Grego vs COMELEC

Facts: In 1981, Basco was removed as Deputy Shriff for serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint filed by a certain Tordesillas (Tordesillas ruling).
In 1988, BAsco ran and won as councillor in Manila. He was also re-elected in
1992. However, his win in the 1992 election was questioned by another candidate
(and two more petitions) alleging Bascos ineligibility on the basis of the Tordesillas
ruling. All of these were however dismissed.
In 1995, Basco ran again and won a third and final term by emerging sixth in
a battle for six councilots. This time petitioner Grego filed with COMELEC a petition
for disqualifictation, for the suspension of Bascos proclamation and for the
declaration of Maranan (the 7th placer) instead.
During the pendency of the case filed by Grego, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Basco as the duly elected councillor.
Comelec 1st Division: dismissed petition of Grego.
COmelec en banc: denied MR.
Issue: (main) WON Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective
position since he had been removed from office as a result of an admin case as per
Sec 40 (b) LGC.
Subissue1: WON the provision applies retroactively to those removed
prior to its effectivity on January 1, 1992.
Subissue2: WON respondents election three times wiped away and
condoned the admin penalty against him
Subsubissue: WON the Tordessilas decision barred BAsco from
running for any elective position.
Subissue3: WON his proclamation during the pendency of the
disqualification case is void ab initio.
Subissue4: WON Maranan the 7th placer may be declared winner
instead pursuant to Sec6 RA 6646.
Held:
No. there is no legal impediment for Basco to continue in office as councillor of the
2nd district of Manila.
1. No. General rule is that the law operates only prospectively and not
retroactively. That the provision in the code in question does not qualify the
date of a candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past
tense does not necessarily mean that it should be applied retroactively.. there
is no such intent expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from
the language of the code.
2. Issue being raised by petitioner is beside the point because it proceeds from
the assumption that Basco was in the first palce disqualified when he ran.
This assumption is untenable because he was not subject to any
disqualification at all under the LGC.

Subsub: the decretal portion of the Tordesillas decision prejudiced the

reinstatement of Basco to any position in the local/national govt.
under the former Civil Service Decree, the term reinstatement referred
only to appointive positions not elective position.
3. No. the provisions and jurisprudence cited by petitioner are not applicable in
this case.
Sec20(i), RA 7166
- This refers only to avoid proclamation in relation to contested returns and
not to contested disqualifications of a candidate.
Sec6, RA 6646
- Suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive as per
the use of the word may in this provision. The discretion of the
COMELEC to suspend is based on the question of won the evidence of guilt
is so strong to warrant such suspension. In this case the COMELEC has not
found any ground.
- The implementing rule of this RA found in the Comelec Rules of Procedure
should be harmonized with this mother law.
Jurisprudence cited
- All inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar. The issues in these
cases were contested election returns, violation of BOCs ministerial duty,
and on advanced copies of the election returns. Whereas the issue in this
case is the alleged disqualification of BAsco.
4. NO. exception to the general rule that a second placer may not be declared
winner does not apply. The two elements in the Labo case are missing: 1) one
who obtained the highest number of vote is disqualified 2) notoriety of the
disqualification

Grego vs. COMELECGR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy
sheriff by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint. Ran for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race
for 3 term. On his final term, an electionprotest was filed against him by petitioner
Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground thathe was removed previously in an
office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995,COMELEC ordered the
parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply thedirective,
the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took
hisoath of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have
suspended theproclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the
provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646,which prohibits the proclamation of the elected
candidate by the COMELEC pending
final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to or
der thesuspension of the proclamation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it
didnot suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending
final judgment of the case filed against it.

HELD:
It did not. The use of the word may in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the
proclamationis merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction
. What is merelymandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of
trial and hearing of the action,inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be
within the scope of the authority granted bythe legislature to the administrative
agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and arule or regulation issued
to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A6646,
the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks
toimplement, employed the word may, it is, therefore improper and highly
irregular for theCOMELEC to have used instead the word shall in its rules.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN
D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order
DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound
workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and

recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the
business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a

petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit

implementation.

ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor
Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the
coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is
hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative

bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the
modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its
parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such
rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement
of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law

not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or
specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.

People vs. Maceren

G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977
Aquino J.

Facts:

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo
Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any
aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal
court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute.

LUZON POLYMERS V CLAVE

FACTS:
This case involves a question with respect to an administrative grant of an
emergency allowance of P50.00 to the employees of a corporation with a capital
stock of P1M. Let us trace back the history of the laws pertaining to such a grant:
First, PD 390 granted said allowance then a LOI was issued by President Marcos to
implement the policy in said decree. The LOI provides: for enterprises capitalized at
1M 4M or more, P50 or higher shall be granted. For enterprises capitalized at
P100K 1M, P30 or higher. Second, the DOLE issued an interpretative Bulletin:
P50 or higher where the Part III | Admin Law Cases | Dean Roy 2D 2012 ANTONIO |
CABRAL | CRUZ | HIPOLITO | MENDOZA J | MENDOZA R | SIRON | SOLLER 11 capital
stock or the total assets exceed P1M. P30 or higher where the capital stock or the
total assets is P100k- P1M. Third, Presidential Decree no. 525 made mandatory the
payment of emergency allowance under LOI 174 which is P50/month if the

capitalization is P1M, P30 of the capitalization is P100K P1M. Fourth, Rules and
Regulations implementing PD No. 525 states P50 where the capital stock or total
assets whichever is applicable and higher, is P1M or more. P30 where it is at least
P100K but less than P1M. Petitioner is a corporation with an authorized capital stock
of P1M and total assets of P2.6M. DOLE held that petitioner is liable for P50
allowance, and, since it had only been giving P30, it was liable for a deficiency of
P20 per month per employees. It was of the opinion that the basis to be used with
respect to petitioner was its total assets was P1M, then petitioner should have been
paying P50 as allowance.

ISSUE W/N the petitioner was indeed liable for P50 allowance instead of only P30
(W/N the rules and regulations issued, which was the basis for the decision of the
DOLE, was valid)

HELD :
NO, the petitioner was only liable for P30 allowance. The rules and regulations were
issued with GAD. To begin with, the LOI 174 created a problem with respect to the
category of an enterprise which has a capitalization of P1M as it fell under both the
P50 and P30 brackets of emergency allowance. This grey area however, was
clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin wherein the P50 allowance would apply to
those whose capitalization was P1M. Clearly then the petitioner falls within the P30
bracket. While the said administrative interpretation of LOI 174 is at best merely
advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what the LOI
really means, it is significant to note that said bulletin was adopted in PD 525. What
seems to have confused the matter is the issuance of the RR implementing PD 525.
It only injected a new determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, it
also provided a choice for the determinative factor, whichever is higher between the
employers authorized c/s and its total assets. The said rule, therefore, introduced a
matter which is not germane to the provisions of PD 525, hence, it is null and void.
AN administrative agency, like the DOLE, cannot amend the law it seeks to
implement.

Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 139813

January 31, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:

The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra,
Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private
respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of
Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive VicePresident in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of
Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a
post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him
on August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the
decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April
26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon
claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post
proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and
directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng
mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,
providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act
and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of
supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the
RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY
THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY.
Held:
The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a
Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral
protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in
authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG
Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and
adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the
National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA.
Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of
such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.
Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved
in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
**take note of the meaning of power of supervision and power of control..
The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the
Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 15 This is distinguished from the power of
control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."