His published books include Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students
It's Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won't Admit It. In addition to his work as
a journalist and scholar, he is a graduate of Harvard Law School and practiced law in
a D.C. firm.) DOA: 2-25-15
Over the five years that she has been chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
Feinstein has seen more inside information on NSA activities than most of her
fellow lawmakers. She is convinced that, since the FISA reforms of the seventies
put safeguards and multiple layers of oversight in place, there has been no
evidence of the NSAs seriously violating those strictures. She is also convinced
that signals intelligence is, if anything, more indispensable than ever at a
time when human intelligencethat is, information from undercover U.S.
operatives operating abroad or inside hostile organizations like al Qaeda
is so hard to come by. That leads her to worry that curbs on the phone
records program might increase the exposure of Americans to danger from
terrorists and other enemies, perhaps including mass-casualty cyber,
biological, or even nuclear attacks.
Al Qaeda activity can be detected with email and phone record

surveillance
908-9
Members of the al Qaeda network can be detected, with good intelligence work or luck, by
examining phone and e-mail communications, as well as evidence of joint travel, shared assets,
common histories or families, meetings, and so on. As the time for an attack nears, "chatter" on
this network will increase as operatives communicate to coordinate plans, move and position assets,
and conduct reconnaissance of targets. When our intelligence agents successfully locate or capture an
al Qaeda member, they must be able to move quickly to follow new information to other operatives
before news of the capture causes them to disappear. The NSA database is particularly important
because it will point the way to al Qaeda agents within the United States, where they are closest to
their targets and able to inflict the most harm on civilians. The September 11 hijackers themselves
16
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 17 of 318
provide an example of the way that the NSA could use business record information to locate an al
Qaeda cell. Links suggested by commercially available data might have turned up ties between
every single one of the al Qaeda plotters and Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawar al Hazmi, the two
hijackers known to the CIA to have been in the country in the summer of 2001. Mihdhar and Hazmi had
rented apartments in their own names and were listed in the San Diego phone book. Both Mohammad
Atta, the leader of the September 11 al Qaeda cell, and Marwan al-Shehi, who piloted one of the planes
into the World Trade Center, had lived there with them. Hijacker Majed Moqed used the same frequent
flier number as Mihdhar; five hijackers used the same phone number as Atta when booking their
flights; the remaining hijackers shared addresses or phone numbers with one of those hijackers, Ahmed
Alghamdi, who was in the United States in violation of his visa at the time. Our intelligence agents, in
fact, had strong leads that could conceivably have led them to all of the hijackers before 9/11. CIA
agents had identified Mihdhar as a likely al Qaeda operative because he was spotted at a meeting in Kuala
Lumpur and mentioned in Middle East intercepts as part of an al Qaeda "cadre." Hazmi too was known as
likely to be al Qaeda. But in neither case was there enough evidence for a criminal arrest because they
had not violated any American laws. If our intelligence services had been able to track immediately
their cell phone calls and e-mail, it is possible that enough of the hijacking team could have been
rounded up to avert 9/11. Our task is much more difficult today, because we might not have even this
slender information in hand when the next al Qaeda plot moves toward execution.
Database needs to be broad to find terrorist cells

911-12
A critic, however, might argue that billions of innocent calling records are not "relevant" to a
terrorism investigation. Even if terrorist communications take place over the phone, that cannot justify the
collection of all phone call records in the United States, the vast majority of which have nothing to do
with the grounds for the search. The FISC rejected this argument because, to be useful, a database has
to be broad enough to find terrorist calls. "Because known and unknown international terrorist
operatives are using telephone communications, and because it is necessary to obtain the bulk
collection of a telephone company's metadata to determine those connections between known and
unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized investigations," the Court observed,
"the production of the information sought meets the standard for relevance under Section 215."
Aggregating calling records into a database, the court found, was necessary to find the terrorist
communications and the links between terrorists. It may not even be possible to detect the links unless
such a database is created. If a database is not comprehensive, in other words, then the government will
only be able to glimpse incomplete patterns of terrorist activity, if it can glimpse any at all.
Broad-based records approaches are often used in national

security cases
PROGRAMS, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, P 91112
Relevance is a slippery concept, but it cannot require that every piece of information obtained by
subpoena must contain information related to guilt. Even when grand juries subpoena the business
records or communications of a criminal suspect, it is likely that the large majority of the items will
17
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 18 of 318
not have any relationship to the crime. Nonetheless, a grand jury may subpoena all of a suspect's
financial records to find those that pertain to a criminal conspiracy. A different way to view the NSA's
telephone calling record program is that the "relevant" tangible "thing" is the database itself,
rather than any individual calling record.
Of course, the NSA program differs from a subpoena to a financial institution for the records of
a known criminal suspect. The amount of data collected by the NSA program is many orders of
magnitude greater, and hence the percentage of directly involved communications much smaller.
Also, unlike a regular subpoena, it is important to have as large a searchable database as possible
because the breadth will bring into the sharpest contrast the possible patterns of terrorist activity.
On the other hand, the magnitude of harm that the government seeks to prevent exceeds by several orders
that of regular crime. The magnitude of the harm should be taken into account in judging relevance as
well as the unprecedented difficulties of locating al Qaeda operatives disguised within the United States.
Mass records collection is needed to catch terrorists because

they are not all in one place
Joshua Kapstein, May 16, 2014, The NSA Can Collect it All,, but what would it do
with the data?, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/the-nsa-cancollect-it-all-but-what-will-it-do-with-our-data-next.html DOA: 2-23-15
The NSA and its allies are staunch defenders of these haystacks, even though
multiple studies concluded the database containing millions of Americans phone
records played little or no role in preventing terrorist attacks. Theyve countered
that its foolish to assume all terrorists hang out in one isolated section of the
Internet, therefore mass-collection becomes a necessary obsession to find that everelusive needle.
Business record 215 program has been used to stop a terror

attack
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31,
2013, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy
Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act) Surveillance Programs" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931
(First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for 13 years in the
Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January
3rd, 2011)
As you mentioned another instance when we used the business record 215
program, as Chairman Leahy mentioned, Basaaly Moalin. So initially the FBI opened
a case in 2003 based on a tip. We investigated that tip. We found no nexus to
terrorism and closed the case. In 2007 the NSA advised us, through the business
record 215 program, that a number in San Diego was in contact with an al-Shabab
and east -- al-Qaida east -- al-Qaida East Africa member in Somalia. We served legal
process to identify that unidentified phone number. We identified Basaaly Moalin.
Through further investigation, we identified additional co-conspirators, and Moalin
and three other individuals have been convicted -- and some pled guilty -- to
material support to terrorism.
18
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 19 of 318
Business records closes holes in intelligence in order to defeat

terrorism
3rd, 2011)
SEN. GRASSLEY: OK.
Mr. Joyce, one part of the balance that we have to strike, protecting privacy of
Americans -- the other part, national security. Thankfully, until the Boston bombing,
we had prevented large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil. I have a few
questions about how valuable the role of Section 215 and 702 programs have
played in predicting (sic) our national security. Two questions, and then I'll have to
stop and go to our colleagues. Can you describe any specific situations where
Section 215 and Section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack
or identify individuals planning to attack, the number of times? And then
secondly, if you didn't have the authority to collect phone records in bulk the way
that they are now under Section 215, how would you have affected those
investigations?
MR. JOYCE: So to your first question, Senator, as far as a specific example of
when we have utilized both of these programs is the one I had first
mentioned, the first al-Qaida-directed plot since 9/11, in September of
2009, when Najibullah Zazi and others conspired plot to bomb the New
York subway system. We initially found out about Zazi through an NSA 702
coverage, and he was actually talking to an al-Qaida courier who was -- he was
asking for his help to perfect an explosives recipe. So but for that, we would not
have known about the plot. We followed that up with legal process and then had
FISA coverage on him and others as we fully investigated the plot. Business
records 215 was also involved, as I had previously mentioned, where we also
through legal process were submitting legal process for telephone
numbers and other email addresses, other selectors. But NSA also
provided another number we are unaware of of a co-conspirator, Adis
Medunjanin. So that is an instance where a very serious plot to attack
America on U.S. soil that we used both these programs.
But I say, as Chairman Leahy mentioned, there is a difference in the utility of the
programs. But what I say to you is that each and every program and tool is
valuable. There were gaps prior to 9/11. And what we have collectively
tried to do, the members of the committee, other members of the other
oversight committees, the executive branch and the intelligence
community, is we have tried to close those gaps and close those seams.
And the business record 215 is one of those programs that we have closed
those seams. So I respectfully say to the chairman that the utility of that specific
19
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 20 of 318
program initially is not as valuable. I say you are right. But what I say is it plays a
crucial role in closing the gaps and seams that we fought hard to gain after the 9/11
attacks.
Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror

attacks
3rd, 2011)
SEN. FEINSTEIN: Good.
Now, the NSA has produced and declassified a chart, which I'd like to make
available to all members. It has the 54 total events. It includes a Section
702 authority and Section 215 authority, which essentially work together.
And it shows the events disrupted based on a combination of these two
programs, 13 in the homeland, 25 in Europe, five in Africa and 11 in Asia.
Now, I remember I was on the Intelligence Committee before 9/11, and I remember
how little information we have and the great criticism of the government because of
those stovepipes, the inability to share intelligence, the inability to collect
intelligence. We had no program that could've possibly caught two people in San
Diego before the event took place. I support this program. I think, based on what I
know, they will come after us. And I think we need to prevent an attack wherever
we can from happening. That doesn't mean that we can't make some changes.
Business records program has stopped many attacks

Rep. Mike Rogers, Miami Times (Florida), June 18, 2013, (Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich.,
is chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/18/nsa-mike-rogers-houseintelligence-committee-editorials-debates/2436541/ , DOA: 2-24-15
The gross distortion of two vital National Security Agency [NSA] programs is
dangerous and unfortunate. Neither program authorizes NSA to read e-mails
or listen to phone calls of American citizens. Both are constitutional with
numerous checks and balances by all three branches of government. They have
been authorized and overseen by Congress and presidents of both parties.
And they have produced vital intelligence, preventing dozens of terrorist
attacks around the world, including plots against New York City subways
and the New York Stock Exchange. The first program allows NSA to preserve a
limited category of business records. It preserves only phone numbers and the
date, time and duration of calls. It doesn't include any names or the
content of calls. These records can only be accessed when NSA is
investigating a foreign terrorist. If a foreign terrorist is found linked to an
20
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 21 of 318
American, the tip is passed to the FBI and requires a court order before additional
action can be taken. This is a critical tool for connecting the dots between
foreign terrorists plotting attacks in the U.S. The second program allows the
NSA to target foreigners overseas to collect certain foreign intelligence with court
approval. It doesn't create a "back door" to any company's server, and doesn't
authorize monitoring of U.S. citizens. No U.S. person anywhere in the world can be
intentionally monitored without a specific order. Any comparison to government
abuses in decades past is highly misleading. Today's programs are authorized in
law, with a thorough system of oversight and checks and balances in place, and a
court review not present in the past. Now each of the agencies has an inspector
general and general counsels who ensure that these authorities are exercised in
accordance with the law. The House and Senate each have Intelligence Committees
charged with overseeing these authorities. Additionally, electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes occurs with approval of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. None of these structures and protections was in place in the
1950s, '60s or '70s. These narrowly targeted programs are legal, do not invade
Americans' privacy, and are essential to detecting and disrupting future terrorist
attacks.
Metadata collection needed to cast a wide net

907-8
A. Phone Call Metadata Collection
Like business records, phone call metadata falls within Section 215's definition of tangible
items. Collection of such metadata relates to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism. Several investigations into al Qaeda plots remain open, as shown by the
repeated indictments against bomb plotters in the last five years. The examination of records also helps
protect the nation against terrorist attacks. According to the NSA, only the information contained in
the billing records is collected; the content of calls is not. There can be no First Amendment violation if
the content of the calls remains untouched. A critic might argue that the terms of the search are too broad
because ninety-nine percent of the calls are unconnected to terrorism. But an intelligence search, as
Judge Richard Posner has described it, "is a search for the needle in a haystack." Rather than focus on
foreign agents who are already known, counterterrorism agencies must search for clues among
millions of potentially innocent connections, communications, and links. "The intelligence services,"
Posner writes, "must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may enable the next
attack to be prevented." For this reason, the FISC approved the NSA program in 2006 and has
continued to renew it since.
21
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 22 of 318
Section 702 Programs Necessary to Defeat

Terrorism
Section 702 programs necessary to defeat terrorism
3rd, 2011)
SEN. GRASSLEY: OK.
Mr. Joyce, one part of the balance that we have to strike, protecting privacy of
Americans -- the other part, national security. Thankfully, until the Boston bombing,
we had prevented large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil. I have a few
questions about how valuable the role of Section 215 and 702 programs have
played in predicting (sic) our national security. Two questions, and then I'll have to
stop and go to our colleagues. Can you describe any specific situations where
Section 215 and Section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack or identify
individuals planning to attack, the number of times? And then secondly, if you
didn't have the authority to collect phone records in bulk the way that they are now
under Section 215, how would you have affected those investigations?
MR. JOYCE: So to your first question, Senator, as far as a specific example of
when we have utilized both of these programs is the one I had first
mentioned, the first al-Qaida-directed plot since 9/11, in September of
2009, when Najibullah Zazi and others conspired plot to bomb the New
York subway system. We initially found out about Zazi through an NSA 702
coverage, and he was actually talking to an al-Qaida courier who was -- he was
asking for his help to perfect an explosives recipe. So but for that, we would not
have known about the plot. We followed that up with legal process and then had
FISA coverage on him and others as we fully investigated the plot. Business
records 215 was also involved, as I had previously mentioned, where we also
through legal process were submitting legal process for telephone
numbers and other email addresses, other selectors. But NSA also
provided another number we are unaware of of a co-conspirator, Adis
Medunjanin. So that is an instance where a very serious plot to attack
America on U.S. soil that we used both these programs.
But I say, as Chairman Leahy mentioned, there is a difference in the utility of the
programs. But what I say to you is that each and every program and tool is
valuable. There were gaps prior to 9/11. And what we have collectively
tried to do, the members of the committee, other members of the other
oversight committees, the executive branch and the intelligence
community, is we have tried to close those gaps and close those seams.
And the business record 215 is one of those programs that we have closed
22
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 23 of 318
those seams. So I respectfully say to the chairman that the utility of that specific
program initially is not as valuable. I say you are right. But what I say is it plays a
crucial role in closing the gaps and seams that we fought hard to gain after the 9/11
attacks.
Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror

attacks
3rd, 2011)
SEN. FEINSTEIN: Good.
Now, the NSA has produced and declassified a chart, which I'd like to make
available to all members. It has the 54 total events. It includes a Section
702 authority and Section 215 authority, which essentially work together.
And it shows the events disrupted based on a combination of these two
programs, 13 in the homeland, 25 in Europe, five in Africa and 11 in Asia.
Now, I remember I was on the Intelligence Committee before 9/11, and I remember
how little information we have and the great criticism of the government because of
those stovepipes, the inability to share intelligence, the inability to collect
intelligence. We had no program that could've possibly caught two people in San
Diego before the event took place. I support this program. I think, based on what I
know, they will come after us. And I think we need to prevent an attack wherever
we can from happening. That doesn't mean that we can't make some changes.
Authority for PRISM is in section 702

James Carafano, 8-6, 13 Heritage Foundation, The Examiner (Washington, DC)m
August 6, 2013, PRISM is essential to U.S. security in war against terrorism (Vice
President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, PRISM
is Essential to US Security in the War on Terrorism,
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/8/prism-is-essential-to-ussecurity-in-war-against-terrorism DOA: 2-1-13
"Our intelligence professionals must be able to find out who the terrorists
are talking to, what they are saying, and what they're planning," said the
president. "The lives of countless Americans depend on our ability to monitor
these communications." He added that he would cancel his planned trip to Africa
unless assured Congress would support the counterterrorism surveillance program.
The president was not , Barack Obama. It was George W. Bush, in 2008, pressing
Congress to extend and update reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). He was speaking directly to the American public, in an address broadcast
live from the Oval Office. How times have changed. Back then, the President of the
United States willingly led the fight for the programs he thought necessary to keep
23
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 24 of 318
the nation safe. Now, our president sends underlings to make the case. In distancing
himself from the debate over PRISM (the foreign intelligence surveillance program
made famous by the world- travelling leaker , Edward Snowden), , President Obama
followed the precedent he established in May at the National Defense University.
There, he spoke disdainfully of drone strikes, the authorization to use military force
against terrorists, and the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay. All three are
essential components of his counterterrorism strategy. In distancing himself from his
own strategy, , Obama hoped to leave the impression that he is somehow above it
all. He has dealt with the Snowden case the same way. When asked while traveling
in Africa if he would take a role in going after the leaker, the president replied "I
shouldn't have to." The White House's above-it-all attitude sends seriously mixed
messages to the American people, who are trying to figure if the government's
surveillance programs are legal and appropriate. Congress has not been much
better. The authority for PRISM is in FISA Section 702. Congress debated
these authorities in 2007 and again when the program was reauthorized in 2008.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., surely remembers the controversy. He
wrote President Bush: "There is no crisis that should lead you to cancel your trip to
Africa. But whether or not you cancel your trip, Democrats stand ready to negotiate
a final bill, and we remain willing to extend existing law for as short a time or as
long a time as is needed to complete work on such a bill." Evidently, Reid must have
felt the authorities granted under Section 702 received a full and sufficient hearing.
Most current members of Congress were seated under the dome during the 2008
debates. They had every opportunity not just to read the law, but to be briefed on
the program by intelligence officials before voting on the bill. For them to act
shocked at the scope of the program today rings about as hollow as , Obama's
expressed disdain for the operations he oversees. The reality is that Congress and
the administration share responsibility for these programs. If they want to change or
modify them, who's stopping them? If changes are made, however, they should to
be made for the right reason. Leaders must never compromise our security for
political expediency. At least 60 Islamist-inspired terrorist plots have been
aimed at the U.S. since the 9/11 attacks. The overwhelming majority have
been thwarted thanks to timely, operational intelligence about the
threats. Congress should not go back to a pre-/11 set of rules just to appeal to
populist sentiment. Congress and the White House have an obligation to protect our
liberties and to safeguard our security -- in equal measure. Meeting that mission is
more important than winning popularity polls.
24
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 25 of 318
Prism Restrictions Link

Prism necessary to get to emails to counter threats
Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and the CIA, May 5, 2014, Michael
Haydens Unwitting Case Against Secret Surveillance,
ihttp://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/michael-haydens-unwittingcase-against-secret-surveillance/361689/ DOA: 2-19-15
Actually,youneedtogobackandlookatthewholemovie.Youneedtoseewhatwentonbefore.Becauseifyou
knowwhatwentonbeforeyoumayhaveadifferentinterpretationofwhatyouthinkthebutlerisguiltyof.There
arethreeorfourthingsthathappenthatNSAandalltheseorganizationshavetriedtosolve.Enormousvolume.
Howdoyouconductsignalsintelligencetokeepyousafeinatsunamiofglobalcommunications?Well,the
answertothatisbulkcollectionofmetadata.Anotherissuethat'soutthereprominentlyisNSAismuckingabout
inthoseglobaltelecommunicationgridsthathaveyouremails.NoonecomplainedwhenNSAwasdoingSoviet
strategicmicrowaverocketsignals.Well,theequivalentofthoseSovietmicrowavesignalsareproliferator,
terrorist,narcotrafficker,moneylaundereremails,coexistingwithyoursandmine,outthereinGmail.And
ifyouwantNSAtocontinuetodowhatitwasdoing,orCSECtocontinuetodowhatit'sdoing,whatithadbeen
doingtokeepyousafe,it'sgottobeinthestreamwhereyourdatais.There'sacoupleotherthingstoo.After9/11,
theenemywasinsidemycountry.That'sthe215program,metadata.Whomightbeaffiliatedwithterrorists
insidetheUnitedStates?Andfinally,whentheenemywasn'tinmycountryhiscommunicationswere.It'san
accidentofhistory,butit'safact,mostemailsresideonserversintheUnitedStates.Theyshouldnotdeserve
constitutionalprotectioniftheemail'sfromabadmaninPakistancommunicatingtoabadmaninYemen.Andthe
Prismprogramiswhatallowedustogetthoseemailstokeepeveryonesafe.There'salotmoretotalkaboutbut
you'regoingtostartclappinginaboutnineseconds.SoI'mgoingtogobacktothepodium.
PRISM has contributed to actionable intelligence in the fight

against terrorism
a D.C. firm.)
The PRISM program poses an even trickier version of the cost/benefit question: it is
easier to justify its efficacy, but because it goes after the contents of
messages, not just their origin and destination, it is more intrusive on the
liberties of the people whose communications it scoops up. Moreover, while
PRISM is more restrictive in its formal mandate (i.e., it is targeted only at foreign
bad actors), in practice it does pry incidentally into the Internet traffic of
many law-abiding U.S. citizens.
25
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 26 of 318
Yet theres no denying that PRISMs mining of emails and other Internet
messages has produced a mother lode of useful information. An internal
NSA document leaked by Snowden described the program as the most
prolific contributor to the Presidents Daily Brief and the NSAs leading
source of raw material, accounting for nearly one in seven [of all the
intelligence communitys secret] reports. More to the point, PRISM has
often contributed to the collection of actionable intelligence used in the
fight against terrorism. Even Wyden, the NSAs strongest congressional critic,
acknowledges as much. He and his ally on the surveillance issue, Senator Mark
Udall (D-Colo.), said in a joint statement last summer that multiple terrorist plots
have been disrupted at least in part because of information obtained under Section
702.
26
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 27 of 318
Reduced Encryption Cracking Links

Encryption cracking necessary to prevent terrorism
Network World, September 19, 2013, NSA wants even closer partnership with
tech industry;
NSA's Debora Plunkett says NSA's now is real-time automated information sharing
on a large scale, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/091913-nsa-techindustry-274011.html DOA: 2-1-15
The National Security Agency's director of information assurance today said the
"way to achieve confidence in cyberspace" is to increase collaboration
between the government and the high-tech industry -- remarks that rang
ironic given former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's revelations about how NSA
works with industry. NSA documents leaked by Snowden showed that the NSA's
goal is to build backdoors into commercial products and weaken
encryption to make it easier for surveillance, allegations that the U.S.
government has not even tried to refute. When asked about that today, NSA
director of information assurance Debora Plunkett, who gave the keynote address at
the New York Institute of Technology Cyber Security Conference here, flatly refused
to discuss the topic. But her keynote address was intended to get hardware and
software vendors to work in ever-closer partnership with the NSA. Cyberattacks
that could take electricity grids offline and disrupt transportation systems
are possible, Plunkett said in her keynote, pointing out the destructive attack that
hit Saudi Aramco last year and impacted data systems there. [RELATED: Reported
NSA actions raise serious questions about tech industry partnerships MORE: Black
Hat: Top 20 hack-attack tools] It's a simple matter to hire hacking services to carry
out attacks such as denial-of-service, she said, and the fear now is of "integrity
attacks" that would destroy or alter critical data. These are all "cyber security
challenges," she noted, and the government today is largely dependent on
commercial hardware and software for which the NSA itself cannot "provide
indemnification." NSA's needs industry's help, she said. Plunkett said "we have to
have a community come together" to collaborate on security in mobility and the
cloud especially. The NSA expects that the future of network security lies in
"more automated cyber defense" based on "large-scale automation" that
would reduce the need for manpower where there would be more realtime sharing of findings. She said there's a need for collaboration with ISPs and
hardware companies to achieve all of this. "We have to build a close partnership,"
she said, adding, there can be "confidence in cyberspace" if "we stay the course."
Plunkett is a 29-year veteran of the NSA who worked her way up through the ranks
to have a hand in guiding strategic direction for the agency, which carries out
surveillance to help defend the country against cyberthreats. But NSA documents
recently leaked by Snowden show that the NSA views its partnership with industry
in part as a way to subvert security in commercial products and services to make
cyber-spying easier. This revelation casts NSA's call for industry partnership and its
insistence that there can be "confidence in cyberspace" in a questionable light.
27
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 28 of 318
Increasing Transparency Links

Increasing transparency increases terrorism risks because
terrorists can take advantage of the information
SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY (R-IA), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight
of FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931
Finally, increased transparency is a worthy goal in general. And as I suggested
before, whenever we can talk about these programs, I think there's less questions
out there in the minds of people, and we probably created some public relations
problems for us and for this program and for our national security community
because maybe we haven't made enough information available. I say that
understanding that we can't tell our enemies what we -- what tools we use. But if
we consider any reform that may bring more transparency to the FISA process, we
should keep in mind, then, that every piece of information we make available to the
public will be read by a determined adversary, and that adversary has already
demonstrated the capacity to kill thousands of Americans, even on our own soil.
28
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 29 of 318
Mass Surveillance Critical to Prevent Terrorism

Surveillance necessary to prevent ISIS attacks
Isis threat justifies greater surveillance

powers in UK, says Liam Fox
Guardian, June 22, 2014 ,
Former defence secretary says first duty of state is to protect citizens and public will
accept greater monitoring powers
Britain's security services may need to be given greater powers of
surveillance to monitor extremists from Isis when they return home to Britain
from Iraq and Syria, the former defence secretary Liam Fox has said. A majority of
people will accept that an "ideological battle" means that the authorities will
need greater powers to intercept the communications of extremists, Fox
said. The former defence secretary, who was speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on
BBC1, said that Britain should offer to put its airbases at the disposal of the US to
avoid "horrendous" situation in Iraq as Isis forces pose a threat to Baghdad. Fox
said: "There are those who say if we don't get involved, if we hunker down then we
will be fine. There will be no backlash. That is utterly, utterly wrong because the
jihadists don't hate us because of what we do. They hate us because of who we are.
We can't change that. It is our values and our history that they detest more than
anything else." Fox said that the authorities could deprive British citizens returning
from Syria and Iraq of their passports. But he said that the greatest effort should
go towards increasing the power of the state to monitor the
communications of extremists. He said: "We have the security services to
ensure that they [extremists] are watched and that they don't pose a greater
threat." Asked whether the powers of the security services were insufficient, the
former defence secretary said: "That is a real question that we are going to have to
ask - whether the security services have adequate resources for an increased
threat. "That is a question politicians will have to take into account in judgments on
spending allocations but also do the powers they have reflect the increasing
[threat]? You've got people in the light of Snowden saying that the state has too
many powers and we have to restrict the powers of the state." Asked which powers
the state should be given, Fox said: "The whole areas of intercept that need to be
looked at. We have got a real debate, and it is a genuine debate in a democracy,
between the libertarians who say the state must not get too powerful and pretty
much the rest of us who say the state must protect itself." Asked whether this
meant more surveillance and increasing the manpower of the security services, he
said: "If required is the first duty of the state to protect its citizens ... it is a
real worry and it is a problem that is going to be with us for a very long time. At
heart it is an ideological battle and we have to realise that we have to win the
ideological battle as well." The remarks by Fox suggests that some figures,
particularly on the right, will use the success of extremists in Iraq to challenge the
claim by Edward Snowden that the state has amassed too many powers of
surveillance. Snowden leaked a series of NSA files to the former Guardian journalist
Glenn Greenwald last year.
29
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 30 of 318
Five reasons 9-11 proves surveillance is needed to prevent

terror attacks
ReportandRecommendationsofthePresidentsReviewGrouponIntelligence,December2013,Libertyand
SecurityinaChangingWorld,December12,http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/201312
12_rg_final_report.pdf
The September 11 attacks were a vivid demonstration of the need for

detailed information about the activities of potential terrorists. This was
so for several reasons.First, some information, which could have been useful,
was not collected and other information, which could have helped to
prevent the attacks, was not shared among departments.Second, the scale
of damage that 21st-century terrorists can inflict is far greater than
anything that their predecessors could have imagined. We are no longer
dealing with threats from firearms and conventional explosives, but with the
possibility of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices and
biological and chemical agents. The damage that such attacks could inflict on
the nation, measured in terms of loss of life, economic and social disruption, and the
consequent sacrifice of civil liberties, is extraordinary. The events of September 11
brought this home with crystal clarity.Third, 21st-century terrorists operate
within a global communications network that enables them both to hide
their existence from outsiders and to communicate with one another
across continents at the speed of light. Effective safeguards against terrorist
attacks require the technological capacity to ferret out such communications in an
international communications grid.Fourth, many of the international terrorists
that the United States and other nations confront today cannot realistically
be deterred by the fear ofpunishment. The conventional means of preventing
criminal conductthe fear of capture and subsequent punishmenthas relatively
little role to play in combating some contemporary terrorists. Unlike the situation
during the Cold War, in which the Soviet Union was deterred from launching a
nuclear strike against the United States in part by its fear of a retaliatory
counterattack, the terrorist enemy in the 21st-century is not a nation state against
which the United States and its allies can retaliate with the same effectiveness. In
such circumstances, detection in advance is essential in any effort to provide for
the common defence.Fifth, the threat of massive terrorist attacks involving
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons can generate a chilling and
destructive environment of fear and anxiety among our nations citizens. If
Americans came to believe that we are infiltrated by enemies we cannot identify
and who have the power to bring death, destruction, and chaos to our lives on a
massive scale, and that preventing such attacks is beyond the capacity of our
government, the quality of national life would be greatly imperiled. Indeed, if a
similar or even more devastating attack were to occur in the future, there
would almost surely be an impulse to increase the use of surveillance
technology to prevent further strikes, despite the potentially corrosive
effects on individual freedom and self-governance.In the years after the
attacks of September 11, a former cabinet member suggested a vivid analogy. He
compared the task of stopping the next terrorist attack to a goalie in a soccer
game who must stop every shot, for if the enemy scores a single goal, the
terrorists succeed. Tomake matters worse, the goalie cannot see the ballit is
30
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 31 of 318
invisible. So are the playershe doesnt know how many there are, or where they
are, or what they look like. Indeed, the invisible players might shoot the ball from
the front of the goal, or from the back, or from some other directionthe goalie just
doesnt know.Although the analogy might be overstated, it is no surprise that
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the government turned to a much
more aggressive form of surveillance in an effort to locate and identify potential
terrorists and prevent future attacks before they could occur. One thing seemed
clear: If the government was overly cautious in its efforts to detect and prevent
terrorist attacks, the consequences for the nation could be disastrous.
Surveillance critical to disrupt clandestine terrorist operations

12_rg_final_report.pdfDOA:1114
In the American tradition, the word security has had multiple meanings. In
contemporary parlance, it often refers to nationalsecurityor homelandsecurity. Thus
understood, it signals the immense importance of counteracting threats that come
from those who seek to do the nation and its citizens harm. One of the
governments most fundamental responsibilities is to protect this form of
security, broadly understood. Appropriately conducted and properly disciplined,
surveillance can help to eliminate important national security risks. It has
helped to save lives in the past. It will help to do so in the future.In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it should not be necessary
to belabor this point. By their very nature, terrorist attacks tend to involve
covert, decentralized actors who participate in plots that may not be easy
to identify or disrupt. Surveillance can protect, and has protected, against
such plots.
The wider the surveillance net, the more effective the

surveillance
12_rg_final_report.pdfDOA:1114
When public officials acquire information, they seek to reduce risks, above
all risks to national security. If the government is able to obtain access to a
great deal of information, it should be in a better position to mitigate
serious threats of violence. And if the goal is to reduce such threats, a
wide net seems far better than a narrow one, even if the government ends
up acquiring a great deal of information that it does not need or want. As
technologies evolve, it is becoming increasingly feasible to cast that wide net. In the
future, the feasibility of pervasive surveillance will increase dramatically. From the
standpoint of risk reduction, that prospect has real advantages.
NSA surveillance has disrupted more than 50 terror plots

31
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 32 of 318
USA Today, JUN 07, 2013,

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secretprograms-terror-plots/2434193/
NSA: Surveillance foiled 50 terror plots By: Kevin Johnson, DOA: 1-1-14
Director says NYSE was among targets
Section: News, Pg. 05a
National Security Agency Director Keith Alexander told a House committee
Tuesday that more than 50 terror threats throughout the world have been
disrupted with the assistance of two secret surveillance programs that
were recently disclosed by former defense contractor Edward Snowden. More than
10 of the plots targeted the U.S. homeland, Alexander told the House Intelligence
Committee, including a plan to attack the New York Stock Exchange. "I would much
rather be here today debating this," Alexander said, "than explaining why we were
unable to prevent another 9/11" attack.
At the rare open committee hearing, Alexander and Deputy Attorney General
Jim Cole told lawmakers that both surveillance operations -- a domestic
telephone tracking system that collects records of millions of Americans and an
Internet monitoring program targeting non-citizens outside the U.S. -- have been
subject to rigorous oversight to guard against privacy abuses. "This isn't
some rogue operation that some guys at the NSA are operating," Alexander
said. Deputy FBI Director Sean Joyce told the committee about a threat that was
neutralized by the programs: Investigators used the phone-tracking system to
identify an operative in San Diego who was providing support to terrorists
in Somalia.
Joyce also referred to two disrupted plots that were disclosed last week as
having been thwarted by the surveillance operations, including a 2009
plan to bomb the New York subway system. In that case, authorities used
NSA's Internet monitoring program to identify overseas communications involving
Najibullah Zazi in Colorado, who was later convicted in connection with the subway
attack plan.
"This is not a program that is off the books," Cole said, outlining the executive,
legislative and judicial controls. In the plot against the stock exchange, Joyce said
investigators identified a former New York accountant working with contacts in
Yemen who were in the early stages of planning an assault. Joyce did not name the
man. In court documents, however, he is identified as Sabirhan Hasanoff, 37, who
pleaded guilty last year to providing support to al-Qaeda. Hasanoff was not charged
in a plot against the stock exchange, but prosecutors, while arguing for a harsh
prison sentence, alleged in court documents that he "cased the New York Stock
Exchange" at the direction of a terror leader in Yemen. Hasanoff's attorney was not
immediately available for comment. Lawmakers raised few questions about the
intelligence officials' authority to conduct the operations, despite the heated
national privacy debate that was prompted by Snowden's disclosures. Rep. Mike
Rogers, R-Mich., the panel's chairman, said the programs were "designed" to protect
Americans. Maryland Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, the committee's ranking
Democrat, said Snowden's unauthorized disclosures "put our country and allies in
danger."
Intelligence gathering critical to defeat terrorism

32
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 33 of 318
Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Senior Legal Research Fellow, 2004

["The Patriot Act Reader," w/ Alane Kochems & James Jay Carafano, 9/20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?
url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=69895]
As should be clear from the outline of the scope of the problem, the suppression of
terrorism will not be accomplished by military means alone. Rather, effective law
enforcement and/or intelligence gathering activity are the key to avoiding
new terrorist acts. Recent history supports this conclusion. In fact, police have arrested more terrorists than military operations have
captured or killed. Police in more than 100 countries have arrested more than 3,000 al-Qaedalinked suspects, while the military captured some 650
enemy combatants. Equally important, it is policing of a different formpreventative rather than reactive, since there is less value in punishing terrorists
after the fact when, in some instances, they are willing to perish in the attack. The foregoing understanding of the nature of the threat from terrorism
helps to explain why the traditional law enforcement paradigm needs to be modified (or, in some instances, discarded) in the context of terrorism
The traditional law enforcement model is highly protective of civil

liberty in preference to physical security. All lawyers have heard one or
another form of the maxim that it is better that 10 guilty go free than
that one innocent be mistakenly punished. This embodies a fundamentally moral judgment that when it
investigations.
comes to enforcing criminal law, American society, in effect, prefers to have many more Type II errors (false negatives) than it does Type I errors (false
positives). That preference arises from two interrelated grounds. One is the historical distrust of government that, as already noted, animates many critics
of the Patriot Act. But the other is, at least implicitly, a comparative valuation of the social costs attending the two types of error. We value liberty
sufficiently highly that we see a great cost in any Type I error. And though we realize that Type II errors free the guilty to return to the general population,
thereby imposing additional social costs on society, we have a common-sense understanding that those costs, while significant, are not so substantial that
The postSeptember 11th

world changes this calculus in two ways. First, and most obviously, it changes
the cost of the Type II errors. Whatever the cost of freeing mob boss John
Gotti or sniper John Muhammad might be, they are substantially less than
the potentially horrific costs of failing to stop the next al-Qaeda assault.
Thus, the theoretical rights-protective construct under which our law
enforcement system operates must, of necessity, be modified to meet the
new reality. We simply cannot afford a rule that better 10 terrorists go free than
that one innocent be mistakenly punished. Second, and less obviously, it changes
the nature of the Type I errors that must be considered. In the traditional law
enforcement paradigm, the liberty interest at stake is personal libertythat is,
freedom from the unjustified application of governmental force. We have as a model
the concept of an arrest, the seizure of physical evidence, or the search of a
tangible place. As we move into the Information Age, and deploy new
technology to assist in tracking terrorists, that model is no longer wholly valid.
they threaten large numbers of citizens or core structural aspects of the American polity.
33
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 34 of 318
Domestic Anti-Terrorism Key

DOMESTIC ANTITERRORISM IS KEY- IT'S THE LINCHPIN TO ALL
OTHER STRATEGIES
Michael Massing, Journalist, 2001
[The American Prospect, " Home-Court Advantage: What the War on Drugs Teaches
Us about the War on Terrorism, 12/3, 12: 21, http://prospect.org/article/home-courtadvantage]
Might not the same be true with terrorism? There is no treatment analogy, of
course. But if our main goal is to prevent future terrorist attacks, wouldn't it be more
effective to concentrate our enforcement efforts here, in the United States, instead
of operating on the hostile terrain of the Middle East? In all the talk about
unleashing the CIA, it's often overlooked that the perpetrators of September 11
had been living in this country for years. In detecting and rooting out
terrorists, shouldn't we tend primarily to our own backyard? The Home
Team Emphasizing prevention at home would offer a number of advantages.
First, it's much easier to carry out undercover work here than abroad.
Agents face fewer hazards in San Diego, Trenton, and Boca Raton than they do in
Beirut, Cairo, or Peshawar. And we have many more resources here. In
addition to the FBI and other federal agencies, thousands of local police
officers are working on terrorism in cities across the country. In the drug
war, the local police have led the way in dismantling drug gangs, and they could
make a similar contribution toward uprooting terrorist networks. Furthermore, when
it comes to obtaining "HUMINT"--the critical "human intelligence" collected
by investigative agencies--the millions of loyal American Muslims living in
this country would seem a far more fruitful source than Islamic
fundamentalists in the Middle East. Finally, concentrating on domestic law
enforcement would avoid the types of covert actions that have proved so
costly and embarrassing in the past.
34
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 35 of 318
Counterterrorism Generally Effective

Efforts to track-down and arrest terrorists are effective
HeritageFoundation,August2011,HomelandSecurity2010,http://www.heritage.org/Events/2011/08/Terror
Trends?query=Terrorism+by+the+Numbers:+Understanding+U.S+and+Global+Trends
A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and after the demise of Osama bin Laden,
looking back is as important as looking forward, in order to learn from the past and to
examine the current and future threats facing the United States. Domestically, since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, at least 40 terror plots against
the U.S. have been foiled thanks to domestic and international cooperation,
as well as efforts to track down terror leads in local communities. Likewise, on
a global scale, from 1969 to 2009, there were a staggering 38,345 terrorist incidents
around the world, with nearly 3,000 targeted at the United States alone. These
numbers serve as a reminder that terrorists have not relented in their desire to
harm the United States and its people America needs to remain vigilant.
Join us as our panelists discuss the nature of the terrorist threat to the United States
and U.S. counterterrorism policy since 9/11.
Existing US counterterrorism efforts effective

Bergen, et al, September 2013, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat
%20Assesment_0.pdf PeterBergenistheauthoroffourbooksaboutalQaeda,threeofwhichwereNewYorkTimesbestsellers.Thebookshave
beentranslatedinto20languages.HeisthedirectoroftheNationalSecurityProgramattheNewAmericaFoundationinWashington,D.C.;afellowatFordham
UniversitysCenteronNationalSecurity;andCNNsnationalsecurityanalyst.HehasheldteachingpositionsattheKennedySchoolofGovernmentatHarvard
UniversityandattheSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudiesatJohnsHopkinsUniversity.BruceHoffmanisaprofessoratGeorgetownUniversitysEdmundA.
WalshSchoolofForeignService,whereheisalsothedirectorofboththeCenterforSecurityStudiesandtheSecurityStudiesProgram.Hepreviouslyheldthe
corporatechairincounterterrorismandcounterinsurgencyattheRANDCorporationandwasthescholarinresidenceforcounterterrorismattheCIAbetween2004
and2006.MichaelHurleyisthepresidentofTeam3iLLC,aninternationalstrategycompany,andadvisestheBipartisanPolicyCentersHomelandSecurity
Project.Heledthe9/11Commissionscounterterrorismpolicyinvestigation,aswellasCIApersonnelinAfghanistanimmediatelyafterthe9/11attacks.Heretired
fromtheCIAfollowinga25yearcareerandhasservedasdirectorontheNationalSecurityCouncilstaff.ErrollSouthersistheassociatedirectorofresearch
transitionattheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritysNationalCenterforRiskandEconomicAnalysisofTerrorismEvents(CREATE)attheUniversityofSouthern
California,whereheisanadjunctprofessorintheSolPriceSchoolofPublicPolicy.HeisaformerFBIspecialagentandwasPresidentBarackObamasnomineefor
theTransportationSecurityAdministration,aswellasGovernorArnoldSchwarzeneggersdeputydirectorfortheCaliforniaOfficeofHomelandSecurityandthe
chiefofhomelandsecurityandintelligencefortheLAXPoliceDepartment.HeistheauthorofHomegrownViolentExtremism.)
Asdetailedabove,alQaedahasweakenedconsiderablyoverthepastfewyears,whileU.S.defenseshavebeen
strengthened.Justconsiderthefollowingchangessincethe9/11attacks:
On9/11,therewere16peopleonthenoflylist.Nowtherearemorethan20,000.
In2001,therewere32JointTerrorismTaskForcefusioncenterswheremultiplelawenforcementagencieswork
togethertochasedownleadstobuildterrorismcases. Nowthereare103.
Adecadeago,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,NationalCounterterrorismCenter,TransportationSecurity
Administration,U.S.NorthernCommand,andU.S.CyberCommanddidntexist.Allofthesenewinstitutionscurrently
makeitmuchharderforterroriststooperateintheUnitedStates.
Before9/11,SpecialOperationsForceswererarelydeployedagainstalQaedaandalliedgroups.Nowtheyperform
nearlyadozenoperationseverydayinAfghanistan,aswellasmissionsinothercountriessuchasYemenandSomalia.
Atthebeginningofthe21stcentury,theAmericanpublicdidntcomprehendthethreatposedbyjihadistterrorists,butthat
changeddramaticallyafter9/11.InDecember2001,itwaspassengerswhodisabledRichardReid,theshoebomber. Similarly,
itwasfellowpassengerswhotackledUmarFaroukAbdulmutallab,theunderwearbomber,eightyearslater. Andthefollowing
35
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 36 of 318
year,itwasastreetvendorwhospottedthebombladenSUVFaisalShahzadhadparkedinTimesSquare.
Before9/11,theCIAandtheFBIbarelycommunicatedabouttheirrespectiveinvestigationsofterroristgroups.Nowthey
worktogetherquiteclosely.
TheU.S.intelligencebudgetgrewdramaticallyafter9/11,givingthegovernmentlargeresourceswithwhichtoimproveits
counterterrorismcapabilities.In2010,theUnitedStatesspentmorethan$80billiononintelligencecollectionandothercovert
activities,atotalmorethanthreetimeswhatitspentin1998.
36
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 37 of 318
Intelligence Critical to National Security

Intelligence failure responsible for Pearl Harbor
a D.C. firm.)
Beginning in the second half of the 19th century, however, technological advances
made it easier for the government to search and seize the contents of private
communications without citizens knowledge, thus depriving them of the ability to
object. Wiretapping is almost as old as the telegraph, going back at least
to the Civil War. Phone tapping has been an instrument of law
enforcement and counterespionage since the beginning of the 20th
century. An early instance of it was useful in probing the intentions of real
and potential foreign enemies. In the first months of 1917, the British
intercepted, decoded, and passed to Washington the Zimmermann
telegram: a proposal from the Kaiser Wilhelm IIs foreign minister to the
Mexican government promising that if Mexico allied itself with Germany in
the event that the United States entered World War I on the side of the
Allies, Germany would reward it with the return of formerly Mexican
territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The revelation helped stoke
support for Congresss declaration of war that April.
However, once the war had ended, President Herbert Hoovers secretary of state,
Henry Stimson, famously shut down the Black Chamber, a precursor of the NSA,
which had begun intercepting and decoding foreign diplomats cables in peacetime,
too. Gentlemen, Stimson harrumphed, dont read each others mail. Others in
the U.S. government were not so nave. By the late thirties, Army and Navy
intelligence officers, aided by civilian experts and technicians, were
decoding diplomatic cables from Tokyo. By New Years Day 1941, they
were picking up hints that Japan was preparing to attack the United States.
But there was a failure of what today would be called connecting the
dots. As a result, the nations leadersincluding Stimson, who was then
Franklin Roosevelts secretary of wartook no action to protect the Pacific
Fleet. Senator Feinstein, the daughter of an air raid warden in San Francisco, was 8
years old in December that year. Pearl Harbor, she feels, engendered her hawkish
views on national security and intelligence. She remembers the blackout after the
attack and a submarine net draped across the Golden Gate to prevent the Japanese
from sneaking into San Francisco Bay.
Joel Brenner views that national trauma as a reminder that the nations most
damaging intelligence scandals pertain not to over-zealousness, but to its opposite,
37
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 38 of 318
the failure to collect or understand critical information in time to identify a threat

and provide enough advance warning to prepare for it or, better yet, preempt it.
Intelligence necessary to protect against WMD proliferation

and terrorism
The national security threats facing the United States and our allies are
numerous and significant, and they will remain so well into the future.
These threats include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and cyber espionage and warfare. A robust foreign
intelligence collection capability is essential if we are to protect ourselves
against such threats. Because our adversaries operate through the use of
complex communications technologies, the National Security Agency, with
its impressive capabilities and talented officers, is indispensable to
keeping our country and our allies safe and secure.
UNFETTERED INTELLIGENCE IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT

TERRORISM
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, National Commission on Terrorism Chair, 2000
["New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them," 7/31,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl678.cfm]
It is obvious that there is no substitute for good intelligence if you are going
to have an effective counterterrorist policy. I have worked in and around
government for 35 years now, and I have never seen a field in which
intelligence is more central to good policy and intelligence is more difficult
to get than in the field of terrorism. If you don't have good intelligence on
terrorists, you simply don't have an effective counterterrorist policy and,
most of all, you cannot prevent attacks. After all, the basic objective of
counterterrorism is to stop the attacks before they happen.
INTELLIGENCE VITAL TO THWARTING TERRORISM

Fernando Reinares, Department of Politics and Sociology, Universidad Nacional de
Education a Distancia, Madrid, War on Terrorism, ed. Alan ODay, 2004, p. 226-7
Given the clandestine and unpredictable nature of terrorism, however, all these
resources may not be effective unless they are accompanied by mechanisms for
detecting and preventing future threats. Reliable intelligence is an essential tool.
Experience shows that, as long as the other components function as they
should, success in the states counter-terrorism campaign is directly
proportional to the emphasis placed on the gathering and analyzing of
reliable information. On the contrary, when intelligence is insufficient or
inadequate, the terrorist group may sense the window of opportunity they are being
offered and will not hesitate to exploit this advantage by escalating its campaign of
38
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 39 of 318
insurgent violence. In 1976, for reasons that have never been sufficiently clarified,
the Italian Government decided to dismantle the special anti-terrorist units it had
created only a few years earlier and ordered far-reaching reorganization of its secret
services. Terrorist attacks, which until then had been diminishing in frequency,
immediately began to pick up and did not ease again until the early 1980s. Not
coincidentally, by that time, revamped intelligence services put under greater
supervisory control of the legislative and executive branches, had begun to produce
results.
39
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 40 of 318
Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Genocide

Intelligence necessary to prevent human trafficking and mass
atrocities
Intelligence is designed not only to protect against threats but also to safeguard a
wide range of national security and foreign policy interests, including
counterintelligence, counteracting the international elements oforganized crime,
and preventing drug trafficking, human trafficking, and mass atrocities.
40
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 41 of 318
A2: Terrorists No Longer Use Email

Terrorists still communicate via email
NSA and GCHQ

mass surveillance a waste of time, says Edward Snowden
Alastair Stevenson , Computer Reseller News UK, June 24, 2014,
"The top spy in the US - the director of National Intelligence James Clapper - stated
in a private meeting that was later reported in the press, that regardless of their
fears, terrorists and criminals have to communicate. And when they do,
they will always make mistakes and give us ways to find them," he said.
"For example, we've all known about telephone wire taps for years now,
but criminals still use them. We know about internet surveillance, but we still
use email because it's critical to our lives. We have ways to monitor them."
41
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 42 of 318
Signal Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Terrorism

Signal intelligence necessary because human intelligence on
the decline
a D.C. firm.)
Over the five years that she has been chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
Feinstein has seen more inside information on NSA activities than most of her
fellow lawmakers. She is convinced that, since the FISA reforms of the seventies
put safeguards and multiple layers of oversight in place, there has been no
evidence of the NSAs seriously violating those strictures. She is also convinced
that signals intelligence is, if anything, more indispensable than ever at a
time when human intelligencethat is, information from undercover U.S.
operatives operating abroad or inside hostile organizations like al Qaeda
is so hard to come by. That leads her to worry that curbs on the phone
records program might increase the exposure of Americans to danger from
terrorists and other enemies, perhaps including mass-casualty cyber,
biological, or even nuclear attacks.
Signals intelligence necessary to combat terrorism and

weapons proliferation
ProtectingTheNationAgainstThreatstoOurNationalSecurity. The ability of the United

States to combat threats from state rivals, terrorists, and weapons
proliferators depends on the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information from a broad range of sources and through a variety of
methods. In an era increasingly dominated by technological advances in
communications technologies, the United States must continue to collect
signals intelligence globally in order to assure the safety of our citizens at
home and abroad and to help protect the safety of our friends, our allies,
and the many nations with whom we have cooperative relationships.
42
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 43 of 318
Terrorist Threat Increasing
43
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 44 of 318
Terror Risk Generally Increasing

Terrorism continues to be a threat
Department of Defense, DOD, 2014, Quadrennial Defense Review,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf
Although core al Qaida has beenseverely degraded, instability in theMiddle East
and civil war in Syria haveenabled al Qaida to expand its globalreach and operate
in new areas. Terrorists remain willing and able to threaten the United States, our
citizens, and our interests from conducting major and well-coordinated attacks to
executing attacks that are smaller and less complex. Terrorist networks continue to
demonstrate interest in obtaining WMD. Foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al
Qaida, as well as individual terrorist leaders, may seek to recruit or inspire
Westerners to carry out attacks against our homeland with little or no warning.
Homegrown violent extremists, for instance, have attacked DoD personnel and
installations. Even groups that are unable to cause harm on U.S. soil may still
threaten U.S. interests and personnel overseas. The possibility that rapidlydeveloping threats, including violent protests and terrorist attacks, could escalate
quickly and directly threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad is a significant
challenge for the United States.
Al-Qaeda is still alive and well- planning attacks on the US.

Byman, Brookings Fellow, 13 (Daniel, professor in the Security Studies Program
of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and the research director of the Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Al Qaeda Is Alive in Africa, Jan
17, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/17/al_qaeda_is_alive_in_africa)
It has been over a year and a half since Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad,
Pakistan, but now it seems like al Qaeda is everywhere : from Algeria to
Somalia , from Mali to Yemen , from Pakistan to Iraq . In July 2011, arriving in
Afghanistan on his first trip as U.S. defense secretary, Leon Panetta said, "We're within reach of
strategically defeating al Qaeda." But on Wednesday, Jan. 16, Panetta seemed
to express a good deal less optimism, making clear that the Algerian
hostage crisis currently unfolding was "an al Qaeda operation." So has al Qaeda really
become this web of linked groups around the world pursuing a common jihad against the West? And what is the
relationship between the al Qaeda core and its affiliate organizations? These are important questions; the debate
about whether the United States should join the French and step up involvement against jihadi groups in Mali
For while al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his lieutenants in

consume much of our thinking on al Qaeda, the United States
is also fighting al Qaeda affiliates like al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the
centers on these complicated ties.
the Afghanistan-Pakistan area
(AQAP), and al-Shabab in Somalia, which is also linked to al Qaeda. In 2012, the
United States conducted more drone strikes on AQAP targets than it did
against al Qaeda core targets in Pakistan. In Mali, U.S. concern is
heightened by reports that some among the wide range of local jihadi groups like Ansar Dine
have ties to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). If groups in Mali and other local
fighters are best thought of as part of al Qaeda, then an aggressive effort is warranted. But if
Arabian Peninsula
these groups, however brutal -- and despite the allegiances to the mother ship they claim -- are really only fighting
to advance local or regional ambitions, then the case for direct U.S. involvement is weak. The reality is that
44
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 45 of 318
affiliation does advance al Qaeda's agenda, but the relationship is often frayed and the whole is frequently far less
than the sum of its parts. Al Qaeda has always sought to be a vanguard that would lead the jihadi struggle against
the United States. Abdullah Azzam, one of the most influential jihadi thinkers and a companion of bin Laden, wrote,
"Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward" and that this vanguard is a "solid base" -- a phrase from
which al Qaeda draws its very name. At the same time, al Qaeda sought to support and unify local Muslim groups as
they warred against apostate governments such as the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and Hosni Mubarak's Egypt.
Convincing local groups to fight under the al Qaeda banner seems to neatly
combine these goals, demonstrating that the mother organization -- now under
Zawahiri -- remains in charge, while advancing the local and regional agendas that the core
supports. More practically, in the past, the al Qaeda core has offered affiliates money and
safe haven. In Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree in Pakistan, jihadists from affiliated
groups came to train and learn and proved far more formidable when they returned to their home war
zones. They also returned with a more global agenda, advancing the core's mission of
shaping the jihadi movement. It also gave the core a new zone of operational access to conduct terrorist attacks in
Perhaps most importantly, the core al Qaeda managed to change

the nature of the affiliates' attacks, so that in addition to continuing to strike at local regime
forces, they also select targets more in keeping with the core's anti-Western
goals. AQIM's attack this week on Western tourists and foreign oil workers
in Algeria mimics the change in strategy. AQAP has taken this one step
further and gone after the U nited S tates outside its region , twice launching
other places.
sophisticated attacks on U.S. civil aviation.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates are still operationally effective.
Counterterrorism is failing, and predictions to the contrary are based on a
lack of information.
Gartenstein-Ross 12 (Daveed, Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist
Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Reports of al
Qaeda's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/
03/reports_of_al_qaedas_death_have_been_greatly_exaggerated)
Reports of al Qaeda's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated The terrorist group may be
headless, but its tentacles still pack a mean punch. Al Qaeda is returning to the shadows. The
experiment by al-Shabab, al Qaeda's Somali affiliate, of attempting to govern a broad area in Somalia's south
officially came to a close this weekend when its fighters fled from their final stronghold, the port city of Kismayo.
Its fate in this regard mirrors that of the jihadi group's Yemeni affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
which also saw its more limited experiment in governance draw to a close in the middle of the year. In contrast,
the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens
suggests the group's North African affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is taking advantage of the
chaos in Libya to hone its capabilities. This isn't just a tale of three different organizations moving in different
directions. Rather, al-Shabab and AQAP's failures, along with AQIM's apparent success, are related to the unique
weaknesses and strengths of global jihadi efforts: Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been able to control territory at
times but have not found much success in doing so. Their rigidity makes them ineffective governors, unable to
Al
Qaeda's retreat from governance, however, does not render it irrelevant. The jihadi organization remains
comfortable as an insurgent actor, adept at moving in the shadows and carrying
out occasional, devastating strikes. AQIM currently represents the success story in
this jihadi triumvirate. After some embarrassing vacillations on the part of President Barack Obama's
administration, U.S. government analysts seem to be converging on the idea that al Qaeda's affiliate in
North Africa was involved in the Benghazi attack. Although it is unclear whether AQIM was the
truly win the sympathies of populations forced to endure their harsh, dystopian brand of Islamic law.
primary perpetrator, U.S. officials have homed in on the group in recent days, exploring ways to counter its
growth, most likely through stepped-up training efforts for local partners in counterterrorism efforts, but perhaps
including a direct U.S. military response. A recent Wall Street Journal article provided the most extensive account
of why analysts are coming to associate al Qaeda with the attack. Importantly, the article highlights how
various al Qaeda franchises and local actors were able to come together and play
45
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 46 of 318
varied roles in an attack.
<Card Continues> Many counterterrorism specialists have argued that we are

seeing the "relocalization of jihad," in which regional interests dominate over global agendas. This may be true,
especially because revolutionary events in the region provide jihadists with local opportunities they simply did not
analysts, however, appear far too eager to declare networks like

al Qaeda irrelevant to the counterterrorism picture. Indeed, in August -- prior to the Benghazi
attack -- the Library of Congress's Federal Research Division published an unclassified 50page report titled "Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile." The report, which unfortunately is not available online,
concludes that the Libyan revolution "may have created an environment conducive to
jihad and empowered the large and active community of Libyan jihadists ," and that
both AQIM and al Qaeda's senior leadership have attempted to exploit this
environment. If indeed the Benghazi attack is connected to AQIM, the details offered in this report
suggest that it was likely the outgrowth of many months of effort to build up a jihadi
network in Libya. Al Qaeda's senior leadership, according to the report, had dispatched highlevel operatives to Libya to bolster its network in the country. As of August, the Federal
Research Division assessed that though a core network had been created in Libya, it "remains
clandestine and refrains from using the al Qaeda name." The report also judged that
the network was expanding and had begun operating training camps and
undertaking social media campaigns. These initial efforts to establish a network were initially
undertaken by al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership, but the report also predicted that AQIM would
"join hands with the al Qaeda clandestine network in Libya." Back in August, the
enjoy previously. Some
majority of analysts writing in the public sphere probably would have disagreed with the report's conclusion.
Many thought that al Qaeda had been marginalized, even within the jihadi
movement. Today that assessment may be different -- not just because of the
Benghazi attack, but also because of additional information that has emerged
about the dynamics of jihadism in Libya. Nobody should be surprised, however, that al
Qaeda would attempt to keep its growth (or regrowth) hidden from view. Its use of
different labels as it established a network in Libya is instructive. It wanted to be
off its adversaries' radar during this network's growth phase. Likewise, in both
Somalia and Yemen, where al Qaeda's affiliates have recently taken a beating, the terrorist
network is going to try to regain strength out of plain sight . On Oct. 2, African Union
peacekeepers were greeted with a bomb blast as they entered Kismayo to take control of the former alShabab stronghold. Although there were no casualties, this was al-Shabab's way of saying that, though
it no longer controls territory, it is still a force in the country. "This is only an introduction
to the forthcoming explosions," the group's spokesman , Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, said.
<Card Continues> But the country's transitional government, on the other hand, does not inspire
much hope. It has never been able to govern effectively, and just like in 2007, it is being
protected by a foreign army. These two deficits may be sufficient to allow an insurgency
to gain strength in Somalia. If one does, its early growth will largely be out of sight -- the
occasional bombing or attack on African Union or transitional government forces the only sign that
al-Shabab remains a force to be reckoned with. AQAP did not manage to control and govern
territory in Yemen for nearly as long as al-Shabab did in Somalia, nor did it preside over as large a region. As
noted Yemen specialist Gregory Johnsen has written, the United States increased its airstrikes in Yemen following
Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi's ascension as president in February, and a major offensive from May to June "forced
AQAP to abandon overt control of the towns it had captured." Hadi has proved very willing to accept
counterterrorism assistance from the United States, including publicly praising drone strikes. Johnsen notes that
AQAP seems to be at a crossroads, faced with the choice of returning to what it had been -- a militant group that
moved in the shadows -- or trying to reclaim its lost territory and "once again position itself as a governing
authority." It is not yet clear which of these routes
AQAP
will try to pursue,
though there are signs
that it is experiencing
somewhat of a rebound. In mid-September, for example, gunmen affiliated

with AQAP front group Ansar al-Sharia captured an entire security unit in Yemen's al-Bayda governorate. As with
AQAP will keep its organization out of public view as much as it

can, meaning that much of what we learn about it will be from its militant actions .
the other two groups,
To that extent, if AQAP did play a role in the Benghazi attack -- even one limited to financing a key perpetrator -- it
46
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 47 of 318
The United States must be on alert

as these al Qaeda affiliates move into a new phase of their evolution. These groups
are done with the business of trying to govern, at least for now, and are back to
doing what they do best: operating in the shadows, fighting as insurgents,
and engaging in terrorist attacks.
tells us something new about its expanding regional influence.
U.S. counterterrorism efforts might have encouraged Al Qaeda to

decentralize their operations, but it did nothing to reduce the global scope
of terrorism.
Jan 11 (Reza, Analyst and the Pakistan Team Lead for the Critical Threats Project
at AEI, Diversified, Not Diminished: Al Qaeda in Pakistan Since 9/11,
http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/jan-qaeda-pakistan-diversified-notdiminished-september-20-2011)
After fleeing the American assault on its Afghan havens, al Qaeda fighters and senior leaders fled east to Pakistan.
Many of al Qaedas rank-and-file took shelter with friendly tribes in Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), while some of its senior leadership hid in Pakistans large cities. Many of those sheltering in urban centers
were later captured with the assistance of Pakistani authorities, including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
By 2004, U.S. officials believed they had

captured or killed two-thirds of al Qaedas original senior leadership .[1] In addition, a
Muhammad, Ramzi bin al Shibh and Abu Zubaydah.
war-scare between India and Pakistan in December 2001 resulting from an attack on Indias parliament building
by Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) led to Pakistan announcing a ban on extremist groups,
including JeM and LeT. A Pakistani crackdown helped reduce cross-border militant infiltration, at least for a time
(there is no evidence, however, that Pakistan has severed its ties to, or significantly restricted the activities of LeT,
The fight against militant

Islamist organizations appeared to be advancing, but success was fragile and
fleeting. Al Qaeda showed great resilience in its command structure and replaced
operatives and leaders with remarkable speed, bringing to the fore a new
generation of al Qaeda leaders that were just as ruthless as their predecessors. The Pakistani terrorist
and various front groups established thereafter, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa).[2]
groups banned by General Pervez Musharrafs government in 2002 re-established themselves under new
sense of collective
victimization, and anger at Pakistans cooperation with the U.S., would soon bring
organizations like JeM and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in line with al Qaeda, which had already
pseudonyms and with a greater sense of bitterness towards the Pakistani state. This
declared war against the Pakistani state. In addition, al Qaeda fighters in the FATA, particularly in Waziristan,
partnered with Afghan insurgents and Pakistans nascent Taliban movement and played a role in the Taliban
resurgence inside Afghanistan, which started in 2003-04 and gathered momentum in 2006. Al Qaeda fighters
cooperated with, trained, and fought alongside Taliban militants launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda assisted and encouraged the Afghan Taliban in the adoption of suicide bombing and the Taliban made
Through the killing

and capturing of many of its top leaders, and the dispersion of others attempting to
avoid a similar fate, al Qaeda in Pakistan lost its strongly hierarchical and bureaucratic
command structure. This flattening of the leadership structure has not, however, made
the organization impotent. The liquefaction of al Qaedas command pyramid
not only allowed the network to survive but also increased the lethality of
the many other militant organizations now impregnated with al Qaeda
operatives. By embedding its operatives in local terrorist groups and insurgent
organizations, al Qaeda was selling its brand cachet and technical expertise in exchange for
protection and the resources it needed to continue to operate and fight . Local groups,
heavy use of al Qaedas propaganda machinery and expertise.[3] <Card Continues>.
apart from being ideologically aligned with al Qaeda, craved the importance and recognition afforded by their
affiliation and thrived on the technical skills and training that al Qaeda operatives possessed. The
result was
to draw together disparate militant groups. Contact with al Qaeda in effect

homogenized the ideologies of the different movements . The increase in drone strikes and
military operations in Pakistan intensified the siege mentality and inter-dependence of the various groups.
Experienced operatives like Ilyas Kashmiri became part of al Qaedas inner circle, providing al Qaeda with a deep
bench with which to plug gaps created by the death of top leaders. This diversified talent pool helped to
47
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 48 of 318
groups like the TTP, LeJ, JeM, HuJI, the Haqqani

Network, the various Uzbek movements and, increasingly, LeT, cooperate to such
an extent that the dividing lines among them have gradually become illusions at best
supplement al Qaedas dwindling core. Today,
and fabrications at worst. Once local groups, following al Qaedas lead, now aspire to act globally and against a
broader target set. The TTP, which previously never showed an inclination for attacking targets outside of the
region, carried out the Times Square bombing attempt in 2010. In concert with the Haqqani Network and al
Qaeda, the TTP also launched a suicide attack on a CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan, in 2009, killing several top
agents. While the network has surely suffered heavy blows with the deaths of Osama bin Laden and dozens of
Although personally
diminished, al Qaedas core group has found new ways of expanding its lethality: it
has succeeded in innervating other groups with the means to conduct violence in
its name, causing the brand to supersede individual membership in importance. While al Qaedas traditional
structure has deteriorated over the years, the threat emanating from Pakistan to the
region, and the world, is diversified rather than diminished . Ten years on, the time
other top leaders over the years, it has retained its vitality and survivability.
for vigilance is not yet past.
There is a strong international consensus that nuclear terrorism is likely

and the reforms needed to prevent it will not be made.
Reuters 6/24/13 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/24/us-nuclear-securityterrorism-idUSBRE95N0RR20130624)
More than 100 states meeting next week will warn of the threat of nuclear
terrorism but without deciding on any concrete new steps to counter the danger, a
draft ministerial statement showed on Monday. The document, which member states of the U.N. nuclear agency
unlikely to satisfy those who advocate stronger

action to ensure that potential nuclear bomb material does not fall into the
wrong hands. <Card Continues>. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano told Reuters last week that
he saw "persistent risks" of nuclear terrorism. The information the U.N. watchdog receives
about illicit nuclear-related trafficking may be the "tip of the iceberg ", he said. The
international nuclear security regime "is not sufficiently robust" to protect against
this kind of threat, an expert group said in a report this year. An apple-sized amount of
plutonium fashioned into a nuclear bomb and detonated in a highly populated urban area could
instantly kill or injure hundreds of thousands of people, the Nuclear Security Governance Experts
have been negotiating since March, looked
international
Group said.
Risk is high.
Neely 3/21/13 (Meggaen, research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues,
Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism, http://csis.org/blog/doubtingdeterrence-nuclear-terrorism)
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) cites nuclear terrorism as todays most
immediate and extreme danger. To counter this danger, the NPR lists research initiatives, securing
nuclear materials, and a commitment to hold fully accountable any who help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons.
Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, the self-described authors of U.S. strategy for deterring terrorist networks,
explain further how the United States can discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. They make
useful distinctions between actors in terrorist organizations, which can have implications for U.S. policies.
However, the United States should not rely exclusively on deterrence that is, those policies that attempt to
discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. Complementary policies that may be more effective will
focus on securing nuclear materials and implementing defensive measures, in addition to conventional
counterterrorism strategies. Although this shift will not make the task of preventing nuclear terrorism easier,
recognizing the limits of deterrence policies will allow the United States to make smarter choices in defending
The risk that terrorists will set

off a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil is disconcertingly high. While a terrorist organization may
experience difficulty constructing nuclear weapons facilities, there is significant concern that
against nuclear terrorism. Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism.
48
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 49 of 318
terrorists can obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials.
The fear that an actor could

steal a nuclear weapon or fissile material and transport it to the United States has long-existed.
Bloomberg 7/3/13 (Fukushima Shows Nuclear-Terrorism Risks at UN Meeting,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-01/fukushima-shows-nuclear-terrorismrisks-at-un-meeting.html)
Fukushima is a nuclear security problem as much as it was a nuclear safety
problem, Kenneth Luongo, who with the U.S. Department of Energy helped secure atomic material in Russia
after the Soviet Union disintegrated, said at a briefing. The IAEA has projected nuclear power is set to
expand worldwide even after the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami caused meltdowns and
radiation leaks at Tokyo Electric Power Co.s Fukushima plant. A nuclear-armed terrorist attack on
the port in San Jose, California, would kill 60,000 people and cost as much as $1 trillion in
damage and cleanup, according to a 2006 Rand study commissioned by the U.S Department of Homeland Security.
Decommissioned Material.
Even
a low-level radiological or
dirty-bomb attack
on Washington, while
causing a limited number of deaths, would lead to damages of $100 billion , according to Igor
Khripunov, the former Soviet arms-control envoy to the U.S, whos now at the Athens, Georgia-based Center for
terrorist needs only about 25 kilograms (55 pounds)

of highly-enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to improvise a bomb, the margin
of error for material accounting is small. There are at least 2 million kilograms of
stockpiled weapons-grade nuclear material left over from decommissioned bombs
and atomic-fuel plants, according to the most recent estimates by the International Panel on Fissile
International Trade and Security. Because a
Materials, a nonprofit Princeton, New Jersey, research institute that tracks nuclear material. Thats enough to
make at least 100,000 new nuclear weapons on top of the 20,000 bombs already in state stockpiles.
The
threat of nuclear terrorism is real and serious, and it will endure for the
foreseeable future, U.S. Secretary of Energy Moniz Ernest said today in prepared remarks.
Bloomberg 7/3/13 (Fukushima Shows Nuclear-Terrorism Risks at UN Meeting,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-01/fukushima-shows-nuclear-terrorismrisks-at-un-meeting.html)
Japans Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant, whose 2011 meltdowns dislocated 160,000 people, may
provide a new blueprint for terrorists seeking to inflict mass disruption, security analysts said at a
United Nations meeting. The UNs International Atomic Energy Agency convened a weeklong meeting of 1,300
diplomats, scientists and security analysts today in Vienna to examine ways to boost protection against nuclear
sent a message to
terrorists that if you manage to cause a nuclear power plant to melt down, that really
causes major panic and disruption in a society, Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University professor and
former White House adviser, said at a briefing. All you need to do to do that is cut off the power
for an extended period of time.
terrorism. It is the IAEAs first ministerial conference on nuclear security. Fukushima
Terror attack threat increasing

Investor's Business Daily, May 20, 2014
Al-Qaida Threat Shows No End, p. A12
Terrorism: The man who knows better than anyone says "the probability" of terrorist attacks on
the U.S. homeland is "growing." How's that "dismantling the core of al-Qaida" working out, Mr.
President? For years, President Obama and Democrats told us that fighting terrorism was one
and the same as killing Osama bin Laden. They mocked President Bush for not getting him; then
when Navy SEALs acted on a lead predating the Obama administration, the White House
49
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 50 of 318
crowed, "GM is alive and OBL is dead." Well, the threat of terrorism is alive and growing
more dangerous. That's what the Army general who directed the National Security Agency
for eight years until March warns in a new New Yorker interview. "The number of attacks
that are coming, the probability, it's growing," Gen. Keith Alexander told the magazine's
Mattathias Schwartz. "What I saw at NSA is that there is a lot more coming our way."
Alexander has also served as U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) commander and chief
of the Pentagon's Central Security Service. "We're at greater risk," he says, despite high-tech
surveillance foiling numerous plots. "Look at the way al-Qaida networks. From al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb, and now in Syria, the al-Nusra
front." Explicitly contradicting the White House line that a more diffuse al-Qaida is good news,
Alexander cautioned, "you can say those are distant countries, but a lot of these groups are
looking to attack the United States." What a comparison to the happy talk of "Mission
Accomplished" that we hear from Obama. In September, he bragged to the United Nations that
"an international coalition will end its war in Afghanistan, having achieved its mission of
dismantling the core of al-Qaida that attacked us on 9/11." Maybe it was in one of the many daily
intel briefings that the president chose to skip, but someone should inform him that the Taliban -which we ran out of town in a few weeks 12 years ago -- is now poised to return to at least partial
power in Afghanistan. Obama also boasted to the General Assembly that "al-Qaida has splintered
into regional networks and militias, which has not carried out an attack like 9/11," downplaying
current threats as being "to governments, diplomats, businesses and civilians across the globe."
The new, less centralized al-Qaida grows in the vacuum of U.S. global power that Obama
has given us. Premature pullouts from Iraq and Afghanistan, and so-called "soft power" have
encouraged what he obliviously describes as "the convulsions in the Middle East and North
Africa" that "have laid bare deep divisions within societies, as an old order is upended, and
people grapple with what comes next." Coming next could well be waves of American blood.
Terror risks to the US increasing

Joseph Lieberman, (Former United States Senator), April 8, 2014, House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Hearing;
"Is al-Qaeda Winning? Grading the Administration's Counterterrorism Policy.",
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140408/102109/HHRG-113-FA18-WstateLiebermanJ-20140408.pdf
Let me begin by commending you for holding this hearing. In the aftermath of September 11,
2001, the overwhelming focus of our government was on the threat of terrorism and in particular
al Qaeda. Today, that is no longer the case. This is in large part a consequence of the success we
have achieved-namely, the fact that we have not had another catastrophic attack on our
homeland on the scale of that terrible September morning. This success, however, is not
because of an absence of terrorist plots against us. Rather, it has been achieved through the
vigilance, determination, courage, and creativity of national security professionals and
elected leaders across two Administrations, as well as the close cooperation and help of
America's allies and partners around the world. Pride in this achievement, however, must be
tempered by an awareness of several realities. First, al Qaeda and its affiliates remain a
ruthless, determined, and above all adaptive adversary. Just as importantly, the underlying
ideology that inspires and drives al Qaeda to attack us and our allies-the ideology of violent
50
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 51 of 318
Islamist extremism-is neither defeated nor exhausted. For these reasons, our safety as a nation is
inseparable from our own ability to adapt to meet an evolving threat. It also requires that we stay
engaged in the world beyond our borders. Yet increasingly we hear voices-on both sides of the
political spectrum-who say that the threat from terrorism is receding, or that it was
overblown in the first place, and that the end of this conflict is near. With respect, I believe
these arguments are badly mistaken. There is no question, the United States-beginning under
President Bush and accelerating under President Obama-has inflicted severe damage to 'core' al
Qaeda, the senior leadership that reconstituted itself in the mid-2000s in the tribal areas of
northwestern Pakistan, after being driven from neighboring Afghanistan. To borrow a
phrase used by David Petraeus, the progress we have achieved against core al Qaeda is real and
significant. But it is also fragile and reversible. What has degraded core al Qaeda in the tribal
areas of Pakistan has been the persistent, targeted application of military force against these
individuals and networks. The precondition for these operations, and the intelligence that enables
them, has been our presence in Afghanistan. If the United States withdraws all of our military
forces from Afghanistan at the end of this year-the so-called "zero option," as some now
advocate-you can be assured that al Qaeda will regenerate, eventually on both sides of the
Afghan-Pakistan border. If you doubt this, I urge you to look at what is happening in western
Iraq, where just a few years ago, during the U.S.-led surge, al Qaeda was dealt an even more
crippling blow than core al Qaeda has suffered in Pakistan today. Yet al Qaeda is surging back in
Iraq, hoisting its black flag over cities like Fallujah, murdering hundreds of innocent Iraqis this
year, pushing violence back to 2007 levels. This leads to my next point. While space for core al
Qaeda in tribal Pakistan has been reduced thanks to persistent U.S. pressure in recent
years, territory where al Qaeda affiliates can find sanctuary has grown elsewhere during
this same period, including in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. AI
Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups have long exploited Muslim-majority countries
weakened or fragmented by conflict, and neglected by the international community. They take
advantage of these places to recruit, radicalize, and train the next generation of extremist foot
soldiers. They use them to plot and plan attacks.
That is why al Qaeda and its affiliates first went to Afghanistan in the 1990s. That is why they
later turned to Yemen and Somalia in the 2000s. And it is why they are fighting to build
sanctuaries in Syria, Libya, and Iraq today. Several factors make the prospect of al Qaeda
sanctuaries in these three countries especially dangerous. The first is their respective locations.
Syria and Iraq are the heart of the Arab Middle East, bordering key American allies like Israel,
Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Libya and Syria are Mediterranean states-comparatively easy
to reach from the West, in contrast to remote Afghanistan and Pakistan. And Libya is also
adjacent to the vast Sahel, with its weak and poorly governed states. Equally worrisome, these
are all places where u.s. policymakers have signaled that involvement of the U.S. military is
for all intents and purposes off the table, or at least severely constrained. This means that the
United States is not able to combat the rise of al Qaeda in these countries effectively. Of the
three countries, the situation in Syria is by far the most alarming; the failure of U.S. policy
by far the most profound; and its implications for our national security by far the most severe.
According to one estimate, there are today more foreign fighters in Syria than in Iraq and
Afghanistan combined over the past ten years. The Director of National Intelligence recently
described Syria as-and I quote-"an apocalyptic disaster." And the Secretary of Homeland
Security recently warned that Syria has become-and again I quote-"a matter of homeland
security," as extremists there "are actively trying to recruit Westerners, indoctrinate them, and see
51
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 52 of 318
them return to their home countries with an extremist mission." Put very bluntly, Syria has
become the most dangerous terrorist sanctuary in the world today-and the United States has no
coherent or credible policy for dealing with it. Nor is there any apparent strategy in place to
address al Qaeda's growth in Iraq or Libya. Let me be very clear. No one is advocating sending
tens of thousands of troops to these countries. Nor is it within our power, or our responsibility, to
solve every problem these countries face. But there is much we could be doing that we are not. In
Afghanistan, we can choose not to squander the gains of the past decade and instead keep a
sufficient follow-on military presence to sustain the increasingly capable Afghan National
Security Forces in our shared fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Global terrorism risks increasing

Rohan Gunaranta, New Straits Times (Malaysia), January 10, 2014
Global terrorist threat set to rise, p. 15
SINCE Sept 11, 2001, the global terrorist threat has been growing exponentially. According
to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (Start),
there were 5,100 terrorist attacks in the first six months of last year, following the 8,400 attacks
in 2012, which killed nearly 15,400 people. "The wave of violence shows few signs of ebbing,"
reported the United States-based Start. The western kinetic operations have failed to reduce
the global threat. Indeed, the threat of international and national terrorism is projected to
grow this year. With half of the countries in the world suffering from political violence and
ideological extremism, terrorism will remain the tier-one national security threat to the stability
of most countries. Afghanistan and Syria are emerging as the two most important hubs of
global terrorism that threaten the security of South Asia, West Asia and North Africa. Just
as the anti-Soviet multi-national Afghan mujahideen campaign formed the foundation of
contemporary terrorism, the blowback from the civil war in Syria is likely to produce the next
generation of fighters - both guerillas who attack government forces and terrorists who attack
civilians. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as India, are the most violent in
South Asia. Next are the Middle East: Syria and Iraq; and Africa: Nigeria and Somalia.
Since 9/11, over a million people, combatants and non-combatants, have been killed or injured
by terrorists and US-led coalition forces fighting insurgents and terrorists. According to Start,
Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan suffered more than half of the 2012 attacks (54 per cent) and
fatalities (58 per cent). The next five most targeted countries were India, Nigeria, Somalia,
Yemen and Thailand. The threat is projected to escalate in 2014 and grow even further following
the US-led coalition's withdrawal from Afghanistan at year end. Counter-insurgency and counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 have had mixed results. Al-Qaeda has weakened but the al-Qaeda
family has grown in strength, size and influence. About 30-40 threat groups in Asia, Africa,
Middle East and the Caucasus are emulating the al-Qaeda ideology of global violence and
methodology of suicide attacks. The deadliest terrorist groups in the world belong to the alQaeda family with the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistan) heading the list. Others are Al
Nusra Front in Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and Al Shabaab in Somalia. The al-Qaeda ability to influence associate groups was brought
to international attention by the brutal attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya by Al
Shabaab. The Arab Spring has become a nightmare with multiple al-Qaeda-linked groups
emerging throughout North Africa and the Middle East, including Al Nusra in Syria. With
52
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 53 of 318
12,000 Sunni and a comparable number of Shia foreign fighters in Syria the threat to the West
and the rest of the world will grow. Stemming from the developments in Syria, the Shia-Sunni
conflict is threatening to break out into a regional conflict, involving Bahrain and Lebanon.
Further afield in the Caucasus, terrorists mounted year-end attacks in Volgograd, southern
Russia, hitting a railway station and a trolley bus. Shumukh al-Islam, the top forum for alQaeda-affiliated propaganda, praised the timing of the attacks. From the Caucasus the terrorists
are travelling through Turkey to Syria to fight against the Bashar al-Assad regime. The South
Asian sub-continent has been most violent in the past decade. In India ethno-political
insurgencies and Muslim terrorists kill both Indians and foreigners. Although Sri Lanka
experienced no revival of terrorism since the Tamil Tigers were dismantled in May 2009, the
terrorists are reorganising in Tamil Nadu in South India. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh
and the Maldives a wave of communal or religious extremism affected Muslim and non-Muslim
communities. Afghanistan has suffered increased insurgent attacks, mostly in the south and east,
where US and ISAF forces have withdrawn from many bases, remaining in only a few cities. Of
the 7,141 attacks in Afghanistan last year, 63 were suicide attacks and 27 were insider
attacks. While 2,730 Afghan security personnel were killed and 5,169 injured, 2,168 guerillas
and terrorists were killed, according to the Afghan ministry of interior. In Southeast Asia,
southern Thailand remains the cockpit of conflict. The threat in Indonesia remains
significant with about a dozen threat groups operationally or ideologically affiliated with
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Although the peace process in the Philippines has stabilised the south,
the threat from the Abu Sayyaf Group and the New People's Army, a leftist terrorist group, is still
significant. The developments in Afghanistan also spilled over to Northeast Asia. The most
violent group in China, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is collaborating with
the al-Qaeda family of threat groups such as the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, Islamic Jihad
Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus and more recently the
Al Nusra Front in Syria.
Middle East conflicts increase terror threats to the US

ABC Premium News (Australia), March 31, 2014
Terrorism threat greater now than before 9/11, says security expert Dr Anthony Bubalo
The West is facing a more powerful terrorism threat now than in the lead-up to 9/11
because of the Middle East's current political and economic uncertainty, according to one
of Australia's top security analysts. Research director at the Lowy Institute for
International Policy Dr Anthony Bubalo says the region's many conflicts have galvanised
international extremism and provided an environment in which "a whole new generation of
jihadists [is] being re-tooled and re-trained". "The people who launched 9/11 didn't just suddenly
appear on the 10th of September. They were the result of conditions and circumstances that had
been developing in the Middle East over a decade and a half," Dr Bubalo told The World Today.
"When we look at the situation today, many of those conditions exist in the region once again."
Domestic unrest in Syria, Egypt and Libya, as well as a rise in the number of ungoverned
regions, has given jihadists new environments in which to flourish, Dr Bubalo warned. "The
concern is that the sheer number of conflicts in the region [and] the nature of the economic
situation will produce a large pool of extremists that will then go on, as they did in the past,
53
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 54 of 318
to find other conflicts to fight once the conflicts in their own region are exhausted," Dr Bubalo
said.
Syria conflict creating massive terrorism threat

Deputy Secretary Burns, who also served as ambassador to Russia from 2005 to 2008 and has
some obvious firsthand experience, March 6, 2014, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of Terrorism and Sectarianism in the
Middle East"
Now, let me turn very briefly to the Levant. The turbulence of the past three years has had many
roots: rising aspirations for dignity, political participation and economic opportunity in a region
in which too many people for too many years have been denied them; the ruthless reaction of
some regimes; and the efforts of violent extremists to exploit the resulting chaos. Nowhere have
these trends converged more dangerously than in Syria. The conflict and the Assad regime
have become a magnet for foreign fighters, many affiliated with terrorist groups from
across the region and around the world. As Matt will describe, these fighters, mostly Sunni
extremists, represent a long-term threat to U.S. national security interests. From the other side,
Assad has recruited thousands of foreign fighters, mostly Shia, to defend the regime with active
Iranian support and facilitation. The hard reality is that the grinding Syrian civil war is now
an incubator of extremism on both sides of the sectarian divide. We face a number of
serious risks to our interests as a result: the risk to the homeland from global jihadist
groups who seek to gain long-term safe havens; the risk to the stability of our regional
partners, including Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq; the risk to Israel and other partners from
the rise of Iranian-backed extremist groups, especially Lebanese Hezbollah fighting in
Syria; and the risk to the Syrian people, whose suffering constitutes the greatest
humanitarian crisis of this new century. These are enormous challenges; they require a steady,
comprehensive American strategy aimed at isolating extremists and bolstering moderates both
inside Syria and amongst our regional partners.
Number of terror attacks increasing

Canberra Times (Australia), February 8, 2014
Fall in terrorism no time to relax, p. B9
Fall in terrorism no time to relax The West mustn't drop the ball on counterterrorism by starving
intelligence agencies of money. In recent years there seems to have been a general falling away
in Western governments' spending on counterterrorism. This has been matched by public
complacency about the terrorism threat. This is disturbing, because while the nature of the threat
has evolved, terrorism is still the most credible violent threat to Western nations' national
security. In terms of terrorism-related deaths internationally, more than four times more
people are dying each year now than was the case in the early 2000s, when around 20003000 a year were killed. According to the US National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism, in 2012 there were 8500 terrorist attacks that killed 15,500
people. Data for 2013 is not yet available, but there were 5100 attacks in the first six
months of 2013 - more than during the same period of 2012. Six of the seven most deadly
groups are affiliated with al-Qaeda, and most of the violence was committed in Muslimmajority countries. Fourteen US civilians died in terrorist attacks outside the US in 2012 (10 in
54
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 55 of 318
Afghanistan and four in Libya). Within the US, nine people died in terrorist attacks in 2012, six
of them in a shooting at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. The top 10 countries in terms of
numbers of deaths in 2012 were Afghanistan (2632), Iraq (2436), Pakistan (1848), Nigeria
(1386) , Syria (657), Yemen (365), Somalia (323), Thailand (174) and the Philippines (109). The
Caucasus should probably be up there, but Russia has been reluctant to release details of killings
related to the Caucasus, not wanting to scare off Sochi Olympics tourists. In the past 12 months
there has also been a surge in deaths in Syria, Iraq and Somalia, often under-reported. The
reasons behind the rise in terrorism violence are complex, but include weak and unstable
states with corrupt or ineffective governments; poverty and high unemployment,
particularly among young men; access to more lethal weaponry and explosives; increasing
use of targeted suicide attacks; heightened sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims; and the increasing use of terrorism as a tactic in insurgency conflicts.
US military attacks in crease terrorism risks

Ivan Eland, The Arab American News, February 15, 2014 - February 21, 2014 The high cost of a
'War on Terror', p. 10 (Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The
independent Institute. Dr. Eland has spent 15 years working for Congress on national security
issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal
Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office.)
One could make the argument - and U.S. security agencies do - that all of their martial efforts
overseas have made Americans safer. In Iraq and Yemen (a major venue for the U.S. drone war),
hard data indicate that US military action has actually increased the numbers of Islamist
terronsts. Data doesn't lie, because what drives radical Islamists to attack the United States is
unnecessary U.S. meddling in Muslim countries - just look at the late Osama bin Laden s
writings.
World-wide terrorism threat increasing
NPR, 9-25, 13, State Department Renews Global Terrorism Alert,

http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/09/25/226199162/state-departmentrenews-global-terror-alert
TheU.S.StateDepartmenthasreneweditsglobalterrorismalert,followingtheattackinNairobi,Kenya,bya
groupclaimingtobepartoftheSomaliabasedalShabab.Becauseofthe"continuingthreatofterroristactionsand
violence"towardAmericans,,U.S.citizensshould"maintainahighlevelofvigilance." Thedepartmentadds:
"CurrentinformationsuggeststhatalQaida,itsaffiliatedorganizations,andotherterroristgroupscontinue
toplanterroristattacksagainstU.S.interestsinmultipleregions,includingEurope,Asia,Africa,andthe
MiddleEast.Theseattacksmayemployawidevarietyoftacticsincludingsuicideoperations,assassinations,
kidnappings,hijackings,andbombings."ThiscautionreplacestheoneissuedinFebruary,butremembertheState
DepartmentissuedarareworldwidetravelalertinAugust.,thealertfollowedtheDepartmentState'sdecisionto
closeallitsembassiesandconsulatesacrosstheMuslimworldthatweekend. Today'scautionsaysterrorists
couldtarget"highprofilesportingevents,residentialareas,businessoffices,hotels,clubs,restaurants,places
ofworship,schools,publicareas,shoppingmalls,andothertouristdestinationsbothintheUnitedStatesand
abroadwhereU.S.citizensgatherinlargenumbers,includingduringholidays."
55
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 56 of 318
Terrorism will expand rapidly as terrorists realize their power

Nathan Myhrvold, 13, July 2013, Myhrvold is chief executive and founder of
Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft . Strategic
Terrorism: A Call to Action, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf
Eventually, the world will figure out that stateless groups are more powerful
than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount
assaults that no nation-state would dare to attempt. although this conclusion
is only dimly perceived at present, the rising arc of terrorists strategic
advantage is clear and inexorable. Bin laden, abu musab al-Zarqawi, and the
chechen terrorists, as well as their surviving followers, represent the vanguard. so
far, they have limited themselves to dramatic and gory tactical terrorism: events
such as 9/11, the butchering of russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over
the internet, and bombings in madrid, london, and Boston. strategic objectives
cannot be far behind. Once stateless groups and their sponsors realize that they
have unmatched power to threaten the mighty, incidents of terrorism will
multiply in the same way that the guerrilla movements did during the cold
War. Terrorists can easily organize and defeat US military measures
consider one example of how the proliferation of technology has tipped the playing
field: U.s. spy satellites have in many crucial cases been rendered useless because
our adversaries know when these eyes in the sky will pass overhead. internet sites
report amateur observations of their orbital parameters, computers enable the
calculation of satellite positions, and cell phones are used to coordinate evasive
actions. What was previously an unassailable technological advantage for the U.s.
government has thus been greatly diluted by a combination of new consumer
technologies. no amount of technology from the national security agency or
national reconnaissance office allowed us to know with certainty whether bin laden
was in that compound in abbottabad, Pakistan before the order to attack was given.
al-Zawahiri, mullah mohammed omar, and other senior commanders of al Qaeda
and the taliban have similarly managed to evade the most sophisticated and
expensive manhunts in history. determined men with disposable cell phones,
laptops, and access to Third World internet cafs can defeat our nations multihundred-billion-dollar investment in space-based surveillance. communications
technologies can also mobilize popular, political, and financial support for
terrorists. osama bin ladens broadcasts on al Jazeera, and anwar al-aulaqis internet
sermons were heard by millions of potential followers. The Boston marathon
bombers were inspired and, to a certain degree, trained by jihadist websites. how
much more difficult would it be to recruit, organize, and fund al Qaeda without that
kind of reach? The bully pulpit afforded by modern communications has allowed
what once would have been isolated fringe groups to knit together into formidable
adversaries against the most powerful nations on earth. indeed, such emerging
loose coalitions may, in some ways, be more effective than large nation-states.
Whenever the rate of technological change is high, new entrants have the
upper hand. This phenomenon is well known in the commercial world. young startups routinely challenge and displace companies that have been around for decades.
The terrorists are playing the role of the dynamic start-up, and established
nations such as the United states fill the role of the old, slow, stuck-in-the-mud
incumbents, unable to take advantage of the latest technological developments.
56
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 57 of 318
Modern communications technology means terrorists can deploy more

military power than nation-states But modern communications gives al Qaeda
and the taliban a chance to establish a virtual emirate at the very least. mullah
omar and his organization already oper-ate one of the most influential virtual
governments in the region. to the extent that competition exists, it does not come
from the reigning government of afghanistan, which commands little popular
support. instead, the leaders with the greatest celebrity and influence in the region
are people such as hassan nasrallah, leader of the stateless hezbollah organization.
The incredible reach of modern communications gives al-Zawahiri, nasrallah, and
their ilk an influence that crosses borders and transcends the local political structure. although resurrecting a caliphate may elude stateless actors, the influence
they command makes them more powerful in many ways than the leaders of
nation-states. This state of affairs is the new world order enabled by technology.
stateless groups can recruit and organize followers across national
borders. They can also develop the lethality sufficient to scare anyone,
superpowers included. For the first time, guerilla warfare can be fought at the
strategic level. This capability gives terrorist groups the power to threaten the
established community of nations, including the remaining superpower, in a truly
unique way. The net result is that terrorists can deploy more usable military
power than any nation-state. it will take some time for these groups to fully
exploit this advantage, but the stage is set for the stateless to become the greatest
threats and thus the pre-eminent military players on the globe. indeed, we seem to
be entering the golden age of stateless organizations. during this age, the military
supremacy and political influence of nation-states will be challenged by much
smaller groups that can wield both political influence and power with cruelty and
without the apparatus of a state. as a result, massive terrorist attacks like 9/11as
well as low-level events such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations
will occur with greater frequency. Bad as that is, it is unfortunately only part of
the story. The organizational power of communications and computing has its
destructive limits because such technology is not itself lethal. The crucial additional
factor is that weapons technology is becoming more accessible and
powerful every year.
Terror threats increasing resort to violence, prison breaks

Carie Lemack, 9-10, 13, She is the director of the Homeland Security Project at the
Bipartisan Policy Center, Jihadists Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, Political
Transcript Wire
First of all, what happened in Egypt -- the fact that a -- a -- a -- there was a military
coup against an elected Muslim Brotherhood government; I -- we're all very focused
on Syria right now, but in a way, this is more important than anything else, because
it confirms al-Qaeda's central narrative, that elections are -- are, basically, you
should not get involved in the elections, that the Muslim Brotherhood has engaged
in elections, and that's both against Islam and also is going to fail, because the
"Crusaders," quote/unquote, and their allies in the Arab world, will never allow a
true Muslim government to come to power.
And unfortunately, that narrative, which Ayman al-Zawahiri has been proposing for
a long time, seems to have just been confirmed in Egypt. And if you're a member
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, you see what -- saw what happened. Just
57
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 58 of 318
look -- just a couple of days ago, the Interior Minister survived as serious
assassination attempt.
You -- I think we are likely to see people who are more inclined to engage in
conventional politics take up arms, and this is a big problem in Egypt and
perhaps elsewhere.
Another factor -- a small one, perhaps, but not insignificant -- is prison breaks.
We've seen huge prison breaks in places like Iraq in the last year where
senior members of al-Qaeda in Iraq are -- are getting out, and hundreds of,
rather (ph), other (ph), are their colleagues. We also saw a similar one in -- with the
Pakistani Taliban, just in July. Another big sort of factor is the Sunni Shia divide. As
you've seen -- as we've seen in Syria, but also in Iraq, and (inaudible) in the account
of sectarian tensions in the Middle East are being amplified.
And if you look at what's happening today in Syria, who is lining up behind the
United States in a war against Assad? It is important Sunni states -- Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, UAE, Turkey -- so, if there is a war of some form, and there obviously is a war
going on already -- but if the war is amplified, it will look a lot like Sunni -- Sunni
states lining up essentially against the de facto Shia alliance of Iraq, Syria,
Lebanese, Hezbollah and Syria. And this -- this conflict could spread.
Finally, Syria could be a training ground for -- in the future. It could also turn out to
be a place where a lot of foreign fighters go to die. We were concerned that during
the Iraq war that there would be blowback from the Iraq war. It turned out, many of
the foreign fighters that were -- that went there, went there as suicide bombers, or
were killed in -- in -- in action. And the blowback that we feared coming out of Iraq
didn't happen.
Syria -- the same thing could -- could be true, or -- or it could look again like the
Afghan war. And certainly, for the Arabs in al- Qaeda who lead the group, Syria is a
much more important conflict than the Afghan war, which -- which (ph) was a
sideshow.
Al-Qaedism spreading
Carie Lemack, 9-10, 13, She is the director of the Homeland Security Project at the
Bipartisan Policy Center, Jihadists Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, Political
Transcript Wire
I think what we found enormously worrisome is that the growth of al-Qaedaism (ph)
and the expansion of the movement. Al-Qaeda has a presence in more countries
today that it did on 9/11, and has a presence that's basically doubled from the 2008
figure to some 16 key theaters of operation, and that, I think, is fundamentally
worrisome.
Secondly, and hand-in-glove with that, the al-Qaeda brand, unfortunately, seems
stronger than it's ever been in recent years. In part, that's in large measure a
reaction to events such as the overthrow of the Morsi government in Egypt, which
has added more fuel to al-Qaeda's fire in saying "you cannot trust the Democratic
process; we will always -- Islamists will always be stabbed in the back."
But also, I think it's a reflection of al-Qaeda's own strategy, and somewhat the
success of that strategy, in expanding further afield to new places -- to the Sahel, to
West Africa, to complement its existing presence in North Africa and East Africa.
58
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 59 of 318
We also see how groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq that, similarly, where the victim or the
targets of successive inroads made against its leadership -- the three initial leaders
of the movement were all killed in U.S. operations, whether it was airstrikes or drone
strikes; yet at the same time, al-Qaeda in Iraq is stronger today than it's ever been,
perhaps since 2008, which I think is another warning sign.
Massive expansion of anti-US terror hostility

Dayton Daily News (Ohio), August 9, 2013, Terrorism: Are we now blase?, p. A8
TODAY'S MODERATOR
It was almost overshadowed by A-Rod's troubles, but the U.S. State Department last
weekend pulled out of several embassies and consulates after overhearing a new alQaida threat.
"In case anyone needed reminding," Bruce Riedel wrote in the Daily Beast,
"the recent global terror alert illustrates that, 15 years after its first
attacks on America, al-Qaida is thriving. The coup in Egypt and the chaotic
aftermath of the Arab awakening is only going to add more militants to
this army of radicals. Failed revolutions and failing states are like
incubators for the jihadists, a sort of Pandora's Box of hostility and
alienation. ... What is new is the rapid growth of these franchises associated cells and sympathetic movements from Algeria to Aden."
59
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 60 of 318
Terrorism Risks Increasing Al Qaeda

Al-Qaedas strength and geographic reach increasing
Dr. Hegghammer, 7-18, 13, Dr. Thomas Hegghammer is the Zukerman Fellow at
Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior
research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment in Oslo, Hearing
of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee Subject: "Global al-Qaida: Affiliates, Objectives and Future
Challenges" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=740859
I would first point out that I think the growth of al-Qaida's affiliate in Syria and other
recent developments make this hearing particularly timely and important. In
reviewing al-Qaida's evolution since 1988, I'm going to make three arguments in my
opening remarks. First, contrary to some interpretations of the weakness of alQaida today, I would respond that it is actually quite resilient. As I look at both
al-Qaida as it stood, reflected in part in your map, Mr. Chairman, there has been a
net expansion in the number and the geographic scope of al-Qaida
affiliates and allies over the past decade, indicating that al-Qaida, at least in
my view, is -- and the movement are far from defeated. I'll explain in a
moment what I mean by al-Qaida. This growth, in my view, is caused by at
least two factors. One is the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes
across North Africa and the Middle East and created an opportunity for al-Qaida to -and its allies to establish or attempt to establish a foothold or a safe haven. I would
submit that the developments in Egypt are of particular concern. It is where the
head of -- current head of al- Qaida is from, and it is another potential avenue for a
foothold, depending on how that situation develops over the next several weeks and
months. In addition, the growing sectarian struggle across the Middle East
between Sunni and Shia, which has been funded by, on the Sunni side,
both states and nonstate actors, has increased the resources available to
militant groups, including to al-Qaida and its affiliates. So the first point is
that I think there's been a slight net expansion in al-Qaida's geographic
scope and its number. Second, however, this expansion has, along with the
weakness of central al-Qaida in Pakistan -- recently, anyway -- has created a more
diffuse and decentralized movement. And I do think this is important, because
I think what we see as we look at Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, Iraq, al-Qaida in Iraq,
Somalia, Al-Shabaab, Yemen, the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, the main affiliates, they largely, as I interpret it,
run their operations somewhat autonomously, though they still communicate with
the core and still may take some strategic advice. And I would note that, what's
interesting in the Syrian front is the attempt from the core in Pakistan to adjudicate
a dispute between al-Qaida in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, and then to have
the affiliate in Syria essentially break away from Iraq, the al-Qaida in Iraq segment,
and swear allegiance directly to the core element in Pakistan, which to me
symbolizes that there is still some importance to that leadership Now, the way I
would -- if pressed, would define al-Qaida today, it would include the core in
Pakistan, and I would say, even if Zawahiri were killed, there are at least
three potential replacements that sit in Iran today, all of whom are quite
60
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 61 of 318
well-esteemed and are members of what was called the management council, and
one that potentially sits in -- or that sits in Yemen. So even with the death of
Zawahiri, I still think you would get a movement that would continue.
The Arab Spring strengthened Al Qaeda three reasons
Gartenstein-Ross 14 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown Universitys security
studies program, The Arab Spring and Al-Qaedas Resurgence, Congressional
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2/4/14,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00Wstate-Gartenstein-RossD-20140204.pdf)
Factors Strengthening al-Qaeda and Jihadism
Three primary factors have strengthened al-Qaeda and jihadism in the
Arab Spring environment, two of which fundamentally relate to the jihadist
strategy previously outlined: prisoner releases, dawa opportunities, and the
resurgence of jihadist-aligned charity networks. Prisoner releases. The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report on the notorious September 2012 attack on
the U.S. consulate in Benghazi notes that a number of individuals affiliated with
terrorist groups were involved, including those affiliated with the Muhammad Jamal
Network. Jamal himself is notable as one of many jihadist figures to have been
released from Egyptian prison. This makes Jamal part of the aforementioned trend
that began with the Arab Spring uprisings, in which prisons in affected
countries have been emptied. In many cases, it is a good thing that prisoners
have gone free: the Arab dictatorships were notorious for unjustly incarcerating and
abusing their political prisoners. But jihadists were part of this wave of
releases. Prisoners went free for a variety of reasons. In Libya, Qaddafis
government initially used releases as an offensive tactic early after the uprisings,
setting prisoners free in rebellious areas in order to create strife.28 As the rebellion
continued, some prison governors decided to empty prisons they were charged with
guarding, including as a means of defection.29 Chaos also allowed prison escapes,
and gunmen attacked prisons in order to free inmates. Regimes that experienced
less chaotic transitions, including Tunisia and Egypt, were hesitant to continue
imprisoning virtually anybody jailed by the old regime, including violent Islamists
with blood on their hands. Moving beyond Muhammad Jamal, other prominent
figures from Egypts jihadist movement were also freed from prison. The
most notorious is Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaedas emir and a
former member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri played a prominent role in
encouraging jihadists to join the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in
Cairo, and American officials told The Wall Street Journal that he has also helped
Muhammad Jamal connect with his brother, the al-Qaeda chief. Other released
Egyptian inmates returned to operational and media roles, including Murjan Salim,
who has been directing jihadists to training camps in Libya. Figures like Jalal al-Din
Abu al-Fatuh and Ahmad Ashush, among others, helped loosely reorganize
networks through media outlets al-Bayyan and al-Faruq. Prisoner releases helped
regenerate jihadist networks in the Sinai that have been able to cause a great
deal of bloodshed since the countrys July coup. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisias
striking growth was also attributable to prisoner releases. AST leader Abu
Iyadh al-Tunisi had been imprisoned since 2003 for involvement in terrorism abroad,
61
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 62 of 318
but was released in the general amnesty of March 2011. In fact, prominent AST
members have claimed that the organization was born during periods of
imprisonment, when communal prayer time served as a forum for discussion and
refining ideas that would be put into practice on release. In Libya, many former
prisoners, including some leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, said they
would forsake armed struggle and join the political process. But other released
prisoners returned to jihadist violence. Mohammed al-Zahawi and Shaykh Nasir alTarshani of Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi both spent years in Qaddafis
notorious Abu Salim prison.31 Abu Sufyan bin Qumu, another Ansar al-Sharia leader
based in Derna, was formerly imprisoned in both Guantanamo Bay and Abu Salim.
Dawa opportunities. Newfound opportunities to undertake dawa allowed
the spread of salafi jihadist ideology in places like Egypt and Tunisia. In
Egypt, members of the salafi jihadist current such as Muhammad al-Zawahiri and
Ahmad Ashush were able to personally advocate for the movement on television
for the first time. In Tunisia, AST developed a sophisticated dawa strategy. It
continues to undertake dawa even after the Tunisian government banned it, but AST
youth leader Youssef Mazouz said the group now carries out less than half the work
it used to before August when it could plan events openly and post details on
Facebook.32 Some of ASTs dawa efforts have been rather traditional: holding
dawa events at markets or universities, holding public protests, and dominating
physical spaces, such as cafs, near places of worship. But AST also used innovative
approaches to dawa, including provision of social services (something other militant
Islamic groups like Hizballah and Hamas have also done) and its use of social media.
As noted, ASTs ban now impedes its ability to leverage social media. ASTs social
services activity has included distribution of food, clothing, and basic supplies, as
well as sponsorship of convoys that provide both medical care and medicine. These
efforts concentrated on areas of Tunisia that are typically neglected by the
government, such as rural and impoverished areas, and AST also provided
emergency humanitarian assistance in the wake of such natural disasters as
flooding. ASTs social services are typically accompanied by distribution of literature
designed to propagate its ideology. But even at its height, ASTs distribution of
social services didnt reach the same areas consistently: it isnt clear any
communities saw AST as a services provider week after week. This is where ASTs
savvy use of social media was particularly relevant. Almost immediately after it
undertook humanitarian efforts, AST would post information about its latest venture,
including photographs, to its Facebook page and other websites. Social media
served as a force multiplier: while AST didnt provide consistent services to a single
area, its social media activity illustrated a rapid pace of humanitarian assistance,
and thus helped the group achieve its goal of visibility. The context in which this
dawa work was undertaken is important, as the countrys economy suffered and
much of its revolutionary hopes had faded. AST positioned itself as a critic of the
status quo and a champion of those whom the system neglected. This helped AST
develop into a growing movement by the last time I did field research there, in April
2013. Whether the new Tunisian constitution will rekindle revolutionary hopes
remains to be seen. Resurgence of jihadist-aligned charity networks. Prior to
the 9/11 attacks, al- Qaeda received significant funding from a well-financed
network of Islamist charity organizations. As a monograph produced for the 9/11
Commission noted, prior to those attacks al-Qaeda was funded, to the tune of
approximately $30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities
and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both
62
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 63 of 318
witting and unwitting donors.33 Despite the efforts made to shut down such
groups, Islamist-leaning international charities and other NGOs have been
reemerging as sponsors of jihadist activity. In Tunisia, the pictures, videos, and
information that AST posted on its Facebook page suggest that AST received
support from jihadist charity networks. In at least one case, it received medical
supplies from the Kuwaiti charity RIHS (the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society). The
fact that RIHS supported a jihadist-oriented group in Tunisia will come as no surprise
to seasoned watchers of terrorist financing. The U.S. Treasury Department
designated RIHS in 2008 for providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda
and al-Qaeda affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and AlItihaad al-Islamiya.34 The Treasury designation also charges that RIHS provided
financial support specifically for terrorist acts. And thats not ASTs only connection
to sympathetic foreign organizations. The literature it passes out at dawa events
can be traced to at least three book publishing houses in Saudi Arabia: Dar alQassem, based in Riyadh; Dar al-Tarafen, based in Taif; and the Cooperative Office
for the Call and Guidance and Education Communities, based in Dammam. Its likely
that AST, which has distributed a significant amount of these publishers literature,
either has a direct relationship with the publishers or else a designated
intermediary. The most significant theater for jihadist charities rebound,
though, will likely be Syria. A recent comprehensive report published by the
Brookings Institution notes the role of individual donors in the Gulf, who
encouraged the founding of armed groups, helped to shape the
ideological and at times extremist agendas of rebel brigades, and
contributed to the fracturing of the military opposition.35 The report singles
out Kuwaiti donors and charities in particularincluding the aforementioned RIHS
in part because Kuwait has had fewer controls than other Gulf countries. Further,
the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF)an umbrella group of six organizations that is
considered one of the key jihadist elements within the Syrian oppositionhas
clearly expressed ties to Turkish and Qatari government-linked NGOs. The video
proclaiming the creation of this new group in December 2012 showed SIF members
providing aid to Syrian civilians with boxes and flags bearing the logos of the Turkish
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). In January 2013, SIF posted a video to
YouTube depicting its members picking up aid from IHH in Yayladagi, Turkey, that
was to be distributed in Syria. Other boxes and flags in SIFs December 2012 video
belonged to Qatar Charity, which used to go by the name Qatar Charitable Society.
Evidence submitted by the U.S. government in a criminal trial noted that in 1993
Osama bin Laden named the society as one of several charities that were used to
fund al-Qaedas overseas operations. Other charities that in the past
supported al-Qaeda and jihadist causes may also be on the rebound. For
example, when the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi charity that provided significant support to al-Qaeda
internationally, it noted that AHIFs leadership has attempted to reconstitute the
operations of the organization, and parts of the organization have continued to
operate.36 Further, the U.N.s Office of the Ombudsperson overseeing sanctions of
al-Qaeda-linked individuals has produced a delisting in 38 different cases as of the
time of this testimony.37 The delisting of al-Qaeda supporters at the United
Nations could further re-energize al-Qaeda charity networks.
Egyptian coup strengthened Al Qaeda
63
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 64 of 318

But al-Qaedas biggest gain last year was perhaps the July military coup
that deposed Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, and the often-brutal
crackdown on protesters that followed. After the coup, jihadist groups in the
Sinai went on an immediate offensive, with targets including security officers
and Christians. That offensive has both extended beyond the Sinai region and
continued into this year, with a series of four January 24 bombings in Greater Cairo,
including an explosion at the security directorate. Egypts coup also bolstered
al-Qaedas narrative. Many Western observers had hoped the Arab uprisings
would weaken al-Qaeda by providing a democratic alternative to the regions
dictators. These hopes rested on an inexorable march toward democracy that would
prompt increasing numbers of citizens to participate in the new political systems.
But the coup showed that democracy is reversibleperhaps particularly so
if political Islamist groups are in power. Al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri
had been saying exactly this since the revolutions beganclaiming in March
2011 that Egypts new regime, even if nominally democratic, would preserve and
maintain the old policies that fight Islam and marginalize the sharia. Though its
too early to say whether more people are gravitating toward al-Qaedas argument
as a result, Zawahiri and other leading jihadist thinkers have already claimed
vindication after the coup, and we can expect more full-throated rhetoric on
this point in the coming year. Al-Qaeda also continues to be a force in its
traditional strongholds. For example, it has spearheaded an assassination
campaign in Yemen that has, for more than two years, targeted the countrys
military officers. Bearing in mind the manner in which prisoner releases gave new
life to jihadism in North Africa, a final concern is a series of jailbreaks in July.
The most significant was a July 21 jailbreak at Iraqs notorious Abu Ghraib prison
that freed about 500 prisoners from a facility boasting a high concentration of
skilled jihadists. On July 28, prison riots coupled with an external attack freed 1,117
inmates from Benghazis Kuafiya prison. And a sophisticated July 30 prison break in
Pakistan, where almost 250 prisoners escaped, was claimed by the militant group
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.45 Some of the least surprising news of the year was that
U.S. officials came to suspect that these incidents, all occurring around the same
time, might be part of an al Qaeda- coordinated Great Escape-like plot.46
Arab Spring led to AQ expansion
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the state of al-Qaeda, its
64
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 65 of 318
affiliates, and associated groups. My testimony will focus on how the Arab Spring
environment presented new opportunities for al-Qaeda, altered its focus
in discernible ways, and allowed it to experience significant geographic
expansion. Not only is the expansion of al-Qaedas recognized affiliates
clear, but also a large number of new organizations have cropped up in the
Middle East and North Africa that profess an allegiance to al-Qaedas
ideology, salafi jihadism, yet claim they are organizationally independent from its
network. These claims cannot necessarily be taken at face value. Indeed, two
central questions that analysts of jihadist militancy debate today are: 1) to what
extent are these new jihadist groups connected to the al- Qaeda network, and 2) to
what extent is al-Qaedas senior leadership (AQSL) able to set priorities and
strategy for its affiliates, and thus either control or influence their activities?
Uncertainties surrounding both questions somewhat complicate the U.S.s policy
response. This testimony begins by examining the question of what al-Qaeda is, and
what its goals are. Thereafter, it turns to the perceptions that al-Qaeda and other
salafi jihadists had of the Arab Spring, and their ideas about how the movement
could benefit. The testimony then calls into question the notion that alQaedas senior leadership has been decimatedwhich, if true, means that
intentions aside, the group would be unable to execute strategy in the new
environment. I then turn to factors that did in fact strengthen al-Qaeda and
jihadism during the Arab Spring, before giving an overview of al-Qaedas
current position. I conclude by discussing what kinds of policy responses are
appropriate for the United States to adopt to address this challenge.
Yemen security forces collapsing, Al-Qaeda on the brink of

victory
The more that you have an expansion of sectarian conflict, the more you will have
initiative for and scope for and encouragement for extremist groups, some of them
affiliated with al-Qaida, to take root and take advantage of public fear.
I want to highlight a couple of things that I think have been lost in this discussion
and thank my -- the terrific staff at Critical Threats Project, Katherine Zimmerman,
who's here, and Sasha Gordon, for their work on al-Qaida and on Yemen in
particular, to say part of my concern stems from the fact that there's places where
we have had strategies like Yemen, the strategy is failing. It's not working. We
have had a strategy of very limited direct attacks against senior al- Qaida in Arabian
Peninsula leaders, coupled with a strategy that focused on diplomatic resolution of
the challenges in Sana'a and assistance to the Yemeni security forces.
Most of the fighting against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was done by the
Yemeni security forces, and they did a very good job of retaking ground that AQAP
had taken, and I think the ranking member's point is a very important one. We
certainly do need to work through allies whenever possible and strengthen our allies
65
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 66 of 318
whenever we can in this fight. The problem is that the Yemeni security forces
are not only not being strengthened, not only are they be weakened, but
they are fracturing. And we have seen -- we have counted more than 24
mutinies in brigade-level units in the Yemeni security forces over the past
couple of years. The rate of mutinying has been accelerating. We have
had instances of elite units engaged in the fight with al- Qaida being
effectively dissolved in place by mutinies and the Yemeni government
response. This is a force that is cracking, unfortunately, and as a result of that,
we are seeing AQAP re-attack into Abyan, re- attack into areas that it had
been driven out of, and begin to reestablish itself.
And I raise this specific case because Yemen has been held up as a model, and
there are even some people who ignore the fact that Afghanistan has no coastline
and suggest that we should apply the Yemen model to Afghanistan. And before we
have that conversation, it's incredibly important to understand that the Yemen
model isn't working in Yemen, and if there's any desire on the part of the
committee, I would be happy to talk about similar challenges that our strategy in
Somalia has (facing ?), where our allies there, who are even more limited in
capability, are running into very predictable challenges to their ability to maintain
gains, let alone to expand on them.
So my bottom line is, I think that Seth may have been a little bit too optimistic. I
think that we actually need to consider the possibility that we are starting
to lose the war with al-Qaida, and that we really need to rethink our strategy,
such as it is, very, very fundamentally in light of the fact that we maybe need to
recognize that it actually is failing for all the damage that we've done to the core
group in Pakistan. Thank you for your time.
Al Qaeda operates world-wide

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, July 18, 2013, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies and a senior editor of The Long War Journal. Mr. Joscelyn is
also a frequent contributor to The Weekly Standard and was the senior
counterterrorism adviser to Mayor Giuliani during the 2008 presidential campaign,
Hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: "Global al-Qaida: Affiliates, Objectives and
Future Challenges" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=740859
THOMAS JOSCELYN: Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Sherman and
other members of the committee, for having me here today. I am honored to be on
this panel alongside these gentlemen and to testify before you on this topic.
And in that vein, al-Qaida's core is not confined, I would argue, to Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The way I look at it, based on al- Qaida's literature, including a
recently published letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri is that it's basically where their
general command is actually headquartered, and they have a series of
committees and advisers surrounding Ayman al-Zawahiri. But the general
command dispatches operatives around the globe to oversee their interests, and I
can -- I won't get into the nerd analysis for you right now, but I can point to specific
operatives who we know are in touch with the general command, who have been
66
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 67 of 318
dispatched by the general command, and they're operating in places such as

Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sinai -- you know, across the globe, basically.
The third and final point is that, you know, a lot of the discussion centers on, of
course, again, the threat to the U.S. homeland. And we should be happy that they
haven't been able to execute something on the level of a 9/11-style attack. That's
the good news. Certainly, America's defenses have improved through the years.
We've thwarted plots. We've also gotten lucky on occasion, avoiding mass casualty
attacks. But I just want to highlight something in my testimony. When you talk
about the threats to the U.S. homeland now, they are more diffuse, not just abroad
but also to us here in this country.
Since 2009, the way I look at it, we have -- there have been plots from alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula, again starting on Christmas Day, 2009, plots
by the Pakistani Taliban in May 2010, which had the failed Time Square bombing.
They actually took credit for that at my website; they emailed us credit for that
operation. The Pakistani Taliban, according to the Obama administration, which has
done a good job of describing the Pakistani Taliban, has a symbiotic relationship
with al-Qaida. There have been -- there was a recent plot earlier this year
from -- connected to al-Qaida members in Iran, which involved derailing the
train from New York to Toronto.
And we've seen recent evidence that al-Qaida in Iraq, according to the Iraqi
government anyway, may have considered dispatching operatives to launch
some sort of chemical weapons attack in Europe and also the U.S. In that
regard, I point out that al-Qaida in Iraq actually was tied to the 2007 failed attacks
in Glasgow and in London, and was actually tasked in 2004 by al-Qaida's general
command with coming up with a plan to attack us.
Strength of Al Qaeda affiliates increasing

My second and more pessimistic point is that the jihadi movement writ large is
thriving and will be with us for another decade, at least. I think that the optimists
were basically wrong in commenting on the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was not
an end of the Cold War moment for jihadism. Al-Qaida core may be very weak, and
Al-Shabaab in Somalia may be experiencing setbacks, but the other affiliates are
doing just fine, and the new Ansar al-Sharia groups in North Africa are growing. The
Syrian war, with its staggering numbers of foreign fighters, has been a major boost
to the movement.
MR. KAGAN: Sir, I do not think that we have articulated a strategy for defeating alQaida as a global network with affiliates and its associates. I think that we have
undertaken a collection of tactics, and we have made a number of broad statements
about this, but I believe that this is a challenge that is worthy of the kind of
analytical and planning effort that went into NSC-68 or any other extremely serious
67
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 68 of 318
war. And candidly, especially after the death of Osama bin Laden, I would have
looked for a major planning effort of that variety to think about what the next stage
was, and I do not believe -- at least if that's happened, then I'm completely unaware
of it.
REP. SHERMAN: Thank you. I don't want the panel to think that the absence of
Democrats here reflects any disinterest, or that my own absence soon will do that.
As it happens, we've scheduled an important caucus meeting at the same time as
this hearing, which -- and of course, this hearing was delayed by votes on the floor.
Al Qaeda strength in Iraq increasing

MR. JONES: I think these are very good questions. I think the failure to establish
and reach a status of forces agreement in Iraq, in the U.S. withdrawal, allowed two
things. It allowed al-Qaida in Iraq to regenerate. Its attacks are greater this year
than they were in the last year of U.S. involvement, in 2011. And second, and
perhaps more important there, it allowed al-Qaida in Iraq to help establish Jabhat alNusra in Syria. Those were two, I think, devastating steps in that region that the
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at least allowed.
68
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 69 of 318
AQAPTargets the U.S.

AQAP is likely to attempt transnational attacks.
Clapper 12 (James, Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for
the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/013112clapper.pdf)
Despite the death in September of AQAP transnational operations chief and US person Anwar al-Aulaqi, we
judge AQAP remains the node most likely to attempt transnational attacks. His death
probably reduces, at least temporarily, AQAPs ability to plan transnational attacks, but many of those
responsible for implementing plots, including bombmakers, financiers, and facilitators, remain and could advance
plots. We assess that AQI will remain focused on overthrowing the Shia-led government in Baghdad in favor of a
Sunni-led Islamic caliphate. It probably will attempt attacks primarily on local Iraqi targets, including government
institutions, Iraqi Security Forces personnel, Shia civilians, and recalcitrant Sunnis, such as members of the Sons
of Iraq, and will seek to re-build support among the Sunni population. In its public statements, the group also
supports the goals of the global jihad, and
we are watchful for indications that AQI aspires to
conduct attacks in the West.
69
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 70 of 318
Threat Africa
Threat of terrorism in Africa increasing
John Manzongo, The Herald (Harare), March 10, 2014, Call for Co-Operation to Fight Terrorism
Defence Minister Dr Sydney Sekeramayi has called for deeper regional co-operation to counter
terrorism threats facing Africa, especially in light of last year's attacks at a popular Kenyan
shopping mall. Addressing delegates at the seventh session of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Joint
Permanent Commission on Defence and Security in Harare last week, Dr Sekeramayi said
terrorist attacks in Africa had escalated in recent years. "A major threat to the stability and
security of Africa continues to be terrorism," he said. "The period under review has seen an
escalation of terrorist activities on African soil. "The terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall
in Nairobi, Kenya and the attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria only serve to highlight the
need for us to further enhance counter-terrorism mechanisms in the region." Dr Sekeramayi
said as Zimbabwe prepared to assume the chairmanship of SADC, it was hopeful that the signing
of a peace agreement between the DRC government and M23 rebels would pave way for peace
and stability in that country. He said the recent peaceful presidential elections in Madagascar
were also commendable. Mozambique's Minister of National Defence, Mr Filipe Jacinto Nyusi,
congratulated President Mugabe and Zimbabweans at large for holding peaceful, free, fair and
credible elections on July 31, 2013.
Africa terrorism risks increasing

Professional Services Close-Up, February 8, 2014
New Aon Terrorism Data Finds Retail and Transport Sectors Face Highest Risk of Attack
Further, despite some improvements in the ratings - eight decreases and just one increase to the
37 country scores that cover Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, Africa remains a continent of high
political violence and terrorism risk, with 22 countries having high to severe risk ratings.
70
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 71 of 318
Threat Africa
Terror threat from Africa increasing
New York Times, September 14, 211, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/threeterrorist-groups-in-africa-pose-threat-to-us-general-ham-says.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
The senior American military commander for Africa warned Wednesday that
three violent extremist organizations on the continent were trying to forge
an alliance to coordinate attacks on the United States and Western interests.
The commander, Gen. Carter F. Ham, the top officer at Africa Command, said terrorist
organizations in East Africa, in the deserts of northern Africa and in Nigeria
have very explicitly and publicly voiced an intent to target Westerners, and
the U.S. specifically. General Ham made clear that the three militant organizations
the Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region of
northern Africa and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria had not yet shown the
capability to mount significant attacks outside their homelands. I have questions
about their capability to do so, General Ham told a group of correspondents, adding
that he was worried about the voiced intent of the three organizations to more closely
collaborate and synchronize their efforts. Each of those three independently
presents a significant threat not only in the nations in which they primarily operate,
but regionally and I think they present a threat to the United States, General Ham
said. Defense Department officials confirmed later on Wednesday that a large car
bomb detonated in August by Boko Haram militants bore signature elements of the
improvised explosives used by the Qaeda offshoot in the Sahel; those forensics are
leading analysts to suggest that the group had shared its tactics and techniques with
the Nigerian terrorist organization. Defense Department officials noted that the three
African terrorist groups had traditionally hit local government targets, and that they
differed in ideology. But one Defense Department official said they were believed to be
working toward an alliance of convenience.
Government experts consider the ascendancy of regional affiliates of Al Qaeda as
especially worrisome. Al Qaedas traditional leadership in Pakistan is deemed
less capable of planning and carrying out significant attacks, especially since
the death of Osama bin Laden in May. But Pentagon and intelligence officials
hold that regional affiliates in particular the Qaeda branch in Yemen
pose increasing threats to American interests today.
71
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 72 of 318
Pakistan Terrorist Threat

Al Qaeda launching terror attacks from Pakistan
DanielL.Byman,DirectorofResearch,SabanCenterforMiddleEastPolicy,September1,2011,TheHistoryofAl
Qaeda,http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0901_al_qaeda_history_byman.aspx
As al Qaeda's star fell in Iraq, its power grew in Pakistan. Since its founding, al Qaeda
has had strong ties within Pakistan, but it found itself on the ropes after 9/11 as the
Pakistani government worked with the United States to capture key leaders such as
9/11-mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. As the decade wore on, however, the
United States became increasingly distracted in Iraq. Meanwhile, Pakistan itself
became more and more chaotic, with a range of radical groups (some of which were
linked to al Qaeda) turning against the Pakistani government. All of this allowed al
Qaeda to reestablish itself operationally in Pakistan. Most of the major terrorist attacks
plotted against European targets since 9/11 had some link to al Qaeda's core in
Pakistan.
72
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 73 of 318
Threat Middle East

Middle East terror threats increasing
CNN Wire, January 23, 2015 , What's happening in the Middle East and why it matters
The country's government is in a shambles. Violence -- some of it sectarian, some of it
thanks to militancy from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) -- has been raging
nationwide for months, if not years. And it's far and away the poorest nation in the region,
with a per capita GDP of $1,473, according to the World Bank. (Compare that with Saudi
Arabia's $25,962.) Let's start with the still unfolding political crisis. Yemen's President and
Prime Minister abruptly resigned Thursday after Houthi rebels -- Shiite Muslims who have
long felt marginalized in the majority Sunni country -- moved on the capital, Sana'a. How
Yemen's new government will look is still unclear, if it's going to have a functioning government
at all. If the Houthis take the lead, that would mean Shiites ruling a country that's mostly Shiite.
While the Houthis and previous government both fought against al Qaeda, this instability can
only help that terror group. And none of this is helping the average Yemeni stuck in poverty,
with little time, money or effort seemingly focused on improving their straits or the economy as a
whole. Why it matters to the West and beyond For the rest of the world, political stability is a
good thing for any country in this region; on the flip side, instability is always a concern. There's
also the fact that Yemen has enough oil and natural gas for its people and export, though unrest
makes it challenging to tap into these resources, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
notes. All those worries and impacts are real. But, for the West, it's about AQAP.
Ever since Osama bin Laden was flushed out of Afghanistan, the terrorist organization he
founded has spread out and evolved. Rather than one overarching entity, al Qaeda is now
more of an association of groups -- each with its own goals, even if they all share a
philosophy of lashing out at the West and promoting their extreme brand of Islam. And of
those, AQAP is widely considered the most dangerous to the West. It's the only al Qaeda
affiliate to send terrorists from Yemen to the United States. There was Umar Farouk
AbdulMutallab, better known as "the underwear bomber" for his attempt to blow up a
commercial airliner on a Detroit-bound flight in December 2009. Then there are the suspects in
the deadly Boston Marathon bombings and Nidal Hassan, who reportedly were inspired by
American-born cleric and top AQAP figure Anwar al-Awlaki. The United States isn't the only
place affected. AQAP has claimed to be behind the January 7 Charlie Hebdo massacre,
and one of the brothers involved -- Cherif Kouachi -- told CNN affiliate BFM that he trained
in Yemen on a trip financed by al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is dead, but his organization is not. With
both Yemen's government and the Houthis focused on each other, AQAP has more space to
recruit and train terrorists, as well as devise ways for them to strike.
Threat of Middle East terrorism increasing

Geoff Chambers, Daily Telegraph, March 31, 2014, Syria a terror incubator, p. 12
A FRESH wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Syria and Egypt had incubated a new
generation of jihadists that could threaten Australia, a leading think tank said. The Lowy
Insitute says Jihadist fighters returning to Australia pose a significant domestic terrorist threat.
The institute's Next-Gen Jihad in the Middle East report released today reveals that 65 per cent of
73
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 74 of 318
Australians remain concerned about terrorism threats. Lowy Institute Research Director Anthony
Bubalo said a fresh wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Syria and Egypt had incubated a new
generation of jihadists. The number of young men from Sydney's inner-west suburbs travelling to
fight with al-Qaeda linked terror groups was a concern, Mr Bubalo said. "In many respects the
current conditions for the creation of extremist movements and ideas in the Middle East
are worse than those that saw the emergence of al-Qaeda," Mr Bubalo said. Three Sydney
Muslims - former soldier Caner Temel, 22, and couple Yusuf Ali and Amira Karroum, both 22 have died fighting with al-Qaeda in Syria. Mr Bubalo said there could be terror fears about
Australians returning from Syria after gaining military skills and links with extremist terror
groups. A Lowy Institute Poll reveals one-third of Australians regard international terrorism as a
"critical threat to Australia's security". "Australia must not lose sight of developments in the
broader Middle East, even as it focuses more intensely on strategic developments in Asia and the
Indo-Pacific," he said.
Middle East terrorism risks increasing

Empirically, the Middle East is the region most afflicted by terrorism in the world, with a 28
percent share of all terrorist attacks recorded worldwide in 2013. A new strain of Salafi
Jihadism has emerged in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as evidenced
by increased levels of terrorism. This is a cause and effect of the limited political recovery of
post Arab Spring countries, and has contributed to widespread high-to-severe risk ratings across
the region.
Resurgence of terrorism threat from Iraq

MATTHEW OLSEN, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, March 6, 2014, Hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of
Terrorism and Sectarianism in the Middle East"
Finally, I'll turn to Iraq. What we've witnessed there over the last three years is a resurgence
by the Islamic State for Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, the former group known as the AQI.
The group has a core cadre of veteran extremists and access to a steady flow of weapons and
fighters from Syria. So last year, ISIL suicide and car bomb attacks returned to their peak levels
from what we saw back in 2007 and 2008. At the end of last year, the group was averaging
one suicide attack per day. The situation in Fallujah is particularly disconcerting, where
hundreds of ISIL fighters have joined the ranks with former insurgent groups to consolidate
control of the inner city and contested areas in neighboring towns. In sum, the threat posed by
ISIL to our interests in the region is growing, not diminishing. And in the period ahead, we'll
be working closely with our colleagues from State and Defense to aid the Iraqi government's
counterterrorism efforts. A last point I'll make is that in light of the large foreign fighter
component in the Syrian crisis, we're working together to gather every piece of information we
can about the identities of these individuals.
74
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 75 of 318
Threat -- Al-Shabaab Strong

Al-Shabaab is also recovering
Another al-Qaeda franchise that is seemingly recovering its capabilities,
based on the attacks it was able to execute, is the Somali militant group
al-Shabaab. Shabaab once controlled more territory in southern Somalia than did
the countrys U.N.-recognized government, but it lost its last major urban stronghold
of Kismayo to advancing African Union forces in October 2012. However,
Shabaabs capabilities have recovered since then. The group captured
worldwide attention on September 21, 2013, when terrorists associated with the
group launched a spectacular assault on Nairobis Westgate Mall. The attack
dragged on for four days, killing 67 and injuring at least 175. But even before
that, there were signs that a complex operation like Westgate was
possible, as Shabaab carried out increasingly sophisticated attacks
throughout the year. These included an April 2013 attack on a Mogadishu
courthouse that killed 29, and a June 2013 twin suicide bombing at Mogadishus
U.N. compound that claimed 22 lives. Over the course of 2013, Shabaab was
able to kill between 515 and 664 people, according to a database that I
maintain.
75
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 76 of 318
Terrorism Risks Increasing Al Qaeda

Geographically Spread
Al Qaeda operates in more places
At the same time, however, al-Qaeda and allied groups today are situated in
more places than on September 11, 2001. They maintain a presence in
some 16 different theatres of operationcompared with half as many as
recently as five years ago. Although some of these operational environments are
less amenable than others (South Asia, Southeast Asia), a few have been the sites
of revival and resuscitation (Iraq and North Africa) or of expansion (Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, and Syria).
76
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 77 of 318
Terrorism Risks Increasing Recruiting Up

Middle East instability increases terror recruiting
Finally, the Middle East is experiencing a level of instability unknown in

recent years. The civil war in Syria mayprovide al-Qaeda with a chance to
regroup, train, and plan operations, much as the U.S. invasion of Iraq
revitalizedthe network and gave it new relevance. Returning foreign fighters
from the war Syria may destabilize the region, or they might try to conduct attacks
in the West. Sunni-Shia tensions are rising across the region, and the military
overthrow of the Morsi government in Egypt may increase support among some
disillusioned Islamists for al-Qaedas ideological rejection of democracy. Any of
these factors might raise the level of threat from groups aligned with alQaeda.
77
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 78 of 318
Terror Risks Increasing/US Counterterrorism Fails

Al-Shabaab attack proves terror risks increasing AND that US
efforts to stop terrorism are failures
Lisa Ruth, 9-26, 13, Intelligence officers warn of more terrorism after Kenya mall attack,
Washington Times, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/intelligence-andworld-affairs/2013/sep/26/intelligence-officers-warn-terrorist-attacks-after/
The horrific terrorist attack by al-Shabaab on the Watergate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya
this week starkly highlights the threat of al-Qaeda affiliates against soft targets around the
world and the increasing reach of terrorist affiliates. It is also raising concerns of another
round of terrorist attacks, potentially even in the United States. The few Americans aware of
al-Shabaab before this week likely categorized it as a Somali terrorist group, active primarily
around the Port of Kismayo. Last year, African Union troops expelled the group from the
stronghold, declaring a cautious victory. Even at the time, however, a village elder warned a local
television station that no one should celebrate. Al Shabaab has not perished, he said on the
television interview, so the worry is what next. Whats next appears to be an effort by the
group to grow geographically and in numbers. Andy Polk, former director of the
congressional anti-terrorism caucus, told the Communities, Al-Shabaab has been working very
quietly to expand regionally after the assaults against them, to stretch the battlefield and get new
recruits. Their regional magazine is clearly aimed at attracting disaffected youth in Ethiopia,
Kenya and elsewhere, and it appears to be working. The hard-line Muslim group, known for
imposing strict Sharia law complete with stonings and public executions in areas it controls, is a
clan-based terrorist group that has declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda. According to the
website of the National Counterterrorism Center, the group is not centralized or monolithic in
its agenda or goals.
However, according to counter-terrorism officials, since the group
formally joined with al-Qaeda in 2007, it has developed a coherent goal beyond expelling the
infidels from Somalia to include global jihad. One intelligence official notes, If you look at
Shabaab and how it is evolved, you can see it clearly has gone from wanting to make Somalia an
Islamic state to promoting al-Qaedas idea of an Islamic Caliphate. A report by the America
Enterprise Group supports this position. In its Analysis of Al-Shabaabs Evolving Rhetoric,
published in February 2011, Cody Curran sites a May 2010 threat by al-Shabaab which said, we
warn that the hand of oppression which has for so long affected worshippers at the mosque in
Bakara Market, a mosque often targeted by cowardly Crusader attack, is the same filthy hand
which kills Muslims in Pakistan and Iraq We will not live in security until we extirpate their
roots, if not tomorrow, then in the near future. Like other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab has
successfully used social media to spread its message and gain recruits. The organization has
mastered YouTube, twitter, and Facebook as well as other social networking sites. According to
Polk, Shabaab is growing in popularity around the region because it is offering recruits and their
family large sums of money to join the organization. He says Ideology is part of it, but their
recruiters are very clever. They will offer a potential recruit whatever they are looking for
money, fame, a way out, or the jihadist ideology if that will get them to join up. At the same
time, they are romanticizing the idea of al-Shabaab, says Polk. Joining them is almost like
camp: You can camp out, learn to shoot, and be part of something greater all of which is
78
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 79 of 318
appealing to a young person in a slum with no job and no hope. Once these young idealists join
al-Shabaab, however, they are basically kidnapped, explains Polk. He says, There is no
money, and they are told if they try to escape they will kill them and their family. Says Polk,
The countries really have to work harder at developing education and counter extremist
messages to let their youth know not all that glitters is gold, that al-Shabaab is not camp but they
are trying to kidnap them away from their families. Soft targets, or civilian targets, are
likely to remain a major aim for al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups. Not only do these
targets require the least planning and skill to succeed, but they also inflict the most psychological
damage. Last January, an al-Qaeda affiliate led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar launched another major
attack against a civilian target. The brigade took over an oil field in Amenas, Algeria, and
demanded that France halt its military intervention in northern Mali. The brigade took more than
800 hostages, including 132 foreigners. Algerian forces ultimately freed most of the hostages, but
49 hostages including three Americans were killed in the crisis. Polk warns, I would not
be surprised to see attacks over the next 12 months against schools, churches, nightclubs
and restaurants like we have seen by Islamists in Kenya and Ethiopia. While international
authorities are attempting to thwart al-Shabaab recruiting efforts, and are stepping up drone
strikes and intelligence operations against the terrorist organization, the threat remains
significant. Andy Polk says, I think Syria is creating a blind spot to a growing security threat to
the U.S. The administration does not seem to fully understand the proliferation of al-Qaeda
throughout Africa in the form of various affiliates, as was evident by the response to the
Benghazi tragedy, nor does it have a real, strategic, long term policy to address the problem. A
former CIA officer who worked on the terrorist target says that despite drone attacks, intelligence
efforts and military attention to the terrorist problem, the mall attack shows that United States is
woefully behind in tracking terrorists. We thought al-Qaeda was dead after bin Laden, he
notes, and they were just regrouping. Now we have affiliates and sympathizers and who
knows what else, and we just cant keep up. We plug up one place and another springs a
leak. Who would have thought al-Shabaab would have launched an attack at a major mall, a
few blocks from the embassy in Christian-dominated Kenya? Maybe some intelligence officers,
but obviously they werent screaming loud enough, he says. The real tragedy, he notes, is
that we have no idea what is going on. We dont have enough resources, or the right kinds of
resources, so Shabaab just goes out and takes over a mall frequented by foreigners and kills
anyone who cant recite a Muslim prayer and we have no idea it is coming. The success of the
attack, he says, is likely to spawn similar efforts.
79
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 80 of 318
Terror Risks Increasing -- Weak Drone Strike Policy

Fails
Increase in terror attacks correlated with reduction in drone
strikes
RT Blog, 9-26, 13, http://rt.com/usa/rogers-drone-strike-terrorism-404/
Effectiveness of Obamas drone program questioned as terrorist attacks surge,
ThechairmanoftheHouseofRepresentative'sPermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceisquestioning
theWhiteHouse'scounterterrorismstrategyamidanincreaseinviolentattacksacrosstheglobe.Rep.Mike
Rogers(RMichigan)raisedconcernsoverUnitedStatesPresidentBarackObama'sforeignpolicyduringan
interviewthisweekwithFoxNews.Atatimewhenterrorismattacksaroundtheworldremainrampant,the
UShassignificantlyscaledbackitsuseofunmannedaerialvehicles,ordrones,whichhadupuntilrecentlybeen
theadministration'ssignaturemethodoferadicatingallegedextremistsinlocalessuchasPakistan,Yemenand
Somalia.ArecentreportfromtheWestPointCounterterroismCenterdeterminedthatmorethan60terror
attackshavebeenconductedinternationallythisyear,whiletheUShasbeenlinkedtoonly22dronestrikes
targetingterroraffectedcountriesduringthatsamespan.It'snotdiminishing,Rep.Rogerssaidofthe
continuingterroristattacksduringaninterviewwithFoxNewsonTuesday.Therehavebeencounterterrorism
changesmadebytheadministrationthathaveconcernedusall,thingsthatwe'vebeenworkingonforaperiodof
monthsthatwe'retryingtoworkthroughthatarevery,veryconcerning.Thisisnotimetoretreat.Mostrecently,
anincidentatashoppingmallinKenyalastweekyieldedover60deathsandhasbeenattributedtotheSomalia
basedgroupalShabab.DuringanaddressinWashingtonearlierthisyear,Pres.Obamasaidhisadministrationwas
enteringanewphasewithregardstoitscounterterrorismstrategy.SpeakingbroadlyofAmerica'suseofdrones
againstsuspectedterroristsoverseas,thepresidentsaid,Tosayamilitarytacticislegal,oreveneffective,isnotto
sayitiswiseormoralineveryinstance.Forthesamehumanprogressthatgivesusthetechnologytostrikehalf
aworldawayalsodemandsthedisciplinetoconstrainthatpowerorriskabusingit,Obamasaid.Onhispart,
Rogershaslongdefendedtheuseofdronestocombatterrorismoverseas,andapprovedoftheObamaauthorized
strikein2011thatkilledAnwaralAwlaki,anAmericancitizensuspectedofbeinginvolvedwithALQaeda. This
wasatoolthatwecouldusetostopfurtherterroristattacksagainstAmericans,RogerstoldCBSNewsin
February.Indeed,theWhiteHousehascontinuedtheuseofUAVsagainstsuspectedterrorists,albeitnotwith
thesameintensityasduringearlieryearsoftheObamaadministration.AdronestrikeinPakistanlastweek
believedtobelaunchedbytheUShasbeencreditedwithkillingsixsuspectedmilitants.Pakistan'sForeignMinistry
saidinresponsethatstrikesarecounterproductive,entaillossofinnocentcivilianlivesandhavehumanrights
andhumanitarianimplications.InAugust,USSecretaryofStateJohnKerryhintedthatAmerica'sdrone
operationsinPakistancouldsoonbesuspendedentirely.Theprogramwillendaswehaveeliminatedmostofthe
threatandcontinuetoeliminateit,Kerrysaidlastmonth.Ithinkthepresidenthasaveryrealtimeline,andwe
hopeitsgoingtobevery,verysoon.
80
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 81 of 318
Terror Risks Increasing A2: Drone Strikes Solve

Al Qaeda dead in Pakistan but operating elsewhere
Core al-Qaeda has been decimated by drone strikes and arrests in

Pakistan, but continues to find some sanctuary in the countrys
ungoverned tribal regions, and is potentially ready to move back into
Afghanistan, should that country experience significant instability after
NATO combat troops withdraw at the end of 2014. CIA drone strikes have
killed 33 al-Qaeda leaders or senior operatives in Pakistan since 2008.3 As
a result, there are only around four al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan today.
The groups overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has proved to be more
capable than some analysts initially thought, officially bringing Somalias
al-Shabaab group and Syrias Jabhat al-Nusra organization into al-Qaedas
fold. Zawahiri also had no problem transferring already existing al-Qaeda affiliates
allegiances from Osama bin Laden to himself. In the three months following bin
Ladens death in May 2011, the leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) all pledged
their allegiance to Zawahiri as their new overall commander.4,5,
Drone strikes wont solve US-citizen terrorists

Brian Ross, 9-11, 13, ABC News, http://gma.yahoo.com/officials-dozens-u-undersurveillance-potential-terror-threats-234106742--abc-news-topstories.html
Twelve years after al Qaeda slaughtered nearly 3,000 Americans on U.S. soil, the
FBI has under watch as many as 100 people inside the homeland
suspected of being linked to or inspired by the terror group, intelligence and
law enforcement officials told ABC News. Additionally, intelligence and law
enforcement officials had anticipated -- even before April's Boston Marathon
bombings -- that this approximate number of terror cases wouldn't change in the
years ahead, even with arrests made, because of new cases expected to surface.
Despite years of losses from drone strikes overseas and counter-terrorism
operations inside the American homeland, the al Qaeda network still
survives thanks in part to its American recruits. "I think that is the most
disturbing thing, to see Americans switching sides and going over to the enemy,"
81
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 82 of 318
Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland

Security, told ABC News. Some of the Americans that have gone over to al
Qaeda have risen far enough in the ranks that in the years after the Twin
Towers fell, often the public voice of the perpetrators of that horrible
attack speak with an American accent. "America is absolutely awash with
easily obtainable firearms," said Adam Yahiye Gadahn, a California Muslim
convert, in a 2011 Al Qaeda video urging individual violent jihad. "So what are you
waiting for?" Gadahn, who once tore up his U.S. passport on camera, is now in Al
Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan, regularly producing videos in English and Arabic. He
is the first American since the 1950's to be charged with treason, indicted in 2006.
Gadahn is one of five Americans the U.S. has offered a total of $21 million in
rewards to help capture because they served under Osama Bin Laden or his
henchmen. The five, however, are only a fraction of the number of Americans
believed to be fighting for al Qaeda or one of its affiliates. Americans taunting their
own countrymen -- or luring them into the fight -- is a new and troubling reality
about the resilience of al Qaeda even after the killings of Osama bin Laden and
Yemeni-American al Qaeda cleric and leader Anwar al-Awlaki two years ago. The
accused American terrorists come from small towns and big cities, law enforcement
officials told ABC News. They include a man who grew up on Monte Vista Road in
Phoenix, 30-year-old U.S. Army veteran Eric Harroun. This year he became one of
about a dozen Americans who authorities say are fighting in Syria with a group that
has sworn allegiance to al Qaeda, called Jabhat al-Nusra. Harroun, who was lured
out of the region by the FBI and charged with terrorism in a Virginia federal court,
allegedly posted videos on Facebook of his adventures in Syria with fellow fighters,
including one where he addressed Syria's president Bashar al-Assad, saying, "Where
you go we will find out and kill you. Do you understand?" Eric Harroun's father says
his son just fell in with the wrong people. "He's not any terrorist, not any more than
I am," Darryl Harroun said in an interview today with ABC News from Phoenix. The
younger Harroun is expected to go to trial in two months on terror charges.
American recruits to al Qaeda are also showing up in other hot spots across the
Middle East and Africa, intelligence sources said. "As an American citizen, I'm
shocked. I'm amazed that something like that occurs," Shawn Henry, who retired
last year as a senior FBI official, told ABC News. Henry, now an executive at the
cyber security firm CrowdStrike, said Americans or "U.S. Persons" -- non-citizens
who have lived here and have certain legal rights -- radicalized to violent Islamist
extremism are "a minority," but the FBI's highest counterterrorism priority. "Once
they get that into their blood, it's a threat," Henry said. At least 50 young American
men have been tracked to the al Qaeda group fighting in Somalia, al-Shabaab,
where a young man from the small town of Daphne, Alabama, Omar Hammami,
became a top commander. "Our main objective, one of the things we seek for in
this life of ours, is to die as martyrs," Hammami explained in one video, among
numerous he made to help al-Shabaab draw Westerners into the fight. More than
15 U.S. citizens have been killed fighting with al-Shabaab, and at least 20 remain
unaccounted for in Somalia. A new American voice in the Somali terror
organization, the as yet unidentified "Abu Ahmed al-Amriki," appeared in a February
video, said his countrymen should fight Western governments in Afghanistan,
Somalia and Mali. "America is going down and the Caliphate is rising," he said,
brandishing an AK-47. Hammami -- who remains committed to violent jihad despite
a falling out with al-Shabaab leaders -- is now one of the five Americans with U.S.
rewards ranging from $1 to $5 million on their head because of their alleged Al
82
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 83 of 318
Qaeda leadership positions. Others are men from Waukesha, Wisconsin, Brooklyn,
New York and Buffalo, New York. For security reasons, the details of those 100 or so
individuals under surveillance inside the U.S. are closely guarded, and both U.S. and
European officials say they're focused on Westerners joining al Qaeda in places such
as Syria, which is relatively easy to enter. Asked via Twitter last March about those
like him, who turn against America by joining al Qaeda affiliates such as al-Shabaab
in Somalia, Hammami did not deny the threat they pose. Somalia has "many
muhajirs from U.S. And dangerous. True," tweeted @abumamerican, an account
believed by U.S. officials to be Hammami's.
83
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 84 of 318
Terrorism Risks Increasing Threats to Nuclear

Power Plants
US nuclear power sites not protected, risk of terror attack
Laura Muth, 9-2, 13 graduated in 2012 from Johns Hopkins University with a
degree in political science, Policy Mic, The Unexpected Threat to Americas Nuclear
Power Sites, http://www.policymic.com/articles/61611/the-unexpected-threat-toamerica-s-nuclear-sites
Decades after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is dealing with a different nuclear threA2: the
security of its own nuclear sites. But the problem is more complicated than you might think. The
University of Texas, Austin Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) recently
released a report stating that none of the 104 commercial nuclear reactors or three research
reactors in the U.S. is adequately protected against terrorist threats. The report cites two
credible threats: the theft of bomb-grade material to make a nuclear weapon, and
sabotage attacks intended to cause a reactor meltdown.
Attack on a reactor means a massive release of radioactivity

Michael Clark, 2013, Michael Clarke (m.clarke@griffith.edu.au) is an Australian
Research Council (ARC) Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, June 2013,
Comparative Strategy, Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?,
pp. 98-114
Commercial power reactors are arguably more attractive for a terrorist
attack aimed at dispersing radioactive material than research reactors
due to the fact that they are more numerous (approximately 440 commercial
power reactors in 31 countries), are larger, contain more radioactive spent
fuel in cooling ponds, and contain much higher levels of radioactivity in
their core. 33 Ferguson and Potter conclude that while a terrorist attack targeting a
reactor or spent fuel pond could not ignite an explosive chain reactionthat is a
nuclear bomb-type explosion, the worst plausible scenario is that terrorists
would be able to cause a massive off-site release of radioactivity and
substantial damage to the nuclear facility.
Terrorists can attack spent fuel rods

Laura Kirkman, Allan Kuperman, 8-15, 13, Nonproliferation Prevention Project,
Protecting US Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Reassessing the Current
Design Basis Threat Approach, http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2013/08/NPPPworking-paper-1-2013-Aug-15.pdf
Sabotage of spent fuel pools is related to sabotage of nuclear power plants, which
typically store their spent fuel in facilities located on their grounds. Unlike fresh fuel,
spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive but unable to sustain as efficient a nuclear
chain reaction. This spent fuel is removed from the reactor and stored in pools of
cooling water, and sometimes is subsequently transferred to more permanent drycask storage on- site. The pools often lack the shielding and structural protections
84
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 85 of 318
that the containment provides to the reactor itself, leaving the spent fuel also more
vulnerable to sabotage by terrorists.43
A 2006 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that a successful
terrorist attack on spent fuel pools would be difficult, but possible.44 In the absence
of a centralized national storage facility for spent fuel, nuclear power plants often
maintain their spent fuel pool inventories at amounts beyond the original design
limits of the pool.45 A terrorist with enough technical knowledge and means could
drain a spent fuel pool, triggering a cladding fire that could result in the release of
large amounts of radioactive material.46 This is similar to what occurred in 2011 in
Fukushima, Japan, when an earthquakes effects drained the spent fuel pools.
According to Beyea, Lyman, and von Hippel, a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool
could cause thousands of deaths from cancer, and economic damages in the
hundreds of billions of dollars.47 In the wake of the NAS report, U.S. utilities
reportedly have taken some measures that may somewhat mitigate this risk, but
not eliminate it.48 An attack on dry cask storage would also result in the release of
radioactive material, although in smaller amounts due to design differences.
Insiders could attack plants

Implicit in the four threats described above is the possibility of an active or passive
insider using knowledge of facilities to assist terrorists in their actions. Passive
insiders could provide information about weaknesses in the plant or operations,
allowing terrorists to magnify their impact. 49 An active insider could deactivate
alarm and emergency safety systems or deliver explosives to sensitive areas of the
nuclear facility.50 A recent incident highlights the immediacy of the insider threat
problem. An American citizen, suspected of al Qaeda membership, worked for five
different US nuclear power plants from 2002 to 2008 after passing federal
background checks.51 This incident is particularly disturbing because nuclear power
plants depend heavily on their employee screening processes to combat the insider
threat.52 Another incident that allegedly involved insider information was the
break-in at the Pelindaba nuclear reactor and research center in South Africa. In
November 2007, four gunmen spent 45 minutes inside the heavily guarded facility,
eventually breaking into the emergency control center at the middle of the facility.
They fled when an alarm was triggered. At the same time, another four men tried
but failed to break-in from the other side of the facility, suggesting a coordinated
attack. The ease with which the attackers disabled multiple layers of security
strongly suggests the use of insider information.53
85
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 86 of 318
Terror Risks Increasing Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terror threats increasing
Michael Brooks, 9-19, 13, The Growing Threat of Maritime Terrorism,
http://www.oodaloop.com/security/2013/09/19/growing-threat-maritime-terrorism/
Introduction The 21st century has seen large-scale, well-organized terrorist attacks
by Islamist terrorists on nearly every continent. These same terrorists and terrorist
organizations have leveraged the cyber domain to support recruitment, training,
and attacks. The maritime frontier, however, is perhaps the one that has continued
comparatively untouched throughout the history of modern Islamist terrorism.
Attacks on maritime targets currently account for less than 1% of all terrorist
attacks. Since al-Qaedas attack on the USS Cole in 2000, there have been few
significant asymmetric terrorist attacks against maritime targets. Although piracy is
a continuing threat in this domain, especially in highly-trafficked strategic choke
points like the strait of Malacca, there are no well-documented cases of pirates
colluding with Islamist terror organizations to carry out a maritime attack. Emerging
evidence suggests that these relationships are being developed and that a
sharp increase in terrorist attacks on maritime targets is possible. Such
attacks have the potential both to inflict heavy casualties and cause widespread
economic havoc. Background, Ideology, and the Illusive Pirate-Terrorist Nexus When
the Arab invaders swept through and established themselves in North Africa during
the seventh and eighth centuries, they moved or established the regional capitals
away from the coast. Modern-day Egypts capital shifted from coastal Alexandria to
inland Cairo. Medieval Tunisia (Ifriqiya) was centered around the inland city of
Kairouan until the 13th century. Fes was the capital of Muslim Morocco for over a
thousand years until the French Protectorate Administration moved it to Rabat in the
early 20th century. These inland placements were intentional and strategic. The
Arab conquerors were not seafaring people. For them, coastal capitals were severe
liabilities, too easily accessible to preying states and pirates. Inland capitals,
however, nullified maritime disadvantages and forced would-be invaders to travel
inland where the Arab conquerors and their Berber allies held strategic dominance.
This land-based culture continues on in most regions of the Muslim conquests.
Radical Islamist geopolitics is another factor that may encourage the prioritization
land-based attacks while de-emphasizing maritime equivalents. To al-Qaeda and
similar groups, the world is divided into the Houses of War and of Islam (Dar al-Harb
and Dar al-Islam), terms that have been in use since the first Muslim invasions.
Moderate Muslims have more peaceful and nuanced conceptions of these terms.
These radical groups conceptions, however, are black and white, focusing on
governments, land, and people. These groups exist to fight until all territory and
persons are within the dar al-Islam and under the rule of the restored caliphate.
Because these goals are land-centric, the worlds seas and oceans are merely
alternate paths to their goals, of varying strategic value but of little importance in
and of themselves. Modern Islamist terrorists in the Middle East are heirs to these
cultural and geographical realities. The vast majority of attacks occur inland on
land-based targets. The maritime side of volatile Karachi, whose shipping processes
95% of Pakistans foreign trade, enjoys comparative peace in contrast to the citys
86
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 87 of 318
sectarian violence that has already claimed between 1,700-2,500 lives in the first
half of 2013. Available evidence suggests that even the sky is more trafficked by
terrorists than the oceans. Reports dating back to 2008 have already linked alQaeda to large-scale criminal aviation networks. Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist
organizations in Africa have made connections with pirate groups but these
connections have been more financial than operational. Somali pirates ransom
funds often find their way into the coffers of al-Shabaab but al-Shabaab has never
colluded with the pirates to execute a terrorist attack on a maritime target. AlShabaab, like other terrorist organizations, is concerned primarily with land territory.
Although there has been little collusion between groups and comparatively few
attacks, the ideology and methodology supporting terrorist attacks against maritime
targets is already in place. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, leader of the attacks behind the
deadly bombings of the USS Cole and the Limburg, developed a four-part strategy
for al-Qaedas maritime terrorist attacks. These four parts include suicide attacks on
vessels, the hijacking of ships for use as weapons against port or transportation
infrastructure, attacking supertankers using explosive-filled aircraft, and attacks on
vessels with underwater demolition teams. Spread by al-Qaeda, these
recommendations have a far-reaching effects. Simple bomb placements or flotilla
attacks (explosive-laden craft driven into the target, the maritime equivalent of a
car bomb) do not require anything more than would an inland attack. In 2004, a
simple eight pound bomb brought down the SuperFerry-14 in the Philippines, killing
116 in the worlds deadliest maritime terrorist attack. As the US and other
governments continue to crack down on terror networks, these attack methods
available to individuals and small groups will increase in use as the ideology and
tactics continue to spread and their official strategies adapt. The Threat
Maritime terrorist attacks have the potential to inflict massive casualties
and wreak economic havoc. Passenger vessels, from ferries to cruise
ships, offer opportunities for high death tolls, a key objective for al-Qaeda
and its affiliates. Attacks on container ships, oil tankers, and other cargo
ships could cause significant damage to the global economy. As 80-90% of
global trade travels on such ships, strategic attacks could raise risk levels which
would affect a number of trade factors that would, in turn, result in higher prices for
many commodities. The economic impact would mirror that of piracy, a continuing
economic strain off of the coasts of West Africa, East Africa, and South East Asia.
The threat of terrorism at sea raises new policing and prevention dilemmas for
states accustomed to fighting traditional piracy. Pirates attack maritime targets for
economic gain. A means of escape is essential in achieving the purpose of their
attacks. As policing turns piracy within certain areas into suicide missions, pirates
will cease to attack those areas. The nearly eradicated piracy off of the Somali coast
is a prime example. Unfortunately the calculus for terrorist attacks, particularly
suicide attacks, is fundamentally different. Terrorists on suicide missions with
the goal of mass casualty or economic destruction cannot be effectively
policed using tactics and strategies designed for pirates. Whereas pirates
can be deterred by ensuring that they cannot escape following an attack,
maritime terrorists must be deterred before an attack even takes place.
This is exceedingly difficult on the expansive seas and among thousands of ships of
different builds and function. Recommendation According to an anti-terror director
at the Pentagon, Indications point to an acceleration of the pace of maritime
terrorism, heralding a coming campaign. The propensity of al-Qaeda for patient and
intricate preparation augurs a future sustained maritime terrorism campaign, rather
87
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 88 of 318
than a continued irregular pattern of attacks. To counter this campaign, the US and
other governments must continue seeking out terrorist networks and frustrating
coordinated attacks. It must simultaneously develop and implement the means to
prevent isolated attacks on important infrastructure and vessels. With proactive
measures within these general policies, governments and maritime corporations
can help limit the scope and intensity of maritime terrorism.
88
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 89 of 318
Terror Risks Increasing Soft Targets

Westgate mall attack could be just the beginning of mall
attacks
CBS News, 9-26, 13, Amanda Cochran, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301505263_162-57604745/could-kenya-terror-attack-be-first-in-wave-of-strikes/ Could
Kenya terror attack be the first in a wave of strikes?
(CBS News) Just days after the Nairobi attack, there is a renewed global terrorism
alert. The State Department issued what it calls a "worldwide caution." Americans
are warned they could be targeted not only in Africa, but Asia, Europe and
the Middle East. The alert may be tied to the attack in Kenya "in some
ways," according to CBS News senior correspondent John Miller, a former FBI
assistant director, but there is a larger issue that may be driving the heightened
awareness. Miller said on "CBS This Morning," "The larger thing that's driving it is
back in August the intelligence community received information that my sources
described to me as the most specific and the most serious threat information they'd
received since the British planes plot in 2006. And they said, 'We know the threat,
we know there's an operation going. We don't know where it's going to be or when.
We know it's in the works.'" He continued, "So the question is was this Kenya thing
it? That's doubtful. The question is was this the first in a wave of possible attacks,
and that's what they're concerned about." In the wake of the Nairobi mall
attack, the Mall of America in Minneapolis has ramped up security.
Minnesota is home to the largest Somali community in the U.S. The Associated Press
reports at least 22 young men have traveled to Somalia since 2007 to join alShabab and the FBI says its investigation of the terror group's recruiting remains a
priority. FBI spokesman Kyle Loven says there's no confirmation of any American
involvement in the Nairobi attack that the Kenyan government says has killed at
least 61 civilians. Miller said malls are "a real concern" following this attack. He
said, "Malls across the country and the world who are saying, 'Do we have
the right plan for an active-shooter situation or more?'" Two dozen FBI
agents are assisting with the investigation at the Nairobi mall. Miller said the help is
due to a relationship between the FBI and the government and counterterrorism
forces in Kenya forged following the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
in 1998. "This is what you'd expect to see here," Miller said. "They want to use the
FBI's forensic ability, and the FBI is very interested to see, are there Americans
among the terrorists."
Terrorists hitting soft targets

Globe & Mail, 9-23, 13, Terrorist attack on soft targets pose growing threat for
civilians, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/terrorist-attacks-on-softtargets-pose-growing-threat-for-civilians/article14491254/
Gleaming icons of wealth, chock-full of extravagance and often teeming with
innocents, shopping malls like big hotels are archetypal soft targets in
89
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 90 of 318
the grim lexicon of modern terrorism. From Kabul to Moscow, and Columbus,
Ohio, to Nairobi, terrorists have targeted crowds of shoppers, including
women and children, in almost-impossible-to-protect shopping malls. The
weeks still-unfolding carnage inside Nairobis Westgate mall is the kind of event
that has been long feared as extremists evolve new tactics, cross-pollinating from
viciously successful strikes in other places by other groups. At Westgate, despite the
horror, neither the targeting nor the strike force of attackers is especially new or
came as a surprise. Terrorism experts have been warning for years that
malls are vulnerable, as harder targets embassies, aircraft, military
bases and government buildings become ever more heavily protected
behind security cordons. Some malls, as well as prominent hotels or wellknown resorts, are in high-profile locations, full of constantly changing
clientele and thus exceeding difficult to secure. Like the multiple strikes in
the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008 by groups of heavily armed and suicideready Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists, the Westgate mall attack by the Somali
al-Shabab terror group appears to involve a squad of well-trained
extremists seeking to kill and main as many victims as possible before
staging a bloody last stand with hostages. More than 160 were killed in
Mumbai across 12 targets, but international media focus was on the high-profile
Oberoi and Taj Mahal hotels just as it is this week on Nairobis upscale mall, where
the mounting death toll includes prominent Kenyans as well as foreign diplomats,
well-heeled visitors and children. Individuals desiring to launch a terrorist
attack seek to strike the highest-profile, most symbolic target possible,
Scott Stewart, vice-president of analysis at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm,
wrote this year. A well known targets can magnify the terror, especially when the
operation grabs the attention of international media. After years of ever-closer ties,
al-Shabab formally allied itself with al-Qaeda in 2012, pledging to march with you
as loyal soldiers, Daniel Byman, who tracks extremist groups at the Brookings
Institution, said in a report last year. Those closer ties included advanced training in
explosives and weapons, which seem to be on grim display this week.
Terror attack on a US mall would collapse the US

psychologically
Globe & Mail, 9-23, 13, Terrorist attack on soft targets pose growing threat for
civilians, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/terrorist-attacks-on-softtargets-pose-growing-threat-for-civilians/article14491254/
Malls in North America, often surrounded by vast parking lots offering easy access
to even heavy vehicles that could be turned into truck bombs, are especially
vulnerable, say security experts. Just as lone gunmen have managed to kill large
numbers at schools, a movie theatre and even a supposedly secure navy base in
downtown Washington in recent years, the prospect of heavily armed extremists
seizing a mall with hundreds inside could redefine terror in North America. A single
suicide bomber in a shopping centre in Topeka, or a single bomb-carrying car
rammed into a movie complex in Omaha, could bring the nation to its psychic
knees, Clark Kent Ervin, director of the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program,
wrote in his book, Open Target: Where America is Vulnerable to Attack. Adding to
90
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 91 of 318
the appeal such scenarios hold for terrorists is the reality that precious little can be
done to prevent them in a society like ours.
91
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 92 of 318
A2: Bergen/Domestic Terrorism Decline

Bergen is wrong domestic terrorism threat is not decreasing
studies program, and the author of Bin Ladens Legacy, Is The Terrorist Threat
Declining? The Use And Abuse Of Statistics, 12/16/13,
http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/is-the-terrorist-threat-declining-the-use-andabuse-of-statistics/)
Earlier this month, terrorism analyst Peter Bergen wrote at CNN that the declining number of
jihadists indicted in the United States demonstrates that the domestic terrorist threat has
markedly declined over the past couple of years. His view is a counterpoint to the
proclamations of Senate and House intelligence committee heads Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D.Calif.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R.-Mich.), who have claimed that the U.S. is no safer than it was
in 2011. Who is right? Bergen, the head of the National Security Program at the New America
Foundation (NAF), contends that though Feinstein and Rogers might be on firm ground in
arguing that al-Qaeda is resurgent in the Middle East, a NAF study of jihadist militants shows a
substantial decline in the number of indicted extremists since 2010. Bergen contends that this
establishes a declining domestic threat: The total number of such indicted extremists has
declined substantially from 33 in 2010 to nine in 2013. And the number of individuals indicted
for plotting attacks within the United States, as opposed to being indicted for traveling to join a
terrorist group overseas or for sending money to a foreign terrorist group, also declined from 12
in 2011 to only three in 2013. Of course, a declining number of indictments doesnt mean that the
militant threat has disappeared. One of the militants indicted in 2013 was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who
is one of the brothers alleged to be responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in April. But
a sharply declining number of indictments does suggest that fewer and fewer militants are
targeting the United States. In short, the data on al-Qaeda-linked or -influenced militants
indicted in the United States suggests that the threat of terrorism has actually markedly declined
over the past couple of years. Heres the interesting thing, to me, about Bergens analysis: it
depends almost entirely on how one reads a sudden spike in homegrown terrorist cases that
occurred in 2009-10. Exactly four years ago, in December 2009, Bergens view of the homegrown
terrorist threat, based on the sudden rise in cases we were then experiencing, was that there is
no denying it is increasing. He explained that a trend toward more homegrown jihadism is just
a fact, since the phenomenon had sort of grown exponentially in the last two years. In other
words, Bergen assessed at the time that the rising cases werent aberrant, but rather part of a
trend of increased homegrown jihadist violence that would continue. At the time, I disagreed in
print with Bergens confidence that we were seeing a definite trend toward a persistently higher
number of homegrown terrorism cases. Now that the 2009-10 spike in cases has receded, Bergen
argues just as confidently that we are safer. I disagree with this conclusion, too. Much of our
disagreement boils down to differences between my methodology of interpreting statistics and
Bergens. In turn, this discussion has implications for broader efforts to assess U.S.
counterterrorism policies: are we drawing the right lessons from the statistics and evidence that we
gather, or are we being fooled by our own numbers? The 2009-10 Spike in Homegrown
Terrorist Cases 2009 saw almost twice as many people in the U.S. indicted for illegally
supporting the jihadist cause as any previous year. According to NAFs database of homegrown
terrorism cases, there were 43 such cases in 2009, when the highest number in any other year
since the 9/11 attacks had been 23, in 2003. The following year, in 2010, the number of
92
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 93 of 318
homegrown jihadist terrorism cases declined to 34, but that still represented more such cases
than any year but 2009. As previously noted, Bergen viewed this sudden spike in homegrown
terrorist cases at the time as an undeniable increase in the threat. I wasnt so sure. In an article I
published in the summer of 2010, I concluded that it wasnt clear that homegrown terrorism is
increasing, for two reasons. The first was that the perceived spike could be based on changes in
policing strategies and tactics. If authorities started making arrests at a different point relative
to a suspect undertaking illegal activities, that could artificially trigger perceptions of a major
increase in homegrown terrorists; and so too could an increase in the number of sting
operations. Second, I raised the possibility that this could be a statistical aberration: Another
possibility is that the current rash of homegrown terror cases is an aberration. In a statistical
sequence measured over the course of years (such as weather patterns or a baseball players
career), aberrant sequences will frequently arise. A spike or precipitous decline in numbers does
not mean the numerical trajectory will extend indefinitely. For example, an unusually cold May
does not mean that July will also be unusually cold. While in the middle of an unusual statistical
sequence, it can be hard to have perspective; and in five years, 2009-2010 may seem exceptional
in terms of the level of homegrown terrorist activity, rather than the beginning of a new trend.
Now that five years have passed since the onset of that spike in cases, it appears to have been
just that, an aberrational sequence. And we can pinpoint the precise development that drove the
2009-10 rise in cases: the Somalia war. In December 2008, the U.S. media first reported
authorities discovery that more than a dozen young Somali men from Minnesotas Twin Cities
area (which has the U.S.s largest Somali community) had disappeared, going abroad to join
jihadist groups in Somalia. They decided to fight there after Ethiopias U.S.-backed invasion of
Somalia in 2006, which was designed to shore up the countrys U.N.-recognized transitional
federal government and push back its main adversary, the Islamic Courts Union. In addition to
the young men being driven by nationalist sentiments, jihadist recruiters focused their
efforts on the Twin Cities areaa somewhat unique dynamic for domestic terrorist cases, the
vast majority of which do not feature recruiters from any established militant organization.
Thereafter, domestic law enforcement made apprehension of the young men who went to fight
abroad, and the networks encouraging and supporting them, a top priority. Terrorism-related
indictments increased as a result: the NAF dataset suggests that 14 indictments in 2009 and 16
in 2010 were related to the Somalia conflict. If you subtract these figures from the number of
total indictments for both years, the numerical spike becomes less extreme, with only 29
indictments in 2009 and 18 in 2010 that were unrelated to the Somalia war. Though 2009 still
would have a higher number of indictments than any year preceding it even with the adjusted
figures, 2010 would be more in line with the numbers from previous years, featuring fewer
terrorism indictments than either 2003 or 2006. As recruiting for the Somalia conflict has
declined, the number of indictments has also gone down. So the question remains: how do we
interpret the lower numbers we are seeing now? Has the threat of homegrown terrorism markedly
declined, as Bergen insists, or is there a better way to understand the number of homegrown
jihadist cases that we have seen in 2012-13?
The Longer View
Fortunately, there has always been a relatively small number of homegrown jihadist terrorism
cases in the United States. The fact that these numbers are small should make us hesitant to infer
too much from numerical fluctuations. Take a look at the number of homegrown jihadists who
have been indicted or killed by year, per the NAF database:
2002:
16
2003:
23
2004:
8
2005:
12
2006:
19
93
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 94 of 318
2007:
16
2008:
6
2009:
43
2010:
34
2011:
22
2012:
7
2013:
10
Bergen asserted that there had been nine indictments this year, but his article came out before
Terry Loewens arrest, which pushes the number to ten. Looking at the full data by year, its not
clear that there is a declining threat. Ten indictments in 2013 is three more than there were last
year; its also a higher number than we saw in either 2004 or 2008. Indeed, there were only six
such cases in 2008the year before we saw the sudden jump to forty-three indictments. In fact,
rather than basing our assessment on indictments, theres an entirely different statistic for
measuring whether we face a declining threat: the number of people killed or injured by
homegrown terrorists in the U.S. in any given year. That number was zero in 2011, while in 2013
three people were killed and 264 injured (in the Boston bombings). The bottom line is that its
perilous to infer too much from the data when the numbers in question are rather small, because
small numbers makes it extraordinarily difficult to measure trends reliably. All it takes is one
unusual developmentsuch as the outbreak of war in Somalia, and its resulting impact on
Minneapolis-St. Paulto make it appear that everything has changed from a numerical
perspective. There is thus little proof that the threat of terrorism has actually markedly declined
over the past couple of years. The core problem with Bergens use of statistics is evident when you
compare his analysis in 2009 with his assessment today: his methodology is prone to perceiving a
significant change in the level of threat based upon the direction that the numerical trend line is
pointing at any given time. If the number of indictments doubled to twenty next year, by Bergens
established methodology the threat would seem to be increasing againeven though the
absolute numbers would still be lower than 2003, 2009, 2010, or 2011. In attempting to
determine whether we are grappling with an increasing or declining threat, its important to view
the most recent data in as broad a context as possible. We should be wary of any method of
statistical interpretation wherein temporary fluctuations in one direction or another can be
mistaken for massive shifts in the threat we confront.
94
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 95 of 318
A2: Terrorism Risk Decreasing

Terrorism risks only decreasing in the West
Neil Henderson, head of Aon Risk Solutions' Crisis Management Terrorism team, said, "The map
shows that while the terrorism threat in the West has declined, other regions are witnessing
significant increases in terrorist violence and activity., Having unrivalled access to regional data
and fact-based insight enables our global clients to begin planning ahead of these trends by
performing necessary risk identification and consider preventive risk management solutions. This
insight allows our clients to plan overseas expansion or international growth and supports them
in their efforts to be resilient to a terrorist or political violence threat."
95
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 96 of 318
A2: State Sponsorship of Terrorism Decreasing

Terrorists dont need state sponsors
Issue 1, p131-159
State sponsorship of terrorism is today in an attenuated positionweaker than at any point in modern
history. Furthermore, the terrorist organizations that currently represent the greatest threat to
civilian populations are far less reliant on state support than terrorist groups in the earlier phases.
Indeed, al Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups operate essentially independent from any state
support. A variety of factors explain why terrorist groups have been able to remain operationally
effective without the aid of state patrons. First, the communications revolution of the late twentieth
century has permitted terrorist networks to reduce their previous reliance on the geographic
proximity of members. Just as the Internet, e-mail, and inexpensive telephony have enabled myriad
businesses to situate their employees in globally disparate locations, these technological agents of
globalization have also enabled terrorist leaders to operate sophisticated terrorist organizations with
agents dispersed across thousands of miles. Thus there is a diminished need today for a physical base of
operations for training, planning, and collaboration. Second, terrorists groups such as al Qaeda have
developed their own streams of revenue by engaging in smuggling and other forms of illicit
commerceincluding the trade in drugs and conflict resourcesand have also generated large sums
through fraudulent charity schemes. Third, the relaxation of border controls has facilitated the flow of
terrorist operatives among their home countries, the headquarters of terrorist organizations, and target
countries.
State sponsorship has played a significant role in supporting

terrorism
Issue 1, p131-159
While generally not the ultimate cause of terrorism, state sponsorship of terrorist organizations has
played a significant role in facilitating the terrorist violence witnessed in the international system
over the past half century (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). State sponsorship encompasses a
variety of assistance measures including, inter alia, arms, safe haven, financing, training,
intelligence, and diplomatic cover. The succor provided by state sponsors facilitates terrorist groups
planning, training, communications, transit, and logistics in support of specific attacks. These benefits
allow for increased sophistication in terror plots, which lead to more lethal attacks. State sponsorship,
therefore, can represent a significant facilitating variable with respect to international terrorism, and it can
amplify the frequency and lethality of attacks.
96
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 97 of 318
A2: Al Qaeda Threat Decreasing

Affiliates as strong as ever
Noah Rotham, Mediaite, May 19, 2014
FBI Director: More, Stronger Al Qaeda Affiliates 'Than I Appreciated'
Al Qaeda's affiliates are both stronger and more prolific than previously anticipated, FBI
director James Comey told the New York Times[1] on Monday. While the Times noted that
some expected Comey to be the first post-9/11 FBI director to redirect his focus away from
terrorism, he clarified that Islamic radicalism is as potent a force as ever. 'I didn't have
anywhere near the appreciation I got after I came into this job just how virulent those
affiliates had become,' Comey told the Times when asked if he thought the threat of al Qaedarelated terrorism had diminished. Referring to the terror group's affiliates in Africa and the
Middle East, Comey said that the threat of terrorism against American interest sis as
present as ever. 'There are both many more than I appreciated, and they are stronger than I
appreciated,' he confessed.
Al Qaeda has adapted and decentralized

MATTHEW OLSEN, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, March 6, 2014, Hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of
Terrorism and Sectarianism in the Middle East" Thank you very much, Chairman, and members
of the committee. I think it was about a year ago I was here to talk about threats in North Africa.
So I appreciate the opportunity to be here again to represent NCTC and to talk a little bit about
the threats we face in the Levant. And I'm particularly pleased to be here with two of our key
partners, Deputy Secretary of State Burns and Assistant Secretary of Defense Chollet. So as you
are aware, we continue to face terrorist threats to the United States and to our interests
overseas, particularly in parts of South Asia and the Middle East and Africa. But it's the
current conflict in Syria and the regional instability in the Levant that stand out for me as areas of
particular concern. I do think it's important to consider Syria in the context of the global terrorist
movement. In the face of what's been sustained counterterrorism pressure, core al-Qaida has
adapted. They've adapted by becoming more decentralized and shifting away from the
large-scale plotting that was exemplified in the attacks of September 11th. al-Qaida has
modified its tactics and looked to conduct simpler attacks that don't require the same
degree of resources and training and command and control. So today, we're facing a wider -a wider array of threats in a greater variety of locations across the Middle East and around the
world. In comparison to the al-Qaida plots that emanated from the tribal areas of Pakistan a few
years ago, these smaller and these less sophisticated plots are often more difficult for us to detect
and disrupt and that's put even greater pressure on us to work closely with our partners here at
the table, across the federal government and around the world. So turning to Syria, Syria has
become the preeminent location for al-Qaida-aligned groups to recruit and to train and to
equip what is now a growing number of extremists, some of whom seek to conduct external
attacks. In addition, Iran and Hezbollah, as you pointed out, are committed to defending the
Assad regime including sending billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training pro97
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 98 of 318
regime and Iraqi Shia militants and deploying their own personnel into the country. Now, from a
terrorism perspective, the most concerning development is that al-Qaida has declared Syria its
most critical front and has called for extremists to fight against the regime in Syria. So what
we've seen is that thousands of fighters from around the world, including hundreds from the West
have traveled to Syria and many of them have joined with established terrorist groups in Syria.
This raises our concern that radicalized individuals with extremist contacts and battlefield
experience could return to their home countries to commit violence at their own initiative or
participate in al-Qaida-directed plots aimed at Western targets outside of Syria. What we've seen
is a coalescence in Syria of al-Qaida veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as
extremists from other hotspots such as Libya and Iraq. These extremists bring a wide range of
contacts and skills as well as battlefield experience and they're able to exploit what has become a
permissive environment from which to plot and train. Shifting briefly to Lebanon, one of the
continuing effects of the Syrian conflict will be the instability in Lebanon in the upcoming year.
I recently traveled to Lebanon and Jordan and the impacts of the continuing conflict in Syria
continue to be of great concern to officials in the region. Hezbollah publicly admitted last spring
that it is fighting for the Syrian regime and has framed the war as an act of self-defense against
Western-backed Sunni extremists. The group is sending capable fighters for pro-regime
operations and support for a pro-regime militia. In addition, Iran and Hezbollah are using allied
Iraqi Shia groups to participate in counter-opposition operations. And this active support to the
Assad regime is of course driving increased Sunni extremist attacks and sectarian violence. In
short, the various factors contributing to instability in Lebanon are only exacerbated by the
protracted conflict in Syria.
Groups associated with Al Qaeda have increased activity

Central Asia General Newswire, April 9, 2014 Radical Islam followers from Europe, Central
Asia fight for Syrian militants - Bortnikov
Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov has reaffirmed the global nature of
terrorism threats. "The terrorism threat became global a rather long time ago. Although the
core of Al Qaeda has reduced its activity, associated militant groups demonstrate the
capacity for autonomous and aggressive actions," Bortnikov said on Wednesday in Krasnaya
Polyana, Sochi, at the 13th conference of chiefs of foreign security services and law enforcement
agencies - partners of the Federal Security Service. The armed conflict in Syria has
galvanized into action destructive forces throughout the Middle East, the Russian
counterintelligence chief stated. "Local rings are being joined by radical Islam followers from
Europe, Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Russia. They are trained in special camps and
engage in the hostilities. The return of persons experienced in sabotage and the creation of
covert organizations to their countries of origin leads to the spread and actualization of the
terrorism threat," Bortnikov said. A complex situation is taking shape in the AfghanPakistani zone where terrorist groups, primarily the Taliban, the Turkestan Islamic Party
and the Pakistani Taliban, have lately bolstered their combat potential, he noted. The
forthcoming partial pullout of coalition forces from Afghanistan builds up the threat of
destabilization in neighboring countries, Bortnikov said
98
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 99 of 318
Al Qaeda spillover from Syria

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ), March 6, 2014, Hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of Terrorism and
Sectarianism in the Middle East"
As we enter the year three of the Syria crisis, headlines coming out of the region are no longer
limited to the violence within Syria, but to the increasing spread of violence across Syria's
borders, especially into Lebanon and Iraq. Of great concern is the proliferation of al-Qaida
affiliates and splinter groups and the increasing sectarian rhetoric fueling the increase of
violence that offers new opportunities for al-Qaida to gain footholds in local communities.
It opens the door for an Iranian-sponsored terrorist network to justify their presence as the
protector of the region's Shias while bolstering the Assad regime and antagonizing Arab states.
The spillover from Syria is dangerous and troubling. In Lebanon, there's been an alarming
uptick in high-profile bombings, many claimed by the al-Qaida-affiliated Abdullah Azzam
Brigades. And at the same time, Hezbollah, purportedly protecting the Lebanese Shia
community, has now extended into Syria, protecting the Assad regime.
Threat from affiliates still strong

China Today, April 15, 2014, Cooperate to counter terrorism challenges
The recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and elsewhere have demonstrated
that the global fight against terrorism is far from over, and it still faces many challenges.
After the death of Osama bin Laden, the threat posed by al-Qaida as a global terrorist
organization has declined. However, the threat posed by its affiliates still persists. The alQaida threat continues to diversify, with numerous loosely linked affiliates and associated
radical individuals and cells innovating with regard to their targets, tactics and technology.
Terrorism is still around. For example, the risk of attacks by al-Qaida affiliates across the
Sahel persists. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continues to be a strong factor affecting
the security situation in Yemen. Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to the security of the
region. In Syria, an affiliate of al-Qaida in Iraq has gained influence and recruits from it are
fighting in the civil war. With the deadline for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in
2014 approaching, it is hard to tell whether the situation in Afghanistan will be better or worse.
Al-Qaida and the Taliban, taking refugee in the mountainous areas along the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, may take advantage of the United States' withdrawal to launch attacks.
Afghan troops and law enforcement forces still lack the capability to keep the situation under full
control. The shutdown of US embassies last year in many parts of the world is a
demonstration of the severe threat of terrorism. The Boston Bombing incident also showed
that individuals can pose a serious threat to peace and security. Recent terrorist attacks in China
alerted people once again to the threat of terrorism. All these have shown that terrorism is still
one of the most serious threats to peace and security. Terrorist attacks are spreading, becoming
more isolated and hi-tech. The international community should work together to prevent and
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Any acts of terrorism are criminal acts and
unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed.
99
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 100 of 318
A2: Al Qaeda Leaders Killed

Al Qaeda has lots of talent and leaders easily replaceable
Thomas Joscelyn, May 20, 2014, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan: An Enduring Threat,
Testimony, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/al_qaeda_in_afghanis.php#
(Thomas Joscelyn is the Senior Editor of The Long War Journal. Thomas is a senior fellow at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He is also the executive director of the Center
for Law and Counterterrorism at FDD. He is a terrorism analyst, economist, and writer living in
New York. Most of Thomas's research and writing has focused on how al Qaeda and its affiliates
operate around the world. He is a regular contributor to the Weekly Standard and its online
publications, the Daily Standard and Worldwide Standard. His work has also been published by
National Review Online, the New York Post, and other media outlets. Thomas is the author of
Iran's Proxy War Against America, a short book published by the Claremont Institute that details
Iran's decades-long sponsorship of America's terrorist enemies. He makes regular appearances on
radio programs around the country and has appeared on MSNBC and FOX News. In 2006 he
was named one of the Claremont Institute's Lincoln Fellows. Thomas served as the senior
terrorism adviser for Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's 2008 presidential campaign. He holds a Bachelor
of Arts degree in Economics from the University of Chicago.)
Al Qaeda is, at its heart, a clandestine organization, but careful analysis reveals that it has a
deep bench of talent from which it draws. Since its founding in 1988, the organization has
attempted to conceal its operations. This has made it difficult to assess some very basic aspects
of al Qaeda. The group does not, for instance, publish an organizational chart or make its total
roster known. If you watch al Qaeda carefully enough, however, you can see that the group has
consistently replaced top leaders lost in the 9/11 wars. In some cases these replacements are not
as competent, while in other cases they may even surpass their fallen comrades. Nasir al
Wuhayshi, the aforementioned general manager of al Qaeda, is a seasoned veteran who replaced
others in that role after they were killed or captured. Wuhayshi is, by all appearances, an all too
competent leader. Still, the American-led counterterrorism effort has certainly disrupted al
Qaeda's international network, delivering severe setbacks in some areas. Al Qaeda's problems
with ISIS stem, to a large degree, from the fact that the U.S. and its allies took out its predecessor
organization's top leadership in 2010. The leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) were loyal to
al Qaeda's "general command" but were replaced with leaders who had not been vetted by al
Qaeda's senior leaders. One of the interesting things about the infighting between the ISIS and Al
Nusrah is that it has led al Qaeda to identify several leaders who were previously unknown to the
public. The leaders were identified because they were called as witnesses against ISIS, relying on
their established jihadist pedigrees to give them credibility. Some of these leaders have dossiers
that stretch back decades, but no one was talking about them until they appeared on screen. This
same phenomenon happens all the time. Al Qaeda leaders who were previously unknown are
identified in either the "general command" or the regional branches.
This dynamic leads to a significant epistemological problem. U.S. officials, under both the Bush
and Obama administrations, have repeatedly claimed to have decimated al Qaeda after a
certain number of leaders of the organization were either killed or captured. Part of the reason
these assessments have been flawed is that al Qaeda has a "deep bench" to draw from, both
100
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 101 of 318
from within its own organization and allied groups. Al Qaeda is constantly in the process of
recruiting new talent as well. In Pakistan and Afghanistan today, al Qaeda likely has a
significant cadre of leaders who have not been publicly identified. The roles played by other,
publicly identified operatives are not widely understood either. For instance, a cursory review of
Vanguards of Khorasan, an al Qaeda publication, reveals numerous leaders who are not regularly
discussed.
101
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 102 of 318
A2: AQIM Divided (General)

Divisions are overstated. Based on incorrect analysis.
Lebovitch 13 (Andrew, Program Associate, National Security Studies Program at
New America Foundation, AQIM and Its Allies in Mali,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/aqim-and-its-allies-in-mali)
The recent attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria has brought renewed attention to al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadists in northern Mali. U.S. intelligence officials have indicated that AQIM
may be planning attacks on Western targets, yet these officials are struggling to grasp the complex nature of the
Many have interpreted reports of divisions within AQIM as

signs of an embattled movement. Yet Washington must understand that although
jihadist factions sometimes differ in focus, strategy, and operations, they continue ,
to some extent, to cooperate and work toward common goals. <Card Continues>. Evidence
suggests that either the divisions between these militant groups are not significant
enough to have a visible impact on operations or that the public narrative about
divisions within these groups obscures a very different reality -- though these two
jihadist groups in the region.
possibilities are not mutually exclusive. There are, broadly speaking, two possible explanations. First,
ideological ties and goals shared by the jihadists and the fall of the north in April 2012
allowed them to overcome their differences. Each group remains committed to the implementation of
sharia, and the groups' key leaders remain focused on Mali, even while attacking in Algeria and elsewhere.
Second, the divisions between these groups were always less significant than they
appeared to be. It is also possible that the creation of MUJAO was part of what could be termed a "managed
separation," whereby AQIM allowed itself to fragment in order to seek new opportunities for financing and
recruitment while permitting other parts of the organization to focus on different populations or areas of
operation. This could help explain why MUJAO was able to so quickly cooperate with an organization it had
previously spurned, and the continued influence of leaders like Belmokhtar on the new organization could help
explain why its military activities diverged so widely from its stated goals and targets.
102
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 103 of 318
A2: AQIM Divided (Specific)

Ansar al-Din
While relations between AQIM and Ansar al-Din were at least publicly ambiguous before and in the
months after the January 2012 outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali led by the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), some analysts insist that the two
cooperated from Ansar al-Din's
creation.
Press reports indicate that by early 2012, Ansar al-Din had acquired greater numbers of fighters -including AQIM fighters under the command of Ag Ghali's cousin, AQIM commander Hamada Ag Hama -- and
weapons from diverse sources. AQIM fighters are also believed to have taken part in fighting in the first months of
the rebellion. <Card Continues> Still, the relationship between these groups remained publicly unclear, and
Ansar al-Din in turn nurtured these ambiguities as different factions within the group jockeyed for position and
some sought a political solution to the violence in northern Mali that would stave off military intervention. Ag
Ghali endorsed Burkina Faso-led mediation efforts on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), with various Ansar al-Din leaders, including Ag Ghali, reportedly traveling to Algiers to partake in
Algeria's own assiduous efforts to separate Ansar al-Din from AQIM and MUJAO. The January offensive, however,
ended speculation that Ag Ghali in particular could be pulled away from AQIM and MUJAO, and the open
cooperation among Ansar al-Din, AQIM, and MUJAO elements seemingly highlights Ag Ghali's
commitment to the overall jihadist cause. The offensive also prompted the January 23
announcement by influential leaders from Ag Ghali's Ifoghas tribe of a new group, the Mouvement Islamique de
l'Azawad, or MIA. The leaders behind this group said that they intended to work for a negotiated settlement to the
conflict in northern Mali, and they have quickly distanced themselves from Ag Ghali.
Mujao
In particular, the seizure of the north prompted MUJAO to settle its differences with
AQIM, according to some observers; this peace was purportedly brokered by Ansar al-Din. In particular since
April 2012, MUJAO has pursued a dual strategy that is at varying times hyperlocal and regional/international;
originally believed to be composed largely of Mauritanians and Gao Arabs, the group is rumored to have benefited
from the support of local businessmen and notables believed to be linked to various illicit trafficking. All the same,
residents' jubilant reaction to MUJAO's expulsion from Gao shows how little support it actually enjoyed.
Nevertheless, the group has recruited regionally and internationally, recently flaunting a very diverse leadership
For all the recent jostling, the

lines between the jihadist groups have always been blurred . For instance, while genuine
hailing from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, among other countries.
animosities and divisions may have separated MUJAO's leaders from other AQIM commanders, several of these
leaders were reportedly close to Belmokhtar and had spent years operating with him. It is no surprise, then, that
Belmokhtar quickly set up his base of operations in Gao and reportedly provided crucial military assistance to
MUJAO's fighters during various battles with the MNLA. Nor is it entirely surprising that MUJAO, an organization
ostensibly founded to spread jihad in West Africa, largely struck Algerian targets, both in Algeria and in Mali -possible precursors to the In Amenas assault, which took place under Belmokhtar's orders.
Belmokhtar
<Card Continues>. However, Belmokhtar's separation from AQIM, apparently after divergences
from AQIM's senior leadership, does not appear to have significantly impeded AQIM's
operations. The In Amenas attack was reportedly planned for at least two months, meaning planning began
during or just after Belmokhtar's purported departure. Further, it did not impede the movement of fighters and
103
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 104 of 318
even commanders between different groups. This movement is best exemplified by Omar Ould Hamaha, a
longtime AQIM member close to Belmokhtar (and possibly his father-in-law) who has since April 2012 been
publicly identified as a leader in each of Mali's jihadist groups.
104
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 105 of 318
Answers to Link Turns
105
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 106 of 318
A2: Plan Facilitates Global Anti-Terror Cooperation

The turn is non-unique -- global cooperation on anti-terrorism
now
Bruce Jones, 2014, Bruce Jones is a senior fellow and the director of the Project on International
Order and Strategy at Brookings and a consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford
University, 2014 Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and
Restraint, Kindle Edition
Terrorism has been a focus of cooperation and aligned interests among the
emerging powers since 9/ 11. This cooperation of strange bedfellows perfectly
illustrates the beyond-blocs theme. Ever since 9/ 11 there has been substantial
cooperation and policy alignment among Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and New
Delhi. All of these capitals see a threat from Islamic terrorism to their domestic
stability and to their networks of globalization and have been willing to cooperate to
tackle it. This cooperation includes intelligence sharing and also domestic action to
hinder the operations of al Qaeda cells or affiliates or financiers. Sometimes the
policy alignment between these powers has caused some of them to turn a blind
eye to human rights violations by their counterparts. These include the pursuit of al
Qaeda by Washington, of Islamist terrorists in the North Caucasus by Moscow , of
Muslim Uighurs in western China by Beijing, and of Pakistani terrorist organizations
by New Delhi. The policy alignment also includes participating in political and
military stabilization efforts. Turkey, for example, is committed to supporting the
complicated effort to stabilize a fragile peace in Somalia (where the United States
deployed its Special Forces to counter an al Qaeda affiliated group, al Shabab ). 21
China has contributed armed peacekeepers to Mali, where another al Qaeda
inspired group, al Qaeda in the Maghreb, has attacked Western energy interests.
China had previously deployed civilian peacekeepers (engineers) to a stabilization
mission in Lebanon one of whose mandates is to help the government of Lebanon
control Hezbollah (a mission that has been failing, it should be noted). 22 There has
been policy tension, of course , but it is primarily among the Western powers. The
United States and Europe have been divided over legal issues, in particular the
question of rendition and the legal procedures for listing and delisting suspected
terrorist figures by the UN Security Council and other bodies. 23 The United States,
India, Russia, and China have taken a legally minimalist view on these issues, while
Europe has sought to expand legal protections. 24 The United States has even been
able to translate these shared interests into a new institution designed to generate
cooperation on counterterrorism, the Global Counterterrorism Forum an informal,
multilateral mechanism established to help countries share lessons and strategies
on counterterrorism strategy. It is a nice illustration of the new dynamics of global
diplomacy. Although the negotiations to create the forum were strongly led by the
United States, State Department officials in charge wisely brought Turkey an
American ally and a Muslim-majority one into the leadership of the process. Here
is the list of governments that have joined the forum: Algeria, Australia, Canada,
China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the
106
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 107 of 318
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 25 This is not the
cast of a post-Western or post-American world; it is the list of allies, partners, and
willing contributors pulled together by the United States around common interests
and a compelling illustration of what I call America's coalitional power. There has
been a similar experience in efforts to prevent nuclear materials getting into
terrorists hands. Here too the United States led in pulling together what was
initially meant to be a one-time summit to galvanize states efforts to secure their
loose nuclear supplies but that has rapidly evolved into the Nuclear Security
Summit (NSS). Membership in the NSS is similar to that of the Global
Counterterrorism Forum. 26 The NSS is also an example of a new style of
multilateral effort. Its mode of operation is more similar to private ventures like the
Clinton Global Initiative than to staid bodies like the UN Conference on
Disarmament. That is, rather than coming together to negotiate dry texts that are
often then not implemented, the mode of the NSS is that countries come together
each year to report on actions they have taken over the previous year. This creates
a kind of moral pressure on participants to take substantial actions it is
embarrassing to have to stand in front of forty-five of your peers and paper over
your inability to get anything productive done in the year past. Jones, Bruce (201403-17). Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry
and Restraint (Kindle Locations 1578-1586). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle
Edition.
107
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 108 of 318
Answers to Other General Take-Outs
108
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 109 of 318
A2: We Can Deter Terrorism

Terrorism cant be deterred
When this happens, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states
will pale in comparison. after all, because we usually dont know where they
live, stateless groups wield much more effective destructive power
because they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation. despite a
$50-million reward for his capture, osama bin laden eluded us for more than a
decade, and ayman al- Zawahiri still remains at large, as does mullah
mohammed omar, the longtime leader of the taliban. although greatly weakened
by the killing and capture of its commanders, the taliban has fought the combined
forces of the american and afghan militaries to a stalemate in afghanistan. other
terrorist organizations have proved similarly resilient. The British military was
never able to apprehend a sufficient number of irish republican army
leaders in northern ireland to quash their independence movement. israel
has similarly failed to assassinate enough of its key terrorist enemies to
halt their activities, despite a very controversial and aggressive program that has
killed large numbers of innocent civilians. even if one could figure out where
terrorists were hiding, going after them and their supporters would probably not
serve as a deterrent. indeed, the fundamental equation of retaliation has
become reversed because a frequent tactic of terrorists is to provoke
reprisal attacks on their own people (or on the people they purport to
represent) in the hope that the reprisals will sway popular opinion in their
favor. how can the threat of a counterattack be effective against enemies who want
to provoke it? among nation- states, the deterrent value of a retaliatory nuclear
strike is enormous, but the United states is impotent when it comes to nuclear
terrorism. Who would we target in response? This question is hard enough to
answer when seen through the lens of the 9/11 attacks, in which the enemy was
recognizable, though hard to find. right after the twin towers fell, angry americans
muttered that we should just nuke the bastards. That kind of emotional reaction is
more comprehensible when ethnicity and ideology make the division between us
and them appear clearer than it is. But think back a few years and consider the
question of retaliation in the context of the second-worst terrorist attack in
american history: the oklahoma city bombing. suppose timothy mcveigh had
committed a terrorist act against another country rather than against oklahoma city.
What would we have thought if a foreign military force had attacked mcveighs
hometown of Pendleton, new york? We would say, hey, wait a minute; that guyis a
lone nutcase who does not represent anybody else in Pendleton. But that argument
is just as true in Kandahar, afghanistan or Falluja, iraq. as tempting as it is to
threaten tough reprisals, it demonstrably didnt work in those countries. you
cannot stop terrorism that way. The difficulty of reprisal gives terrorist groups enormous power. terrorists can directly attack the most powerful country on
earth with an anonymityand thus impu- nitythat no nation-state could match.
109
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 110 of 318
at most, a terrorist attack will provoke a military adventure in hostile

territory that will prove much more costly to the superpower than to the
terrorists. indeed, provoking such attacks may be part of their plan.
Terrorists dont think they will be caught

Note that the key word here is deter. We can retaliate to some degree with
commando raids, by conducting drone strikes or even full scale invasions, as
occurred in afghanistan. These actions have had significant impact, and have
helped reduce subsequent attacks. But the threat of counterattack does not
act as an effective deterrence against terrorists. if we had been able to
capture or kill the entire leadership, and completely disrupt the organization in short order following the 9/11 attacks, that might have deterred
others. But as it stands, a would be terrorist would conclude that it is
extremely difficult to act against a stateless group, and thus would not be
deterred. Unfortunately, the fact is that al Qaeda and taliban have
survived as organizations (along with many of their leaders) for more than
a decade after 9/11. That does not make a strong case for deterrence.
indeed, future stateless groups could draw the opposite conclusion.
States News Service
110
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 111 of 318
A2: US Military Intervention Solves Terrorism

US intervention motivates terrorism
Scheuer, 22 years at the CIA, 8-24-11 (Michael, The Zawahiri Era The National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/zawahiri-era-5732)
Ayman al-Zawahiri has a chance to advance al-Qaedas work to an extent that bin
Laden may have just begun to see in his last months. Having an opportunity and
exploiting it are two different things, however, and al-Zawahiris personality, earlier
operational record, multiple detractors as well as the absence of bin Ladens steadying
hand certainly leave open the possibility that he will fly the next plane into a mountain
rather than, say, the rebuilt Pentagon. But we must not count on al-Zawahiri being
anything other than what he has appeared to be since 1998: a rational, prudent,
brave, dedicated and media-savvy leader.
BEYOND LEADERSHIP crises, changing tactics and mounting operations is one
steadfast reality: al-Qaedas indispensable, long-term and utterly reliable ally
Washingtons interventionist foreign policyremains the groups true center of gravity.
It is a galvanizing force which cannot be harmed, let alone destroyed, until U.S. leaders
in politics, the media, religion (especially evangelical Protestants), the military and the
academy begin to accept the truth; that is, the United States government is hated by
most Muslims for what it does in the Islamic world, and not for how Americans think
and behave at home. Needless to say, an enemy with such an unassailable core is
pretty formidable, if not impregnable.
As al-Zawahiri takes charge, the U.S. government continues to: arm and defend the
Saudi police state; depend on oil and debt purchases from Riyadh and other oil-rich
Gulf tyrannies; keep military forces in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan; fund and defend Israel; fund and direct a new U.S.-NATO war on Libya; and
assist the UN, EU and George Clooney in tearing out the oil-rich southern region of
Muslim Sudan and giving it to a new Christian state. In other words, the powerful
religious motivation for al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups to fight the United States
and the West remains exactly what it was when bin Laden declared war in 1996
Israel, oil, intervention, occupation and support for tyranny.
Force application cannot solve terrorism

ChristopherPaulisaRANDsocialscientistwhoseareasoffocusincludestrategic
communication,counterinsurgencies,andinformationoperations,2011,The Long Shadow of
9/11: Americas Response to Terrorism, Ed. Bruce Michael Jenkins and Paul Hodges, p.106
SuperiorequipmentandmartialskillmightallowtheUnitedStatestowinallthebattles,but
tryingtoprevailinthiswaycouldalsocondemnittolosingthewar.Strictlymilitarydefeatof
terroristorinsurgentgroupscanhavetheeffectofmultiplyingtheirranks,asstillotherstakeup
thecauseorseekretaliation.Theapplicationofforcealonedoesnothingtoaddresstheirreasons
forfighting.
Perceptions that the US is at war with Islam drives Al Qaeda
recruiting
111
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 112 of 318
ToddHelmushasservedasanadviserincounterinsurgencystrategytoU.S.militarycommands
inIraqandAfghanistan,2011,The Long Shadow of 9/11: Americas Response to Terrorism, Ed.
Bruce Michael Jenkins and Paul Hodges, p.1212
Individualsjointhejihadistcauseforamultitudeofreasons.Theexcitementofaclandestineand
militantlife,therecognitionandfamethatarealltoorareinamoribundhomelife,thesocial
bondsoffriendsandpeergroupsthatactasapropellantforaction,thelureofanafterlifethat
givesmorethanthislifeoffersallofthesefactorsmotivateterroristrecruitsatonelevelor
another.Butthemostcommonmotivationappearstobetheperceptionthatawarisbeingwaged
againstIslam.Thisisattheheartofthejihadistnarrative.TheworldwideMuslimcommunity,or
ummah,ispurportedlyunderattackbyinfidelandWesternpowers.AlQaedathuscallsMuslims
toIslamsdefense;andtoalQaeda,itisnotadefenseofrhetoricbutadefenseofarmedaction.
TothevastmajorityintheMuslimworld,theappealhasnoresonance.Forahaplessand
dangerousfew,however,itisalltoocompelling.
Iraq and Afghanistan wars increase terror recruiting
ToddHelmushasservedasanadviserincounterinsurgencystrategytoU.S.militarycommands
inIraqandAfghanistan,2011,The Long Shadow of 9/11: Americas Response to Terrorism, Ed.
Bruce Michael Jenkins and Paul Hodges, p. 123
Even before Abu Ghraib, the U.S. war in Iraq was seen by some as reason enough to
join the militant cause. In the eyes of jihadists, the Iraq War was unjustified and
constituted a foreign and infidel occupation of Muslim lands. In this sense, the
motivations of foreign fighters entering Afghanistan in the 1980s were little different
from those of fighters coming into Iraq. Simplistic and false accusations that the United
States entered Iraq to take its oil, the real fact that the United States ignored many
pleas of the international community before invading, and the U.S. failure to establish
security following a successful invasion were further used to tarnish the image of the
United States. Al Qaeda uses U.S. operations in Afghanistan to similar effect. In the
wake of 9/11, it was necessary to attack al Qaeda at its Afghan base, and establishing
stability and security remains an imperative. But the war drags on. The rallying cry of
an infidel occupation of a Muslim land is a common jihadist refrain that not only
motivates foreign fighters and some Taliban but also galvanizes recruits in the West.
This efrain was the argument used by Nidal Hassan, the sole suspect in the shootings
at Fort Hood, Texas, whose PowerPoint presentation to classmates at the Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences spoke of the war against Islam, the U.S.
campaign in Afghanistan, and a Muslims duty. The very nature of the Iraqi and Afghan
conflicts, wars fought among civilian populations in an urban landscape, has inevitably
led to accusations of abuse. Insurgents and terrorists in both countries have foresworn
distinguishing uniforms and shamefully hide behind civilian populations. U.S. forces
by no means intend civilian casualties and go to great lengths to avoid them. But when
mistakes happen, al Qaeda pounces. The isolated and worst-case scenarios are used to
allege a systematic campaign of abuse. Aiding these arguments, at times, has been a
slow and feeble response that in the cases of Abu Ghraib, the deaths of civilians in
Haditha, and other civilian casualty events has failed to quickly investigate accusations
and admit wrongdoing. Perceptions of abuse of Muslims were what motivated Carlos
Bledsoe, the convicted attacker at the military recruiting center in Little Rock,
112
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 113 of 318
Arkansas, who asserted that he was defending Muslims against U.S. military actions in
the Middle East.
Iraq invasion increased terror recruiting

DanielL.Byman,DirectorofResearch,SabanCenterforMiddleEastPolicy,September1,2011,TheHistoryofAl
Qaeda,http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0901_al_qaeda_history_byman.aspx
The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq helped rescue al Qaeda, both operationally and
ideologically. The war vindicated Bin Laden's message, "proving" to skeptics that the United
States was indeed bent on controlling the Islamic world. It also motivated a new generation of
jihadists to travel to Iraq.
Iraq war boosted and radicalized Al Qaeda
FredericWehrey,RANDSeniorAnalyst,servedasanadvisertotheMultiNationalForceIraq
in2008,2011,The Long Shadow of 9/11: Americas Response to Terrorism, Ed. Bruce Michael
Jenkins and Paul Hodges, p.489
Amongtheinitialbooststhe2003invasiongavetoalQaeda,noneisassignificantasthepublic
relationscoupithandedthemovement.TheinvasionbyaWesternforceofanIslamic,oilrich
landthathadonceservedastheseatofthemightyAbbasidcaliphateseemedapowerful
vindicationofalQaedasargumentthattheWestwasirrevocablybentonsubjugatingMuslims.
TheensuingconflictenabledalQaedatorefashionthenarrativeofitsstruggleintoadefensive
jihadawarofliberationinanIslamicland,compellingablebelieversoutsideIraqsbordersto
takeuparms.ThechaosthatensuedafterthepoorlyplannedoccupationallowedalQaedato
expanditsrecruitmentbasebeyonditstraditionalhomeintheArabianPeninsulaandEgypt,to
theLevantandtheMaghreb.Thewaralsoradicalizedanewcadreof
Iraqisalafijihadists,orviolentIslamicfundamentalists,wherefewhadexistedbefore.
Aidingthisrecruitment,thewarcreatedabroaderbacklashagainstAmericanpresenceinthe
MiddleEastand,moreominously,againstthecachetofdemocratizationitself.Theconductof
AmericascounterinsurgencycampaignwasinmanywaysapowerfulboosttoalQaedas
rampantantiAmericanism,withtheindelibleimagesofAbuGhraibcreatingfertilegroundfor
therecruitmentofextremists.Governmentsaroundtheregionfoundanewimpetustodelayor
defertheirstepstowardreformandliberalizationbypointingtothecivilwarinIraq,whichthey
arguedhadbeensparkedbytheforcibleandprematureimpositionofdemocracy.Inmanypublic
opinionsurveys,democratizationduringtheIraqWarassumedanegativeconnotationbecauseof
itsaffiliationwiththeAmericanmisadventurethere,thedifficultiesofbuildingacohesive
governmentinIraq,andthenearuniversalunpopularityoftheBushadministration.TheIraq
Warprovedtobeanewlaboratoryforguerrillawarfare,clandestineorganization,andthe
developmentoflethaltacticsagainstconventionalarmiestacticssuchasimprovised
explosivedevicesandsuicidebombings.Inthewordsofonejihadiideologue,If[the1980s
warin]Afghanistanwastheschoolofjihad,thenIraqistheuniversity.Yetwidespreadfearsof
asocalledjihadibleedouttheexodusofhardened,battletrainedgraduatestoother
theatersdidnotmaterializeasexpected.Inmanycases,foreignvolunteersinIraqdidnot
113
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 114 of 318
acquiresignificantskillsthatweretransferrabletootherbattlefronts.Thiswaspartlybecauseof
thearduousanduniqueconditionsofurbanwarfareinIraq,butalsobecausejihadicommanders
inIraqtendedtousepoorlytrainedbutideologicallycommittedforeignersascannonfodder.
Theaccountsofreturningveteranssuggestthatfarfrombeingthenobleexperienceofjihadthey
hadexpected,theirserviceinIraqwasconfused,demoralizing,andultimatelyunfulfilling.Many
returnedInmanyways,theeventthattippedthescalesagainstalQaedascampaigninIraqwas
theemergenceofitsmostprominentbattlefieldcommander,theaforementionedAbuMusabal
Zarqawi.TheJordanianjihadist,hardenedbyyearsofprisonandbattletestedinAfghanistan,
arrivedinnorthernIraqbeforetheinvasion.Thevariousmutationsofhisinsurgentorganization
quicklyestablishedareputationasthemostfearlessandbrutaloftheinsurgentgroups.His
ferocioustacticsofbeheadings,suicidebombingsagainstcivilians,andtargetingShiite
Muslimswereinitiallyarecruitingwindfall,particularlyaftertheUnitedStateslavished
excessiveattentiononhim,grantinghimadegreeofnotorietyhewouldotherwisenothave
enjoyed.Onthesurface,alZarqawisstrategyappearedtoconformneatlytothatenvisionedby
thenotoriousalQaedatheoristAbuBakrNajiinhislengthyblueprintforglobaljihad,The
ManagementofSavagery.Sowenoughtna(chaos)andbloodshed,Najiadvised,andthecivilian
populationwillwelcomejihadistswithopenarmsasliberatorsandprovidersofsecurity.
Infact,theoppositeoccurred.AlZarqawisincreasinglyindiscriminateviolenceultimately
provedtobehisundoing.Thiswasespeciallysoafterhetriedtoextendthewarbeyondthe
bordersofIraq.HisbombingsofhotelsinAmman,Jordan,in2005,mostofwhosevictimswere
Jordaniancivilians,spawnedasharpoutcrythroughouttheArabworldandamongmanyjihadi
ideologues.ThisatrocitywasfollowedbyasimilarattackonciviliansbyalQaedasaffiliatesin
SaudiArabia,whichprovokedsimilaroutrage.Thenetresultwasthatpopulationsthathad
previouslycheeredalQaedafromafarturnedagainstitwhenconfrontedwithitsviolenceat
home.AfteralZarqawisdeathfromaU.S.airstrikein2006,alQaedascampaigncontinuedto
depleteitspublicsupportinsideIraqandbeyond.InthewesternIraqiprovinceofalAnbar,
wherethegrouphadonceenjoyedgreatmaneuverabilityduetothemarginalizationoftheareas
SunnitribesfromthenewlyShiiteledgovernment,alQaedasattempttogoverntheareawas
metwithgrowingresistancestartingin2008.ThetribeschafedunderalQaedasdraconian
socialmores,extortion,and,mostimportantly,attemptstomarrylocalwomen.Thetribal
backlashledtotheformationofthesocalledawakeningcouncilsandsonsofIraqSunni
IraqimilitiasthattheU.S.forcesadroitlyexploitedtodrivealQaedafromtheareaanddiminish
itslogisticalandfundingnetworks.
Pakistan security policies generate widespread Anti-Americanism
Khurshid Ahmad, Policy Perspectives, June 30, 2011 US Policies, Ensuing Terrorism
and Anti-Americanism: Some Reflections, http://www.ips.org.pk/islamicthoughts/1266-us-policies-ensuing-terrorism-and-anti-americanism-somereflections.html

While recent surveys show that ideology does play an important role in people's public
and private lives, not only in the Muslim World but in the US as well, it would be nave
to attribute anti-American sentiments to a particular religion, or followers of a
particular religion. The US administration and policymakers need to go beyond the
superficial analyses and understand the causes of terrorism and anti-Americanism. Eds.]
114
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 115 of 318
The advent of the 21st century, heralding a new millennium, was welcomed by a large
number of the people world over. It was hoped that the humanity would learn from the
disasters it had to wade through in the last century and make a fresh start to have its
coveted rendezvous with global peace and justice. Unfortunately, these hopes have
been dashed to pieces particularly as a result of the tragic events of 9/11, and the
disastrous response of the United States to them. The war on terror, which was
unleashed to counter terrorism, has made the world much more terrorridden, insecure, unjust, and verging on economic collapse. The first decade
of the 21st century would go down in history as a lost decade primarily
because of the flawed strategies of the only super power, the United States
of America.
The US has failed to critically review its policies vis--vis the rest of the
world resulting in an unending series of failures and their catastrophic
consequences. Almost all major surveys of public opinion conducted during
the last decade reflect increasing the grass roots disappointment about the
US policies and performance in different parts of the world, particularly in
relation to the Palestine problem and the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and their
fall out in different parts of the world. Yet there is no evidence of any major
change in the direction of key US policies. It seems that the hold of the Neoconservatives and the Military-Industrial Complex, about which then US President
Eisenhower had warned in his farewell address, remains unshaken. American
leadership, despite change of faces, remains caught in the quagmire of policies that
could not deliver.
"Terrorism" and "anti-Americanism" have become buzzwords in contemporary political
discourse. The need to critically examine the causes of phenomenal rise in terrorism
has become an existential imperative. It is undeniable that terrorism that was confined
to a few flashpoints in the world has now expanded far and void, becoming a global
phenomenon. Humanity today is beset with terrorisms of many hues and colors
perpetrated by individuals, groups, and states.
While the book market has been inundated with literature on terrorism, it is a sad fact
that much of it represents the viewpoint of the power-elite responsible for the
escalation of terrorism. Partisan perspectives dominate. Viewpoint of the aggrieved do
not get appropriate space in this discourse which is becoming more and more a
monologue. Propaganda is getting an upper hand at the cost of truthful description
and objective analysis. A new breed of terrorism is being promoted through print and
electronic media: intellectual terrorism. However, some voices of dissent against the
conventional thinking are now being raised and alternate perspectives are beginning
to get space in political discourse. Contributions based on independent research and
critical analysis of policies and strategies represent a silver lining on the intellectual
horizon.
Two U.K. based scholars Dr. Usama Butt and Prof. Julian Schofield are engaged in
research on "The US-Pakistan and Pakistan's Foreign Relations: Geo-Politics and
Strategy in the War of Terror". They invited me to respond to questions regarding some
of the key issues namely terrorism, anti-Americanism and the responses of the Islamic
forces in Pakistan. Following piece is based on this email-interview.
'Islamic domestic reaction' to Pak-US relations: sentiments of 'Anti-Americanism'?
Pakistani people are extremely unhappy, even angry, over the US policies at all the
three levels-Global; relating to the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian issue; and
the South Asian Region with particular reference to the Kashmir Issue, Afghanistan and
Indian hegemonic role in the region. The strategic Indo-American relationship, as it has
developed during the Bush-Obama regimes, has very serious implications for the
whole region particularly for Pakistan, China and Iran.
To put things in correct perspective, it may be recalled that feelings of
disenchantment, disapproval and alienation from the US began to explode worldwide
after the World War II. The character of the "Ugly American", as it flashed out in
115
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 116 of 318
literature in the 1960's, was not a figment of imagination. It represented an emerging

reality. Fiction only gave a name and a character to a feeling widely held.
It is claimed that it was in 1985, sixteen years before the tragic events of 9/11, that
two political scientists from the University of Pennsylvania Alvin Z Rubinstein and
Donald B. Smith published a collection of writings on the topic of "anti-Americanism in
the Third World." They focused on a "growing antipathy and willingness to think the
worst of America" in many Third World countries, an attitude they called "antiAmericanism". Sigrid Faath has also referred to the work of a British social scientist
Stephen Haseler (1986) and of a former US Ambassador Richard B. Parker (1988) both
focusing on "anti-American rhetoric and acts of violence against US institutions,
symbols and representations" as a reaction to "the growing US role in world politics."
All these and many other analysts have described the rise of "anti-Americanism" the
world over as an "unavoidable consequence" of the feelings of disappointment of
these countries with the US foreign policies and economic activities.
This is the context in which the current phenomenon of opposition to the US role in the
world deserves to be considered and not in the smoke-screen of "they hate our
values", or that "they are against human rights and democracy", or that something is
"congenitically wrong with the Muslims/Islam," that has promoted "a culture of
extremism, violence and terrorism."
Nevertheless, the "generous", rather indiscriminate, use of the term "antiAmericanism" is not appropriate, as "anti-Americanism" is a complex global
phenomenon and not a typical current Pakistani or Muslim obsession. It also has many
shades and dimensions. To group together a number of factors and forces under one
rubric deserves to be reconsidered.
In this context, it would be incorrect to assume the existence of a widespread feeling
of enmity against the US and the American people as such among the Pakistani
people. The positives about the US society and culture have never been denied or
denigrated. All opinion polls, which bring into sharp focus widespread disapproval of
US policies and activities, also record appreciation for certain positive contributions of
the American people and civilization. Interestingly enough, according to a Gallup
survey made in 2007, while 69% of the respondents had 'very bad' or 'bad' opinion
about the United States, the same respondents when asked about the 'people' of the
US, only 50% described the American people as such. Those who rated US people as
very good or good jumped to 49%. This aspect of the ground situation may not be
ignored.
Having said so, the fundamental issue that plagues Pakistan's relationship with the US,
particularly at the level of Pakistani people, relates to persistent US policies and
practices directed towards Pakistan, Arab/ Muslim world, and now towards Islam as a
religion and the Islamic movements, as expressions of contemporary Islamic
resurgence.
This brings the discussion to the presence of a number of concerns and conflicts of
strategic significance underscoring clash between the national interests of Pakistan
and the Muslim Ummah on the one hand, and on the other, the policies pursued, even
imposed by the American leaderships resorting to "soft" and "hard" powers. There is
also a widely held perception that while some of these policies may be in the pursuit of
genuine US global interests, yet there are quite a few that can be traced to the
disproportionate influence of the Military-Industrial establishment so candidly referred
to by President Dwight Eisenhower in his Farewell Address. Similarly, the perennial
influence of Zionist lobby and of the emerging Indian lobby is a cause for serious
concern. In brief, feelings against America are largely in reaction to:
a) American hegemonistic foreign, and security policies;
b) systematic efforts towards economic and cultural domination; and
c) to the arrogance, hypocrisy and double standards persistently displayed by
respective American leaderships and media.
116
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 117 of 318
The people of Pakistan, by and large, firmly hold that American policies vis--vis
Pakistan and the Muslim world are seriously flawed. Without denying a certain area of
'convergence of interests', it has to be acknowledged that there also exist vast 'areas
of divergence', characterized by some serious conflicts between the national interests
and strategic objectives of the US and Pakistan.
That is the reason why a large majority of the people and not merely the
Islamic groups, (who definitely are in the vanguard) is opposed to the US policies
and presence in the country in overt and covert forms, as also to the
collaborative role of their own political leaderships, including the military
establishment, with the US and other foreign players. It deserves to be
noted that all public opinion surveys conducted by Gallup or other
US/Western organizations have consistently reported popular opposition to
the US policies by an overwhelming number of people of Pakistan, ranging
from 70 to 80 percent.
It may be noted that a rare public opinion survey conducted recently by the New
American Foundation in Pakistan's worst affected Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) reports that 75% of the people whom the US, NATO and Pakistani forces
are protecting from the "terrorists" are "opposed to US drone attack on
Pakistan side" and that 48% of those who responded, claimed that "only
innocent civilians are being killed in these attacks" while another "33
percent thought that both terrorists and civilians are being killed. Most eyeopening has been the response of 6 out of 10 of those who are opposed to
terrorism and yet they say that "suicide attacks are justified against US
military", even 10 percent justify such attacks against the Pakistan Army.
Although Pakistan is the main focus of the question in the context of the US war on
terror in Afghanistan, but the repugnance towards US policies and activities at the
popular level is an almost universal phenomenon as far as the Muslim and Third world
countries are concerned. Perhaps the only exceptions are Israel and to an extent India.
Even in a number of European and South American countries similar trends are
noticeable . It deserves to be noted that even all those Muslim countries where
leaderships are politically on the same page with the US there exists popular
disapproval of the US and its policies. Countries like Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Indonesia
and Turkey deserve special mention.
If this is the grass roots feeling, would it not be a saner policy to address 'what lies
behind this explosion' of "anti-Americanism" by probing the causes and factors that
have generated this universal reaction and not be obsessed with certain pre-conceived
notions about religion-centeredness of certain reactions or be lost in a maze of political
clichs and rhetoric so brazenly presented as "thought" and "analysis"?
Domestic reaction: 'Islamic' or widespread?
There had been widespread disaffection even before the devastating event of 9/11: it
has increased after that. One cannot forget the shock the people of Pakistan had in
1965 when after Indian attack on Pakistan, the so-called "best friend" stopped all its
supplies of military spares critically important for the very security of Pakistan. All
economic assistance was also instantly stopped. Then came the outrageous
intimidations and sanctions to deny Pakistan its nuclear research and development.
Finally, the US took a U-turn after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with all its
devastating consequences for Afghanistan and serious after-shocks for Pakistan. The
height of this turn-about came in the form of stringent sanctions against Pakistan,
followed by an unending media crusade and think-tank onslaughts to project Pakistan
as a "Pariah" and a "Failed/Failing State." Even the dates of its expected demise were
not in short supply.
The situation has been aggravated by the US War on Muslim lands in the wake of 9/11.
There is a tsunami of Islamophobia and Pakistan-bashing that have further imperiled
these relationships.
117
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 118 of 318
The US war on terror had always been looked upon by the people of Pakistan
with suspicion-as a war with ulterior motives imposed upon Pakistan by
bullying the then Pakistani leadership under threats of throwing Pakistan
back to the Stone Age. The ever-increasing stream of anti-Islam outbursts flowing
from the US and Europe has further accentuated peoples' sentiments against the US
and Western powers. That is why an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis disapproves
of US policies and performance, both globally and in the region. They are extremely
critical of the way the US continues to pressurize Pakistani establishment, civil and
military, to serve the US interests and pursues with arrogance and impunity activities
that violate Pakistan's sovereignty, independence, and honor. These soft and hard
strokes threaten its stability and constitute an existential challenge.
Military invasions killed 100s of thousands and have bred terrorists

Khurshid Ahmad, Policy Perspectives, June 30, 2011 US Policies, Ensuing Terrorism
and Anti-Americanism: Some Reflections, http://www.ips.org.pk/islamicthoughts/1266-us-policies-ensuing-terrorism-and-anti-americanism-somereflections.html

The terrorist attack of 9/11 was a crime against humanity. But the way the US
responded to 9/11 is no less a crime, a blunder and a global catastrophe. The heinous
attacks on Twin Towers were not treated as 'a criminal act', to be handled within the
framework of criminal justice system and due process of law, as was done even by the
US itself in the cases of the earlier New York Trade Centre attack of 1993, the
Oklahoma terrorist attack in which 168 Americans were killed and the attack on the
naval ship US Cole in Yemen waters (October, 2000). Instead a legal fiction of "War on
America" was concocted, and the world thrown into the fires of global confrontation,
leading to invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and even parts of Pakistan.
None of the 19 terrorists supposed to be involved in the 9/11 episode were
Afghans, Iraqis or Pakistanis; yet in the name of "counter terrorism" and
"elimination of safe havens" Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded resulting in
merciless killing of hundreds of thousands of people, destruction of huge
populations and properties on a horrendous scale, and creation of new
legions of terrorists, making the world a much more insecure place for all.
The demonization of Islam and Muslims in general and of Arabs and
Pakistanis in particular, is another terrible product of this multidimensional
Neo-Crusade.
It is hard to find a direct link between the pre-Afghan Jihad and post-Afghan Jihad, as
also their alleged nexus with any 'Islamic domestic reaction'. The so-called link
between 9/11 and 'post-Afghan Jihad' reaction is a hypothesis and a surmise. The
phenomenon is much more complex, having multiple dimensions and a much longer
history than 9/11. Simplistic generalizations and politically motivated formulations
cannot help in understanding the real situation. The issue is primarily political and
strategic, even though there may be a lot of religious gloss and rhetoric. The 9/11
remains a mystery and the US leadership has failed to hold an independent inquiry to
let the world, and for that matter its own people, understand the whole truth,
highlighting the real factors and forces behind that outrageous crime against humanity.
It has also failed to identify all forces responsible for its perpetration, as well as those
whose failure made it possible including the seventeen odd US intelligence agencies,
its immigration and civil aviation authorities and its military and security
establishment. There are standing instructions to the US air force to immediately
intercept any plane that deviate from its clearly laid out traffic path. There is no record
of any interception even though the tragic drama took some two hours to unfold.
118
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 119 of 318
Military action increased terrorism in Pakistan and Iraq

Post Crescent, 9/15/11,
http://www.postcrescent.com/article/20110915/APC06/109150490/Trudy-Rubin-column-Takingaccount-war-terror
After that, the Bush administration's grandiose approach to war against terrorism did
us in. InsteadofcleaningupthealQaidanetworkinAfghanistanandPakistan,BushrushedtowarinIraq
whichhadnoalQaida.OurshiftinfocuspermittedalQaidatoflourishinPakistanandignoredthereturn
ofTalibannetworkstoAfghanistan.Meantime,thegrossmishandlingofpostwarIraqhelpedcreateanal
Qaidamonsterinthatcountry,wheretherehadn'tbeenone.Italsoinspiredjihadiselsewhere.
119
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 120 of 318
Terrorism Very Bad
120
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 121 of 318
Terror O/W Prolif

Proliferation can be monitored and contained once terrorists have the
bomb, its over
Amitai Etzioni, GWU Sociology Prof, 2005 [The National Interest, "Enforcing Nuclear
Disarmament," Winter, LN]
There are several reasons why nuclear terrorism is much more challenging than nuclear
attacks from rogue states and hence deserves much more attention and greater dedication
of resources than it currently receives. First of all, the list of rogue states is small and well
known, and their actions can be monitored with relative ease. The opposite holds true
for terrorists. Their numbers are large, their identities are often unknown, and their actions
are difficult to track. Second, rogue states are easier to deter from using their nuclear
arms than are terrorists, especially those willing to commit suicide, a sacrifice which more
than a few have shown themselves ready to make. It is true that the leaders of some rogue
states are unstable, and they could act irrationally or simply miscalculate, disregarding the
fact that their regime-and they personally-would not survive if they employed nuclear
weapons against the U.S. mainland or even one of its allies-or if it became known that they
provided terrorists with such arms. However, miscalculations of the magnitude that would
lead a Kim Jong-il or the mullahs of Iran to use nuclear weapons are very rare indeed. In
contrast, if terrorists acquired a nuclear bomb or the material to make one, they would not
fear retaliation, and they could not be deterred by a balance of terror. Indeed,
terrorists often hold that if their actions lead to attacks on their own homelands, then
support for their cause would increase. Moreover, because terrorists are not the army of one
state, it is often difficult to determine against which nation to retaliate, and thus whom to
deter and how. This dilemma was all too evident when the United States learned after 9/11
that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian nationals. Therefore, there are several strong
reasons to rank the danger of nuclear terrorism much higher than the danger of nuclear
strikes by rogue states-yet U.S. foreign policy, its military, its intelligence agencies and their
covert actions and other resources are focused on dealing with rogue nuclear states both
alleged and real, and not the hundreds of sites from which terrorists can acquire nuclear
material and the few from which they could obtain ready-made bombs.
121
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 122 of 318
Terror Turns Prolif Advantage

Terrorist attacks make non-proliferation efforts impossible
Goodby, 7 (James E., Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy
Studies, U.S. Must Take Offensive Against Nuclear Terrorism, February 4, The Baltimore
Sun, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/goodby/20070204.htm)
We need an aggressive U.S. policy aimed at denying terrorists the pool of nuclear weapons
and related materials from which they can buy or steal the means to destroy an American
city. A diplomatic offensive to block nuclear terrorism should not just fix the easier problems.
It should dry up the most serious potential source of nuclear terror: the weapons that are
stockpiled, the new weapons that are being built, and the infrastructure that supports these
programsand not just in Russia. No American anti-proliferation policy can be
complete or successful if it does not address this side of the problem.
122
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 123 of 318
Fighting Terror Moral Obligation

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS A WAR INTENDED TO DESTROY THE WEST,
BASED ON SHIFTING BLAME FROM WEAK POLITICAL SYSTEMS BATTLE
AGAINST IT IS MORALLY OBLIGATORY
Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, Professor International Relations, Universita Cattolica Del Sacro
Cuore, 2006, The Inevitable Alliance: Europe and the United States beyond Iraq, p. 49-50
The overwhelming majority of Muslims now live in independent states, which have brought no
solutions to their problems. The bastard offspring of both ideologies, national socialism, still
survives in a few states that have preserved the Nazi Fascist style of dictatorial government and
indoctrination, the one through a single all-powerful party. These regimes too have failed every
test except survival, and have brought none of the promised benefits. If anything, their
infrastructures are even more antiquated than others, their armed forces designed primarily for
terror and repression.
Meanwhile the blame gamethe Turks, the Mongols, the imperialists, the Jews, the Americans
continues, and shows little sign of abating. For the governments, at once oppressive and
ineffectual, that rule much of the Middle East, this game serves a useful, indeed an essential
purposeto explain the poverty that they have intensified. In this way they seek to deflect the
mounting anger of their unhappy 'subjects against other, outer targets.
These are tough comments by the well-known, highly esteemed British scholar of Middle
East problems Bernard Lewis. But the words that come from inside the Arab world from
those who have experienced first hand those conditions sound even more bitter. As was
observed by Ali Ahmad Said Esber, a Syrian poet of among the most important in the Arab
world, in exile in France since 1985, Arab culture "should work towards its refoundation," so
that "the previous cultural experiences, all for one cause, are not repeated: for Palestine, for
Arab nationalism, for socialism and liberation from colonialism etc. All of this passed for the
cause of Arab unity, or rather, that experience which, with its Fascist connotations on one
hand and clerical on the other, was the reason for our defeats and our decadence."89 And
so, not surprisingly, such plurality and diversity having been so long compressed, no longer
limit themselves to demanding a sort of right to co-existence in the name of the particularity
of their own culture. Rather, they push toward demanding the right to break the totally
"Western" unity of the same international political system: they do this even at the cost
destroying the foundations, resorting to ever more spectacular terrorist acts, those truly
asymmetric new wars that accompany the dawn of a millennium that was supposed to
commence under the sign of "universal perpetual peace." Recalling Michael Novak's words,
the authoritative Catholic American intellectual greatly heeded by the White House (just like
Bernard Lewis), an international war has been clearly declared. "Its perpetrators called it an
international jihad, aimed not only against the U.S. but the entire West, indeed, against the
whole non-Islamic world. . . . No major moral authority had any difficulty in recognizing that
a war to prevent this new type of terrorism is not only just but morally obligatory. "
123
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 124 of 318
Bioterror High Probability

Bioterrorism is the greatest risk its threats increase exponentially
with time other WMD threats are static
United States Senator Joseph Lieberman, SEN LIEBERMAN COMMENTS ON BIODEFENSE,
US FED NEWS, October 6, 2004, lexis
Bioterrorismmaybethegreatestthreatweface.Anattackfromahijackedjetliner,achemicalrelease,oradirty
bombcouldcauseacatastrophiclossoflife.Buttheperimeterofsuchanattackisfixed.Withaninfectiousdisease,
theperimeterofanattackmightgrowexponentiallyastheinfectionspreads.Itispossibletokillthousandswitha
bomb,chemicalorradiationattack.Butitispossibletokillmillionswithabioterrorpathogen.Stocksof
bioweaponsdevelopedbytheformerSovietUnionmightfallintothehandsofterrorists.Theseincludeantibiotic
resistantstrainsofplagueandanthrax,apowderedformofMarburgahemorrhagicfeversimilartoEbolaanda
plaguediphtheriahybrid.Thesepathogenscouldbedeployedbyterrorists,
sociopathsorroguestatesthatwill
happilykillinmassivenumbers.
Overthelongterm,asthepowerofmodernbiotechnologygrows,thebioterror
threatwillgrowandincreasinglyvirulentandexoticweaponsmightbecomethreats.Thisiswhyweneedto
establishabiodefenseindustrythatcanrespondasthreatsevolve.Stockinguponafewproductstohandlethe
currentknownthreatsisnotenough.
Nuclear terrorism only scenario for state-based nuclear war

Nautilus Institute 04 (Who Will Stop Nuclear Next Use? The Nautilus Institute
Scenarios Workshop 2004 Final Report April 27-28,
http://www.nautilus.org/gps/scenarios/ScenariosFinal2004.pdf)
despite participants' deep professional expertise in nuclear proliferation in North Korea, India and
Pakistan, and the Middle East, none of the scenarios generated nuclear next-use
arising from state vs. state conflict. In each case, the nuclear next-use (or near next-use) was
carried out by non-state actors against a state or national entity . Such an event
could then lead to state vs. state conflict because the state hit by such an
attack may strike back against the nation believed to have provided the
terrorists with nuclear capabilities (such an outcome was discussed by the "The Tightened Knot"
First,
team as a possible result of their scenario). The focus on non-state actors reflects both the anxiety of the current
world situation and the recognition that political factors ranging from international and domestic pressure to
nuclear deterrence can dampen down the possibility of state-level nuclear

weapon use. Non-state actors terrorists may not be so responsive to these kinds of political
effective
effects, a perspective that is deeply embedded in all the scenarios.
They want it will choose a time and location where retaliation is most
likely to escalate
considerations of cost and benefit mattered less to a terrorist group in
possession of a nuclear weapon ? As Quester writes: Governments would, under many circumstances,
have a strong incentive to preserve their adversarys ability to negotiate and surrender; terrorists, by contrast,
might have a much stronger incentive to create general chaos, to disrupt and
destroy all of their targets ability to control and moderate its responses .50 What if a
But what if these
124
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 125 of 318
terrorist group realized that it might just be able to spark a catalytic nuclear war?
Might that group then work to increase the likelihood of such a war , or to threaten to do so,
as a way of either increasing its bargaining power, prestige, or security or to bring about the
apocalypse that some observers believe they really desire? Ferguson and Potter argue that apocalyptic
groups . . . may believe that detonating a nuclear warhead would spark a broader
nuclear conflict, enabling them to hasten the end of the world .51 To the extent that any
terrorist group has already recognized that this potential for inspiring catalysis may exist, could this also prove a
major incentive for it to seek nuclear weapons in the first place? What then might be the situations where a
Once
in possession of a useable nuclear weapon, such a group might be inclined to look
for a time and place where relations between two or more major nuclear powers
were already tense. The catalytic potential could be amplified if the two nucleararmed countries (the original target of the terrorist detonation and the country with whom a wider nuclear
exchange could then begin) were involved in a serious crisis in which case there was a
heightened state of alert and even an expectation that some sort of attack by one on the other was likely
or even imminent. In such a hot-headed environment, a terrorist nuclear detonation
might be even more easily misunderstood and misinterpreted , thus combining the Cold War
fears of both catalytic and accidental nuclear war. A terrorist group might exploit the situation
further with a false but enormously provocative claim that its nuclear attack had
been supported by the state with which the victim of the attack was already in a
crisis situation. The loudest of denials by the state so identified might fall on deaf ears in a period when fear
terrorist group could maximize the admittedly slim chances of setting off such a massive nuclear exchange?
and paranoia reigned52 : in fact, the victimized state again might simply refuse to believe that the attack could
have come from a non-state actor and would be busy looking for the real source of the attack.
125
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 126 of 318
WMD Terrorism Risk & Impacts
126
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 127 of 318
Nuclear and Biological Terrorism Risks Increasing

Terrorists will use WMDs
Theyll use WMDs --- causes extinction
Gary A. Ackerman 14 & Lauren E. Pinson, Gary is Director of the Center for
Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Lauren is Senior Researcher and Project Manager
for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism,
An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous
Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 26, Issue 1
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors
come and whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small
autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons
by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or supplement the attributes of the more
general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological
Recent and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from synthetic

biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new
medicines and materials, but also to new possibilities for malefactors to
inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors
and small autonomous cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the
commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weapons-relevant
technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and
safety of the technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume,
and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example, whereas fifty
years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might
have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant,
expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of
chemical microreactors, 5 the same processes might be accomplished far
more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage, purchased
commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student . The
rapid global spread and increased user-friendliness of many technologies
thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm
a single individual or small autonomous group could historically cause . 6
development.
From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and
the number of people

that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could
kill with a single action has increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed,
it has even been asserted that over time as the leverage provided by technology
increases, this threshold will finally reach its culminationwith the ability
eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11),
of one man to declare war on the world and win . 7 Nowhere is this trend
more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional
weapons. These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level.
Globalization and the expansion of information networks provide new
opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the
globe to become familiar with core weapon concepts and to purchase
equipmentonline technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be
purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes,
people who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find
127
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 128 of 318
radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of

virtual identities on the Internet. All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more
deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in some quarters as superempowered individuals. 8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers,
i.e., they constitute a single (and often singular) individual who can shock the
entire system
(whether national, regional, or global)
by relying only on their own
resources . Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex
communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a lone-wolf. 9 The end result, according to the
pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, the unprecedented nature of his attack
ensures that
no counter-measures are in place
to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will
not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social systems that
the same concerns attach to small

autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities and resources can be
combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented
to intelligence and law enforcement agencies seeking to detect such
behavior. With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs, the most likely means by
govern modern life. 10 It almost goes without saying that
is through the use of CBRN agents as WMD .

On the motivational side, therefore, lone actors and small autonomous
cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more
established terrorist groupswho are usually more conservative in their
tactical orientationbecause the extreme asymmetry of these weapons
may provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve
their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system . The inherent technical challenges
which to accomplish this level of system perturbation
presented by CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a very
different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety
of constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other factors beyond a perceived potential to
achieve mass casualties might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives,
12 including a fetishistic fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be
perpetrator's belief system. Others are far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state
actors in general) with respect to their potential for using CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the
barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in today's networked, tech-savvy environment.
13 Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are less constrained in motivations, more
challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney cautions against
making presumptions about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the
even most of these pundits concede that low-level CBR attacks

emanating from this quarter will probably lead to political, social, and
economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately
affected by the attack. This raises an essential point with respect to CBRN
terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an
actor's capability (or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a
catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger
psychological impact on audiencesthe essence of terrorismthan the traditional
gun and bomb. This is surely not lost on those lone actors or autonomous
cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties .
Internet. 15 However,
Proven Capability and Intent While legitimate debate can be had as to the level of potential threat posed by lone
actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN weapons, possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive
these actors have already

demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN
weapons, in some cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine
WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr.
examination of the issue is the most concrete one of allthat
Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001
anthrax letters, which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed five and
seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government
128
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 129 of 318
facilities. 16 Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small autonomous cells highlight
the need for further exploration. Among the many extant examples: 17 Thomas Lavy was caught at the AlaskaCanada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned
to do with it, and what motivated him. In 1996, Diane Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with
shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives were unclear. In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was
charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agentbacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax. In
1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over 100
razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry. In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested
for mailing samples of the mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese
government agencies to persuade authorities to look into potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea. In
2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack shop's products and killed 42 people. In 2005, 10 letters
containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO
headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported. In 2011, federal agents arrested four
elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department
officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents. Two recent events may signal an even greater
interest in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's treatise, his
CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical

level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed audiences) that even low-level CBRN
weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven by fear. 18 Whether or not
references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that
Breivik would actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often farright) extremist circles and his treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
released two issues of Inspire magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand,
call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and , on
the other, permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The
combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon
selection of lone actor jihadists in Western nations. 19
And, the risk of nuclear and biological terrorism is high

Allison, IR Director @ Harvard, 12 (Graham, Director, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy
School, "Living in the Era of Megaterror", Sept 7,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22302/living_in_the_era_of_megaterror.html)
Forty years ago this week at the Munich Olympics of 1972, Palestinian terrorists conducted one of the most
dramatic terrorist attacks of the 20th century. The kidnapping and massacre of 11 Israeli athletes attracted days of
around-the-clock global news coverage of Black Septembers anti-Israel message. Three decades later ,
on
9/11, Al Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 individuals at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
announcing a new era of megaterror. In an act that killed more people than Japans attack on Pearl Harbor, a band
of terrorists headquartered in ungoverned Afghanistan demonstrated that individuals and small groups can kill on a
Today, how many people can a small group

of terrorists kill in a single blow? Had Bruce Ivins, the U.S. government
microbiologist responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks, distributed his
deadly agent with sprayers he could have purchased off the shelf, tens of
thousands of Americans would have died. Had the 2001 Dragonfire
report that Al Qaeda had a small nuclear weapon (from the former Soviet arsenal) in New
York City proved correct, and not a false alarm, detonation of that bomb in Times
Square could have incinerated a half million Americans. In this electoral season, President
scale previously the exclusive preserve of states.
Obama is claiming credit, rightly, for actions he and U.S. Special Forces took in killing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, at last weeks
Republican convention in Tampa, Jeb Bush praised his brother for making the United States safer after 9/11. There can be no doubt
that the thousands of actions taken at federal, state and local levels have made people safer from terrorist attacks. Many are
therefore attracted to the chorus of officials and experts claiming that the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda means the end of this
While applauding actions that

have made us safer from future terrorist attacks, we must recognize that
they have not reversed an inescapable reality: The relentless advance of
science and technology is making it possible for smaller and smaller
groups to kill larger and larger numbers of people. If a Qaeda affiliate, or
some terrorist group in Pakistan whose name readers have never heard, acquires highly enriched
uranium or plutonium made by a state, they can construct an elementary
nuclear bomb capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people . At
chapter of history. But we should remember a deeper and more profound truth.
129
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
biotech labs
Page 130 of 318
around the world, research scientists making

are also capable of making pathogens, like
anthrax, that can produce massive casualties. What to do? Sherlock Holmes examined crime
across the United States and
medicines that advance human well-being
scenes using a method he called M.M.O.: motive, means and opportunity. In a society where citizens gather in unprotected movie
theaters, churches, shopping centers and stadiums, opportunities for attack abound. Free societies are inherently target rich.
Motive to commit such atrocities poses a more difficult challenge. In all societies, a percentage of the population will be homicidal.
No one can examine the mounting number of cases of mass murder in schools, movie theaters and elsewhere without worrying
about a societys mental health. Additionally, actions we take abroad unquestionably impact others motivation to attack us. As
Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 would-be Times Square bomber, testified at his trial: Until the hour the U.S. ... stops the occupation of
Muslim lands, and stops killing the Muslims ... we will be attacking U.S., and I plead guilty to that. Fortunately, it is more difficult for
a terrorist to acquire the means to cause mass casualties. Producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium requires expensive
industrial-scale investments that only states will make. If all fissile material can be secured to a gold standard beyond the reach of
thieves or terrorists, aspirations to become the worlds first nuclear terrorist can be thwarted. Capabilities for producing bioterrorist
agents are not so easily secured or policed. While more has been done, and much more could be done to further raise the
technological barrier, as knowledge advances and technological capabilities to make pathogens become more accessible, the means
One of the hardest truths about modern

life is that the same advances in science and technology that enrich our
lives also empower potential killers to achieve their deadliest ambitions.
for bioterrorism will come within the reach of terrorists.
To
imagine that we can escape this reality and return to a world in which we are invulnerable to future 9/11s or worse
we will live in an era of megaterror.

Nuclear terror is a big deal yo most recent evidence theyre
complacency
Bunn 13 (2013, Matthew, PhD, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator,
Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard, Beyond Crises: The Unending Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons
and Materials, in Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Ed.
Henry D. Sokolski. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 253-278)
is an illusion. For as far as the eye can see,
the threats are out there. In a world that includes terrorists with global
reach, effective nuclear security and accounting measures are needed wherever
nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU exist. All countries with such stockpiles on their
soil should ensure that they are at least protected against a modest group of well-armed, wellIn short,
trained outsiders; a wellplaced insider; and both outsiders and an insider working together, using a broad range of
Countries that face more substantial adversary threats Pakistan being an obvious
to provide even higher levels of protection .9
Unfortunately, in many countries around the world, the security measures in place today
are demonstrably not sufficient to protect against the kinds of threats terrorists and
thieves have already shown they can pose. For example, a U.S. team visiting a foreign
site with a Category I quantity of HEU from 2005 to 2010 found that there were no fences
around the perimeter, no sensors to detect intrusions, no video surveillance
systems to help guards assess the cause of alarms generated by sensors, and no
vehicle barriers.10 (It is a reasonable bet that this facility also did not have an on-site armed response team
tactics.
exampleneed
to protect it from armed attackers.) The U.S. team recommended that all of these basic security measures be put in
place, which the country agreed to do. But when a team of congressional auditors visited in 2010-11, some of the
The fact that such glaring weaknesses still existed at a

site with Category I materials years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks
speaks volumes about the urgent work still ahead to plug nuclear security weak
points around the world. Indeed, I would argue that every country with nuclear weapons or weaponsimprovements were still under way.
usable nuclear materialsincluding the United Stateshas more to do to ensure that these items are effectively
protected.
PUNCTUATING COMPLACENT EQUILIBRIUM: THE U.S. CASE
If political turmoil is not the most important driver of nuclear security problems,
what is? In a word, complacency the belief that nuclear terrorism is not a serious
threat, and that whatever security measures are in place today are already
sufficient. The history of nuclear security is a story of punctuated equilibrium, with
long stretches of complacency and little change punctuated by moments when
130
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 131 of 318
somethingtypically, a major incident of some kind made it possible to move the

system to a higher-security state, from which it would then begin to drift slowly into complacency
again. The results of incidents and other events are mediated by the different political cultures and institutions in
one country might react to an incident by establishing

substantial new security rules, while another might react by having participants in
the system offer explanations why it could never happen again.
different countries, so that
Terror defense is wrong high risk of nuclear attacks.

Zimmerman 09 (2009, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and elementary particle
physics, Emeritus Professor of Science and Security at King's College London, former
Chief Scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Do We Really Need to
Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, Defence Against
Terrorism Review Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2009, 1-14)
This paper considers the case for and against there being a substantial risk
that a sub-state adversary might be able to carry the construction of a nuclear
device to completion and delivery . It discusses works both for and against the proposition that the
Abstract:
detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a stolen nuclear weapon is sufficiently probable that strong
Contrarian articles and books have appeared

suggesting that the possibility of nuclear terrorism has been greatly exaggerated .
They argue that building an IND is too difficult for even well-financed terrorists, that
obtaining sufficient fissile materials is nearly impossible, and that no intact weapons
will be stolen. But an examination of these works finds some to be simplistic
and ridden with basic mistakes in risk analysis or misconceptions , while others
are better informed but still flawed. The principal barrier to entry for either a new nuclear weapons
possessor state or a sub-state group, namely acquiring fissile material , plutonium or highly enriched
uranium (HEU), became less imposing with the collapse of the Soviet Union . There is a
gap in our knowledge of Russian fissile inventories , which have not always been well guarded,
measures to prevent the act must be considered.
and in this circumstance one cannot reassure the world that there has been no theft of fissile material, or that any
The probability of a
nuclear terrorist attack in any given year remains significant. Significant
investment to deter, prevent, detect, and destroy a nuclear terror plot is
required.
attempt will be detected quickly enough to prevent its being made into a nuclear device.
Terrorists seeking more complex weapons

As one analyst put it, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists
tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. 56
This is somewhat overstated, however, because 9/11 demonstrated that terrorists
could use box cutters to transform a jumbo jet into a weapon of mass destruction.
Terrorists in Japan and elsewhere have also attempted chemical weapons attacks,
another major technological innovation. Disturbingly, as elucidated below, the
NRCs design basis threat (DBT) does not even posit that terrorists would have some
of the conventional weapons that they have used in the past.
131
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 132 of 318
High risk of nuclear terrorism, empirically denied arguments

are bunk, and terrorists can steal materials
Simon Sturdee, 7-1, 13, UN Atomic Energy Agency Sounds Warning on Nuclear
Terrorism, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/01/un-atomic-agency-soundswarning-on-nuclear-terrorism/
The head of the UN atomic agency warned Monday against complacency in
preventing "nuclear terrorism", saying progress in recent years should not lull the
world into a false sense of security. "Much has been achieved in the past decade,"
Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency told a gathering in Vienna
of some 1,200 delegates from around 110 states including 35 ministers to review
progress on the issue. "Many countries have taken effective measures to prevent
theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts
involving nuclear or other radioactive material. Security has been improved at many
facilities containing such material." Partly as a result, he said, "there has not been a
terrorist attack involving nuclear or other radioactive material." "But this must not
lull us into a false sense of security. If a 'dirty bomb' is detonated in a major
city, or sabotage occurs at a nuclear facility, the consequences could be
devastating. "Nuclear terrorism" comprises three main risks: an atomic bomb, a
"dirty bomb" -- conventional explosion spreading radioactive material -- and an
attack on a nuclear plant. The first, using weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, is
generally seen as "low probability, high consequence" -- very difficult to pull off but
for a determined group of extremists, not impossible. There are hundreds of tonnes
of weapons-usable plutonium and uranium -- a grapefruit-sized amount is enough
for a crude nuclear weapon that would fit in a van -- around the world. A "dirty
bomb" -- a "radiological dispersal device" or RDD -- is much easier but would be
hugely less lethal. But it might still cause mass panic. "If the Boston marathon
bombing (in April this year) had been an RDD, the trauma would be lasting a whole
lot longer," Sharon Squassoni from the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) told AFP. Last year alone, the IAEA recorded 17 cases of illegal
possession and attempts to sell nuclear materials and 24 incidents of theft
or loss. And it says this is the "tip of the iceberg". Many cases have involved
former parts of the Soviet Union, for example Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova -where in 2011 several people were arrested trying to sell weapons-grade uranium -but not only. Nuclear materials that could be used in a "dirty bomb" are also
used in hospitals, factories and university campuses and are therefore
seen as easy to steal. Major international efforts have been made since the end
of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States to prevent nuclear material falling into the wrong hands. US President Barack
Obama hosted a summit in 2010 on the subject which was followed by another one
in Seoul last year. A third is planned in The Hague in March. A report issued in
Vienna on Monday to coincide with the start of the meeting by the Arms Control
Association and the Partnership for Global Security said decent progress had been
made but that "significant" work remained. Ten countries have eliminated their
entire stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium, many reactors producing nuclear
medicines were using less risky materials and smuggling nuclear materials across
borders, for example from Pakistan, is harder, it said. But some countries still do
not have armed guards at nuclear power plants, security surrounding
nuclear materials in civilian settings is often inadequate and there is a
132
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 133 of 318
woeful lack of international cooperation and binding global rules. "We are
still a long way from having a unified regime, a unified understanding of the threat
and a way to address it," Michelle Cann, co-author of the report, told AFP.
Risk of dirty bomb attacks increasing

pp. 98-114
The threat of terrorist use of an RDD or dirty bomb has increased since
September 11, 2001, and is perceived as the most likely act of nuclear
terrorism. An RDD is not a nuclear weapon but a bomb that uses conventional
explosives to spread radiological material over a wide area. The damage caused by
the detonation of an RDD would not necessarily stem from the effects of the
radiological material itself but instead from the amount of conventional explosives
used. 35 Nonetheless, the detonation of a dirty bomb would have a major
psychological impact due to the widespread fear of radiation in the public
imagination. 36 The effectiveness of an RDD would also depend on a number of
variables including the radiological material used, the amount of conventional
explosive, and the weather conditions. While there are hundreds of radioactive
isotopes, only a small number are considered to be effective in an RDD, notably
cesium-137 and cobalt-60, both of which are produced in nuclear reactors and are
widely used for medical/industrial purposes. As these materials are found in
hospitals, universities, and research facilities, they are perceived by some
analysts as a soft target for potential terrorists seeking materials for an
RDD. 37 Spent fuel from nuclear power reactors has also been identified as
a potential source of radioactive materials for an RDD.
133
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 134 of 318
WMD Terrorism Means Extinction

Terror attack means human extinction
The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide
small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We
now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons thatare as
destructive asor possibly even more destructive thanthose held by any nationstate. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, now have the
ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is perfectly feasible, from a
technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth.
The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without
seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any
degree of seriousness numbs the mind. Worries about the future of the human race
are hardly novel. Indeed, the notion that terrorists or others might use
weapons of mass destruction is so commonplace as to be almost pass.
spy novels, movies, and television dramas explore this plot frequently. We have
become desensitized to this entire genre, in part because James Bond always
manages to save the world in the end.
134
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 135 of 318
Nuclear Terrorism Impacts
135
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 136 of 318
Terrorists Trying to Get Nukes

Al Qaeda likely to use WMDs extreme ideology, no fear of
counterattack, ambitious goals and they are likely to attack
the US homeland
The risk that al Qaeda or some future group will use equally terrible
weapons seems higher on every level. its geopolitical goals are, if anything,
more ambitious than the soviets were. al Qaedas ideology is more
extreme. The groups vulnerability to counterattack or reprisal is far lower
than anything the soviets facedit has already survived the worst our nation
can throw at it. The terrorists have demonstrated a shocking degree of ruthlessness.
Under any theory of risk, these foes must be considered more likely to act than the
soviets ever were. Another reason terrorists would attack is the oldest justification
in the worldbecause were trying to get them. its no secret that the United states
aims to exterminate al Qaeda and similar terrorist groupsand rightly so. With
revenge and self-preservation on their minds, our primary adversaries are not likely
to show us unnecessary mercy. A more mundane reason to worry is that the
information cascade that empowers stateless groups will ultimately demand more
numerous and spectacular demonstrations of power to feed popular interest.
terrorism survives by making a big impact, and when the world gets desensitized to
beheadings, the temptation to one-up the last attack increases. Similarly, the arc of
terrorism in iraqwhich spiked dramatically from 2004 through 2007 and then
leveled off, only to resurge somewhat recentlymay foreshadow an increasing risk
to the United states. terrorists quite ratio- nally sought to destabilize iraq and
afghanistan as a way to humble the United states and influence its policy by forcing
a pullout. That strategy focused terrorists attention more on these countries and
possibly distracted some groups from directly attacking U.s. territory.
as U.s. forces withdraw from the region, these targets become less interesting.
What next? al Qaeda and other stateless groups will seek to build on their
previous successes. They have successfully carved out a safe haven for
themselves in the lawless frontiers of Pakistan. dramatic attacks on the
american homeland would be a natural next step.
The decentralized nature of stateless organizations raises another set of
concerns. once mass death becomes accessible to small groups, it is
unclear who would be in control. This lack of direction has already been seen in
various al Qaeda attacks in saudi arabia and europe, some of which clearly hurt
the cause of islamic terrorists. They took place because no single chain of command
exists in the overall movementit is, at best, a loose confederacy.
136
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 137 of 318
an additional issue might be called the craziness factor. small groups can have
crazy goals. The smaller the group, the crazier they may be. The apocalyptic death
cult aum shinrikyo is a case in point. Kaczynski is another example.
The belief that terror groups will not use terrible weapons if they get them
seems foolish in the extreme. to borrow a phrase from A Streetcar Named
Desire, to hold this belief is, in effect, to rely on the kindness of terrorists. any rational analysis must assign a substantial amount of the terror
risk to large-scale, high-magnitude events. yet that is not how our defenses
are organized and not how we are spending our resources. instead, we focus most
of our counterterrorism efforts on thwarting small-scale attacks by, for example,
confiscating grandmas four-ounce bottle of hand lotion at the airport.
Terrorists attempting to gain access to WMDs

However, the fact that jihadist extremists in the United States have shown no
interest in CBRN weapons doesnot eliminate the need for securing potential sources
of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. According to a count by the New
America Foundation, since 2001, 13 extremists motivated by right-wing
ideologies, one left-wing militant, and two individuals with idiosyncratic
motives have deployed, acquired, or tried to acquire chemical, biological,
or radiological weapons. For example, William Krar and Judith Bruey, two
anti-government extremists, possessed precursor chemicals for hydrogen
cyanide gas, which they discussed deploying through a buildings
ventilation system.10 They were arrested in 2003.
Zawahiris new goal is acquisition of a nuclear bomb risk of al

Qaeda nuclear attack is high
Kanani, Editor of World Affairs Commentary, 6-29-11 (Rahim, New
al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaedachief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)
We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiris
leadership. In a recent report titled Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For
and Against Nuclear Weapons, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S.
Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaedas WMD ambitions are stronger than ever.
137
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 138 of 318
And that this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational. I believe al-Qaeda is
laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the
next year or two, continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier
this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy
School. The attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that
al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack. Most will
readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they are right,
but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head
of the Central Intelligence Agencys WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and crossreferencing Zawahiris 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled Exoneration, the
analytics steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected.
138
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 139 of 318
Nuclear Terrorism Toon

Extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war
Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at
CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, Atmospheric effects and societal consequences
of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism, online:
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the worlds great urban
centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million
individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear
explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car , small
plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the
15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in
some cases, and casualties exceeding one million . Thousands of small weapons still exist in the
arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons
inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to
assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15
even a single
surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to
cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades
kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover,
owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana
the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe

would most likely have severe national and international economic
consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield
suggests,
detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are
terrorists would be most likely to strike there.

Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists
supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once
predicted for a full-scale nuclear counterforce exchange in a
superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated
by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to
significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our
concentrated. Rogue nations and
casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial
explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and
Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.
139
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 140 of 318
(Nuclear) Barrett (US-Russian Nuclear War)

Causes accidental US-Russia nuclear war.
Barrett et al. 13 (6/28, Anthony, PhD, Engineering and Public Policy from
Carnegie Mellon University, Director of Research, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute,
Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, Seth Baum, PhD,
Geography, Pennsylvania State University, Executive Director, GCRI, Research
Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar
position at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia
University, and Kelly Hostetler, Research Assistant, GCRI, Analyzing and Reducing
the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,
Science and Global Security 21(2): 106-133, pre-print, available online)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are
by far the largest of any nations , could have globally catastrophic effects such as
severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization
worldwide and even the extinction of humanity .2 Nuclear war between the United
States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or
unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or
unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over
nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or
explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to
attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation
mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3
(Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of
risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4 )
nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional

attack through development of deterrence capabilities , though numerous measures were also
taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of
deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant
capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a
Over the years,
subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the
other sides forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to detect a
first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5
Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations
between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was
significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war
between the United States and Russia has continued to present a
substantial risk.7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they
have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8
False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways . First, a wide range of
events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty
terrorist
groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia
that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as
exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb ,10 especially if such an event occurs during a
crisis between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are
possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use
them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to
circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their
security.14
computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second,
140
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 141 of 318
It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is
significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions ,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being
a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly
deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of
ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia ,
making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks .
141
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 142 of 318
(Nuclear) -- Beres
Nuclear terrorism means nuclear omnicide
Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue,
TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY, 1987, p. 42-3
Nuclear terrorism could even spark a full scale war between states. Such a war
could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a
nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might
such far reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about?
Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault
against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example,
consider the following scenario: Early in the 1990s, Israel and its Arab
state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive,
multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and
Egypt already many years old, only the interests of the Palestinians, as
defined by the PLO, seem to have been left out. On the eve of the
proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear
explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities.
Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed is matched
only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the
government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist
strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria
retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict
has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries of the area have suffered
unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the
makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the
situation in the Middle East? What would be the soviet response? It is certainly
conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could
ensue, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers or even every
nuclear weapon state on the planet.
142
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 143 of 318
(Nuclear) Easterbrook, Amhed, Haas

A new wmd terrorist attack in the u.s. will trigger retaliation
that will kill 100 million people
Greg Easterbrook, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November 2001, p.
www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html. (UNDRG/C324)
Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al
Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message,
it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great
benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the
United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say,
in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims
would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim
countries.
This will escalate to mass extinction via global nuclear war

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 2004 [Al-Ahram Weekly,
"Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the
negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on
themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations
and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop
the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more
critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge
victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without
winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
A nuclear terror attack on the U.S. will trigger a global

depression
Richard Haas, President, Council on Foreign Relations, PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC
NUCLEAR TERRORISM, March 2006,
A nuclear attack by terrorists against the United States has the potential to make the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, look like a historical footnote. In addition to the immediate horrific devastation, such an
attack could cost trillions of dollars in damages, potentially sparking a global economic depression. Although, during
the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush and Democratic challenger Senator John F. Kerry agreed that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons worried them more than any
other national security threat, the U.S. government has yet to elevate nuclear terrorism prevention to the highest priority. Despite several U.S. and international programs to secure nuclear
weapons and the materials to make them, major gaps in policy remain.
143
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 144 of 318
(Nuclear) Speice
A terrorist attack escalates to a global nuclear exchange
Speice 06 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr.,
NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY
BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, William
& Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear
device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of
stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39
Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the
stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [1438] such a country, or
[buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally
threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device
on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon .
41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon
are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a
nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could
successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that
are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of
countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for
maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at
least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy
has stabilized somewhat, there [1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid
and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their
nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48
The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that
seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear
weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses . 49 Moreover,
there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and
retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially
triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of
nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and
may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear
attacks against the United States [1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the
likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the
use of nuclear weapons. 53
144
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 145 of 318
(Nuclear) Zedillo, Alexander

Third, a nuclear terrorist attack will trigger every impact
scenario
Ernesto Zedillo, Former President of Mexico Director, Yale Center for the Study of
Globalization, FORBES, January 9, 2006, p. 25
Even if you agree with what's being done in the war on terror, you still could be upset about what's not
happening: doing the utmost to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack. We all should have a pretty clear idea of what
would follow a nuclear weapon's detonation in any of the world's major cities. Depending on the potency of the
device the loss of life could be in the hundreds of thousands (if not millions), the destruction of property in the
trillions of dollars, the escalation in conflicts and violence uncontrollable, the erosion of authority and
government unstoppable and the disruption of global trade and finance unprecedented. In short, we could
practically count on the beginning of another dark age.
Terrorism risks extinction

Yonah Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, 2003 [The Washington
Times, "Terrorism myths and realities," 8/28]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist
threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to
regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national
security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the
unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's
commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of
1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still
"shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process
through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as
scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist
"surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute
to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double
standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda
and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new
scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and
brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g.
biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional
and global security concerns.
145
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 146 of 318
(Nuclear) Hannity, Zedillo, Alexander

Terrorism risks extinction & outweighs war
Sean Hannity, Fox News Political Analyst, 2004 [Deliver Us from Evil: Defeating Terrorism,
Despotism, and Liberalism, pg. 6]
But the terrorists are no mere political sideshow. Though it manifests itself
differently, the threat they represent is every bit as grave as the one we
experienced during World War II or the Cold War. There is no appeasing this enemy; they
will stop at nothing in their quest to destroy the United States, and they will lay waste to every human
life they can in the process. As you read these words, the evildoers are plotting the
disruption of our lives, the destruction of our property, the murder of our families.
Today or tomorrow, fanatical extremists could come in possession of suitcase
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, whether through rogue
nations or via black-market thugs from the former Soviet Union. We face the
possibility of our civilization being destroyed, as surely as we did during the Cuban Missile Crisis;
indeed, with recent advances in technology and the ongoing instability in the Middle East and around
the world, the danger may be worse than ever.
A nuclear terrorist event would catalyze an accidental nuclear

war- killing billions.
Lewis 02 (Michael, Webmaster for Armageddon Online,
Armageddononline.tripod.com/nuclear.htm)
Russia created around 250 suitcase bombs - nuclear weapons the size of suitcases. According to a
Soviet defector called Aleksander Lebed it has lost track of more than 100 - each of
which could kill more than 100,000 people. Many of these bombs were distributed and hidden in
hostile countries. Possibly the worst effect of a terrorist nuclear device would be that it could
trigger a nuclear war. If America thought Russia had used nuclear weapons against it, it would not
hesitate to retaliate; so one small nuclear device could kill billions.
146
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 147 of 318
(Nuclear) Ayson
Terrorist attack leads to global nuclear war with Russia and China
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare
It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially

an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them .
not necessarily separable.
In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War
years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear
war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early
1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable
amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to
such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States,
it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups.
They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as
how
might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material
used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks ,40 and if for some
reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear
easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example,
material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al.
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its
radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable , and a wealth of information
that while the
can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some
if the act of nuclear terrorism

came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a
terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift
immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France,
and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short
list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at
what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In
particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China , and at a time when threats had
already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be
tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if
indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively,
the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they
were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the
present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a
period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the
pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the
attack?
Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also
raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a
tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that
Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use
force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt
such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still
147
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 148 of 318
meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of
nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant
conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist
group and/or states seen to support that group . Depending on the identity and especially the
location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too
close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of
influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might
stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided
somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents . . . longstanding interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself
unable or unwilling to provide.
148
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 149 of 318
(Nuclear) Global Economy

A nuclear terrorist attack will destroy the global economy
DEFENSE NEWS, November 6, 2006

Should there be a catastrophic event inside America, how we respond across the network will
depend and vary on the target; it will be tailored, but our response should be broad
and across the range of our capabilities. Indeed, this policy approach may
encourage the international cooperation and transparency we seek to halt WMD
proliferation. Our policy statements and deterrence strategies are becoming too
complex to understand the message; we need to keep it simple and produce the
same strategic effect that the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction did with the
Soviet Union. At the end of the day, such a nuclear detonation will not destroy us, but it
very likely will severely damage our economy and the global economy, change history and
national relationships, not to mention civilizational symbols and lives. We need to be
able to reciprocate at the same level, and put at risk and hold strategically culpable
the entire proliferation network.
A nuclear terror attack will collapse the global economy and

trigger massive poverty
Graham Allison, JFK School @ Harvard, Harvard International Review. Cambridge: Fall
2006.Vol.28, Iss. 3; pg. 50, 6 pgs
The face of nuclear danger today is a nuclear September 11. As Nobel Prize winner and head of the IAEA
Mohamed ElBaradei has warned, "The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and current." UN secretary-General
Kofi Annan noted, "Nuclear terrorism is still often treated as science fiction. I wish it were. But unfortunately we
live in a world of excess hazardous materials and abundant technological know-how, in which some terrorists
clearly state their intention to inflict catastrophic casualties...Were a nuclear terrorist attack to occur, it would
cause not only widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy and thrust tens of
millions of people into dire poverty."
A nuclear terror attack in the U.S. will collapse the global

financial markets
William J. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford
University. He is a senior fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
and serves as codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 86
Of course, terrorists setting off a nuclear bomb on U.S. soil would not be equivalent to the
nuclear holocaust threatened during the cold war. But it would be the single worst
catastrophe this country has ever suffered. Just one bomb could result in more than one
hundred thousand deaths, and there could be more than one attack. The direct economic
losses from the blast would be hundreds of billions of dollars, but the indirect economic
impact would be even greater, as worldwide financial markets would collapse in a way that would make
149
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 150 of 318
the market setback after 9/11 seem mild. And the social and political effects are incalculable,
especially if the weapon were detonated in Washington or Moscow or London,
crippling the government of that nation.
150
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 151 of 318
(Nuclear) -- Middle east war

Persistent instability means nuclear terror escalates to war.
Freilich 10 (2010, Chuck, PhD, Senior Fellow at the International Security
Program, Harvard Kennedy School, Adjunct Professor at New York University, former
Deputy National Security Adviser in Israel, The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and
the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 84,
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS84.pdf)
The Middle East is a demographic, socio-economic, political, and military time bomb
waiting to explode. Even before the recent global economic crisis, unemployment in Arab countries was the
highest in the world, including among young people. Economic growth in the Middle East is likely
to remain stagnant, with the region falling further behind the rest of the world. When combined with
the highly combustible winds of religious fundamentalism, the danger of nuclear terrorism is
particularly acute in this region.23
There is little reason to believe that regional governments will permit political
reform and greater self-expression, and political grievances will likely continue to be expressed in
extremist and fundamentalist terms which render them inviolate and nonnegotiable. For example, there is no assurance that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak will be succeeded by a
moderate and peaceful leader, or that Egypt will not become a radical Islamic state. The long anticipated regime
change in Iran may give rise to a more moderate government, but may also result in an even more radical one.
Saudi Arabias future is also questionable. Even the future of Turkey, heretofore held out as a beacon of democracy
and secularism within the Muslim world, is unclear.
Hatred of Israel, the US, and the West is likely to continue and possibly intensify .
Progress towards peace with Israel and improvements in Arab-Western relations are
unlikely to be sufficient to reduce the evolving socio-economic, political, and demographic pressures.
The Middle East faces another explosion today of potential nuclear capabilities. Not only
Israel, but also the Sunni Arab regimes, are deeply afraid of Iran's nuclear capabilities. In response,
over a dozen Arab countries have announced civil military programs. Arab civil
nuclear programs, as seen from past experience, have a nasty tendency to morph into
military ones. The danger of nuclear terrorism, further abetted by the spread of nuclear technology
and materials in the region, will be greatly exacerbated by the rise of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East.
Nuclear terrorism could give rise to a broader war in the Middle East and
even lead to nuclear war. Nuclear war could give rise to more nuclear
terrorism.24
Middle East war leads to extinction unstable security framework means
it escalates
Russell 09 (James A. Russell, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Strategic Stability Reconsidered:
Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East, in collaboration with
the Atomic Energy Commission,
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/russell/PP26_Russell_2009.p
df)
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric
interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from
actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into
relationships between the antagonist s; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the
151
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 152 of 318
perceptions by Israel
and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing ,
which could prompt a preventive attack ; (5) the prospect that Irans response to preemptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons , which could prompt escalation by
Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and
cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive
bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen
either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime
circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a
conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the
use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the
nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the
context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors
in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war a war in which
escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war
starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making
would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways . The international community must take
deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4)
this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an
unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
152
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 153 of 318
xt middle east war

Terrorist attack on the US prompts Mideast war
There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international system might
do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in
sympathy or support of their attacked colleague. Moreover, if these countries are themselves
nuclear armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well.
For example, if in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, a nuclear
armed ally such as Israel might possess special information about the group
believed to be responsible and be willing and able to take the action required to punish that
group. If its action involved threats of the use of nuclear force , or the use of nuclear force
itself (perhaps against a country Israel believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how might other
nuclear armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the
United States rein in its friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place?
Or would they wait long enough to ask the question ?
153
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 154 of 318
(Nuclear) -- Hegemony Collapse

Destroys America literally.
Michael 12 (2012, George, PhD, Associate Professor of Counterproliferation and
Deterrence Theory, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, Strategic
Nuclear Terrorism and the Risk of State Decapitation, Defence Studies Volume 12,
Issue 1, 2012, taylor and francis)
In his book Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, John Mu eller
argues that even if a

single nuclear device were detonated, though catastrophic, it would not portend the
demise of an entire city, much less the economy of a country, a government, or a
civilization. Rather, Mueller believes that America would be resilient , citing the example of
Japan during World War II, which sustained an intense nationwide conventional bombing campaign along with two nuclear attacks,
yet whose civil society and government survived. Conceding that a nuclear attack could devastate a locale, Mueller still dismisses
the notion that it would extinguish the rest of the country as he puts it Do farmers in Iowa cease plowing because an atomic bomb
went off in an Eastern city? Do manufacturers close down their assembly lines? Do all churches, businesses, governmental
structures, community groups simply evaporate? 105
Muellers analysis is somewhat facile and gives short shrift to the

possibility of strategic nuclear terrorism. For instance, a nuclear device planted in a
certain place (near the Capitol Building in Washington DC) at a certain time (the Presidents State of the Union
Address) could decapitate the US government. Although there is a plan of presidential
succession, it might not be carried out smoothly. Moreover, in this scenario if power were
contested by different officials, would the rest of the country recognize their authority? And
without a functioning government, would the state governments , which depend so much on the
federal government, really be viable for very long? In time of crisis, Americans have come to assume that the federal
government will take the lead. If the federal leadership were decapitated, it might not be that easy to put
Humpty Dumpty together again.
Former Defense Secretary William Perry once speculated that it was more likely that a nuclear device
would arrive in Washington DC or New York City by way of a truck or freighter than a
missile. 106 The federal governments planning scenario envisages a ten-kiloton nuclear device detonated in an urban area. 107
Arguably, though,
In a case study developed by the Homeland Security Council, a ten-kiloton nuclear device was detonated near the White House. The
study estimated that over 150,000 injuries would be incurred with a possible 70 percent mortality rate. Furthermore, over 100,000
persons would require decontamination, which would overwhelm regional capabilities. In the aftermath, the study predicted that
over 500,000 persons would attempt to evacuate the city, effectively closing both egress and ingress routes. 108
In a typical nuclear-fission weapon explosion, about half of the energy goes into the blast. About a third of the energy goes into
thermal effects. The remaining energy goes into prompt and residual radiation. Much of the radiation lies in the mushroom cloud
produced by the explosion. 109 In addition to the direct effects of the detonation, people would also be killed from indirect blast
effects, such as the collapse of buildings and fires caused from broken gas pipes, gasoline in cars, and so on. 110 Inasmuch as
terrorists would not have the capability to deliver a nuclear bomb by air, the detonation would almost certainly be at ground level
a ground burst weapon would loft

far more radioactive debris into the atmosphere resulting in greater contamination.
At ground zero, that is, the point on the earth at which the detonation occurs, a ten-kiloton blast would
produce a fireball about 72 meters (236 feet) in diameter. 112 Prompt radiation would kill
approximately 95 percent of the people within a diameter of 2.4 kilometers (roughly one
and a half miles) within weeks. 113 A detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device on Pennsylvania Avenue in the area
thus limiting the blast radius and the resulting firestorm. 111 Nevertheless,
where the Robert F. Kennedy Department of Justice Building is located would largely destroy a circle area about two miles (3.2
would encompass the White House, the Capitol Building, and the
Supreme Court Building. 114 Many of the people unfortunate to be in the area would be killed.
kilometers) in diameter which
During the Cold War, the US government faced the prospect of a decapitating strike. Soviet Yankee-class submarines, which
regularly operated 600 nautical miles from the East Coast of the United States, had the capability of destroying Washington DC,
within eight to ten minutes of launching their nuclear missiles. 115 However, an attempted decapitation strike by the Soviet Union
would have been an act of irrational desperation insofar as an attack on Washington would not have prevented a devastating series
of retaliatory strikes from the US military. 116 To ensure second strike capability, both the United States and the Soviet Union
developed plans for the continuity of command and control of nuclear weapons in the event of a decapitation strike. 117
The Continuity of Government (COG) refers to a system of procedures that would allow
the government to continue operations in the event some catastrophic event . Although
protocols of succession and the replacement of elected and appointed officials were included by the framers in the Constitution, the
154
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 155 of 318
need for COG plans took on a new sense of urgency in the nuclear era. A series of national security directives dictate procedures for
government agencies in the event of a crisis. In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Directive 67, which requires federal
agencies to develop plans to ensure the continuance of operations, a chain of command, and delegation of authority. The full text of
the directive remains classified. 118
The 25th amendment clarifies the procedures for the transfer of power relating to the incapacitation of the president. However,
under the conditions of a nuclear attack and the ensuing societal

disruption, a smooth transition may not be possible . If the sitting elected president survives,
then everyone should agree that he legitimately holds the reins of power. If, however, the president is dead or missing, the lines of
authority are less clear as evidenced on 30 March 1981, when John F. Hinckley Jr attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.
Soon thereafter, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that he was in charge of the executive branch because Vice President
George H.W. Bush was out of town and President Reagan was incapacitated while undergoing surgery for his wound. In doing so,
Haig overlooked that the Speaker of the House Tip ONeill and the President pro tempore of the Senate Strom Thurmond preceded
him in the line of succession respectively.
Ensuring the continuity of the command, control, and communications of the

military is vital as well. Christened as the National Command Authority (NCA), 119 the political and
military leaders who are designated as members of the chain of command for US forces must be able to survive a surprise attack in
order to carry out retaliatory attacks. 120 According to the Department of Defense Directive 5100.30 issued on 2 December 1971,
consists only of the president and the secretary of defense or their deputized
alternatives or successors. This could lead to confusion insofar as there are twin
lines of succession, one for the presidency and one for the command of US military
forces. 121
the NCA
In order to avoid the prospect of decapitation, the US government has established plans to evacuate the NCA authorities from
Washington DC to a National Airborne Operations Center aircraft and to 96 hardened command bunkers in the Federal Relocation
Arc, located about 50 miles or more from the city. 122 The underground White House located inside Raven Rock Mountain in
Pennsylvania is the home of the Alternative National Military Command Center and is equipped to house the president and other
members of the NCA. Another important relocation center the Western Virginia Office of Controlled Conflict Operations was
established in a man-made cavern within Mount Weather located about 50 miles northwest of Washington DC, just outside
Bluemont, Virginia. 123
Though commendable, these plans might not be adequate to ensure a continuity of

government in the event of a surprise decapitating strike by a terrorist group.
Certain trends in contemporary America could make the issue of transition
particularly contentious. One worrisome development is a seeming polarization in
the United States over matters such as political partisanship, national identity, and cultural
issues. Since the 1990s, the American party system has been increasingly characterized by an
ideological divide. This was reflected in the rift in the electoral map of the country after the 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections. Generally speaking, red states favor a more conservative course for the nation, while blue states prefer a more liberal
orientation. The political center appears to be attenuating. As the political scientist Alan Abramovitz found in his research, in 1984,
41 percent of the voters surveyed identified themselves at the midpoint of an ideological scale. By 2005, though, the number that
Historically, American political culture

has favored centrism and pragmatism over ideology . And though the distribution of wealth in the
identified themselves at the center had dropped to 28 percent. 124
country is quite uneven compared to other Western democracies as measured by the Gini Index, the middle class is still the class
with which most Americans overwhelmingly identify. 125 The festering economic crisis, though, could create a greater pool of the
In a highly-polarized America,
establishing a consensus could be challenging in the aftermath of a severe crisis.
discontented, as evidenced by the Occupy Wall Street protests in the fall of 2011.
155
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 156 of 318
(Nuclear) -- Economic Collapse

Causes global economic collapse.
Cirincione 07 (2007, Joseph, President of the Ploughshares Fund, former vice
president for national security and international policy at the Center for American
Progress in Washington, DC, former director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear
Weapons, p. xi)
Profound societal damage would also occur . Physicist Charles Ferguson and scholar William Potter
explain in a 1004 study:
Consequences stemming from a terrorist-detonated nuclear weapon in an America

city would emanate beyond the immediate tens or hundreds of thousands of
fatalities and the massive property and financial damage . Americans who were not killed
or injured by the explosion would live in fear that they could die from future nuclear terrorist attacks. Such
fear would erode public confidence in the government and could spark the downfall
of the administration in power. The tightly interconnected economies of the
United States and the rest of the world could sink into a depression as a
result of a crude nuclear weapon destroying the heart of a city.
This threat stems not only from the 27,000 nuclear weap ons held by eight or nine nations today but also
from the possibility that new nations or even terrorist groups will join this deadly club . Many
therefore conclude that we must find a non-nuclear alternative to global security. Upon receiving the 2005 Nobel
Peace, Prize Mohamed EIBaradei, the dircc tor general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, "I have no
if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no

place in our collective conscience. and no role in our security .7
doubt that.
Collapses global financial markets.

Montgomery 09 (2009, Evan Braden, Research Fellow, has published on a range
of issues, including alliance politics, nuclear terrorism, military doctrine, and political
revolutions, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, MA in Foreign Affairs,
PhD Candidate at UVA, Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a
Response, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506768)
These figures are sobering, but they are hardly the only costs or consequences that would
follow a nuclear terrorist attack. In the immediate aftermath of an attack, federal, state,
and local emergency responders would very likely be overwhelmed by the demands placed
upon them, which could include rescuing survivors from heavily damaged and contaminated areas, containing
widespread fires that would break out as the result of thermal radiation igniting combustible material and blast
damage to fuel sources such as gas lines and electrical circuits, and coordinating the evacuation of locations near
any medical facilities spared by the explosion would be

inundated with victims, and would have to be supported by military field hospitals.103 In the weeks
and months to follow, economic costs would mount , as areas that were not
destroyed by the initial blast would have to be decontaminated . Moreover, if ports and
border entry points were closed for an extended period of time in an effort to prevent any
additional weapons from entering the country, supply chains would be severely
disrupted and the economic effects of the explosion would ripple
throughout the nation and the globe . This could in turn lead stock markets
worldwide to plummet .104
the point of detonation. Meanwhile,
Terrorism collapses the world economy, kills tens of millions

156
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 157 of 318
Bunn 10 (Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F.

Kennedy School of Government, April 2010, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All
Nuclear Materials in Four Years, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
It is important to understand the full history-changing scope of the catastrophe that
even a single terrorist nuclear bomb could cause. The heart of a major city could be
reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin , leaving tens or hundreds of thousands of people dead.8
Terrorists either those who committed the attack or otherswould probably claim
they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did nor not), and the fear
that this might be true could lead to panicked evacuations, creating widespread
havoc and economic disruption. Some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is really only a concern
for the countries most likely to be the targets, such as the United States. In reality, however, such an event
would cause devastating economic aftershocks worldwide. In 2005 then-UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push tens of millions of people
into dire poverty, creating a second death toll throughout the developing world .9
Even a small nuclear attack would instantly collapse the economy
Galbraith 2k (2000, John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard Economics Prof, Economic
Aspects, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon1galb.html)
the American economy that in the form we know it, it could be brought
to an end by the most elementary of nuclear attacks. This could be
accomplished by a tactical nuclear weapon on downtown New York. With such an
attack there would, of course, be massive death and destruction . But additionally the
American economy would be made non-functional. No longer in the economic world would it be
Such is the vulnerability of
known what was owned and what possessed in the banks. That knowledge would be destroyed along with the
The trading of securities would, of course, come to an

end but, as seriously, so would the knowledge throughout the country of what is
owned. Those with ownership in and income from the financial world stocks, bonds and
other financial instruments would find a record of their possessions eliminated. It would be
people that convey the information.
true for individuals and for corporations throughout the country. Ownership would come to an end; of assets
Capitalism as it is known would be finished . This, to

would be the result of one small nuclear weapon.
possessed there would no longer be a record.

repeat,
Nuclear attack would immediately halt trade and collapse the economy
Allison 07 (Graham, director of Harvards Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?,
Council on Foreign Relations, April 20,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how_likely_is_a_nuclear_terrorist_attack_on_the
_united_states.html)
Furthermore,
the effect of a nuclear terrorist attack would reverberate beyond U.S.

shores. After a nuclear detonation, the immediate reaction would be to block all
entry points to prevent another bomb from reaching its target . Vital markets for
international products would disappear, and closely linked financial markets
would crash. Researchers at RAND, a U.S. government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear
explosion at the Port of Los Angeles would cause immediate costs worldwide of
more than $1 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 7.5
percent.
157
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 158 of 318
Nuclear terrorism in the u.s. would devastate the global

economy
Matthew C. Weinzierl, Council of Economic Advisers Economist, 2004 [The National
Interest, "The Cost of Living: The Economics of Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,"
Spring, LN]
Nuclear terrorism presents an unparalleled threat to the United States. The economic impact alone of a
nuclear terrorist attack would undoubtedly be staggering. Estimates of the direct economic cost of one
potential scenario-a crude nuclear device detonated in lower Manhattan-range well over $ 1 trillion.
Even this estimate cannot capture the full tragedy of such a scenario, which could include half a million
deaths, a zone of total destruction one mile wide, and radiation extending for miles around the blast's
center. For the protectors of America's national interest, no single issue is more urgent and frightening.
Even a small terrorist nuclear strike would collapse the global

economy
John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard Economics Prof, 2000[Economic Aspects,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon1galb.html]
Such is the vulnerability of the American economy that in the form we know it, it could be brought to an
end by the most elementary of nuclear attacks. This could be accomplished by a tactical nuclear weapon
on downtown New York. With such an attack there would, of course, be massive death and destruction.
But additionally the American economy would be made non-functional. No longer in the economic world
would it be known what was owned and what possessed in the banks. That knowledge would be
destroyed along with the people that convey the information. The trading of securities would, of course,
come to an end but, as seriously, so would the knowledge throughout the country of what is owned. Those
with ownership in and income from the financial world stocks, bonds and other financial instruments
would find a record of their possessions eliminated. It would be true for individuals and for
corporations throughout the country. Ownership would come to an end; of assets possessed there would
no longer be a record. Capitalism as it is known would be finished. This, to repeat, would be the result of
one small nuclear weapon.
158
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 159 of 318
xt airlines
Even failed attacks trigger economic collapse
Gartenstein-Ross 11 (12/1, Daveed, vice president of research at the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, where he directs the Center for Terrorism Research. He
is currently a Ph.D. candidate in world politics at the Catholic University of America.
"Al-Qaeda's Rope-A-Dope," The Journal of International Security Affairs, Fall/Winter,
Number 21, https://www.securecargo.org/content/al-qaeda-s-rope-a-dope)
This is how a relATIVELY SMALL AND WEAK ACTOR, LIKE AL-QAEDA, CAN
BEAT A STRONG ACTOR LIKE THE U.S.: BY TURNING ITS STRENGTH

AGAINST it. While AL-QAEDA hasnt fully replicated Muhammad Alis successful strategy, it HAS
MANAGED TO PUT THE U.S. IN A POSITION WHERE MANY OF ITS
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES DO IN FACT SERVE TO
MAKE AMERICA MORE VULNERABLE BY EXHAUSTING IT. An examination
of the evolution of al-Qaedas strategy for undermining the U.S. economy is instructive. (A key facet of al-Qaedas
anti-American warfare has always been economic.) Its initial phase linked terrorist attacks directly to economic
harm. A prime example is the September 11th attacks, in which a major economic target (the World Trade Center)
was destroyed. Its clear that 9/11 was intended to create a serious economic setback for the U.S. In an interview
conducted by Al Jazeeras Taysir Allouni in October 2001, Bin Laden spoke at length about the extent of the
economic damage the attacks inflicted: this economic harm was in fact the first accomplishment to which he
pointed. A second identifiable phase in this strategy can be called the bleed-until-bankruptcy plan. Bin Laden first
used this phrase in October 2004, when he made clear that al-Qaeda sought to embroil the U.S. and its allies in
draining wars in the Muslim world, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another step in this strategy targeted the
oil supply: Bin Laden exhorted his followers to attack oil targets, and new al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri has
similarly advocated for this. Jihadis have responded by attacking oil targets in countries that include Saudi Arabia
JIHADI WARFARE
ENTERED A NEW PERIOD THAT CAN BE CALLED ITS STRATEGY OF
A THOUSAND CUTS PHASE. AN OVERARCHING REASON FOR THIS
SHIFT IS THAT AMERICA NOW APPEARS MORTAL. According to Inspire, the
and Iraq. But after the collapse of the U.S. economy in September 2008,
English-language online magazine of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the gist of this strategy has been to
perpetrate smaller, but more frequent attacks. The cover of the November 2010 issue of Inspire features a photo
of a UPS plane and the headline $4,200. That pithy headline provides deep insight into the direction that alQaedas strategy has taken, referring to the disparity between the cost of executing terrorist attacks and the cost to
Western countries of defending themselves. $4
,200 refers to what it cost AQAP to
execute a cartridge-bomb plot in October 2010 , in which PETN-based bombs were placed
on FedEx and UPS planes.
Even though no planes were brought down, the plot will
cost Western countries far more than it cost al-Qaeda, as these countries
attempt to prevent terrorists from successfully destroying planes in the
future through similar measures.
In Inspire, radical Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki
explains that AQAP settled on attacking cargo planes because the jihadis foes would be faced with a dilemma once
YOU EITHER SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

TO INSPECT EACH AND EVERY PACKAGE IN THE WORLD, HE wrote,
OR YOU DO NOTHING AND WE KEEP TRYING AGAIN . Awlaki further
explained, THE AIR FREIGHT IS A MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY.
AQAP placed bombs on these planes.
FedEx alone flies a fleet of 600 aircraft and ships an average of four million packages per day. It is a huge worldwide
159
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 160 of 318
FOR THE TRADE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE,

AIR CARGO IS INDISPENSABLE AND TO BE ABLE TO FORCE THE
WEST TO INSTALL STRINGENT SECURITY MEASURES SUFFICIENT
ENOUGH TO STOP OUR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES WOULD ADD A HEAVY
ECONOMIC BURDEN TO AN ALREADY FALTERING ECONOMY. Inspire
industry.
also explains that large-scale attacks, such as those of 9/11, are in its view no longer required to defeat the United
States. To bring down America we do not need to strike big, it claims. In such an environment of security phobia
that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to
launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked so hard to erect. (Al-Qaeda, however,
has not abandoned catastrophic attacks entirely: its attempt to execute multiple Mumbai-style urban warfare
attacks in Europe in late 2010 shows that these efforts continue.) The Foreman-Ali analogy is apt: al-Qaeda thinks it
is turning the U.S.s strength against it, envisioning the elevated security spending exhausting America and making
it more vulnerable. The fundamental problem with the U.S.s system of homeland defense is that it has been
structured in an expensive manner from top to bottom. One striking example is the U.S.s hesitance to embrace a
system of terrorist profiling (most notably in airports), which produces inefficiencies. As Sheldon Jacobson, a
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign computer science professor who has studied aviation security since
SPENDING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON SCREENING THE

WRONG PEOPLE USES UP FINITE RESOURCES. IF WE KEEP
FOCUSING ON STOPPING TERRORIST TACTICS RATHER THAN
STOPPING THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES, THE AVIATION
SECURITY SYSTEM WILL NEVER REACH AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL
OF SECURITY. The problem is that if we simply slash our national security spending without making our
system of defending against the terrorist threat more efficient and effective, well end up less safe. Thus, A
CRITICAL CHALLENGE THE U.S. NOW FACES IS IMPROVING THE
EFFICACY OF THE SYSTEM, EVEN AS IT REDUCES ITS
EXPENDITURES IN AN EFFORT TO ESCAPE FROM AL-QAEDAS
ROPE-A-DOPE.
1996, has noted:
160
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 161 of 318
(Nuclear) Democracy
A nuclear terror attack would collapse U.S. democracy
Brian Jenkins, internationally renowned terrorism expert, 2008, WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR?,
p. 278-9
To contemplate nuclear terrorism, the actual death and destruction that would result from a nuclear
explosion is only part of what we fear. Instant death is easy. We fear the consequences of fear itself. Terror
arises from fears of the immediate social disruptionthe nightmare of panic, hysteria, predatory mobs,
looting, rape, and murderthe continuing shadow of insecurity, economic decline, and disorder or
dictatorship, all of which have been vividly depicted in literature and film. Would democracy itself
survive? According to Tommy Franks, the four-star general who commanded American forces in the
Middle East, perhaps not. The first high-ranking official to openly speculate that the Constitution could be
scrapped in favor of a military government, Franks said that if terrorists were to use a weapon of mass
destruction that inflicts heavy casualties, it would cause "our population to question our own Constitution
and to begin to militarize our country in order to avoid a repeat of another mass, casualty-producing
event."
161
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 162 of 318
(Nuclear) Ext US-Russian Nuclear War

Will detonate in Russia to provoke retaliation against the US.
Morgan 09 (Dennis, full professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, World
on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible
extinction of the human race, Futures, November, Science Direct)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? [10].4 In
most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions

figured out that the best way to escalate
these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange . As Moore points
out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one
small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of
the Russian dead hand system , where regional nuclear commanders would
be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed, it is likely that any
attack would be blamed on the United States [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist
supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack ,
whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal Samson
option against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option
would also include attacks on Russia and even anti-Semitic European cities [10]. In that
case, of course, Russia would retaliate , and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would
probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads,
many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards,
Section 1, Moore points out what
between powerful countries. No doubt, theyve
for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death
nuclear winter that

could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile
ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious,
hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken
communication, false signal or lone wolf act of sabotage or treason
could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons,
and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of
nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since
or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a
each country would act under the use them or lose them strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would
be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to win the war.
In other words, once Pandoras Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone
to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one
does, however, everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal
and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites needs for power and plunder,
these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations
oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their
oppressors [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear
arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons,
leading to horrific
scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human
civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a
remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter .
and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used,
In Scenarios, Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin:
Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks , or through the need
to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear
It might quickly move on to the use of strategic
nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range
bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for
weapons meant to destroy hardened targets.
162
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 163 of 318
hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military
facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start
through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons. [10]
She then goes on to describe six scenarios for catastrophic nuclear exchanges between various nations. Each
scenario incorporates color-coded sections that illustrate four interrelated factors that will determine how a nuclear
war will begin, proceed and escalate. These factors are labeled as accidental, aggressive, pre-emptive, and
retaliatory.
As for the accidental factor of nuclear war, both the U.S. and Russia have launch on
warning systems that send off rockets before confirmation that a nuclear attack is
underway; thus, especially during a time of tensions, a massive nuclear war could take
place within only 30 min after a warningeven if the warning is false. This
scenario has almost happened on several occasions in the past. It was only because of individual
human judgments, which disbelieved the false warnings, that nuclear war did not happen, but if the human
judgment had indeed interpreted the warnings according to protocol, an all-out
nuclear war would surely have taken place.
163
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 164 of 318
Africa Nuclear Terror Impact

African-based terrorist will use nuclear weapons against the
US
Dempsey 6 [Thomas, Director of African Studies, Army War College, former Chief of Africa
Branch of DIA. COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICAN FAILED STATES: CHALLENGES AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub649.pdf]
Raising the Stakes: The Nuclear Dimension of the Terrorist Threat. The threat that terrorist hubs based in
failed states pose to the United States and to its allies escalates dramatically if those hubs can obtain
access to nuclear weapons. The risk that such weapons will find their way into terrorist hands is
increasing significantly as a result of three interrelated factors. The end of the Cold War has witnessed an
alarming erosion of control and security of Russian nuclear technology and weaponry. It has also
witnessed increasing nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states. The circumstances surrounding that
proliferationprimarily its clandestine and covert naturemake it far more likely for nuclear weapons to
find their way from state proliferators into the hands of terrorist groups. The problematic issue of
accounting for and controlling Soviet era nuclear weapons and technology has been explored thoroughly
by Jessica Stern in her 1999 study of terrorism and WMD. Stern described a Soviet-era military that was
melting down, unpaid, and rife with corruption. Loss of accountability for fissionable materials, poor
controls on the technology of nuclear weapons production, and poor supervision of Russias militarized
scientific community characterized the post-Cold War Russian nuclear sector. Lapses may have even
included loss of operational nuclear devices.46 More recent reporting on the situation is hardly more
encouraging. A survey in 2002 of 602 Russian scientists working in the Russian WMD sector revealed
that roughly 20 percent of the Russian scientists interviewed expressed a willingness to work for nations
identified as WMD proliferators: Iran, North Korea or Syria.47 Most recently, Busch and Holmes have
catalogued the efforts of rogue states and of Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons capability from the
inadequately controlled Russian nuclear sector, and have identified the human element of that sector as
being especially vulnerable.48 When viewed in combination with the growing influence and reach of
Russian organized crime, the lack of security in the Russian weaponized nuclear technology sector
represents a significant risk of nuclear capability finding its way into the hands of terrorist hubs.
Exacerbating this risk are the efforts of non-nuclear states that are seeking to develop a nuclear strike
capability. While North Korea frequently is cited as the best example of this sort of nuclear proliferation, in the context of terrorist access to WMD, Iran may prove to be
far more dangerous. The clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program is reportedly well-advanced. A recent study of the Iranian nuclear program published by the U.S. Army War College
considers Iranian fielding of operational nuclear weapons to be inevitable and estimates the time frame for such a fielding to be 12 to 48 months.49 Given Irans well-established relationship with
Hezballah in Lebanon and its increasingly problematic, even hostile, relationship with the United States, the Iranian nuclear weapons program would seem to offer a tempting opportunity to Al
Qaeda elements seeking clandestine access to nuclear technology. Even if the Iranian leadership does not regard sharing nuclear secrets with terrorist groups as a wise policy, elements within the
Iranian government or participants in its nuclear weapons program may be willing to do so for their own reasons. The nature of clandestine nuclear weapons programs makes them especially
vulnerable to compromise, as the Pakistani experience has demonstrated. The clandestine nuclear weapons program directed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan on behalf of the Pakistani government
exemplifies the risks inherent in such secret undertakings. As the details of Khans nuclear weapons operation have emerged, it has become increasingly evident that he exercised little control
over the elements of his network operating outside of Pakistan. His non-Pakistani partners in acquiring nuclear technology appear to have been motivated almost entirely by money, and Khan
, the risk that critical nuclear technology

will be diverted to groups like Al Qaeda is particularly high, especially when those groups have access to
significant financial resources, and program participants are able to profit from diversion with little
chance of detection by either the proliferating state or by opponents of that proliferation. While both hubs
and nodes exist in failed state terrorist networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, only the hubs present a threat of
genuinely serious proportions to U.S. interests. Escalating nuclear proliferation offers terrorist hubs
sheltering in failed states the opportunity to translate funding into weapons access. If those hubs are
successful in maintaining even a tenuous connection through their virtual network to terrorist nodes
existing within the United States or the territory of its allies, or in other areas of vital U.S. interest, then
the risk posed by terrorist groups operating from failed states becomes real and immediate. The recent
attacks by terrorist nodes in London, Cairo, and Madrid suggest that such is the case. Developing the
nexus between nuclear weapons acquisition, delivery to a local terrorist node, and employment in a
himself seems to have operated with minimal oversight from the Pakistani government.50 Under such circumstances
164
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 165 of 318
terrorist attack probably will require significant resources and considerable time. Evolved terrorist hubs
operating in failed states like Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Somalia may have both. Identifying those hubs,
locating their members, and entering the failed state in which they are located to apprehend or destroy
them will be a complex and difficult task
165
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 166 of 318
General Terrorism Impacts/Turns

Case Cards
166
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 167 of 318
Terrorism Outweighs Rights

Some sacrifice of rights necessary to counter terrorist threats
Donald J. Musch, former Foreign Service officer, May 17, 2002, Civil Liberties and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, ed. Donald J. Musch, 20 03, p. 203
Yet, as stated in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly on September 22, 2001
regarding the new legislative initiative, Next to authorizing the use of military
force, some of the most important decisions Congress will now have to make involve
striking a new balance between law enforcement powers and civil liberties. What is
clear is that the Administration (and Congress after September 11th) recognized
that drastic steps were required to protect against future terrorist attacks
and that a war footing might not succeed against an elusive terrorist
mindset without giving up something in the arena of private rights.
Absolute commitment to freedom is a license for terrorism

Douglas W. Kmiec, Dean, Catholic University of America Law School, Rights vs. Public Safety After
9/11: America in the age of terrorism, eds. Etzioni & Marsh, 2003, p. 44
In considering the USA Patriot Act, it is useful to remember that our founders
conception of freedom was not a freedom to do anything or associate for any
purpose but to do those things that do not harm others and that, it was hoped,
would advance the common good. Freedom separated from this truth is not freedom
at all but license. Congress can no longer afford, if it ever could, to confuse freedom and license
because doing so licenses terrorism, not freedom. Those who have voiced opposition to the Patriot Act
seem to have either a more extreme view of freedom, a less sober view of the threats we face, or both.
With due respect, such unrefined autonomy or complacency hides a basic confusion or underappreciation
for the war against terrorism that now must be fought. The objectors think of the mass destruction of the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon as the equivalent of murder, kidnapping, or bank robbery. They
think the point is a criminal trial; it is notit is the elimination of terrorism.
167
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 168 of 318
Terrorism Outweighs War

There is a much higher risk of terrorism than nuclear war- due
to deterrence
Gregg Easterbrook, The New Republic Editor, 2001 ["The Real Danger is Nuclear: The
Big One," 11/5, http://www.tnr.com/110501/easterbrook110501.html]
One reason Americans may not worry about the atomic threat is that we lived through a half-century of
cold war nuclear standoff, and neither Washington nor Moscow pushed the button. But much of the
reason was "mutually assured destruction"--the knowledge that if one side launched, it would also be hit.
That logic might well prevent Saddam from directing an atomic bomb at the United States or Israel-because he would know that the counterstrike would be horrific beyond words. (It is believed that during
the Gulf war, Washington warned Saddam that if he gassed coalition troops, the United States would go
nuclear; Iraq put its chemical weapons away.) But Saddam might try to escape retaliation by transferring a
bomb to some hard-to-trace third party--Al Qaeda or a similar group--for anonymous use against the
United States or Israel. And nuclear deterrence may not work if the enemy can't be found--if the United
States does not know what cave in Afghanistan bin Laden is hiding in, even nuclear warheads cannot kill
him. More important, nuclear deterrence only obtains if the other side is rational. And many terrorists are
not; they actively court death. Indeed there's an eerie sense that bin Laden is actually pleased that the
United States is now bombing Afghanistan, because the ensuing civilian deaths might spark the general
conflict between Islam and the West--and among Islamic countries themselves--that he desperately
desires. An American nuclear attack, by Al Qaeda's grizzly logic, might be even better than an American
conventional attack, since death would come by the millions.
Risk of terrorism outweighs risk of war by rogue state

aggression
Amitai Etzioni, GWU Sociology Prof, 2005 [The National Interest, "Enforcing Nuclear
Disarmament," Winter, LN]
There are several reasons why nuclear terrorism is much more challenging than
nuclear attacks from rogue states and hence deserves much more attention and
greater dedication of resources than it currently receives. First of all, the list of
rogue states is small and well known, and their actions can be monitored with
relative ease. The opposite holds true for terrorists. Their numbers are large, their
identities are often unknown, and their actions are difficult to track. Second, rogue
states are easier to deter from using their nuclear arms than are terrorists,
especially those willing to commit suicide, a sacrifice which more than a few have
shown themselves ready to make. It is true that the leaders of some rogue states
are unstable, and they could act irrationally or simply miscalculate, disregarding the
fact that their regime-and they personally-would not survive if they employed
nuclear weapons against the U.S. mainland or even one of its allies-or if it became
known that they provided terrorists with such arms. However, miscalculations of the
magnitude that would lead a Kim Jong-il or the mullahs of Iran to use nuclear
weapons are very rare indeed. In contrast, if terrorists acquired a nuclear bomb or
the material to make one, they would not fear retaliation, and they could not be
deterred by a balance of terror. Indeed, terrorists often hold that if their actions lead
to attacks on their own homelands, then support for their cause would increase.
168
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 169 of 318
Moreover, because terrorists are not the army of one state, it is often difficult to
determine against which nation to retaliate, and thus whom to deter and how. This
dilemma was all too evident when the United States learned after 9/11 that 15 of
the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian nationals. Therefore, there are several strong reasons
to rank the danger of nuclear terrorism much higher than the danger of nuclear strikes by rogue
states-yet U.S. foreign policy, its military, its intelligence agencies and their covert actions and other
resources are focused on dealing with rogue nuclear states both alleged and real, and not the
hundreds of sites from which terrorists can acquire nuclear material and the few from which they could
obtain ready-made bombs.
Nuclear terrorism represents the world's biggest threat- its

probability outweighs war
Graham Allison, Harvard Government Prof, 2002 [The National Interest, "The New
Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism," w/ Andrei Kokoshin, Fall, LN]
During the Cold War, American and Russian policymakers and citizens thought long
and hard about the possibility of nuclear attacks on their respective homelands. But
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the threat
of nuclear weapons catastrophe faded away from most minds. This is both ironic
and potentially tragic, since the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States or
Russia is certainly greater today than it was in 1989. In the aftermath of Osama bin
Laden's September 11 assault, which awakened the world to the reality of global
terrorism, it is incumbent upon serious national security analysts to think again
about the unthinkable. Could a nuclear terrorist attack happen today? Our
considered answer is: yes, unquestionably, without any doubt. It is not only a
possibility, but in fact the most urgent unaddressed national security threat to both
the United States and Russia.
Terrorist use of wmd is much more likely than a major war- due
to deterrence
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, 2001 [Foreign Affairs, "Preparing for the
Next Attack," Nov/Dec, LN]
Even if START II and START III were fully implemented, the United States would still be left with a
nuclear force capable of destroying any nation reckless enough to use nuclear weapons against it. In
particular, a nuclear attack using ballistic missiles would be instantly tracked to its place of origin and
thus invite immediate retaliation by U.S. nuclear forces -- a fact known by all. Some worry that a nation
with nuclear weapons might attack a U.S. ally with conventional weapons, believing that Washington
would not honor its defense commitment for fear of provoking a nuclear attack on U.S. cities. But any
such move would be a serious mistake, since the United States would respond in kind -- with its own
conventional military forces -- to a conventional attack on an ally. The aggressor might then threaten a
nuclear strike but would have to contemplate, once again, the certain knowledge of immediate and
catastrophic retaliation. So long as the United States maintains strong conventional forces, therefore, the
threat of nuclear extortion reverts to the classic deterrence scenario. Moreover, if threatened, the United
States has the capability to destroy a hostile nation's launch sites, storage sites, and production facilities
with its long-range, precision-guided, conventionally armed weapons -- and others know it. Whatever
Washington's stated policy, therefore, no hostile nation could rule out the possibility that the United States
would strike back if attacked. In short, the United States has a powerful and credible deterrent involving
both nuclear and conventional weapons, which should make a direct nuclear attack or nuclear extortion
169
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 170 of 318
by a nation very unlikely. The chance still exists, however, that a hostile nation armed with nuclear or
biological weapons could end up under a leader who is mentally unbalanced or who miscalculates the
consequences of his or her actions. And a terrorist group is probably less deterrable; its members might
believe that an attack could not be traced back to them, or they might even be seeking to die for their
cause. Both prevention and deterrence, in other words, could fail in the face of terrorism, and there is
always the possibility, however remote, of an accidental or unauthorized launch from another nuclear
power. Any of these contingencies would create a catastrophe, so it is reasonable for the United States to
seek "catastrophe insurance," much as individuals buy earthquake insurance to cover the possibility that
their house might be destroyed by such an event.
170
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 171 of 318
Turns Case- Civil Liberties Violations

Our impact turns the case- terrorism results in massive civil
violations, the collapse of democracy, and militarism
Michael Ignatieff, Harvard Human Rights Prof, 2004[The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics
in an Age of Terror, pg. 153-154]
It is a commonplace of presidential and prime ministerial rhetoric to insist that their
democracies cannot lose in a war on terror. My own analysis thus far has confirmed
that no democracy has ever been toppled by a terrorist campaign, unless other
factors, like economic collapse or military defeat, were present too. But faced with
terrorism that deploys weapons of mass destruction, we cannot be as certain that
the historical pattern, argued for in this book, would prevail in the future. In other
words, we could lose. What would defeat look like? It would not be like invasion,
conquest, or occupation, of course, but rather would entail the disintegration of our
institutions and way of life. A succession of mass casualty attacks, using weapons
of mass destruction, would leave behind zones of devastation sealed off for years
and a pall of mourning, anger, and fear hanging over our public and private lives.
Such attacks would destroy the existential security on which democracy depends.
Recurrent attacks with weapons of mass destruction might not just kill hundreds of
thousands of people. We might find our selves living with a national security state
on permanent alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks, and permanent
detention camps for suspicious aliens and recalcitrant citizens. A successful
attack would poison the wellsprings of trust among strangers that make the relative
liberty of liberal democracy possible. Our police forces might descend to torturing
suspects in order to prevent future attacks, and our secret security forces might
engage in direct assassination of perpetrators or mere suspects as well. Our
military might itself use weapons of mass destruction against terrorist enemies. If
our institutions were unable to stop the attacks, the state's monopoly of force might
even break down, as citizens took the law into their own hands seeking to defend
themselves against would-be perpetrators. Vigilantes would patrol blighted and
deserted streets. This is what the face of defeat might look like. We would survive,
but we would no longer recognize ourselves or our institutions. We would exist but
lose our identity as free people.
Terrorism risks massive civil liberties violations- turning the

case
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, National Commission on Terrorism Chair, 2000 ["New
Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them," 7/31,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl678.cfm]
Our argument is that you had better think about that beforehand, not afterwards. If
you are concerned with civil liberties, that is an even better reason to think about it
beforehand. And the example we use is Pearl Harbor, which was certainly by
anybody's definition a catastrophic attack on the American people. After Pearl
Harbor America's two great 20th century liberals, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Earl
Warren, locked up Japanese-Americans. Our view is that the best way to assure that
in the wake of a catastrophic event you do not trample on our constitutional rights
and on the civil liberties we have come to take for granted, is to think about it
ahead of time to make plans and to exercise them ahead of time.
171
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 172 of 318
Turns the case- terrorism crushes civil liberties

Ivan Eland, Independent Institute Senior Fellow, 2003
[Mediterranean Quarterly, "Bush's Wars and the State of Civil
Liberties," 14.4, pg. 158-175]
Unfortunately, counterproductive U.S. government action in response to terrorism is not confined to
aggressive behavior overseas. In fact, the most pernicious effects of the escalating cycle of violence
between the terrorists and the U.S. government are not found overseas, although those are bad enough,
but at home. With each new round of terrorist attacks, the government takes away more of the civil
liberties enshrined in the U.S. Constitution by the nation's founders. When this occurs, the terrorists have
woneven if we capture or kill them all.
172
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 173 of 318
Turns Case- Morality

There is a categorical imperative to prevent nuclear terror
Graham Allison, Harvard Government Prof, 2005 [The American Prospect, "The
Gravest Danger," March, LN]
The gravity of the potential consequences requires that the president give absolute priority to this
challenge. In the Cold War, we recognized that preventing a global nuclear war was a necessary condition
for pursuing any other objective. In Ronald Reagan's oft-quoted one-liner, "A nuclear war can never be
won and must never be fought." The face of that danger today is a nuclear terrorist attack on an American
city. This would be a world-altering event. The categorical imperative, therefore, is to do everything
technically feasible on the fastest possible time line to prevent it.
173
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 174 of 318
Turns Case- Biopower

Turns the case- terrorism = biopower
Joseph Tuman, San Francisco State U Communication Prof, 2003 [Communicating
Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism, pg. 40]
In the definition of terrorism, there is also an effect upon power-although this time, the redistributive
effect of power occurs between the groups of the victims and the terrorists/aggressors. In many situations
(if we are referencing dissent terrorism), the terrorists/aggressors begin in the role of those who are
already oppressed or who have the self-perception of being in such a condition. When engaging in terror
as a means of fighting back against a perceived oppression, the terrorists reverse the power relationship in
that moment, for they now control life and death, destruction or tranquility. The victims, formerly
perceived by the terrorists to be in a position benefiting from oppression or the like, are now in a position
of becoming the oppressed.
174
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 175 of 318
Turns Case- Democracy

WMD terrorism disrupts the social fabric and undermines
democratic governments
Steve Bowman, CRS Researcher, 1999 ["Weapons of Mass Destruction- the Terrorist
Threat," 12/18, w/ Helit Barel,
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/crs/wpnsmssdst120899.pdf]
Some experts emphasize that a WMD terrorist attack could, nevertheless, create a panic disproportionate
to the actual casualties because chemical and biological incidents constitute a sudden unfamiliar threat
with no sensory warning, carry the possibility of contagion or contamination, and play upon highly
charged public fears.20 Others go farther and raise concerns that a WMD event might shake or shatter the
social order and threaten democratic governments.
175
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 176 of 318
Terrorism Outweighs- Generally

Impact calculus- there's a large risk & magnitude of future
terror attacks
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, 2001 [Foreign Affairs, "Preparing for
the Next Attack," Nov/Dec, LN]
The United States can take many actions to make this sort of attack more difficult
to carry out, and it will do so, despite the inconvenience and expense. But as
Washington moves to reduce the vulnerabilities exposed by the last strike, it should
also try to anticipate the next one. As deadly as the World Trade Center disaster
was, it could have produced a hundredfold more victims if the terrorists had
possessed nuclear or biological weapons. And the future threat could come from
hostile nations as well as terrorists. Nuclear or biological weapons in the hands of
terrorists or rogue states constitute the greatest single danger to American security
-- indeed, to world security -- and a threat that is becoming increasingly less remote.
Several nations hostile to the United States are already engaged in covert programs
to develop nuclear weapons, and multinational terrorist groups have demonstrated
both by word and by deed that their goal is to kill Americans and destroy symbols of
American power. Such terrorists have escalated their methods from truck bombs to
the near equivalent of a tactical nuclear weapon, and they clearly have the
motivation to go further up the ladder of destruction. Indeed, Osama bin Ladin has
told his followers that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is a "religious
duty." The only question is whether they will succeed. Since the end of the Cold War,
the barriers to success have been lowered. The know-how for making nuclear
weapons is increasingly available through the Internet. Security controls on the
huge supply of nuclear weapons (which number in the tens of thousands) and fissile
material (amounting to hundreds of tons) are becoming increasingly uncertain. And
the thriving black market in fissile material suggests that demand is high. In the
next few years this combination of forces could result in a nuclear incident with
results more catastrophic than the destruction wreaked by the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombs, which together killed an estimated 200,000 people. A nuclear
attack's capacity for destruction is familiar by now, but recent simulations indicate
that an attack with smallpox germs could cause just as many deaths. Furthermore,
there is good reason to fear that biological weapons could become the weapon of
choice for terrorists. They can be produced without the massive infrastructure
required for their nuclear counterparts, and biotechnology pharmaceutical
developments are proliferating these production techniques. Hostile groups that
cannot develop their own weapons, meanwhile, may be able to buy them through
illicit channels. The Soviet Union produced a large supply of biological weapons
during the Cold War, some of which may still be available. China, North Korea, and
Iraq have all had biological weapons programs, as did the Aum Shinrikyo cult in
Japan, which in 1995 released a chemical weapon, sarin, in a deadly attack on
Tokyo's subways. Finally, the threat posed by long-range missiles has received much
attention. But a long-range missile in the hands of a hostile force does not pose a
significant new danger unless the missile has a nuclear or biological warhead.
Nuclear and biological weapons, in contrast, are dangerous even in the absence of
missiles, since they can be delivered by a range of methods, including trucks, cargo
ships, boats, and airplanes. Indeed, given its attractions, covert rather than overt
176
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 177 of 318
delivery is not only feasible, it is the most likely method of attack. Considering the
level of catastrophe that could occur in a nuclear or biological attack, mitigating
such threats should be an overriding security priority today, just as heading off a
nuclear attack was an overriding priority during the Cold War. In that era the United
States essentially depended on a single strategy: deterrence. Now it can add two
other strategies to the mix -- prevention (curbing emergent threats before they can
spread) and defense. Rather than relying exclusively on any one strategy, the
sensible approach is to deploy a balanced mix of all three. Missile defense should be
one element of national policy, but if the single-minded pursuit of it conflicts with
programs designed to curb proliferation and strengthen deterrence, it could
decrease our own security rather than increase it.
Nuclear terrorism outweighs all else

Robert Chesney, Law Clerk, 1997 [Loyola of Los Angeles International &
Comparative Law Review, "National Insecurity: Nuclear Material Availability and The
Threat of Nuclear Terrorism," November, 31-2]
The horrible truth is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, in light of the
potential existence of a black market in fissile material. Nuclear terrorists might
issue demands, but then again, they might not. Their target could be anything: a
U.S. military base in a foreign land, a crowded U.S. city, or an empty stretch of
desert highway. In one fell swoop, nuclear terrorists could decapitate the U.S.
government or destroy its financial system. The human suffering resulting from a
detonation would be beyond calculation, and in the aftermath, the remains of the
nation would demand both revenge and protection. Constitutional liberties and
values might never recover.When terrorists strike against societies already
separated by fundamental social fault lines, such as in Northern Ireland or Israel,
conventional weapons can exploit those fault lines to achieve significant gains. n1 In
societies that lack such pre-existing fundamental divisions, however, conventional
weapon attacks do not pose a top priority threat to national security, even though
the pain and suffering inflicted can be substantial. The bedrock institutions of the
United States will survive despite the destruction of federal offices; the vast
majority of people will continue to support the Constitution despite the mass murder
of innocent persons. The consequences of terrorists employing weapons of mass
destruction, however, would be several orders of magnitude worse than a
conventional weapons attack. Although this threat includes chemical and biological
weapons, a nuclear weapon's devastating potential is in a class by itself. Nuclear
terrorism thus poses a unique danger to the United States: through its sheer power
to slay, destroy, and terrorize, a nuclear weapon would give terrorists the otherwiseunavailable ability to bring the United States to its knees. Therefore, preventing
terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons should be considered an unparalleled
national security priority dominating other policy considerations.
Even if the risk of catastrophic terrorism is small- the

magnitude outweighs
Matthew Bunn, Harvard Senior Research Associate, Managing the Atom Project, 2004
[Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, w/ Anthony Wier, May,
http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf]
The use of an actual nuclear bomb would be among the most difficult types of
attack for terrorists to accomplish. Few terrorist groups would want to carry out an
177
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 178 of 318
attack as horrifyingly destructive as a nuclear blast, even if they could. Getting a

nuclear bomb or the nuclear material to make oneparticularly making the
connection with people with access to such material and the ability to steal itis
difficult. Even after acquiring nuclear material, making a nuclear bombor setting
off a stolen bombwould be a great challenge. Smuggling a bomb to its intended
target could be risky for the attacker. Many policymakers and analysts appear to
believe that these difficulties are so great that the danger of terrorists carrying out a
nuclear attack is vanishingly small, unless, perhaps, they were sponsored by a state
with nuclear capabilities. As one noted European analyst put it, religious zealots or
political extremists may present many dangers, but wielding nuclear bombs and
killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people is not one of them.We believe
that this view is profoundly wrong. While a nuclear attack would by no means be easy for
terrorists to carry out, the probability that terrorists could succeed in doing so is large enough to
justify doing everything in our power, in President Bushs words, to prevent it. If world leaders
were convinced, as we are, that the risk of a terrorist nuclear attack on a major city is substantial,
and that there are actions that they could take that would dramatically reduce that risk, we believe
they would act, and act swiftly, to reduce this deadly threat. Therefore dispelling the key myths that
lead officials and policy elites to downplay the danger is crucial to building momentum for an
effective response. Each of these myths, like all myths, contains an element of truthbut each is a
dangerously weak reed on which to rest the worlds security against nuclear attack.
178
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 179 of 318
Terrorism Nuke War (Sid Ahmed, Easterbrook)

Retaliation means terror attack causes extinction
Greg Easterbrook, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November 2001, p.
www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html. (UNDRG/C324)
Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to
cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic
weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the
United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current
environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S.
nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.
Escalation causes global nuke war

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 2004
[Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the
negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on
themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations
and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop
the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more
critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge
victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without
winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
179
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 180 of 318
Terrorism Nuke War (Alexander)

Terrorism risks extinction
Yonah Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, 2003
[The Washington Times, "Terrorism myths and realities," 8/28]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated
dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the
magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself.
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or
irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore,
that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists
striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its
citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the
second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive
diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna].
Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of
modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of
the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of
terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the
exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical
counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of

conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and
brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super
Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber ] with its serious implications
concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
180
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 181 of 318
Economy Module
Terrorist attack sparks global depression
Richard Haas, President, Council on Foreign Relations, PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf
A nuclear attack by terrorists against the United States has the potential to make the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, look like a historical footnote . In addition to the
immediate horrific devastation, such an attack could cost trillions of dollars in damages, potentially
sparking a global economic depression. Although, during the 2004 presidential campaign, President
George W. Bush and Democratic challenger Senator John F. Kerry agreed that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons
worried them more than any other national security threat, the U.S. government has yet to elevate nuclear
terrorism prevention to the highest priority. Despite several U.S. and international programs to secure nuclear
weapons and the materials to make them, major gaps in policy remain
Nuclear War
Richard C. Cook, 6/14/07, Writer, Consultant, and Retired Federal Analyst U.S. Treasury Department, "It's
Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?
context=va&aid=5964
Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the
economic music . The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II .
Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S.
decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they don't want our
dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?
Any nuclear attack would devastate the global economy

Matthew C. Weinzierl, Council of Economic Advisers Economist, 2004
[The National Interest, "The Cost of Living: The Economics of Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,"
Spring, LN]
Nuclear terrorism presents an unparalleled threat to the United States . The economic
impact alone of a nuclear terrorist attack would undoubtedly be staggering. Estimates of
the direct economic cost of one potential scenario-a crude nuclear device detonated in
lower Manhattan-range well over $ 1 trillion. Even this estimate cannot capture the full tragedy of
such a scenario, which could include half a million deaths, a zone of total destruction one mile wide, and radiation
extending for miles around the blast's center. For the protectors of America's national interest , no single issue
is more urgent and frightening.
Even a small nuclear attack would instantly collapse the economy

John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard Economics Prof, 2000 [Economic Aspects,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon1galb.html]
Such is the vulnerability of the American economy that in the form we know it, it could be brought to
an end by the most elementary of nuclear attacks. This could be accomplished by a
tactical nuclear weapon on downtown New York. With such an attack there would, of course,
be massive death and destruction. But additionally the American economy would be made nonfunctional. No longer in the economic world would it be known what was owned and what possessed in the
banks. That knowledge would be destroyed along with the people that convey the information. The trading of
securities would, of course, come to an end but, as seriously, so would the knowledge
throughout the country of what is owned. Those with ownership in and income from the
financial world stocks, bonds and other financial instruments would find a record of their
possessions eliminated. It would be true for individuals and for corporations throughout the country.
181
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 182 of 318
Ownership would come to an end; of assets possessed there would no longer be a record. Capitalism as it is
known would be finished. This, to repeat, would be the result of one small nuclear weapon.
Nuclear attack would immediately halt trade and collapse the economy
Allison, 7 (Graham T., director of Harvards Belfer Center for

Science and International Affairs, How Likely is a Nuclear
Terrorist Attack on the United States?, Council on Foreign
Relations, April 20,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how_likely_is_a_nuclear_te
rrorist_attack_on_the_united_states.html)
Furthermore,
the effect of a nuclear terrorist attack would reverberate beyond U.S. shores .
After a nuclear detonation, the immediate reaction would be to block all entry points to
prevent another bomb from reaching its target. Vital markets for international products
would disappear, and closely linked financial markets would crash. Researchers at RAND, a U.S.
government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Los Angeles would
cause immediate costs worldwide of more than $1 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports
would cut world trade by 7.5 percent.
A nuclear attack will destroy the economy

DEFENSE NEWS, November 6, 2006
Should there be a catastrophic event inside America, how we respond across the network
will depend and vary on the target; it will be tailored, but our response should be broad and across the
range of our capabilities. Indeed, this policy approach may encourage the international cooperation and
transparency we seek to halt WMD proliferation. Our policy statements and deterrence strategies are becoming
too complex to understand the message; we need to keep it simple and produce the same strategic effect that the
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction did with the Soviet Union. At the end of the day, such a nuclear
detonation will not destroy us, but it very likely will severely damage our economy and the
global economy, change history and national relationships, not to mention civilizational symbols and lives. We
need to be able to reciprocate at the same level, and put at risk and hold strategically culpable the entire
proliferation network.
A nuclear attack would collapse global financial markets

William J. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University. He is
a senior fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and serves as codirector
of the Preventive Defense Project, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 86
Of course, terrorists setting off a nuclear bomb on U.S. soil would not be equivalent to the
nuclear holocaust threatened during the cold war. But it would be the single worst
catastrophe this country has ever suffered. Just one bomb could result in more than one
hundred thousand deaths, and there could be more than one attack. The direct economic
losses from the blast would be hundreds of billions of dollars, but the indirect economic
impact would be even greater, as worldwide financial markets would collapse in a way that
would make the market setback after 9/11 seem mild. And the social and political
effects are incalculable, especially if the weapon were detonated in Washington or Moscow
or London, crippling the government of that nation.
182
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 183 of 318
US Lashout
The 2010 NPR supports our argument. The U.S. reserves the right to
retaliate with nuclear weapons. There would be extreme pressure to do so
in the wake of a terrorist attack.
ISIS 10 (Institute for Science and International Security, What the Nuclear
Posture Review means for proliferation and nuclear outliers, http://isisonline.org/isis-reports/detail/what-the-nuclear-posture-review-means-forproliferation-and-nuclear-outlier, *bolded text preserved from article)
At the same time, the NPR makes clear that the United States reserves the right to
hold fully accountable any state or group that supports or enables terrorist
efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or
providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts. (p. 12) The implication is that the United
States reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a state whose
nuclear explosive material is used in an attack , whether by a state or terrorist group.
While the NPR makes clear that the United States would only consider the use of such weapons under extreme
it is important to be aware that in the event of a terror attack, the use

of nuclear weapons is not explicitly proscribed. This leaves a potentially
dangerous opening for the use of a nuclear weapon when demands for
retaliation will be especially acute and intelligence and forensic
information vulnerable to misinterpretation.
circumstances,
Our response to Sept. 11th proves the point.

NYT 08 (Gates Gives Rationale for Expanded Deterrence,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/washington/29gates.html?
pagewanted=print&_r=0)
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Tuesday that the United States would hold 'fully accountable' any country or
group that helped terrorists to acquire or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In a speech to the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank, he also made a strong case for modernization of US
United States will hold any state, terrorist

or other non-state actor or individual fully accountable for supporting or enabling
terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction - whether by facilitating,
nuclear weapons. "Today we also make clear that the
group
financing or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts," Gates. He said it was important to modernize the
nation's nuclear arsenal as a hedge against what he described as "rising and resurgent powers" like Russia or
China, as well as "rogue nations" like Iran or North Korea and international terrorists. By declaring that those who
facilitated a terrorist attack would be held "fully accountable," Gates left the door open to diplomatic and
And, to be sure, the United States has acted

forcefully before against those who sheltered terrorists, with the invasion of
Afghanistan to oust Al Qaeda and its Taliban government supporters after the
attacks of Sept. 11. His speech was the latest signal that the administration was moving in its
closing months to embrace more far-reaching notions of deterrence and self-defense. On
economic responses as well as military ones.
Monday, senior officials justified a weekend attack against a suspected Iraqi insurgent leader in Syria by saying
the administration was operating under an expansive new definition of self-defense.

The policy, officials said, provided a rationale for conventional strikes on militant targets in a sovereign nation
without its consent - if that nation were unable or unwilling to halt the threat on its own. By law, the new
president must conduct a review of the nation's nuclear posture, and Mr. Gates's address could be viewed as
advocating a specific agenda for the next occupant of the White House. The first public indication that the
administration was expanding the traditional view of nuclear deterrence came in a statement by President George
W Bush in October 2006 that followed a test detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea. Mr. Bush said North
Korea would be held "fully accountable" for the transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to any nation or terrorist
organization. The president was not as explicit then as Gates was on Tuesday in saying that the administration
would extend the threat of reprisals for the transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to all countries, not just
183
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 184 of 318
North Korea. Gates also expanded the threat to nations or groups that provide a broader range of support to
terrorists. Early this year, in a little-noticed speech at Stanford University, Stephen Hadley, Bush's national
security adviser, also spoke of how the president had approved an expanded deterrence policy. In his speech
Tuesday, Gates argued for modernizing the nation's nuclear arsenal because "as long as other states have or seek
nuclear weapons - and potentially can threaten us, our allies and friends - then we must have a deterrent
capacity."
Flawed response measures and emotional panic means retaliation its an

explicit goal of terrorist attacks.
Montgomery 09 (2009, Evan Braden, Research Fellow, has published on a range
of issues, including alliance politics, nuclear terrorism, military doctrine, and political
revolutions, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, MA in Foreign Affairs,
PhD Candidate at UVA, Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a
Response, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506768)
In the wake of a nuclear explosion, both the government and the general public would
also be preoccupied with the possibility that additional attacks might occur , much as
they were in the aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, this fear might be quite justified; as Ashton
Carter has argued, If one bomb goes off, there are likely to be more to follow .105
Given the difficulty of acquiring even a single intact nuclear weapon or the fissile material necessary to build one,
this is not a foregone conclusion. What can almost certainly be expected, however, are multiple claims of
even fictitious claims and false

alarms can have significant, and extremely costly, effects . While some threats might
responsibility and threats of future attacks.106 Unfortunately,
easily be dismissed as apocryphal, the grave consequences of ignoring these claims and being proven incorrect
would require many and perhaps all of them to be investigated. Doing so, however, would further tax government
agencies already occupied with preventing subsequent attacks, determining who was responsible for the attack,
and formulating a response both at home and abroad. Moreover, the heightened possibility of follow-on attacks also
increases the likelihood that preemptive emergency measures such as evacuations would be taken in cities
throughout the country, which would in turn require additional time, effort, and resources on the part of a severely
overstretched government.107
To these concerns, one can also add the possible psychological, strategic, and
political consequences of a nuclear explosion . The very idea of a nuclear attack on
American soil, along with the graphic images such an attack would produce, could
lead to widespread panic and a tremendous loss of confidence in
government, especially if response efforts were handled poorly.108
The public reaction to an attack could also include emotional demands for retaliation
that might be ill advised, given that a recurring goal for terrorists generally and al
Qaeda and its affiliates in particular is to incite a reprisal , or even to spark a wider
interstate war between their enemies. For example, one of the key goals bin Laden hoped to
achieve with the 9/11 attacks was to provoke an American invasion of Afghanistan, which he calculated would be as
protracted and draining for the United States as it had been for the Soviet Union two decades earlier.109 Another al
Qaeda plot one that was never carried out envisioned recruiting pilots from the Saudi Royal Air Force to steal
their own fighter jets and conduct a rogue attack against Israel, in the hope that this would instigate another ArabIsraeli war.110 Should a nuclear terrorist attack ever occur, the perpetrators could have similar motives.
Fear of looking weak on national security will prompt immediate nuclear

retaliation
Ferguson 04 (10/5, Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations, Prevention Not Retaliation, Foreign Policy Forum
Archives)
voters
would demand instant revenge. Others would argue that retaliation would send a
strong message of deterrence. That is, a devastating U.S. response would tell
countries with nuclear material that if you let this dangerous material slip out of
Either candidate could find himself in a damned if he does or damned if he doesnt situation. Many
184
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 185 of 318
your hands, the United States would wreak destruction on your territory. But a nuclear
retaliatory response risks violent escalation . If terrorists stole nuclear material from a Russian
research reactor site, for example, should Washington nuke Moscow? Short of conclusive evidence of the Russian
governments complicity, such a response would be madness and self-defeating. As in the movie and book Fail
the American president may have

to sacrifice New York to restore balance through an eye for an eye -- between the
United States and Russia. Another plausible nuclear terrorist scenario involves terrorists seizing small
Safe, where a U.S. nuclear bomber accidentally destroyed Moscow,
amounts of weapons-usable material from many nuclear facilities in several countries. Eventually, they gather
enough material to make a bomb. Should the United States launch retaliatory attacks against all these countries?
Or should Washington punish the country that originally supplied this material? Over many decades, the United
States and Russia have provided highly enriched uranium, usable for nuclear bombs, to dozens of countries.
Nuclear forensics on detonated uranium would most likely point to the United States and Russia as sources for the
terrorists bomb. Launching a retaliatory attack against ourselves, of course, makes no sense.
Negligence doctrine is current policy

Sagan 09 [Scott, Co-Director of CISAC and Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political
Science; FSI Senior Fellow The Role of US Strategic Posture in Deterring and
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism In The Eyes of the Experts Taylor Bolz Editor 2009]
The first policy pronouncement in this regard was limited to a single government, in President Bushs declaration
after the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test that the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea
to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North
The second policy pronouncement was

the direct and more expansive declaratory statement made by National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley in February 2008: The United States has made it clear for many years that it reserves
the right to respond with overwhelming force to any use of weapons of mass
destructionThe United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or
use weapons of mass destruction. This Hadley statement was more direct, by threatening response
Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action.
with overwhelming force and more expansive both in terms of applying the doctrine to any state, not just North
Korea, and by broadening the set of actors whom the U.S. would hold accountable after an attack. The third policy
by which the current government seeks to deter terrorist use of nuclear weapons is an indirect one, by trying to
delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons in the eyes of supporters of specific terrorist organizations. This was also
announced by Hadley in his February 2008 speech: Many terrorists value the perception of popular or theological
legitimacy for their actions. By encouraging debate about the moral legitimacy of using weapons of mass
It is worth noting that these

policy statements did not differentiate between deliberate transfers or assistance
and those that derived from lapses regarding nuclear materials or weapons security.
Senator Joseph Biden, however, did draw a connection between the intent and
responsibility for nuclear terrorism and the potential U.S. responses when he stated
in May 2007 that we must make clear in advance that we will hold accountable any
country that contributes to a terrorist nuclear attack, whether by directly aiding
would-be terrorists or willfully neglecting its responsibility to secure the nuclear
weapons or weapons-usable material within its borders . It is also worth noting that this more
destruction, we can try to affect the strategic calculus of the terrorists.
nuanced statement by Senator Biden did not include the possibility that terrorists might successfully seize or
acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material despite sincere and serious efforts on the part of the
government involved to provide adequate security. It also did not address the difficulty that the U.S. could have in
determining both the source of the materials or weapon used in a terrorist attack and the manner in which the
terrorist organization acquired the materials or weapon.
185
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 186 of 318
at rationality checks
Extreme emotions will coopt rational decisionmaking.
the foregoing arguments for carefully deciding on the extent of the military
response to a terrorist nuclear attack assume a fairly cool process of rational calculation
where the long-term political consequences of any action are weighed up against the short- term
need for something to be done. But it is not certain that the aftermath of a nuclear attack
would encourage relatively cool and calm decision-making processes . It is not clear
exactly how much public pressure would rise up demanding swift and dramatic action, but
it might be wise to assume that this pressure would be very significant. The depth
of anger could be considerable and so could a mood of vengeance. Political leaders
might not even wait for this mood to emerge, but may anticipate it or be so
aggrieved personally and collectively as to decide on decisive action even before the full
facts were available. And it is quite likely that leaders could expect to find support for
very extreme measures of response if they sought to implement them. \
Most of
Radiation is psychologically distinct from other kinds of terrorism

Pandza 11 (2011, Jasper, research analyst at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, MA in Science and Security, Kings College London, PhD candidate
researching CBRN terrorism, nuclear security and non-proliferation and nuclear
energy, Managing the Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism, Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy Volume 53, Issue 5, 2011, taylor and francis)
The magnitude of the social, psychological and economic disruption could
be severe. Radioactivity, especially when released intentionally through a terrorist act,
could easily produce persistent and high levels of distress on a large scale, including
among members of the public not exposed to radiation. 7 Following a radiological incident,
whether accidental or intentional, people are often uncertain about their own health,
including their risk of getting cancer, and about the impact on their unborn children.
Economic damage following a radiological attack could be caused by contaminated
areas becoming economically unusable for a lengthy period , the need for expensive
and time-consuming decontamination, and the stigmatisation of products from an
affected area. The cost of managing the aftermath of the Litvinenko incident was reported to have amounted
to more than 3 million, even though only one person was targeted.8 In 1987, scrap-metal workers in Goiania,
Brazil, discovered a 97-gram source of caesium-137 in an abandoned radiotherapy unit. Not knowing the dangers of
the material but attracted by its blue glow, the workers distributed the caesium among family and friends.9 The
cost of the clean-up operation after the Goiania accident was $20m, not including the substantial economic
damages due to losses in agriculture and tourism.10 A 2007 study of the impact of a possible dirty-bomb attack on
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach estimated that the direct costs, as well as the secondary impact to the US
economy, would reach $63 billion for a 120-day shutdown and $252bn for a one-year shutdown.11 These figures
also hint at the possible international consequences of a radiological attack.
186
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 187 of 318
at no nuclear forensics
Wed retaliate against a proxy if we couldnt trace the attack
where there were already doubts about the overall value of an
allied country to the interests of international security and the prevention of terrorism, any
connection to the nuclear terrorists could easily be the turning point in the
relationship, rationalizing an especially swift and harsh response . Knowledge of a
In some cases, however,
connection between the nuclear terrorists and Saudi Arabia in the case of a nuclear attack on the United States or
elsewhere in the Western world could be an example of this phenomenon. At the same time, if for some reason
the
attacked country might consider actions against a proxy or a pariah so as to set an
example and display resolve. On the whole, it would be a nervous time for any country
in very bad standing with the country that had just suffered the nuclear terrorist
attack. As George Quester suggests: There will be an urgent need to find some
appropriate form of retaliation against attackers like those involved in the events of
September 11, 2001, but this might thus pose a temptation to come up with a state
supporter, whether or not there really is one.37 And there might be few barriers to
military action against a particular government was regarded as impractical or unwise for some reason,
anticipatory action as well. It may be an overstatement on the part of Stephen Krasner to propose that
conventional
rules of sovereignty would be abandoned overnight38 in the wake of a terrorist nuclear

would be lifted, at least for a while.
attack, but it is likely that some of the normal restraints
187
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 188 of 318
at fear --> inaction

Fear based paralysis would only be temporary
varieties of the inactive end of the spectrum of responses are probably little
more than exercises in sophistry. Any paralysis on the part of the victim of the
attack is likely to be very temporaryif it occurs at all. If it does take some time
for the targeted country to recover from the initial shock of attack (and there is no
These
guarantee that this would stretch out for any real length of time, especially as only part of the country is likely to
the pressure for something to be done would probably

soon be immense. And any remaining nuclear weapons believed to be held by a
terrorist group could easily become immediate and urgent purposes for a response ,
have been directly affected35 ),
rather than a reason not to act at all.
188
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 189 of 318
Answers to Nuclear Terrorism

Answers
189
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 190 of 318
State Sponsorship Increases Nuclear Terrorism

Risks
State sponsors could provide terrorists with nuclear weapons
Issue 1, p131-159
The findings offered here indicate that, although state sponsorship no longer occupies an indispensable
position in international terrorism, state sponsorship remains a critical issue in international relations
for two primary reasons. First, significant linkages and support remain between several states and
active terrorist organizations. Second, and ultimately more important, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons technology has greatly magnified the potential consequences of state sponsorship of
terrorism. The three states that still retain programs of support for terrorist organizations (Iran,
Pakistan, and Syria) also represent the worlds three most significant nuclear proliferation concerns
(excepting North Korea). Iran has an advanced nuclear technology program, which is widely regarded by
the West as a launch pad for a nuclear weapons program. Syria also was revealed in 2007 to possess an
inchoate and clandestine nuclear program (although the intent of the program is more heavily contested as
compared to Iran). Pakistan is perhaps the greatest concern with respect to the nexus of nuclear weapons
and terrorism. The state possesses an advanced nuclear weapons program and a sizeable arsenal, and
substantial linkages exist between Pakistans intelligence community and jihadist terrorist organizations
that reside in the country or in neighboring states. Furthermore, the proliferation activities of A. Q. Khan
(the founder of Pakistans nuclear program) suggest that either the government of Pakistan was complicit
in the spread of nuclear weapons technology, or it has poor controls over strategic technology; either of
which scenario is troubling (Allison 2010, 74-85). Furthermore, the growing assertiveness and military
competence of Islamic militants in the country and the manifest threat they represent to the government of
Pakistan amplifies the potential of transfer of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and/or strategic
knowledge to terror groups. North Korea, while presently quiescent in its support for terrorism, has a
proven and expanding nuclear arms program and also has engaged in the proliferation of nuclear and
missile technology. Syrias 2007 construction of a nuclear reactor is believed to have received support
from North Korea (Sanger and Mazzetti 2007). Pyongyangs foreign policy displays a penchant for
unpredictability and assertive actions, and if the six-party talks completely unravel, the regime may seek
extreme measures of financing and retribution, which could include nuclear transfer to anti-Western
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. The proposition that state sponsors of terrorism might transfer nuclear
material or devices to terrorist organizations is not an unchallenged concept in the field of international
relations. John Mueller and William Langewiesche are perhaps the most prominent of the skeptics of
nuclear transfer. The likelihood of nuclear transfer by a state sponsor is exceptionally low, according to
Mueller and Langewiesche, as any transferred device could easily be traced back to its patron (Mueller
2007, 5). The devastating and assured retribution by any target state would thus represent an
overwhelming deterrent to nuclear arms transfer. Nuclear-capable state sponsors would also fear that any
donated device might be used instead against an allied or neutral country, or even against the sponsor
itself. Furthermore, the group considered most likely to detonate a nuclear device if it acquired oneal
Qaedais unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone, maintains Mueller (2007, 5). Others, including
Graham Allison and Michael Levi, maintain that state transfer of nuclear arms to terrorists is a quite
190
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 191 of 318
plausible scenario. Allison (2004) cites Pakistan and North Korea as considerable nuclear transfer
threats. Pakistan has a well-documental history of proliferation activities, most notably through the A. Q.
Khan network, which maintained links with Pakistans ISI intelligence service (Allison 2004, 74-81).
North Korea, asserts Allison (2004, 78-81), has demonstrated a willingness to sell nearly anything to
foreign buyers to secure hard currency. Levi (2008, 5) maintains that absent a compelling deterrence
strategy, nuclear transfer from North Korea represents a credible concern. He arrives at the same
conclusion with respect to a Pakistan and Iran under different leadership (Levi 2008, 5). Therefore,
despite the decline in state sponsorship activity, and the increasing self-reliance of contemporary terrorist
groups, the practice of state sponsorship bears close scrutiny as it holds potentially greater consequences
today than ever before. The greatest risk for nuclear transfer to terrorist groups would likely come from a
state with a risk-acceptant foreign policy, identification with militant ideologies, and in possession of an
advanced nuclear weapons programsthat is, North Korea. Nuclear transfer to terrorist groups could
also materialize as a result of a successful jihadist insurgency, whereby Islamic fundamentalist groups
seize political control. Some analysts envision this scenario as a realistic outcome in Pakistan
(Brulliard 2011; Reidel 2011). If this were to materialize, the potential for nuclear transfer to terrorists
would be considerable and the potential consequences catastrophic.
State sponsorship increases nuclear terrorism risks
Issue 1, p131-159
The global spread of nuclear technology represents the most compelling reason why state-sponsored
terrorism remains a highly salient topic of international relations and an enduring security concern.
Although the scope and intensity of state sponsorship has dimmed considerably, the potential lethality of
state-supported terrorism has escalated because of the proliferation of nuclear technology into the
remaining set of terrorist sponsors. In earlier eras, state-sponsored acts of terrorism, while more
frequent and still very lethal, involved conventional weapons in which the damage is circumscribed by
the technological limitations of conventional armaments. In the contemporary era, where nuclear weapon
arsenals and programs exist in many risk-acceptant statesincluding states with terrorist clientsthere
exists a genuine risk that terrorism may turn nuclear. To be clear, powerful deterrents against nuclear
transfer to terrorists exist, and therefore, such an event may never manifest and certainly is unlikely to
become a common practice. Still, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and materials by a terrorist
group may occur as a result of the following scenarios. First, terrorist groups operating freely
(because of state sponsorship) in a country with nuclear capability may exploit ideological
sympathies to secure the collaboration of lower-level agents in nuclear smuggling operations.
Second, deterrence strategies to prevent nuclear transfer by state sponsors of terrorism are
predicated on the theory of regime leaders as rational actorstypically a safe assumption, but
hardly a certainty. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that a particular leader or regime, operating
under a nonrational decision-making model, may decide someday to transfer nuclear weapons or
materials to terrorists. State sponsorship of terrorism may continue to decline as a practice of statecraft;
however, as long as it remains extant, and nuclear technology continues to proliferate, state-sponsored
terrorism will remain a potent security threat in the international system.
191
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 192 of 318
Nuclear Terrorism Risk High

Brent Budowsky 8/22/14, LL.M. degree in international financial law from the
London School of Economics, former aide to former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and Bill
Alexander, then chief deputy majority whip of the House, ISIS poses nuclear 9/11
threat, 2014, http://www.opednews.com/articles/ISIS-poses-nuclear-9-11-th-byBrent-Budowsky-ISI_Military_Nuclear_insanity_Threat-To-World-Peace-140822911.html
After the latest grotesque atrocity by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the beheading of an American journalist, American and European policymakers must clearly understand
ISIS will launch a major terror attack on American

or European soil. Analysts estimate that ISIS has amassed a cash hoard of between $400
million and $2 billion. It is highly probable that ISIS will attempt to use
the near certainty that unless it is defeated and destroyed,
some of this money to obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other

w eapons of m ass d eath on the international black market or from
corrupt officials in nations such as Russia, China, Pakistan or North Korea
to use in attacks against New York, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels or other nations it considers infidel enemies. This danger
is magnified by the fact that ISIS has recruited nationals of the United
States and Europe, who possess American and European passports and are physically indistinguishable from local populations in America and Europe. It is
extraordinary that the mass murdering butchery of ISIS is so demented than even al Qaeda is offended. It is alarming that the CIA, which launched
intelligence operations even against the United States Senate, and the NSA, which launched massive and unprecedented eavesdropping operations, and intelligence services of leading
the most barbaric terrorists in modern history

had taken over almost a third of Iraq and are on the brink of creating a
terrorist super-state that dwarfs al Qaeda's efforts prior to 9/11 . I vehemently opposed the
European nations were blind to the magnitude of the ISIS threat until
misguided Iraq War from the moment it was proposed by former President George W. Bush and have never been a neoconservative, warmonger or super-hawk. But aggressive action
ISIS has stated its intention to attack the United States and
Europe to advance its evil, messianic and genocidal ideology and ambitions. ISIS has
against ISIS is urgently needed.
the money to purchase the most deadly weapons in the world , and has
recruited American and European traitors with above-average capability
to execute an attack . The odds that ISIS can obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other forms of mass destruction weapons are impossible to ascertain
but in a world of vast illegal arms trafficking, with so many corrupt officials
in nations possessing arsenals of destruction, the danger is real . The fact that WMD
scares prior to the Iraq War ranged from mistaken to deceitful does not mean that the WMD danger does not exist today. It does. I
applaud the recent actions taken by President Obama. Obama's airstrikes saved tens of thousands of Yazidis from genocide, took back the Mosul Dam from ISIS and saved countless
Iraqis, Kurds and Syrians from slaughter. The airstrikes inflicted material damage to ISIS. The diplomacy of Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry contributed mightily to the
replacement of a disastrous Iraqi government by a government can unite Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. The Obama-Kerry initiatives will lead to the creation of a stable Afghan
government and avoid the collapse that was possible after the recent controversial Afghan elections. These are real successes. In the current political climate, Obama seems to get credit
the danger of ISIS pulling off a

nuclear, chemical, biological or other mass death 9/11-style attack in a
major American or European city is real. Even with dirty or primitive WMD
weapons, the casualty totals could be catastrophic . ISIS must be defeated and destroyed. This will not be
for nothing, but he deserves great credit for some important successes in recent weeks. And yet
achieved with "boots on the ground" proxies from Iraqi or Kurd forces alone, though Kurdish forces should immediately receive strong military assistance. America should not initiate
another massive Iraq ground war. What is needed is a multinational special ops strike force made up of 10,000 troops from NATO nations and possibly Arab League nations.
192
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 193 of 318
A2: Terrorists Wont Use Nukes

Predictive and empirical evidence interest has existed and will increase
in the future.
Phillips 12 (2012, Andrew, PhD, Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science
and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Horsemen of the
apocalypse? Jihadist strategy and nuclear instability in South Asia, International
Politics (2012) 49, 297317)
Jihadism and the enduring appeal of nuclear weapons
Jihadists have long sought to acquire and use WMD including nuclear weapons against
Western targets. Al Qaeda has reportedly possessed a WMD research branch within
its organisation since the early 1990s (Scheuer, 2006, p. 7), while revelations that Al Qaeda
representatives met with Pakistani nuclear scientists in August 2001 proved pivotal in
galvanising the Bush Administration's fears concerning the potential for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons after
Jihadist furthermore
propaganda routinely tallies the Muslim victims of infidel injustice in the millions ,
situating this lamentation alongside a corresponding call for the jihadists to inflict revenge
on a proportionate scale against the West (Al-Fahd, 2003, p. 8). The May 2003 fatwa of an
influential radical Saudi cleric authorising as halal (religiously permissible) the use of WMD
against Western targets further reveals the extent to which jihadists have sought to
pre-emptively shape public opinion in the Islamic world in ways that might be conducive towards
9/11 (Suskind, 2006, pp. 6162; Bunn, 2009, p. 113; Albright, 2010, pp. 178179).
greater Muslim acceptance of any jihadist WMD attack against the West (Salama and Hansell, 2005, p. 627). Finally,
the seriousness with which counter-terrorism experts judge the jihadist nuclear threat is underscored by the Obama
administration's nomination of nuclear terrorism as the greatest immediate threat to global security (Bunn, 2009, p.
112).
The jihadist fixation with WMD and especially nuclear weapons is thus a matter of public
record, and the jihadist nuclear attraction is likely to intensify in the light of the
jihadists setbacks in the war on terror sketched above. Jihadist motivations to strike
either America or one of its close allies with a nuclear weapon echo those that drove
both the 9/11 attacks as well as a host of other mass-casualty attacks planned or
perpetrated against Western targets since 2001. The desire to sow fear in the polities they deem
responsible for Muslims oppression; the hope that a mass-casualty attack might
provoke the West into a disproportionate response that may then draw the faithful to fight under
the jihadist banner; the expectation that a blow sufficiently painful might compel the
West to abandon its support for its client states by withdrawing from the Greater Middle East and
South Asia each of these motivations are likely to inform jihadist nuclear aspirations. An assessment of
jihadists past behaviour and an evaluation of the movement's bleak
prospects absent a system-destabilising shock to restore its fortunes all
point to a revived interest in nuclear weapons being one of the most likely
future developments in jihadist circles in coming years. In the light of this evidence,
Western counter-terrorism officials have naturally concentrated on the threat of direct nuclear jihadist terrorist
attacks on Western targets. However, while I would agree that this remains the jihadists preferred method of
advancing their objectives, an alternative outlet for jihadist nuclear aspirations lies in an effort to provoke an Indo
Pakistani nuclear confrontation with a view towards profiting from the ensuing chaos. This reasoning supporting this
assessment is outlined below.
AQ wants to obtain and use nuclear weapons multiple fatwas prove

Bunn et al. 11 (May 2011. Matthew Bunn, associate professor, at Harvard Kennedy School and Co- Principal
Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs;
Colonel Yuri Morozov, prof @ Russian Academy of Military Sciences former chief of General Staff of the Russian
military; Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. Senior fellow at Belfer Center, fmr. director of Intelligence at DoE; Simon Saradzhyan,
senior fellow at Belfer Center; William Tobey, senior fellow at Belfer Center & director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to
Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, fmr. deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the NNSA; Colonel
193
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 194 of 318
General Viktor I. Yesin, senior fellow at the U.S.A and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences
and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, fmr. chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces;
Major General Pavel S. Zolotarev, deputy director of the U.S.A and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy
of Sciences and fmr. head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The U.S.Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and
the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies.)
Obtaining high-end weapons of mass destruction has been a high priority for a
terrorist group that harbors ambitions of defeating the U.S. and its allies, overthrowing
so-called apostate regimes, restoring the Islamic Caliphate, and expanding it to cover the globe. Al-Qaeda
leaders have consistently noted in public pronouncements spanning more than two decades
that they are willing to employ all available means at their disposal to achieve their
objectives. They have mastered the art of surprise with each successive attack. In this context, they do not
appear to be interested in chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear weapons for their own sake, apart from their
potential effectiveness against specific targets. The leaderships pursuit of a nuclear bomb in parallel to the groups
known efforts to develop anthrax in the late 1990s suggests that either a nuclear or a biological weapon would be
suitable for use in a future attack that was being contemplated, depending on which means (if any) they could
Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership (2003 and 2008) offer a
meticulously researched religious ruling, or fatwa, for the use of weapons of mass
destruction in the mass slaughter of civilians. It is clear that the group desires highend WMD, whether in the form of biological weapons or of nuclear weapons capable of killing millions
of people and causing mass economic damage . The al-Qaeda leaderships justification for
the use of WMD on religious grounds cannot be dismissed as a theological exercise.
In all probability, the groups leaders are explaining why the use of WMD is
necessary because they are actively planning to use these weapons; if 9/11 was a
acquire.
declaration of war against America, a Hiroshima bomb is a way to win the war. Nuclear and big bio weapons are
desirable because they can produce global economic disruption, cause mass casualties, and perhaps most
there are
chilling similarities between the warning and planning cycle associated with the
9/11 attack, and rituals associated with al-Qaedas WMD statements. Osama bin
Laden issued 1998 fatwa that served as a harbinger of the 9/11 attack that followed
three years later. The al-Qaeda leaders declaration of war against America not only fulfilled a religious
importantly, create widespread doubts concerning world order and governance. In this context,
obligation, it launched a secret planning process for an unprecedented attack that was carried out with devastating
The timing of al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiris 2008 fatwawhich

meticulously justifies an unprecedented attack on an almost unimaginable scale of
destructionmay have started the clock ticking for an attack capable of fulfilling alZawahiris promise to elevate the level of violence to a new scale. The high-end scale of al-Qaedas
intent to produce mass destruction is clearly evident from a 26- page fatwa entitled A
Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels, published by radical
Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd on May 21, 2003.10 Al-Fahd offered three central arguments
justifying the use of WMD. First, one kills in a good manner only when one can. If
those engaged in jihad cannot do so , for example when they are forced to bomb, destroy, burn or
flood, it is permissible. Second, one avoids killing women and children only when one
can distinguish them from men. If one cannot do so , as when infidels make a night attack or
invade, a Muslim may be killed as collateral damage in killing the fighters . And third,
killing a Muslim is forbidden and not permitted; but if those engaged in jihad are forced to
kill him because they cannot repel the infidels or fight them otherwise, it is
permitted, as when the Muslim is being used as a living shield.11 But al-Fahd also argued that using
nuclear weapons against U.S. civilians was justified because it was a proportionate
response to the harms inflicted on the Islamic community : If a bomb that killed 10 million of
effect.
them and burned as much of their land as they have burned Muslims land were dropped on them, it would be
permissible. On March 2, 2008, al-Zawahiri released a lengthy document entitled The
Exoneration: A Treatise Exonerating the Nation of the Pen and the Sword of the Denigrating Charge of Being
Irresolute and Weak,
in which he revisited al-Fahds fatwa and strengthened the argument

194
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 195 of 318
for conducting mass casualty attacks. Specifically, al-Zawahiri raised key Quranic
themes to justify the use of WMD to include the legality of killing women, children,
and the elderly; the use of Muslims as human shields; the inevitability of environmental
destruction; notions of retaliatory use and deterrence; attacking in the night and unintentionally harming
noncombatants; and other such issues. Al- Zawahiri explained why he considers the United States
to be the main enemy of all Muslims and a single juridical entity under Islam.
This judgment means all Americans are valid targets, whether they are men,
women, or children. Indeed, not only are the same scholars, clerics and quotations of Exoneration also
referenced in al-Fahds fatwa, but many of the same examples from the former are used nearly verbatim in the
latter.
Al Qaeda has nuclear ambitions and would use nuclear

weapons
Brian Jenkins, world-renownded exert on terrorism, The
National Journal, October 18, 2008
NJ: Are you saying that Al Qaeda is interested in nuclear weapons only in the abstract, as a propaganda
tool?
Jenkins: No. Al Qaeda has actual nuclear ambitions, there is no doubt about that. When Osama
bin Laden was in Sudan, he tried to acquire some nuclear material. The efforts were mostly
amateurish, and Al Qaeda was the victim of some scams. Qaeda [leaders] also had meetings with
some Pakistani nuclear scientists while in Afghanistan. So, clearly, they were thinking about nuclear
weapons. If bin Laden were able to acquire a nuclear weapon, I also suspect that he would use it.
My larger point is that Al Qaeda has already become the world's first nonstate nuclear power without even
having nuclear weapons.
9-11 proves terrorists will detonate nuclear weapons

CHARLESTON GAZETTE, November 3, 2006, p. 4A
As insane as it seems, the worst peril facing humanity nowadays comes from furtive religious extremists
who think that God wants them to massacre great numbers of people. Sensible folks know that this belief
is loony, yet it is the most frightening reality of the new century. The 9/11 suicide strike and similar
horrors made it clear that such militants eagerly would detonate a nuclear bomb in a large U.S. city,
gladly dying as "martyrs" along with their victims.
Religious nature of most terrorist groups makes catastrophic

terror ambitions inevitable
Captain Matthew Morgan, HHOC Intelligence Commander, 2004
[Parameters, "The Origins of the New Terrorism," Spring, http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.htm]
While there is certainly no cooperation between foreign Islamist and US-domestic Christian radicals, there is a disquieting
similarity in their views. August Kreis of the paramilitary group Posse Comitatus responded to the collapse of the World Trade
Center towers with this disconcerting rant: Hallelu-Yahweh! May the WAR be started! DEATH to His enemies, may the World
Trade Center BURN TO THE GROUND!38 Jessica Sterns recent book, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants
Kill, which compiles interviews with international terrorists conducted over five years, does not begin with an example from the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility or the streets of the Middle East. Her introductory example is a former Christian terrorist in a
Texas trailer park. While Islamic terrorism is the most salient threat to the United States, it is not the only danger posed by the
new trend of a culture of religious violence and extremism. A cluster of several cultural features among new international
195
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 196 of 318
terrorist groups indicates the high level of threat. These aspects include a conception of righteous killing-as-healing, the necessity
of total social destruction as part of a process of ultimate purification, a preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction, and a
cult of personality where one leader dominates his followers who seek to become perfect clones.40 These aspects taken together
represent a significant departure from the culture of earlier terrorist groups, and the organizations that these characteristics
describe represent a serious threat to the civilized world
The "new" terrorism makes wmd use likely
Captain Matthew Morgan, HHOC Intelligence Commander, 2004 [Parameters,

"The Origins of the New Terrorism," Spring, http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.htm]
Most recent scholarship, however, has taken the perspective that contemporary
terrorism represents a significant departure from the past. Various factors have led
to the development of this new type of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson pondered the
increase in indiscriminateness among terrorists, and he posited several possible
reasons accounting for this upsurge. First, the saturation of the media with images
of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract
headline attention. Second, terrorists have realized that civilian soft targets involve
lower risk to themselves. Finally, there has been a shift from the politically-minded
terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic.
Al-Qaeda has the motivation to acquire and use nuclear

weapons
Graham Allison, Harvard Government Prof, 2002 [The National Interest, "The New
Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism," w/ Andrei Kokoshin, Fall, LN]
There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden and his associates have serious nuclear ambitions. For almost a
decade they have been actively seeking nuclear weapons, and, as President Bush has noted, they would
use such weapons against the United States or its allies "in a heartbeat." In 2000, the CIA intercepted a
message in which a member of Al-Qaeda boasted of plans for a "Hiroshima" against America. According
to the Justice Department indictment for the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, "At various times from at least as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others, known and
unknown, made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons." Additional evidence from a former
Al-Qaeda member describes attempts to buy uranium of South African origin, repeated travels to three
Central Asian states to try to buy a complete warhead or weapons-usable material, and discussions with
Chechen criminal groups in which money and drugs were offered for nuclear weapons. Bin Laden
himself has declared that acquiring nuclear weapons is a religious duty. "If I have indeed acquired
[nuclear] weapons", he once said, "then I thank God for enabling me to do so." When forging an alliance
of terrorist organizations in 1998, he issued a statement entitled "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam."
Characterized by Bernard Lewis as "a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose",
it states: "It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God."
If anything, the ongoing American-led war on global terrorism is heightening our adversary's incentive to
obtain and use a nuclear weapon. Al-Qaeda has discovered that it can no longer attack the United States
with impunity. Faced with an assertive, determined opponent now doing everything it can to destroy this
terrorist network, Al-Qaeda has every incentive to take its best shot.
196
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 197 of 318
A2: Terrorists Dont Want to Kill A Lot of People

Al Qqaeda is trying to purchase nuclear materials in order to
kill a lot of people
Peter D. Zimmerman, professor of science and security in the Department of War Studies at King's
College London, Jeffrey G. Lewis, executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, NATIONAL POST, December
20, 2006, p. A26
Osama bin Laden's long-standing interest in developing nuclear weapons is deeply troubling, and the
attempt to purchase uranium from the Sudanese was far from an isolated incident. Al-Qaeda operatives
have repeatedly tried to acquire nuclear materials over the years. In August, 2001, a month before
the September 11 attacks, bin Laden received two former Pakistani nuclear officials,
asking them to help recruit other Pakistani scientists with expertise in building
nuclear weapons. After the military effort to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan, U.S. forces found
extensive documents, including crude bomb designs, at an al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul. In 2003, bin
Laden sought a fatwa from an extremist Saudi cleric permitting the use of weapons
of mass destruction, calling their acquisition a "religious duty." As recently as September,
al-Qaeda put out a call urging nuclear scientists to join its war against the West. Bin Laden's attempt
to purchase highly enriched uranium in the past belies the conventional wisdom
that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Clearly, some
terrorists do want a lot of people dead.
Attempted uranium purchases prove that terrorists want high

death rates
Peter D Zimmerman, Jeffrey G Lewis. Foreign Policy. Washington: Nov/Dec 2006., Iss. 157; pg. 33, 7 pgs
Osama bin Laden's long-standing interest in developing nuclear weapons is deeply troubling, and the attempt
to purchase uranium from the Sudanese was far from an isolated incident. Al Qaeda operatives have
repeatedly tried to acquire nuclear materials over the years. In August 2001, a month before the September 11
attacks, bin Laden received two former Pakistani nuclear officials, asking them to help recruit other Pakistani
scientists with expertise in building nuclear weapons. After the military effort to oust the Taliban from
Afghanistan, U.S. forces found extensive documents, including crude bomb designs, at an al Qaeda safe
house in Kabul. In 2003, bin Laden sought a fatwa from an extremist Saudi cleric permitting the use of
weapons of mass destruction, calling their acquisition a "religious duty." As recently as September, al Qaeda
put out a call urging nuclear scientists to join its war against the West. Bin Laden's attempt to purchase highly
enriched uranium in the past belies the conventional wisdom that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead. Clearly, some terrorists do want a lot of people dead.
Easier to produce a nuclear weapon than a chemical or

biological weapon
Peter D Zimmerman, Jeffrey G Lewis. Foreign Policy. Washington: Nov/Dec 2006., Iss. 157; pg. 33, 7 pgs
Could a nuclear attack by bin Laden, or any other terrorist, actually happen? Some say it would be impossible,
mistakenly believing that terrorists do not have the motivation, or the ability, to assemble the highly
sophisticated, modern tools necessary for the task. Most observers, however, agree that a small group could
197
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 198 of 318
construct a lethal nuclear weapon since they are conceptually simple devices. After all, the technology involved
in creating a nuclear weapon is more than 60 years old. In fact, it is perhaps easier to make a gun-assembled
nuclear bomb than it is to develop biological or chemical weapons.
198
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 199 of 318
A2: Empirics
This arg is stupid they probably have one but cant use it because THEIR
WHOLE ORGANIZATION IS IN HIDING.
Mowatt-Larssen 10 (2010, Rolf, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard, former Director of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, 23 years as a CIA intelligence
officer, Nightmares of nuclear terrorism, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, ebsco)
Another dangerous bias in assessing the threat is the belief that once terrorists obtain
a nuclear bomb, they will use it. Thus, the following argument is proffered: Since Al Qaeda has
yet to use a nuclear weapon, it does not possess one . This might comfort the
doubters, but terrorists may not agree that it is difficult to stash a nuclear
or biological weapon in a safe place for future use, without fear of
discovery. After all, it has proved exceedingly difficult to find bin Laden and his lieutenant
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and we have a pretty good idea of where they might be hiding.
Plus, nothing in Al Qaedas behavior suggests that its leaders follow
predictable patterns concerning the means and timing of attacks .
Theyre biding their time until the perfect moment need to stay on the
offensive to avoid being taken by surprise.
A furtherand highly unsettlingexplanation of Al Qaedas extraordinary patience is
that group members think time is on their side . They probably believe they have drawn
the United States into a deepening commitment to fight a protracted insurgency in
Afghanistan. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was deposed, opening up long-term possibilities
for an Islamic theocracy in Iraq. Gen. Pervez Musharraf is out of power in Pakistan, and
the domestic instability there is growing every day. These developments create
opportunities to change the global status quo . In other words, Al Qaeda may be
waiting for a perfect storm in the alignment of targets, opportunity, and
timing to launch another game-changing attack . If they do so, it will certainly be
based on a calculation that the moment is ripe to try to force Washingtons hand in
ways that favor Al Qaedas long-term goals.
the groups long-held intent and persistent efforts to acquire nuclear and
biological weapons represent a unique means of potentially fulfilling its wildest
hopes and aspirations. As bin Laden declared in 1998, it is his duty to obtain WMD. He apparently
In this light,
understood at this early juncture that using such weapons might become necessary at some stage of his
Al Qaeda feverishly pursued

nuclear and biological weapons capabilities before 9/11 . These efforts were
managed by the groups most senior leadership, with a sense of purpose and
urgency that suggests it was important to make progress on possessing WMD prior
to its 2001 attack on the United States . Yet in spite of bin Ladens declaration and Al Qaedas
subsequent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, the threat is not widely being treated
as a clear-and-present danger that requires an urgent response .
confrontation with the United States and its allies. With this in mind,
199
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 200 of 318
New data on non-catastrophic radiological terror proves catastrophic

attacks will increase in the future.
Early et al. 13 (2013, Bryan, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Quan Li, Atoms for Terror?
Nuclear Programs and Non-Catastrophic Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism, British
Journal of Political Science / , FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge Journals)
we built a new dataset of noncatastrophic NR terrorist incidents
and plots from 1992 to 2006. Using this dataset and a sample of 152 countries, we
found that as a country's nuclear program develops and grows in size, it is more
likely to be targeted with NR terrorism. But, consistent with our argument, the effect of nuclear
To test these arguments,
programs on NR terrorism is weakened if a country is committed to reducing corruption and strengthening nuclear
security. A state with a large nuclear program can, therefore, reduce its vulnerability to NR terrorism by instituting
appropriate counterterrorism measures. Policies that protect states from NR terrorism will probably be most
effective when they are instituted together rather than separately. However, comparing the two measures analyzed
in this study, reducing corruption appears to be more effective than bolstering nuclear security. When corruption is
rampant, simply committing to the CPPNM does not eliminate a state's vulnerability to terrorism. Yet reducing
corruption to its lowest possible level insulates states from the dangers of NR terrorism regardless of whether they
are committed to the CPPNM or not. As we previously emphasized, however, future research would benefit from a
more nuanced measure of nuclear security.75
Policymakers are most concerned about catastrophic NR terrorist attacks. While our
data do not provide direct insight into when and why these incidents might occur, our analysis
does shed some light on catastrophic NR terrorism . This is in part because terrorists
did intend to cause catastrophic consequences in many of the observed incidents
and plots in our dataset. All catastrophic plots were disrupted before they could be
successfully executed and the observed attacks sometimes had more limited effects than the perpetrators
but this does not imply that similar trends will continue in the
future. Thus, based on the prior motivations of terrorist groups, our results suggest that the
future risk of catastrophic NR terrorism is likely to be higher in countries
with large nuclear programs.
intended,
200
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 201 of 318
A2: No Al Qaeda Nukes

Weve just been lucky theyre still out there all connected to Pakistan
and Afghanistan though.
AEI 12 (10/17, American Enterprise Institute, Why we must win in Afghanistan,
http://www.aei.org/issue/why-we-must-win-in-afghanistan#1)
After 11 years without an attack on US soil, aren't we overstating the threat?
There have been two attacks on US soil since 2009 and two more attempts
disrupted after they were well underway. In December 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
successfully got an explosive device (in his underwear) onto an aircraft and attempted to
detonate it over US soil. The attempt failed only because the device was faulty not because
we disrupted the attack. In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad got a vehicle loaded with explosives into Times Square in New
York City. Again, the attack failed only because he had built the bomb badly and it was discovered before it
exploded. If he had designed the bomb properly (which is not all that hard to do), the attack would have succeeded.
In Fall 2010, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (in Yemen) hid bombs in printer
cartridges and got them into the parcel delivery system headed to targets in the US. The bombs were
discovered en route. In April 2012, a Saudi informant tipped Riyadh off about
another underwear-bomb plot, which was disrupted while underway by Saudi and US officials.
Al Qaeda franchises have grown dramatically in strength and capability since 2009. Al
Qaeda in Yemen retains a much larger safe haven in that country than it had in 2009, despite
recent successes by US direct-action operations and Yemeni counterinsurgency
operations. It has used that safe haven, as we have seen, to attempt attacks on the US even
as it fought against Yemeni forces. Al Qaeda in Iraq, almost destroyed and operationally
insignificant when Obama took office, has re-established itself following the withdrawal of all American
forces from Iraq at the end of 2011. It is now conducting regular spectacular attacks in Iraq
(including against the limited number of US facilities that remain there). But it has also spread its
operations into neighboring Syria, where it is radicalizing the originally moderate groups opposing
Bashar al Assad's regime and developing new safe havens from which to expand operations in the future. Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, born in Algeria, was an almost-irrelevant group limited to
kidnap-for-ransom operations a year ago. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently revealed, it has now
expanded across North Africa and was responsible for the attack on our consulate in
Benghazi, Libya, that killed our ambassador. It has also spread into Equatorial Africa, using unrest in Mali to
establish a foothold there.
These groups are all directly linked to and affiliated with the core al Qaeda
group now led by Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, from Pakistan. if it
We have killed leaders of that core group for 11 years, but it can recover
very quickly regains freedom of action in Afghanistan, especially since it can now harness the strength and
expansion of franchises that did not exist in 2001.
201
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 202 of 318
A2: Nukes Uneconomical

Its both cost effective and politically appealing to terrorists.
Zimmerman and Lewis 06 (10/10, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and
elementary particle physics, Emeritus Professor of Science and Security at King's
College London, former Chief Scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
and Jeffrey, Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America
Foundation, former Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom/Science,
Technology, and Public Policy Program, Belfer Center, Harvard University, The
Bomb in the Backyard, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/10/10/the_bomb_in_the_backyard?
page=0,1)
Would terrorists build a nuclear device? Presumably, some terrorist organizations
want to kill as many people as possible at the lowest cost . Like any organization,
sophisticated terrorist outfits are concerned with "cost effectiveness." It is a gruesome
business, but very similar attacks may result in widely different casualties depending on the target. For example,
the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 killed a relatively small number of people compared to the
if one considers the bulk of

terrorist attacks, the relationship of cost to casualties follows a simple curve, with
the cost per casualty increasing as the size of the terror attack increases -- from the
2002 Bali bombings, despite the use of relatively similar devices. But,
relatively inexpensive Madrid bombing (which cost less than $10,000, or around $50 per murder) to the September
11 attacks (which cost $400,000-$500,000, or about $170 per murder).
Some might claim that thinking about terrorist attacks in terms of cost-versus-casualty
ratios fails to capture the essentially political ends of a terrorist group. Cost data from
previous attacks suggest that al Qaeda is sometimes willing to pay a significant
premium to attack high-profile, heavily protected targets that may produce fewer casualties, but have greater
political implications, such as a U.S. embassy or Naval vessel. For example, the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S.
Yet
terrorists do not have to pay a premium for a nuclear attack; on a per
murder basis, nuclear weapons are both cheap and can be used against
high-profile targets. And a nuclear attack induces great fear. Its specter has hung
Cole in Yemen may have cost $10,000, but with 17 casualties, it added up to a pricey $590 per murder.
over the world since the United States dropped Little Boy on Hiroshima.
terrorists would likely find a nuclear attack cost

effective. The simple appeal of nuclear terrorism can be illustrated with a hypothetical
situation. A failed nuclear detonation, one that produced only a few tens of tons in yield, could kill
10,000 people in just a few hours if the device exploded in a crowded financial center. Not only
would 10,000 persons represent the upward limit of a conventional terrorist attack,
but that figure would also exceed the combined casualties in all of al Qaedas
attacks over the entire history of the organization.
And that's a "worst-case" scenario for the terrorists. A "successful" nuclear detonation would kill 10
times as many people. If terrorists could construct a successful device that killed 100,000 people for a cost of
$10 million dollars -- about $100 per murder -- it would be a bargain, considering that most
of al Qaeda's attacks have been mounted in the $100 to $300 per murder range . A
To put it in strictly commercial terms,
nuclear terrorist attack that cost $5 million would result in a cost per murder comparable to the Madrid bombings.
So, just how difficult an enterprise would this be? What would a terrorist group have to do to build a bomb that
would kill 100,000 people for less than $10 million?
202
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 203 of 318
A2: Tech Barriers

Physicists conclude that its easy, material is available terrorist weapons
dont require the same high standards that make regular weapons so
complex
Zimmerman and Pluta 06 (2006, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and
and Anna, researcher, Center for Science and Security at King's College London,
PhD candidate, Nuclear terrorism: A disheartening dissent, Survival: Global Politics
at some price nuclear explosive material is available to well
funded terrorists, even if there have been no documented incidents in which
nuclear explosive material has been sold in useful quantities. With access to fissile materials , in
particular HEU or reasonably clean Pu-239, many authors have claimed that improvised nuclear
devices29 are comparatively easy to build.30 The principal physicists who are exponents of
the easy-to-build idea are Theodore B. Taylor, a former fission-weapons designer at Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Nobel Laureate Luis Alvarez. Alvarez notably suggested
that a nuclear explosion could result if one appropriate ly sized and shaped piece of U-235
metal were dropped on a second properly sized and shaped piece;31 Taylor, in John McPhee's The
Curve of Binding Energy, claimed that, given the material, building a bomb is very easy .
Double underlined. Very easy.32 It is likely that both experts spoke somewhat loosely for effect,
It seems certain that
because at the time they wrote the official position was that no terrorist could build a nuclear device because
constructing a nuclear weapon required an effort on the scale of the Manhattan Project together with a team of
scientists of the calibre of those at Los Alamos from 1942 to 1945.
Time has shown that states can go nuclear with smaller projects, and certainly with
less brilliant scientists. In part this reduction in required effort and talent is because very large amounts of
information about the construction of nuclear weapons as well as the fast-reactor physics needed to compute the
behaviour of nuclear devices have become public. This publication sometimes occurred deliberately, as in the
historic 1954 Atoms for Peaceconference or the 1970s-era International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluationstudy.
Sometimes the information oozed out, as in the McPhee book, and sometimes it was effectively re-invented.33
Many details can now be found in the physics literature.34
There are crucial differences between nuclear weapons built by a state for use in a
military stockpile and devices constructed by groups for use in single dramatic acts
of terror. A military device must be reliable (it must explode when detonated); it must be
predictable (the yield attained must be substantially the same across a complete production run of weapons
so that troops using the weapons can choose the one which will best do the job); and it must be safe (a military
weapon must be safe to handle and not detonate in common accidents; above all it must not detonate with nuclear
yield when the detonation has not been authorised).
A bomb built by a terrorist need not be especially reliable, and it certainly need not
be particularly predictable. That is, any yield falling somewhere between 100 tonnes (0.1kt) and 20,000
tonnes (ZOkt) of TNT will almost certainly be considered adequate by the terror group concerned. Surely the strike
group would prefer a larger yield to a smaller one, all things being equal; but a 100-tonne explosion will be very
Most importantly, it will be perceived as

nuclear, and it will contaminate a very large area with radioactive fallout (some, of
course, being the unfissioned nuclear material itself). We assume that the terror cell will be
concerned with its own safety while assembling the device and transporting it to target, but we do
not believe that any terrorist group would or even could attempt to reach the safety
levels demanded of an American weapon 35
In 1977 the US Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) studied nuclear proliferation and
safeguards. In its report the OTA panel concluded that an appropriate technical team for
nearly as effective as a tool of terror as a 20kt one.
203
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 204 of 318
building an improvised nuclear device was two people , one of whom was a skilled
machinist and the other a physicist.36 If the fissile fuel for the device is uranium enriched to 50% or more,
this is a plausible, if stressing, scenario that has been explored in some detail in fiction.37
Only requires 19 people and 1 year physics is easy and the barriers are
vastly exaggerated.
Zimmerman and Lewis 06 (10/10, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and
and Jeffrey, Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America
Foundation, former Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom/Science,
Technology, and Public Policy Program, Belfer Center, Harvard University, The
Bomb in the Backyard, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/10/10/the_bomb_in_the_backyard?
page=0,1)
The constraint we have placed on our would-be bomb-makers is a total of 19 persons -the same number of hijackers who orchestrated the September 11 attacks -- working
over the course of a year in the United States. We estimate that a three-person physics team ,
including a relatively senior physicist and two postdoctoral students, would be capable of rendering the
design in three to six months. Their salaries during the course of a year would total approximately
$200,000. In addition to the physics team, the project could comprise a few small engineering
teams to address the following: casting the uranium for the device, constructing the proper
gun, assembling the supercritical mass of uranium, overseeing the electronics, and finally,
the actual detonation.
In many respects, the most difficult task for nuclear terrorists would be casting the uranium
metal, which melts at high temperatures, into appropriate shapes. The metallurgy team would include at
least one person with experience in advanced casting techniques. A vacuum furnace is probably required to reduce
oxygen contamination and prevent the uranium from igniting. The team would likely need to practice using either
The group could find the vacuum

furnace to fit their specifications by searching on the Internet, and could probably purchase it for less than
$50,000.
The actual pit -- or core of the weapon containing the highly enriched uranium -- could be fabricated
quickly. When China built its first nuclear bomb in 1964, a single technician named Yuan Gongfu used a lathe to
natural uranium or some surrogate before casting the final core.
shape the highly enriched uranium in just one night. New or used lathes large enough to properly finish the roughly
cast pit can be bought on the Internet, even on eBay, for $10,000. These instruments are probably as capable as
Our terrorist
outfit could probably find all the standard machine shop equipment it would need in
any university physics department. None of the tools requires special licenses to
purchase.
the one Yuan used more than 40 years ago. Computer-controlled machine tools are not necessary.
The machining group would also have the task of designing and building the required structure for the device and
assembling the whole. This requires at least two or three people able to carry out such common laboratory tasks as
welding, brazing, and hard soldering. One member of the group should bring the skills of a draftsman, and
preferably good abilities to use computers to design complex shapes.
terrorists do not need to fashion the right type of gun. "Team

Gun" would likely consist of three or four people , at least one of whom is familiar with the interior
ballistics of guns in the appropriate size range. Their principal task would be to find a surplus
artillery piece of the correct size and to build a projectile. Such recoilless rifles are widely
available in the United States and Canada as military surplus, though they require a license to purchase.
A hobbyist could easily refurbish a recoilless rifle for just a few thousand dollars. In all
likelihood, the gun team would want to test-fire the gun with a dummy nuclear projectile to verify
its actual speed. One or two shots should suffice . Barrel life, usually hundreds of shots without
To detonate a nuclear bomb,
204
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
maintenance, would not pose
adapt and test a reliable gun.
Page 205 of 318

a problem. It is unlikely to take more than six months for such a group to
the electronics team would likely include one or two technicians and
probably be headed by an engineer with at least a baccalaureate degree in electrical
engineering or experimental physics. Its principal job would be to design the circuitry that arms and fires the
Meanwhile,
device at the desired point, and which prevents it from detonating accidentally. In addition, the group would need to
assemble or purchase, install, and calibrate neutron detectors to be used in testing the device.
The terror group will also require a large, remote area for their "mini-Los Alamos." Their
biggest concern would be the noise caused by firing the gun during their tests. We would
choose a 150-acre ranch in an isolated area -- relatively small compared to the 500,000
acre ranch that Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo purchased in Australia. We estimate that such
a ranch might be purchased for $150,000 in remote areas of the United States, such as Texas or Wyoming, and
require another $50,000 in temporary improvements to build the foundry, machine shop, electronics lab, and other
equipment.
the nuclear device itself is likely to be less than 9 feet long . Although it would
it could be transported in a van or small panel truck with, say, a
couple drivers and a couple more people to keep an eye on the device. The plotters could target any number
Once complete,
not fit easily in a sedan,
of major metropolitan areas and would be free to choose based entirely on their desire to travel unobtrusively and
the transportation
phase of the operation would pose significant risks for the terrorists . For the first time, the
undetected, presumably across a large fraction of the United States. Nevertheless,
device would be moved, most likely on public roads, with little security.
The plotters would want to travel on busy roads so as to lose themselves in
the traffic
stream. In the event that the government became aware of the plot, it would seek to install targeted roadblocks.
These checkpoints would force the terrorists to back roads, where they may be likely to attract the attention of local
police. The trip would consume no more than 40 driving hours, and could easily be completed in four to five days
The cost to deliver the device using a typical rental truck

from our hypothetical Wyoming ranch to, say, New York City or Washington, D.C.,
would be less than $3,000.
At this point, the project would have employed roughly 17 people full time for about
one year. Purchasing the necessary items -- from land to supplies, and surplus gun barrels to vacuum casting
traveling between dawn and dusk.
equipment -- is a specialized business, particularly because the purchases could be traced by law enforcement. The
plotters would want to avoid being personally involved in purchasing supplies, so there could be a need for one or
two specialists who would be responsible for clandestine procurement.
Even so, the entire active
team would number no more than 19 people.
205
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 206 of 318
A2: Cant test gun

Bullshit obviously wouldnt be assembled near critical mass and gun can
be tested a few times in remote locations.
*Small bolded text is the assertion to which Zimmerman is responding
One could not check whether the projectile and target of a gun-assembled device actually fitted
together.
It is hard to know how to deal with such a narrow comment . Is it intended to be

taken seriously? Then it can be disproved quickly. Is it, instead, intended to emphasize
the need for testing? In which case it is partially correct, but Jeffrey Lewis and I stressed
that our bomb factory needed to be located in a remote area without curious neighbors
precisely so that a few bangs could be allowed to happen if needed.
Consider Wirz and Eggers comment at face value. If the gun-assembled device looks like the picture in Richard
Rhodes book, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, in which a bullet is launched by a cannon into a hollow cylinder
neither ring assembly nor bullet will be even close to

criticality under most circumstances. The solid projectile would have to be fired into
the center of the ring assembly But, of course, the rings and plug would not be
critical when assembled unless they were surrounded by a thick neutron reflector, possibly made of
made up of rings of enriched uranium,
tungsten or some other heavy material. So long as the reflector were absent, the plug could be inserted into the
without initiating a chain reaction . If

the target cylinder is made of rings, they can easily be spaced so that the projectile
can be checked in each ring without danger of a criticality accident. One wonders how
center of the target without exceeding one critical mass, and so
much thought Wirz and Eggers gave to this point in the first place.
The Swiss group raises other technical issues, but none rises to the level of difficulty of
either the need to prevent a criticality accident , nor of making major alterations to a design
previously specified by another power.
206
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 207 of 318
A2: Cant design it

Information is available, their ev considers only the most complex
weapons, and some teams can do it anyway.
If terrorists had the complete set of working drawings for a nuclear device built by a nuclear weapon
state (NWS), they could not build it because they would surely need to make some design changes to
accommodate different fissile material and as work-arounds for impossible to acquire technology. But
to do that they would have to be fully capable of coming up with an indigenous design. And this they
could not do.
technical information about the components of a fission weapon has either been
officially declassified or has leaked out into the public domain even if it technically remains
classified, and sometimes whether it is right or wrong.20 One can conveniently divide the areas of
required knowledge into fundamental physics and practical engineering. The
fundamental physics is not dissimilar from the physics of a fast nuclear reactor; the
practical engineering of a deliverable, safe and reliable nuclear weapon is a different matter entirely.
To the extent that modifications are required to accommodate highly enriched uranium that differs
slightly from the design enrichment, they can almost be ignored so long as the fully
assembled core of the device is super critical and so long as the designer is not
wedded to a particular yield.
Changing the engineering details of even a World War II Fat Man-style weapon will
be more difficult, but then again, making any kind of implosion-assembled IND is apt to
be harder than building a gun-assembled system . One can ask what events might dictate
Much
changes. A leading possibility is the unavailability of the explosives needed to form lens charges, but this is unlikely,
as the explosives said in public to have been used for Fat Mans lens charges are neither exotic nor uncommon.
Lack of sufficient material for a neutron generator might also require some changes.
Despite these difficulties, the best argument on this point that Wirz and Egger make is this:
some terrorists probably could not make some changes potentially dictated by some
engineering problems uncovered when trying to build an implosion-assembled nuclear weapon from a blueprint.
Conversely, some terrorist technical teams could make some potentially

needed revisions.
207
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 208 of 318
A2: Cant Build It

Easy for terrorists to make bombs
It is generally acknowledged that terrorists could transform stolen fissile material
into a workable fission bomb.26 The capability in a specific instance would depend
on the type and amount of fissile material and the sophistication of the terrorists. A
device producing any level of fission yield would satisfy terrorists, since even a low
fission yield would significantly surpass a conventional explosive yield, offering
destructive and coercive potential.27 They would not have to build a sophisticated,
miniaturized warhead to sit atop a missile, but instead could make a crude fission
bomb that is deliverable by vehicle or boat.28 Some skeptics argue that only the
best-resourced, organized, and connected groups would stand any chance of
constructing their own device,29 even with sufficient fissile material in hand. This
is true for certain types of fission weapons for example, using plutonium in an
implosion device, like the Nagasaki bomb. By contrast, it is a relatively trivial
challenge to make a gun-type weapon, like the Hiroshima bomb, from fresh
weapons-grade HEU in metal form.30
Terrorists want to attack reactors
The IAEA defines radiological sabotage as any deliberate act directed against a
nuclear or radiological facility or nuclear or radioactive material in use, storage or
transport that could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of
personnel, the public and the environment by exposure to radiation or release of
radioactive substances.33 In this section, we focus on deliberate sabotage of
nuclear facilities, such as by aircraft attacks, vehicle bombs, anti-tank weapons, or
the disabling of pumps by an insider or an intruder facilitated by an insider who
disables locks and alarms.
Terrorists may commit radiological sabotage to provoke public fear, showcase their
ability to inflict societal harm, or potentially induce an energy crisis in areas
dependent on power reactors.34 There have been no recent major attacks against
nuclear power plants, leading some to argue that nuclear power plants are low
priority targets for terrorists. Various reasons are given for this: conventional acts
against non-nuclear soft targets may suffice to meet the goals of terrorist groups;
the sophistication and resources required for a successful attack against a nuclear
facility increase the risk of failure; and the potential political consequences of
attacking a nuclear facility are uncertain, thus unattractive.35 Another reason
provided by the 9/11 Commission Report is that an attack on a nuclear plant might
not have the desired symbolic value for some terrorists.36 In addition, the damage
from such sabotage would be regionally concentrated, whereas a terrorist nuclear
weapon could be detonated anywhere in the world.37
In reality, however, terrorists have considered nuclear power plants as potential
targets. There have been reported threats or attempts to blow up or penetrate
nuclear reactors in Argentina, Russia, Lithuania,Western Europe, South Africa, and
208
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 209 of 318
South Korea.38 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al Qaeda also considered
attacks on a nuclear power reactor as part of its original plan.39 Research reactors,
operated by universities and industry, are particularly vulnerable to sabotage attack
because their protection levels tend to be lower than nuclear power plants, but the
potential consequences are also considerably smaller.40 The advent of suicidal
terrorists increases the number of potential sabotage targets in nuclear facilities to
include components in high-radiation areas because there is no longer a
presumption that those areas are inherently self- protecting.41
Radiological sabotage of a nuclear power reactor could have devastating
consequences for public health, the environment, and the economy. Edwin Lyman of
the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) analyzed the consequences of a
hypothetical terrorist attack on the Indian Point nuclear power plant located thirtyfive miles from New York City. An attack that resulted in a core meltdown and a
large radiological release to the environment could cause 44,000 short-term deaths
and 500,000 long-term deaths from radiation. He estimated economic damages at
$2 trillion.
209
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 210 of 318
A2: Livermore test

The nuclear device designed as part of Livermores nth Country experiment was not built or tested,
so one has no idea of the performance of hypothetical independent nuclear designs.
It is true that the nth Country device was not actually built . Nevertheless, the design
was simulated on computers with the result that if it had been built, it would have worked.
Given the era in which the experiment was conducted in which the nominal yield of an atomic
bomb was 20 kt one may reasonably speculate that Robert Selden and his
colleagues were aiming for about that yield. Even then the ability to simulate World War II atomic
bombs was fairly well developed; we may assume that the performance of the device was calculated as accurately
it is widely accepted that the nth Country design would

have exploded with significant nuclear yield.18
Selden also commented recently that the design was rudimentary in the same way that the
Trinity device was rudimentary, when compared to modern nuclear weapons technology. The
Livermore Laboratory management decided that their nuclear weapons codes were very adequate
for calculating the performance of the nth Country device, and that it was not necessary to
build it or conduct a nuclear test. (And in hindsight, I agree completely.) The calculated yield of
the device was in the multiple kiloton range, certainly meeting the goal of a militarily
significant yield which was laid out at the beginning of the experiment.
as possible in that era, and
It does not appear that Wirzs and Eggers complaint that the device was not tested in any way indicates that it
would not have worked as designed.
The weapons lab had full confidence in its simulation.
210
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 211 of 318
A2: Uranium Toxic

Fissile material isnt toxic enough to pose a serious barrier non-scientific
lit vastly exaggerates.
Uranium is toxic and radioactive. Uranium is hard to machine, and many of the machine tools needed
for complex mechanical processes such as making neutron reflectors are subject to export controls.
The toxicity of uranium is vastly exaggerated in much of the open literature, particularly
in articles by groups which oppose the use of depleted uranium in non-nuclear battlefield weapons and in armor.
Far more dangerous substances (e.g. beryllium) are routinely handled in laboratories and
factories. Similarly, even fissile uranium-235 is not particularly radioactive , and emits rather
little radiation. Most of its emissions are alpha particles which can be stopped in a sheet
of paper. Highly enriched uranium is, of course, very valuable, as macroscopic samples need to
be assembled molecule by molecule, with the end product being used mostly in atomic
weapons. It is true that uranium work hardens quickly, but so do many materials.
Most of the difficulties of working with uranium metal are well known, and the
procedures for such work are not especially onerous, particularly if the machinists are
willing to accept the risk of martyrdom.
Uranium is actually not a particularly difficult metal to machine . T. O. Morris of Oak Ridge
National Laboratory says that uranium is comparable to the stainless steels in machining
properties.19 It is true that uranium is pyrophoric, meaning that fine dust can spontaneously ignite.
This is a complication, but not a major one.
211
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 212 of 318
A2: Uranium Not Enriched Enough

The 90% threshold is bullshit only for top grade modern military
programs.
Arbatov et al. 08 (2008, Alexei, Doctor of History, director of the Center for
International Security, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations,
Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), Aleksandr Pikaev, PhD, heads a
department at IMEMO RAN, and Vladimir Dvorkin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, is
senior research fellow at IMEMO RAN and honored scientist of the Russian
Federation, Nuclear Terrorism, Russian Politics and Law, vol. 46, no. 1, January
February 2008, pp. 5078)
Experts often discuss the prospects and sources for terrorists theft of weapons-grade
nuclear materials and the feasibility of their subsequent assembling an atomic
bomb. Most studies conclude that highly enriched uranium is the most
attractive material for terrorists. It can be used to build a relatively simple bomb of the
cannon type. Military programs require uranium to contain at least 90 percent U-235
to be considered weapons-grade. Highly enriched uranium with a lower U-235 content
can, however, also be used to build weapons . For example, when the United States
built the bomb that it subsequently dropped on Hiroshima, the scientists used about
60 kilograms of uranium enriched to about 80 percent. South Africa also used highly enriched
uranium with a lower enrichment rate in the nuclear warheads that it voluntarily destroyed in the early 1990s:
80 percent per bomb, according to estimates. Some

scientists believe that even lower enrichment levels can yield an atomic
bomb.11
about 55 kilograms of uranium enriched to
212
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 213 of 318
A2: Fear of failure

Risk of failure doesnt outweigh the potential mass devastation caused by
a nuclear attack terrorists seek maximum damage
Allison 07 (Graham T., director of Harvards Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?,
Council on Foreign Relations, April 16,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how_likely_is_a_nuclear_terrorist_attack_on_the
_united_states.html)
But Dr. Levi raises the possibility that, were terrorists to get their hands on enough nuclear weapons material to
a terrorists ten-kiloton nuclear warhead were to

misfire (known to nuclear scientists as a fizzle) and produce a one-kiloton blast, bystanders
near ground zero would not know the difference . Such an explosion would torch
anyone one-tenth of a mile from the epicente r, and topple buildings up to one-third of a mile out.
Does the real possibility of a fizzle or failure mean that terrorists wont attempt a
nuclear attack? Not necessarily. If terrorists pursued only fool-proof plans,
they would have begun suicide bombing attacks on U.S. public
transportation by now. But from a terrorists point of view, why pursue a course
of action with a 95 percent chance of success, but at most forty victims, if you have
a 10 percent chance at killing five-hundred thousand ?
make a bomb, their design might fail. If
213
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 214 of 318
A2: Deterrence
Deterrent threats create a perverse incentive for terrorists to exploit
enemy arsenals to start a war.
Weitz 11 (2011, Richard, PhD in political science, Harvard, Senior Fellow and
Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, non-resident
Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Nuclear Forensics: False
Hopes and Practical Realities, Political Science Quarterly Volume 126 Number 1
2011)
Proposals have been made to threaten explicitly to use military force against a
country whose government failed to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons related
material to terrorists.'"' The assumption is that due to their severity, threats of force will prove most effective at
inducing potential nuclear leakers to plug any nuclear supply holes. Yet, such pre-incident threats could easily
backfire. The use of threats juxtaposes uneasily with the principle of cooperative threat reduction based on mutual
interest that underpins a multilateral nuclear attribution regime. This principle has allowed Russian-American
Such threats
discourage a government from alerting the international community
about the possible loss of its nuclear materials.''^ In addition, threats to attack a
nuclear weapons state for the diversion of its materials are not credible, since their implementation
could well lead to a nuclear exchange in which both parties would suffer
severely. Finally, enemies of the potential target could become more inclined to
manufacture a nuclear incident that erroneously implicated their adversary as the
negligent source of the weapon. For example, al Oaeda might try to provoke a
nuclear confrontation between the governments of the United States and
Pakistan, while Chechen extremists could aspire to do the same between
Russia and the West.
nuclear security collaboration to persist despite the recent downturn in their bilateral relations.
would also
Martyr complex means no deterrence retaliation by terrorists is also

more credible only applies to state sponsors.
2011)
International security experts are less sanguine about the technique's potential for deterring
nuclear terrorists themselves as opposed to their state sponsors." Suicide terrorists would
presumably not be concerned about threats of direct retaliation against them. Some might
even welcome the recognition and perhaps even falsely claim itif an operation succeeded,
or hope that the target would respond in a disproportionate manner and
attack innocent parties or a suspect (such as a particular government) the terrorists
themselves opposed. They might arguably refrain from specific nuclear terrorism attempts if they
considered that nuclear forensics techniques could thwart their operations and result in deterrence by denial rather
they could simply wait for a more opportune occasion to

undertake their planned nuclear operation .
It is possible that the key enablers of any nuclear terrorist operation such as the weapons
designers, the financiers, the shippers, and other middlemen would worry about detection
than deterrence by retaliation.''' But
and punishment if they were motivated by monetary or other considerations that did not include a desire for
martyrdom.'^
But they might be committed extremists themselves, or could reasonably

214
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 215 of 318
consider retaliation by the terrorists for a failure to support their cause to be

more plausible than possible detection and punishment by their victims . Although
potential targets would be wise to claim the capability to identify these intermediaries, their detection would
probably require exquisite human, signals, or other intelligence to supplement the information acquired through
nuclear forensics.
Only way to defeat nuclear terror is to destroy the organizations

irrationality and apocalyptic religious motives mean no deterrence.
Van de Velde 10 (2010, James, PhD, Lecturer in the Global Security Studies
Program at Johns Hopkins University, cyber, WMD, intelligence, and
counterterrorism analyst at the international consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton,
The Impossible Challenge of Deterring Nuclear Terrorism by Al Qaeda, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism Volume 33, Issue 8, 2010, taylor and francis)
Al Qaeda continues to represent a worldwide threat to the United States and its allies. It
continues to plot terrorist acts against the West and aspires to acquire or develop
weapons of mass destruction, which it very well might use against the West without
hesitation.
Despite much intellectual effort, there remain some inescapable truths regarding Al
Qaeda's interest in attacking the West with a nuclear weapon :
The United States cannot likely persuade the irredeemable jihadists that it is not at war
with Islam.
Acquiring a WMD is not categorically forbidden by Islam .
Ayman al-Zawahiri may have claimed on 2 March 2008, that the practical use of a WMD
would be to deter Western aggression, but there is no discernable Al Qaeda WMD
employment doctrine. The United States has no idea when, where, or why Al Qaeda
might use an IND (Improvised Nuclear Device). And a decision to use such a weapon will
be influenced by such factors as how and where the weapon was acquired, by
whom, who controls it, and the weapon type (IND vs. a stolen state-weapon).
The West ought, therefore, to characterize those irredeemably committed to acquiring
a nuclear weapon as irrational, apocalyptic, and dangerousfirst and
foremost because they are! The center of gravity in the war with Al Qaeda is the
worldwide fight over Al Qaeda s legitimacy and Muslim perceptions of the West . The
best and perhaps only means, therefore, to deter Al Qaeda's use of a nuclear weapon in
particular is to treat it as an insurgency and defeat the group by starving it of
recruits. The goal must be to defeat and end Al Qaeda legitimacy and
recruitment, since an insurgency is defeated when no one (or very few)
join it.
Al Qaeda cannot be deterred-multiple reasons
Fisher 07 (Feb. 2007, Uri, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Colorado, Deterrence Terrorism and American Values, Homeland
Security Affairs, Vol. 3 No. 1)
deterring a group such as al-Qaeda is a complex
endeavor. First, terrorists are highly motivated and therefore they are willing to risk
anything their lives in the case of suicide-bombers to accomplish a goal. Second, the political goals of
terrorist groups are often very broad, idealistic, ambiguous, or unclear. Third, terrorists are
difficult to locate. Terrorist networks operate trans-nationally and therefore make reprisals
difficult to return to sender. Fourth, it remains undecided how deterrence can work against
an enemy that understands that the ultimate policy goal of the U.S. is not to coexist
By now, the arguments are familiar for why
215
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 216 of 318
with groups like al-Qaeda, but to eradicate them . Finally, terrorists often attempt to
incite retaliation. Terrorists have used the collateral damage caused by retaliatory
efforts to foment more support for their organization or broader cause. In total, the deck is
stacked against deterrence playing a significant role in U.S. counterterrorism policy.
216
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 217 of 318
A2: Cant Transport

Delivery into the US is impossible to stop too many border crossings
Bunn and Wier 06 (Matthew Bunn & Anthony Wier, on the staff of the Managing the
Atom Project at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government, are the coauthors of
Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (2004). The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism,
Harvard Belfer Center, available for download here:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/658/seven_myths_of_nuclear_terrorism.html)
border detection capabilities is certainly worthwhile, this last line of

defense will always be a very porous one. The physics of nuclear materials and nuclear
weapons, the geography of the huge and complex American borders, and the
economics of the global flow of people and goods conspire to make the terrorists
job easy and the defenders job very difficult. Once stolen, the nuclear material for a
bomb could be anywhere, and it is very difficult to detect, especially if shielding is
used to limit radiation emissions. Typical nuclear weapons are not large, and could
readily be smuggled across Americas or other nations borders. The nuclear material
needed for a bomb could easily fit in a suitcase. Even an assembled bomb could fit in a van, a
cargo container, or a yacht sailed into a US harbor. Or the materials could be smuggled in
and the bomb built at the site of its intended use . Terrorists have routinely used truck bombs that
were physically larger than even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would need to be. Americas borders
stretch for thousands of miles, and millions of trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes in
which nuclear material might be hidden cross them every year. Hundreds of
thousands of illegal immigrants and thousands of tons of illegal drugs cross US
borders every year, despite billions of dollars of investment in trying to stop them. (Some have
While some investment in improving
said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material into the United States would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana.)
Every nations border is vulnerable to various types of illicit movement, be it drugs, terrorists, or the material
radiation from plutonium, and especially from HEU, is weak

and difficult to detect at any significant distance, particularly if the material is
surrounded with shielding. Technology does exist, and is being further developed, to make it possible to
needed to unleash nuclear terror. The
detect HEU or plutonium in objects right in front of the detectors (as might be possible at controlled border
crossings), including finding hidden nuclear material in everything from airline baggage to cargo containers.
Programs are now under way to put these kinds of detection capabilities into place at an increasing number of sites.
capabilities should not be exaggerated. While US Customs officers have been

radiation pagers, these would have essentially no chance of detecting HEU
with even minor shielding, even if it were in a bag directly in front of the inspector .
More sophisticated equipment that can detect both HEU and plutonium is being purchasedbut
it will be years before such equipment is installed and in use at all the major ports
and border crossings into the United States . Two points are crucial to understand. First,
inspecting cargo as it arrives in the United States is not good enough: if a bomb
were on a boat sailing into a major US harbor, it could wreak horrible devastation
before the ship ever pulled up to the dock to be inspected . That is why many of the new
But these
equipped with
initiatives after the 9-11 attacks involve putting detectors in place at foreign ports that ship to the United States.
But it will take an immense and continuing effort to ensure that detection at these ports is effective, that there are
no ready possibilities for bribing a customs official to let a container through uninspected and that already
the number of possible

pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb or its ingredients into the United States is
immense, and intelligent adversaries will choose whichever pathway remains
undefended. If an effective system were put in place to make it very difficult to get nuclear material into the
inspected containers cannot be tampered with. Second, and more fundamentally,
country in a cargo container without detectionand the country is a long way from that point todaythen terrorists
would bring their bomb in on a yacht, a fishing boat, or by some other means.
217
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 218 of 318
Smuggling a weapon into the US is easy

Bunn 10 (Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, April 2010, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All
Nuclear Materials in Four Years, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
The nuclear material needed for a bomb is small and difficult to detect. Once such
material has left the facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere , and
finding and recovering it poses an immense challenge. The plutonium required for
an implosion-type nuclear bomb would fit in a soda can. The HEU required for the
simplest type of nuclear bomb for terrorists to make , a less efficient gun-type bomb that slams
two pieces of HEU together at high speed, is smaller than two two-liter bottles.17 The radiation
from plutonium, and particularly from HEU, is weak and difficult to detect, particularly if the
adversaries attempting to smuggle it use any significant amount of shielding. The
detectors that are being widely deployed throughout the world or even the more
expensive Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs) that are being considered to replace them would have
little chance of detecting HEU metal if it had significant shielding .18 (Plutoniums radiation
is more penetrating and easier to detect.) To date, only one of the successes in seizing stolen
nuclear material reportedly included the material being detected by one of these
detectors; the others were the result of police and intelligence efforts, often including participants in the
conspiracy or people they were trying to convince to help them or to buy their stolen nuclear material informing the
police.19 A crude terrorist nuclear bomb would be considerably larger than the plutonium or HEU at its core,
just as interdicting smuggling of nuclear materials

poses immense challenges, it would also be extremely difficult to stop terrorists
from smuggling a crude nuclear weapon to its target. A nuclear bomb might be
delivered, intact or in ready-to-assemble pieces, by boat or aircraft or truck. The
length of national borders, the diversity of means of transport, the vast scale of
legitimate traffic across borders, and the ease of shielding the radiation from
plutonium or especially from HEU all operate in favor of the terrorists. Building the
overall system of legal infrastructure, intelligence, law enforcement, border and customs forces, and
radiation detectors needed to find and recover stolen nuclear weapons or materials , or to
interdict these as they cross national borders, is an extraordinarily difficult challenge .20
perhaps weighing a ton or so. Nevertheless,
Terrorists have multiple points of entry to the U.S., making delivery

impossible to stop
Allison 04 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs and Prof of Government at Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for
policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 10-11)
terrorists would not find it difficult to smuggle such a nuclear device into the
United States. The nuclear material in question is smaller than a football. Even an
assembled device, like a suit-ease nuclear weapon, could be sent in a Federal Express
package, shipped in a cargo container, or checked as airline baggage . Of the seven
million cargo containers that arrive in U.S. ports each year, fewer than 5 percent
are opened for inspection. As the chief executive of CSX Lines, one of the foremost container-shipping
companies, noted, "If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to smuggle
in a nuclear bomb."
Third,
218
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 219 of 318
A2: No Space
Terrorists dont need a massive sanctuary to build a bomb and, even if
they did, they have their pick of over 50 countries
Bunn 06 (Sept. 2006, Matthew, senior research associate at the Project on
Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 146)
some argue that in the absence of a stable sanctuary with large fixed facilities,
it would be nearly impossible for a terrorist group to make a nuclear bomb . The
Finally,
overthrow of the Taliban regime and the removal of al Qaeda's Afghan sanctuary undoubtedly disrupted al Qaeda's
large fixed facilities are not

necessarily required for putting together a crude nuclear explosive , and the time
required may be distressingly short (as suggested by the U.S. Department of Energy's [1994]
security regulations). The building that South Africa used to assemble its nuclear weapons, for
instance, is a very ordinary-looking warehouse, with little external sign of the deadly activities that
went on inside (Albright 1994). 11 Terrorists might well process nuclear material or
manufacture a crude nuclear bomb on the premises of an apparently legitimate
front company operating in a developed country. Second, a wide range of possible sanctuaries
still exists. Indeed, in March 2004, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet expressed his
concern regarding stateless zones in approximately fifty countries around the
world where central governments have no consistent reach . In as many as half of
those zones, Tenet said, terrorist groups were thriving (U.S. Senate 2004).
nuclear efforts significantly. But two crucial points should be made. First,
219
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 220 of 318
A2: Cant do it Alone

AQ will collaborate with other groups
Overcoming the formidable obstacles in planning a nuclear attack would be

facilitated by the collaboration of like-minded groups. Al-Qaeda has a history of
working with other groups on WMD. Ayman al-Zawahiri solicited the assistance of JI
leader Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali) to help create a Southwest Asian-based
anthrax network, which was led by hard-core JI operative Yazid Sufaat. This network complemented
al-Qaedas Pakistan-based anthrax network, which was led by a mid-level government biologist
named Rauf Ahmed. Al-Zawahiri personally supervised the two networks, keeping them separate and independent
of each other. He personally tasked each group with somewhat redundant missions in
pursuit of a single objective: the development of a lethal strain of anthrax capable of producing mass casualties and
Al-Zawahiris tradecraft in recruiting and handling the operatives in

these two networks was well-disciplined and fairly effective , although it appears that the
roughly two-year project was abandoned in the summer before 9/11, probably without reaching fruition.22 Due
to the fact that planning is being directed by the same narrow circle of people, the
methodology of the al-Qaeda leaderships nuclear efforts is likely to share certain
similarities with the anthrax project. While assessing al-Qaedas options in acquiring nuclear-related
capabilities, the possibility must be taken into account that the al-Qaeda core might consider joining
forces with senior leaders of North Caucasus terrorists, and groups like Lashkar alTayyib, in a joint effort to acquire a nuclear bomb .
economic damage.
220
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 221 of 318
A2: No theft (generic)

Theft is large scale and ongoing
Bunn 13 (2013, Matthew, PhD, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator,
Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard, Beyond Crises: The Unending Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons
and Materials, in Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Ed.
Henry D. Sokolski. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 253-278)
Theft of h ighly e nriched u ranium and plutonium, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, is not a
hypothetical worry it is an ongoing reality . The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has documented some 18 cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
1993-2007 that were confirmed by the states concerned . See Table 1.1 (These cases
involving real weapons-usable nuclear material are only one small part of
the broader phenomenon of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive
materials; the IAEA has reported hundreds of situations involving other materials.) Three of these
cases (New Jersey, in 2005; Fukui, Japan, in 2005; and Hennigsdorf, Germany, in 2006) involve inadvertent
loss, leaving 15 involving instances of intentional theft and smuggling. Of those, five involve
less than a gram of material, and are included here only because of the possibility that these are samples of larger
stocks available to the smugglersas smugglers often claim is the case.
after 2008, the IAEA stopped issuing public updates of this list of HEU and
This does not mean, however, that incidents stopped occurring. The
Georgian government has confirmed that in March 2010, Georgian agents seized approximately
18 grams of HEU just below 90-percent enrichment from smugglers who crossed into Georgia from
Armenia. The smugglers reportedly claimed that more was available.2 In June 2011,
authorities in Moldova arrested six people who reportedly had 4.4 grams of weapons-grade
HEU. The smugglers claimed to have access to nine kilograms of HEU, which they were
Unfortunately,
plutonium incidents.
willing to sell for $31 million. Moldovan officials report that members of the ring, who have not yet been detained,
have one kilogram of uranium.
This case appears to involve a real buyerstill at largeand the

HEU in the smugglers hands ,
possibility that there are kilograms of weapongrade

making it potentially the most serious case in years.3
In addition to these cases confirmed to the IAEA, there is strong evidence that a number of additional
thefts have occurredincluding confessions and convictions for some of the
perpetratorswhich the states concerned have not confirmed to the IAEA. In particular, there was a welldocumented theft of 1.5 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched HEU in 1992 (described in
detail below), and two thefts from Russian naval facilities in 1993 that are not included in the
IAEA database. Thus, there appear to be approximately 20 well-documented cases of actual theft and smuggling of
plutonium or HEU in the public record.4 At the classified level, the U.S. Government regards a significant number of
additional cases as confirmed.
To these cases of actual theft and smuggling of plutonium and HEU must be added a substantial
number of attempts, attacks, and intrusions that have taken place over the years. These include,
among others: the still-unexplained apparent loss of hundreds of kilograms of HEU at the
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) in the mid-1960s (which the balance of the evidence
suggests was a theft by senior facility officials on behalf of Israel);5 a 1982 incident in which an insider at
the Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa planted and detonated explosives on the steel
pressure vessel (before fuel had been loaded, intended only to raise alarm, not to spread radioactivity);6
incidents in 2001 in which terrorist teams carried out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear weapons
storage sites, and apparently also on nuclear weapon transport trains;7 and a 2007 intrusion in
South Africa in which two teams of armed men attacked the Pelindaba site, where hundreds of
kilograms of HEU are stored (with one of the teams penetrating a 10,000 volt security fence, disabling
221
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 222 of 318
intrusion detectors, going to the emergency control center and shooting a worker there after a struggle, and
departing
without ever being engaged by site security forces ).8
Over 200 sites where enough material or weapons are available.

Freilich 10 (2010, Chuck, PhD, Senior Fellow at the International Security
Program, Harvard Kennedy School, Adjunct Professor at New York University, former
Deputy National Security Adviser in Israel, The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and
the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 84,
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS84.pdf)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 18 cases of theft involving weapons-usable
plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU),6 and there have been hundreds of proven cases of theft of nuclear
In the 12-month period ending June 30, 2008, nearly 250 thefts
of nuclear or radioactive materials were reported , although the amounts were small, prompting
materials around the world.
the head of the IAEA to warn that the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive materials
remains a grave threat.7 During 2007-2008, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are reported to have launched three terrorist
there are over 200 sites around

the world from which terrorists could obtain either an intact nuclear bomb
or the fissile materials required to assemble one.9
attacks against Pakistani nuclear sites. All told, it is estimated that
In November 1995, Chechen terrorists placed a "dirty bomb" in a Moscow park, but alerted a TV station and
refrained from detonating it.10 On October 14, 2001, Israel is reported to have arrested a man linked to al-Qaeda
who was trying to enter the country from the West Bank city of Ramallah with a radiological bomb hidden in his
backpack.11 On October 11, 2001, just a month after the 9/11 attack, CIA Director George Tenet warned President
Bush of a report that alQaeda had placed a nuclear weapon in New York City. A Nuclear Emergency Support Team
(NEST) was dispatched to New York and the report fortunately proved to be a false alarm.12 To be on the safe side,
26 NESTs have been positioned around the US since 2001 to detect and respond to threats of nuclear terrorism.
Flying around the country in helicopters and airplanes specially equipped with radiation detectors, they regularly
scan cities for signs of nuclear weapons.13
Nuclear experts assess that a capable and well-organized terrorist group will be able
to make a crude nuclear bomb, without the help of a state, provided that they have access
to sufficient fissile materials.14 Only 20-100 kilograms of fissile materials are
needed, and this can be purchased in small amounts to make detection
even harder.15 With state assistance, of course, the difficulties would be significantly
reduced and even eliminated completely , if an intact weapon was provided.
222
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 223 of 318
fyi about amount needed

Need 25 kg to make a bomb.
Allison 10 (2010, Graham, director of Harvards Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/20057/nuclear_terrorism_fact_sheet.
html)
Amount of HEU required to make a crude nuclear bomb: 25 kg
Global stockpile of HEU: 1,600,000 kg
Amount of Pu required to make a crude nuclear bomb: 8 kg
Global stockpile of separated Pu: 500,000 kg
Number of bombs that can be built with global stocks of fissile material:
More than 200,000
Bombs' worth of fissile material that has been stolen or lost: More than 1
223
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 224 of 318
A2: security
Terrorists can get HEU security is atrocious
Bunn 10 (Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, April 2010, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials
in Four Years, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
there is also a real risk that terrorists could get the plutonium or HEU
needed to make a nuclear bomb . As described in more detail in the next chapter, important
weaknesses in nuclear security arrangements still exist in many countries, creating
weaknesses that outsider or insider thieves might exploit . And as discussed in the previous
chapter, theft of the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons is not a hypothetical
worry but an ongoing realitythe IAEA has documented 18 cases of theft or loss or
plutonium or HEU, confirmed by the states concerned. HEU-fueled research reactors, for example,
sometimes located on university campuses, often have only the most minimal
security measures in place. Many have few or no armed guards; very loose
arrangements (if any) to screen personnel before granting them access to the reactor and its nuclear
material; few means to detect intruders until they are entering the nuclear material areas; and little
revenue to pay for more substantial security arrangements . In some cases, the security
in place amounts to little more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence.
In countries such as Pakistan, even substantial nuclear security systems are
challenged by immense adversary threats, both from nuclear insiders some with a
demonstrated sympathy for Islamic extremistsand from outside attacks that might
include scores or hundreds of armed attackers. In Russia, there have been dramatic improvements in security
Unfortunately,
and accounting for nuclear materials since the early 1990s, and the most egregious security weaknessesgaping
holes in fences, lack of any detector to set off an alarm if plutonium or HEU is being removedhave been corrected,
significant risks remain, from insider

corruption to weak nuclear security regulation . In the end, all countries where these
materials existincluding the United Stateshave more to do, and need to
continually reassess their efforts, to ensure that the security and accounting measures they have in
with U.S. and other assistance and Russias own efforts. But
place are sufficient to meet the evolving threat. A nuclear security system not focused on continual improvement is
likely to see its effectiveness decline over time as complacency sets in.
224
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 225 of 318
A2: locked weapons

Terrorists can still get the fissile material
If they could not detonate a stolen weapon, terrorists might remove its nuclear
material and fashion a new bomb. Some modern, highly efficient designs might not contain enough
material for a crude, inefficient terrorist bomb; but multistage thermonuclear weapons, with
nuclear material in both the primary (the fission bomb that sets off the fusion reaction) and
the secondary (where the fusion takes place) probably would provide sufficient material.
Terrorists can still access the fissile material
Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the
capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government
studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to
accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the
electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen
nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own .
225
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 226 of 318
A2: Cant Get Nuclear Material

Death has been democratized, terrorists have easy access to
WMDs
The Democratization of Death Dealing
throughout history, the lethality of weapons technology has inexorably
increased. Bronze weapons were better than those made of stone; steel later
outdid bronze; guns replaced bows; and so forth. each new generation of weapons
technology was more lethal than its predecessor. yet a general rule prevailed:
successively more lethal weapons required successively larger
investments and industrial bases. making a bronze sword involved mining,
smelting, and casting. making a steel sword required forced-air furnaces to melt the
iron, alloying technology to produce the steel, and forging techniques to shape the
blade.This trend continued unabated through modern history. The outcome of
World War ii was decided in large part by the superiority of U.s. industrial output to
that of germany and Japan. heroism and courage are great things, but ammunition,
tanks, and ships ultimately matter more. nuclear weapons were the zenith of this
arc of increasing lethality and effort. a single device could destroy an entire city,
but it also cost as much as an entire city and was far harder to build. The first
nuclear explosives were created by the three-year manhattan Project, which at its
peak employed 130,000 people. it cost more than $2 billionin the currency of the
timethe equivalent, in 2013, of more than $26 billion. But that is just money. to
put the engineering and industrial effort in perspective, the project became
comparable in manpower and capital cost to the entire prewar U.s. automobile
industry. yet these measures underestimate the true cost and difficulty of the
manhattan Project because the special circumstances of the war inspired the
necessary talent to volunteer. another factor is nuclear safety in those days a
combination of navet and bravery during a war meant that many people took
incredible personal risks and paid the price with their lives or health. From that
time forward, nuclear weapons put an enormous strain on the economies of the
states that decided to field them; in addition to the bombs themselves, the expense of the delivery systems and other aspects of nuclear warfare required a
staggering investment. The escalating cost of competing with U.s. weapons
systems, particularly the star Wars missile-defense system, is widely cited as one
of the factors in the economic collapse of the soviet Union. The technological
sophistication required to build and maintain these weapons is also daunting. This
level of sophistication is the primary reason that only two countries became
nuclear superpowers. a larger number of states produced some nuclear weapons
but did not ante into the full superpower game. The cost of nuclear weapons had
two stabilizing effects. First, the set of entities that could wreak nuclear havoc was
very small. second, each leader with a finger on the button tended to bear the full
responsibility fora large and complex stateeach understood that use of the
226
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 227 of 318
weapons would bring a very dangerous reprisal, which helps explain why the cold
War stayed cold. The inescapable equation tying highly lethal weapons
systems to high cost and complexity meant that the power to devastate
was available only to the richest and most sophisticated statesuntil now.
For the first time in human history, the curve of cost versus lethality has
turned rapidly downward, fallingmany orders of magnitude in just a
generation. today, tremendously lethal technology is available on the
cheap. anyoneeven a stateless groupcan have the deadliest weapons on
earth. several trends led to this inflection point. one is nuclear proliferation, which
in recent years reached a tipping point at which access to nuclear weapons became
impossible to control or limit in any absolute way. The collapse of the soviet
Union scattered ex-soviet weapons across many poorly governed and
policed states, and from there, the weapons may spread further into the hands of
terrorists. at the same time, the set of ragtag countries that have developed
homegrown nuclear devices is large and growing. The entrance to the
nuclear-weapons club, once limited to a small number of sophisticated and stable
countries, is now far more open. it is only a matter of time before a nuclear
bomb gets into the hands of a terrorist group, whether by theft or construction. a nuclear weapon smuggled into an american city could kill between
100,000 and 1,000,000 people, depending on the nature of the device, the
location of ground zero, and the altitude of detonation. an optimist might say that it
will take another decade for such a calamity to take place; a pessimist would point
out that the plot may already be under way. chemical weapons, particularly
nerve agents, are another new addition to the terrorist arsenal. sarin, a
frighteningly lethal poison discovered in 1938 and stockpiled (although never
used) by the nazis, was produced and released in locations in the tokyo subway
system in 1995 by aum shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult. The attack injured
nearly 3,800 people and killed 12. a botched distribution scheme in the tokyo
subway spared many of the intended victims; better dispersal technology would
have resulted in a vastly higher death toll. cult members had more morbid
ambitions than a subway attack. They had gathered hundreds of tons of raw
materials and had procured a russian military helicopter to use in spraying the
nerve agent over tokyo. expertshave estimated that aum shinrikyo had the
ingredients to produce enough sarin to kill millions of people in an all-out
attack. The civil war in syria, whose military is known to possess stockpiles of
sarin and other chemical weapons, raises the prospect that these munitions
could fall into the hands of extremists. Frightening as such possibilities are,
nuclear bombs and chemical agents pale in lethality when compared with
biological weapons. indeed the term weapon is not entirely adequate because
biological agents include not only pathogens that are controllable (in the traditional
sense) but also those that are not. even more so than with nuclear weapons, the
costand technical difficulty of producing biological arms has dropped
precipitously in recent decades with the boom in industrial molecular
biology. a small team of people with the necessary technical training and some
cheap equipment can create weapons far more terrible than any nuclear bomb.
indeed, even a single individual might do so. taken together, these trends utterly
undermine the lethality-versus-cost curve that existed throughout all of human
history. access to extremely lethal agentseven to those that may exterminate
the human racewill be available to nearly anybody. access to mass death
has been democratized; it has spread from a small elite of superpower leaders to
227
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 228 of 318
nearly anybody with modest resources. even the leader of a ragtag, stateless
group hiding in a caveor in a Pakistani suburbcan potentially have the
button.
Many unauthorized access incidents

UK Government, States News Service, January 7, 2014, HOW NUCLEAR FORENSICS CAN
HELP US TO TACKLE NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Incident Tracking Database records incidents of
radiological and nuclear materials being found outside of regulatory control - and between
1993 and 2012, the IAEA's Trafficking Database recorded 419 incidents of unauthorised
possession and criminal activity relating to radiological or nuclear material. And the
availability of nuclear material could increase as more nations adopt nuclear energy. We
must work together to ensure that controls on dangerous material remain tight and we correctly
manage sensitive nuclear information. We must prevent access to nuclear devices, materials and
expertise by those who would seek to do us harm, so these materials are never used for illicit
purposes.
Terrorists Can Get LEU

Caline Malek, March 24, 2014, The National, Controlling enriched material is key
"The use of highly enriched uranium is not always necessary," said the summit's organisers,
the Nuclear Security Summit 2014 project group from the ministry of foreign affairs in The
Netherlands. "It can be processed to make low-enriched uranium, which involves much
lower risks and can be used as a fuel for nuclear reactors." Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, the
UAE's permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said the peaceful
use of nuclear security benefits countries. "It can allow them to enjoy freely the use of nuclear
energy or its application in a manner that can help their economy or help their society, only if it
is addressed," he said. "The increased threat of terrorism in general also led to the increased
threat of nuclear terrorism in particular, and that's why nuclear security is such a high
priority for UAE policy." Improving the security of nuclear material, nuclear installations and
radiological sources is also vital. "Security can be enhanced by installing physical barriers and
detection equipment, providing security personnel with better training and raising awareness
among nuclear-facility employees of the risks of nuclear terrorism," the organisers said. "These
measures also help prevent smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials." Mr Al Kaabi said
nuclear material found in reactors and research facilities, as well as radioactive material widely
used in industry and in hospitals, did not necessarily enjoy the same physical protection as other
nuclear facilities.
A lot of insecure HEU

Reuters, March 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/us-nuclearsecurity-summit-idUSBREA2O12820140325
228
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 229 of 318
Since1991,thenumberofcountrieswithnuclearweaponsusablematerialhasroughlyhalvedfromsome
50.However,morethan120researchandisotopeproductionreactorsaroundtheworldstilluseHEUfor
fuelortargets,manyofthemwith"verymodest"securitymeasures,aHarvardKennedySchoolreport
saidthismonth
Terrorists can get nuclear material

The theft of nuclear material in quantities large enough to construct an
improvised fission bomb is a real possibility. It is arguably easier than stealing
a complete weapon due to the lower security levels associated with storage of
nuclear material, the increased administrative difficulty in accounting for SNM
compared to weapons, and the wider dispersal of SNM.17 For example, the United
States for peaceful purposes has exported tons of SNM overseas to dozens
of countries, most of which do not apply the same level of physical
security as the U.S. government, and some of which do not report to the
United States the location or disposition of the material, making it
impossible for Washington to verify the level of physical security that is
applied.
Can be stolen from Pakistan

pp. 98-114
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and proliferation record have often been
identified as a threat to regional and international security. The potential threat
posed by Pakistan's nuclear capability has generally been viewed as stemming from
such issues as Islamabad's ability to develop a coherent nuclear doctrine and the
gray market nuclear proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network. 1 This focus
has shifted over the past decade to the threat posed by the possibility of Pakistan
losing control over its nuclear weapons, materials and infrastructure through
internal instability. For example, the May 22, 2011 Taliban raid on the PNS
Mehran airbase in Karachi, the headquarters of Pakistan's naval air force,
which involved up to 20 militants further underlined for many observers
the scale of the security threat faced by Islamabad in this regard. 2 Such
challenges have prompted some to envisage a scenario in which the Pakistani state
is overrun by a radical Islamist insurgency resulting in a failed state with loose
nukes. 3 Pakistan from this perspective represents a unique set of
challenges for nuclear security due its regional environment, ongoing
internal instability, and past records of support for terrorism and active
nuclear proliferation.
229
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 230 of 318
A2: No Theft (research reactors)

Dispersed, not guarded, and above the 90% threshold.
Highly enriched uranium can be obtained not only from the military arsenals
of the limited number of nuclear states but also from other sources. Specifically, the HEU
stockpiles in reactor fuel cause serious concern. Some types of reactors, primarily those used in
research and on ships, use fresh fuel with an enrichment rate that exceeds 90
percent. The spent fuel of such reactors also has high concentrations of U235.
The fuel used in research reactors is especially dangerous , because it is
dispersed in facilities in dozens of countries, many of them vulnerable to terrorism . The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that throughout the world about a hundred
research reactors use weapons-grade uranium as fuel, and another twenty use
uranium with enrichment rates exceeding 50 percent. Seventeen countries have research reactors built with
assistance from the USSR/Russia and using HEU as fuel. Most of these are states of the former Soviet Union or in
Central and Eastern Europe, but they also include Egypt, Libya, China, North Korea, and Vietnam. The majority of
many still use fresh or spent fuel with a

concentration of U-235 that is close to weapons grade .19
the reactors have switched to less-enriched fuel, but
230
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 231 of 318
A2: No Theft (Russia)

Lack of records and no guards in Russia
Allisons study Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe29 raised
provided one solution: lock up all fissile materials, plutonium
and highly enriched uranium, under conditions such as those used to protect the American gold
reserves in the vault at Ft. Knox, Kentucky.
The problem with this Harvard solution is that we do not know how much fissile
material exists 30, so even if all of it were locked up, we could not prove it, nor
confidently rely on the notion that all of it were under control. Indeed, the stock of separated
plutonium in the former Soviet Union is estimated by David Albright and his co-authors at from
106 metric tonnes to 156 metric tonnes, an enormous range .31 The same authors suggest
Harvard professor Graham
the perceived threat level, and
that the FSU may have a stockpile ranging from 735 to 1,365 metric tonnes. This includes the 500 tonnes sold to
the US to be down-blended to make reactor fuel.
The enormous gap in our knowledge of Russian fissile inventories far exceeds the
uncertainties in the inventories of other nuclear states, whether or not they have nuclear
weapons programs. It is probable that the Russian government also does not have good
enough records to assess how much fissile material it has produced. The uncertainty in Russias
fissile inventories dwarfs the IAEA significant quantities 32 for HEU and plutonium (25 kg and 5
kg, respectively). Many experts believe that these quantities are too high to provide adequate warning. Clearly
the uncertainties in the FSU stockpiles leave a lot of wiggle room for the theft of one or more
significant quantities without detection.33
In 1993, 4.5 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium used for naval reactor fuel were stolen from the Sevmorput
A Russian special investigator on the case suggested

that in his country potatoes are guarded better. 34
ship yard in Murmansk, Russia.
Nevertheless, the vigorous actions by the United States to assist Russia and the other states of the FSU to round up
and safeguard known stocks of weapons-usable material during the late 1990s and the 2000s have borne fruit.
Highly enriched uranium in Kazakhstan was flown out to storage sites in the United States during the 1994
Operation Sapphire and to the US or Russia on subsequent occasions.
35,36 HEU from members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (Bulgaria, for example) has also been returned
to its country of origin.37 Access to weapons-grade uranium has been generally restricted since the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, but much remains to be done.
For now it is safe to say that there is a lot of fissile material rattling around, and that we do not know how much a
In this circumstance it is not possible

to reassure the world that there has been no theft of fissile material, or that any
attempt will be detected quickly enough to prevent its being made into a nuclear
device. Safeguarded vaults for fissile material are necessary, but they are
not sufficient.
physical inventory should show, let alone what it would show.
231
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 232 of 318
A2: Security (Russia)

Russian HEU is vulnerable
Bunn 10 (Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, April 2010, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials
in Four Years, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
Corruption and insider theft are endemic in Russia, and have included military
personnel selling off conventional weapons; one Russian official estimated in 2008 that a third of
Russias military spending is lost to corruption.29 Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has identified corruption as
In the nuclear sector, former Minister of Atomic

Adamovs conviction for stealing millions of dollars from the HEU
Purchase Agreement is only the tip of the iceberg . In 2003, the chief of security for one
of Russias largest HEU and plutonium facilities warned that guards there were often
corrupt, becoming the most dangerous internal adversaries .31 In May 2008, an MVD
one of the biggest threats to Russias national security.30
Energy Evgeniy
colonel was reportedly arrested for soliciting thousands of dollars in bribes to overlook violations of security rules in
the closed nuclear city of Snezhinsk.32 Protective measures to prevent insider theft at nuclear facilities have
significant weaknesses remain. In general, material

control and accounting measures have not progressed as rapidly as physical
protection improvements have. Many facilities continue to use easily-faked wax or
lead seals. Facilities with hundreds or thousands of containers of nuclear material have paper
records of how much material is in those containers, but in some cases have still not
actually measured each container to see if any of that material is missing. Rules for
material accounting do not yet require the statistical analyses necessary to detect a
slow, bitby-bit theft. The most important insider issues relate to bulk processing facilities (which have been
the source of almost all of the known thefts of HEU or plutonium), where insiders might be able to steal
small amounts of material at a time without detection .
improved dramatically in recent years, but
Russian fissile material is vulnerable to theft despite recent increases in

safeguards
Clark et al. 10 (Emily Diez, Terrance Clark, & Caroline Zaw-Mon, researchers at Akribis
Group and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Global Risk of Nuclear
Terrorism Journal of Strategic Security)
The collapse of a major nuclear state followed by instability and infighting in the
early 1990s resulted in a significant nuclear proliferation problem . Russian leaders faced
the challenge not only of securing nuclear material but also of creating a new system of export controls in a newly
minted capitalist society.
Although Russia has made significant
strides in nuclear non-proliferation
with its heavy involvement in international agreements and in establishing strong export controls,
these
measures have proven to be inadequate.
At the end of the Cold War, Moscow controlled only

eighty percent of its strategic nuclear weaponry, with remaining materials and supplies located in the Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan.10 Today, the Russian Ministry of Defense maintains and consolidates these warheads
located in a small number of storage sites and facilities.
Russia owns the world's largest stockpile of
weapons-usable fissile materials, including at least 950 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and approximately 145 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (plus or minus 30 percent).11 Of this amount, Moscow has
350 tons of HEU and 55 tons loaded on nuclear warheads.12 Although the government has decreased its number of
nuclear warheads since the mid-1980s,
Russia's nuclear supply still remains a major security
problem.13
Moscow revised export legislation in 1999 and established the Export Control Commission of the
Russian Federation to coordinate export control lists for weapons materials and dual-use technologies. The Russian
Government recently enacted a number of controls aimed specifically at limiting nuclear proliferation. The passage
of these measures demonstrates progress, but
Russia continues to support missile programs

232
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 233 of 318
and civilian nuclear projects in high-risk nations for nuclear proliferation and
terrorist activities.14 Without effective nuclear material safeguards in the Former Soviet
Union (FSU), second-tier proliferation will increase . Although Russia has a strong strategic interest in
supporting nuclear nonproliferation, Moscow has not prioritized or provided sufficient
resources for effective export controls to stop the unauthorized export of nuclear
and sensitive dual-use technology and equipment. Not only does Russia lack
political will, but corruption and a scarcity of resources have also hindered nonproliferation efforts.15 Furthermore, as Russia has attempted to expand its economy, the
country has developed a business culture that is averse to regulations , and firms have
been slow to implement effective compliance systems.16 Accountability and control are Russia's
greatest challenges, and safeguarding a large quantity of nuclear materials remains
a daunting task since Moscow lacks a comprehensive strategy for accountability and security.
233
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 234 of 318
A2: No Theft (Black Market)

Black market HEU available
Assembled nuclear weapons exist in the arsenals of nine states; some U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in several
HEU and plutonium outside of nuclear weapons exist in a wide

variety of forms and circumstances. From 98 percent to 99 percent of the worlds HEU is held in
military stockpiles, where in most cases substantial levels of security are in place. Civilian HEU is often
kept at research reactorssome of which are located on university campusesand
often with minimal security measures in place. Roughly half of the worlds plutonium
separated from spent fuel is held in military stockpiles (or former military stockpiles now declared excess
to military needs), while the rest is in civilian-controlled storage. As with HEU, security measures are
additional states in Europe.
generally higher in the military sphere, though large plutonium-handling facilities in the civilian sector are also often
controlled by substantial security measures. The risk of nuclear theft from any given facility is determined by the
quantity and quality of material at that facility (that is, how hard it would be to make a bomb from the material that
could be stolen); the kinds of threats the security measures at that facility can protect against; and the kinds of
threats adversaries are able to pose in the area near that facility .
All but one of the known thefts of

HEU or plutonium appear to have involved theft by insiders from facilities where material was
being handled in bulk, a circumstance that makes it easier for a thief to steal material
without detection. Today, many tons of HEU and plutonium continue to be processed in bulk every year.
Below, we discuss several regions and circumstances that may pose particular concerns. The fact is that illicitly
acquired material occasionally turns up for sale on the nuclear black market. Most
known black-market seizures have originated from sites in the FSU or in Eastern
Europe. In a number of cases, the material was seized in Russia or shortly after
crossing the Russian border into another state. Georgia appears to be a hotbed of
nuclear trafficking, with HEU seizures having been recorded there in 2003, 2006, and 2010.27 Central
Asia is also one of the centers of the international black market for uranium trading. There are two major
terrorist organizations active in Central Asia that may develop interest in nuclear material: the Islamic Party of
Turkestan (formerly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and the Islamic Jihad - Jammat of Mujahideen. It is not
known cases of nuclear trafficking are illustrative of more, as-yetundetected material trafficking, or whether already-stolen material may be stashed
for future sale. Based on available information held by the IAEA, reported seizures of materials have been
largely serendipitous. Facilities from which the materials originated did not report them as
being missing. Not all materials have been recovered . Typically, potential buyers have not been
identified. There have been incidents that have not been reported publicly, and
presumably others which have occurred but have never been detected. The
existence of a nuclear black market provides empirical evidence that inaccuracies
and discrepancies in inventory procedures continue to result in nuclear materials in
bulk form disappearing from their facilities of origin without being noticed . The 20 or so
clear whether the
publicized cases of weapons-usable materials that have turned up over the past two decades serve as an important
metric in assessing global standards of nuclear security.28
234
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 235 of 318
A2: No Theft (Pakistan)

Growing arsenal, extremism, and deteriorating CMR make breakdown
likely.
Allegations that the threat posed by Pakistani loose nukes has
been hyped and that the Pakistani military has everything under control may sound soothing, but
they obscure the fact that South Asia is replete with violent extremists . Mix in a
rapidly expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons and growing domestic instability, and there
is a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world.
Pakistan loses control of its Bomb.
It is a good thing then that the Pakistani military approaches nuclear security with great professionalism, for
Pakistan has fewer margins for error than any other nuclear state . For comparisons sake,
in the United States, it was widely recognized that significant nuclear security upgrades had to be made after 9/11.
Specific attention was given to the possibility that terrorists could gain access to a nuclear weaponsrelated facility,
particularly with the assistance of insiders working at the facility. Accordingly, large increases in funding were
allocated to assure a much higher U.S. nuclear security standard, including an increased emphasis on intelligence
and counterintelligence programs. Nonetheless, in recent years, there have been appalling lapses in controls over
nuclear weapons and the compromise of nuclear weaponsrelated informatione.g., a U.S. Air Force B-52
mistakenly and unknowingly flew six nucleartipped cruise missiles across the country (from North Dakota to
Louisiana) in August 2007. With this in mind, U.S. concerns about Pakistani vulnerabilities should not be interpreted
broader trends in
Pakistan, however, elevate the risks of compromised nuclear security.
The burgeoning Pakistani nuclear arsenal. A growing domestic nuclear program means more
nuclear activity taking place in more places necessitating more materials,
weapons, facilities, transportation, and storage . In short, there are now more places where
as finger-pointing or meddling; it obviously can happen in the United States as well. Some
something can go wrong.
Growing levels of extremism means higher numbers of potential

insiders in the nuclear establishment willing to work with outsiders to provide
access to facilities and exfiltrate nuclear-related materials and weapons. Recent warnings by the
Taliban and Al Qaeda that Washington will seize Pakistans nuclear weapons amount
to a clever recruiting pitch to insiders to collaborate with extremists. In an attempt to stoke such
groundless fears, A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and Bashiruddin Mahmood, the
radical CEO of Khans rogue nuclear supplier network, both recently called upon Pakistan to expand
its arsenal of nuclear weapons, implying that they guarantee sovereignty and assure Islamabads
Increased extremism.
standing as a leading Islamic nation.
Although Pakistans nuclear National Command

Authority is controlled by the military, the Pakistani constitution delegates certain
nuclear weapon responsibilities to the civilian government . This creates the
potential for a militarycivilian standoff over nuclear assets during a crisis , especially in
the event that extremist elements assume power. Moreover, there are no guarantees of how the
military and government would react to all contingencies they may encounter in a rapidly
The perilous military-civilian relationship.
unfolding crisis. For instance, how would they respond to a breakdown in internal communication, or with the
outside world? Unconfirmed news reports of a seizure of nuclear weapons in transit? A takeover of a facility by a
rogue military unit? Taliban penetration of a nuclear weapons storage site? More importantly, how would India
interpret and react to such developments? Along these lines: Are current communication mechanisms between
Islamabad, New Delhi, and Washington robust enough to be reliable during a crisis?
Even if military nukes are controlled, civilian materials are vulnerable.
235
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 236 of 318
Clarke 13 (2013, Michael, PhD, Research Fellow, nuclear proliferation policy and
Central Asia, Griffith University, Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the
Threat? Comparative Strategy Volume 32, Issue 2, 2013, taylor and francis)
there remain a number of safety security problems arising from such an
expansion that may increase the likelihood that nuclear materials could be stolen by
or diverted to nonstate actors. Prospective safety problems include inadequate regulatory
oversight of new facilities, inadequate training of reactor operators, and inadequate protection
of spent reactor fuel. 86 All power plants and fuel cyclerelated facilities are operated by the Pakistan Atomic
Nonetheless,
Energy Commission (PAEC), while regulatory oversight is the brief of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Agency
(PRNA), which is also responsible for implementing recommendations and guidance received from the IAEA. 87
However, it is uncertain that the PRNA has the capacity to deal with these issues as Pakistan expands its
It is not clear for instance that PNAC will be able to train adequate
numbers of personnel for the proposed expansion , with one estimate suggesting that for the
commercial nuclear capacity.
proposed eight, 800-megawatt expansion of capacity, PRNA would need to have an operation cadre of between
4,400 and 8,800 persons trained and qualified within a 20-year period. 88
An expansion of nuclear power reactors will also raise the issue of the security of
spent reactor fuel that could be a source of plutonium or of highly radioactive
material for an RDD. The increase in the quantity of spent fuel and increase in the
number of sites at which it is stored not only raises the potential for material to be
diverted or stolen, but also increases the burden on PAEC and PNAC to ensure that such nuclear material is
secured and accounted for. In this respect Pakistan had produced around 240 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by
2000, a level projected to increase to around 1,180 tons by 2020 due to the expansion of its nuclear power
generation capacity. 89 SNF is currently secured by the PNAC through physical verifications and regulatory
inspections of relevant facilities. Mannan notes that SNF is most vulnerable to theft or diversion when in transit and
envisages a scenario in which terrorists attempt to interdict SNF casks in transit. His analysis suggests that
terrorists would have to attack SNF casks with one of twelve antitank missiles that are
capable of penetrating 12 to 20 inches of armor in order to penetrate the containment system used in SNF
transportation casks. 90 Such an attack would cause complete perforation and release more than one percent of
Such a scenario is conceivable in contemporary Pakistan given the

availability of various antitank missiles and extremist groups' employment of tactics
such as suicide and truck bombing. 92 Terrorists could also capture the
transportation cask and breach its containment system via the application of
explosives that could transform the cask into an RDD. 93 However, it is unclear how much SNF is transported
within Pakistan and which sites/facilities are involved. This suggests that Pakistan's planned expansion
of its nuclear power capacity combined with the existence of large and well-armed
Islamist groups, some of whom may have a desire to obtain fissile material, and potentially inexperienced
nuclear reactor personnel all point to the possibility that future nuclear material
diversion attempts might be successful. 94
cask contents. 91
Pakistans nuclear facilities have been attacked by Al Qaeda

pp. 98-114
Such an expansion of nuclear-related sites and facilities requires a concomitant
expansion of effort to protect and secure them. 78 There have been a number of
reported attacks on nuclear-related facilities since 2007, which have led some to
argue that al Qaeda and/or the Taliban are targeting Pakistan's nuclear complex.
236
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 237 of 318
There have been al Qaeda/Taliban attacks on a nuclear missile storage facility at

Sargogha (November 1, 2007), a suicide bomber attack at the nuclear airbase at
Kamra (December 10, 2007) and another suicide bomber attack on the nuclear
weapon assembly site at Wah (August 20, 2008). 79 Shaun Gregory argues that
such attacks highlight the vulnerability of nuclear weapons infrastructure sites to
three forms of potential nuclear terrorism: an attack to cause a fire at a nuclear
facility, thus creating a radiological hazard; an attack to cause an explosion at a site
containing nuclear weapons components; and an attack to seize an intact nuclear
weapon. 80
Expansion of the number of Pakistans nuclear reactors

increases theft risks
pp. 98-114
Although at present nuclear power accounts for but a small portion of Pakistan's
electricity generation capacity, Pakistan's Mid-Term Development Framework
released in 2005 calls for the installation of a further 8,500 megawatts of nuclear
capacity by 2030. The first phase of this expansion has been a Pakistani request to
purchase eight 600-megawatt reactors from China. This proposed expansion may
face a number of difficulties, however, due to Pakistan's nonproliferation stance.
First, the export of new nuclear plants to Pakistan may be problematic for China
given its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), whose guidelines
prohibit the export of nuclear components to non-NPT parties and states that have
not signed full scope safeguards with the IAEA. In this latter regard, while
Pakistan's commercial power plants are under IAEA safeguards its military facilities
are not so it does not, meet the full-scope criteria. Second, Pakistan's record of
proliferation through the A. Q. Khan network and Islamabad's refusal to permit the
IAEA to interview Khan and key associates would most likely give the more lenient
members of the NSG such as China pause for thought. Additionally, as China
currently cannot manufacture all the components required for the reactors, it would
also need the consent of supporting equipment manufacturersJapan and France
before it could export the plants to Pakistan. In order to avoid this development
Pakistan has requested that nuclear suppliers such as the U.S. Russia, China,
France, and Canada grant it a deal similar to that struck between the U.S. and India
in July 2005. 84 Pakistan has proposed that it keep all its commercial reactors under
IAEA safeguards, abide by UN Resolution 1540, and bring its export control
guidelines into line with that of the NSG. While this would be less than full-scope
safeguards, it would be more comprehensive than the agreement reached by the
U.S. and India. 85
Nonetheless, there remain a number of safety security problems arising from such
an expansion that may increase the likelihood that nuclear materials could be stolen
by or diverted to nonstate actors. Prospective safety problems include inadequate
regulatory oversight of new facilities, inadequate training of reactor operators, and
inadequate protection of spent reactor fuel. 86 All power plants and fuel cycle
related facilities are operated by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC),
237
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 238 of 318
while regulatory oversight is the brief of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Agency
(PRNA), which is also responsible for implementing recommendations and guidance
received from the IAEA. 87 However, it is uncertain that the PRNA has the capacity to
deal with these issues as Pakistan expands its commercial nuclear capacity. It is not
clear for instance that PNAC will be able to train adequate numbers of personnel for
the proposed expansion, with one estimate suggesting that for the proposed eight,
800-megawatt expansion of capacity, PRNA would need to have an operation
cadre of between 4,400 and 8,800 persons trained and qualified within a 20-year
period. 88
An expansion of nuclear power reactors will also raise the issue of the security of
spent reactor fuel that could be a source of plutonium or of highly radioactive
material for an RDD. The increase in the quantity of spent fuel and increase in the
number of sites at which it is stored not only raises the potential for material to be
diverted or stolen, but also increases the burden on PAEC and PNAC to ensure that
such nuclear material is secured and accounted for. In this respect Pakistan had
produced around 240 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by 2000, a level projected to
increase to around 1,180 tons by 2020 due to the expansion of its nuclear power
generation capacity. 89 SNF is currently secured by the PNAC through physical
verifications and regulatory inspections of relevant facilities. Mannan notes that SNF
is most vulnerable to theft or diversion when in transit and envisages a scenario in
which terrorists attempt to interdict SNF casks in transit. His analysis suggests that
terrorists would have to attack SNF casks with one of twelve antitank missiles that
are capable of penetrating 12 to 20 inches of armor in order to penetrate the
containment system used in SNF transportation casks. 90 Such an attack would
cause complete perforation and release more than one percent of cask contents.
91
Such a scenario is conceivable in contemporary Pakistan given the availability of
various antitank missiles and extremist groups' employment of tactics such as
suicide and truck bombing. 92 Terrorists could also capture the transportation cask
and breach its containment system via the application of explosives that could
transform the cask into an RDD. 93 However, it is unclear how much SNF is
transported within Pakistan and which sites/facilities are involved. This suggests
that Pakistan's planned expansion of its nuclear power capacity combined with the
existence of large and well-armed Islamist groups, some of whom may have a desire
to obtain fissile material, and potentially inexperienced nuclear reactor personnel
all point to the possibility that future nuclear material diversion attempts might be
successful. 94
238
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 239 of 318
A2: Security (Pakistan)

Pakistani security measures make it easier for terrorists to get HEU
Costello 11 (Ryan Costello, research assistant with the Center for the Study of Threat
Convergence at the Fund for Peace, January 2011, Countering Terrorist Aspirations and
Improving Nuclear Security, Fund for Peace report)
Pakistan appears to have robust security measures in place to moderate the threats posed by
external assault. Pakistans nuclear weapons are believed to be scattered and
disassembled. Reports indicate that the weapons are stored at up to six locations and are likely buried in deep
underground facilities in order to prevent their destruction or seizure during an attack on the facility.40 Analysts
believe that the weapons are stored in component form in separate buildings or facilities, thus
necessitating multiple operations to seize control of a complete nuclear weapon.41 The SPDs official position is that
if the
weapons are stored in component form, this measure might make the theft of a
fissile nuclear core easier if its location within the facility is known and can be
accessed.42 This indicates that Pakistans nuclear security is principally designed to
safeguard against an attack by states, such as India, and not by extremist or rogue
forces interested in obtaining nuclear components rather than a full-scale, strategic nuclear device.
the weapons will be ready when needed but will not be on hair trigger alert. It should be noted that
Secrecy creates vulnerabilities doesnt prevent theft

Costello 11 (Ryan Costello, research assistant with the Center for the Study of Threat
Convergence at the Fund for Peace, January 2011, Countering Terrorist Aspirations and
Improving Nuclear Security, Fund for Peace report)
Another tool that Pakistani forces utilize to safeguard their nuclear weapons is the
secrecy of the program itself. The location of nuclear weapons sites and other critical aspects of the
program are kept secret, and transport of nuclear components and materials is generally conducted clandestinely
and avoids highly visible security measures.48 This approach offers both strengths and weaknesses for countering
external attacks from extremist forces. The secrecy of the location of nuclear components limits the ability of
extremists because they will not know where to look for the weapons without insider assistance. Ideally, not only
will outsiders not know precisely which facilities house nuclear components, but they also will not know where to
look within those facilities for the components in question.49 However,
this emphasis on secrecy

rather than overt security could create vulnerabilities during transportation. If a
terrorist group obtained intelligence on the timing and route of transported nuclear
components they could be susceptible to theft .50
239
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 240 of 318
A2: Deterrence Stops Nuclear Terrorism

Risks of nuclear terrorism high, deterrence wont solve
Daily Times, February 25, 2014, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/25-Feb-2014/preventing-nuclearterrorism
On October 11, 2001, exactly a month after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, President
George W Bush was informed by his CIA director, George Tenet, about the presence of al Qaeda-linked
terrorists in New York City with a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb. Overwhelmed by paralysing fear that
terrorists could have smuggled another nuclear weapon into Washington DC as well, President Bush
ordered Vice President Dick Cheney, along with several hundred federal employees from almost a dozen
government agencies, to leave for some undisclosed location outside the capital where they could ensure
the continuity of government in case of a nuclear explosion in Washington DC. Although, after
subsequent investigations, the CIAs report turned out to be false, this incident showed that even a false
alarm signalling a nuclear attack could lead to a much higher probability of disaster. A nuclear
attack in downtown Washington DC has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of people immediately
and wipe the White House, the State Department and many other buildings off the face of the earth,
making the 9/11 attacks a historical footnote.
It is evident that the spectre of a terrorist-controlled nuclear weapon is a real threat and is global in
scope. Given the potentially disastrous consequences, even a small possibility of terrorists obtaining and
detonating a nuclear device justifies urgent action. The most urgent security threat to the world today
is the possibility of the stealing of weapons or fissile materials by terrorists. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, hundreds of confirmed cases of successful theft of nuclear materials were reported in
Russia. In 1997, General Alexander Lebed, assistant for national security affairs to Boris Yeltsin, revealed
that 84 out of 132 special KGB suitcase nuclear weapons were unaccounted for in Russia. There are
also widespread apprehensions expressed by the international community that militants could steal
Pakistans nuclear weapons or fissile material. Unfortunately, some incidents of jihadi penetration of
Pakistans armed forces have further fuelled this perception.
In 2001, US officials discovered that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, were in
contact with two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists for assistance in making a small nuclear device. Later
in 2003, some junior Pakistani army and air force officers colluded with al Qaeda terrorists to attempt to
assassinate President Musharraf and enforce sharia in Pakistan. Notwithstanding that the dangers about
the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons might be highly exaggerated; some genuine concerns arising
due to links between terrorists and government authorities must be immediately addressed. Umar Khalid
Khurasani, the ameer (head) of the Mohmand Agency chapter of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
also wants to seize nuclear weapons and overthrow the government of Pakistan. Another potential source
for the theft of fissile material is more than 130 civilian research reactors worldwide operating with
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Most of these facilities have very modest security - in many cases, no
more than a night watchman.
Unlike the Cold War period, when both the US and the Soviet Union knew that a nuclear attack
from either side would be met with a massive retaliatory strike, conventional deterrence does not
work against the terrorist groups. In a famous 2007 Wall Street Journal article by Henry Kissinger,
George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn (together known as the four horsemen), it was claimed
that, Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear
weaponry is increasing. In todays war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the
ultimate means of mass destruction...unless urgent new actions are taken, the US soon will be
compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was the Cold War.
240
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 241 of 318
A2: Terrorists Cant Build a Bomb

Technical information to build a bomb easily available
Robert L. Gallucci, dean of Georgetown University's School of
Foreign Service, November-December 2008, The National
Interest, p. online
Ultimately, though, the size observation is not really reassuring. There are just too many variables
involved, and ignorance on the part of the current generation of analysts is not the most important one. It
is certainly arguable that if terrorists manage to get their hands on enough highly enriched
uranium, rather than plutonium, and the overall size of the whole bomb package was not limited by
the requirements of the method of delivery, there is enough information available these days for a
terrorist organization to make a bomb of the simple "gun type" design and yield used at
Hiroshima. If true, this would make the higher-yield city-buster quite plausible, even assuming no
special knowledge of nuclear-explosive design. However, it would require some expertise in nuclear
engineering, high explosives and metallurgy. Moreover, drawing conclusions from first attempts at
nuclear explosions using plutonium and the more technically demanding "implosion" design,
whether by India or North Korea, may not be particularly relevant, especially when we are
uncertain about those governments' intent, or "design yield."
Easy to assemble a nuke once terrorists have the material

20, 2006, p. A26
Could a nuclear attack by bin Laden, or any other terrorist, actually happen? Some say it would be
impossible, mistakenly believing that terrorists do not have the motivation, or the ability, to assemble the
highly sophisticated, modern tools necessary for the task. Most observers, however, agree that a small
group could construct a lethal nuclear weapon since they are conceptually simple devices. After all, the
technology involved in creating a nuclear weapon is more than 60 years old. In fact, it is perhaps easier to
make a gun-assembled nuclear bomb than it is to develop biological or chemical weapons.
Terrorists could build a nuclear bomb with publicly-available

materials
Graham Allison, JFK School @ Harvard, Harvard International Review. Cambridge: Fall
2006.Vol.28, Iss. 3; pg. 50, 6 pgs
Once a terrorist group acquires 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU), building an elementary nuclear
bomb no longer takes the mind of an Oppenheimer. Standing on these shoulders, with fissile material acquired
from a weapons state, using publicly available documents and items commercially obtainable in any
technologically advanced country, terrorists could construct a gun-type bomb like the one dropped on
Hiroshima.
241
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 242 of 318
A2: Terrorists Cant Build a Bomb

Terrorists could easily build a bomb similar to what we used on
Hiroshima
20, 2006, p. A26
What kind of nuclear device might a terrorist organization consider? Some bombs can produce an
extremely big bang, but are difficult to build; other devices produce a smaller explosion but are
comparatively easy to construct. In order not to publish anything that would make the terrorists' work
easier, we have chosen a crude but well-known design concept, widely available on the Internet, that is
similar to the device that the United States used when it bombed Hiroshima. Our device consists of a
gun that fires a highly enriched uranium "bullet" into a cylindrical target block, also made of highly
enriched uranium. Terrorists could use a surplus light artillery gun barrel, something that's easily available
today on the global arms market or the Internet for much less than US$10,000. The target is hollow with a
hole to receive the bullet, and is simply bolted onto the muzzle of the gun. The explosion in Hiroshima
produced a yield of approximately 12.5 kilotons, which killed about 100,000 people instantaneously.
How many people would it take to construct a crude nuclear device? In a 1977 government report on
safeguards against nuclear proliferation, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimated that a small
group, including a "person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields
and a jack-of-all- trades technician," could build a nuclear device for a sum that "need not exceed a
fraction of a million dollars." Adjusted for inflation, that's less than US$3-million today. The constraint
we have placed on our would-be bomb-makers is a total of 19 persons -- the same number of hijackers
who orchestrated the Sept. 11 attacks -- working over the course of a year in the United States. We
estimate that a three-person physics team, including a relatively senior physicist and two post-doctoral
students, would be capable of rendering the design in three to six months. Their salaries during the course
of a year would total approximately US$200,000. In addition to the physics team, the project could
comprise a few small engineering teams to address the following: casting the uranium for the device,
constructing the proper gun, assembling the supercritical mass of uranium, overseeing the electronics and
finally, the actual detonation. In many respects, the most difficult task for nuclear terrorists would be
casting the uranium metal, which melts at high temperatures, into appropriate shapes. The metallurgy
team would include at least one person with experience in advanced casting techniques. A vacuum
furnace is probably required to reduce oxygen contamination and prevent the uranium from igniting. The
team would likely need to practice using either natural uranium or some surrogate before casting the final
core. The group could find the vacuum furnace to fit their specifications by searching on the Internet, and
could probably purchase it for less than US$50,000. The actual pit -- or core of the weapon containing
the highly enriched uranium -- could be fabricated quickly. When China built its first nuclear bomb in
1964, a single technician named Yuan Gongfu used a lathe to shape the highly enriched uranium in just
one night. New or used lathes large enough to properly finish the roughly cast pit can be bought on the
Internet, even on e Bay, for US$10,000. These instruments are probably as capable as the one Yuan used
more than 40 years ago. Computer-controlled machine tools are not necessary. Our terrorist outfit could
probably find all the standard machine-shop equipment it would need in any university physics
242
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 243 of 318
Designing and detonating a bomb is not difficult

Micah Zenko is a research associate in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 104
American intelligence estimates about the development of nuclear weapons by
other states and their intentions for their use have been a mixed bag of quiet
successes and notable failures. Knowing the capabilities and intentions of non-state
groups interested in obtaining nuclear weapons is undoubtedly a much more
difficult proposition. Nevertheless, in reviewing the history of known intelligence
estimates of the threat of nuclear terrorism, several important themes emerge: the
proliferation of interest among of nonstate actors to obtaining a bomb, the
acknowledged ease with which terrorists could assemble a crude nuclear device,
the ease with which any malicious actor could smuggle it into the United States, and
the continued surprise of the U.S. government that this threat has persisted over a
half century. The intelligence estimates presented above demonstrate beyond any
doubt that the United States has been sufficiently warned about the very real
possibility of a nuclear terror attack. If a terrorists' bomb were detonated on
American soil tomorrow, given the sustained strategic warning that the IC has
provided to policy makers, it would be a "bolt from the blue" only to the indifferent,
but not the unaware.
243
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 244 of 318
A2: Uranium toxic

Fissile material isnt toxic enough to pose a serious barrier non-scientific
lit vastly exaggerates.
Uranium is toxic and radioactive. Uranium is hard to machine, and many of the machine tools needed
for complex mechanical processes such as making neutron reflectors are subject to export controls.
The toxicity of uranium is vastly exaggerated in much of the open literature,

particularly in articles by groups which oppose the use of depleted uranium in non-nuclear battlefield weapons and
Far more dangerous substances (e.g. beryllium) are routinely handled in

laboratories and factories. Similarly, even fissile uranium-235 is not particularly
radioactive, and emits rather little radiation. Most of its emissions are alpha particles which
can be stopped in a sheet of paper. Highly enriched uranium is, of course, very
valuable, as macroscopic samples need to be assembled molecule by molecule, with the end product
being used mostly in atomic weapons. It is true that uranium work hardens quickly,
but so do many materials. Most of the difficulties of working with uranium
metal are well known, and the procedures for such work are not especially
onerous, particularly if the machinists are willing to accept the risk of
martyrdom.
Uranium is actually not a particularly difficult metal to machine . T. O. Morris of
Oak Ridge National Laboratory says that uranium is comparable to the stainless steels in machining
properties.19 It is true that uranium is pyrophoric, meaning that fine dust can spontaneously ignite.
This is a complication, but not a major one.
in armor.
244
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 245 of 318
A2: Not Enriched Enough

The 90% threshold is silly only for top grade modern military programs.
Experts often discuss the prospects and sources for terrorists theft of weapons-grade
nuclear materials and the feasibility of their subsequent assembling an atomic
bomb. Most studies conclude that highly enriched uranium is the most
attractive material for terrorists. It can be used to build a relatively simple bomb of the
cannon type. Military programs require uranium to contain at least 90 percent U-235
to be considered weapons-grade. Highly enriched uranium with a lower U-235 content
can, however, also be used to build weapons . For example, when the United States
built the bomb that it subsequently dropped on Hiroshima, the scientists used about
60 kilograms of uranium enriched to about 80 percent. South Africa also used highly enriched
uranium with a lower enrichment rate in the nuclear warheads that it voluntarily destroyed in the early 1990s:
80 percent per bomb, according to estimates. Some

scientists believe that even lower enrichment levels can yield an atomic
bomb.11
about 55 kilograms of uranium enriched to
245
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 246 of 318
A2: Terrorists Couldnt Build a Trigger Device

Terrorists could easily find a trigger device
20, 2006, p. A26
To detonate a nuclear bomb, terrorists do not need to fashion the right type of gun. "Team Gun" would
likely consist of three or four people, at least one of whom is familiar with the interior ballistics of guns in
the appropriate size range. Their principal task would be to find a surplus artillery piece of the correct size
and to build a projectile. Such recoilless rifles are widely available in the United States and Canada as
military surplus, though they require a licence to purchase. A hobbyist could easily refurbish a recoilless
rifle for just a few thousand dollars. In all likelihood, the gun team would want to test-fire the gun with a
dummy nuclear projectile to verify its actual speed. One or two shots should suffice. Barrel life, usually
hundreds of shots without maintenance, would not pose a problem. It is unlikely to take more than six
months for such a group to adapt and test a reliable gun.
246
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 247 of 318
A2: Nukes Too Expensive for Terrorists

For terrorists, nuclear weapons are cheap per death
20, 2006, p. A26
For example, the October, 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemenmay have cost
US$10,000, but with 17 casualties, it added up to a pricey US$590 per murder. Yet
terrorists do not have to pay a premium for a nuclear attack; on a per-murder basis,
nuclear weapons are both cheap and can be used against high profile targets. And a
nuclear attack induces great fear. Its specter has hung over the world since the
United States dropped Little Boy on Hiroshima. To put it in strictly commercial
terms, terrorists would likely find a nuclear attack cost effective. The simple appeal
of nuclear terrorism can be illustrated with a hypothetical situation. A failed nuclear
detonation, one that produced only a few tens of tons in yield, could kill 10,000
people in just a few hours if the device exploded in a crowded financial centre. Not
only would 10,000 persons represent the upward limit of a conventional terrorist
attack, but that figure would also exceed the combined casualties in all of alQaeda's attacks over the entire history of the organization. And that's a "worstcase" scenario for the terrorists. A "successful" nuclear detonation would kill 10
times as many people. If terrorists could construct a successful device that killed
100,000 people for a cost of US$10-million -- about US$100 per murder -- it would
be a bargain, considering that most of al-Qaeda's attacks have been mounted in the
US$100 to US$300 per murder range. A nuclear terrorist attack that cost US$5million would result in a cost per murder comparable to the Madrid bombings. So,
just how difficult an enterprise would this be? What would a terrorist group have to
do to build a bomb that would kill 100,000 people for less than US$10-million?
247
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 248 of 318
A2: Small Cells Couldnt Produce/Detonate a

Nuke
Only a small number of people are needed to produce and
detonate a nuclear weapon
Matthew Bunn is a senior research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government,
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE, September 2006,
p. 145
Others assert that a group with al Qaeda's structure of small cells would not be well suited for an arguably
large, long-term project like making a nuclear bomb, particularly given the substantial operational
disruptions sustained since 9/11. This would undoubtedly make a bomb effort more difficult.
Unfortunately, as already noted, repeated technical studies show that the group needed to design and
fabricate a crude nuclear explosive, once the needed materials are in hand, might be quite small--possibly
as small as a single al Qaeda cell.
248
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 249 of 318
A2: Deterrence Solves

Deterrent threats create a perverse incentive for terrorists to exploit
enemy arsenals to start a war.
2011)
Proposals have been made to threaten explicitly to use military force against a country
whose government failed to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons related material to
terrorists.'"' The assumption is that due to their severity, threats of force will prove most effective at inducing
potential nuclear leakers to plug any nuclear supply holes. Yet, such pre-incident threats could easily backfire. The
use of threats juxtaposes uneasily with the principle of cooperative threat reduction based on mutual interest that
underpins a multilateral nuclear attribution regime. This principle has allowed Russian-American nuclear security
Such threats would also

discourage a government from alerting the international community about the
possible loss of its nuclear materials.''^ In addition, threats to attack a nuclear weapons
state for the diversion of its materials are not credible, since their implementation could well lead to a
nuclear exchange in which both parties would suffer severely. Finally, enemies
of the potential target could become more inclined to manufacture a nuclear
incident that erroneously implicated their adversary as the negligent source of the
weapon. For example, al Oaeda might try to provoke a nuclear confrontation
between the governments of the United States and Pakistan, while
Chechen extremists could aspire to do the same between Russia and the
West.
collaboration to persist despite the recent downturn in their bilateral relations.
Martyr complex means no deterrence retaliation by terrorists is also

more credible only applies to state sponsors.
2011)
International security experts are less sanguine about the technique's potential for deterring
nuclear terrorists themselves as opposed to their state sponsors." Suicide terrorists would
presumably not be concerned about threats of direct retaliation against them. Some might
even welcome the recognition and perhaps even falsely claim itif an operation succeeded,
or hope that the target would respond in a disproportionate manner and
attack innocent parties or a suspect (such as a particular government) the terrorists
themselves opposed. They might arguably refrain from specific nuclear terrorism attempts if they
considered that nuclear forensics techniques could thwart their operations and result in deterrence by denial rather
they could simply wait for a more opportune occasion to

undertake their planned nuclear operation .
It is possible that the key enablers of any nuclear terrorist operation such as the weapons
designers, the financiers, the shippers, and other middlemen would worry about detection
than deterrence by retaliation.''' But
and punishment if they were motivated by monetary or other considerations that did not include a desire for
But they might be committed extremists themselves, or could reasonably

consider retaliation by the terrorists for a failure to support their cause to be
martyrdom.'^
249
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 250 of 318
more plausible than possible detection and punishment by their victims . Although
potential targets would be wise to claim the capability to identify these intermediaries, their detection would
probably require exquisite human, signals, or other intelligence to supplement the information acquired through
nuclear forensics.
Only way to defeat nuclear terror is to destroy the organizations

irrationality and apocalyptic religious motives mean no deterrence.
Van de Velde 10 (2010, James, PhD, Lecturer in the Global Security Studies
Program at Johns Hopkins University, cyber, WMD, intelligence, and
counterterrorism analyst at the international consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton,
The Impossible Challenge of Deterring Nuclear Terrorism by Al Qaeda, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism Volume 33, Issue 8, 2010, taylor and francis)
Al Qaeda continues to represent a worldwide threat to the United States and its allies. It
continues to plot terrorist acts against the West and aspires to acquire or develop
weapons of mass destruction, which it very well might use against the West without
hesitation.
Despite much intellectual effort, there remain some inescapable truths regarding Al
Qaeda's interest in attacking the West with a nuclear weapon :
The United States cannot likely persuade the irredeemable jihadists that it is not at war
with Islam.
Acquiring a WMD is not categorically forbidden by Islam .
Ayman al-Zawahiri may have claimed on 2 March 2008, that the practical use of a WMD
would be to deter Western aggression, but there is no discernable Al Qaeda WMD
employment doctrine. The United States has no idea when, where, or why Al Qaeda
might use an IND (Improvised Nuclear Device). And a decision to use such a weapon will
be influenced by such factors as how and where the weapon was acquired, by
whom, who controls it, and the weapon type (IND vs. a stolen state-weapon).
The West ought, therefore, to characterize those irredeemably committed to acquiring
a nuclear weapon as irrational, apocalyptic, and dangerousfirst and
foremost because they are! The center of gravity in the war with Al Qaeda is the
worldwide fight over Al Qaeda s legitimacy and Muslim perceptions of the West . The
best and perhaps only means, therefore, to deter Al Qaeda's use of a nuclear weapon in
particular is to treat it as an insurgency and defeat the group by starving it of
recruits. The goal must be to defeat and end Al Qaeda legitimacy and
recruitment, since an insurgency is defeated when no one (or very few)
join it.
Al Qaeda cannot be deterred-multiple reasons
Fisher 07 (Feb. 2007, Uri, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Colorado, Deterrence Terrorism and American Values, Homeland
Security Affairs, Vol. 3 No. 1)
deterring a group such as al-Qaeda is a complex
endeavor. First, terrorists are highly motivated and therefore they are willing to risk
anything their lives in the case of suicide-bombers to accomplish a goal. Second, the political goals of
terrorist groups are often very broad, idealistic, ambiguous, or unclear. Third, terrorists are
difficult to locate. Terrorist networks operate trans-nationally and therefore make reprisals
difficult to return to sender. Fourth, it remains undecided how deterrence can work against
an enemy that understands that the ultimate policy goal of the U.S. is not to coexist
with groups like al-Qaeda, but to eradicate them . Finally, terrorists often attempt to
By now, the arguments are familiar for why
250
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 251 of 318
incite retaliation. Terrorists have used the collateral damage caused by retaliatory
efforts to foment more support for their organization or broader cause. In total, the deck is
stacked against deterrence playing a significant role in U.S. counterterrorism policy.
251
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 252 of 318
A2: Terrorists Dont Have a Large Sanctuary to

Produce a Nuke
Plenty of terrorist sanctuaries for nuclear production
Matthew Bunn is a senior research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government,
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE, September 2006,
p. 146
Finally, some argue that in the absence of a stable sanctuary with large fixed
facilities, it would be nearly impossible for a terrorist group to make a nuclear bomb.
The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the removal of al Qaeda's Afghan
sanctuary undoubtedly disrupted al Qaeda's nuclear efforts significantly. But two
crucial points should be made. First, large fixed facilities are not necessarily
required for putting together a crude nuclear explosive, and the time required may
be distressingly short (as suggested by the U.S. Department of Energy's [1994]
security regulations). The building that South Africa used to assemble its nuclear
weapons, for instance, is a very ordinary-looking warehouse, with little external sign
of the deadly activities that went on inside (Albright 1994). Terrorists might well
process nuclear material or manufacture a crude nuclear bomb on the premises of
an apparently legitimate front company operating in a developed country. Second, a
wide range of possible sanctuaries still exists. Indeed, in March 2004, former
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet expressed his concern regarding
stateless zones in approximately fifty countries around the world where central
governments have no consistent reach. In as many as half of those zones, Tenet
said, terrorist groups were thriving (U.S. Senate 2004).
11
252
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 253 of 318
A2: Countries Wont Transfer Nukes to Terrorists

Many states may give may give nuclear material to terrorists
Robert L. Gallucci, dean of Georgetown University's School of
Foreign Service, November-December 2008, The National Interest, p.
online
Iran and North Korea will transfer nuclear weapons to
terrorists
The fissile material would have to be acquired by transfer from a country whose government had
approved its movement, or as the result of theft from a country whose government had not authorized its
movement. Jenkins disparages the former, state-sponsored nuclear terrorism and, indeed, this
would seem the less likely scenario. However, current concerns that North Korea and Iran might do
just that should not be dismissed too rapidly. The regime in Pyongyang has a record of transferring
extended-range-ballistic-missile technology, equipment and more to the Middle East and South
Asia, creating a medium-range-ballistic-missile threat for the delivery of nuclear weapons in
countries where one did not exist before. North Korea is the only country on earth still in this
business. Moreover, the best information currently available suggests that the North Koreans built
a plutonium-production reactor in Syria, a well-known sponsor of terrorism, that would be
providing that country with a shortcut to nuclear weapons were it not for Israel's concept of
nonproliferation. As for Iran, while it now has no source of fissile material, it is busy building
facilities that will give it the capability to produce both highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
From the American perspective, Iran is now the world's most active supplier of advanced
conventional weapons to terrorist groups operating in the Middle East. So, assuming that Tehran
will act responsibly if it acquires fissile material would seem to involve more optimism than is
justified by experience.
253
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 254 of 318
A2: No Documented Theft Risks

150 cases of theft per year
Senator Lieberman, December 11, 2008HEARING OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SUBJECT: PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
In fact, the IAEA handles about 150 cases a year involving trafficking of nuclear material. Some of that
material -- some of that material reported stolen is never recovered, and some of the material recovered
has never been reported stolen.
Intercepted material is a small amount of what is available on

the black market
Rens Lee is President of Global Advisory Services in McLean,
Virginia. He is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute in Philadelphia, Summer 2008, Orbis, p.
Other explanations, though, view this apparently anemic and supplier- driven traffic
in more ominous terms. Observed data from confirmed smuggling incidents and
associated seizures and arrests are not necessarily representative of the wider
universe of black market nuclear deals, including sophisticated schemes that
escape scrutiny. As with other illegal commodities drugs for instancewhat is
captured probably represents just a fraction of what is available in the international
marketplace. For example, the small (usually multi-gram) quantities of HEU and
plutonium intercepted by authorities suggests that traders planned to show
prospective customers samples of what could be larger inventories of privately-held
material. Even kilogram-sized lots appearing in the black market may represent the
tip of the proverbial iceberg. For instance, according to a Czech police investigation
of a 1994 seizure in Prague of 2.7 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU, smugglers
claimed they could deliver to buyers an additional 40 kilograms of HEU in the short
term and 5 kilos each month over the next 12 months. 2 Where this vagabond
material, if it really existed, is now anyones guess.
254
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 255 of 318
A2: Economic Growth Solves

Rapid economic growth would increase, not decrease,
terrorism
Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. From 2003-05 he served on the Policy
Planning Staff of the State Department as Speechwriter to the Secretary of State, Summer 2008, Orbis, p.
But the idea that stimulating rapid economic growth in Middle Eastern countries would reduce the
generation of terrorism is ahistorical in the extreme. To assert it demonstrates ignorance of the evolution
of Western society; it is, for example, to forget everything we ever knew about the social effects of the
Industrial Revolution.2 One does not need a social science Ph.D. to see that rapid economic growth
invariably brings disruptive social change in its wake. It does not settle down societiesquite the
reverse, at least for a transitional time. 3 Rapid economic and social change induced from outside by
wealthy and powerful statesmeliorism on steroids, as it wereis not the solution to the terrorism
problem: At base, it is the problem.
255
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 256 of 318
A2: Arab-Israeli Peace Solves

Arab-Israeli peace will not solve Middle Eastern terrorism
Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. From 2003-05 he
served on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department as
Speechwriter to the Secretary of State, Summer 2008, Orbis, p.
As to the grievance trope, there is a general tendency to exaggerate the role of Israei-Palestinian and
Israei-Arab conflicts in the broader Middle Eastern context. Even conservatives have been known to do it,
and the reasons are understood by those well read enough in the history of the conflict. 4 Not that the
conflict over Palestine plays no role in generating anti-American sentiment, and not that active U.S.
diplomacy is necessarily a bad idea even when prospects for diplomatic progress are slight. But the idea
that an Israeli-Palestinian peace arrangement, could one be produced, would have a major bearing on
reducing the terrorist threat to the United States and the West is delusional. Indeed, Western or U.S.
brokerage of a settlement that leaves a Jewish State of Israel in any borders whatsoever would increase
terrorism, not reduce it.
256
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 257 of 318
A2: Reducing Poverty Solves

Solving Middle Eastern poverty will not reduce terrorism
Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. From 2003-05 he served on the Policy
Planning Staff of the State Department as Speechwriter to the Secretary of State, Summer 200 8, Orbis, p.
The fact is that the depredations of Arab autocracies are better enablers and
accelerators of the frustrations that can congeal into terrorist violence than
anything that goes on in Israel/Palestine. And that is true despite the role that AlJazeera and other regional news media have played in using Palestine as an
organizing principle for a second try at pan-Arabism. Moreover, just as rapid
economic growth would produce more angst and, hence, more terror recruits,
making Israel the scapegoat to appease radical Muslim demands would only help
radicals in their internal social battle against more moderate and traditional forces,
and encourage further demands. Those who think that alleviating poverty in the
Middle East and addressing the grievances of our enemies are the best policy
foundations to deal with Islamist terror would, were their nostrums taken seriously,
only substitute different counterproductive policies for current ones.
Poverty is not the root causes of terror, U.S. policies are

Sunday Herald, February 19, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20060219/ai_n16158178
A LEADING US academic will challenge the establishment this week when he makes the controversial claim that poverty is not
the root cause of international terrorism. Alan Krueger, professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University, will say
suicide bombers tend to come from middle-class families. He will also argue that terrorism is directly motivated by US policy
decisions. Krueger's arguments will be made in a prestigious three-part lecture series at the London School of Economics,
beginning on Tuesday. The former member of the Clinton administration will present new research on the "causes and
consequences" of terrorism, which he says have been misunderstood. One of his main findings disputes the supposed link
between deprivation and terrorism. "One point I'm going to make is that the popular stereotype, from Tony Blair on down, seems
to be that poverty is the root cause of terrorism. That is a very questionable presumption. The evidence doesn't point in that
direction, " he told the Sunday Herald. Krueger reached the conclusion by sampling members of Hezbollah and looking at the
biographies of suicide bombers in Israel. "Overwhelmingly they were from well-off families, " he said He said his model is
relevant to al-Qaeda (whose leader Osama bin Laden came from a wealthy family and whose main ally was a doctor) and the
9/11 attacks on New York. "It fits very well. Fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers were middle-class or from high-income classes. Krueger
also applied his findings to the London Tube and bus bombings last July. "My vibe on the people who carried out the suicide
attacks was that they were not from struggling families. He argues that terrorists, instead of coming primarily from poor states,
tend to hail from oppressive regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This, he says, shows that terrorists tend to be motivated by
fanaticism, not poverty. "In most cases [a suicide bomber] is not someone who has nothing to live for, but someone who
desperately believes in a cause." He will also say US policies, such as the presence of troops in the Middle East, are one of the
main factors behind terrorism. "A good example is US presence in Saudi Arabia, which is a large part of the motivation for alQaeda. The US just had to think of suicide bombers as people who are destitute, whereas I think they are motivated by political
factors. "We have to own up to the fact that a lot of the terrorist activity is in response to policy decisions." Krueger's research
challenges the conventional wisdom that terrorism is motivated by third world conditions in Arab countries and by envy of the
West. The left, particularly in Britain, has tended to argue that a root cause of Muslim anger is Palestinian poverty, an explanation
that Krueger's model seems to reject.
257
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 258 of 318
A2: Terrorists Cant Get Materials

A nuclear black market exists in Russia
Furthermore, the basic preconditions of a true marketwould-be sellers and
interested buyersappear to be present. In Russia, the post-cold war loss of
government orders for nuclear goods, weakened security controls, and the
economic desperation faced by the Russian workforce, set the stage for a
dangerous proliferation dynamic. As then-senator Sam Nunn told a Senate hearing
in 1995, the former Soviet Union was a vast potential supermarket for nuclear
weapons, weapons grade uranium and plutonium and equally deadly chemical and
biological weapons. 3 The literally hundreds of attempted thefts of nuclear and
radiological materials at post-Soviet nuclear enterprises, especially in the 1990s, is
ample evidence of proliferation pressures on the supply side. In one revealing 1998
incident, suggestive of a highly unstable security climate, Russian security officials
reportedly foiled a plot by staff members of a Chelyabinsk nuclear facility to steal
18.5 kilograms of HEU which, depending on the level of enrichment, could be almost
enough for an atomic bomb.
258
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 259 of 318
A2: Terrorists Cant Get Materials

Al Qaeda can access smuggled materials

At this juncture, the conclusion seems warranted that nuclear leakage, including
deliberate clandestine transfers of fissile material, is not just a threat but a reality.
The extent and significance of such transfers cannot be precisely calibrated. The
cases of Iran and Al Qaedaadversaries of greatest current concernsuggest a
plausible link between smuggling and proliferation, even if no definitive evidence
exists that either has obtained a weapon or the means to make one through
smuggling channels. The link is especially obvious in the case of Al Qaeda, since for
nonstate actors smuggling is practically the sole pathway to a nuclear capability.
The group is believed to have sought HEU (apparently unsuccessfully) in various
venuesAfrica, Western Europe, and the former Soviet Unionsince the early
1990s. The group appears to have been victimized by scam artists offering lowgrade reactor fuel and radioactive trash, useless for making fission weapons,
Possibly of greater import are its efforts to acquire a complete nuclear weapon.
Stories circulated in 1998 that bin Laden offered a Kazakh arms dealer two million
pounds for a weapon, and that Al Qaeda actually bought 20 tactical nuclear
warheads from the Chechen mafia for $20 million and two tons of opium. 13 Also,
former CIA director George Tenet recounts in his book, At the Center of the Storm,
that the agency in 2001 had received a stream of reliable reporting that senior Al
Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia had been negotiating for the sale of three Russian
tactical nuclear devices.14 Al Qaedas leaders have not been shy about claiming
success in its nuclear ventures. Bin Laden announced in a late 2001 interview that
we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri told the same correspondent in 2004 that the group had succeeded in
purchasing some suitcase nuclear weapons, and that such items were widely
available on the black market in Central Asia. 15 Most observers are skeptical of
such claims, citing the groups technical inexperience, its pariah status, the failure
to detonate such a weapon and other factors. Importantly, an extensive search of
government buildings, military compounds, terrorist camps, safe houses and the
like in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom found no trace of fissile materials or
a weapon.16 Predictable denials have come from Russia: then Russian president
Vladimir Putin stated in a 2002 interview that he was absolutely confident that
terrorists in Afghanistan do not possess Soviet or Russian weapons of mass
destruction.17 Nevertheless, Al Qaedas evident determination to acquire a nuclear
weapon and the possibility that some such weapons are unaccounted for or at least
not under Russian control are disconcerting, to say the least. For a nation-state,
smuggling is one pathway, if not the preferred one, to a nuclear bomb. Unlike
259
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 260 of 318
terrorists, states have various legitimate options for engaging a supplier country
including official diplomatic ties, open contacts with officials, scientists and so on. In
the case of Iran, a cozy nuclear relationship with Russia, epitomized by, but not
limited to, the construction of a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant at Busehr is a
continuing source of proliferation concern. Some U.S. officials believe that Iran could
leverage the relationship to expand contacts with Russias nuclear entities and to
acquire information and materials directly applicable to a nuclear weapons program.
For Iran, the chances of pulling off a clandestine procurement effort for nuclear
wares seem much higher than for an internationally proscribed group such as Al
Qaeda.
260
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 261 of 318
A2: No Black Market

Lack of a clear market proves the threat is significant
Finally, the ostensible lack of clear market relationships in observed nuclear
smuggling activity may be unrepresentative of the true state of affairs. That is,
purveyors of strategic nuclear wares may be converging with customers in ways not
readily apparent to western intelligence or security officials. The prime example of
such a shadow market in the nuclear realm was the notorious marketing network
for nuclear weapons technology set up by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. The
network, which sold centrifuges, centrifuge components, uranium hexafluoride gas,
and nuclear weapons designs to various adversary nations, operated for about 15
years (from the late 1980s to early 2004) before being shut down by a joint U.S.U.K. intelligence effort. Conceivably, a Khan-type network dedicated to covert sales
of weaponsusable materials could take shape on the territory of the former Soviet
Union, managed by corrupt elements within the nuclear establishments of Russia
and other newly independent states.
261
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 262 of 318
A2: Russian Security Has Improved

90s thefts make improvements irrelevant
These positive trends, however, beg the question of what might have happened in
the 1990s-a time of extreme hardship within the Russian nuclear complexwhen
modern safeguards technology had not yet been widely introduced. For example, at
the end of the decade, security enhancements under the Department of Energys
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program had been completed at fewer
than one-third of the Russian building sites believed to house weapons-usable HEU
and plutonium. Completion at all targeted sites is scheduled for year-end 2008 and
deployment of radiation detectors at border crossings, mostly in Russia, is expected
to extend into the next decade. These programs have an intrinsic threat-reduction
value, but by this timesome 16 years after the USSRs collapsesome nuclear
material of consequence could have fallen outside whatever improved fences and
security barriers may now be installed and become available for sale. 9 A related
problem of the 1990s concerns the status of former Soviet inventories of nuclear
weapons. Weapons are generally believed to be better guarded than their fissile
material counterparts. However, when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union
disintegrated, tens of thousands of tactical nukes of various descriptionsfrom
short range missiles to atomic demolition minesremained on the territory of most
of the new post-Soviet states. These weapons were supposed to have been shipped
back to Russia by mid-1992, but some observers are skeptical. As Harvard scholar
Graham Allison observes Under the most favorable circumstances, DHL or Federal
Express would find it challenging to move so many items from so many sites in so
little time without losing any.10 Moreover, persistent reports have circulated over
the years. Some weapons wee deliberately withheld by the new republics. For
instance, an unconfirmed April 2006 report in the independent newspaper, Novaya
Gazeta, claimed that Ukraine had failed to return some 250 nuclear warheads to
Russia after the Soviet collapse, and hinted that a number of them could have been
sold to third countries, including Iran.11 Meanwhile, the visible black market for
nuclear materials continues to draw international attention, despite evidence of
reduced activity. For example, in June 2003 an Armenian smuggler was captured at
the border with Georgia carrying 170 grams of HEU. The material was enriched to
89 percent U-235, close to the standard used for nuclear weapons (above 90
percent). In early 2006, a Russian (North Ossetian) trafficker was apprehended in a
sting operation in Georgia with 100 g of HEU also enriched to 89 percent. Whether
the two shipments were part of the same cache is not known. The smuggler told
Georgian authorities that he had access to an additional two to three kilograms of
the same material, but this claim was not verified. A New York Times account of the
incident observed that the case has alarmed officials, because they had thought
262
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 263 of 318
that new security precautions had tamped down the nuclear black market that
developed in the 1990s . . . However, in both of the above cases, there is a strong
likelihood that the material leaked out years earlier, before the safeguards were
fully in place, and then stashed while the perpetrators looked for a buyer
263
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 264 of 318
A2: IAEA Solves Nuclear Materials Diversion

Lack of resources constrains the IAEA
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, December 2008,
http://documents.scribd.com/docs/15bq1nrl9aerfu0yu9qd.pdf
The IAEA is constrained in serving as the worlds nuclear watchdog because its staff is aging
and its budget has increased little over the past decade. The IAEA has been forced to rely on
extrabudgetary contributions from member countries, including the United States. Because
of this, the IAEA now faces uncertainties about its long-term ability to perform its
fundamental missiondetecting the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and discovering
clandestine activities associated with weapons programs.
Civil nuclear expansion overhelms the IAEA

Perhaps the most important challenge facing the IAEA is the expected expansion of civil
nuclear programs throughout the world. New nuclear facilities will have to be carefully
monitored to ensure that no nation uses peaceful activities as a cover for a secret nuclear
weapons program or for diverting weapons-usable material to a weapons program. Such
monitoring will increase the strain on the IAEAs already limited resources. As a first step,
the United States and the IAEA should ensure that civilian nuclear facilities are designed and
built with safeguards in mind.
IAEA cant detect nuclear materials diversion in a timely

manner
Among the other tests facing the IAEA is the inherent difficulty of reliably detecting
dangerous illicit nuclear activities in a timely fashion. Some of these difficultiessuch as
detecting military diversions from nuclear fuel cycle activitiesare not likely to be remedied
no matter how much the IAEAs resources are increased. In the past 20 years, while the
amount of safeguarded nuclear material usable for weapons (highly enriched uranium and
separated plutonium) has increased by a factor of 6 to 10, the budget for safeguards has not
kept pace and there are actually fewer inspections per safeguarded facility than before.
IAEA lacks authority to secure material

In addition to limited resources, the IAEA lacks clear authority to secure nuclear material and
install near-real-time surveillance at the sites it inspects, or to conduct the wide-area
surveillance needed to monitor activities under the Additional Protocol. Dysfunctional and
nontransparent national accounting practices and national procedures for inventorying
nuclear materials further limit the IAEAs effectiveness, especially when coupled with the
agencys increasing inability to meet its timely detection goals.
264
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 265 of 318
265
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 266 of 318
A2: Cooperative Programs With Russia Solve

Russia wont cooperate on biological weapons materials
security
Increasingly, the Russian government has viewed biological CTR programs with disinterest
and even suspicion, arguing that its growing economic strength obviates the need for
continued foreign assistance.
266
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 267 of 318
Nuke Terror Attack Will Originate from Pakistan

Next terror attack likely to originate from Pakistan
Frontier Star (AsiaNet-Pakistan), December 3, 2008, p. online
Describing Pakistan as "the intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism", a top US Congressional
panel has warned that the next terror attack on America is likely to originate in its ally's tribal
areas. While observing that Pakistan is a US ally, the commission on weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) and terrorism said "the next terrorist attack against the United States is likely to originate
from within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas" in Pakistan. The US says the tribal areas in
northwest Pakistan, where the government exerts little control, are a haven for militants from both
Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan. The commission also expressed particular concern about the
nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, and about Pakistan, which it described as "the intersection
of nuclear weapons and terrorism." It warned that there is a threat of nuclear terrorism, both
because more countries are developing nuclear weapons and because some existing nuclear powers are
expanding their arsenals. "Terrorist organizations are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons," said the
report, which was published Tuesday on the Internet and will be officially released Wednesday.
Terrorists could get access to nuclear material through

Pakistan
ABC News, 12-2, 8, http://www.abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=6375476&page=1
The report notes that Pakistan's nuclear weapons stockpile consists of about 85 nuclear warheads and that
China has recently agreed to build two nuclear power plants in Pakistan, which could help exacerbate a
regional nuclear arms race with its nuclear armed neighbor India. "Though most U.S. and Pakistani
officials say that these weapons and their components are safe from inside or outside theft, the risk that
radical Islamists -- al Qaeda or Taliban -- may gain access to nuclear material is real." "America's margin
of safety against a WMD attack is shrinking. But we also want to assure the people that there is ample and
solid ground for hope about the future," the report states.
267
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 268 of 318
A2: Terrorism Is a Meaningless Term

Its value-loaded nature doesn't render terrorism a meaningless
term
Paul Wilkinson, Professor in International Relations, University of St Andrews,
TERRORISM, PROTEST AND POWER, Martin Warner and Roger Crisp eds., 19 90,
p.45-6. (MHSOLT1896)
It is frequently suggested that the usage of the concept of terrorism outlined above is so contentious or
'value-loaded' that there is no adequate basis for meaningful scholarly debate and collaborative research in
the field. This is far from being the case. Since the mid 1970s there has been considerable development
internationally in the academic social scientific and historical literature on terrorism. As one would expect
there is an enormous variety of approaches, theories and methodologies within the field. An examination
of the scholarly literature on other aspects of conflict, such as revolution or limited war, would find a
similar diversity of methods and conclusions. It would be foolish to expect the literature on terrorism to
reflect total agreement on concepts, theories, data and literature. It is noteworthy, however, that the most
authoritative guide to the international literature on terrorism (Schmid 1988) concludes that there is a
consensus among over a hundred leading scholars worldwide on what its editors call a 'minimal
definition' of terrorism. This consensus rests on five elements or characteristics which the overwhelming
majority of scholars in the field identify as the distinguishing characteristics or hallmarks of terroristic
violence. These five elements are:1. the intention to create extreme fear or terror;2. the targeting of
random and symbolic targets, including civilians and civilian property;3. the attempt to influence a wider
audience than the immediate victims of the violence;4. the use of particularly brutal or extreme methods
of violence, viewed as 'extranormal' according to the norms of the community under attack;5. the
exploitation of terrorism for a variety of purposes, including influencing the mass media, public opinion,
sectors of the population and governments.
268
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 269 of 318
State Support Critical to Nuclear Terror

State support critical to terrorist bomb construction
Matthew Bunn is a senior research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
& SOCIAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 136-7
Plutonium separation is effected by chemical means, which is possible because
plutonium displays different chemical behavior than the other elements with which
it is mixed. Because the separation process can be chemical rather than based on
isotopic masses, it is technically easier, in principle, than uranium enrichment. But
the process is made greatly more difficult by the intense radiation emanating from
the commingled fission products. This intense radioactivity makes it extremely
difficult to fix problems with reprocessing plants as they arise (a problem that has
led some commercial plants even in advanced nuclear states to close soon after
they opened, such as the U.S. West Valley facility and the Windscale reprocessing
facility in the United Kingdom). In short, producing either HEU or plutonium is a technically
daunting enterprise. It is extremely unlikely that a subnational terrorist group would be able to make its
own nuclear bomb material. The U.S. Department of Defense (1998, II-V-60) has stated
that "90 percent of the overall difficulty in making a nuclear weapon lies in the production of special
nuclear material," noting that more than 90 percent of the Manhattan Project budget
supported material production. Given these underlying physical realities, it is virtually
inconceivable that a terrorist group would be able to produce separated plutonium or HEU on its own.
The terrorists' main path to the bomb is getting the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons (or a
nuclear weapon itself) after they have already been produced by a state. A state could transfer
nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist group deliberately, but this is unlikely
given the potential for retaliation if it were traced back to the program of origin.
Confirmed cases of theft

Unlike theft of a complete nuclear weapon, there are confirmed cases of theft of
weapons-usable material.20 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
reported eighteen seizures of stolen HEU or plutonium from 1993-2007, but most of
269
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 270 of 318
these cases involved very small quantities.21 Another source lists only one known
incident involving a substantial quantity of HEU, a 1994 case in Prague involving
Czech, Slovak and Russian nationals.22 Says one analyst, if you add up all the
reported attempts to sell highly enriched uranium or plutonium, even including
those that have the scent of security-agency hype and those where the material
was of uncertain quality, the total amount of material still falls short of what a
bomb-maker would need to construct a single explosive.23 But, he acknowledges,
that does not account for the undetected cases of theft.24 A separate danger, not
covered by this brief, is from radiological dispersion devices, which would inflict only
a handful of fatalities but could sow terror. More than one terrorist group has
seriously considered such an attack, and in another instance Chechen rebels placed
a radiological source in a public park and then alerted reporters, to demonstrate
their capability.25
270
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 271 of 318
Bioterrorism
271
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 272 of 318
Bioterror Risks
Bioterror risks increasing
Bruce Jones, 2014, Bruce Jones is a senior fellow and the director of the Project on International
Order and Strategy at Brookings and a consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford
University, 2014 Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and
Restraint, Kindle Edition
With 9/ 11 we saw the capacity of a well-organized, global terrorist organization to
challenge the basic structures of international order and the security of the world's
superpower. The ability of terrorist organizations to disrupt international networks
and flows continues to be a serious threat to the global economy and to various
states security. But what most worries me is the growing capacity of individuals,
individual scientists, and even the lone terrorist to manipulate with increasing
sophistication and increasing access to technology our biological future. As the
scientific capacity to manipulate DNA shifts from being the terrain of highly
specialized government programs to being the terrain of common university-level
research, so the risks of accidental release of deadly biological material will grow, as
will the prospects for terrorist use of biological material. Jones, Bruce (2014-03-17).
Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and
Restraint (Kindle Locations 3255-3262). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.
272
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 273 of 318
Billions Die
Bioterrorism Kills Billions
Alexander 07 (Timothy, M.A. in European Studies, Former Scottish Editor of Burkes Peerage, B.Sc. in Pol. Sc.
& History; October 22nd, War On Iran = You Die from Biowar, Op Ed News, Lord Stirling,
http://www.opednews.com/articles/genera_lord_sti_071020_war_on_iran__3d_you_di.htm)
We have been conditioned, by seeing films of mushroom clouds and images of nuclear destruction in Japan at the end of WWII, to
understanding of the horrific effects of a nuclear war. We have NOT been conditioned to
biological war. The kill numbers are very similar,
just with biowar you don't get the "big bangs", the mushroom clouds, the nuclear bombers, the
ICBMs, etc. Just sub-microscopic genetically engineered super killer viruses that we have
absolutely no defense against, delivered in secret, with a slow horrifying
unstoppable migration through the global human population . All the fear of a naturally mutated
form of "bird flu" that might kill tens of millions is simply "child's play" compared to multiple designer military viruses that
are built to kill in the many hundreds of millions to billions of people globally. It costs approximately US$1
have some
understand the effects of Twenty-first Century advanced
million to kill one person with nuclear weapons-of-mass destruction but only approximately US$1 to kill one person with biological
weapons-of-mass destruction. Bioweapons are truly the "poor man's nukes". The Iranians are known to have a biological weapons
program and they, and their allies, certainly have the means to deliver biowar agents into the Israeli and European and North
American homelands. Bioweapons do not have to be dispersed via missiles or bombs, they are perfect for non-traditional normally
non-military delivery systems. Being very small (there are, for example, typically approximately 40 million bacterial cells in every
gram of soil and massively more viruses in the same gram), they lend themselves to an enormous variety of non-detectable
methodologies for delivery and use in war, both regionally and globally. What is being missed here, with all the talk of Iran
developing nuclear weapons or not (depending on one's viewpoint), is that Iran is already a state that possesses WMD. HELLO, ANY
WAR WITH IRAN IS HIGHLY APT TO INVOLVE LARGE SCALE DEATHS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN
WMD THREAT. Hello again, this means that YOU...the person reading this...is apt to die from biowar in event of a war with Iran! We
are in a MAD....mutually assured destruction....pre-war state with Iran, just as we are with Russia and and to a lessor extent with
China when it comes to nuclear weapons. A famous line from the movie "Wargames" (referring to engaging in nuclear war and the
odds of "winning" such a war) is "the only winning move is not to play". Sad to say, this does not seem to have any bearing on the
The nature of biowar is that it is a "gift that

keeps on giving". Once released, advanced recombination DNA based viral
bioweapons will continue to spread and kill and kill ....regardless if Iran (and its ally Syria) are but a sea
apocalyptic strategy of the neocon push for war with Iran.
of green radioactive glass devoid of all life. With advanced biowar agents, it is not the quantity that counts but the quality; humans
themselves become the vectors and delivery systems of the bioweapons. It does not require large amounts of weapons running into
the millions or billions of tons of high explosives; nor does it require ICBMs and cruise missiles and $100 million dollar warplanes to
deliver the bioweapons. A very small group of human assets, prepositioned with small amounts of easily hidden biowar weapons
(submicroscopic viruses), in the Middle East, Europe, Canada, and America can begin the process that will result in the deaths of
does it matter if you die from

some exotic bioengineered hemorrhagic fever or from radiation poisoning/nuclear
blast .......dead is still dead. To begin to understand the truly horrific nature of the biowar threat, one only has to look
to history for some "mild" examples. The Black Death bubonic pandemic, believed caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis,
hundreds of millions or even billions of human beings. When you get right down to it,
is estimated to have killed between a third and two-thirds of Europe's population after it spread to Europe in 1347 from South-
is easily treated with modern

turned Black Death from a medieval plague into a 20th
western/Central Asia. Yersinia pestis, being a bacteria is massive when compared to a virus, and
antibiotics. However, the Soviet Union's Biopreparat organization
Century
bioweapon.
The Yersinia pestis bacteria was exposed to every then-known antibiotic,
in a process that any
advanced
high
school
or early undergraduate college level biology class student could undertake , and the resulting
antibiotic resistant Y. pestis was bred and loaded into a small number of Soviet ICBMs aimed at America. The resistant Y. pestis had
The intent was to hit American

survivors of a nuclear war with a new and untreatable form of Black Death that itself
could survive the effects of nuclear fallout. As frighting as a totally antibiotic resistant Yersinia pestis
also been exposed to various levels of radiation to "radiation harden" the bacteria.
bacteria is, it remains "child's play" compared to the more advanced recombination DNA technology used in most biowar programs.
This typically involves the recombining of viral DNA into new virus, "designer virus". The Soviets, years ago, engineered a new virus
that combined elements of Smallpox and Ebola. With the genetic engineering of viruses those doing the "designing" can engineer
into the virus a wide number of different characteristics. For instance, an advanced hemorrhagic fever can be designed to be:
airborne (capable of being transmitted via sneezing), with a very small amount of viral material required to infect a human host,
with a incubation period of 14 days or longer, with most of the incubation period that is both highly contagious and at best looks like
a mild version of the common cold, with the resulting hemorrhagic fever having a mortality of 90% or more. The same technology
can be used to create a large number of different viruses which can all be released on a target population at the same time, vastly
273
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 274 of 318
complicating detection and containment and treatment programs. In fact the normal research and development process used in
genetic engineering results in a large number of different new viruses. Those nations not directly involved in a strike upon Iran, that
is most of the rest of the world, will nevertheless face massive deaths within their nations...they will lose more of their citizens to the
war, that we are about to unleash, than they lost in World War II and ALL THE OTHER WARS IN HISTORY COMBINED. Needless to say,
The global
military, political, economic, and medical chaos resulting from global biowar will make
the use of nuclear weapons a likely outcome as America, the United Kingdom,
France and other nations starting the war will be seen as out-of-control "mad dogs" who have unleashed
World War III. The Book of Revelations speaks of one-third of the world dying, in the Final Battle, from plague ....biowar; and
this will have a profound effect on their actions towards those nations who have started the mess in the first place.
another one-third of the world dying from "wormwood"....which we now know to be nuclear war effects ...Chernobyl, which comes
from the Ukrainian word "chornobyl", translates into wormwood (or its close relative mugwort). (Chernobyl is the site of a massive
uncontrolled nuclear meltdown disaster in the Ukraine on the 26th of April 1986). We are in a period of extreme danger to us all.
Even more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 60s. Yet far too many people are so uneducated as to the real dangers
from advanced Twenty-first Century biowar that they are totally blind to the profound risk to their own lives.
274
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 275 of 318
Bioterrorism Causes Human Extinction

Terrorists will use bioweapons, triggering human extinction
The First and simPlest Kinds of biologi-cal weapons are those that are not
contagious and thus do not lead to epidemics. These have been developed for use
in military conflicts for most of the 20th century. Because the pathogens used are
not contagious, they are considered controllable: that is, they have at least some of
the command-and-control aspects of a conventional weapon. typically, these
pathogens have been weaponized, mean- inbred or refined for deployment by
using artillery shells, aerial bombs, or missiles much like conventional explosive
warheads. They can be highly deadly.
anthrax is the most famous example. in several early- 20th-century outbreaks, it
killed nearly 90% of those infected by inhaling bacterial spores into their lungs.
anthrax was used in the series of mail attacks in the United states in the fall of
2001. even with advanced antibiotic treatment, 40% of those who contracted
inhalational anthrax died during the 2001 attacks.1 That crime is believed to have
been the work of a lone bioweapons scientist who sought to publicize the threatof a
biological attack and boost funding for his work on anthrax vaccines. This
conclusion is consistent with the fact that virtually no effort was made to disperse
the bacte- riumindeed, the letters carrying the spores thoughtfully included text
warning of anthrax exposure and recom- mending that the recipient seek immediate
treatment. despite this intentional effort to limit rather than spread the infection, a
surprising amount of trouble was caused when the fine anthrax powder leaked from
envelopes and contaminated other mail. Before this episode, nobody would have
guessed that letters mailed in new Jersey to addresses in manhattan and
Washington, d.c., could kill someone in connecticut, but they did. and no one would
have predicted that a domestic bioterrorist launching multiple attacks, including
one against the U.s. congress, would elude the FBi for years. But that is what
happened. What if such an attack were made not by some vigilante trying to alert
the world to the dangers of bioweaponsbut instead by a real sociopath? Theodore J.
Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, may have been such a person. he
was brilliant enough to earn a Ph.d. in math- ematics from the University of
michigan yet was mentally disturbed enough to be a one-man terrorist cell: his mail
bombs claimed victims over nearly two decades. Kaczynski certainly had enough
brains to use sophisticated methods, but because he opposed advanced
technology, he made untraceable low-tech bombs that killed only three people. a
future Kaczynski with training in microbiology and genetics, and an
eagerness to use the destructive power of that science, could be a threat
to the entire human race.
indeed, the world has already experienced some true acts of biological
terror. aum shinrikyo produced botulinum toxin and anthrax and
reportedly released them in tokyo on four separate occasions. a variety of
technical and organizational difficulties frustrated these attacks, which did not
275
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 276 of 318
cause any casualties and went unrecognized at the time for what they were, until
the later sarin attack clued in the authorities.2 had the group been a bit more
competent, things could have turned out far worse.
one 2003 study found that an airborne release of one kilogram of an anthrax-sporecontaining aerosol in a city the size of new york would result in 1.5 million infections and 123,000 to 660,000 fatalities, depending on the effectiveness of the public
health response.3 a 1993 U.s. government analysis determined that 100
kilograms of weaponized anthrax, if sprayed from an airplane upwind of
Washington, d.c., would kill between 130,000 and three million people.
Because anthrax spores remain viable in the environment for more than
30 years,1 portions of a city blanketed by an anthrax cloud might have to
be abandoned for years while extensive cleaning was done. Producing
enough anthrax to kill 100,000 americans is far easier
to doand far harder to detectthan is constructing a nuclear bomb of
comparable lethality. anthrax, moreover, is rather benign as biological weapons
go. The pathogen is reasonably well understood, having been studied in one form or
another in biowarfare circles for more than 50 years. natural strains of the
bacterium are partially treatable with long courses of common antibiotics such as
ciprofloxacin if the medication is taken sufficiently quickly, and vaccination soon
after exposure seems to reduce mortality further.5 But bioengineered anthrax
that is resistant to both antibiotics and vaccines is known to have been
produced in both soviet and american bioweapons laboratories. in 1997, a
group of russian scientists even openly published the recipe for one of these
superlethal strains in a scientific journal.6
in addition, numerous other agents are similar to anthrax in that they are highly
lethal but not contagious. The lack of contagion means that an attacker must
administer the pathogen to the people he wishes to infect. in a military context,
this quality is generally seen as a good thing because the resulting disease can be
contained in a specific area. Thus, the weapon can be directed at a well-defined
target, and with luck, little collateral damage will result.
Unfortunately, many biological agents are communicable and so can spread
beyond the people initially infected to affect the entire population.
infectious pathogens are inherently hard to control because there is
usually no reliable way to stop an epidemic once it starts. This property
makes such biological agents difficult to use as conventional weapons. a nation
that starts an epidemic may see it spread to the wrong countryor even to its own
people. indeed, one cannot target a small, well-defined population with a contagious
pathogen; by its nature, such a pathogen may infect the entire human race.
despite this rather severe drawback, both the soviet Union and the United states, as
well as imperial Japan, investigated and produced contagious bioweapons. The
logic was that their use in a military conflict would be limited to last-ditch,
scorched earth campaigns, perhaps with a vaccine available only to one side.
smallpox is the most famous example. it is highly contagious and spreads through
casual contact. smallpox was eradicated in the wild in 1977, but it still exists in both
U.s. and russian laboratories, according to official statements.7 Unofficial holdings
are harder to track, but a number of countries, including north Korea, are believed
to possess covert smallpox cultures.
Biological weapons were strictly regulated by international treaty in 1972. The
United states and the soviet Union agreed not to develop such weapons and to
destroy
276
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 277 of 318
existing stocks. The United states stopped its bioweapons work, but the russians
cheated and kept a huge program going into the 1990s, thereby producing
thousands of tons of weaponized anthrax, smallpox, and far more exotic biological
weapons based on genetically engineered viruses. no one can be certain how far
either the germs or the knowledge has spread since the collapse of the soviet
Union.
experts estimate that a large-scale, coordinated smallpox attack on the United
states might kill 55,000 to 110,000 people, assuming that sufficient vaccine is available to contain the epidemic and that the vaccine works.8, 9 The death toll may be
far higher if the smallpox strain has been engineered to be vaccine-resistant or to
have enhanced virulence. moreover, a smallpox attack on the United states
could easily broaden into a global pandemic, despite the U.s. stockpile of at
least 300 million doses of vaccine. all it would take is for one infected person
to leave the country and travel elsewhere. if new york city were attacked
with smallpox, infections would most likely appear on every contine nt,
except perhaps antarctica, within two weeks. once these beachheads were
established, the epidemic would spread almost without check because the
vaccine in world stockpiles and the infrastructure to distribute it would be
insufficient. That is particularly true in the developing world, which is ill equipped
to handle their current disease burden to say nothing of a return of smallpox. even if
only 50,000 people were killed in the United states, a million or more would
probably die worldwide before the disease could be contained, and containment
would probably require many years of effort. as horrible as this would be, such a
pandemic is byno means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons.
First, most of the classic bioweapons are basedon 1960s and 1970s technology
because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United
states and most other Western countries. second, the russians, although solidly
committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the
cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and
technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly
transforming the field in the last few decades. high school biology students routinely
perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for
the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons
research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as
the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. tomorrows terrorists will have
vastly more deadly bugs to choose from.consider this sobering development: in
2001, australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects
mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic
modifica- tion transformed the virus.10, 11 instead of producing mild symptoms, the
new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring
strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing
vaccine or antiviral drug. a team of researchers at saint louis University led by mark
Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it:
Bullers variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators
also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially
effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 another saving
grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. of course, it is
quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too.
strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to
mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses
277
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 278 of 318
as well. might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that
infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is
resistant to any known antiviral therapy? ive asked this question of experts many
times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldnt be done. This
case is just one example. many more are pour- ing out of scientific journals and
conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial
study done at the University of Wisconsinmadison in which virologists enumerated
the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it
easily transmitted from one mammal to another. Biotechnology is advancing so
rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. nor is it clear
that anyone is even trying. in addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other
parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic
depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during
which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. delaying the onset of serious
symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus
harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by hiv, which is very difficult
to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. intimate contact is
needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that hiv can
take years to progress to aids, which can then take many more years to kill the
victim. What makes hiv so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed hiv to claim more than 30 million
lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and
facing a highly uncertain future. a virus genetically engineered to infect its host
quickly, to generate symptoms slowlysay, only after weeks or monthsand to
spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating
than hiv. it could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects
suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because
most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. a
technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus
and kill a large part of humanity with it. indeed, terrorists may not have to
develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. given
the rate at which biologists are making discover-ies about viruses and the immune
system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial
pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. indeed, a detailed
species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal.
The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate
the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16
When ive talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point
out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies.
if you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan,
however, they have plenty of ideas. modern biotechnology will soon be
capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human
race or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech
civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups
could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but
keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these
tasks. never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so
easily. even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological
science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a
weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history.
278
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 279 of 318
access to extremely lethal agentslethal enough to exterminate Homo

sapienswill be available to anybody with a solid background in biology,
terrorists included.The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom
had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of
training. Bin laden had a degree in civil engineering. mohammed atta attended a
ger- man university, where he earned a masters degree in urban planningnot a
field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. a future set of terrorists could just
as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies in- nocently
enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. hundreds of universities in europe
and asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a
sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United states accept
students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the
near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic
individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly
terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even
billions of people. indeed, the creation of such weapons within the next 20 years
seems to be a virtual certainty. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate. one approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause
compares with that of other calamities that the human race has faced.
Bioterror attacks risk extinction

Steinbruner 97
(Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institution, 97 (John, Foreign Policy, 12/22, Lexis)
More than 70 years later, revulsion persists and the Geneva Protocol has been strengthened, but the sense of threat
of biological warfare has intensified. It is widely recognized that, as potential instruments of destruction,
biological agents are inexpensive, readily accessible, and unusually

dangerous. Of the thousands of pathogens that prey upon human beings, a few are now known to have the
potential for causing truly massive devastation, with mortality levels conceivably exceeding what chemical or even
nuclear weapons could produce. Nature provides the prototypes without requiring any design bureau or
manufacturing facility. Medical science provides increasingly useful information, which by its very nature is
conveyed in open literature. A small home-brewery is all that would be required to produce a potent threat of major
proportions. At least 17 countries are suspected of conducting biological weapons research - including several, such
as Iran and Iraq, that are especially hostile to the United States. CONTINUES Although human pathogens are
often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an
Pathogens are alive, weapons are not.

Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not
obvious, fundamentally important difference:
independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things.

That deceptively simple
observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage
occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably
predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent
of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component
The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process

whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological
for tactical military planning.
agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective
weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to
A lethal pathogen
that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable
of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately
threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential
be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction.
for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.
Bioterror risks extinction

Richard Ochs, Chemical Weapons Working Group Member, 2002 [Biological Weapons
must be Abolished Immediately, June 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html]
279
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 280 of 318
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure
or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or
deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a
"nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and
severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other
hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to
guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally
released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small
in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority
because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than
nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future
generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end.
Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially
worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck
even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola
viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or
vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW
POSSIBLE.
Bioterrorism results in extinction

Sandberg et al 8 Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at
Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, StockholmANDJason G.

MathenyPhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins.
special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of PittsburghAND
Milan M. irkovisenior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of
Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How
can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-ofhuman-extinction)
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great
progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by
We may face even greater

risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it
the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter.
possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction -level pandemics. The knowledge,

equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear
unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small

arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the
extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of
susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even
isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high
transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction . While
such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to
improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
weapons. And
280
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 281 of 318
at generic defense
Diffusion of technological knowledge means their evidence doesnt apply.
Tucker 08 (3/26, Jonathan, PhD in political science, BS in biology, manages the
Biosecurity Education Project at the Federation of American Scientists, former
founding director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program
at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, The bioweapons threat is
broader and closer than commonly thought,
These remarkable achievements have resulted in a shift from materials-based risks
to knowledge-based risks. High-throughput synthesizers can rapidly convert a DNA
sequence stored in computer memory into the physical reality of a pathogenic gene
or an infectious virus. Moreover, companies that synthesize custom pieces of DNA to order for corporate or
scientific clients are springing up around the world, even in cities such as Beijing, Mumbai, and Tehran. Some of
these firms, called "gene foundries," are capable of making gene-length DNA strands that can be ordered over the
Access to this capability could eventually enable technically skilled

individuals to construct deadly viruses such as Ebola in the laboratory ,
circumventing governmental controls on "select agents" of bioterrorism concern .
Given the existence today of thousands of "black-hatted" software hackers who create
and disseminate destructive computer viruses for their own personal gratification, it does not seem farfetched to worry about the possible emergence of a new generation of hobbyists or
"biohackers" who exploit biotechnology for malicious purposes. The pool of individuals with
relevant technical know-how is expanding rapidly as the field of synthetic biology
Internet.
attracts established researchers, graduate students, and even undergraduates. For example, MIT sponsors an
annual International Genetically Engineered Machines competition in which student teams manipulate advanced
genetic components and technologies. This event has grown from five teams in 2004 to 54 teams (750 students)
from 19 countries in 2007.
Cheap, easy, and new knowledge solves barriers.

Glassman 12 (4/4, James, diplomat-in-residence at the School of International
Service at American University, former senior fellow at AEI, We're Letting Our
Bioterrorism Defenses Down,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2012/04/04/were-letting-ourbioterrorism-defenses-down/)
Biological weapons have been called the poor mans atom bomb. They
are nowhere near as difficult to manufacture as nuclear weapons, and their return address
is hard to assess, making them ideal for non-state actors like Al Qaeda, which, in fact,
has been seeking to acquire biological WMD since at least 1999.
A report 12 years ago concluded, Individuals, with no background in the development and
production of bioweapons and no access to the classified information from the
former U.S. bio-weapons program, were able to produce a significant quantity of highquality weaponized Bacillus globigii a close cousin to the well-known threat, Anthrax.
In the spring of 2001, a Defense Science Board report, co-authored by Nobel Prize winner
Joshua Lederberg and George Whiteside, former chair of the Harvard chemistry
department, concluded that major impediments to the development of
biological weaponshave largely been eliminated in the last decade by
the rapid spread of biotechnology.
Knowledge dissemination means it only gets easier in the future.
281
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 282 of 318
Danzig 09
(2009, Richard, PhD, JD, director of the Center for a New American Security, member of the
Defense Policy Board and the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board, A Policymakers Guide to Bioterrorism and
What to Do About It, https://gfbr.virtualbiosecuritycenter.org/resource_docs/Danzig+-+2010++A+Policymaker's+Guide+to+Bioterrorism.pdf)
The recent revolution in biotechnology has proliferated, and predictably will continue to
proliferate knowledge, skills, and equipment that can be applied to develop and use
biological weapons.
Just as the invention of the semiconductor at midcentury enabled an information
revolution over the last quarter of the 20th century, so have advances in biotechnology in
recent decades initiated a revolution in biological sciences . An observation made by a task
3.
force of the Defense Science Board 7 years ago is even more emphatically the case today:
There is no area of science that is developing more rapidly than modern biology , and
no area of technology developing more rapidly than modern medicine. . . . This understanding can, unfortunately,
The
existing capabilities in biological weapons pose a very large threat to the [United
States]. . . . Advanced, optimized biological weapons could be catastrophically
effective.14
Concepts derived from the discovery of the structure and sequencing of DNA and
related genetic materials have deepened understanding and led to new
technologies and techniques (particularly polymerase chain reaction and synthesis). These have been
be applied, with only a modest shift of emphasis, to causing disease and thwarting medical treatment. . . .
supplemented by improvements in well-established practices (for example, fermentation and the distribution of
biological capabilities blur

the longstanding distinction between fundamental and applied research that has
aerosols). Today, as well discerned by a National Academy of Sciences paper,
served as the basis for much of at least U.S. policy toward balancing scientific openness and controls on research
Concomitantly, there has been a worldwide

distribution of biological knowledge and equipment through educational institutions
and dissemination in the name of security.15
(even at the high school level, but especially in college programs and graduate schools) and industries (including
the Internet contributes to the

dissemination of knowledge and the sale and resale of equipment. In combination, these
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology companies). As in other domains,
factors bring a general capability to obtain and proliferate pathogens into the hands of millions of people. As a
respected scientist recently summarized the situation:
anyone with a high school education can use widely available protocols and
prepackaged kits to modify the sequence of a gene or replace genes within a
microorganism; one can also purchase small, disposable, self-contained bioreactors
for propagating viruses and microorganisms. Such advances continue to lower
the barriers to biologic-weapons development. 16
Today,
282
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 283 of 318
at no availability
Tons of easy paths to getting pathogens.
Danzig 09 (2009, Richard, PhD, JD, director of the Center for a New American Security, member of the
Defense Policy Board and the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board, A Policymakers Guide to Bioterrorism and
What to Do About It, https://gfbr.virtualbiosecuritycenter.org/resource_docs/Danzig+-+2010++A+Policymaker's+Guide+to+Bioterrorism.pdf)
though most nations subscribe to the principle that biological weapons

should be controlled,10 we have no strategy, much less a comprehensive practice, to prevent
biological arms proliferation, or even to slow it appreciably.
There are three paths to obtaining a pathogen: harvest it from nature, obtain it from a research center, or
As a result,
create it by either modifying another pathogen or synthesizing it from its obtainable components.
Harvesting. Over 1,000 pathogens that exist in nature are inimical to man. Many of
these can be harvested from the soil, air, or the bodies of infected animals or people. Scores of
these can be cultured using well-established methods. It is as though
enriched uranium could be distilled from soil, or as though we were attempting gun
control when guns grew on trees .
Ordering. Culture libraries have also made pathogens more easily accessible. Controls
on access to particularly virulent pathogens tightened in the United States and abroad after the 2001 anthrax letter
attacks, but these controls vary between nations,11 and a large number of samples have already been dispersed.
Research on vaccines and drugs, combined with requirements for education and
training, have resulted in tens of thousands of pathogens being present in
laboratories throughout the world.12
Creating. The new biology has facilitated the creation of viruses and bacteria from
material that can be transferred from other organisms or be synthesized from
snippets purchased from commercial providers.13
Naturally occuring sources, theft from labs, and open source technical
literature.
Hellmich and Redig 07 (2007, Christina, PhD, Reader in International Relations
and Middle East Studies, and Amanda, MD, PhD, Clinical Fellow in Medicine, Harvard
Catalyst Clinical and Translational Science Center, The Question is When: The
Ideology of Al Qaeda and the Reality of Bioterrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Volume 30, Issue 5, 2007)
naturally occurring epidemics that makes the threat of
engineered epidemics so troubling. In many parts of the world, diseases that would
make ideal bioweapons still infect and kill people on a regular basis; the organisms
behind the disease can thus rightly be considered publicly accessible . Anthrax can occasionally be
Moreover, it is precisely the concern over
found in domesticated cattle and wild deer, hemorrhagic fevers can be documented in parts of Africa, and plague
bacteria infect wild rodents in parts of the United States (including many of the squirrels at the Grand Canyon,
which, it should be noted, are so used to people that they routinely approach tourists and beg for food). 60 More
recently, H5N1 avian flu was documented as the cause of death of three Turkish children and has even been
isolated from a dead bird in one of the most geographically remote regions of Europe, the Kingdom of Fife in eastern
Scotland. 61 And, in what is no small irony, the small fishing town of Cellardyke in which the dead swan was found
is a mere 7 miles from the town of St. Andrews and the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
hospitals and research facilities themselves are a veritable treasure trove of

infectious organisms. As has been previously noted, hospital pathology facilities will
purposely try to culture pathogens for purposes of identification. In research facilities,
production and storage of microbes occurs for similar reasons . Research on
pathogens likely to cause great harm to human health thus becomes dual-use
In addition,
283
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 284 of 318
research at its most polarized. Unintentionally, the desire to prevent viruses such as SARS or
avian flu from becoming a global pandemic has created a situation in which a great deal of
technical information about such deadly organisms has become public access . By its
very nature, scientific investigation requires openness and the exchange of information. Yet as with anything else,
honorable motives can be exploited by those seeking to do harm instead of good . In

October of 2005, joint publications in the two most prestigious scientific journals in the world, Science and Nature,
documented the recreation of the 1918 influenza strain responsible for 50 million deaths worldwide. 62 Although
the journals respective advisory boards reviewed the manuscripts prior to publication in light of the potentially
harmful applications of such knowledge, the decision was eventually made that the work should be published
because of the advancement to scientific knowledge and the fact that the techniques used have already been
It is ironic that an argument resting on the greater good is used both

by scientists considering counterterrorism and by the terrorists themselves . Although
the justifications offered by the scientists are undoubtedly true, the fact remains that once more, public
attention has been drawn to the ease with which some of humanity's greatest
achievements can also be misappropriated for nefarious purposes .
publicly discussed.
284
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 285 of 318
at no dispersal
Yes dispersal human carriers.
there is no
reason to think that Al Qaeda operatives themselves could not become , in what would be
the ultimate permutation of a suicide attack, mobile carriers of disease . The deliberate spread of
disease as a tool of warfare is not without historical precedent ; records indicate that the fourteenth
Furthermore, even without the risk of exposed civilians exacerbating an act of bioterrorism,
century plague epidemic may have gained a foothold in the European continent following the 1346 siege of Caffa in
which Mongol invaders catapulted corpses of their own soldiers who had died of the plague into the city in a crude
More recent history leaves

no doubt as to Al Qaeda's ability to recruit disenfranchised individuals to sacrifice
their own lives in an attempt to destroy as many of the enemy as possible in the
process. The evil genius behind this tactic is the way in which such actions have been
covered in a cloak of honor under the guise of Islam. In an even more troubling trend, the identity of
the so-called suicide bombers appears to be expanding beyond the traditional
stereotype of the young, Middle-Eastern male. Confirmed Al Qaeda attacks in Iraq and
Jordan and Chechen operations with suspected Al Qaeda ties have been carried out by women . 58 In a
world of globalization, the scope of legitimate passengers for international air travel is
virtually limitless. During a trans-Atlantic flight, the 400 passengers aboard a 747 aircraft will breathe recirculated air for eight or nine hours. If that air is spiked with the respiratory secretions of a
passenger with a contagious disease or a deliberate introduction of aerosolized materials, widespread
infection could ensue. Indeed, in a reflection of this concern, during the height of the SARS outbreak, certain
yet successful attempt to disseminate what is now known as Yersinia pestis. 57
international airports began requiring thermal scans of all passengers; those with a documented fever were not
permitted to fly. 59
However, such precautions are not routine nor do they possess the required sensitivity and specificity to exclude
passengers harboring a potentially deadly infection in their bodies or carry-on luggage from boarding an aircraft.
Not all contagious diseases present with a fever, and the infectious prodrome of many diseases is
actually noteworthy for its absence of symptoms. In addition, security checkpoint screening focuses
so heavily on the detection of conventional weapons and explosive devices that a
biological weapon would almost certainly slip through undetected . An infected
passenger would not be detected by current screening tools, and a collection of spores or
microbes designed for in-air release is several orders of magnitude smaller than a more conventional weapon. The
range of hiding places on a person or in carry-on luggage is endless, and even if chemical
scans did detect the potential signature of a laboratory chemical, without visual identification of an obvious weapon
the passenger in question would most likely be cleared to continue boarding. Finally, as the aftermath of 11
September demonstrates, terrorists with a calling card of multiple, simultaneous attacks are very, very difficult to
foil completely.
285
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 286 of 318
motive generic
Weapon of choice for international terrorism toxic, easy to spread, and
undetectable.
Roul 09 (Apr. 2009, Animeesh, co-founder and Executive Director (Research) of
the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi, Mphil, School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Is Bioterrorism
Threat Credible? Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, CBW Magazine,
http://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/IsBioterrorismThreatCredible_aroul_0408)
Much water has been passed since the anthrax scare which had taken its limited toll against the most powerful
country on earth immediately after the events of 9/11 terrorists events in the US. Though limited in its spread,
experts have concluded that the worst situation would arise mainly due excessive
human interference in the natural process of life . A substantial part of the threat
also constitutes the malign use of naturally occurring organisms (biological agents) by
mankind in general and terrorists in particular. There are many factors that attract a
terrorist group towards biological weapons and biological weapons attack. Most
important is their toxicity. In addition, their un-detectability and capacity to reproduce
rapidly make biological weapons a weapon of choice for terror groups .
Biological Weapons Use: Real Time or Futuristic
The big question is whether the threat of biological weapon use is real
or a product of
fearful future thinking? Plausibly enough, we are passing though a time where innovation is the key to survive. But
as
far as terrorist groups are concerned, they not only wish to survive, but endeavor
to thrive with continuous innovation and improvisation. Trends show that terrorists in South Asia ,
particularly in India, have always improvised their tactics and methods , be it in suicide attacks,
serial blasts, handling improvised explosives using pressure cookers, hurling grenades recruiting unemployed
civilians or in choosing targets (temples, Mosques and busy market places).2 And if intelligence reports are to be
they have graduated to snipers for targeting high-profile political or business

personalities in India. In the face of this continuous up-gradation of terror tactics,
use of biological weapon or deadly pathogen by terrorist groups or a lone wolf into civilian
population or targeting individuals, might be probable.
Equally imperative to note is the nature of the biological weapon agents. Biological weapon could be
lethal in the hands of non-states actors like terrorists, religious cults, and Mafia
syndicates. International terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda have made
unexpected efforts in developing bio-weapon capability among other
weapon of mass disruption/destructions (WMD) in the past and possibly,
are doing so even now.
believed,
286
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 287 of 318
motive al qaeda
Previous technical analyses ignore Al-Qaeda distorted islamic ideology
has been deployed to require bioweapons development organization
strength can overcome technical hurdles.
In the light of the discussion thus far, it is all too evident that bin Laden's rhetoricwith its
simultaneous appeal to powerful imagery embedded in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community and
its juxtaposition of political goals with the teachings of the Quran inspires his
followers to commit
terrible acts of destruction while being fully convinced that they are fulfilling the ordained will of Allah. As
a terrorist organization, Al Qaeda has shown itself to be not simply considering but
rather actively involved in the preparation of an actual bioterror attack.
Consequently, counterterrorist measures must consider the threat of biological weapons from the perspective of
those who would commit such acts, not from the position of a community that considers them reprehensible. Put
bluntly, in order to stop them, everyone else must learn to think like the terrorists.
the organizational leadership of Al Qaeda has repeatedly

demonstrated the ability to adapt all available resources, even those that appear
deceptively low-tech, toward the pursuit of complex end points . Indeed, the single most
As has been previously discussed,
devastating attack on a United States Navy vessel in recent years was inflicted not by a rogue SAM but by a dinghy
carrying a basement pipe bomb. 29 The stocking feet of travelers at airports around the world are now on constant
display thanks to a bombing attempt that, although fortunately a failure, was averted not by successful airport
screening but rather by the aptly named shoe bomber's incompetence. 30 As just two examples of an internally
consistent modus operandi, the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole and Richard Reid's attempted American
Airlines suicide bombing in 2001 highlight the synergistic combination of destruction and creativity underlying Al
these and other incidents make clear that Al Qaeda

operatives can and will use any and all means at their disposal to carry out terrorist
attacks: there is no justification for assumptions that the scope of such
attacks is limited to conventional terrorist weapons. On the contrary, Al Qaeda's
history suggests that advances in any field are potential targets for terrorist
manipulation.
This analytical framework is crucial for an analysis of the threat of bioterror as applied to Al Qaeda. Recent
developments in molecular biology and bioinformatics have made heretofore
unthinkable advancements and techniques not only possible but commonplace as
tools for laboratory or clinical applications. Watson and Crick discovered the structure of
Qaeda operations. Furthermore,
deoxyribonucleic acidDNAin 1953, resulting in a landmark Nature publication that forever changed the face of
a commercially available kit for

extracting DNA can be purchased for $200 and used in an elementary school
classroom while anyone with Internet access can peruse a database containing the coding sequences of
biology. 31 It is almost inconceivable that less than 50 years later,
hundreds of thousands of genes, including the human genome in its entirety. 32 The scientific achievements of the
biomedical life sciences from double helix to human genome are truly remarkable. However, as with information of
there is no guarantee that the potential applications of these advances will

be beneficial and not destructive. Information may well be a powerful tool, but in itself information can
any kind,
neither regulate the means by which it is acquired nor dictate the ends to which it is applied. In a flash of insight the
echoes of which have only grown louder in the decades since it was first uttered, Vaclav Havel pointedly reminds us
science, is not in itself a guarantee of a humane outcome. 33 In the context of

military technology, communication advances, improved
transportation, and even scientific breakthroughs in non-biological fields have been
usurped to kill and destroy. 34 Consequently, there is no reason to think that the most
that
modern terrorism studies,
287
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 288 of 318
destructive terrorist organization in human history will not seek to subvert one of the
most remarkable tools of modern science the tremendous power of molecular biology to achieve
their goals. Indeed, Al Qaeda's anthrax history indicates that they already have.
Earlier analyses of the threat of bioterrorism have identified the technical hurdles
involved with carrying out such an attackaccess to materials, developing a weapon, targeting,
transport, and deliveryand have concluded that such factors are responsible for
the lack of attempted, let alone successful, bioterror attacks. Although this conclusion may be
true as it applies to historically recognized terrorist organizations , it does not
adequately analyze, as the first half of this commentary has outlined, the inner logic of the
present-day terrorists most likely to pursue such methods. An evaluation of the
means behind a terrorist threat without preceding analysis of the decision-making paradigm of the terrorists is
dangerously misguided and must be considered invalid. Consequently, it is only following a detailed discussion of
the philosophical framework underlying Al Qaeda's decision-making process that this analysis turns to the technical
aspects of a strategic option the organization has already demonstrated an interest in pursuing: a biological
approach to political violence.
Al-Qaeda has been recruiting bioweapons scientists and distributing

technological materials online concrete evidence of a program.
Roul 09 (Apr. 2009, Animeesh, co-founder and Executive Director (Research) of
the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi, Mphil, School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Is Bioterrorism
Threat Credible? Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, CBW Magazine,
http://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/IsBioterrorismThreatCredible_aroul_0408)
There are recent reports that Al Qaedas Abdur Rauf, a Pakistani microbiologist has
searched every corner of Europe to obtain anthrax spores and equipment for Al Qaeda
biolaboratory in Afghanistan to weaponise the pathogens, much before 9/11 events. Not to
forget Menad Benchellalis covert activities and his quest to weaponise Ricin , before his
arrest in early 2004, in his bio/chem laboratory in Lyon, France. Benchellali, an Al Qaeda trained
terrorist, was convicted in 2006 along with 24 others. His handling of bio/chem
material in small laboratory and expertise under terrorists disposal
opened a can of worms. Somebody has rightly pointed out that Benchellalis case had opened the door
of secret world of bio-terrorism.
Islamist terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, are employing and indoctrinating

scientists, trained microbiologists in its fold? The answer may be still unknown, but conventional
wisdom suggests that there is a hidden design in place and that certainly involves
intentional fiddling with life science and living organism . The picture is still hazy. The news
about a couple of Indian origin doctors among others in their fraternity from Jordan
and Iraq had been detained and suspected in connection with the foiled attacks in Glasgow and
London last year might make the picture more clear.3 The attempted bomb attacks by trained
doctors who have undergone life science and pathological laboratory training to
save human life, now on a terror call, are certainly very disturbing. This is not all!
Why
Investigations into a terror web forum suggest that around 45 (all Muslim) doctors planned a consorted Jihad
against the US.
analysts have stumbled upon chemical and biological weapon manuals

being circulated in Jihadi web forums over the internet . This finding makes
the bioterror threat more plausible, even though, these openly available manuals can help terrorist to
develop crude biological weapon with minimum lethal factor. A survey published by Janes
Intelligence Review (2007) indicates that chemical and biological weapons on
password protected web forums constitute a part of jihadi discussion. At least two
longer manuals on biological weapons have found in these Jihadi forums which describe methods
Again,
for growing plague bacteria and botulinum toxin.4
288
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 289 of 318
289
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 290 of 318
xt yes motive
Fits perfectly with al-qaeda strategic logic:
a) strong psychological after-effect
The psychological advantages conferred to an organization such as Al Qaeda following the
successful use of any kind of biological or biohazardous weapon are immense. The secondary
goals of Al Qaeda attacks involve creating an environment of fear and vulnerability
among a large population. The widespread panic, terror, and horror felt by U.S.
citizens following the attacks on the Twin Towers were as much a goal of the terrorists as the actual destruction
of the buildings. The public panic, political fallout, and economic consequences likely to
ensue if even a portion of a major U.S. city was targeted with radioactive or biohazardous
waste are difficult to imagine. Under the best of circumstances, clean-up efforts could take days if not
weeks and the unpredictable behavior of civilians following evacuation or quarantine
efforts could easily create more casualties than an initial explosion.
b) use of public transportation
a second feature of
many such terrorist attackspublic transportation as a targetis equally suited for
exploitation of biological agents used as weapons . Whether in a train, plane, or
subway system, public transportation by definition involves large numbers of people
in transit between geographically and temporally separated locations . The rapidity with
In addition to the documented frequency with which Al Qaeda attacks utilize explosives,
which it is possible to commute between suburbs and city center, city to city, or even across state and international
boundaries fuels modern commerce, but it also creates a situation previously manipulated by terrorists in which
large numbers of people are vulnerable to a well-placed weapon. Perhaps the most recognizable example of such a
phenomenon is not the threat of a manmade plague but rather the international concern raised first by SARS and
now by a strain of influenza known as H5N1: avian flu. 54 Why are these viruses of such great concern? The answer
lies in the mobility and globalization of society. It truly is possible for a businessman to unintentionally carry a virus
from the far reaches of Asia straight into the heart of Toronto in a matter of hours thanks to modern aviation. 55
Although not yet endemic in the human population, the inexorable march of avian flu in bird populations across the
Eurasian continent makes credible the speculation of a pandemic should the virus successfully cross the zoonotic
The influenza pandemic of 1918 killed 50 million people in an

age in which it took 10 days to travel between New York and London by ocean liner .
56 Today, the consequences of a similar outbreak could be disastrous.
It is precisely because of this potential for devastation that a connection between
biological materials and mass transit should be considered . It would be a mistake to think the
potential for sweeping infection has been noted solely by the global public health community. In fact, public
divide from birds to humans.
290
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 291 of 318
exposure to biohazardous materials represents a particularly devious and thus

desirable terrorist strategy as neither radioactive waste nor pathogens offer any
initial warning to indicate exposure; an individual could become contaminated or contagious without
realizing it. In the setting of public transit, the contact tracing that defines
epidemiology could spiral out of control. A single infected day-trader could
come into contact with literally hundreds of people during the commute from Westchester to
Wall Street. As previously discussed, a biohazard-laced explosive device would wreak havoc in
a public transportation setting as clearly as anywhere else, but a more subtleand dangerousthreat is the
possibility that people on a contaminated airplane or subway car could be transformed into walking carriers of
For an organization with an ethos that defines outsiders as infidels, such a

strategy fits perfectly.
disease.
291
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 292 of 318
xt only aq specific evidence

Only evidence that assumes the specifical organization structure and
goals of al-qaeda should be evaluated.
this article is not meant to be a scientifically valid primer in
the production or distribution of a biological agent. Rather, it is intended to illustrate the ease with
which biological agents can be adapted to more conventional and well-documented
historical examples of terrorism. In this setting, the question du jour is not if it can
be done, but rather, is there someone willing to do it . It is thus the aim of the
The fictional scenario presented at the beginning of
remainder of this commentary to provide a missing piece of analysis in what has become a topic of international
Current evaluations of bioterrorism do not

adequately consider either the unique and often unrecognized ideological position
of Al Qaeda or the relevance of the organization's historical and contextual setting .
Furthermore, in what is a dangerous oversight, the scientific and technical aspects of
creating and using biological weapons have only been assessed from a now invalid
historical paradigm that does not accurately reflect the decision-making structure and
operations of the present-day organization most likely to use such weapons . As
counterterrorism measures are only as accurate as the analysis on which they are based, it is a matter of
grave importance that the threat of bioterror be philosophically and scientifically
reevaluated through the only lens that matters: Al Qaeda's .
concern with a budget of billions of dollars.
292
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 293 of 318
xt soviet anthrax
Got them from the damn Soviets.
Although the ability to effectively weaponize a microbe such as anthrax, smallpox , or
Yersinia pestis is admittedly a challenge, it has already been accomplished by at least
one state entity, namely the former Soviet Union. 64 This raises concerns at two levels: in
the dissolution of an entire society, what happened to the reagent stocks
of bioweapons and what happened to the scientists who created them?
Ironically, the world was probably more secure from the threat of biowarfare during the
years in which some of the world's most talented molecular biologists were actively
creating superstrains of bacteria and determining how to effectively deliver them
than it is today. For even as research accelerated the development of extremely sophisticated bioweapons,
the political checks and constraints of a bipolar world made the likelihood of their eventual use very low. In addition,
the not inconsiderable resources of a superpower with an established Gulag and NKVD were fully deployed to
prevent the unauthorized use, transport, or discussion of such weapons.
the politics that prevented a nuclear holocaust triggered by the opposition of

two superpowers during the Cold War simply do not apply to the political or
strategic decision-making process of an organization like Al Qaeda . And although Al
Qaeda itself may not have the resources to create a weapons-grade strain of anthrax or smallpox,
Biopreparat did. In the collapse of any social safety net, and in the wake of rampant inflation, unemployment,
and poverty following the end of the Soviet Union, it is not hard to imagine that some of the
estimated 50,000 scientists employed by Biopreparat may have been tempted to
trade what resources were leftinformation or materialsto stave off starvation, secure medical care for
an ill child, or provide the means to relocate to a more stable society. In short, Al Qaeda is poised to
benefit from resources it could never hope to match while organizing an operation a
state actor could never conceivably order. Bioterror attacks are unlikely as long as the means and
However,
the will to orchestrate them remain separated. Quite simply, the Western world can no longer assume that is the
case.
293
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 294 of 318
A2: No Capability
No barriers diffusion of knowledge, lax security, and recruitment of
western scientists
the large pool of individuals with laboratory access , the greatly decreased
technical obstacles for basic biology techniques, and the array of damaging organisms and
chemicals accessible in both medical and research facilities should be a matter of grave
concern for the counterterrorism community: each of these variables resembles a general factor
exploited for strategic gain by recent Al Qaeda operations. As has been previously discussed, it is often
touted that a truly successful bioterrorism attack has not yet occurred due to the
difficulties in orchestrating synergistic cooperation between scientists working in an underground
environment. What this argument overlooks is that Al Qaeda terrorists are often most
successful because they work from within the very community they target. The men who flew
Taken together,
the planes into the Twin Towers learned to fly not in jihad training camps but in the United States. Thus, it is quite possible that the
scientists
will conduct their work not in a secret

Afghanistanadmittedly a very difficult propositionbut rather from within what is a thriving
sector of Western society and academic communities . Although Al Qaeda's attempts to acquire and
use anthrax have not yet been successful, it is worth noting that Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian national and one of the
scientists involved in the Al Qaeda anthrax project under the direction of known terrorist Hambali,
received his training in the United States, graduating from California State University, Sacramento in 1987
who may eventually be responsible for a bioterror attack
facility in the caves of
with a major in biological sciences and a minor in chemistry. 46
the academic research environment exists to promote intellectual inquiry and

knowledge. By definition, this cannot be an environment in which the daily
activities of every single member are monitored. Although there is a range of personalities and working
Furthermore,
the pursuit of
styles among the principal investigators who head research laboratories, in the end as long as the members of their respective
laboratories are producing results, the precise details of who is in the lab at what hours doing what experiments is often not closely
scrutinized. As junior competitors on the tenure track, graduate students and post-doctoral fellows are almost required to work long
One of the first things to occur upon joining

a lab is acquisition of the keys and security clearance that grant 24-hour access to
the building and laboratory space. Even in the most heavily guarded facilities, it is
assumed that security threats do not come from the scientists themselves . Science is not
evening hours and weekends when no one else is in the lab. 47
a 95 job, and a scientist who works long or unusual hours arouses absolutely no suspicion. Indeed, there is not a career life scientist
in the world who has not at least once (if not routinely) conducted an experiment that required laboratory hours when most other
people are asleep. Keys, pin numbers, swipe-cards, and 24-hour security are all instituted and managed to keep non-scientists out,
not to monitor the scientists who go in.
although an overtly large order of reagents or laboratory supplies would

likely be noticed and questioned, in the midst of a busy research environment,
periodic smaller orders go largely unchecked. The ordering protocols for most labs in the
academic community functions through blanket P.O. accounts funded by an investigator's
grants following processing through an internal university business office (e.g., a Cancer Center business office or the accountspayable section of the Department of Pathology). Biological research requires working with large
numbers of disposable reagents and supplies that are used without quantification of
In addition,
each unit; a busy lab will go through certain items in vast quantity, requiring a steady stream of new orders that is not considered
unusual. The cost of even the most basic supplies can be immensedisposable tissue-culture flasks for growing cells are used with
the frequency of plastic dinnerware yet cost over $1 eachand yearly accounts for even a moderate sized 10-person lab can be in
294
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 295 of 318
the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 48 In addition, the independence of a research facility requires each scientist to take
responsibility for ensuring that he or she obtains the reagents necessary for his or her experiments. As long as the order in question
A
productive graduate student or post-doctoral fellow would be fully capable of
running a covert set of experiments using equipment belonging to a university and
reagents paid for from an advisor's grant money with no one being the wiser . Indeed,
the very things that might stand out as secretive behavior in another context odd
hours, an excessive amount of time spent at work, piles of papers and notes are considered the hallmarks of
scientific success and go completely unnoticed in the research community . The same
can be processed through a standard supplier, this often happens with only minor oversight of what is being ordered.
techniques, supplies, and even data of a legitimate research endeavor could be indistinguishable from those of a terrorist. The
unrecognized challenge facing the counterterrorist community is that there is no good reason to build a pipe bomb, but there are
thousands of good reasons to create genetically modified organisms, clone a gene, extract a protein, or culture microorganisms.
Is Al Qaeda capable of exploiting the affiliations of its terrorists? The answer is an

unequivocal yes and applies as equally to biological science as it does to
flight school . One of the most remarkable characteristics of science and the people
who do it is the truly international character of the field. Top quality research takes place
at many locations around the globe through the hands and minds of people from many different countries
working together. However, the greatest concentration of scientific research facilities is in the United States, and the universal
language of scientific publications is English. This provides the perfect pretext for moving people from anywhere in the world to
Unlike many disciplines, it is not

unusual to have 5 different nationalities represented in a research team of 10 people.
Terrorists, especially the smart ones, need to have real jobs until the time of planned operations. In light of the
almost universal recognition of the value of scientific progress, there can be few more failsafe ways to
provide an almost-impenetrable cover for the pesky hurdle of customs and
immigration than a research position with its resulting visa requirements and job
security.
Furthermore, many known terrorists have been radicalized while already attending a
university or working in an academic environment . 49 This phenomenon paves the
way for an eventual geographic relocation , ostensibly for the purposes of a career that arouses no suspicion.
In addition, as Adullah al-Muhajir, otherwise known as Jose Padilla, illustrates, there is no guarantee that an
American national cannot be converted to the cause of Al Qaeda. 50 It is a dicey
within the borders of the nation defined by Al Qaeda ideology as the enemy.
proposition indeed to assume that all of the tens of thousands of already-placed graduate students and junior scientists within
Western research facilities are immune to recruitment by a terrorist cell. If even a few such individuals are recruited, regardless of
how or why, Al Qaeda will have gained not only their intellectual and technical abilities but also access to the vast laboratory
The need to create undetected laboratory space and

acquire costly equipment or fragile biological materials is obviated by an operative
who already has both carte blanche access to state-of-the-art facilities and ordering
privileges as a result of a position that could serve as a permanent base or a
training opportunity. The tools required to create bioweapons are in use everyday by the thousands of scientists involved
in biomedical research. Instead of insisting that Al Qaeda has not succeeded in the
undeniable challenge of building their own secret research facilities, the
counterterrorism community should be focusing on a different question : is there
any guarantee that Al Qaeda has not co-opted the facilities of the West? It is
environment in which scientists function.
unknown who or whom was responsible for the 2001 anthrax mailings, but the genetic profile of the bacterial strain used in the
attacks is certain: the Ames strain was first isolated in culture by an American lab. 51 Even if Al Qaeda was not the party responsible
for using it in an act of terrorism, the fact remains that someone else did and in the process reminded us all that such an act is
indeed possible.
Theyve had a really long time to develop it and are strongly motivated.
295
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 296 of 318
The very public death of a very large group of people is exactly the stated objective
of an Al Qaeda press release issued in July 2005. Beyond claiming responsibility for the London tube
bombings, this statement announced that at least 100,000 Americans would have to
die in retaliation for the war against Iraq . Even the simultaneous attacks of 11 September 2001
unambiguously the most successful Al Qaeda operation to datedid not come anywhere near such a catastrophic
although the violence and devastation Al Qaeda attacks

perpetuate is repugnant to most of the world, the organization cannot be accused of
inactivity or complacency with regard to operational planning. In publicly advertising their desire to
murder 100,000 people, the Al Qaeda leadership is also implicitly acknowledging the
development of a strategy that would enable at least the possibility of such an
undertaking. Traditional terrorism strategies, although more than capable of murder and mayhem,
are not strategically suited for causing casualties on a widespread scale. Consequently, consideration
must be given the possibility that in declaring their desire for mass annihilation, Al Qaeda may be
signaling an internal shift to a category of weapons that would permit
such an attack.
death toll. Furthermore,
Indeed, Al Qaeda is believed to have had anthraxor at least the organism itself in its unweaponized formsince
1997 when it was purchased by bin Laden through the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. 28 In early June 2003, a
Central Intelligence Agency report publicly disclosed that Mohammed Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui inquired about
crop dusters because they were considering using similar equipment to disperse biological agents such as anthrax.
An early September 2003 Newsweek article included a rumor by a Taliban source that at a meeting in April 2003,
bin Laden was planning an unbelievable biological attack, the plans for which had suffered a setback upon the
arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) the previous month in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Furthermore, although there
are still no conclusive leads as to the identity of the person or persons responsible for the 2001 anthrax mailings,
the fact that a viable biological agent could be delivered courtesy of the United States Postal Service and cause
several fatalities in the process should be cause to take seriously the intentions of those with a stated interest in
such a strategy.
In the case of Al Qaeda, handwritten notes and files on a laptop seized upon the
capture of KSM included a feasible anthrax production plan using a spray dryer as
well as a plan to recruit those with the necessary technical expertise . What this data did
not reveal, however, was that five years earlier the CIA had seized a computer disk with
similar information from Ayman Zawahiri's right-hand operative , Ahmed Salama Mabruk.
This disk was confiscated following Mabruk's arrest by the CIA in Azerbaijan and was reportedly handed over to the
there is a good chance that the current analysis

of Al Qaeda's biological threat capabilities underestimates the time the
organization has had to make progress in the recruiting and research
required to develop such a weapon. In fact, a report issued by the UN concluded that Al
Qaeda is determined to use chemical and biological weapons and is restrained only
by technical difficulties. Even if, as is likely, Al Qaeda was not at all connected to the 2001 anthrax
Egyptian authorities. Given such reports,
mailings, the fact that such an approach could be used at all stands as a proof-of-principle example for the
organization's bioterror ambitions. Hence, in order to adequately assess the threat posed by Al Qaeda's use of
bioterrorism, it is essential to carefully consider the true nature of the barrier presented by such technical
difficulties.
296
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 297 of 318
A2: Islamic Law Prevents it

Al-Qaeda ideological and capacity is consistent with bioweapons
capability.
This article evaluates the threat of bioterrorism through a joint analysis of
Al Qaeda's ideology and the practical utility of molecular biology. Al Qaeda
is shown to advance a logic that is based not on the main schools of Islamic theology but
rather on the result of applying Islamic principles to sociopolitical change , thereby reinterpreting the guidelines of Islamic law. Al Qaeda's philosophical underpinnings render non-combatants
legitimate targets and inspire its followers to commit violent acts of destruction while being convinced they are
In conjunction with this ideological perspective, a

discussion of modern biomedical research considers the technical challenges of
applying scientific advances to the development and deployment of biological
weapons consistent with Al Qaeda's operational history. This multidisciplinary analysis
reveals that the reality of Al Qaeda challenges both the ideological and the
technical constraints that have hitherto precluded a successful
bioterrorism attack.
fulfilling the ordained will of Allah.
297
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 298 of 318
A2: Authors
298
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 299 of 318
A2: Frost (Generic)

Frost assumes greater complexity than needed sets up technical straw
men.
Canadian analyst Robin Frost attained prominence in the nuclear sceptic group with his MA thesis
from Simon Fraser University.21 His reputation rests on his Adelphi Paper,22 Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11. My
Pluta, and I have thoroughly analyzed the flaws in that paper in our article
As with Mueller, Frost begins by setting up
technical straw men, requirements appropriate to national nuclear weapons
programs seeking safe, reliable, rugged and predictable nuclear weapons for use by a nation. For example,
Frost posits requirements for precision far in excess of those attainable in 1944-45
when the first nuclear weapons were designed and built. I provide a single example
here to illustrate the magnitude of the misconception: Frost suggests that the uranium core would
have to be fabricated using computer-guided machine tools with laser
interferometer(s) and require complex shapes machined to a tolerance of about 10-10 meters. This is
much smaller than a wavelength of light, and its clear that no such machine tools were
available in the years 1943-45 when the first nuclear weapons were built at Los Alamos.
Frosts arguments discounting nuclear terror as a significant risk do not
stand up to analysis.
colleague, Anna
Nuclear terrorism: A disheartening dissent23
299
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 300 of 318
A2: Frost (Russia Nukes)

Russian nuclear security is bad and getting worse closed cities,
underpaid guards, corruption.
A static analysis of the state of Russian practices to secure nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive material
might well lead to optimism. Russian nuclear weapons appear to be under the generally good
control of elite troops, Frost argues.6 There is no evidence in open source material that a nuclear
warhead, from any national arsenal or another source, has ever made its way into the world's illegal arms
bazaars, let alone terrorist hands .7
Russia is believed to have produced approximately 180 tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium
and 1,100 tonnes of HEU.8 These are estimates, however, as no inventory of Russian
weapons-grade material exists. There is also no inventory of Russia's tactical nuclear
weapons.9 Their small size and portability (some can be carried by one person), however, make them
appealing to terrorists. Russia's plutonium stockpile, estimated at 150 tonnes, presents another
potential threat.10 We do not know whether a nuclear warhead has entered the illegal
arms market, but the number of reported thefts of nuclear material certainly gives cause for
concern. In January 2005,Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warned that
trafficking in Russian nuclear-weapons material poses serious threats. He also did not exclude the possibility that significant
quantities of HEU had been acquired by terrorist groups.11 According to a report to the 2005 NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
half of Russian nuclear fissile material storage sites were provided with some
security upgrade and as little as 26% received comprehensive security safeguards.12
only
form of
Similar concerns are expressed in the 2002 and 2004 National Intelligence Council (NIC) Annual Reports to Congress on the Safety
Frost makes frequent, albeit selective, reference to

reports. For instance, he quotes a section of the 2004 report confirming that a multilayered approach that includes physical, procedural and technical measures13 exists. He then interprets
this to mean that the Russian stockpile is relatively secure .14 While better than nothing, such
loosely defined measures could range from a complex safeguards system to a
padlocked gate occasionally patrolled by an underpaid guard.
and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.
both
Frost also quotes from the 2002 NIC report: An unauthorised launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely
as long as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place.15 This
statement refers to accidental use and hence appears out of place in a study of nuclear terrorism. The prevention of accidental use
does not preclude theft or sabotage.
Both NIC reports are critical of the condition of Russian safeguards . They acknowledge that
progress in securing the stockpile has been made but also emphasise that much remains to be done. As the 2004 report states:
Russia is upgrading its physical, procedural and technical measures to secure its weapons against both external
and internal threats, and Russia's nuclear security has been slowly but unevenly improving over the last
several years. Risks remain, however, and we continue to be concerned about vulnerabilities
to an insider who attempts unauthorised actions as well as potential terrorist
attacks.16
Lax safeguards and dire economic conditions , together with the growth of terrorism, have created
incentives for the theft of nuclear material . The fact that this has so far not resulted in
a nuclear terrorist attack does not, unfortunately, mean that it will not do so in the future .
High levels of criminalisation and corruption, combined with economic instability and the
presence of a large, inadequately secured nuclear complex , may make it relatively easy for
300
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 301 of 318
terrorist groups to obtain nuclear materials. Russia's nuclear cities are

particularly vulnerable. The ten cities housing 750,000 people remain closed. Their facilities, crumbling
under a lack of government support,17 continue to house large quantities of bombgrade materials.
Louise Shelley and Robert Orttung of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at the American University have researched the
influence of corrupt officials and the work of criminal and terrorist networks on technical security in the Russian weapons complex.
Following a study of the closed city of Ozersk in the Chelyabinsk Oblast they found that a wide array
of criminal networks exists in the city and could be used by terrorists groups to obtain
nuclear material.18
As Shelley and Orttung point out, Chelyabinsk is on a major drug trafficking route , and drug dealers
inside the closed city have connections to Tajik drug groups, which in turn may be connected to terrorist organisations. Released
convicts living in Ozersk, as well as corrupt employees of the nuclear plant, may have both incentive and ability to sell nuclear
material could be easily transported out of the city by a

number of routes, ranging from conscript soldiers who guard the city to criminalised taxi drivers or construction groups.19
materials to criminal groups. The
301
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 302 of 318
A2: Frost (Tech Barriers)

Tech barriers are straw men easy to solve with 1940s technology
-use exploding-bridgewire detonator instead (made of small amounts of gold and explosives like rdx which are
already used by terrorists)
-compressing dry powder material during ignition avoids a giant press needed to achieve critical density
-machining tools are available in university physics departments

Frost, however, quoting Friedrich Steinhausler, sets out a series of requirements for construction of an
implosion-assembled improvised nuclear device , resembling to some extent the Fat Man
device dropped on Nagasaki and tested at Trinity . In addition to requiring that the terrorists have the
requisite knowledge of basic science, engineering and the construction of modestly complex equipment, Steinhausler's list
includes the following:39
access to a workshop with advanced equipment , such as precision calibrated, computer-guided machine
tools (25,000rpm) with laser interferometer, airbearing lathe and artificial room ventilation with built-in air cleaner;
a supply of Krytron [sic] switches;

machining capabilities for the production of complex shapes (tolerance: about 10-10m).
To specify such technology for the production of an improvised nuclear device is ludicrous. To see this it is
only necessary to reflect upon what was available in 1945 when the first nuclear
weapons were designed and assembled .40 The laser had yet to be invented;
computer was a job title, not a machine; airbearing lathes had not reached the market ;
and while machining precisions of 10-5 or 10-6 m were routinely achievable, 10-10
was unthinkable. Nevertheless, the Manhattan Project delivered three functioning
nuclear devices (Trinity, Little Boyand Fat Man) with a total construction time not
exceeding six months (the designs were frozen in March 1945; the Trinity test took place on 16 July 1945 and the
warshots on 6 and 9 August of the same year) 41
More appropriate technology might include tool and die makers capable of fabricating a pattern for a uranium or plutonium pit to an
accuracy of 0.0003mm, a precision tracer lathe capable of following the shape of the pattern, and a machine shop not substantially
better than those commercially in use in 1945. John Lewis and Xue Litai describe the machining of a uranium implosion pit in their
many university physics departments have machine

shops which greatly exceed the requirements for machining nuclearweapon components.
If the device to be fabricated were to be gun-assembled rather than driven by
implosion, the requirements on technology decrease substantially, although not to the level of
book China Builds the Bomb.42 Indeed,
the Alvarez concept described earlier.

Mark and his colleagues suggest that preparing the design drawings would require a large number of man-hours and the direct
participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, chemical and metallurgical properties of
the various materials to be used as well as the characteristics affecting their fabrication; high explosives and/or chemical
preparation of design
drawings has been greatly simplified by modern computer-aided design software,
and detailed information on the characteristics of both uranium and plutonium can be readily obtained
and interpreted by a broad range of physical scientists and engineers.
propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry and others.43 This is true enough, but the
Frost, quoting Mark, suggests that terrorists might opt to use plutonium or uranium compounds such as oxide or nitrate powders.
but
either highly enriched uranium oxide or plutonium oxide might be better choices.
Compressing a dry powder to form a critical mass is most readily done by surrounding the
powder with high explosive or designing a sort of gun in which the shock wave from
detonating explosive is used to compress the material directly . According to standard physics
The use of plutonium nitrate (PuNO3) is particularly attractive since it is the end product of reprocessing or spent fuel,
302
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 303 of 318
This option is preferable

to that proposed by Mark in which a large amount of PuNO3 is first compressed in a
special isostatic press until it very nearly reaches critical density and then further
compressed by hydrodynamic shockwaves . In particular, it avoids having to procure a
large isostatic press to compress the fissile powder to high densities. Acquisition of such a press might be a red flag
texts on shock compression, a density increase of a factor of six is achievable as a limit.44
exposing the plot.45

Because the compounds used in powder weapons contain oxygen and other light elements, radioactive decay of the fissile material
will produce a large spontaneous neutron background.46 This background is large enough to virtually guarantee initiation of a chain
reaction after the assembly passes first criticality and before it reaches maximum compression. This is the definition of a fizzle yield
for more conventional fission devices, although it is likely to be the maximum yield of a powder bomb and to be between 50 and 100
tonnes of TNT equivalent.
There are remaining challenges to a group bent on designing and constructing its own nuclear device from
available nuclear explosive material. These include:
Rough casting and final forming of uranium or plutonium components is not trivial, as the materials involved are
pyrophoric (finely divided powders ignite spontaneously in air) and may harden enormously on a lathe or mill, so that cutting precise
shapes is difficult, and in the case of alpha-phase plutonium may even shatter when worked.
The forming of any tamper is difficult, but especially if it is made of either beryllium metal or tungsten carbide, for
which special tools and skills are needed.
The electronics needed to detonate an implosion weapon of classical design must deliver high current pulses of nearidentical size to many detonators simultaneously.
But all of these problems, and many more, have solutions rooted in 1945 technology and
techniques. There is prima facie evidence that, given nuclear explosive material, there are no
insurmountable, nor even particularly high, barriers to a well-financed sub-national group
constructing a nuclear weapon . We estimate that such a project will take from
60 days (for a uranium gun) to about a year (for an implosion device) from start of
construction to completion.
303
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 304 of 318
A2: Frost (No Motive)

Theyre clearly interested in mass casualty attacks and the barriers are
negligible.
We can thus distinguish a wide range of terrorist organisations potentially capable of nuclear
terrorism, ranging from isolated cells to multi-million-dollar conglomerates. Whereas a small terrorist
organisation would find improvising a nuclear weapon very difficult, a powerful
network such as Aum Shinrikyo or al-Qaeda could do so relatively easily.
Robin Frost, with all due caveats attached, suggests that unconventional terrorism is unlikely
since Terrorists in general probably share the same ignorance and fear of WMD as others
do and probably see little reason to turn to unknown, possibly unpredictable and certainly
dangerous when the older tactics have proved themselves to be simple, reliable and cheap - or so, at least, we
We disagree. Over the past 30 years, the maximum levels of terrorist

violence have escalated. The escalation has not been smooth, nor have annual
terror death tolls always moved upward; but the record stands at approximately 3,000
and counting for a single day and operation. There are few psychological
barriers to true mass-casualty terrorism still standing; fissile material is or
can become available if the price is right, and some organisations can probably pay any
price; and the technical barriers to constructing an improvised nuclear device are far lower than
Frost indicates.
hope.49
304
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 305 of 318
A2: Levi (Murpheys Law)

Levi is too optimistic AND doesnt even say nuke terror is unlikely
Potter 08 (2008, William, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, director,
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Using Murphys Law Against
Nuclear Terrorists, Arms Control Today, April 2008,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/BookReview)
Levis slender volume On Nuclear Terrorism is a valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on catastrophic terrorism. Unlike many recent studies, it neither
hypes the nuclear threat nor discounts it. Instead, Levi sketches the obstacles a terrorist would need to overcome to
Michael
successfully implement a nuclear attack and then discusses the panoply of means available to preclude that outcome. Although many of the challenges and preventive measures have
been discussed in much greater depth elsewhere, Levis study adopts a systems analysis perspective to demonstrate the power of an integrated, multilayered defense.
Underlying Levis concept of defense as a system is the premise that, in order for a defense against nuclear terrorism to be effective, it only needs to succeed at one stage in the terrorist
chain of events. In contrast, the terrorist must successfully complete each step in the plot to acquire fissile material or an intact nuclear explosive, fabricate a nuclear weapon, deliver
Levi argues that a

carefully conceived and integrated, multilayered defense stands a much better
chance of obstructing a nuclear attack than may at first appear to be the case.
This approach leads Levi to exploit what he calls Murphys Law of Nuclear Terrorism, what
can go wrong (from a terrorists perspective) might well go wrong. In other words, understanding the various ways in which terrorists might fail
the weapon to the target, and detonate the explosive.[1] Although any element or layer of defense may be relatively ineffectual,
provides insights and potential tools for increasing the odds of terrorist failure. This perspective, in turn, suggests the importance of understanding both terrorist capabilities and their
attitudes toward risk and failure.
Levis work, like most analyses of nuclear terrorism, does not delve very deeply into terrorist motivations. Yet,
it does highlight the intriguing finding by several analysts that many terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, appear to be tactically conservative and risk averse from an operational
standpoint; they may be very willing to risk their lives, but not in futile operations. This tendency may not dissuade a terrorist organization from embarking on the very challenging tasks
of devising and implementing a nuclear strike, but it suggests a number of opportunities for exerting countervailing pressures that may reinforce their cautionary inclinations and steer
them away for the pursuit of high-consequence but low-probability acts.
In reviewing the various barriers in the path of a would-be nuclear terrorist, Levi correctly identifies state
stockpiles of fissile material as the gateways to nuclear terrorism and emphasizes the importance of security at the source. As
Graham Allison famously observed, [N]o nuclear material, no nuclear bomb.[2] Unfortunately, the world currently is awash in
fissile material, including about 500 metric tons of separated plutonium and more
than 1,700 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough for tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons.[3] Although the overwhelming majority of this amount resides in the United States
and Russia, more than a dozen states are estimated to possess at least 25
kilograms of HEU, the minimum quantity needed for a nuclear weapon, according to the
International Atomic Energy Agency.[4]
In Search of a Nuclear Fort Knox
A number of approaches have been employed with varying degrees of success in order to secure nuclear weapons-usable material at the source. They include materials protection,
control, and accounting (MPC&A). Although Levi does not dispute the desirability of providing the same degree of MPC&A for nuclear material as gold is afforded at Fort Knox, he
observes a number of difficulties in achieving a gold security standard for nuclear material. One problem pertains to the fact that although the precise amount of gold in storage is
known, there is no reliable figure for the amount of global stocks of HEU and plutonium. Indeed, physical inventories have never been conducted in some countries. In addition, although
the movement of gold from Fort Knox is very limited (only very small quantities are reportedly ever removed, for purposes of testing its purity), significant quantities of HEU and
plutonium are on the move frequently, especially between facilities within a country, but also on occasion internationally. As a consequence, although the Fort Knox analogy may be
useful from an aspirational standpoint, one must look more closely at the existing deficiencies in MPC&A to appreciate both the promise and potential for preventing leakage of fissile
material into the hands of terrorists.
One of Levis important observations in this respect is his recognition of the human
dimension to physical protection. In other words, although the three Gs (guns, guards, and gates) are
important, the major limits to physical materials protection and material control pertain to
human factors such as the presence or absence of a highly developed
nonproliferation and security culture and the commitment by political leaders to expend the
resources necessary to make MPC&A a national priority.
Levi calls attention to the problems posed by deficient political will and underdeveloped culture, he does not offer much guidance
about how to correct the deficit, which arguably requires a long-term investment in nonproliferation education and training in order to change
Although
mindsets on the part of nuclear custodians as well as nuclear industry officials. He also ignores a number of other promising approaches for reducing the risk of fissile material leakage,
including the minimization or elimination of HEU use in the civilian nuclear sector.
Buyers and Sellers
One of the more interesting and original sections of Levis book pertains to the economics of illicit nuclear trade. Price, he notes, will present a major barrier to all but the wealthiest
terrorist organizations and, in principle, could be manipulated to impede terrorist acquisition of fissile material. For example, he suggests that intelligence and law enforcement entities
might attempt to purchase nuclear materials themselves, driving terrorists out of the market. Such action, however, also might have the unintended effect of attracting more nuclear
suppliers and thieves to the illicit market place. As a consequence, Levi believes sting operations directed at buyers rather than sellers are a more promising approach and could increase
uncertainty for terrorists in the market for nuclear goods and services. As such, the authorities could raise [the terrorists] perceived chances of failing and hence the odds that a riskaverse terrorist group would be deterred.
Analogies are often drawn between the trade in narcotics and illicit nuclear trafficking. Although these comparisons typically are put forth to illustrate the amount of nuclear material
trade that may have gone undetected (i.e., approximately 20 confirmed cases of smuggling fissile material are just the tip of a much bigger iceberg), Levi cites other drug trade statistics
to indicate the potential for even very imperfect border security to disrupt a nuclear terrorists plans. For example, he notes estimates by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency that 10-15
percent of the cocaine leaving South America for the United States in 2004 was lost or seized in the transit zone and that the combined probability that cocaine departing South
America destined for the United States will actually make it to the United States was between 35-70 percent. Although these figures and profit margin may still be attractive for drug
smugglers, it is less obvious that nuclear traffickers possessing a relatively small supply of material would judge similar odds to be favorable. As such, even less-than-airtight border
controls could significantly affect the calculus of would-be nuclear terrorists and might be particularly effective against failure-averse organizations.
INDs vs. Intact Nuclear Weapons
305
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 306 of 318
In principle, would-be nuclear terrorists could choose to build their own nuclear
explosive or an improvised nuclear device (IND) or seek to purchase or steal an intact
nuclear weapon. The chain of necessary conditions for these two types of nuclear terrorism is different, as are the opportunities for frustrating their occurrence.
The potential for nonstate actors to build an IND has been acknowledged by experts for many years, and most concur with the view of the U.S. National Research Council that crude
HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance.[5] There is much less agreement among specialists, however, about how technically competent terrorists would have to be
to make a gun-type device or how large a team they would need.
At one end of the spectrum is the view that a suicidal terrorist could literally drop
one piece of HEU metal on top of another piece to initiate an explosive chain
reaction. At the other end are some senior Russian nuclear officials who continue to
deny that nonstate actors could fabricate a nuclear explosive even if they were able to obtain enough fissile
material. Levi stakes out a middle position , which recognizes the possibility of terrorist-manufactured INDs but emphasizes the multiple barriers
that would have to be overcome, including acquiring a sufficient quantity and quality of fissile material, reshaping the material to meet nuclear explosive specifications, avoiding
he tends to portray the task as far more

demanding than several other recent accounts . For example, although he does not directly
challenge the assumptions of the widely publicized article by Peter Zimmerman and Jeffrey Lewis on the
prospects for terrorists to build a bomb on a terror farm, he correctly notes that it will not be a simple task to find
accidents such as spontaneous ignition, and initiating the explosion. In this respect,
experienced farmers and appropriate utensils, not to mention the necessary seed stock of fissile material.[6]
Levis discussion of the prospects for terrorist acquisition of an intact nuclear

weapon is less satisfying and focuses primarily on scenarios in which states transfer
nuclear weapons to nonstate actors either intentionally or as a consequence of their collapse. He largely
ignores the risks posed by thousands of nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons
that remain in Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals . These weapons represent a particular
concern from the standpoint of nuclear terrorism because of a combination of their physical properties and
basing modes. Their relatively small size; portability; and, in the case of some older systems, the lack of
electronic locks, as well as their forward deployment, make tactical nuclear weapons the likely weapon of
choice for a nuclear terrorist organization. These are also the weapons for which
there are no legally binding and verifiable arms control restraints in place.
306
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 307 of 318
A2: Mueller (Generic)

Muellers studies are flawed & academically lazy
Gusterson 11 (Hugh Gusterson, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University, author
of People of the Bomb: Portraits of Americas Nuclear Complex, January/February 2011, Atomic Escapism? book
review of Muellers Atomic Obsession, American Scientist, http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/atomicescapism)
The most original, incisive and interesting part of the book is the last third, in which Mueller slashes through the
hype that guides much public discourse and policymaking about the risk of nuclear terrorism. He points out that a
foreign government is unlikely to give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group because of the danger that, as supplier,
that country would invite retaliation against itself. He also uses the writings of several nuclear scientists, including
the former Los Alamos division leaders Carson Mark and Steve Younger, to argue that it would be prohibitively
difficult for a small terrorist group that lacked state sponsorship to acquire the subtle engineering knowledge
needed to overcome the technical challenges involved in turning black-market nuclear material into a workable
Many scientific experts not cited here by Mueller would take issue with
that argument. And having read one of the articles that Mueller does citeCan Terrorists Build Nuclear
nuclear weapon.
Weapons?, by J. Carson Mark and others (1987)I am of the opinion that it does not, in fact, support Muellers
in dismissing the case for a terrorist nuclear threat, Mueller does

not adequately address the possibility that a terrorist group seeking a bomb might
have access to a scientist with nuclear-weapons experience from another state as
an adviser or team member. Still, by pointing out the importance of tacit and esoteric knowledge to the
argument. Furthermore,
success of such an endeavor, Mueller is making an important challenge to glib assumptions about the ease with
Mueller
fails to discuss another possibility: that a rogue element within a state, not the state
leadership itself, might sell an intact nuclear weapon to which it has access. This
scenario is far from speculative: After the fall of the Berlin wall, a Soviet soldier
guarding nuclear weapons in East Germany offered to sell an atomic warhead to the
antinuclear organization Greenpeace; Greenpeace wanted to buy the weapon and display it to show
which a terrorist group, even if it had access to uranium and plutonium, might be able to make a bomb.
the dangers of nuclear proliferation. They were arranging payment and transportation when the warhead in
It is, sadly, all too typical of

Muellers style of argument that he makes his case with copious references to any
literature that supplies evidence supporting his point of view, but he ignores
inconvenient facts and arguments.
question was abruptly removed from East Germany by the Soviets.
307
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 308 of 318
A2: Mueller (20 things)

Muellers a tool manipulates numbers to gain a persuasive effect and
doesnt understand nuclear physics.
Mueller chooses another set of criteria by which to judge the plausibility of improvised nuclear
devices. He writes down twenty tasks in what he calls the most likely scenario11 He then
posits that there is a 50-50 chance of success for each of these tasks and that taken
together, this means that the odds of success are 1 in 1,048,576. This is truly a small number, and if taken seriously
would probably mean that no further significant attention need be paid to nuclear terror scenarios.
this is far too simplistic.

It is true that if one raises 0.5 to the 20th power, the resulting value is quite small ,
However,
less than one in a million as desired. The question, however, is not if the value for 0.5^20 is small; of course it is.
does it bear any relationship to the problem at hand?

How did Mueller come to the number twenty for his list of tasks? Some of the items are
even compound tasks, one following another, so there could be more than twenty, and by Muellers
reasoning a still smaller chance of success. Some of them are not tasks proper, but conditions
to satisfy (There must be no inadvertent leaks. No locals must sense that something out of the ordinary is
going on.) Still others seem like padding to reach the number 20 (A detonation team must
But
transport the IND to the target place and set it off and the untested and much-traveled IND must not prove to be
a dud.). Since Mueller asserts that the probability of a nuclear terrorist starting a project and succeeding is less
0.520 is, therefore, one

in a million. That seems to be the totality of the logic behind the twenty
hurdles of the Mueller papers and book. There seems to be no analysis to
show that 50-50 are appropriate odds for the success of each step, and it is manifestly clear
that the twenty hurdles are not statistically independent . Nevertheless, it would seem that
than one in a million, it is worth noting that 220 is almost exactly 1,000,000 and that
twenty hurdles is the smallest plausible number that can provide the one chance in a million which allows Mueller to
suggest that those who believe in nuclear terrorism might, with equal logic, believe in the tooth fairy.12
the odds of success for some tasks are nearly 100 percent . For
it is not difficult to put an IND in a white van and drive it from Montana to
Minneapolis, or from outside Boise to inside Boston, so long as the drivers break no traffic laws. I give that
task a 90-plus percent probability.
Assembling a team of scientists and technicians is likely to be far easier than
Mueller supposes. The Manhattan Project was the most exciting, and indeed glamorous, scientific project of
In any event,
example,
the first half of the twentieth century, led by a constellation of great scientists. Many physicists, even today,
I give this one an 85-95 percent chance, at least.

In any event, Mueller makes elementary mistakes in risk analysis at the conceptual
level: He decides on a path to the goal of a nuclear device, and then decides that it is either
the only, or the easiest, or the most favorable route. Along the way his analysis is flawed.
fantasize about following in their footsteps.13
Mueller suggests that smugglers would be more likely than not to turn in the nuclear gang to the authorities. But
as Matt Bunn of Harvard has pointed out Al Qaeda and Mexican drug lords routinely
manage to move sensitive materials and people across borders , even those of highly
developed countries such as the United States . Successful smugglers-for-hire
generally do not betray their customers ; the penalties for betrayal probably range from a severe
beating to barbaric torture followed by a gruesome death.
308
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 309 of 318
A2: Mueller (threat con)

Mueller is an arrogant idiot and smarter people crush on him.
Mueller
frequently lashes out at those who refuse to set the likelihood of such acts at 1 in a
million, or less. We are alarmists. And we are imaginative. 15 According to Mueller, my
colleague, Jeffrey Lewis, and I indulge in worst case fantasies .16 Mueller seems never
to have talked with anybody who actually built a nuclear weapon , for his
understanding of the components of a simple device makes it seem far
more complex than it is. Nor can I share the results of my conversations with weaponeers except
to say that they do not consider the construction of certain kinds of nuclear weapons to
be beyond the skills of the kind of 20-person group Lewis and I envisioned. Lewis
and I carefully assessed the budget for a nuclear terrorist, and arrived at a figure of
$10 million. Mueller waves our extensive effort away with the comment that $10
million isnt enough to corrupt three people. He must live in an expensive district for
political bribery. Lewis and I estimated a budget more like a couple of million for
actually building the device, including salaries and the procurement of all necessary nonIn his articles and presentations on the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, Prof.
nuclear components and equipment. We do not believe that recruiting the technical staff will require any bribery or
corruption.
Mueller assumed that he has found the shortest critical path to an improvised nuclear device.
He also seems to assume that his list of tasks is so general that it includes all possible
critical paths. Hes clearly wrong on the first count, but even if he is right on the
second and I think he is wildly wrong his compilation is so general that it offers no
guidance to law enforcement or the terrorists except to hope for or to guard against betrayals.
309
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 310 of 318
A2: Mueller (Low Casualties)

Would kill a ton of people and Mueller selectively picks unrealistic
examples.
Yes, be worried
Mueller discounts the consequences of an improvised nuclear device in odd ways. He
suggests that a one kiloton ground burst in New Yorks Central Park would barely
damage the buildings on the boundaries of the park. That is true, but the same bomb detonated
a kilometer or two away could kill tens of thousands or even one hundred thousand people. If
the explosion took place in the financial business district of London or New York or Paris or
Singapore in the middle of the working day, there could be several hundred thousand dead or
wounded from the immediate effects. And the fallout from any of these explosions, even the one in
Central Park, would kill many tens of thousands more. And Mueller decries the statement that such a
Conclusion:
bomb could destroy a major city; he points out that only a small fraction of the city would be destroyed, just as
only a fairly small part of Hiroshima died from a larger bomb.
I
have worked at the Nevada Test Site and walked the terrain where , fifty years ago, the
United States tested atomic bombs against real buildings , homes such as those Americans live
I find myself horrified at the effects of even a very small nuclear explosion in a city. Perhaps that is because
in and cars such as those we drove then.
The important fact to face is that despite the nuclear Pollyannas who argue that the
construction of an improvised nuclear device is too difficult for even a well-financed terrorist, that obtaining
sufficient fissile materials is nearly impossible, that the theft of an intact weapon is not going to happen (any
longer), and that we may safely relegate nuclear terrorists to the fantasies of nuclear alarmists and the subjects of
the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in any given

year remains significant . Whether the probability is 20 percent, 5 percent, or even as low as one
percent, the consequences of an incident are enormous. Significant investment to deter, prevent,
bad television and movies
detect, and destroy a nuclear terror plot is required. So is investment and research into ways to mitigate the effects
of an attack, should all of our defenses fail and a nuclear detonation occur in one of the great cities of the world.
310
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 311 of 318
311
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 312 of 318
Nuke Power Impact

Al-Qaeda will successfully attack nuclear power plants across
the globe causes meltdowns and kills the nuclear industry
Kimery 11 Homeland Security Today's senior reporter and online editor (Anthony, W. Scott Malone,
multiple Emmy and Peabody award-winning investigative journalist and former senior editor of NavySEALs.com. He
runs the website's counterterrorism newsletter spin-off, BlackNET Intelligence Channel, 05/12, Al Qaeda Could
Try to Replicate Fukushima-type Meltdowns, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/al-qaeda-could-tryto-replicate-fukushima-type-meltdowns/aa96292934d83bb8c9f97fd9d685f32b.html)
A May 5 "intelligence brief" prepared by a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official at the Pacific
Regional Information Clearinghouse (PacClear) in Hawaii, warned Al Qaeda might try to cause the
meltdown of certain vulnerable nuclear power plants in the US and Europe by
replicating the failure of the electric supply that pumped cooling water to the reactors at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The plant's primary and backup power supplies were knocked
out by the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March, resulting in partial meltdowns of the plant's reactors.
Only a week after the intelligence brief was circulated, federal officials dispatched a security alert notifying US
power plant operators to raise the level of their security awareness. According to the analysis in the for official use
the earthquake and tsunami

were acts of nature, but a catastrophic nuclear reactor meltdown could potentially
be engineered by Al Qaeda by replicating the cascading loss of electric power that knocked out the
only intelligence brief, which was obtained by Homeland Security Today,
in Japan
Fukushima nuclear power plants ability to cool its reactors fuel rods, which led to the partial meltdowns of the
Even today, highly radioactive fuel rods

are fully exposed in the No. 1 reactor at the plant. The six-reactor complex has been bellowing radiation
reactors, causing the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl.
since March 11, and the International Atomic Energy Agency said the "overall situation ... remains very serious." On
Thursday, plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., said the amount of water leaking from the No. 1 reactor is more
serious than previously believed, meaning it's likely there is severe damage to the reactor. The intelligence brief
issued by PacClear, Recreating Fukushima: A Possible Response to the Killing of Usama Bin Laden - The Nuclear
Option, cautioned that the death of [O]sama Bin Laden may serve as an impetus to apply lessons learned from
Several senior counterterrorism

officials told Homeland Security Today that despite the apparent amateurism of some Al
Qaeda attacks and plots that were thwarted in recent years, we still must remain cognizant of the fact
that Al Qaeda is capable of sophisticated attacks, one said, noting in the same breath that the
Fukushima to attack the United States or another Western country.
terrorist organization is now under increased pressure to avenge their leaders murder at the hands of infidels with
something spectacular. Indeed. Intelligence collected from Bin Laden's compound in Pakistan during the May 2 raid
in which he was killed, has disclosed that he continued to urge his lieutenants to focus on carrying out another
9/11-scale attack on US soil that would kill many thousands - or more. The intelligence further showed that the
terrorist leader remained obsessed with acquiring, and using, weapons of mass destruction. "I consider Al Qaeda,
now being pushed by Anwar Al Awlaki [the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, and a possible heir to
Bin Laden], in the position to begin planning for a new '9/11 style' attack using a weapon of mass destruction ... not
to say they will not continue their recruiting of 'lone wolf' types - I do believe the long term goal of Al Qaeda 2.0 to
be a spectacular attack to the US infrastructure that would cause significant and permanent damage to a significant
portion of the continental US," Homeland Security Today was told by former Army Special Forces Lt. Col. Anthony
Shaffer, author of, Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan - and the Path to
a reactor meltdown could potentially cause hundreds of thousands of

deaths from cancer, at a minimum. The ensuing panic would probably be the most immediate
danger. Besides the immense clean-up costs and potential environmental damage, the economic blow to
the nuclear power industry would be devastating worldwide. Its no secret that US
Victory. A successful attack resulting in
authorities have uncovered numerous efforts by Al Qaeda to obtain nuclear weapons and radiological materials
over the years. Although we know from their own statements as well as intelligence and security success in
blocking a number of efforts, Al Qaeda has been determined to acquire deliverable weapons of mass destruction
[WMD], including nuclear, for a long time, veteran CIA operations officer and Islamist jihad expert, Clare Lopez, told
Homeland Security Today. The new intelligence brief pointed out that the disaster in Fukushima may have provided
the knowledge Al Qaeda needs to carry out such an operation in lieu of possessing a prepositioned [nuclear]
weapon. "While the Al Qaeda organization may, or may not, possess either a nuclear device or radiological
material," the brief stated, "the pressure on the organization to fulfill that threat is now enormous. If Al Qaeda does
possess such a weapon, the danger is obvious. If, however, there is no such device or material in Al Qaedas
control, then it is likely that Al Qaeda and [Bin Ladens] supporters may attempt an attack comparable in scale that
312
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 313 of 318
will at least be perceived as a nuclear response to Bin Ladens death. Surely, the determination to strike, and
especially now after the killing of [Bin Laden], remains intense, Lopez said. And the
scenario described [in the
PacClear alert] is completely believable, maintained Charles Faddis, a 20-year career covert CIA
operations officer who headed the National Counterterrorism Centers WMD terrorism unit when he retired several
years ago. All
you have to do to cause a meltdown is kill the cooling system. Cutting

the power would do that. So would blowing up the pumps or rupturing the right pipes.
Author of, Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security, which discussed at length the vulnerability
of nuclear power plants to terrorist attacks, Faddis stressed to Homeland Security Today that security
at
nuclear plants is not adequate, and there are no moves afoot to improve it. Nothing has
changed in the last few years. Faddis also outlined his concerns about the security and vulnerability of US nuclear
Wikileaks
revealed that US officials have been concerned that Japan has not provided adequate security at
its nuclear power plants to defend against potential terrorist attacks, Asahi Shimbun reported
Tuesday. The intelligence briefing stated that the disaster in Fukushima may have provided the
knowledge Al Qaeda needs to carry out such an operation . The global focus on the disaster in
Japan has made the vulnerabilities of our aging nuclear infrastructure painfully
apparent. In the past, preparations to defend a nuclear facility mostly focused on protecting the reactor vessel
from breach. The briefing pointed out that studies commissioned after the 9/11 attacks were mostly
concerned with the capability of an airplane strike in effecting such a breach, but the March 11th
earthquake and tsunami demonstrated that simply turning the power off [with] some reactor designs
can result in a catastrophic failure within a matter of hours
power facilities in an op-ed he wrote in March 2010. Similarly, US State Department cables leaked to
Terrorists could just attack nuclear plants

Micah Zenko is a research associate in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 14
Many U.S. domestic vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. The borders of the United
States are still essentially open, offering easy entry to terrorists. U.S. nuclear reactors
and chemical plants remain vulnerable and inviting targets for terrorists. Clever attacks on these reactors
and plants could cause immense damage, killing tens of thousands or more. U.S. railroad security
remains porous, allowing the possibility of an attack on trains carrying lethal
chemicals that could again kill tens or hundreds of thousands.
18
Meltdowns cause extinction

Lendman 11 Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen, 03/ 13, Nuclear
Meltdown in Japan, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan)
Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster.
under a worst case

meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened
with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12,
This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover,
core
Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying:
Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor
downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already
may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor
core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted
fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the
melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed
nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences
of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko
313
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 314 of 318
said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within
Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive

contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country
can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear
reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere."
nuclear power.
Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its)
containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring,
"containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the
quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized.
Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the
potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion
at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are
affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme
catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by
venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the
explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak
(because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a
partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details
until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear
If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or

radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an
explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the
entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.
disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation.
more plants), the super-heated
314
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 315 of 318
xt solves warming
Only nuclear power prevents catastrophic warming
Lynas 11 author of "Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet" and "High Tide:
The Truth About Our Climate Crisis" (Mark, 04/10, Why nuclear power is still a good
choice, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/10/opinion/la-oe-lynas-nukes20110410)
For the green movement, which is often justifiably accused of making the perfect the enemy of the good, having to
environmentalists assert that a

renewables and efficiency can decarbonize our energy supply and save us both from
global warming and the presumed dangers of nuclear power. This is technically possible but extremely
unlikely in practice. In the messy real world, countries that decide to rely less on nuclear will
almost certainly dig themselves even deeper into a dependence on dirty fossil fuels ,
confront real-world choices about energy technologies is painful. Most
combination of
especially coal. In the short term, this is already happening. In Germany -- whose government tried to curry favor
with a strongly anti-nuclear population by rashly closing seven perfectly safe nuclear plants after the Fukushima
Regarding
carbon dioxide emissions, you can do the math: Just add about 11 million tons per year for each
nuclear plant replaced by a coal plant newly built or brought back onto the grid. In China the numbers
crisis began -- coal has already become the dominant factor in electricity prices once again.
become even starker. Coal is cheap there (as are the thousands of human lives lost in extracting it each year), and
if the hundred or so new nuclear plants previously proposed in China up to 2030 are not built,
it is a fair bet that more than a billion tons can be added to annual global carbon dioxide
emissions as a result. Japan is also heavily dependent on coal, so it is a fair bet that less nuclear power there
will add substantially to the country's emissions. No wonder the Japanese are insisting on backing off from the Kyoto
turning away from nuclear power

could make the difference between whether the world warms by 2 degrees Celsius (bad
climate treaty. Looking at the entire global picture, I estimate that
but manageable) and 3 degrees Celsius (disastrous) in the next century. We have already made this mistake once. In
the 1970s it looked as if nuclear power was going to play a much bigger role than eventually turned out to be the
case. What happened was Three Mile Island, and the birth of an anti-nuclear movement that stopped dozens of halfbuilt or proposed reactors; coal plants were substituted instead. It is therefore fair to say that the environmental
movement played a substantial role in causing global warming, surely an ecological error it should learn from in
years ahead. Don't get me wrong: I am an enthusiastic proponent of replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy
sources. I strongly support wind, solar and other clean-tech options. But all energy technologies come with an
ecological price tag. Wind turbines kill and injure birds and bats. Solar thermal plants proposed in the Mojave Desert
have conservationists up in arms. If we are serious about taking biodiversity into consideration as well as climate
change, these concerns cannot be idly dismissed. In terms of land use, nuclear scores very well, because the
comparatively small quantities of fuel required means less land disturbed or ruined by mines, processing and
related uses. Take Japan again. According to some recent number crunching by the Breakthrough Institute, a
centrist environmental think tank, phasing out Japan's current nuclear generation capacity and replacing it with
wind would require a 1.3-billion-acre wind farm, covering more than half the country's total land mass. Going for
solar instead would require a similar land area, and would in economic terms cost the country more than a trillion
Those debating the future of nuclear power also tend to focus on out-of-date
technology. No one proposes to build boiling-water reactors of 1960s-era Fukushima vintage in the 21st century.
Newer designs have a much greater reliance on passive safety, as well as a host of
other improvements. Fourth-generation options, such as the "integral fast reactor" reportedly
being considered by Russia, could be even better. Fast-breeders like the IFR will allow us to
power whole countries cleanly by burning existing stockpiles of nuclear waste, depleted
dollars.
uranium and military-issue plutonium. And the waste left over at the end would become safe after a mere 300
years, so
no Yucca Mountains needed there.
Warming causes extinction

315
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 316 of 318
McPherson 11
professor emeritus of natural resources and the environment at the University of

Arizona (Guy, 08/20, Three paths to near-term human extinction, http://guymcpherson.com/2011/08/three-pathsto-near-term-human-extinction/)
WERE PUTTING THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON

OUR OWN EXTINCTION PARTY, with the party probably over by 2030. During the intervening
About a decade ago I realized we
period Ive seen nothing to sway this belief, and much evidence to reinforce it. Yet the protests, ridicule, and hate
THE POTENTIAL FOR NEAR-TERM

EXTINCTION OF HOMO SAPIENS. Were different. Were special. Were too intelligent.
mail reach a fervent pitch when I speak or write about
Well find a way out. We always do. Were humans, and therefore animals. Like all life, were special. Like all
organisms, were susceptible to overshoot. Like all organisms, we will experience population decline after
overshoot. Lets take stock of our current predicaments, beginning with one of several ongoing processes likely to
cause our extinction. Then Ill point out the good not quite so bad news.
WERE HEADED FOR
EXTINCTION VIA global CLIMATE CHANGE Its hotter than it used to be, but not as hot as
its going to be. The political response to this now-obvious information is to suspend the scientist bearing the bad
news. Which, of course, is no surprise at all: As Australian climate scientist Gideon Polya points out, the United
States must cease production of greenhouse gases within 3.1 years if we are to avoid catastrophic runaway
greenhouse. I think Polya is optimistic, and I dont think Obamas on-board with the attendant collapse of the U.S.
industrial economy. Apparently too little, too late a couple people have noticed a few facts about Obama. This
awakening might explain why his political support is headed south at a rapid clip. But back to climate change, one
of three likely extinction events. Well, three I know about: Im certain there are others, and any number can play.
WITH FOUR MONTHS REMAINING IN THE YEAR, THE U.S. HAS

ALREADY TIED ITS YEARLY RECORD FOR the MOST billion-dollar
WEATHER DISASTERS. Russia is headed directly for loss of 30% of its permafrost by 2050.
TUNDRA FIRES COULD ACCELERATE planetary WARMING. This year, the
Northeast Passage was open as of 27 July. This is a massively dire situation for the Arctic. In fact, we have passed a
de facto tipping point with respect to Arctic ice. This latter outcome is stunning, but only to those who follow the
horrifically conservative and increasingly irrelevant Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Nature is
ALL EARTHS
SYSTEMS ARE RAPIDLY DECLINING. Many ORGANISMS CANT keep up as
they try to STAY AHEAD OF AN OVERHEATING PLANET.
responding with hybrid bears, suggesting the near-term loss of all polar bears. Indeed,
Independently, CO2 emissions will destroy the ocean - causes

extinction
Sify, Citing Professors @ University of Queensland and North Carolina, 10 (Sify
News, Citing Ove Hoegh-Gulberg, Professor @ University of Queensland and
Director of the Global Change Institute AND Citing John Bruno, Associate Professor
of Marine Science @ UNC, Could unbridled climate changes lead to human
extinction?, June 19th, http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changeslead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html)
GROWING CONCENTRATIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES ARE DRIVING IRREVERSIBLE AND DRAMATIC
CHANGES IN THE way the OCEANS function, PROVIDING EVIDENCE THAT
HUMANKIND COULD WELL BE ON THE WAY TO the next great
EXTINCTION. THE FINDINGS of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the
world's marine ecosystems' EMERGED FROM A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT
RESEARCH on the world's oceans, CARRIED OUT BY two of THE WORLD'S
LEADING MARINE SCIENTISTS. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg,
Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how
316
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 317 of 318
WE MAY
SEE SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED CHANGES THAT HAVE SERIOUS
RAMIFICATIONS FOR the overall well-being of humans, including THE CAPACITY OF
THE PLANET TO SUPPORT PEOPLE. This is further evidence that WE ARE WELL
ON THE WAY TO THE NEXT GREAT EXTINCTION EVENT ,' says HoeghGuldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly IF THE TREND
CONTINUES. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of
professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). '
human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health.
It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which
THE OCEAN SERVICES UPON WHICH HUMANITY DEPENDS ARE

undergoing massive change and in some cases BEGINNING TO FAIL', he added.
317
22-Apr-15
Stefan Bauschard
Page 318 of 318
xt solves nuke war

Nuclear power solves nuclear wars
Cohen 99 (Bernard, Professor-Emeritus of Physics and Astronomy and of Environmental and Occupational
Health at University of Pittsburgh. He has authored 6 books, over 300 papers in scientific journals, and about 75
articles in non-technical journals. He has presented invited lectures in 47 U.S. States, 6 Canadian provinces, 7
Japanese prefectures, 6 Australian states and territories, and 24 other countries in Europe, Asia and South America.
His awards include the American Physical Society Bonner Prize, the Health Physics Society Distinguished Scientific
Achievement Award. He has been elected Chairman of the Division of Nuclear Physics of the American Physical
Society, and Chairman of the Division of Environmental Sciences of the American Nuclear Society The nuclear
Power Advantage, http://www.praphansarn.com/new/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=14313&get=last)
Much has been made of the connection between nuclear power and nuclear bombs, although the relationship is
There are much easier, faster, and cheaper ways for a nations to develop
nuclear weapons than through a nuclear power programme . All nuclear weapons states have
really very weak.
developed their bombs independently from their electricity generation facilities, and any nation with a serious
desire to obtain nuclear weapons could and would do the same. The problem here is not so much to avoid the
One of the most likely

scenarios for their use is in fighting over oil as world supplies dwindle to precarious
levels during the twenty-first century. Oil resources are limited and located largely in the politically
unstable Middle East, so that competition for it can become intense. The 1991 Persian Gulf War could
development of nuclear bombs that is essentially a lost cause as to avoid their use.
easily be a forerunner of much more serious confrontations. However, electicity can replace oil for space heating,
Nuclear Power thus has the

advantage of mitigating the need for oil, thereby avoiding one of the prime potential
reasons for using nuclear bombs.
and produce hydrogen as a substitute for oil in transportation applications.
318
22-Apr-15

Terrorism DA

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Terrorism DA

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Stefan Bauschard

FYI --rrorism Defined................................................................................................ 6

A2: Terrorism Risk Decreasing............................................................................87

(Nuclear) Ext US-Russian Nuclear War.........................................................148

A2: Cant do it Alone........................................................................................ 204

FYI --rrorism Defined

B. The impact is a global nuclear exchange

It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially

if the act of nuclear terrorism

General Surveillance Restriction Links

John McLaughlin teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International

Surveillance is a critical tool needed to defeat terrorism

Surveillance is one piece of the puzzle used to catch terrorists

Warrant Requirement Links

Warrant requirement for national security decisions

Business Records/Section 2015/Email and Phone

Al Qaeda activity can be detected with email and phone record

Database needs to be broad to find terrorist cells

Broad-based records approaches are often used in national

Mass records collection is needed to catch terrorists because

Business record 215 program has been used to stop a terror

Business records closes holes in intelligence in order to defeat

Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror

Business records program has stopped many attacks

Metadata collection needed to cast a wide net

Section 702 Programs Necessary to Defeat

Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror

Authority for PRISM is in section 702

Prism Restrictions Link

PRISM has contributed to actionable intelligence in the fight

Reduced Encryption Cracking Links

Increasing Transparency Links

Mass Surveillance Critical to Prevent Terrorism

Isis threat justifies greater surveillance

Five reasons 9-11 proves surveillance is needed to prevent

The September 11 attacks were a vivid demonstration of the need for

Surveillance critical to disrupt clandestine terrorist operations

The wider the surveillance net, the more effective the

NSA surveillance has disrupted more than 50 terror plots

USA Today, JUN 07, 2013,

Intelligence gathering critical to defeat terrorism

Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Senior Legal Research Fellow, 2004

The traditional law enforcement model is highly protective of civil

The postSeptember 11th

Domestic Anti-Terrorism Key

Counterterrorism Generally Effective

Existing US counterterrorism efforts effective

Intelligence Critical to National Security

the failure to collect or understand critical information in time to identify a threat

Intelligence necessary to protect against WMD proliferation

UNFETTERED INTELLIGENCE IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT

INTELLIGENCE VITAL TO THWARTING TERRORISM

Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Genocide

A2: Terrorists No Longer Use Email

NSA and GCHQ

Signal Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Terrorism

Signals intelligence necessary to combat terrorism and

ProtectingTheNationAgainstThreatstoOurNationalSecurity. The ability of the United

Terrorist Threat Increasing

Terror Risk Generally Increasing

Al-Qaeda is still alive and well- planning attacks on the US.

For while al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his lieutenants in

Perhaps most importantly, the core al Qaeda managed to change

sophisticated attacks on U.S. civil aviation.