Labor

1 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY.
GUTTIEREZ
CHARM
1..
Case Digest_De La Salle University v De La Salle
University Employees Association
GR No. 109002 April 12, 2000
Facts: On December 1986, De La Salle University and
De La Salle University Employees Association entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with a life span of
3 years, that is, from December 23, 1986-December 22,
1989. During the freedom period, or 60 days before the
expiration of the said collective bargaining agreement,
the Union initiated negotiations with the University for a
new collective bargaining agreement, which however,
turned out to be unsuccessful, hence the Union filed a
Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, National Capital Region. After several
conciliation-mediation meetings, 5 out of the 11 issues
raised in the Notice of Strike were resolved by the
parties. A partial collective bargaining agreement was
executed by the parties. On March 18, 1991, the parties
entered into a Submission Agreement identifying the 6
unresolved issues. The parties appointed Buenaventura
Magsalin as voluntary arbitrator.
The Voluntary
Arbitrator is constrained to respect the original intention
of the parties, the same being not contrary to law, morals
or public policy. Subsequently, both parties filed their
respective motions for reconsideration which, however,
were not entertained by the voluntary arbitrator.
On March 5, 1993, the University filed with the Second
Division of this Court a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction assailing the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator, as having been rendered in excess of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion.
Likewise, the Union also filed a petition for certiorari
with the First Division. Upon motion by the Solicitor
General, both petitions were consolidated and
transferred to the Second Division. The Solicitor General
came to the conclusion sufficient evidence to justify the
Unions proposal to consider the University and the CSB
as only one entity because the latter is but a mere
integral part of the university.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the voluntary arbitrator
committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to (1)
computer operators assigned at the Universitys
Computer Services Center and the Universitys discipline
officers may be considered as confidential employees
and should therefore be excluded from the bargaining
unit; (2) a union shop clause should be included in the
parties collective bargaining agreement; (3) the denial of
the Unions proposed method of laying-off employees is
proper; (4) the ruling that on the basis of the Universitys

proposed budget, the University can no longer be
required to grant a second round of wage increases for
the school years 1991-92; (5) the denial of the Unions
proposals on the deloading of the union president is
proper; (6) the finding that the mulit-sectoral committee
is the legitimate group which determines the annual
salary increases; and (7) the ruling that 70% share in the
incremental tuition proceeds is the only source of salary
increases and fringe benefits of the employees is proper.
Held: The petitions in the consolidated cases are
partially granted. On the first issue, the Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of
the computer operators and discipline officers from the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986
collective bargaining agreement does not bar any renegotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees
in the bargaining unit. On the second issue, the right to
join a labor organization should carry with it the
corollary right not to join the same.
On the third issue, the Supreme Court affirms the ruling
of the voluntary arbitrator for the inclusion of a union
shop provision in addition to the existing maintenance of
membership clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. The right to refrain from joining labor
organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act is however limited. The legal protection
granted to such right to refrain from joining is
withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and
an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of
which the employer may employ only members of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of
the contract in order to keep their jobs. On the fourth
issue, the university can no longer be required to grant a
second round of wage increases for the school years
1991-9222 and 1992-93 and charge the same to the
incremental proceeds.
The voluntary arbitrator
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of excess of jurisdiction. On the fifth issue, the Supreme
Court agrees with the voluntary arbitrators rejection of
the said demands, there being no justifiable reason for
the granting of the same. On the sixth issue, the Court
finds that the voluntary arbitrator did not gravely abuse
his discretion on the matter. It appears that during the
parties negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement, the Union demanded for a 25% and 40%
salary increase for the 2nd and 3rd years. Assuming for
the sake of argument that the said committee is the
group responsible for determining wage increases and
fringe benefits, as ruled by the voluntary arbitrator, the
committees determination must still be based on duly
audited financial statements.
2 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

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On the secventh issue, the Court deems that any
determination of this alleged error is unnecessary and
irrelevant, in view of the rulings on the fourth and
preceding issues and there being no evidence presented
before the voluntary arbitrator that the University held
incremental tuition fee proceeds from which any wage
increase or fringe benefit may be satisfied.
2.
A.C. No. 4763
March 20, 2003
DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS,
IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO, LUZ
DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES,
FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C.
MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI,
REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE
LUIS TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP
AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO
CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA
FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES,
NATIVIDAD SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL,
complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO
JR., respondent.
FACTS: Sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mario Jr.
as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union
officers entered into a CBA with the management of UST
for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35
million. The 1986 CBA expired in 1988 but efforts to
forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989 the faculty
members of UST went on strike and as a countermeasure UST terminated the employment of 16 officers
and directors of the UST Faculty Union including
respondent. The administration of UST and the UST
Faculty Union entered into a compromise agreement for
the payment of P7M from which P5M was intended to
settle the back wages and other claims of the dismissed
employees who were earlier ordered reinstated by the
Court, and the sum of P2M to satisfy the remaining
obligations of UST under the 1986 CBA. In 1992 UST
and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of
agreement to settle the salary increases and other
benefits under the CBA effective 1988 for a total of
P42M. It was agreed that the benefits accruing from 1
June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be taken from the
sum of P42M which UST would release directly to the
faculty members, while the remainder of the P42M
package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty
Union which would then disburse the balance to cover
the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993. The
memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of
P2M agreed upon in the 1990 compromise agreement as
well as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mario worth P4.2M
against the P42M outlay. Complainants as members of

the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of
transparency among the officers and directors of the
union in the management and disbursement of the
monetary benefits for the faculty members.
Complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Mario accusing him of (a) compromising
their entitlements under the 1986 CBA without the
knowledge, consent or ratification of the union
members, and worse, for only P2,000,000.00 when they
could have received more than P9,000,000.00; (b)
failing to account for the P7,000,000.00 received by him
and other officers and directors in the UST Faculty
Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack
of transparency in the administration and distribution of
the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package
under the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal
to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00 in favor of
the faculty members although the amount was
denominated as attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent must be
reprimanded from practice of law due to misconduct?
HELD: There are ethical lapses on the part of
respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. in the manner by
which he secured the P7M by virtue of the compromise
agreement and the P4.2 attorney's fees under the
memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows
that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as
having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the
funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the
series of agreements with the management of UST, the
Court believes that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict
of interests, first, when he negotiated for the
compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse
roles of union president, union attorney and interested
party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his
own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the
attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior
disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to
the members of the UST Faculty Union. As one of the
sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking
compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for
their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in
obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to
act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST
Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement.
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof."15 In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a
conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a

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position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually
impels him to do less than his best for his client.
Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other
person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property
or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own
benefit the property committed to his custody for
management.16 This rule is entirely independent of
whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be
shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because
the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from
placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict
between self-interest and integrity. Necessarily, a lawyer
cannot continue representing a client in an action or any
proceeding against a party even with the client's consent
after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the
same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant
will be able to satisfy both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer
is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject
matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.
3.
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP.,
petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST
COMMERCIAL CORP. WORKERS
ASSOCIATION, respondent.
FACTS: Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines
(CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a
petition for certification election among the regular
rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corp. and its Affiliates. Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the
dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the
bargaining unit. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers
Union then reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUPSta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association (CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership
to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation. CLUP-SLECCWA then filed
the instant petition. It alleged that SLECC employs
about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its
members.
CLUP-SLECCWA claimed that no
certification election has been held among them within
the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and
while there is another union registered covering the
same employees, namely SMSLEC, it has not been
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of SLECCs
employees. Subsequently, SLECC filed a motion to
dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily
recognized SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of
its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective
bargaining negotiations already commenced between
them. Then a CBA between SMSLEC and SLECC was
ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered

with DOLE.
ISSUE: Whether or not certification election must be
conducted in the SLECC?
HELD: Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor
organization as any union or association of employees
which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon
compliance with all the documentary requirements, the
Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the
applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that
it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate
labor organization are different from, but related to, the
concept of a bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be
the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law. However, employees in two corporations
cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the
businesses of the two corporations are related. The
inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not
among the grounds for cancellation of registration,
unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated
in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
[10] Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its affiliates workers union,
having been validly issued a certificate of registration,
should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The
proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-SLECC
and its affiliates workers union and not to immediately
commence voluntary recognition proceedings with
SMSLEC.
WHEREFORE, petition is denied.
3. FVC Labor Union-PTGWO vs SANAMA-FVCSIGLO
G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO
the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file

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employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated signed
a five-year collective bargaining agreement with the
company. The five-year CBA period was from February
1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of
the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLUPTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation
of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the
CBAs duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the
renegotiated CBA provides that this re-negotiation
agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001
and until May 31, 2003 thus extending the original fiveyear period of the CBA by four (4) months. On January
21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003
expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term
(and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the
expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent
Sama-SamangNagkakaisangManggagawasa
FVCSolidarity of Independent and General Labor
Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
petition for certification election for the same rank-andfile unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLUPTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the certification election petition was filed outside
the freedom period or outside of the sixty (60) days
before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
Issue:
Was the certification election filed within the freedom
period?
Ruling:
Yes. While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs
original five-year term together with all other CBA
provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of
five years will not carry with it a change in the unions
exclusive collective bargaining status. By express
provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining
status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the
workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite
an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five
years, either as an original provision or by amendment,
the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is
effective only for five years and can be challenged within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first
five years.
In the present case, the CBA was originally signed for a
period of five years, i.e., from February 1, 1998 to
January 30, 2003, with a provision for the renegotiation
of the CBAs other provisions at the end of the 3rd year
of the five-year CBA term. Thus, prior to January 30,
2001 the workplace parties sat down for renegotiation

but instead of confining themselves to the economic and
non-economic CBA provisions, also extended the life of
the CBA for another four months, i.e., from the original
expiry date on January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.
This negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal
effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining
representation status which remained effective only for
five years ending on the original expiry date of January
30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or starting
December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file
a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on
January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the expiration
of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive
bargaining status, was seasonably filed.
4. Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, et. al.
G.R. No. 183317
December 21, 2009
Facts:
On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng
MgaManggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc.
(SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of
Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region
IV-A.On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics,
Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union
Registration against private respondent, claiming that
the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not
complying with the 20% requirement and that it
committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in
violation of Article 239 of the same code.
The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order
granting the petition, revoking the registration of
respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active
labor unions. SMMSC-Independent appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the
respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate
labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and insisted
that private respondent failed to comply with the 20%
union membership requirement for its registration as a
legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation
from the total number of union members of 102
employees who executed affidavits recanting their union
membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1) Was there failure to comply with the 20% union
membership requirement?

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2) Did the withdrawal of 31 union members affect the
petition for certification election insofar as the 30%
requirement is concerned?
Ruling:
No.While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be
considered as a resignation from the union, the fact
remains that at the time of the unions application for
registration, the affiants were members of respondent
and they comprised more than the required 20%
membership for purposes of registration as a labor
union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a
20% minimum membership during the application for
union registration. It does not mandate that a union
must maintain the 20% minimum membership
requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31
union members had withdrawn their support to the
petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction
must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the
petition are presumed voluntary unless there is
convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals
made after the filing of the petition are deemed
involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the
employees were not totally free from the employers
pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees
execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has
an impairing dimension on the right of labor to selforganization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be
grounds for cancellation of union registration under the
Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough
to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
5. HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila,
Petitioner - versus - SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION
OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND
RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN),
NACHURA, J.:
The Constitution affords full protection to labor, but the
policy is not to be blindly followed at the expense of
capital. Always, the interests of both sides must be
balanced in light of the evidence adduced and the
peculiar circumstances surrounding each case.
FACTS:
Respondent Union is the certified collective bargaining

agent of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency
Manila, a hotel owned by petitioner Hotel Enterprises of
the Philippines, Inc. (HEPI).
In 2001, HEPIs hotel business suffered a slump due to
the local and international economic slowdown,
aggravated by the events of September 11, 2001 in the
United States. An audited financial report made by
SycipGorresVelayo (SGV) & Co. on January 28, 2002
indicated that the hotel suffered a gross operating loss
amounting to P16,137,217.00 in 2001,[5] a staggering
decline compared to its P48,608,612.00 gross operating
profit[6] in year 2000.[7] According to petitioner, the
management initially decided to cost-cut by
implementing energy-saving schemes: prioritizing
acquisitions/purchases; reducing work weeks in some of
the hotels departments; directing the employees to avail
of their vacation leaves; and imposing a moratorium on
hiring employees for the year 2001 whenever
practicable.[8]
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, the Union filed a notice
of strike due to a bargaining deadlock before the
National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB),
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS 08-253-01.[9] In the course
of the proceedings, HEPI submitted its economic
proposals for the rank-and-file employees covering the
years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The proposal included
manning and staffing standards for the 248 regular
rank-and-file employees. The Union accepted the
economic proposals. Hence, a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) was signed on November 21, 2001,
adopting the manning standards for the 248 rank-andfile employees.[10]
Then, on December 21, 2001, HEPI issued a
memorandum offering a Special Limited Voluntary
Resignation/Retirement Program (SLVRRP) to its
regular employees. Employees who were qualified to
resign or retire were given separation packages based on
the number of years of service.[11] The vacant positions,
as well as the regular positions vacated, were later filled
up with contractual personnel and agency employees.
[12]
Subsequently, on January 21, 2002, petitioner decided to
implement a downsizing scheme after studying the
operating costs of its different divisions to determine the
areas where it could obtain significant savings. It found
that the hotel could save on costs if certain jobs, such as

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engineering services, messengerial/courier services,
janitorial and laundry services, and operation of the
employees cafeteria, which by their nature were
contractable
pursuant
to
existing
laws
and
jurisprudence, were abolished and contracted out to
independent job contractors
On April 12, 2002, the Union filed a notice of strike
based on unfair labor practice (ULP) against HEPI.
On July 20, 2004, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision,[44] reversing the resolution of the NLRC and
reinstating the October 30, 2002 decision of the Labor
Arbiter which declared the strike valid. The CA also
ordered the reinstatement of the 48 terminated
employees on account of the hotel managements illegal
redundancy and retrenchment scheme and the payment
of their backwages from the time they were illegally
dismissed until their actual reinstatement.[45] HEPI
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for
lack of merit.[46]
Hence, this petition.
The issue boils down to whether the CAs decision,
reversing the NLRC ruling, is in accordance with law and
established facts.
We answer in the negative.
ISSUE: To resolve the correlative issues (i.e., the validity
of the strike; the charges of ULP against petitioner; the
propriety of petitioners act of hiring contractual
employees from employment agencies; and the
entitlement of Union officers and terminated employees
to reinstatement, backwages and strike duration pay), we
answer first the most basic question: Was petitioners
downsizing scheme valid?
HELD: ART. 283. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the
[Department] of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall
be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his
one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures
or cessation of operations of establishment or

undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent
to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction
of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1)
whole year.
Retrenchment is the reduction of work personnel usually
due to poor financial returns, aimed to cut down costs
for operation particularly on salaries and wages.[47]
Redundancy, on the other hand, exists where the
number of employees is in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.
[48] Both are forms of downsizing and are often resorted
to by the employer during periods of business recession,
industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, and
during lulls in production occasioned by lack of orders,
shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new
production program, or introduction of new methods or
more
efficient
machinery
or
automation.[49]
Retrenchment and redundancy are valid management
prerogatives, provided they are done in good faith and
the employer faithfully complies with the substantive
and procedural requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence.[50] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For a valid retrenchment, the following requisites must
be complied with: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to
prevent losses and such losses are proven; (2) written
notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and
(3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one-month
pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of
service,
whichever
is
higher.[51]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In case of redundancy, the employer must prove that: (1)
a written notice was served on both the employees and
the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date
of retrenchment; (2) separation pay equivalent to at least
one month pay or at least one month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher, has been paid; (3) good
faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4)
adoption of fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining
which positions are to be declared redundant and
accordingly abolished.[52] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is the employer who bears the onus of proving
compliance with these requirements, retrenchment and
redundancy being in the nature of affirmative defenses.
[53] Otherwise, the dismissal is not justified.[54]

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6.CaseDigest_Jackbilt Industries Inc v Jackbilt
Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU GR No.
171618-19 March 20, 2009
Facts:
Due to the adverse effects of the Asian
economics crisis on the construction industry beginning
1997 petitioner decided to temporarily stop its business,
compelling most of its employees to go on leave for 6
months. Respondent immediately protested the
temporary shutdown. Because its collective bargaining
agreement with petition was expiring during the period
of the shutdown, respondent claimed that petition halted
production to avoid its duty to bargain collectively.
Respondent went on strike. Petitioner filed a petition for
injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO in the
NLRC. It sought to enjoin respondbent from obstructing
free entry to and exit from its production facility.
On April 14, 1998, the NLRC issued a TRO directing the
respondents to refrain from preventing access to
petitioners property. The NLRC ordered the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, petitioner
sent individual memoranda to the officers and members
of respondent who participated in the strike ordering
them to explain why they should not be dismissed for
committing illegal acts in the course of a strike.
Aggrieved, respondent filed complaints for illegal
lockout, runaway shop and damages, unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal
to bargain on behalf of its officers and members against
petitioner and its corporate officers. In a decision, the
labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout
and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However,
because petitioner did not file a petition to declare the
strike illegal, it was found guilty of illegal dismissal. On
appeal, it modified the decision of the labor arbiter. Both
petitioner and respondent moved for reconsideration but
they were both denied for lack of merit. The petitioner
assailed the decision of the NLRC via a petition for
certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition. Thus, this
recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of a petition with the
labor arbiter to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine
qua non for the valid termination of employees who
commit an illegal act in the course of such strike
Held: The petition is granted. Article 264(e) of the Labor
Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from
obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the
employers premises. Since respondent was found by the
NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit
vehicles from petitioners compound, respondents
officers and employees clearly committed illegal acts in
the course of the March 9, 1998 strike. We uphold the
legality of the dismissal of respondents officers and
employees. Article 264 of the Labor Code further
provides that an employer may terminate employees

found to have committed illegal acts in the course of a
strike.
7.G.R. No. 168406
July 13, 2009
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F.
DE LEON, Petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN
BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA,
JOHNNY ARINTO AND ROBERTO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. is a non-stock,
non profit corporation duly formed, organized and
existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty.
Roberto F. de Leon as its president. Respondents Ronnie
Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto and Roberto de
Guzman, on the other hand, were former officers and
members of the Club Filipino Employees Association.
The union and the company had a CBA which expired on
May 31, 2000. Prior to the expiration of the CBA and
within the freedom period, the union made several
demands for negotiation. No negotiations, however, took
place for various reasons proffered by the company,
among them the illness of the chairman of the
management panel. The union then filed a notice of
strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure
to bargain. The company formally responded to the
demands of the union when it submitted the first part of
its economic counter-proposal; the second part was
submitted on May 11, 2001. Meanwhile, on May 4, 2001,
the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision
of the DOLE. In response to the companys counterproposal, the union sent the company its improved
proposal, but the company refused to improve on its
offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May
26, 2001 on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock.
The company then filed a petition to declare the strike
illegal.
ISSUE: whether or not the strike staged by respondents
was legal?
HELD: Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code states: In cases of
bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as
practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the
bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the
written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of
the employer and the proof of a request for conference to
settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the
notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts
complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute
amicably. In the instant case, the union cannot be
faulted for its omission of not attaching the counterproposal of the company in the notice of strike it

CHARM
submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counterproposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on
April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations
but it was only on April 22, 2001 when the company
formally responded to the union by submitting the first
part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company
another 3 weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11,
2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. The
Implementing Rules use the words "as far as
practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-proposal
of the company to the notice of strike of the union was
not practicable. Indeed, compliance with the
requirement was impossible because no counterproposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of
strike. The law does not exact compliance with the
impossible. Nemoteneturadimpossibile.
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of
the illegality of the strike should not be automatically
followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from
employment. The law is clear: Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status. Note that
the verb "participates" is preceded by the adverb
"knowingly." This reflects the intent of the legislature to
require "knowledge" as a condition sine qua non before a
union officer can be dismissed from employment for
participating in an illegal strike. The provision is worded
in such a way as to make it very difficult for employers to
circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees
in the guise of exercising management prerogative. This
is but one aspect of the States constitutional and
statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to
self-organization.
8.
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA (OWNED AND
OPERATED BY GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION) Petitioner, vs. PINAG-ISANG
GALING AT LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
HERITAGE MANILA (PIGLAS-HERITAGE),
Respondent
This case is about a companys objections to the
registration of its rank and file union for non-compliance
with the requirements of its registration.
FACTS: Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file
employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila
(petitioner company) formed the "Heritage Hotel
Employees Union" (the HHE union). The Department of
Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-
NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this

union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for
certification election that petitioner company opposed
alleging that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be
an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local
chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and
Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) and the
company also filed a petition for the cancellation of the
HHE unions registration certificate.
The Med-Arbiter granted the HHE unions petition for
certification election. Petitioner company appealed it
and filed a motion for reconsideration which was both
denied respectively, prompting it to file a petitioin for
certiorari with the CA.On October 12, 2001 the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of
the HHE unions certification election, effective until the
petition for cancellation of that unions registration shall
have been resolved with finality. The decision of the
Court of Appeals became final when the HHE union
withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this
Court.
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees
of petitioner company held a meeting and formed
another union, the respondent Pinag-IsangGaling at
LakasngmgaManggagawasa Heritage Manila (the
PIGLAS union). This union applied for registration with
the DOLE-NCR and got its registration certificate on
February 9, 2004. Two months later, the members of the
first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its
dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for
cancellation of its union registration.
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a
petition for certification election that petitioner company
also opposed, alleging that the new unions officers and
members were also those who comprised the old union.
According to the company, the employees involved
formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of
Appeals injunction against the holding of the
certification election sought by the former union.
Despite the companys opposition, however, the MedArbiter granted the petition for certification election.
On December 6, 2004, petitioner Company filed a
petition to cancel the union registration of respondent
PIGLAS union. The company claimed that the union
made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union
registration and committed dual unionism" which is a
ground for canceling a unions registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new Union can have a valid
certification election?

CHARM
RULING: The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its
registration is a serious charge and deserves close
scrutiny. Once such charge is proved, the labor union
acquires none of the rights accorded to registered
organizations. Here, the discrepancies in the number of
union members or employees stated in the various
supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union
submitted to labor authorities can be explained. While it
appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003
organizational meeting that only 90 employees
responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be
assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as
reflected on the signature sheet for attendance. There is
also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the
fact that only 127 members ratified the unions
constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the
attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed that all those
who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws.
Any member had the right to hold out and refrain from
ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the
process.
At any rate, the Labor Code and its implementing rules
do not require that the number of members appearing
on the documents in question should completely
dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures
are shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution
and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed
to have complied with registration requirements.
Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS
union was required to submit the names of all its
members comprising at least 20 percent of the
employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it
submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding
that the signature and attendance sheets reflected a
membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission,
said
the
company,
amounted
to
material
misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of the
unions registration.
But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is
immaterial. A comparison of the documents shows that,
except for six members, the names found in the subject
list are also in the attendance and signature sheets.
Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS
union sought to represent consisted of 250 employees.
Only 20 percent of this number or 50 employees were
required to unionize. Here, the union more than
complied with such requirement. And last, the fact that
some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also
members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union,
is not a ground for canceling the new unions
registration. The right of any person to join an
organization also includes the right to leave that
organization and join another one.
9. G.R. Nos. 174040-41 : September 22, 2010

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL,
Petitioner, vs. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL
DAVAO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: On November 6, 2000, respondent Waterfront
Insular Hotel Davao (respondent) sent the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region XI, Davao
City, a Notice of Suspension of Operations5cralaw
notifying the same that it will suspend its operations for
a period of six months due to severe and serious business
losses. In said notice, respondent assured the DOLE that
if the company could not resume its operations within
the six-month period, the company would pay the
affected employees all the benefits legally due to them.
During the period of the suspension, Domy R. Rojas
(Rojas), the President of Davao Insular Hotel Free
Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL), the recognized labor
organization in Waterfront Davao, sent respondent a
number of letters asking management to reconsider its
decision.
After series of negotiations, respondent and DIHFEUNFL, represented by its President, Rojas, and VicePresidents, Exequiel J. Varela Jr. and Avelino C. Bation,
Jr., signed a Memorandum of Agreement14cralaw
(MOA) wherein respondent agreed to re-open the hotel
subject to certain concessions offered by DIHFEU-NFL
in its Manifesto.
Accordingly, respondent downsized its manpower
structure to 100 rank-and-file employees as set forth in
the terms of the MOA. Moreover, as agreed upon in the
MOA, a new pay scale was also prepared by respondent.
The retained employees individually signed a
"Reconfirmation of Employment"15cralaw which
embodied the new terms and conditions of their
continued employment. Each employee was assisted by
Rojas who also signed the document.
On June 15, 2001, respondent resumed its business
operations.
Issue: whether or not a union is prohibited from offering
and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the
employees?
Held:
Article 100 of the Labor Code provides:

CHARM
PROHIBITION
AGAINST
ELIMINATION
OR
DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS- Nothing in this Book
shall be construed to eliminate or in any way diminish
supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed
at the time of the promulgation of this Code.
Clearly, the prohibition against elimination or
diminution of benefits set out in Article 100 of the Labor
Code is specifically concerned with benefits already
enjoyed at the time of the promulgation of the Labor
Code. Article 100 does not, in other words, purport to
apply to situations arising after the promulgation date of
the Labor Code x x
Even assuming arguendo that Article 100 applies to the
case at bar, this Court agrees with respondent that the
same does not prohibit a union from offering and
agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees.
In Rivera v. Espiritu, this Court ruled that the right to
free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to
suspend it, thus:
A CBA is "a contract executed upon request of either the
employer or the exclusive bargaining representative
incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement." The primary purpose of a CBA is the
stabilization of labor-management relations in order to
create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace.
In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and
realistic and give due consideration to the context in
which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is
intended to serve.
10.
G.R. No. 159460 : November 15, 2010
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (now known as
FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION),
Petitioner, v. ERNESTO U. GAMIER, ELENA R.
CONDEVILLAMAR, JANICE L. ARRIOLA and
OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
Facts: Sometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank
and respondent Solidbank Employees Union (Union)
were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their
1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to
cover the remaining two years thereof. Negotiations
commenced on November 17, 1999 but seeing that an
agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock
on December 22, 1999 and filed a Notice of Strike on
December 29, 1999.[2] During the collective bargaining
negotiations, some Union members staged a series of
mass actions. In view of the impending actual strike,
then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E.
Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute,

pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended. The assumption order dated January 18,
2000 directed the parties to cease and desist from
committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the
situation.[3]
Was private respondents act of massing in front of the
DOLE Building calculated by them to cause work
stoppage, or were they merely airing their grievance over
the ruling of the Labor Secretary in exercise of their civil
liberties? Who can divine the motives of their hearts?
But when two different interpretations are possible, the
courts must lean towards that which gives meaning and
vitality to the Bill of Rights. x xx[37]
On April 2, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its
Resolution[38] dated August 7, 2003.
Petitioners argued that the CA erred in holding that the
mass action of April 3, 2000 infront of the Office of the
Secretary of Labor was not a strike considering that it
had all the elements of a strike and the respondents
judicially admitted that it was a strike. The CA deemed
the mass action as an exercise of the respondents
freedom of expression but such constitutional right is
not absolute and subject to certain well-defined
exceptions. Moreover, a mass action of this nature is
considered a strike and not an exercise of ones freedom
of expression, considering further that the Secretarys
Order dated January 18, 2000 is a valid exercise of
police power.
Petitioners assail the CA in not considering the damage
and prejudice caused to the bank and its clients by
respondents illegal acts. Respondents mass actions
crippled
banking
operations.
Over-the-counter
transactions were greatly undermined. Checks for
clearing were significantly delayed. On-line transactions
were greatly hampered, causing inestimable damage to
the nationwide network of automated teller machines.
Respondent Unions actions clearly belie its allegation
that its mass action was merely intended to protest and
express their dissatisfaction with the Secretarys Order
dated March 24, 2000.
In view of the illegal strike conducted in violation of the
Secretarys assumption order, petitioners maintain that
the dismissal of respondents was not illegal, as
consistently ruled by this Court in many cases. Even
granting arguendo that their termination was illegal, the
CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of respondents
and holding that Solidbank, FMIC and Metrobank are
solidarily liable to the respondents. Lastly, the CA erred

CHARM
in not finding that respondents were guilty of forum
shopping as respondents claim that they did not know
the Union had filed a complaint was unbelievable under
the circumstances.[39]
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in ruling that the
dismissal of respondents Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola
and De Guzman was illegal, considering that this was not
an issue raised in the petition for certiorari before the
appellate court. What was raised by petitioners was only
the propriety of the award of separation pay by the
NLRC which in fact declared their dismissal to be valid
and legal.
Petitioners maintain that respondents are not entitled to
separation pay even if the dismissal was valid because
they committed serious misconduct and/or illegal act in
defying the Secretarys assumption order. Moreover, the
CA also erred in disregarding the Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim executed by twenty-one (21) individual
respondents who entered into a compromise agreement
with Solidbank.[40]
Issues
The fundamental issues to be resolved in this
controversy are: (1) whether the protest rally and
concerted work abandonment/boycott staged by the
respondents violated the Order dated January 18, 2000
of the Secretary of Labor; (2) whether the respondents
were validly terminated; and (3) whether the
respondents are entitled to separation pay or financial
assistance
Our Ruling
Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike
as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment
or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employers and employees.[41] The term
strike shall comprise not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns,
attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant
equipment and facilities and similar activities.[42] Thus,
the fact that the conventional term strike was not used
by the striking employees to describe their common
course of action is inconsequential, since the substance
of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed
to be controlling.[43]
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the

CA patently erred in concluding that the concerted mass
actions staged by respondents cannot be considered a
strike but a legitimate exercise of the respondents right
to express their dissatisfaction with the Secretarys
resolution of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA
negotiations with petitioners. It must be stressed that
the concerted action of the respondents was not limited
to the protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on April 3,
2000. Respondent Union had also picketed the Head
Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712
employees, including those in the provincial branches,
boycotted and absented themselves from work in a
concerted fashion for three continuous days that
virtually paralyzed the employers banking operations.
Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a
bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of
jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of
Labor to avert an impending strike, there is no doubt
that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the
result of a labor dispute.
11. CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNIONFEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,
- versus CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC.,
G.R. No. 190515
November 15, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an
electronics and semi-conductor firm situated inside the
Laguna Technopark, had an existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Cirtek Employees
Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for
the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005.
Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA, the parties
renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a
settlement, particularly on the issue of wage increases.
Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock
and filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board-Regional Office No.
IV (NCMB-RO IV) on April 26, 2004. Respondent, upon
the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout on June 16,
2004.
While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing,
respondent placed seven union officers including the
President, a Vice President, the Secretary and the
Chairman of the Board of Directors under preventive
suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of
overtime work. The officers were eventually dismissed
from employment, prompting petitioner to file another
Notice of Strike which was, after conciliation meetings,
converted to a voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal

CHARM
of the officers was later found to be legal, hence,
petitioner appealed.
In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was
deadlocked, petitioner went on strike on June 20, 2005.
By Order[1] dated June 23, 2005, the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a
Return to Work Order which was complied with.
Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the
controversy, respondent created a Labor Management
Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the
remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)[2] providing for daily wage increases
of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P9.00 per
day effective January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the
MOA via Motion and Manifestation[3] to the Secretary
of Labor, alleging that the remaining officers signed the
MOA under respondents assurance that should the
Secretary order a higher award of wage increase,
respondent would comply. By Decision[7] of September
24, 2009, the appellate court ruled in favor of
respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision of the
Secretary of Labor. It held that the Secretary of Labor
gravely abused his discretion in not respecting the MOA.
It did not give credence to the minutes of the meeting[8]
that attended the forging of the MOA as it was not
verified, nor to the Paliwanag[9] submitted by
respondent union members explaining why they signed
the MOA as it was not notarized.
ISSUES:
The relevant issues for resolution are 1) whether the
Secretary of Labor is authorized to give an award higher
than that agreed upon in the MOA, and 2) whether the
MOA was entered into and ratified by the remaining
officers of petitioner under the condition, which was not
incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor
the Secretary of Labors award in the event that it is
higher.
HELD:
The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the
exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art.
263 (g)[11] of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues
involved in the controversy including the award of wage
increases and benefits.[12] While an arbitral award
cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily
entered into by the parties because it requires the
intervention and imposing power of the State thru the
Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the
arbitral award can be considered an approximation of a
collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise
have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the

force and effect of a valid contract obligation.[13]
While a contract constitutes the law between the parties,
this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not
to the MOA in which even the unions signatories had
expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming
arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA, since it
is imbued with public interest, it must be construed
liberally and yield to the common good.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the
law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary
contract to which is applied the principles of law
governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract
within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which governs the relations
between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in
nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must
yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed
liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the
courts must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which
it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.
[17] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated September 24, 2009 and the Resolution
dated December 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March
16, 2006 and Resolution dated August 12, 2008 of the
Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED.
12.
G.R. No. 162025 : August 3, 2010
TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA
SA ASIA BREWERY, Petitioner, vs. ASIA
BREWERY, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) is engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of beer, shandy,
bottled water and glass products. ABI entered into a
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(CBA),4cra1aw
effective for five (5) years from August 1, 1997 to July 31,
2002, with Bisig at LakasngmgaManggagawasa AsiaIndependent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT), the exclusive
bargaining representative of ABI's rank-and-file
employees. On October 3, 2000, ABI and BLMAINDEPENDENT signed a renegotiated CBA effective
from August 1, 2000 to 31 July 2003.

CHARM
, a dispute arose when ABI's management stopped
deducting union dues from eighty-one (81) employees,
believing
that
their
membership
in
BLMAINDEPENDENT violated the CBA. Eighteen (18) of these
affected
employees
are
QA
Sampling
Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician
who formed part of the Quality Control Staff. Twenty
(20) checkers are assigned at the Materials Department
of the Administration Division, Full Goods Department
of the Brewery Division and Packaging Division. The rest
are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective
division managers.7cra1aw
BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI's actions
restrained the employees' right to self-organization and
brought the matter to the grievance machinery. As the
parties failed to amicably settle the controversy, BLMAINDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The parties
eventually agreed to submit the case for arbitration to
resolve the issue of "[w]hether or not there is restraint to
employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization."8cra1aw
In his Decision, Voluntary Arbitrator BienvenidoDevera
sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT after finding that
the records submitted by ABI showed that the positions
of the subject employees qualify under the rank-and-file
category because their functions are merely routinary
and clerical. He noted that the positions occupied by the
checkers and secretaries/clerks in the different divisions
are not managerial or supervisory, as evident from the
duties and responsibilities assigned to them. With
respect to QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and
Machine Gauge Technician, he ruled that ABI failed to
establish with sufficient clarity their basic functions as to
consider them Quality Control Staff who were excluded
from the coverage of the CBA. Accordingly, the subject
employees were declared eligible for inclusion within the
bargaining
unit
represented
by
BLMAINDEPENDENT.9cra1aw
On appeal, the CA reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator
ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE 81 EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM
AND ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN THE
BARGAINING UNIT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2,
ARTICLE 1 OF THE CBA[;]
HELD: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits
the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor
organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to confidential employees
or those who by reason of their positions or nature of

work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.14cra1aw
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rankand-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate
category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial
employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in
view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can
also become company-denominated with the presence of
managerial
employees
in
the
Union
membership.15cra1aw Having access to confidential
information, confidential employees may also become
the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act
as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement.16cra1aw
Unfair labor practice refers to "acts that violate the
workers' right to organize." The prohibited acts are
related to the workers' right to self organization and to
the observance of a CBA. For a charge of unfair labor
practice to prosper, it must be shown that ABI was
motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course,
that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxiety resulted x x x"28cra1aw from ABI's act in
discontinuing the union dues deduction from those
employees it believed were excluded by the CBA.
Considering that the herein dispute arose from a simple
disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA provision
on excluded employees from the bargaining unit,
respondent cannot be said to have committed unfair
labor practice that restrained its employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, nor have
thereby demonstrated an anti-union stance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 22, 2002 and Resolution dated January
28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
55578 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company
are hereby declared rank-and-file employees who are
eligible to join the Union of the rank-and-file employees.
13.
Picop Resources Incorporated (PRI) v. Taeca,
G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010
FACTS:
On
February
13,
2001,
respondents
AnacletoTaeca, Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime

CHARM
Campos, GeremiasTato, MartinianoMagayon, Manuel
Abucay and fourteen (14) others filed a Complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money claims
against petitioner PICOP Resources, Incorporated (PRI),
Wilfredo Fuentes (in his capacity as PRI's Vice
President/Resident Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel (in
his capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor), Southern
Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), Atty. Wilbur T.
Fuentes (in his capacity as Secretary General of SPFL),
PascasioTrugillo (in his capacity as Local President of
NagkahiusangMamumuosa PICOP Resources, Inc.SPFL [NAMAPRI-SPFL]) and Atty. Proculo Fuentes, Jr.
[6] (in his capacity as National President of SPFL).
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of
PRI
and bona
fide members
of NagkahiusangMamumuosa PRI Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the
collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file
employees of petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years from May
22, 1995 until May 22, 2000.
On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination
for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom
NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the
ground of acts of disloyalty committed against it when
respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition
for Certification Election of FFW before the freedom
period during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated
October 21, 2000 was also served on the Department of
Labor and Employment Office (DOLE), Caraga Region.
Respondents then accused PRI of Unfair Labor Practice
punishable under Article 248 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of
the Labor Code, while Atty. Fuentes and Wilbur T.
Fuentes and Pascasio Trujillo were accused of violating
Article 248 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code.
ISSUES:
I
WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVELY (sic)
BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) CAN BE GIVEN ITS
FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL ITS TERMS AND
CONDITION INCLUDING ITS UNION SECURITY
CLAUSE, EVEN BEYOND THE 5-YEAR
PERIOD WHEN NO NEW CBA HAS YET BEEN
ENTERED INTO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN HONEST ERROR IN THE
INTERPRETATION AND/OR CONCLUSION OF LAW
FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF CERTIORARI UNDER

RULE 65, REVISED RULES OF COURT.?
HELD:
1.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC

decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been
settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin Funeral
Home v. National Labor Relations Commission.[11] This
Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and that this action should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of
the hierarchy of courts.[12] Moreover, it is already
settled that under Section 9 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10] (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over
Petitions for Certiorari is specifically given the power
to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to
resolve factual issues. [13]
2.
We now come to the main issue of whether there
was just cause to terminate the employment of
respondents.
Petitioner's argument is untenable.

Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to
and comprehends "closed shop," union shop,"
"maintenance of membership," or any other form of
agreement which imposes upon employees the
obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment. There is union shop
when all new regular employees are required to join the
union within a certain period as a condition for their
continued employment. There is maintenance of
membership shop when employees, who are union
members as of the effective date of the agreement, or
who thereafter become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued employment
until they are promoted or transferred out of the
bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed
shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise
in which, by agreement between the employer and his
employees or their representatives, no person may be
employed in any or certain agreed departments of the
enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the

CHARM
duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the
employees in interest are a part.[15]
However, in terminating the employment of an employee
by enforcing the union security clause, the employer
needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security
clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the
enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA;
and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
decision of the union to expel the employee from the
union. These requisites constitute just cause for
terminating an employee based on the union security
provision of the CBA.[16]
As to the first requisite, there is no question that the CBA
between PRI and respondents included a union security
clause, specifically, a maintenance of membership as
stipulated in Sections 6 of Article II, Union Security and
Check-Off. Following the same provision, PRI, upon
written request from the Union, can indeed terminate
the employment of the employee who failed to maintain
its good standing as a union member.
Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL,
in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their letters
dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate the
employment of respondents due to their acts of
disloyalty to the Union.
However, as to the third requisite, we find that there is
no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to
terminate the employment of the respondents.
We will emphasize anew that the power to
dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. This,
however, is not without limitations. The employer is
bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of
his employees especially so when it is made upon the
request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary
and capricious. Due process must be observed in
dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his
position but also his means of livelihood. Employers
should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their
employees, which include the right to labor.[25]
An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the
twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If
reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to
the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally
dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the
amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service. Under Republic Act No.
6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled
to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other

benefits, or their monetary equivalent, computed from
the time their actual compensation was withheld from
them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. But if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall
be computed from the time of their illegal termination
up to the finality of the decision. Moreover,
respondents, having been compelled to litigate in order
to seek redress for their illegal dismissal, are entitled to
the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total
monetary award.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
14.SCA Hygiene Products Corporation
Employees Association-FFW vs. SCA Hygiene
Products Corporation, G.R. No. 182877, August
9, 2010.
FACTS:
Respondent SCA Hygiene Products Corporation is a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale
and distribution of industrial paper, tissue and allied
products.
It has existing Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) with SCA Hygiene Products
Corporation Monthly Employees Union-FSM (Monthly
Employees Union) and petitioner SCA Hygiene Products
Corporation
Employees
Association-FFW
(Daily
Employees Union), which represent the monthly and
daily paid rank-and-file employees, respectively.
As a result, the Monthly Employees Union demanded
that the 22 daily paid rank-and-file employees be given
conversion increase, promotion increase as well as
retroactive salary increase from the time the job
evaluation was completed on the ground that their
positions had been converted into a higher job grade
level which amounted to a promotion. Likewise, the
Daily Employees Union asked for the adjustment of said
employees compensation since the conversion
warranted their entitlement to the benefits, status and
privileges of a monthly paid rank-and-file employee.
As respondent failed to respond, both unions submitted
their grievances for mediation. When the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement, they submitted the case
for voluntary arbitration. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of respondent. First, it held that
the job evaluation was conducted as a reorganization
process to standardize the companys organizational setup. It was not designed to provide any conversion or
adjustment to the salaries of the employees. The CBAs
merely provided the procedure for the implementation
of the job evaluation. It did not specifically state that the

CHARM
covered employees are entitled to any salary adjustment
after the job evaluation. Hence, in the absence of any
law or agreement between the parties, any conversion
much less promotion is left entirely to respondents
sound discretion. Second, the appellate court did not
give credence to the unions claim that the grant of
conversion/promotion increase was respondents longstanding practice. To be considered a regular practice,
the grant of such increase should have been done over a
long period of time and must be shown to be consistent
and deliberate. In this case, there was no evidence that
respondent agreed to continue giving the benefits
knowing fully well that its employees are not covered by
the law requiring payment thereof. Third, the appellate
court noted that those employees converted to Job Grade
Level 3 positions were given salary and benefits increase
since they became managerial employees after the job
evaluation. The same could not be said with regard to
those holding Job Grade Level 2 positions since they
remained rank-and-file employees.
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE CASE IN
UTTER DISREGARD OF THE SUBSTANTIATED
FACTS THAT A PROMOTION TOOK PLACE WHEN
THE TWENTY-TWO (22) DAILY PAID EMPLOYEES,
WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY OCCUPYING JOB LEVEL I
POSITIONS, WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CONVERTED
INTO OR PROMOTED TO JOB LEVEL 2 POSITIONS
AFTER THE RESULT OF THE JOB EVALUATION ON
FEBRUARY 24, 2004.
Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between

BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.This Article and Plan
of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on April 7, 2000.
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the
assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and
absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC
employees, including those in its different branches
across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own
employees, with their status and tenure recognized and
salaries and benefits maintained.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter
- Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (hereinafter the
Union, for brevity) is the exclusive bargaining agent of
BPIs rank and file employees in Davao City. The former
FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not
belong to any labor union at the time of the
merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on
March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC
employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop
Clause (Article II, Section 2) of the existing CBA between
petitioner BPI and respondent Union.[7]
After two months of management inaction on the
request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its
decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the
Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance
Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at
this level and so it was subsequently submitted for
voluntary arbitration by the parties.[11]
HELD:
Employee; evaluation and promotion. The fact that
employees were re-classified from Job Grade Level 1 to
Job Grade Level 2 as a result of a job evaluation program
does not automatically entail a promotion or grant them
an increase in salary. Of primordial consideration is not
the nomenclature or title given to the employee, but the
nature of his functions. What transpired in this case was
only a promotion in nomenclature. The employees
continued to occupy the same positions they were
occupying prior to the job evaluation. Moreover, their
job titles remained the same and they were not given
additional duties and responsibilities.
15.
BPI v. BPI Employees Union-Davao ChapterFederation of Unions in BPI Unibank,
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010
FACTS:
On
March
23,
2000,
the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas approved the Articles of
Voluntary Arbitrator Rosalina Letrondo-Montejo, in a

Decision[12] dated November 23, 2001, ruled in favor of
petitioner BPIs interpretation that the former FEBTC
employees were not covered by the Union Security
Clause of the CBA between the Union and the Bank on
the ground that the said employees were not new
employees who were hired and subsequently regularized,
but were absorbed employees by operation of law
because the former employees of FEBTC can be
considered assets and liabilities of the absorbed
corporation. The Voluntary Arbitrator concluded that
the former FEBTC employees could not be compelled to
join the Union, as it was their constitutional right to join
or not to join any organization.
The Court of Appeals pertinently ruled in its Decision:
A union-shop clause has been defined as a form of union
security provision wherein non-members may be hired,
but to retain employment must become union members
after a certain period.

CHARM
There is no question as to the existence of the unionshop clause in the CBA between the petitioner-union and
the company. The controversy lies in its application to
the absorbed employees.
To rule otherwise would definitely result to a very
awkward and unfair situation wherein the absorbed
employees shall be in a different if not, better situation
than the existing BPI employees. The existing BPI
employees by virtue of the union-shop clause are
required to pay the monthly union dues, remain as
members in good standing of the union otherwise, they
shall be terminated from the company, and other unionrelated obligations. On the other hand, the absorbed
employees shall enjoy the fruits of labor of the
petitioner-union and its members for nothing in
exchange. Certainly, this would disturb industrial peace
in the company which is the paramount reason for the
existence of the CBA and the union.
ISSUES:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FORMER
FEBTC EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
NEW EMPLOYEES OF BPI FOR PURPOSES OF
APPLYING THE UNION SHOP CLAUSE OF THE CBA
II
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS INTERPRETATION OF
THE COVERAGE OF THE UNION SHOP CLAUSE IS
AT WAR WITH THE SPIRIT AND THE RATIONALE
WHY THE LABOR CODE ITSELF ALLOWS THE
EXISTENCE OF SUCH PROVISION[16]
HELD:
Merger; employee terms and conditions. That
BPI is the same entity as FEBTC after the merger is but a
legal fiction intended as a tool to adjudicate rights and
obligations between and among the merged corporations
and the persons that deal with them. Although in a
merger it is as if there is no change in the personality of
the employer, there is in reality a change in the situation
of the employee. Once an FEBTC employee is absorbed,
there are presumably changes in his condition of
employment even if his previous tenure and salary rate is
recognized by BPI. It is reasonable to assume that BPI
would have different rules and regulations and company
practices than FEBTC and it is incumbent upon the
former FEBTC employees to obey these new. Not the
least of these changes is the fact that prior to the merger
FEBTC employees were employees of an unorganized

establishment and after the merger they became
employees of a unionized company that had an existing
CBA with the certified union. Thus, although in a sense
BPI is continuing FEBTCs employment of these
absorbed employees, BPIs employment of these
absorbed employees will not be under exactly the same
terms and conditions as stated in the latters
employment contracts with FEBTC
In essence, the sole issue in this case is whether
or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed
by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI
should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the
existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.
Petitioner is of the position that the former FEBTC
employees are not new employees of BPI for purposes of
applying the Union Shop Clause of the CBA, on this note,
petitioner points to Section 2, Article II of the CBA,
which provides:
New employees falling within the bargaining unit as
defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may hereafter
be regularly employed by the Bank shall, within thirty
(30) days after they become regular employees, join the
Union as a condition of their continued employment. It
is understood that membership in good standing in the
Union is a condition of their continued employment with
the Bank.[17] (Emphases supplied.)
Section 2, Article II of the CBA is silent as to how one
becomes a regular employee of the BPI for the first
time. There is nothing in the said provision which
requires that a new regular employee first undergo a
temporary or probationary status before being deemed
as such under the union shop clause of the CBA.
Union security is a generic term which is applied
to and comprehends closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of membership or any other form of
agreement which imposes upon employees the
obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment. There is union shop
when all new regular employees are required to join the
union within a certain period for their continued
employment. There is maintenance of membership shop
when employees, who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter
become members, must maintain union membership as
a condition for continued employment until they are
promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the
agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other
hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by
agreement between the employer and his employees or

CHARM
their representatives, no person may be employed in any
or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he
or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the
agreement, remains a member in good standing of a
union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in
interest are a part.[19]
In other words, the purpose of a union shop or other
union security arrangement is to guarantee the
continued
existence of the union through enforced membership for
the benefit of the workers.
To reiterate, petitioner insists that the term new
employees, as the same is used in the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA at issue, refers only to employees
hired by BPI asnon-regular employees who later
qualify for regular employment and become regular
employees, and not those who, as a legal consequence of
a merger, are allegedly automatically deemed regular
employees of BPI. However, the CBA does not make a
distinction as to how a regular employee attains such a
status. Moreover, there is nothing in the Corporation
Law and the merger agreement mandating the automatic
employment as regular employees by the surviving
corporation in the merger.
In the case of former FEBTC employees who initially
joined the union but later withdrew their membership,
there is even greater reason for the union to request their
dismissal from the employer since the CBA also
contained a Maintenance of Membership Clause.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the
Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, subject to the thirty (30) day
notice requirement imposed herein. Former FEBTC
employees who opt not to become union members but
who qualify for retirement shall receive their retirement
benefits in accordance with law, the applicable
retirement plan, or the CBA, as the case may be.
16.
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC.
versus PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION
(PILA),
G.R. No. 170830
FACTS:
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of
matches, with principal address at Phimco Compound,
Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco
Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly

authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCOs
daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named
respondents are PILA officers and members.
When
the last collective bargaining agreement was about to
expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA
negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a
deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits. On
March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the
ground of the bargaining deadlock. On May 3, 1995,
PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), to
enjoin the strikers from preventing through force,
intimidation and coercion the ingress and egress of
non-striking employees into and from the company
premises. On May 15, 1995, the NLRC issued an ex-parte
TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20) days, or until
June 5, 1995.
On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with
the NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-07-04705-95, and raffled to Labor Arbiter (LA)
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998,[5] and
found the strike illegal; the respondents committed
prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress
to and egress from PHIMCOs premises and preventing
the non-striking employees from reporting for work. He
observed that it was not enough that the picket of the
strikers was a moving picket, since the strikers should
allow the free passage to the entrance and exit points of
the company premises. Thus, LA Mayor declared that
the respondent employees, PILA officers and members,
have lost their employment status.
On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members
appealed LA Mayors decision to the NLRC.
THE NLRC RULING
The NLRC decided the appeal
on December 29, 1998, and set aside LA Mayors
decision.[6] The NLRC did not give weight to PHIMCOs
evidence, and relied instead on the respondents
evidence showing that the union conducted a peaceful
moving picket.
THE CA RULING
In a Decision[10] promulgated
on February 10, 2004, the CA dismissed PHIMCOs
petition for certiorari. The CA noted that the NLRC
findings, that the picket was peaceful and that
PHIMCOs evidence failed to show that the picket
constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the

CHARM
points of entry to and exit from the company premises,
were supported by substantial evidence.
in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be

given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the
issues raised in this case are factual in nature that we
cannot generally touch in a petition for review, unless
compelling reasons exist; the company has not shown
any such compelling reason as the picket was peaceful
and uneventful, and no human barricade blocked the
company premises.
THE ISSUE
Did the CA correctly determine whether
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
on the case?
In this light, the core issue in the present case is whether
the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the unions strike
was legal.
These requirements are mandatory, and the unions

failure to comply renders the strike illegal.[17] The 15 to
30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the
parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute
with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,
while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the
DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the
union members.[18]
17.
ELPIDIO CALIPAY
,
- versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
TRIANGLE ACE CORPORATION and JOSE LEE,
G.R. No. 166411
OUR RULING We find the petition partly meritorious.

Requisites of a valid strike
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their
struggle with management in the course of setting their
terms and conditions of employment. Because it is
premised on the concept of economic war between labor
and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe
life to or destroy the union and its members, and one
that must also necessarily affect management and its
members.[14]
In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike
must be exercised responsibly and must always rest on
rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by
the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it must focus on
legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike
should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a
means of attaining social justice is never meant to
oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.[15]
Since strikes affect not only the relationship between
labor and management but also the general peace and
progress of the community, the law has provided
limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a
strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of
the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike
be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be
approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot
Facts: On July 16, 1999, a Complaint[3] for illegal

dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages
and 13th month pay, non-payment of service incentive
leave pay, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest
day, night shift allowances and separation pay was filed
by herein petitioner ElpidioCalipay, together with
Alfredo Mission and Ernesto Dimalanta against herein
private respondents Triangle Ace Corporation (Triangle)
and Jose Lee.
Calipay and the other complainants alleged in their
Position Paper that in the course of their employment,
they were not given any specific work assignment; they
performed various kinds of work imposed upon them by
Lee; in discharging their functions, they were required
by Lee to work for nine (9) hours a day, beginning from
7:00 a.m. and ending at 6:00 p.m. with a break of one
hour at 12:00 noon; they were also required to report
from Monday to Sunday; for work rendered from
Mondays to Saturdays beyond the normal eight (8)
working hours in a day, they were paid a uniform daily
wage in the amount of P140.00 even during holidays; for
work performed on Sundays, they were not paid any
wage due to the policy of Lee that his workers must
provide work without pay at least a day in the week
under his so-called bayanihan system; in receiving
their wages, they were not given any duly accomplished
payslips; instead, they were forced to sign a blank form
of their daily time records and salary vouchers.
It was further alleged that in May 1998, Lee confronted
Calipay and Mission regarding their alleged participation

CHARM
and assistance in Dimalantas claim for disability
benefits with the Social Security System; despite their
denials, Lee scolded Calipay and Mission; this incident
later led to their dismissal in the same month.
In their Position Paper, private respondents countered
that the termination of Calipay and the other
complainants was for a valid or just cause and that due
process was observed. They claimed, among others, that
Calipay was on absence without leave (AWOL) status
from November 2, 1998 up to November 17, 1998; a
memorandum dated November 17, 1998, requiring him
to explain why his services should not be terminated,
was sent by mail but he refused to receive the same; for
failure to explain his side, another memorandum dated
December 11, 1998 was issued terminating Calipays
employment on the ground of abandonment of work;
there is no unfair labor practice because there is no
union; there is full compliance with the law regarding
payment of wages and other benefits due to their
employees; non-payment of nightshift premium is true,
because the company does not operate at night.
On July 10, 2000, the Labor Arbiter handling the case
rendered a Decision[4] dismissing the Complaint for lack
of merit.
Calipay and the other complainants filed an appeal with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[5]
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT ISSUED ITS DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST
2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED 10 DECEMBER 2004
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT NLRC DATED 30 JUNE 2003 AND 24
SEPTEMBER
2002,
WHICH
RESOLUTIONS
DISMISSED
PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT
FOR
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BY REVERSING RESPONDENT
NLRCS PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DATED 01
FEBRUARY 2002.
HELD:
Procedural rules; strict application. Procedural rules
setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a
petition for review are generally inviolable. It is
doctrinally entrenched that an appeal is not a
constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege.
Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of such
privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing
it. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the

manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to
perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court
final and executory. Just as a losing party has the
privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
so does the winner also have the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the decision.
We agree with the Labor Arbiters finding that petitioner
Calipay had abandoned his work. x xx
In the instant case, petitioner Calipay had failed to
report for work for unknown reasons x xx His continued
absences without the private respondents approval
constituted gross and habitual neglect which is a just
cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.[24]
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court arrives at the
conclusion that the filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal appears only as a convenient afterthought on
the part of petitioner and the other complainants after
they were dismissed in accordance with law.
Jurisprudence has held time and again that
abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the
same is accompanied by a prayer for reinstatement.[27]
In the present case, however, petitioner filed his
complaint more than one year after his alleged
termination from employment. Moreover, petitioner
and the other complainants inconsistency in their stand
is also shown by the fact that in the complaint form
which they personally filled up and filed with the NLRC,
they only asked for payment of separation pay and other
monetary claims. They did not ask for reinstatement. It
is only in their Position Paper later prepared by their
counsel that they asked for reinstatement. This is an
indication that petitioner and the other complainants
never had the intention or desire to return to their jobs.
In fact, there is no evidence to prove that petitioner and
his former co-employees ever attempted to return to
work after they were dismissed from employment.
Finally, it bears to point out that the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. The
settled rule is that the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are accorded not only great respect but also finality,
and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence.[28] In the
present case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from this rule.

CHARM
18.
Alex Gurango vs. Best Chemicals and
Plastic, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 174593, August 25,
2010.
FACTS:Respondent Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc.
(BCPI) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of
biaxially oriented polypropylene and related products.
Respondent Moon Pyo Hong (Hong) is the president and
chief executive officer of BCPI.
Petitioner Alex R. Gurango (Gurango) and Romeo S.
Albao (Albao) worked as boiler operator and security
guard, respectively, in BCPI. In a memorandum7 dated 2
May 2003, BCPI prohibited its empoyees from bringing
personal items to their work area. Erring employees
would be suspended for six days.
The NLRCs Ruling
In its 17 October 2005 Resolution, the NLRC affirmed in
toto the Labor Arbiters 6 July 2004 Decision. The NLRC
held that:
Although fighting within company premises constitute
serious misconduct, this however, does not apply in this
case. Complainant did not start nor provoke the fight. It
was precipitated, instead, by guard Albao when he tried
to get the complainants camera for no valid reason. The
statement of Albao that complainant tried to snatch his
service firearm is not only unbelievable but is also
exaggerated. The Labor Arbiter is correct and we concur
in his finding that the complainant was not foolish
enough to try to snatch the gun of Albao. The camera is
undisputably owned by complainant.The Court of
Appeals Ruling
In its 20 July 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals set
aside the 17 October 2005 and 24 January 2006
Resolutions of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals held that
private respondent engaged himself in a fistfight with
the security guard23 and that engaging in a fistfight
constituted serious misconduct.
Gurango filed a motion24 for reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its 11 September 2006
Resolution. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Gurangoraises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in

ruling that he was legally dismissed. BCPI failed to prove
that he engaged in a fistfight and that there was just
cause for his dismissal.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 45; review of factual findings. As a general rule,

only questions of law may be raised in petitions for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However,
there are recognized exceptions to the rule. Among the
exceptions are when the findings of fact are conflicting
and when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based. In the
present case, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
conflict with the findings of fact of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter. Also, the finding of the Court of Appeals
that Gurango engaged in a fistfight is a conclusion
without citation of specific evidence on which it is based.
19.
Century Canning Corporation, Ricardo T. Po, Jr.,
et al. vs. Vicente Randy R. Ramil,
G.R. No. 171630, August 8, 2010.
FACTS: Petitioner Century Canning Corporation, a
company engaged in canned food manufacturing,
employed respondent Vicente Randy Ramil in August
1993 as technical specialist. Prior to his dismissal on
May 20, 1999, his job included, among others, the
preparation of the purchase requisition (PR) forms and
capital expenditure (CAPEX) forms, as well as the
coordination with the purchasing department regarding
technical inquiries on needed products and services of
petitioner's different departments.
On March 3, 1999, respondent prepared a CAPEX
form for external fax modems and terminal server, per
order of Technical Operations Manager Jaime Garcia, Jr.
and endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva, Secretary of
Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po, for the latter's
signature. The CAPEX form, however, did not have the
complete details[3] and some required signatures.[4]
The following day, March 4, 1999, with the form
apparently signed by Po, respondent transmitted it to
Purchasing Officer Lorena Paz in Taguig Main Office.
Paz processed the paper and found that some details in

CHARM
the CAPEX form were left blank. She also doubted the
genuineness of the signature of Po, as appearing in the
form. Paz then transmitted the CAPEX form to
Purchasing Manager Virgie Garcia and informed her of
the questionable signature of Po. Consequently, the
request for the equipment was put on hold due to Po's
forged signature. However, due to the urgency of
purchasing badly needed equipment, respondent was
ordered to make another CAPEX form, which was
immediately transmitted to the Purchasing Department.
Suspecting him to have committed forgery,
respondent was asked to explain in writing the events
surrounding the incident. He vehemently denied any
participation in the alleged forgery. Respondent was,
thereafter, suspended on April 21, 1999. Subsequently,
he received a Notice of Termination from Armando C.
Ronquillo, on May 20, 1999, for loss of trust and
confidence.
Due to the foregoing, respondent, on May 24, 1999,
filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
overtime pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against petitioner and its
officers before the Labor Arbiter (LA)Frustrated by this
turn of events, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA, in its Decision dated December 1,
2005, rendered judgment in favor of respondent and
reinstated the earlier decision of the NLRC, dated August
26, 2002.
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
DISREGARDING
THE
UNANIMOUS FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER
AND
THE
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S TERMINATION FROM HIS
EMPLOYMENT.
HELD: Dismissal; burden of proof. The law mandates
that the burden of proving the validity of the termination
of employment rests with the employer. Failure to
discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore,
illegal. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt,
such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant
to the social justice policy of labor laws and the
Constitution.
Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo P.

Albayda, Jr., G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010.
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr. (respondent) was an
employee of Upjohn, Inc. (Upjohn) in 1978 and
continued working there until 1996 when a merger
between Pharmacia and Upjohn was created. After the
merger, respondent was designated by petitioner
Pharmacia and Upjohn (Pharmacia) as District Sales
Manager assigned to District XI in the Western Visayas
area. During the period of his assignment, respondent
settled in Bacolod City.
Sometime on August 9, 1999, a district meeting was
held in Makati City wherein one of the topics discussed
was the district territorial configuration for the new
marketing and sales direction for the year 2000.
In December 1999, respondent received a
Memorandum[4] announcing the sales force structure
for the year 2000. In the said memorandum, respondent
was reassigned as District Sales Manager to District XII
in the Northern Mindanao area. One of the key areas
covered in District XII is Cagayan de Oro City.
In response to the memorandum, respondent wrote
a letter[5] dated December 27,1999 to Felicito M. Garcia
(Garcia), Pharmacias Vice-President for Sales and
Marketing, questioning his transfer from District XI to
District XII. Respondent said that he has always been
assigned to the Western Visayas area and that he felt that
he could not improve the sales of products if he was
assigned to an unfamiliar territory. Respondent
concluded that his transfer might be a way for his
managers to dismiss him from employment. Respondent
added that he could not possibly accept his new
assignment in Cagayan de Oro City because he will be
dislocated from his family; his wife runs an established
business in Bacolod City; his eleven- year-old daughter is
studying in Bacolod City; and his two-year-old son is
under his and his wifes direct care.
On August 14, 2000, respondent filed a
Complaint[22] with the NLRC, Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI, Bacolod City against Pharmacia, Chu,
Montilla and Garcia for constructive dismissal. Also
included in the complaint was Ashley Morris,
Pharmacias President. Since mandatory conciliation
failed between the parties, both sides were directed to
submit their position papers.
20
On July 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered
a Decision[23] dismissing the case,

CHARM
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (CEBU
CITY) CAN REVERSE OR SET ASIDE THE FACTUAL
AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC WHICH WAS
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN THERE
IS NO SHOWING OF PALPABLE ERROR OR THAT
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE LABOR ARBITER
IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE NLRC.[31]
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Dismissal; due process. In termination proceedings of
employees, procedural due process consists of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second
informs the employee of the employers decision to
dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied
with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and
not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted
21
. Wensha Spa Center, inc. and/or XuZhiJie ,vs.
Loreta T. Yung, G.R. No. 185122, August 16,
2010.
FACTS:
Wensha Spa Center, Inc. (Wensha) in Quezon City is in
the business of sauna bath and massage services.
XuZhiJie a.k.a. Pobby Co (Xu) is its president,[3]
respondent Loreta T. Yung (Loreta) was its
administrative manager at the time of her termination
from employment.
on May 18, 2004, she was promoted to the position of

Administrative Manager.[5]
Loreta recounted that on August 10, 2004, she was asked
to leave her office because Xu and a FengShui master
were exploring the premises. Later that day, Xu asked
Loreta to go on leave with pay for one month. She did so
and returned on September 10, 2004. Upon her return,
Xu and his wife asked her to resign from Wensha
because, according to the FengShui master, her aura did
not match that of Xu. Loreta refused but was informed
that she could no longer continue working at Wensha.
That same afternoon, Loreta went to the NLRC and filed
a case for illegal dismissal against Xu and Wensha.
Wensha and Xu denied illegally terminating Loretas
employment. They claimed that two months after Loreta
was hired, they received various complaints against her
from the employees so that on August 10, 2004, they
advised her to take a leave of absence for one month
while they conducted an investigation on the matter.
Based on the results of the investigation, they terminated
Loretas employment on August 31, 2004 for loss of trust
and confidence.[6]
The Labor Arbiter (LA) Francisco Robles dismissed
Loretas complaint for lack of merit. He found it more
probable that Loreta was dismissed from her
employment due to Wenshas loss of trust and
confidence in her.
This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC in its December
29, 2006 Resolution,[9] citing its observation that
Wensha was still considering the proper action to take
on the day Loreta left Wensha and filed her complaint.
The NLRC added that this finding was bolstered by
Wenshas September 10, 2004 letter to Loreta asking her
to come back to personally clarify some matters, but she
declined because she had already filed a case.
In her position paper,[4] Loreta stated that she used to

be employed by Manmen Services Co., Ltd. (Manmen)
where Xu was a client. Xu was apparently impressed by
Loretas performance. After he established Wensha, he
convinced Loreta to transfer and work at Wensha.
Loreta was initially reluctant to accept Xus offer
because her job at Manmen was stable and she had been
with Manmen for seven years. But Xu was persistent
and offered her a higher pay. Enticed, Loreta resigned
from Manmen and transferred to Wensha. She started
working on April 21, 2004 as Xus personal assistant and
interpreter at a monthly salary of P12,000.00.
Loreta moved for a reconsideration of the NLRCs ruling

but her motion was denied. Loreta then went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the ruling of
the NLRC on the ground that it gravely abused its
discretion in appreciating the factual bases that led to
Loretas dismissal.
Loreta introduced positive changes to Wensha which

resulted in increased business. This pleased Xu so that
HELD:
ISSUE: W/N The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS

committed grave abuse of discretion and serious errors
when it held that petitioner XU ZHI JIE to be solidarily
liable with WENSHA, assuming that respondent was
illegally dismissed?

CHARM
Dismissal; fengshui; breach of trust and confidence. The
Court finds that the complainants allegations are more
credible and that she was dismissed from her
employment because the FengShui master found that
complainants Chinese Zodiac Sign was a mismatch to
that of respondents. This is not a just and valid cause for
an employees dismissal.
In contrast, respondents pleadings and evidence suffer
from several inconsistencies and the affidavits presented
by respondents only pertain to petty matters that are not
sufficient to support respondents alleged loss of trust
and confidence. To be a valid cause for termination of
employment, the act or acts constituting breach of trust
must have been done intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely; and they must be founded on clearly
established facts
et al., docketed as LAC No. 01-000390-08. The NLRC,

on the other hand, reversed and set aside the July 24,
2007 decision of the labor arbiter of the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. V, Legazpi City, in RAB-V Case
No. 09-00407-06 which held that petitioner was illegally
dismissed by respondents Equitable PCI Bank (now
Banco de Oro), Rene Buenaventura and SilesSamalea.
In reversing the labor arbiter, the NLRC ruled that
petitioners dismissal was for just cause. He was guilty of
serious misconduct, willful disobedience and gross
negligence for not performing his duty to complete the
documentary requirements in the opening of accounts
pursuant to the banks internal procedures. This directly
resulted in the unauthorized abstraction of bank funds.
ISSUE: W/N CA was thus correct in upholding the
dismissal of petitioner.
22
Jesus E. Dycoco, Jr.vs. Equitable PCI Bank (now
Banco de Oro), Rene Bunaventura and
SilesSamalea, G.R. No. 188271, August 16, 2010.
FACTS: In February 1997, petitioner was hired by
respondent bank as Assistant Manager and/or OIC
Branch Head of its Legazpi City Branch, Region V
(Legazpi branch). In 2000, petitioner became Branch
Head and in September 2003, respondent bank
underwent an internal reorganization. Pursuant thereto,
petitioner became the Personal Banking Manager (PBM)
of the Legazpi branch.
In June 2005, several clients of the Legazpi branch filed
complaints for alleged unauthorized abstractions of
various trust funds, treasury placements and deposits.
Respondent
bank
promptly
commenced
an
investigation. Consequently, show cause letters were
issued to the officers of the Legazpi branch, including
Branch Center Head Glena Orogo, former Service Officer
respondentSilesSamalea, Service Officer Irene Tabuzo,
Operations Officers Imelda Espiritu and Maria Fe
Gianan, Investment Clerk Carlo Quirong and the
petitioner as the PBM.
Petitioner Jesus E. Dycoco, Jr. seeks reconsideration of
the August 26, 2009 resolution denying his petition[1]
wherein he assailed the February 16, 2009 decision and
May 12, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 105126.
The CA affirmed the decision and resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Jesus
Dycoco, Jr. v. Equitable PCI Bank / Rene Buenaventura,
HELD:
Dismissal; gross negligence and loss of confidence. Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of
ones duties. Petitioners failure on 3 separate occasions
to require clients to sign the requisite documents
constituted gross negligence. Furthermore, it has been
held that if the employees are cashiers, managers,
supervisors, salesmen or other personnel occupying
positions of responsibility, the employers loss of trust
and confidence in said employees may justify the
termination of their employment. As the Banks Personal
Banking Manager, petitioners failure to comply with
basic banking policies and procedures were inimical to
the interests of the bank, making his dismissal based on
loss of confidence justified.
23
Carlos De Castro vs. Liberty Broadcasting
Network, Inc. and Edgardo Quigue, G.R. No.
165153. August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief
building administrator at LBNI. On May 31, 1996, LBNI
dismissed de Castro on the grounds of serious
misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of the trust
reposed in him as a managerial employee.
Aggrieved, de Castro filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against LBNI with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region, praying for reinstatement,
payment of backwages, damages, and attorneys fees.[4]
He maintained that he could not have solicited
commissions from suppliers considering that he was new

CHARM
in the company.[5] Moreover, the accusations were
belatedly filed as the imputed acts happened in 1995. He
explained that the one gallon of Delo oil he allegedly took
was actually found in Gil Balais room.[6] He denied
threatening Vicente Niguidula, whom he claimed
verbally assaulted him and challenged him to a fight, an
incident which he reported to respondent Edgardo
Quiogue, LBNIs executive vice president, and to the
Makati police.[7] De Castro alleged that prior to
executing affidavits against him, Niguidula and Balais
had serious clashes with him.[8]
The respondent, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(LBNI), filed the present Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Suspend Proceedings, asking us, first, to
set aside our Decision[1] and, second, to suspend the
court proceedings in view of the Stay Order issued on
August 19, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 138, in relation to the corporate
rehabilitation proceedings that LBNI initiated.
The dispositive part of our Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT
the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the Decision and Resolution of the CA promulgated on
May 25, 2004 and August 30, 2004, respectively, and
REINSTATE in all respects the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated September
20, 2002. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED
ISSUE: W/N DISMISSAL VALID?
HELD:
Dismissal; probationary employment. Though the acts
charged against de Castro took place when he was still
under probationary employment, the records show that
de Castro was dismissed on the ninth month of his
employment with LBNI. By then, he was already a
regular employee by operation of law. As a regular
employee, de Castro was entitled to security of tenure
and his illegal dismissal from LBNI justified the awards
of separation pay, backwages, and damages
24
D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Antonio Gobres, et al.,
G.R. No. 169170, August 8, 2010.
FACTS:
Respondents Antonio Gobres, Magellan Dalisay,
GodofredoParagsa, Emilio Aleta and GenerosoMelo
worked as carpenters in the construction projects of
petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction company,
on several occasions and/or at various times. Their

termination from employment for each project was
reported to the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), in accordance with Policy Instruction No. 20,
which was later superseded by Department Order No. 19,
series of 1993. Respondents last assignment was at
Quad 4-Project in Glorietta, Ayala, Makati, where they
started working on September 1, 1998. On October 14,
1998, respondents saw their names included in the
Notice of Termination posted on the bulletin board at
the project premises.
Respondents filed a Complaint with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) against petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. and David
M. Consunji for illegal dismissal, and non-payment of
13th month pay, five (5) days service incentive leave pay,
damages and attorneys fees.
Petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. and David M. Consunji
countered that respondents, being project employees,
are covered by Policy Instruction No. 20, as superseded
by Department Order No. 19, series of 1993 with respect
to their separation or dismissal. Respondents were
employed per project undertaken by petitioner company
and within varying estimated periods indicated in their
respective project employment contracts. Citing the
employment record of each respondent, petitioner and
David M. Consuji averred that respondents services
were terminated when their phases of work for which
their services were engaged were completed or when the
projects themselves were completed. Respondents
notices of termination were filed with the DOLE, in
compliance with Policy Instruction No. 20,[2]
superseded by Department Order No.19, series of 1993.
[3] With respect to respondent Generoso G. Melo,
petitioner and David M. Consuji maintained the same
positions they had against the case of Melos cocomplainants.[4] Petitioner contended that since
respondents were terminated by reason of the
completion of their respective phases of work in the
construction project, their termination was warranted
and legal.[5]
Moreover, petitioner claimed that respondents have
been duly paid their service incentive leave pay and 13th
month pay through their respective bank accounts, as
evidenced by bank remittances.[6]
Respondents replied that the Quad 4-Project at
Glorietta, Ayala, Makati City was estimated to take two
years to finish, but they were dismissed within the twoyear period. They had no prior notice of their
termination. Hence, granting that they were project

CHARM
employees, they were still illegally dismissed for nonobservance of procedural due process.[7]
On October 4, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision[8] dismissing respondents complaint. The
Labor Arbiter found that respondents were project
employees, that they were dismissed from the last
project they were assigned to when their respective
phases of work were completed, and that petitioner D.M.
Consunji, Inc. and David M. Consunji reported their
termination of services to the DOLE in accordance with
the requirements of law.
Respondents appealed the Labor Arbiters Decision to
the NLRC
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
70708, dated March 9, 2005, and its Resolution, dated
August 2, 2005, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N DISMISSAL VALID?
HELD:
Dismissal; project employees; damages. Prior or advance
notice of termination is not part of procedural due
process if the termination of a project employee is
brought about by the completion of the contract or phase
thereof. This is because completion of the work or
project automatically terminates the employment, in
which case, the employer is, under the law, only obliged
to render a report to the DOLE. Therefore, failing to give
project employees advance notice of their termination is
not a violation of procedural due process and cannot be
the basis for the payment of nominal damages.
25
Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al./Winston F. Garcia Vs. Mario I. Molina, et al.,
G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 10,
2010.
FACTS:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the
GSIS, received two separate Memoranda[5] dated May
23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with grave
misconduct. Specifically, Molina was charged for
allegedly committing the following acts: 1) directly and
continuously helping some alleged disgruntled
employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or
illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS
President and General Manager; 2) leading the
concerted protest activities held in the morning of May
22, 2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound;

and 3) continuously performing said activities despite
warning from his immediate superiors. [6] In addition to
the charge for grave misconduct for performing the same
acts as Molina, Velasco was accused of performing acts
in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving
his office without informing his supervisor of his
whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently
disregarding petitioners instructions that Velasco
should report to the petitioners office.[7] These acts,
according to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal
of the confidential nature of their positions and in
outright defiance of the Rules and Regulations on Public
Sector Unionism. In the same Memoranda, petitioner
required respondents to submit their verified answer
within seventy two (72) hours. Considering the gravity of
the charges against them, petitioner ordered the
preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90)
days without pay, effective immediately.[8] The
following day, a committee was constituted to investigate
the charges against respondents.
In their Answer[9] dated May 27, 2002,
respondents denied the charges against them. Instead,
they averred that petitioner was motivated by
vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them falsely.
They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for
lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed
their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant,
prosecutor and judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order.[10] They contended that
the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily
characterized as grave misconduct. Consistent with their
stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant,
prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed
with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This
Commission.[11]
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed
petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the
investigating committee and required them to appear at
the scheduled hearing.[12]
Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to
resolve respondents motions to lift preventive
suspension order and to transfer the case from the GSIS
to the CSC.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the
CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[13]
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170.

CHARM
Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of
petitioners order directing the former to submit to the
jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and
investigate the administrative case filed against them.
They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee)
be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing
and from taking any action on the aforesaid
administrative case against respondents.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a
decision[14] in favor of respondents,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR
AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS;
AND
IN
PERPETUALLY
RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING
AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS SOLELY ON
THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED
ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM.
HELD:
Due process;
decision rendered without due process. The
violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue that cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and
administrative proceedings, for the constitutional
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process is unqualified by the
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative)
where he stands to lose the sameLabor Procedure
CSC; rules for dismissal.
The filing of formal charges against the
respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least giving the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the
latters right to due process. These rules on due process
apply even in cases where the complainant is the
disciplining officer himself, as in this case. The fact that
the charges against the respondents are serious or that
the evidence of their guilt is strong cannot compensate
for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner.
26.
Erector Advertsing Sign Group, Inc. v. NLRC,

G.R. No. 167218, July 2, 2010
G.R. No. 167218
July 2, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Erector Advertising Sign Group, Inc.
is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
constructing billboards and advertising signs. Sometime
in the middle of 1996, petitioner engaged the services of
ExpeditoCloma (Cloma) as company driver and the latter
had served as such until his dismissal from service in
May 2000.[4]
In his Complaint[5] filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Cloma alleged that he
was illegally suspended and then dismissed from his
employment without due process of law. He likewise
claimed his unpaid monetary benefits such as overtime
pay, premium pay for worked rest days, service incentive
leave pay and 13th month pay, as well as moral,
exemplary and actual damages and attorneys fees.
It is conceded by petitioner that Cloma has been
suspended several times from work due to frequent
tardiness and absenteeism, but the instant case appears
to be likewise the result of documented instances of
absenteeism without prior notice to and approval from
his superior, and of misbehavior. The former happened
between May 12 and May 15, 2000 when Cloma
supposedly failed to report for work without prior notice
and prior leave approval[6] which thus effectively
prevented the other workers from being transported to
the job site as there was no other driver available;
whereas the latter incident happened on May 11, 2000
when allegedly, Cloma, without authority, suddenly
barged into the premises of the Outright Division and,
without being provoked, threatened the employees with
bodily harm if they did not stop from doing their work.
[7] This second incident was supposedly narrated fully
in a letter dated May 13, 2000 addressed to the
personnel manager and signed by one Victor Morales
and Ruben Que.[8]
The NLRC pointed out that not only was Cloma
dismissed without due process but also, that he was
dismissed without just cause. The NLRC based its
finding on the termination letter served by petitioner on
Cloma such that with respect to the first ground of
termination
Hence, this petition,
ISSUE: whether Cloma was dismissed with just cause
and with due process of law.

CHARM
HELD:
We find no merit in the petition.
The validity of an employees dismissal from service
hinges on the satisfaction of the two substantive
requirements for a lawful termination. These are, first,
whether the employee was accorded due process the
basic components of which are the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself. This is the procedural
aspect. And second, whether the dismissal is for any of
the causes provided in the Labor Code of the
Philippines. This constitutes the substantive aspect.[27]
With respect to due process requirement, the employer
is bound to furnish the employee concerned with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected. One is the notice apprising the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought and this may loosely be considered
as the proper charge. The other is the notice informing
the employee of the managements decision to sever his
employment. This decision, however, must come only
after the employee is given a reasonable period from
receipt of the first notice within which to answer the
charge, thereby giving him ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative should he so desire. The requirement of
notice, it has been stressed, is not a mere technicality but
a requirement of due process to which every employee is
entitled.[28]
In this case, we find that Clomas dismissal from service
did not comply with this basic precept.
Finally, anent the charge that Cloma had terrorized the
staff of the Outright Division and incited a work
stoppage, it is clear, from the May 17, 2000 suspension
order, that he has already been penalized with
suspension for this offense and, hence, this act may no
longer be added to support the imposition of the
ultimate penalty of dismissal from service nor may it be
used as an independent ground to that end.[30]
All told, we find that no error has been committed by the
Court of Appeals in ruling that Clomas dismissal from
service was both without just cause and without due
process of law.
BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA NG

TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL, represented by
SABINO F. GRAGANZA, Union President, and
REYVILOSA TRINIDAD, Petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and TRIUMPH
INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
The union and the company had a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired on
July 18, 1999. Theunion seasonably submitted proposals
to the company for its renegotiation. Among these
proposals were economic demands for a wage increase of
P180.00 a day, spread over three (3) years, as follows:
P70.00/day from July 19, 1999 ; P60.00/day from July
19, 2000, and P50.00/day from July 19, 2001. The
company countered with a wage increase offer, initially
at P42.00 for three years, then increased it to P45.00,
also for three years.
The negotiations reached a deadlock, leading to a Notice
of Strike the union filed on October 15, 1999 .7cralaw
The National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB ) exerted efforts but failed to resolve the
deadlock.
On November 15, 1999, the company filed a Notice of
Lock-out8cralaw for unfair labor practice due to the
union's alleged work slowdown. The unionwent on strike
three days later, or on November 18, 1999.
On February 2 and 3, 2000, several employees
attempted to report for work, but the striking employees
prevented them from entering the company premises.
The Labor Secretary reiterated his directives in
another order dated February 22, 2000 ,11cralaw and
deputized Senior Superintendent Manuel A. Cabigon,
Director of the Southern Police District, " to assist in the
peaceful and orderly implementation of this Order ."
On June 8, 2000, the union and the officers filed a
petition to cite the company and its responsible officers
for contempt, and moved that a reinstatement order be
issued.23cralaw They claimed that: (1) the company
officials violated the Labor Secretary's return-to-work
order when these officials placed them under preventive
suspension and refused them entry into the company
premises; (2) the company also violated the March 9,
2000 order of the Labor Secretary when they were
reinstated only in the payroll; and (3) the company
committed unfair labor practice and dismissed them
without basis.
27
G.R. No. 167401 : July 5, 2010
The union's other economic demands and non-economic

proposals were all denied.

CHARM
The CA found the petition partly meritorious. It affirmed
the Labor Secretary's wage increase award, but modified
his ruling on the dismissal of the union officers.33
ISSUE:
The Illegal Dismissal Issue
Before we rule on the substantive aspect of this issue, we
deem it proper to resolve first the company's submission
that the CA erred: (1) in ruling that the Labor Secretary
gravely abused his discretion in not deciding the
dismissal issue; and, (2) in deciding the factual issue
itself, instead of remanding the case, thereby depriving it
of the right to present evidence on the matter.
HELD:
We agree with the CA's conclusion that the Labor
Secretary erred, to the point of abusing his discretion,
when he did not resolve the dismissal issue on the
mistaken reading that this issue falls within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. This was an egregious
error and an abdication of authority on the matter of
strikes - the ultimate weapon in labor disputes that the
law specifically singled out under Article 263 of the
Labor Code by granting the Labor Secretary assumption
of jurisdiction powers. Article 263(g) is both an
extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an
extraordinary situation - a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest. This
grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of
strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or
lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or
lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As
the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the intent of
the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to
resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or
which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising from
or related to the dispute, including cases over which the
labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.54
In the present case, what the Labor Secretary refused to
rule upon was the dismissal from employment that
resulted from the strike. Article 264 significantly dwells
on this exact subject matter by defining the
circumstances when a union officer or member may be
declared to have lost his employment. We find from the
records that this was an issue that arose from the strike
and was, in fact, submitted to the Labor Secretary,
through the union's motion for the issuance of an order
for immediate reinstatement of the dismissed officers
and the company's opposition to the motion. Thus, the
dismissal issue was properly brought before the Labor

Secretary and this development in fact gave rise to his
mistaken ruling that the matter is legally within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter to decide.
For having participated in a prohibited activity not once,
but twice, the union officers, except those our Decision
can no longer reach because of the amicable settlement
they entered into with the company, legally deserve to be
dismissed from the service. For failure of the company,
however, to prove by substantial evidence the illegal acts
allegedly committed by Rosalinda Olangar, who is a shop
steward but not a union officer, we find her dismissal
without a valid cause.
28.
G.R. No. 188223 : July 5, 2010
SENTINEL INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner, vs. RIO JOSE REMO, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Sentinel Integrated Services, Inc.
(Sentinel) challenges, in this petition for review on
certiorari,1cralawcralawthe decision2cralaw cralawand
the resolution3cralaw cralawof February 12, 2009 and
June 3, 2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99550.cra4
The challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated January 31, 2007,5cralawcralawthat in
turn affirmed the labor arbiter's decision dated January
31, 2006.cra6cralaw cralawThe labor arbiter's decision
upheld the dismissal of respondent Rio Jose Remo
(Remo) on the ground of retrenchment. (Remo served
Sentinel for almost twenty [20] years, commencing
employment on March 21, 1986 as a janitor, and rising to
the
position
of
operations
officer
in
2005.)chanroblesvirtualawlibray
The CA Decision
The CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding Remo's dismissal on the ground
of retrenchment. The appellate court found that Sentinel
failed to discharge the burden of proving that the losses
it incurred warranted Remo's dismissal. The CA rejected
Sentinel's financial statements from 1995 to 2005 (which
were submitted during the compulsory arbitration) in
the absence of evidence that these were "fully audited by
an independent external auditor." Also, it held that the
NLRC should not have factored in the P5 million
awarded by this Court in another case7cralaw cralawas
an actual loss because the award, although final, could

CHARM
still be the subject of compromise. The CA considered
the hiring of a replacement (Marcelo Albay) for Remo, as
an indication that Sentinel's financial distress was not as
serious as it claimed, and that retrenchment was not the
actual reason for Remo's dismissal. Lastly, the CA
pointed out that there was no showing that other less
drastic means had been tried and found insufficient or
inadequate before Sentinel resorted to retrenchment - a
jurisprudential requisite in retrenchments.cra8cralaw
cralawIt, therefore, opined that Sentinel did not act in
good faith in terminating Remo's employment.
Court's Ruling We resolve to deny the petition for lack
of merit.
for every year of service which should be from the date of

the respondent's dismissal up to the finality of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
29. G.R. No. 170464 : July 12, 2010
LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY
CORPORATION and LAMBERT LIM,Petitioners,
vs. HELEN BINAMIRA,Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We find, after considering the records and the parties'

submissions, that although the CA focused more on the
retrenchment aspect of the disputed dismissal, it still
committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC
resolution as it found grave abuse of discretion in the
labor tribunal's gross misappreciation of the other
adduced evidence.
It is fundamental that an employer is liable for illegal

dismissal when it terminates the services of the
employee without just or authorized cause and without
due process of law.
The labor tribunals glossed over this misrepresentation

and failed to appreciate it for what it was - an act of
active bad faith that fatally tainted Remo's dismissal and
rendered it illegal. We note that the CA correctly noted
this fatal flaw when it stated that, "If this was so, then
the termination of [Remo] should not have been
attributed to retrenchment."12cralaw cralawThis finding
totally renders any further discussion of Sentinel's
submitted financial statements and its audit-related
issues unnecessary.
FACTS: Petitioner Lambert Lim (Lim) is a Malaysian

national operating various businesses in Cebu and Bohol
one of which is Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry
Corporation. Lim is married to RhodoraBinamira,
daughter of Atty. BolerBinamira, Sr., (Atty. Binamira),
who is also the counsel and father-in-law of respondent
Helen Binamira (Helen). Lambert Pawnbrokers and
Jewelry Corporation - Tagbilaran Branch hired Helen as
an appraiser in July 1995 and designated her as Vault
Custodian in 1996.
ISSUE: W/N Remo's dismissal is valid on the ground of

retrenchment?
HELD: As a rule, an illegal dismissal merits the penalty
of reinstatement and the payment of backwages from the
time of dismissal up to actual reinstatement.cra13cralaw
cralawConsidering, however, the sensitive nature of
Remo's position, viewed in light of what had transpired
between the parties, we deem it appropriate to order the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
computed from the time of Remo's dismissal up to the
time of finality of this Decision.cra14cralaw cralawThis is
the same result that the CA decreed, although not for the
same reason and under a computation reckoned from
the finality of its own decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the
challenged decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99550, with MODIFICATION
with respect to the exact basis for the finding of illegality
and the computation of separation pay of one month pay
On September 14, 1998, Helen received a letter 5cralaw

from Lim terminating her employment effective that
same day. Lim cited business losses necessitating
retrenchment as the reason for the termination.
Helen thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioners docketed as NLRC RAB-VII CASE NO. 010003-99-B.6cralaw In her Position Paper7cralaw Helen
alleged that she was dismissed without cause and the
benefit of due process. She claimed that she was a mere
casualty of the war of attrition between Lim and the
Binamira family. Moreover, she claimed that there was
no proof that the company was suffering from business
losses.
In their Position Paper,8cralaw petitioners asserted that
they had no choice but to retrench respondent due to

CHARM
economic reverses. The corporation suffered a marked
decline in profits as well as substantial and persistent
increase in losses. In its Statement of Income and
Expenses, its gross income for 1998 dropped from
P1million to P665,000.00.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On November 26, 1999,
Labor Arbiter Geoffrey P. Villahermosa rendered a
Decision9cralaw which held that Helen was not illegally
dismissed but was validly retrenched. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads:chan robles
virtual law library
Ruling of the NLRC On appeal, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
observed that for retrenchment to be valid, a written
notice shall be given to the employee and to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least
one month prior to the intended date thereof. Since none
was given in this case, then the retrenchment of Helen
was not valid. The dispositive portion of the Decision law
library
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On petition for
certiorari,16cralaw the CA found that both the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC failed to consider substantial
evidence showing that the exercise of management
prerogative, in this instance, was done in bad faith and
in violation of the employee's right to due process. The
CA ruled that there was no redundancy because the
position of vault custodian is a requisite, necessary and
desirable position in the pawnshop business. There was
likewise no retrenchment because none of the conditions
for retrenchment is present in this case.
Issue
Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing, through the
extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari, the findings of facts
of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
dismissal of respondent was with valid and legal basis.
RULE:
The petition is without merit.
There was no
retrenchment.
valid
dismissal
based
on
Retrenchment is the termination of employment

initiated by the employer through no fault of and without
prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during
periods of business recession, industrial depression,
seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack
of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant
to a new production program, or automation. 21cralaw It
is a management prerogative resorted to avoid or
minimize business losses, and is recognized by Article
283 of the Labor Code, which reads:chan robles virtual
law library
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel.- The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to x xx retrenchment
to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operations of the establishment x xx by serving a written
notice on the worker and the DOLE at least one month
before the intended date thereof. x xx In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half
month for every year of service whichever is higher. x xx
(Emphasis ours)
To effect a valid retrenchment, the following elements
must be present: (1) the retrenchment is reasonably
necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if
already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious and real, or only if expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in
good faith by the employer; (2) the employer serves
written notice both to the employee/s concerned and the
DOLE at least one month before the intended date of
retrenchment; (3) the employer pays the retrenched
employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the
Code; (4) the employer exercises its prerogative to
retrench in good faith; and (5) the employer uses fair
and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
retrenched or retained.22
There was no
redundancy.
valid
dismissal
based
on

CHARM
Redundancy, on the other hand, exists when the service
capability of the workforce is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the demands of the
enterprise. A redundant position is one rendered
superfluous by any number of factors, such as over
hiring of workers, decreased volume of business,
dropping of a particular product line previously
manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a
service activity previously undertaken by the business.
Under these conditions, the employer has no legal
obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are
necessary for the operation of its business.24
For the implementation of a redundancy program to be
valid, the employer must comply with the following
requisites: (1) written notice served on both the
employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the
intended date of termination of employment; (2)
payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one
month pay for every year of service; (3) good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to
be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.25
Lambert
Pawnbrokers
and
Jewelry
Corporation is solely liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent.
As a general rule, only the employer-corporation,
partnership or association or any other entity, and not its
officers, which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of
employees or for other wrongful acts. This is as it should
be because a corporation is a juridical entity with legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting for
and in its behalf and, in general, from the people
comprising it.27cralaw A corporation, as a juridical entity,
may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the
directors' and officers' acts as corporate agents, are not
their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the
corporation they represent.28cralaw It is settled that in
the absence of malice and bad faith, a stockholder or an
officer of a corporation cannot be made personally liable
for corporate liabilities. 29cralaw They are only solidarily
liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of
services of employees if they acted with malice or bad
faith. In Philippine American Life and General
Insurance v. Gramaje,30bad faith is defined as a stateof
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with

some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purpose. It implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.
In the present case, malice or bad faith on the part of
Lim as a corporate officer was not sufficiently proven to
justify a ruling holding him solidarily liable with the
corporation. The lack of authorized or just cause to
terminate one's employment and the failure to observe
due process do not ipso facto mean that the corporate
officer acted with malice or bad faith. There must be
independent proof of malice or bad faith which is lacking
in the present case.
30. MARIBAGO BLUEWATER BEACH RESORT,
INC - versus - NITO DUAL,
G.R. NO. 180660
July 20, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maribago is a corporation operating a resort
hotel and restaurant in Barangay Maribago, LapuLapu City. 1995[3], it hired respondent Dual as waiter
and promoted him later as outlet cashier of its
Poolbar/Allegro Restaurant.[4]
On 9 January 2005, around 6:30 p.m., a group of
Japanese guests and their companions dined at Allegro.
[5] Captain waiter Alvin Hiyas (Hiyas for brevity) took
their dinner orders comprising of six (6) sets of lamb and
six (6) sets of fish. As per company procedure, Hiyas
forwarded one copy of the order slip to the kitchen and
another copy to respondent.[6] Pursuant to the order
slip, fourteen (14) sets of dinner were prepared by the
chef. Hiyas and waiter Genaro Mission, Jr. (Missionfor
brevity) served twelve (12) set dinners to the guests, and
another two (2) sets to their guides[7] free of charge
(total of 14 sets of dinner).
After dinner, at around 9:00 p.m., the guests asked for
their bill. Since Hiyas was attending to other guests, he
gave a signal to Mission to give the bill. Missionasked
respondent Dual for the sales transaction receipt and
presented this to the guests. The guests paid the amount
indicated on the receipt and thereafter left in a hurry.[8]
In view of the discrepancy between the order slip and the
receipt issued, petitioner Maribago, through its Human
Resource Development (HRD) manager, issued
memoranda, all dated 12 January 2005, requiring
respondent Dual, Alvin Hiyas, Ernesto Avenido and
BasilioAlcoseba to explain why they should not be
penalized for violating House

CHARM
After the investigation, respondent Dual was found
guilty of dishonesty for his fabricated statements and for
asking one of the waiters (Mission) to corroborate his
allegations. He was terminated per memorandum
dated 22 January 2005. Alcoseba was also terminated
for dishonesty based on his admission that he altered the
order slip.[11]
Respondent Dual confirms that the orders were for six
(6) sets of lamb dinner and six (6) sets of fish
dinner. He, however, alleges that four (4) sets were
cancelled and two (2) sets were given to the guides for
free. He was able to confirm the cancellation with
Alcoseba and Hiyas. Hence, he received the payment for
the six (6) sets only.[12]
He avers that when he noticed the alteration in the order
slip, he verified this with Mission. The latter allegedly
told him that the order slip was handed by
Alcoseba. Respondent further avers that he went to see
Alcoseba who, in turn, told him that some orders were
cancelled because some of the companions of the
Japanese guests did not take their dinner. Upon
verification from chief waiter Hiyas, he was allegedly
told that the sets of dinner were indeed cancelled and
placed in the utensil station. According to respondent,
he checked the utensil station and found the
Petitioner Maribago submits that the transaction
receipt handed to Mission by respondent Dual amounted
to P10,100.00 (more or less). The guests allegedly gave
Mission P10,500.00 with the instruction to return only
P200.00. The rest can be kept by the waiter as tip.
Mission then handed Dual the P10,500.00 and
relayed the guests instruction. Dual handed Mission the
P200.00 which the latter gave to the guests.
It was discovered later that only P3,036.00 was
entered by Dual in the cash register. The rest of the
payment was missing. The original transaction receipt
for P10,100.00 was likewise missing and in its place,
only a transaction receipt for P3.036.00 was
registered. Upon verification, it was also found out that
the order slip was tampered by Alcoseba to make it
appear that only six (6) set dinners were ordered.
According to petitioner, on 14 January 2005, Dual
and Alcoseba tried to convince Mission to say that he
altered the order slip from twelve (12) sets of dinner to
six (6) sets.[13] Mission did not report for work and did
not attend the 15 January 2005 clarificatory hearing
since he could not in conscience tell a lie.[14] At past
11:00 p.m. of 15 January 2005, Dual met Mission and
tried again to convince him to say that only six (6) sets of
dinner were ordered.[15] Mission reported on 16
January 2005 and attended the hearing that day. Dual
was not present.[16]
On 3 February 2005, Dual filed a complaint[17] for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-payment of
13th month and separation pay, and damages before the
NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City.
The Labor Arbiter found that respondents termination
was without valid cause and ruled that respondent is
entitled to separation pay, to wit:
The NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiters decision and
dismissed the complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Labor
Arbiter
dated 03
August
2005 is VACATED and SET
ASIDE and
the
complainants complaint is DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
[19]
It ruled that complainants act of depriving respondent
of its lawful revenue is tantamount to fraud against the
company which warrants dismissal from the service.
[21] Falsification of commercial documents as a means
to malverse company funds constitutes fraud against the
company.[22]
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
resolution of the NLRC. Finding no sufficient valid
cause to justify respondents dismissal, the Court of
Appeals ordered petitioner to pay respondent full
backwages and separation pay, as follows:
ISSUE:
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REVERSING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND DIRECTING PETITIONER TO PAY
RESPONDENT FULL BACKWAGES FROM THE TIME
HE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED, UP TO THE
FINALITY OF [ITS] DECISION AND SEPARATION PAY
OF ONE MONTH SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE.[24]
In essence, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD:

CHARM
After a full review of the case, we are constrained to
reverse the Court of Appeals.
The law requires that an employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just or
authorized cause. Otherwise, an employee unjustly
dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement and full
backwages.[32] The law also requires the employer to
observe
due
process
in
termination
cases.
[33] InAgabon
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,[34] we ruled that violation of the
employees statutory right to due process makes the
employer liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The law further requires that the burden of
proving the cause for termination rests with the
employer.[35]
Withal, the law, in protecting the rights of the laborers,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. While the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute
will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The
management also has its own rights, as such, are entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in
life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not
toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts
with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and doctrine.[38]
Regarding the due process requirement, petitioner had
complied with it as clearly shown by the facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution dated 7 March 2007 and 30
July 2007, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP
No.
02062
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint of respondent Nito Dual
is DISMISSED.
31.
G.R. No. 172988 : July 26, 2010
JOSE P. ARTIFICIO, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RP
GUARDIANS SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JUAN
VICTOR K. LAURILLA, ALBERTO AGUIRRE,
and ANTONIO A. ANDRES, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose P. Artificio was employed as
security guard by respondent RP Guardians Security
Agency, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine Laws and likewise duly licensed to
engage in the security agency business.
Sometime in June 2002, Artificio had a heated argument

with a fellow security guard, Merlino B. Edu (Edu). On
25 July 2002, Edu submitted a confidential
report5cralaw to Antonio A. Andres (Andres),
Administration & Operations Manager, requesting that
Artificio be investigated for maliciously machinating
Edu's hasty relief from his post and for leaving his post
during night shift duty to see his girlfriend at a nearby
beerhouse.
On 29 July 2002, another security guard, Gutierrez Err
(Err), sent a report 6cralaw to Andres stating that
Artificio arrived at the office of RP Guardians Security
Agency, Inc. on 25 June 2002, under the influence of
liquor. When Artificio learned that no salaries would be
given that day, he bad-mouthed the employees of RP
Guardians Security Agency, Inc. and threatened to
"arson" their office.
Andres informed Artificio that a hearing will be held on
12 August 2002.cra9
Without waiting for the hearing to be held, Artificio filed
on 5 August 2002, a complaint for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest days, 13th month
pay, and damages. He also prayed for payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.cra10
After hearing, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
dated 6 October 2003, finding respondents guilty of
illegal suspension and dismissal. It ruled that Edu's
allegation of irregularity in the observance of relieving
time was not specifically detailed. Since Edu had an axe
to grind against Artificio, his allegation should be taken
with utmost caution. It was also held that Artificio
should have been allowed to confront Edu and Err before
he was preventively suspended. Since he was denied due
process, his preventive suspension was illegal. Such
preventive suspension ripened into illegal dismissal.
LA rendered declaring respondents guilty of illegal
suspension/lay-off and illegal dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC, in a Decision13cralaw dated 31
August 2004, set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
It ruled that the Labor Arbiter erred in considering
preventive suspension as a penalty. While it is true that
preventive suspension can ripen into constructive
dismissal when it goes beyond the 30-day maximum
period allowed by law, such is not prevailing in this case
since Artificio immediately filed a complaint before the
labor tribunal. It added that it was Artificio who
terminated his relationship with respondents when he

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asked for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
although he has not yet been dismissed. The NLRC
clarified further that: virtual law library
x xx While it is true that preventive suspension can ripen
into a constructive dismissal when such goes beyond the
30 day maximum period allowable by law, such is not
prevailing in the case at bar as it was complainant who
chose to file a complaint and have due process before the
courts of law. It was complainant who terminated the
relationship with respondents by asking for separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement when the fact of dismissal
has not yet happened. From the documents presented,
complainant was put on preventive suspension pending
investigation of company violations which were
supported by documentary evidences on July 29, 2002.
He was set to be heard on August 12, 2002 but before the
respondents could hear his side, he filed this instant
complaint on August 5, 2002, pre-empting the
administrative
investigation
undertaken
by
respondents.cra14cralaw
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE
TERMINATED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT ON THE
VERY DATE HE RECEIVED A LETTER FOR HIS
PURPORTED RELIEF WITHOUT FIRST BEING GIVEN
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE CHARGES
LEVELED AGAINST HIM AND BEING INFORMED OF
[THE] NATURE AND CAUSE OF HIS DISMISSAL.
Artificio maintains that he was illegally suspended since
his preventive suspension was for an indefinite period
and was imposed without investigation. He also argues
that he was illegally dismissed because the charges
against him were couched in general and broad terms.
Further, he was not given any notice requiring him to
explain his side.
Respondents counter that Artificio was not dismissed
but merely placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation of the charges against him.
As succinctly stated above, preventive suspension is
justified where the employee's continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or
property of the employer or of the employee's coworkers. Without this kind of threat, preventive
suspension is not proper.cra19
In this case, Artificio's preventive suspension was
justified since he was employed as a security guard
tasked precisely to safeguard respondents' client. His
continued presence in respondents' or its client's
premises poses a serious threat to respondents, its
employees and client in light of the serious allegation of
conduct unbecoming a security guard such as

abandonment of post during night shift duty, light
threats and irregularities in the observance of proper
relieving time.
Besides, as the employer, respondent has the right to
regulate, according to its discretion and best judgment,
all aspects of employment, including work assignment,
working methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision,
lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall
of workers. Management has the prerogative to
discipline its employees and to impose appropriate
penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules
and regulations.
This Court has upheld a company's management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith
for the advancement of the employer's interest and not
for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights
of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.cra20cralaw
Artificio is entitled to separation pay considering that
while reinstatement is an option, Artificio himself has
never, at anytime after the notice of preventive
suspension intended to remain in the employ of private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 31 March 2006, as well
as the Resolution dated 1 June 2006, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88188 are hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay be granted to Artificio
computed at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year
of service reckoned from the start of his employment
with the respondents in 1986 until 2002.
32. Golden Ace Builders vs. Jose A. Talde
GR No. 187200; May 5, 2010
Facts: Jose Tadle was hired in 1990 as a carpenter by
petitioner Golden Ace Builders. In February 1999,
petitioner, alleging the unavailability of construction
projects, stopped giving work assignments to
respondent, prompting the latter to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Talde and his immediate reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, and with payment
of full back wages. Pending appeal with the NLRC and in
compliance with the Labor Arbiters decision, petitioner
advised Talde to report for work in the construction site.
Talde however submitted a a manifestation to the Labor
Arbiter that actual animosities existed between him and
petitioners and there had been threats to his life and his

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familys safety, hence, he opted for the payment of
separation pay.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal holding that respondent
was a regular employee and not a project employee, and
that there was no valid ground for the termination of his
services. The petitioner and Talde were then referred to
the Fiscal Examiner of the NLRC for the recomputation
of the amount due to Talde. The NLRC ruled that since
respondent did not appeal the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter granting him only reinstatement and backwages,
not separation pay in lieu thereof, he may not be
afforded affirmative relief; and since he refused to go
back to work, he may recover backwages only up to May
20, 2001, the day he was supposed to return to the job
site.
The CA set aside the Resolution of the NLRC holding
that Talde is entitled to both backwages and separation
pay, even if separation pay was not granted by the Labor
Arbiter, the latter in view of the strained relations
between the parties.
Issue:
Is Talde entitled to separation pay?
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of

separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates
the employee from what could be a highly oppressive
work environment. On the other hand, it releases the
employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer
trust.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact,
however, to be adequately supported by substantial
evidence. In the present case, the Labor Arbiter found
that actual animosity existed between petitioner and
Talde as a result of the filing of the illegal dismissal case.
Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court as in the case at bar, is binding upon the Court.
Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and
separation pay as his reinstatement has been rendered
impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by
the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must
be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed
until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999
until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement was
rendered impossible without fault on his part.
Ruling:
Yes. The basis for the payment of backwages is different
from that for the award of separation pay. Separation
pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer
advisable because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer. Backwages represent
compensation that should have been earned but were
not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis
for computing backwages is usually the length of the
employees service while that for separation pay is the
actual period when the employee was unlawfully
prevented from working.
As to the computation of separation pay, petitioner was

hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to
have been in the service not only until 1999, when he was
unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is
deemed to have been actually separated (his
reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from
petitioner company or for a total of 15 years. Thus, Talde
is entitled to separation pay for 15 years.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a

catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without
just cause and without due process is entitled to
backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation
pay in lieu thereof. The accepted doctrine is that
separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if
reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best
interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee
decides not to be reinstated.
Facts:
33. Caltex vs. Agad

G.R. 162017, APRIL 23, 2010
Petitioner Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) employed

respondent Hermie G. Agad (Agad) as Depot
Superintendent-A on a probationary basis for six
months. On 28 February 1984, Agad became a regular
employee. After Agad had served for two years since
1990 as Superintendent of the Tacloban Bulk Depot
(Depot) in Leyte, Caltex transferred Agad to Bauan Bulk
Depot in Batangas effective 16 May 1992. To transfer his
belongings from Leyte to Batangas, Agad secured the
carpentry services of Alfredo Delda (Delda), the owner of
A.A. Delda Engineering Services (Delda Services) for the
construction of two crates. Agad paid Delda P15,500,

CHARM
evidenced by Official Receipt and submitted the receipt
and Caltex reimbursed him the said amount.
Caltex conducted its regular audit of employees account
and expenses. The company auditor of Caltex verified
the crating expense incurred by Agad with Delda. Delda
alleged that he was forced by Agad to issue the official
receipt in order to get a favorable recommendation from
the incoming superintendent of the Depot.
In another audit report, the company auditor declared
that 190 pieces of 11 kg. liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders from the Depot were allegedly withdrawn when
Agad was still depot superintendent In a Confidential
Memorandum, Agad was informed of his dismissal on
the grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence. The LA held that there were no just causes
for Agads termination of employment. The NLRC
reversed the decision of the LA and held that there
existed just causes which justified Agads dismissal.
Agad filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA for the nullification of the decision of the
NLRC. The CA modified the judgment of the NLRC and
ruled in favor of Agad. Caltex filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Did Caltex legally terminate Agads employment on just
causes?
Ruling:
The findings of the CA and National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) establish the following: (1) Agads
request for withdrawal of the 190 cylinders of LPG as
stated in a Memorandum dated 12 February 1992 cannot
be given credence since the Memorandum pertains to
the replacement of the scrap materials due to
Boy Bato consisting of 3,000 kilograms of black iron
plates and not to the subject LPG cylinders; (2) Agad did
not observe Caltexs rules and regulations when he
transferred the said cylinders to Millanes compound
without the RMRD form as required under Caltexs Field
Accounting Manual; (3) Agad gave specific instructions
to Millanes to sell the cylinders without bidding to third
parties in violation of company rules; (4) Agad failed to
submit the periodic inventory report of the LPG
cylinders to the accounting department; (5) Agad did not
remit the proceeds of the sale of the LPG cylinders; and
(6) even if considered as scrap materials, the LPG
cylinders still had monetary value which Agad cannot
appropriate for himself without Caltexs consent.
Considering
these
findings,
it
is
clear
that Agad committed a serious infraction amounting to
theft of company property. This act is akin to serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer in connection with his
work, a just cause for termination of employment
recognized under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.
Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To be
serious, the misconduct must be of such grave and
aggravated character.
34. Peaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing
Corp.
G.R. No. 177114, April 13, 2010
Facts:
Peaflor was hired as probationary HRD Manager of
Outdoor Clothing on September 2, 1999. On March 13,
2000, more than six months from the time he was hired,
Peaflor learned that Outdoor Clothings President,
Nathaniel Syfu (Syfu), appointed Edwin Buenaobra
(Buenaobra) as the concurrent HRD and Accounting
Manager. After enduring what he claimed as
discriminatory treatment at work, Peaflor considered
the appointment of Buenaobra to his position as the last
straw, and thus filed his irrevocable resignation from
Outdoor Clothing effective at the close of office hours on
March 15, 2000. He thereafter filed an illegal dismissal
complaint with the labor arbiter claiming that he had
been constructively dismissed. The labor arbiter agreed
with Peaflor and issued a decision in his favour.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the labor arbiters ruling. When
Peaflor questioned the NLRCs decision before the CA,
the appellate court affirmed the NLRCs decision.
Hence, Peaflor filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Court.
Issue:
Was Peaflor constructively dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. While the letter states that Peaflors resignation
was irrevocable, it does not necessarily signify that it was
also voluntarily executed. Precisely because of the
attendant
hostile
and
discriminatory
working

CHARM
environment, Peaflor decided to permanently sever his
ties with Outdoor Clothing. This falls squarely within
the concept of constructive dismissal that jurisprudence
defines, among others, as involuntarily resignation due
to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by
the employer. It arises when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer exists and has
become unbearable to the employee. The gauge for
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in
the employees position would feel compelled to give up
his employment under the prevailing circumstances.
With the appointment of Buenaobra to the position he
then still occupied, Peaflor felt that he was being eased
out and this perception made him decide to leave the
company.
The fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift

the burden of proving that the employees dismissal was
for a just and valid cause from the employer to the
employee. In Mora v. Avesco [G.R. No. 177414,
November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226], the Court ruled that
should the employer interpose the defense of
resignation, it is still incumbent upon the employer to
prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.
35.G.R. No. 178989
March 18, 2010
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE
RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU),
Respondents.
The Facts
On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridges
rank-and-file employee had a meeting where they
organized themselves into an independent labor union,
named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU or
Union),5 elected a set of officers,6 and ratified7 their
constitution and by-laws.8
On December 19, 2005, EREU formally applied for
registration9 and filed BLR Reg. Form No. I-LO, s.
199810 before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office IV (RO IV). In
time, DOLE RO IV granted the application and issued
EREU Registration Certificate (Reg. Cert.) No. RO400200512-UR-003.
The EREU then filed a petition for certification election
in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club, Eagle Ridge
opposed this petition,11 followed by its filing of a petition
for the cancellation12 of Registration, Eagle Ridges
petition ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or
fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its
constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of
the Union, and the election of its officers.
Going into specifics, Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU

declared in its application for registration having 30
members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005
organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members.
The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the
discrepancy between the certification issued by the
Union secretary and president that 25 members actually
ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6,
2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed their
signatures on the documents, making one signature a
forgery.
Issue:
Whether
THERE
WAS
FRAUD,
MISREPRESENTATION AND/OR FALSE STATEMENT
WHICH WARRANT THE CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF EREU.28
The Union submitted the required documents attesting
to the facts of the organizational meeting on December
6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption of
the Unions constitution and by-laws. It submitted
before the DOLE Regional Office with its Application for
Registration and the duly filled out BLR Reg. Form No.
I-LO, s. 1998, the following documents, to wit:
(a) the minutes of its organizational meeting43 held on
December 6, 2005 showing 26 founding members who
elected its union officers by secret ballot;
(b) the list of rank-and-file employees44 of Eagle Ridge
who attended the organizational meeting and the
election of officers with their individual signatures;
(c) the list of rank-and-file employees45 who ratified the
unions constitution and by-laws showing the very same
list as those who attended the organizational meeting
and the election of officers with their individual
signatures except the addition of four employees without
their signatures, i.e., Cherry Labajo, Grace Pollo,
AnnalynPoniente and Rowel Dolendo;
(d) the unions constitution and by-laws46 as approved
on December 6, 2005;
(e) the list of officers47 and their addresses;
(f) the list of union members48 showing a total of 30
members; and
(g) the Sworn Statement49 of the unions elected
president and secretary. All the foregoing documents
except the sworn statement of the president and the
secretary were accompanied by Certifications50 by the
union secretary duly attested to by the union president.
The members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it
applied on December 19, 2005 for registration. The
Union thereby complied with the mandatory minimum
20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). Of
note is the undisputed number of 112 rank-and-file
employees in Eagle Ridge, as shown in the Sworn
Statement of the Union president and secretary and
confirmed by Eagle Ridge in its petition for cancellation.

CHARM
Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the
CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely
err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of
the members had no evidentiary weight to warrant the
cancellation of the Certificate of Registration.
36. MiguelaSantuyo, et al. vs. Remerco
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. and/or Victoria
Reyes
GR No. 174420; March 22, 2010
Facts:
Petitioners, who are employees of the Remerco
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI), were among
those recalled to work by the company, after their union,
the
KaisahanngManggagawasaRemerco
Garments
Manufacturing Inc. (KMM Kilusan), staged a 2-year
illegal strike from 1992 to 1994. Among the conditions of
their recall was that they would no longer be paid a daily
rate but on a piece-rate basis. However, even before
RGMI could normalize its operations, the union filed a
notice of strike in the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) on August 8, 1995. According
to the union, RGMI conducted a time and motion study
and changed the salary scheme from a daily rate to
piece-rate basis without consulting it. It claimed that
RGMI therefore not only violated the existing collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) but also diminished the
salaries agreed upon. It therefore committed an unfair
labor practice. The conciliation proceedings between the
union and RGMI before the NCMB resulted in a lockout. The union went on strike in November 1995.
Therafter, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction
over the case, pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code. It ordered all striking workers to return to work.
The Secretary of Labor found that the employees would
receive higher wages if they were paid on a piece-rate
rather than on a daily rate basis. Hence, the new salary
scheme would be more advantageous to the employees.
For this reason, despite the provisions of the CBA, the
change in salary scheme was validated.
In an order dated September 18, 1996, the Secretary of

Labor ordered all employees to return to work and
RGMI to pay its employees their unpaid salaries (from
September 25, 1995 to October 14, 1995) on the piecerate basis. Neither the union nor RGMI appealed the
aforementioned order. Meanwhile, however, on October
18, 1995, while the conciliation proceedings between the
union and respondent were pending, petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against RGMI and
respondent Victoria Reyes, accusing the latter of
harassment. Petitioners subsequently amended their

complaint, demanding payment of their accrued salaries
from September 25 to October 14, 1995.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint in view of
the pending conciliation proceedings, involving the same
issue, in the NCMB. It also claimed that alleged
violations of the CBA should be resolved according to the
grievance procedure laid out therein. It argued that the
labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. The
labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction over the case and
rendered a decision granting the claims of the union. The
NLRC denied the appeal of the respondents. The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed the NLRC and ruled that
the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
This prompted the petitioners to elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did the labor arbiter have jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the petitioners?
2. Was the labor arbiter barred by prior judgment from
assuming jurisdiction over the complaint?
Ruling (First Issue):
No, the labor arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the
complaint. Petitioners clearly and consistently
questioned the legality of RGMIs adoption of the new
salary scheme (i.e., piece-rate basis), asserting that such
action, among others, violated the existing CBA. The
controversy was not a simple case of illegal dismissal but
a labor dispute involving the manner of ascertaining
employees salaries, a matter which was governed by the
existing CBA. Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that
[c]ases
arising
from
the
interpretation
or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided
in said agreements.
This provision requires labor arbiters to refer cases
involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance
machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration.
Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that
such disputes must be referred first to the grievance
machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they
shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.
Thus, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, voluntary
arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over

CHARM
matters which have not been resolved by the grievance
machinery. Pursuant to Articles 217 in relation to
Articles 260 and 261 of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter
should have referred the matter to the grievance
machinery provided in the CBA. Because the labor
arbiter clearly did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, his decision was void.
(Second Issue):
Yes, the labor arbiter was barred by prior judgment from
assuming jurisdiction over the complaint. The Secretary
of Labor resolved the labor dispute between the union
and RGMI in his September 18, 1996 order. Since
neither the union nor RGMI appealed the said order, it
became final and executory. Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code gives the Secretary of Labor discretion to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute likely to cause a strike or
a lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest and to decide the controversy or to refer the
same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In doing
so, the Secretary of Labor shall resolve all questions and
controversies in order to settle the dispute. The Secretary
of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy
because RGMI had a substantial number of employees
and was a major exporter of garments to the United
States and Canada
Settled is the rule that unions are the agent of its

members for the purpose of securing just and fair wages
and good working conditions. Since petitioners were part
of the bargaining unit represented by the union and
members thereof, the September 18, 1996 order of the
Secretary of Labor applies to them.
Furthermore, since the union was the bargaining agent

of petitioners, the complaint was barred under the
principle of conclusiveness of judgments. The parties to
a case are bound by the findings in a previous judgment
with respect to matters actually raised and adjudged
therein. Hence, the labor arbiter should have dismissed
the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
37. G.R. No. 149552
March 10, 2010
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.ERNESTO CASIO, ROLANDO IGOT, MARIO
FAMADOR, NELSON LIM, FELICISIMO BOOC,
PROCOPIO OBREGON, JR., and ANTONIO
ANINIPOK, Respondents,andVIRGILIO PINO,
PAULINO CABREROS, MA. LUNA P. JUMAOAS,
DOMINADOR BOOC, FIDEL VALLE,
BARTOLOME AUMAN, REMEGIO CABANTAN,

LORETO GONZAGA, EDILBERTO MENDOZA
and ANTONIO PANILAG, Respondents.
Facts:
On November 30, 1991, IBM-Local 31, through its
officers and board members, namely, respondents
Virgilio Pino,4 PaulinoCabreros, Ma. Luna P. Jumaoas,
DominadorBooc, BartolomeAuman, RemegioCabantan,
Fidel Valle, Loreto Gonzaga, Edilberto Mendoza and
Antonio Panilag (Pino, et al.), entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with GMC. The effectivity
of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.5
Gabiana then wrote a letter10 dated March 10, 1992,
addressed to Eduardo Cabahug (Cabahug), GMC VicePresident for Engineering and Plant Administration,
informing the company of the expulsion of Casio, et al.
from the union pursuant to the Resolution dated
February 29, 1992 of IBM-Local 31 officers and board
members. Gabiana likewise requested that Casio, et al.
"be immediately dismissed from their work for the
interest of industrial peace in the plant."
Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair
labor practice, GMC acceded to Gabianas request to
terminate the employment of Casio, et al. GMC issued a
Memorandum dated March 24, 1992 terminating the
employment of Casio, et al. effective April 24, 1992 and
placing the latter under preventive suspension for the
meantime.
On March 27, 1992, Casio, et al., in the name of IBMLocal 31, filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMBRegional Office No. VII (NCMB-RO). Casio, et al. alleged
as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of union
officers and members, discrimination, coercion, and
union busting. The NCMB-RO held conciliation
proceedings, but no settlement was reached among the
parties.12
Casio, et al. next sought recourse from the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional
Arbitration Branch VII by filing on August 3, 1992 a
Complaint against GMC and Pino, et al. for unfair labor
practice, particularly, the termination of legitimate union
officers, illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and moral
and exemplary damages. Finding that the Case did not
undergo voluntary arbitration, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
Since the dismissal is not for a cause detrimental to the
interest of the company, respondent General Milling
Corporation is, nonetheless, ordered to pay separation
pay to all [Casio, et al.] within seven (7) calendar days
Issue:

CHARM
Whether THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING
TO
LACK
OR
EXCESS
OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SAID THAT PETITIONER
GMC FAILED TO ACCORD DUE PROCESS TO [Casio,
et al.].
Held: The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of procedural due
process. The law requires the employer to furnish the
employee sought to be dismissed with two written
notices before termination of employment can be legally
effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if
he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. This
procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the
dismissal with illegality.34
Irrefragably, GMC cannot dispense with the
requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing
Casio, et al. even when said dismissal is pursuant to the
closed shop provision in the CBA. The rights of an
employee to be informed of the charges against him and
to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a
controversy with either the company or his own union
are not wiped away by a union security clause or a union
shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An
employee is entitled to be protected not only from a
company which disregards his rights but also from his
own union the leadership of which could yield to the
temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from
membership and hence dismissal from his job.35
38. Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramics
Employees Association
G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., a corporation
primarily in the business of manufacture, makes, buy
and sell, on whole sale basis, tiles, marbles, mosaics and
other similar products. Respondent Lepanto Ceramics
Employees Association is the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent in the establishment of petitioner.
In 1998, petitioner gave P3, 000.00 as bonus to its
employees, members of the respondent Association.
Subsequently, in September 1999, petitioner and
respondent Association entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides for, among
others, the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to
the members of the respondent Association.
In the succeeding years, 1999, 2000, 2001, petitioner

gave bonuses in a form of a certificate which is
equivalent to P3, 000.00. However, in 2002, petitioner
gave only P600.00 as cash benefit. Respondent
Association objected to the P600.00 cash benefit and
argued that it was in violation of the CBA. Petitioner
averred that the giving of extra compensation was based
on the companys available resources for a given year
and the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the
company does not make profits. Unable to amicably
settle the dispute, the case was referred to the Voluntary
Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
decision, declaring that petitioner is bound to grant each
of its workers a Christmas bonus of P3,000.00 for the
reason that the bonus was given prior to the effectivity of
the CBA between the parties and that the financial losses
of the company is not a sufficient reason to exempt it
from granting the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Issue:
Is petitioner obliged to give a Christmas bonus to
respondent Association?
Ruling:
Yes. Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and
enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it
must have been promised by the employer and expressly
agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this
case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the
nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its
incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to
respondent Association has become more than just an
act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a
contractual obligation it has undertaken.
A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the
same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift
package/bonus" without qualification. The said
provision did not state that the Christmas package shall
be made to depend on the petitioners financial standing.
The records are also bereft of any showing that the
petitioner made it clear during CBA negotiations that the
bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the
petitioner and respondent Association intended that the
P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company
earnings, such intention should have been expressed in
the CBA.
All given, business losses are a feeble ground for
petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The
rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being

CHARM
enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced,
diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer.
The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded
on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of
workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor
full protection.
possess the required authority at the time the petition

was filed on February 27, 2006.
39. G.R. No. 171231

February 17, 2010
PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND
SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PSTMSDWO), represented by
its President, RENE SORIANO, Petitioner, vs.
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Held: In the case at bar, the Supreme Court rule that

Rene Soriano has sufficient authority to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping for
the following reasons: First, the resolution dated June
30, 2006 was merely a reiteration of the authority given
to the Union President to file a case before this Court
assailing the CBA violations committed by the
management, which was previously conferred during a
meeting held on October 5, 2005. Thus, it can be
inferred that even prior to the filing of the petition before
Us on February 27, 2006, the president of the union was
duly authorized to represent the union and to file a case
on its behalf. Second, being the president of the union,
Rene Soriano is in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Third,
assuming that Mr. Soriano has no authority to file the
petition on February 27, 2006, the passing on June 30,
2006 of a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent
the union is deemed a ratification of his prior execution,
on February 27, 2006, of the verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.
Facts: PNCC Skyway Corporation Traffic Management

and
Security
Division
Workers'
Organization
(PSTMSDWO) is a labor union duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). PNCC
Skyway Corporation is a corporation duly organized and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines.
On November 15, 2002, petitioner and respondent
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
incorporating the terms and conditions of their
agreement which included vacation leave and expenses
for security license provisions.
Petitioner objected to the implementation of the said
memorandum. It insisted that the individual members of
the union have the right to schedule their vacation leave.
Due to the disagreement between the parties, petitioner
elevated the matter to the DOLE-NCMB for preventive
mediation. For failure to settle the issue amicably, the
parties agreed to submit the issue before the voluntary
arbitrator.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, from the
decision of the arbitrator which the voluntary arbitrator
denied in the Order7 dated August 11, 2004.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the CA, and the CA rendered
a Decision dated October 4, 2005,8 annulling and setting
aside the decision and order of the voluntary arbitrator.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
CA denied. Hence, the instant petition assigning errors:
Respondent alleged that the petition was fatally defective
due to the lack of authority of its union president, Rene
Soriano, to sign the certification and verification against
forum shopping on petitioner's behalf. It alleged that the
authority of Rene Soriano to represent the union was
only conferred on June 30, 2006 by virtue of a board
resolution,10 while the Petition for Review had long been
filed on February 27, 2006. Thus, Rene Soriano did not
Issue: Whether or not Rene Soriano possess the required

authority at the time the petition was filed on February
27, 2006.
40
G.R. No. 183810 :: January 21, 2010
FARLEY FULACHE, MANOLO JABONERO,
DAVID CASTILLO, JEFFREY LAGUNZAD,
MAGDALENA MALIG-ON BIGNO, FRANCISCO
CABAS, JR., HARVEY PONCE and ALAN C.
ALMENDRAS, Petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Respondent
FACTS:In June 2001, petitioners Farley Fulache,
ManoloJabonero, David Castillo, Jeffrey Lagunzad,
Magdalena Malig-on Bigno, Francisco Cabas, Jr., Harvey
Ponce and Alan C. Almendras (petitioners) and
CresenteAtinen (Atinen) filed two separate complaints
for regularization, unfair labor practice and several
money claims (regularization case) against ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation-Cebu (ABS-CBN). Fulache
and Castillo were drivers/cameramen; Atinen, Lagunzad
and Jabonero were drivers; Ponce and Almendras were
cameramen/editors; Bigno was a PA/Teleprompter
Operator-Editing, and Cabas was a VTR man/editor. The
complaints (RAB VII Case Nos. 06-1100-01 and 06-117601) were consolidated and were assigned to Labor
Arbiter Julie C. Rendoque.

CHARM
The petitioners alleged that on December 17, 1999, ABSCBN and the ABS-CBN Rank-and-File Employees Union
(Union) executed a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) effective December 11, 1999 to December 10,
2002; they only became aware of the CBA when they
obtained copies of the agreement; they learned that they
had been excluded from its coverage as ABS-CBN
considered them temporary and not regular employees,
in violation of the Labor Code. They claimed they had
already rendered more than a year of service in the
company and, therefore, should have been recognized as
regular employees entitled to security of tenure and to
the privileges and benefits enjoyed by regular employees.
They asked that they be paid overtime, night shift
differential, holiday, rest day and service incentive leave
pay. They also prayed for an award of moral damages
and attorneys fees.
Lagunzad; and (4) ruling that they are not entitled to damages
and attorneys fees.
The Illegal Dismissal Case.
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING,

taking into account the factual scenario and the evidence
adduced by both parties, it is declared that complainants in
these cases are REGULAR EMPLOYEES of respondent ABSCBN and not INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS and thus
henceforth they are entitled to the benefits and privileges
attached to regular status of their employment.
While the appeal of the regularization case was pending, ABSCBN dismissed Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo, Lagunzad and
Atinen (all drivers) for their refusal to sign up contracts of
employment with service contractor Able Services. The four
drivers and Atinen responded by filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal (illegal dismissal case). The case (RAB VII Case
No. 07-1300-2002) was likewise handled by Labor Arbiter
Rendoque.
In defense, ABS-CBN alleged that even before the labor
arbiter rendered his decision of January 17, 2002 in the
regularization case, it had already undertaken a comprehensive
review of its existing organizational structure to address its
operational requirements. It then decided to course through
legitimate service contractors all driving, messengerial,
janitorial, utility, make-up, wardrobe and security services for
both the Metro Manila and provincial stations, to improve its
operations and to make them more economically viable.
Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo, Lagunzad and Atinen were not
singled out for dismissal; as drivers, they were dismissed
because they belonged to a job category that had already been
contracted out. It argued that even if the petitioners had been
found to have been illegally dismissed, their reinstatement had
become a physical impossibility because their employeremployee relationships had been strained and that Atinen had
executed a quitclaim and release.
The CA Petition and Decision
The petitioners went to the CA through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They charged the NLRC
with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) denying them the
benefits under the CBA; (2) finding no evidence that they are
part of the companys bargaining unit; (3) not reinstating and
awarding backwages to Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo and
ABS-CBN, on the other hand, questioned the propriety of the

petitioners use of a certiorari petition. It argued that the proper
remedy for the petitioners was an appeal from the reinstated
decisions of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: W/N VALID DISMISSAL
HELD:We find merit in the petitioners positions.
As regular employees, the petitioners fall within the coverage
of the bargaining unit and are therefore entitled to CBA
benefits as a matter of law and contract. In the root decision
(the labor arbiters decision of January 17, 2002) that the
NLRC and CA affirmed, the labor arbiter declared:
All these go to show that ABS-CBN acted with patent bad

faith. A close parallel we can draw to characterize this bad
faith is the prohibition against forum-shopping under the
Rules of Court. In forum-shopping, the Rules characterize as
bad faith the act of filing similar and repetitive actions for the
same cause with the intent of somehow finding a favorable
ruling in one of the actions filed. ABS-CBNs actions in the
two cases, as described above, are of the same character, since
its obvious intent was to defeat and render useless, in a
roundabout way and other than through the appeal it had
taken, the labor arbiters decision in the regularization case.
Forum-shopping is penalized by the dismissal of the actions
involved. The penalty against ABS-CBN for its bad faith in
the present case should be no less.
41. G.R. No. 155125
December 4, 2009
YSS EMPLOYEES UNION - PHILIPPINE
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION, Petitioner,
vs.
YSS LABORATORIES, INC., Respondent
It is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
YSS Employees Union (YSSEU) Philippine Transport
and General Workers Organization seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision dated 26 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 29 August 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66095 nullifying the Orders
of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and

CHARM
Employment (DOLE) dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June
2001 which enjoined the strike staged by petitioner, and
ordered respondent YSS Laboratories Inc. (YSS
Laboratories) to accept the workers back to their work,
including those who were retrenched from employment
due to serious business losses.
FACTS: YSS Laboratories is a domestic corporation
engaged in the pharmaceutical business. YSSEU is a duly
registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees
of YSS Laboratories.
In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS
Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program
which affected 11 employees, nine were officers and
members of YSSEU. Initially, these employees were
given the option to avail themselves of the early
retirement program of the company. When no one opted
to retire early, YSS Laboratories exercised its option to
terminate the services of its employees. Copies of the
Notices of Termination were filed with DOLE on 19
March 2001 and were served to concerned employees on
20 March 2001.
Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of
discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the
said retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a
strike. The Secretary of Labor to finally intervene in
order to put an end to a prolonged labor dispute, the
Secretary of Labor deemed that the continuation of the
labor dispute was inimical to national interest. Thus, in
an Order dated 11 May 2001, the Secretary of Labor
certified the labor dispute to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration. Accordingly, all striking workers were
thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from
their receipt of the said Order, and YSS Laboratories to
accept them under the terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike. YSS Laboratories, however, refused to
fully comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor.
YSS Laboratories argued that nine union officers and
members who were previously terminated from service
pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be excluded
from the operation of the return-to-work order. It also
asserted that the union officers11 who participated in the
purported illegal strike should likewise not be allowed to
be back to their employment for they were deemed to
have already lost their employment status. YSSEU, for its
part, moved that YSS Laboratories be cited for contempt
for refusing to admit the 18 workers back to work. In
addition, YSSEU prayed for the award of backwages in
favor of these employees who were not permitted by YSS
Laboratories to return to their respective stations despite
the Secretary of Labors directive. Acting on the aforesaid
motions, the Secretary of Labor, on 9 June 2001, granted
the motion of YSSEU and thus issued an Order directing

YSS Laboratories to immediately accept back to work the
nine retrenched employees and the nine union officers
who initiated the alleged illegal strike pending
determination of the validity of the retrenchment and
illegal strike cases. Unyielding, YSS Laboratories brought
a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
seeking to annul the certification order and the returnto-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor. On 26
November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision granting the Petition and reversing the assailed
Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001, as they
found that YSS Laboratories validly carried out its
retrenchment program, which effectively severed the
concerned employees employment with the company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the retrenched employees
should be excluded from the operation to the return
work order?
RULING: YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the
exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage
of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the
authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor
dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy.
The Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad
powers, and is granted great breadth of discretion to
adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of
writing finis to the labor dispute. The Secretary of Labor
directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking
workers back to work; the Secretary did not exceed his
jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same. By harping on
the validity of the retrenchment and on the exclusion of
the retrenched employees from the coverage of the
return-to-work order, YSS Laboratories undermines the
underlying principle embodied in Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code on the settlement of labor disputes -- that
assumption and certification orders are executory in
character and are to be strictly complied with by the
parties, even during the pendency of any petition
questioning their validity. Accepting back the workers in
this case is not a matter of option, but of obligation
mandated by law for YSS Laboratories to faithfully
comply with. Its compulsory character is mandated, not
to cater to a narrow segment of society, or to favor labor
at the expense of management, but to serve the greater
interest of society by maintaining the economic
equilibrium.
42. Case Digest_S.S. Ventures International Inc
v S.S. Ventures Labor Union
Facts: Petitioner S.S. Ventures International Inc is in the
business of manufacturing sports shoes. Respondent S.S.

CHARM
Ventures Labor Union is a labor organization registered
with the DOLE.
On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE a
petition for certification election in behalf of the rankand-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two
signatures, 82 of which belong to 2008.
Terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic
documents supporting the petition. ON August 21, 2000,
Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the Union's certificate
of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article
239(a) of the Labor Code. The Union denied committing
the imputed acts of fraud or forgery. In its supplemental
reply memorandum filed on March 20, 2001, Ventures
cited other instances of fraud and misrepresentation,
claiming that the affidavits executed by 82 alleged
Union members show that they were deceived into
signing paper minutes or were harrassed to signing their
attendance in the organizational meeting. Ventures
added that some employees signed the affidavits
denying having attended such meeting.
In a decision, Regional Deirector of DOLE-Region III
fournd for Ventures. It resolved to cancel Certificate
Registration No. (RO300-00-02-UR-0003).
Aggrieved, the Union interposed a motion for
reconsideration, a recourse which appeared to have been
forwarded to the BLR. Although it would later find this
motion to have been belatedly filed, the BLR, over the
objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge,
gave it due course and treated it as an appeal.
Despite Ventures' motion to expunge the appeal, the
BLR Director rendered a decision granting the Union's
appeal and reversing the decision of Dione.
Ventures sought reconsideration fo the above decision
but was denied by the BLR. Ventures then went to the
CA on a petition for certiorarti under Rule 65. The CA
dismissed Ventures' petiton. Venturs' motion for
reconsideration met a similar fate. Hence, this peition
for review under Rule 45.
Issue: whether or not the inclusion fo the 82 employees
in the list of attendees to the January 9, 2000 meeting is
an internal matter within the ambit of the worker's right
ot self-organization and outside the sphere of influence
of this office and the petitioner
Held: The petition is denied. The right to form, join, or
assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution and such right, according to
Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the
Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with
the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor
organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While a certificate
of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the
concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be
canceled or the union may be decertified as the
bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of

the status of a legitimate labor organization. Among the
grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, such
as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the union's constitution and
like documents.
Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with
regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed
in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a preelection conference. The issue surrounding the
involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of
membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to
cancel union registration.
43. Case Digest_Republic of the Philippines
Represented by DOLE v Kawashima Textile MFG
Philippines Inc.
Facts:
KFWU filed with DOLE a Petition for
Certification Election to be conducted in the bargaining
until composed of 145 rank-and-file employees of
respondent. Attached to its petition are a Certificate of
Creation of Local/Chapter issued on January 19, 2000
by DOLE, stating that it submitted to said office a
Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation
Phil. Transport & General Workers Organization, and a
Report of Creation of Local/Chapter.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the
ground that KFWU did not acquire any legal personality
because its membership of mixed rank-and-file and
supervisory employees violated Article 245 of the Labor
Code, and its failure to submit its books of account
contravened the ruling of the Court in
Progressive Development Corporation v Secretary,
DOLE.
In an Order, Med-Arbiter found KFWU's legal
personality defective and dismissed its petition for
certification election. Meanwhile, KFWU appealed to the
DOLE which issued a decision granting the appeal.
The DOLE held that Med-Arbiter Bactin's reliance on the
decisions of the Court was misplaced, for while 245
declares
supervisory
employees
ineligible
for
membership in a labor organization for rank-and-file
employees, the provision did not state the effect of such
prohibited membership on the legitimacy of the labor
organization and its right to file for certification election.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
DOLE denied the same.
However, on appeal by
respondent, the CA rendered the decision assailed
herein, reversing the August 18, 2000 DOLE. KFWU
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it.

CHARM
The RP filed the present petition to seek closure.
Issue: Whether or not a mixed membership of rankand-file and supervisory employees in a union is a
ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification
election
Held: The petition is granted. In the case at bar, as
respondent union's membership list contains the names
of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in
Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to
purging itself of its supervisory employee members,
attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to
file a petition for certification election.n Dunlop, n which
the labor organization that filed a petition for
certification election was one for supervisory employees,
but in which the membership included rank-and-file
employees, the Court reiterated that such labor
organization had no legal right to file a certification
election to represent a bargaining unit composed of
supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file
employees among its members.
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an
employer is a mere bystander to any petition for
certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial
and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to
determine which organization will represent the
employees in their collective bargaining with the
employer. The choice of their representative is the
exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot
have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere
with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to
dismiss or an appeal from it, note even a mere allegaiton
that some employees participating in a petition for
certification election are actually managerial employees
will lend an employer legal personality to block the
certification election.
44. G.R. No. 172013
October 2, 2009
PATRICIA HALAGUEA, MA. ANGELITA L.
PULIDO, MA. TERESITA P. SANTIAGO,
MARIANNE V. KATINDIG, BERNADETTE A.
CABALQUINTO, LORNA B. TUGAS, MARY
CHRISTINE A. VILLARETE, CYNTHIA A.
STEHMEIER, ROSE ANNA G. VICTA, NOEMI R.
CRESENCIO, and other flight attendants of
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, Petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED,
Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners were employed as female flight
attendants of respondent PAL on different dates prior to
November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines

(FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and
exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards
and pursers of respondent. Respondent and FASAP then
entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and
conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to
2005. Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA,
provides that: A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before
22 November 1996: x xxx 3. Compulsory Retirement Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this
Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55)
for females and sixty (60) for males. x xx. Petitioners
filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 147 against respondent for the
invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory
retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP? Whether Section 144, Part
A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and
unconstitutional?
HELD: The Court held that the jurisdiction of labor
arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor
Code is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can only be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
CBA. Here, the employer-employee relationship between
the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action
ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e.,
the Constitution and CEDAW.
Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved
not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor
relations statute or a CBA but by the general civil law,
the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular
courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. This Court held that the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to determine
and settle the issues at hand. They have no jurisdiction
and competence to decide constitutional issues relative
to the questioned compulsory retirement age. Hence,
only disputes involving the union and the company shall
be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators. In the case at bar, the dispute is not between
FASAP and respondent PAL, who have both previously
agreed upon the provision on the compulsory retirement
of female flight attendants as embodied in the CBA. The
dispute is between respondent PAL and several female
flight attendants who questioned the provision on

CHARM
compulsory retirement of female flight attendants. Thus,
referral to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration would not serve the interest of the
petitioners.
The rule is settled that pure questions of fact may not be
the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This mode
of appeal is generally limited only to questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The question as to
whether Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is
discriminatory or not being a question of fact that would
require a full-blown trial which jurisdiction to hear the
same is properly lodged with the the RTC, is therefore,
remanded to the RTC for the proper determination of
the merits of the petition for declaratory relief is just and
proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
45. G.R. No. 177594
July 23, 2009
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC.
Petitioners, vs. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN
EMPLOYEES UNION- FFW, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner forged with the University of San
Agustin Employees Union-FFW a CBA effective for 5
years. Among other things, the parties agreed to include
a provision on salary increases based on the incremental
tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds
(TIP) and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728, The
Tuition Fee Law. It appears that for the School Year
2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the computation of
the salary increases. Respondent refused to accept
petitioners proposed across-the-board salary increase of
P1,500 per month and its subtraction from the
computation of the TIP of the scholarships and tuition
fee discounts it grants to deserving students and its
employees and their dependents. Respondent likewise
rejected petitioners interpretation of the term "salary
increases" as referring not only to the increase in salary
but also to corresponding increases in other benefits.
Respondent argued that the provision in question
referred to "salary increases" alone, hence, the phrase
"P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher,"
should apply only to salary increases and should not
include the other increases in benefits received by
employees.
Resort to the existing grievance machinery having failed,
the parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary
arbitration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase of P1500 or
80% of the TIP is correct?
HELD: Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the 2000-20005 CBA reads:

Salary Increases. The following shall be the increases
under this Agreement:
SY 2000-2001 P2,000.00 per month, across the
board.
SY 2001-2002 P1,500.00 per month or 80% of the
TIP, whichever is higher, across the board.
SY 2002-2003 P1,500.00 per month or 80% of the
TIP, whichever is higher, across the board. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law
that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are
obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a
contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. A
reading of the above-quoted provision of the CBA shows
that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP or at the least
the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual
salary increases. The CBA does not speak of any other
benefits or increases which would be covered by the
employees share in the TIP, except salary increases. The
CBA reflects the incorporation of different provisions to
cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus (Art. VIII,
Sec. 1), service award (Art. VIII, Sec.5), leaves (Article
IX), educational benefits (Sec.2, Art. X), medical and
hospitalization benefits (Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Art. 10),
bereavement assistance (Sec. 6, Art. X), and signing
bonus (Sec. 8, Art. VIII), without mentioning that these
will likewise be sourced from the TIP. Thus, petitioners
belated claim that the 80% TIP should be taken to mean
as covering ALL increases and not merely the salary
increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the
CBA does not lie. In the present case, petitioner could
have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed the
inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80%
of the TIP to salary increases alone, as it was and is not
under any obligation to accept respondents demands
hook, line and sinker. Art. 252 of the Labor Code is clear
on the matter: The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreement
and executing a contract incorporating such agreements
if requested by either party but such duty does not
compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession. The records are thus bereft of any showing
that petitioner had made it clear during the CBA
negotiations that it intended to source not only the salary
increases but also the increases in other employee

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benefits from the 80% of the TIP. Absent any proof that
petitioners consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or
duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA
voluntarily, had full knowledge of the contents thereof,
and was aware of its commitments under the contract.
Even a perusal of the law will show that it does not make
70% as the mandated ceiling. Unmistakably, what the
law sets is the minimum, not the maximum percentage,
and there is even a 10% portion the disposition of which
the law does not regulate. Hence, if academic institutions
wish to allot a higher percentage for salary increases and
other benefits, nothing in the law prohibits them from
doing so.
46. G.R. No. 171587
October 13, 2009
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs.
FERRER D. ANTONIO, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent was hired by petitioner to work as a
seaman on board its various vessels. Respondent started
as an Apprentice Engineer on December 12, 1981 and
worked in petitioner's various vessels where he was
assigned to different positions. The last position he held
was that of 3rd Engineer on board petitioner's vessel
M/V Eastern Venus, where he worked until February 22,
1996. On February 13, 1996, while in Yokohama, Japan
and still in the employ of petitioner, he suffered a
fractured left transverse process of the fourth lumbar
vertebra. He consulted a doctor in Osaka, Japan and was
advised to rest for a month. He was later examined by
the company doctor and declared fit to resume work.
However, he was not admitted back to work. Being in
dire financial need at that time to support his family, he
applied for an optional retirement on January 16, 1997
but was disapproved by the petitioner. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for payment of optional
retirement benefits against petitioner before the DOLE.
ISSUE: Whether respondent shall be granted the
optional retirement benefit being applied for under the
gratuity plan of petitioner?
HELD: The age of retirement is primarily determined by
the existing agreement or employment contract. In the
absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be
fixed by law. Under the Labor Code, the mandated
compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the
minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.
In the case at bar, there is a retirement gratuity plan
between the petitioner and the respondent. Under
Paragraph B of the plan, a shipboard employee, upon his
written request, may retire from service if he has reached
the eligibility age of 60 years. While under Paragraph C,
it will be the exclusive prerogative and sole option of the
company to retire any covered employee who shall have
rendered at least 15 years of credited service for landbased employees and 3,650 days actually on board vessel
for shipboard personnel. Records show that respondent
was only 41 years old when he applied for optional
retirement, which was 19 years short of the required
eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim either of the
optional retirement benefits under the plan as a matter
of right.
It is also worth to note that respondent, being a seaman,
is not entitled to the payment of separation pay. It is
clear that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. Thus, they are not entitled to reinstatement
or payment of separation pay or backwages. However,
the Court held that financial assistance may be allowed
as a measure of social justice and exceptional
circumstances, and as an equitable concession. In the
present case, for having been deprived of continued
employment with petitioner's vessel, respondent opted
to apply for optional retirement. Records also show that
respondent's seaman's book, as duly noted and signed by
the captain of the vessel was marked "Very Good," and
"recommended for hire." Respondent had no derogatory
record on file over his long years of service with the
petitioner. Thus, ends of social and compassionate
justice would be served best if respondent will be given
some equitable relief. The award of P100,000.00 to
respondent as financial assistance is , therefore, deemed
equitable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
47. G.R. No. 160236
October 16, 2009
"G" HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS
UNION Local 103 (NAMAWU); SHERIFFS
RICHARD H. APROSTA and ALBERTO MUNOZ,
all acting Sheriffs; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, Region VI, Bacolod
District Office, Bacolod City, Respondents.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the October
14, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 75322.
FACTS: The petitioner, "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business
of owning and holding shares of stock of different
companies. It was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 1992. Private
respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum

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Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a
copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay, Negros
Occidental.
On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale
Agreement6 executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety
percent (90%) of MMCs shares and financial claims.
These financial claims were converted into three
Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over MMCs
properties.
Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement
and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated down
payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of
the mine site and its facilities, and took full control of the
management and operation of MMC.
Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a
labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and unfair
labor practice) arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with
the latter eventually filing with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike.
Then Labor Secretary later assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. In his July 30,
1997 Order in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (Quisumbing Order),
Secretary Quisumbing declared that the lay-off (of
workers) implemented on May 7, 1996 and October 7,
1996 was illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor
practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laidoff workers, with payment of full backwages and
benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms
and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an
annual increase in the workers daily wage.
On May 11, 2001, then Acting Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now also an Associate
Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of
NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a partial writ of
execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to
proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the
same. Much later, in 2006, this Court, in G.R. Nos.
157696-97, entitled Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
Brion and NAMAWU, affirmed the propriety of the
issuance of the Brion Writ.
The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs
resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of
NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
ordered the issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). On
October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the
members of the union, and several armed men
implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the
properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay,

Negros Occidental.
On October 14, 2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to
Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on Properties. GHI contended
that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated September 5,
1996 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the
aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this deed was
registered on February 24, 2000; and that the
mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially
foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest
bidder on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001.
The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72
hours, and set the hearing on the application for a writ of
injunction. On October 17, 2002, the trial court ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Injunction (issued on October
18, 2002) enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further
enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any
public sale of the levied-on properties, subject to GHIs
posting of a P5M bond.
Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the October 17, 18 and
December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC, the appellate court
rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC issuances and
directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas
Writ. The CA ruled, among others, that the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was sham,
fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed two weeks
after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly, it
was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately
after the Court affirmed with finality the Quisumbing
Order. The CA also found that the certificates of title to
MMCs real properties did not contain any annotation of
a mortgage lien, and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene
in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its
right as a mortgagee of virtually all the properties of
MMC. The CA further ruled that the subsequent
foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment
against MMC. It noted that the foreclosure proceedings
were initiated in July 2001, shortly after the issuance of
the Brion Writ; and, more importantly, the basis for the
extrajudicial foreclosure was not the failure of MMC to
pay the mortgage debt, but its failure "to satisfy any
money judgment against it rendered by a court or

CHARM
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, in favor of any
person, firm or entity, without any legal ground or
reason.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage and sale agreement
between GHI and MMC is valid and would prevent the
satisfaction of the claims of NAMAWU because of unfair
labor practice?
RULING: The mortgage was not a sham.
Republic etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the
existence of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between
the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to
that transaction, as follows:
The series of negotiations between the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, through the APT as its
trustee, and "G" Holdings culminated in the execution of
a purchase and sale agreement on October 2, 1992.
Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and
deliver 90% of the entire issued and outstanding shares
of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G" Holdings in
consideration of the purchase price of P673,161,280. It
also provided for a down payment of P98,704,000 with
the balance divided into four tranches payable in
installment over a period of ten years."
The "company notes" mentioned therein were actually
the very same three (3) Promissory Notes amounting to
P550M, issued by MMC in favor of GHI. As already
adverted to above, these notes uniformly contained
stipulations "establishing and constituting" mortgages
over MMCs real and personal properties.
It may be remembered that APT acquired the MMC from
the PNB and the DBP. Then, in compliance with its
mandate to privatize government assets, APT sold the
aforesaid MMC shares and notes to GHI. To repeat, this
Court has recognized this Purchase and Sale Agreement
in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc.
The participation of the Government, through APT, in
this transaction is significant. Because the Government
had actively negotiated and, eventually, executed the
agreement, then the transaction is imbued with an aura
of official authority, giving rise to the presumption of
regularity in its execution. This presumption would
cover all related transactional acts and documents
needed to consummate the privatization sale, inclusive
of the Promissory Notes. It is obvious, then, that the
Government, through APT, consented to the
"establishment and constitution" of the mortgages on the
assets of MMC in favor of GHI, as provided in the notes.
Accordingly, the notes (and the stipulations therein)
enjoy the benefit of the same presumption of regularity
accorded to government actions. Given the Government
consent thereto, and clothed with the presumption of
regularity, the mortgages cannot be characterized as
sham, fictitious or fraudulent. It is difficult to conceive
that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost

four (4) years before NAMAWU filed its notice of strike,
were a "fictitious" arrangement intended to defraud
NAMAWU. After all, they were agreed upon long before
the seeds of the labor dispute germinated.
We are not unmindful, however, of the fact that the labor
claims of NAMAWU, acknowledged by this Court in
Maricalum, still await final execution. As success fades
from NAMAWUs efforts to execute on the properties of
MMC, which were validly foreclosed by GHI, we see that
NAMAWU always had, and may still have, ample
supplemental remedies found in Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court in order to protect its rights against MMC.
48. G.R. No. 177024
October 30, 2009
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA (OWNED AND
OPERATED BY GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION) Petitioner,
vs.
PINAG-ISANG GALING AT LAKAS NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA HERITAGE MANILA
(PIGLAS-HERITAGE), Respondent
This case is about a companys objections to the
registration of its rank and file union for non-compliance
with the requirements of its registration.
FACTS: Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file
employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila
(petitioner company) formed the "Heritage Hotel
Employees Union" (the HHE union). The Department of
Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLENCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this
union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for
certification election that petitioner company opposed
alleging that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be
an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local
chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and
Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) and the
company also filed a petition for the cancellation of the
HHE unions registration certificate.
The Med-Arbiter granted the HHE unions petition for
certification election. Petitioner company appealed it
and filed a motion for reconsideration which was both
denied respectively, prompting it to file a petitioin for
certiorari with the CA.On October 12, 2001 the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of
the HHE unions certification election, effective until the
petition for cancellation of that unions registration shall
have been resolved with finality. The decision of the
Court of Appeals became final when the HHE union

CHARM
withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this
Court.
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees
of petitioner company held a meeting and formed
another union, the respondent Pinag-IsangGaling at
LakasngmgaManggagawasa Heritage Manila (the
PIGLAS union). This union applied for registration with
the DOLE-NCR and got its registration certificate on
February 9, 2004. Two months later, the members of the
first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its
dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for
cancellation of its union registration.
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a
petition for certification election that petitioner company
also opposed, alleging that the new unions officers and
members were also those who comprised the old union.
According to the company, the employees involved
formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of
Appeals injunction against the holding of the
certification election sought by the former union.
Despite the companys opposition, however, the MedArbiter granted the petition for certification election.
On December 6, 2004, petitioner Company filed a
petition to cancel the union registration of respondent
PIGLAS union. The company claimed that the union
made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union
registration and committed dual unionism" which is a
ground for canceling a unions registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new Union can have a valid
certification election?
RULING: The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its
registration is a serious charge and deserves close
scrutiny. Once such charge is proved, the labor union
acquires none of the rights accorded to registered
organizations. Here, the discrepancies in the number of
union members or employees stated in the various
supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union
submitted to labor authorities can be explained. While it
appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003
organizational meeting that only 90 employees
responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be
assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as
reflected on the signature sheet for attendance. There is
also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the
fact that only 127 members ratified the unions
constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the
attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed that all those
who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws.
Any member had the right to hold out and refrain from
ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the
process.
At any rate, the Labor Code and its implementing rules

do not require that the number of members appearing
on the documents in question should completely
dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures
are shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution
and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed
to have complied with registration requirements.
Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS
union was required to submit the names of all its
members comprising at least 20 percent of the
employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it
submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding
that the signature and attendance sheets reflected a
membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission,
said
the
company,
amounted
to
material
misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of the
unions registration.
But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is
immaterial. A comparison of the documents shows that,
except for six members, the names found in the subject
list are also in the attendance and signature sheets.
Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS
union sought to represent consisted of 250 employees.
Only 20 percent of this number or 50 employees were
required to unionize. Here, the union more than
complied with such requirement. And last, the fact that
some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also
members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union,
is not a ground for canceling the new unions
registration. The right of any person to join an
organization also includes the right to leave that
organization and join another one.
49. G.R. No. 89920 October 18, 1990

UNIVERSITY OF STO.TOMAS, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
UST FACULTY UNION, respondents.
FACT: The University of Sto. Tomas (UST) terminated
the employment of all 16 union officers and directors of
respondent UST Faculty Union on the ground that in
publishing or causing to be published in Strike the
libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father
Rector, has committed the offenses of grave misconduct,
serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming
a faculty member. As a result of the dismissal of said
employees, some faculty members staged mass leaves of
absence and several days thereafter, disrupting classes in
all levels at the University. The faculty union filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
with the DOLE. The labor arbiter certified the matter to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment for a possible
suspension of the effects of termination. Secretary

CHARM
Franklin Drilon subsequently issued an order
suspending the termination of the 16 employees.
Petitioner UST filed a motion for reconsideration.
Secretary Drilon issued another order modifying his
previous order, ordering UST to readmit all its faculty
members under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the present dispute. The NLRC
subsequently caned the parties to a conference. The
respondent union filed before the NLRC a motion to
implement the orders of the Honorable Secretary of
Labor and Employment; while petitioner filed its
opposition to the private respondent's motion. The
NLRC issued a resolution, which is the subject of this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the order of the alternative
remedies of actual reinstatement or payroll
reinstatement of the dismissed faculty members is
proper? Whether or not the University can be required to
pay full backwages of the dismissed employees? Whether
or not NLRC is correct when it arrogated upon itself the
exercise of the right and prerogatives reposed by law to
the petitioner university in the latters capacity as
employer?
HELD: (1) It was held that it was error for the NLRC to
order the alternative remedies of payroll reinstatement
or actual reinstatement. However, the order did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion. Such error is merely
an error of judgment which is not correctible by a special
civil action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its
best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a
festering and serious problem. The payroll reinstatement
will actually minimize the petitioners problems in the
payment of full backwages.
(2) A return-to-work order is immediately effective and
executory despite the filing of a motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner. Additionally, although
the Secretary's order was modified, the return-to-work
portion of the earlier order which states that "the faculty
members should be admitted under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the dispute" was affirmed.
Since the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. There is no showing that such
substantial evidence is not present. The reinstated
faculty members' refusal to assume their substantially
equivalent academic assignments does not contravene
the Secretary's return-to-work order. They were merely
insisting on being given actual teaching loads, on the
return-to-work order being followed. It was found that
their persistence justified as they are rightfully and
legally entitled to actual reinstatement. Since the
petitioner failed to comply with the Secretary's order of

actual reinstatement, it was adjudged that the NLRC's
award of backwages until actual reinstatement is correct.
(3) The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion
of employees are traditionally Identified as management
prerogatives. However, these are not absolute
prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in
law, a CBA, or general principles of fair play and justice.
Article 263(g) is one such limitation provided by law. To
the extent that Art. 263(g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike, the petitioner University is restricted
from exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer
or reassign its employees. The petitioner manifests the
fear that if the temporarily reinstated faculty members
will be allowed to handle actual teaching assignments in
the classroom, the latter would take advantage of the
situation by making the classroom the forum not for the
purpose of imparting knowledge to the students but for
the purpose of assailing and lambasting the
administration. There may be a basis for such a fear.
However, such a fear is speculative and does not warrant
a deviation from the principle that the dismissed faculty
members must be actually reinstated pending resolution
of the labor dispute.
50. G.R. No. 182836
October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON.
ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner
Continental Steel and a member of respondent Union
filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the CBA concluded between
Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the
death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had
a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death,
the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Continental
Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death
and accident insurance.

CHARM
ISSUE: Whether or not the CBA is clear and
unambiguous so that the literal and legal meaning of
death should be applied such that only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a
juridical personality?
HELD: As identified, the elements for bereavement leave
under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2)
the death must be of a dependent; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article
XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are same with the above
elements with additional element of presentation of the
proper legal document to prove such death.
Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. As such, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death. A dependent is "one who relies on
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under
said general definition, even an unborn child is a

dependent of its parents. Additionally, the CBA did not
provide a qualification for the child dependent.
Therefore, child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers
womb. The term legitimate merely addresses the
dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. A
legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a
valid and lawful marriage. The children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that
their child was conceived during said marriage, hence,
making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Hortillano was also able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance
under the CBA or the presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child. Given the existence of all
the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same
should have been granted by Continental Steel.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED.

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1 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY.

proper; (4) the ruling that on the basis of the Universitys

2 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

against the P42M outlay. Complainants as members of

3 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered

4 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

2001 the workplace parties sat down for renegotiation

5 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Respondent Union is the certified collective bargaining

6 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

or cessation of operations of establishment or

7 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

provides that an employer may terminate employees

8 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this

9 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

9. G.R. Nos. 174040-41 : September 22, 2010

10 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute,

11 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the

12 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the

13 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

or those who by reason of their positions or nature of

14 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF CERTIORARI UNDER

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC

Petitioner's argument is untenable.

15 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other

16 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between

Voluntary Arbitrator Rosalina Letrondo-Montejo, in a

17 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

FEBTC employees were employees of an unorganized

18 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly

19 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

These requirements are mandatory, and the unions

OUR RULING We find the petition partly meritorious.

Facts: On July 16, 1999, a Complaint[3] for illegal

20 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

it. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the

21 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Gurangoraises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in

Rule 45; review of factual findings. As a general rule,

22 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo P.

23 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

on May 18, 2004, she was promoted to the position of

In her position paper,[4] Loreta stated that she used to

Loreta moved for a reconsideration of the NLRCs ruling

Loreta introduced positive changes to Wensha which

ISSUE: W/N The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS

24 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

et al., docketed as LAC No. 01-000390-08. The NLRC,

25 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

on several occasions and/or at various times. Their

26 CASE DIGESTS IN LABOR RELATION(2011-2012) 1ST SEM ATTY. GUTTIEREZ

22, 2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound;