SPE 93723

HAZOP Studies for Grass-Roots Field Development Project

H. Saadawi, SPE, ADCO

Copyright 2005, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 14th SPE Middle East Oil & Gas Show and
Conference held in Bahrain International Exhibition Centre, Bahrain, 1215 March 2005.
This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following review of
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presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to
correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any
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Al-Dabbiya is located approximately 50 km south west of Abu

Dhabi City. It comprises of a series of low lying islands.
The majority of Al-Dabbyia wells, however, are located
offshore on existing artificial islands. A network of marine
pipelines and power cables will be required to support this
arrangement.
Rumaitha and Shanayel fields are located
entirely onshore in a desert location, some 30 km south of AlDabbiya. The location map is shown in figure 1 and the field
layout is shown in figure 2.
The fields are located in environmentally sensitive areas. AlDabbiya presents special concerns because of its proximity to
delicate coastal ecologies.

Abstract
The North East Bab (NEB) Project is currently under
construction by Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil
Operations (ADCO). It is a grass root field development
project. New production facilities are installed to handle oil,
gas and water production from three separate oil fields; Al
Dabbiya, Rumaitha and Shanayel.
In accordance with the project HSE plan, a HAZID (Hazard
Identification) study was conducted during the conceptual
design phase. HAZOP studies were carried out during the
FEED and EPC phases of the project.

The EPC Contract for the project was awarded to an

international contractor in May 2003.
The project facilities comprise of the following:

Central processing plant (CPP) at Al-Dabbiya

Central processing plant (CPP) at Rumaitha
15 Clusters (remote stations) at Al-Dabbiya
10 Clusters at Rumaitha / Shanayel

The key design parameters of the facilities are as follows:

This paper describes the role of HAZOP in a complex major
project involving full field development. Topics covered
include: project description, project HSE plan, HAZOP
logistics, main HAZOP findings, follow-up and
implementation of the HAZOP recommendations as well as
the lessons learnt. Finally, the paper concludes by making
recommendations on the effective way to implement HAZOP
studies for new projects in an E& P environment.

Al-Dabbaiya
-

Sustainable oil production rate = 70,000 BPD

Peak oil production rate=84,000 BPD
GOR= 1000 to 2500
Wellhead closing pressure = 4000 to 1000 psia
Two processing trains x 55,000 BOPD
H2S contents = associated gas 1% mol, nonassociated gas 5% mol, facilities design basis 3%
mol.

Introduction
Rumaitha / Shanayel
Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) is
currently implementing Phase I of North East Bab (NEB)
Project, which is a grass root development. New processing
facilities will be required to handle oil, gas and water
production from three separate oil fields; Al-Dabbiya and
Rumaitha and Shanayel. Water and gas injection facilities
will also be required to provide pressure support and enhanced
oil recovery.

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Sustainable oil production rate = 40,000 BPD

Peak oil production rate=55,000 BPD
GOR= 500 to 2000
Wellhead closing pressure = 4000 to 1000 psia
One processing train x 55,000 BOPD
H2S contents= associated gas 1% mol, non-associated
gas 5% mol, facilities design basis 3% mol.

SPE 93723

A block diagram of the Central Processing Plant (CPP) at AlDabbaiya is shown in figure 3

Unit.
For each vendor package, a vendor representative
participated in the HAZOP sessions.

Project Implementation

HAZOP Procedures

Similar to most grass-root projects in the oil industry, the three

main phases of the NEB project are:

Preparation work and procedures for conducting HAZOP

studies are well documented in literature. See, for example
references [1] and [2]. A brief outline of the HAZOP
procedure is given below.

Conceptual design phase

Front End Engineering Design (FEED) phase
Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC)
phase

During the conceptual phase, two important HSE documents

were developed. These were Project HSE Plan and Project
HSE Philosophy. These documents define HSE requirements
for the project. The HSE plan identifies the various HSE
studies and audits that will be carried out during the life of the
project. Studies carried out during the Conceptual Design
phase included Hazard Identification (HAZID) and
Environmental Impact Assessment. Studies conducted during
the FEED phase of the project include among other things
HAZOP and Fire Assessment study.
In addition to the FEED HAZOP, a second HAZOP study was
done during the EPC phase of the project. The remaining part
of the paper will focus on the EPC phase HAZOP study.

HAZOP Logistics
The Company has a number of qualified HAZOP leaders who
normally lead the HAZOP studies for the Company assets. It
is also a policy that for new projects, HAZOP studies are led
by a Team leader from the Company or an outside Team
Leader who is appointed by the Company rather than the
Engineering Contractor. It has been our experience that this
ensures that the study is more impartial and objective.
The HAZOP study for the EPC Contract was conducted in the
home office of the EPC Contractor, which was in Paris,
France. This meant mobilising the HAZOP team Leader and
the team members from Operations and Safety Departments to
Paris for the duration of the HAZOP. It is always more
efficient to carry out the HAZOP study at the location where
the centre of engineering activities are.

The technique consists essentially of a line-by-line review of

the P & IDs for the system being studied. This is done using
a formalized guideword-based approach. The lines are divided
into convenient nodes to be addressed.
The first step is to divide the P & IDs into nodes. Thus, the
system under review is divided into manageable sections.
The HAZOP Team leader prior to the start of the review
session carries out this task. The limits of each node is
determined by natural selection depending on the process
function, equipment within the system, piping specification
changes, or points where there is a significant change in
temperature or pressure. Each node is numbered and entered
on the worksheet and is the reference for any prospective
actions
During the review, the process deviations are examined for
each node using the appropriate guideword and deviation,
such as more than, less than which are used in relation to the
process parameters. The list of guide words used is given in
table 1.
For each key word, the HAZOP team lists the possible causes
and the consequences regarding the operating procedures and
the safety aspects from both a personnel and material point of
view. Accordingly, the HAZOP team investigates the
available safeguards.
If the protections indicated on the P&ID were considered
inadequate, the team made appropriate recommendations.
The records of the HAZOP sessions were recorded using
proprietary software. This software has integrated recording,
reporting and analysis systems for the management of HAZOP
studies [3].

Major Findings
The total duration of the HAZOP studies was 7 weeks. They
were carried out in 4 different sessions as follows:
Central processing plant oil path: 2 weeks
Gas processing & compression facilities: 2 weeks
Clusters: 1 week
Vendor packages: 1 week
Flare & vapour recovery systems: 1 week

A substantial number of recommendations were made by the

HAZOP team. Some of the major ones are highlighted below:
1.

The separators and stabilizer columns were not provided

with blow down valves. Blow down valves are needed in
order to reduce the magnitude and duration of a hazardous
event by disposing of the hydrocarbon inventory in a safe
and controlled manner.

Vendor packages included; dehydration package, fired heaters,

seals gas systems for the compressors and nitrogen generation

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SPE 93723

2.

3.

Two main drain headers from different equipment that

were tied into to the closed drain drum. One header is
class 2500 and other is class 150. The compressor knockout drums are tied-into the 2500 class header. On the
other hand, the inlet manifold headers, which are class
900, are tied into the class 150 class header. This
situation can confuse the operator who may assume that it
is OK to depressurize the manifold through the closed
drain system. This, of course, would create a very
hazardous situation. A recommendation has been made to
ensure consistent design and operating philosophy.

The design does not allow operating the second stage

desalter, while bypassing the 1st stage desalter if it is
under maintenance. This is because the produced water is
discharged to the water treatment system only from the
first stage. It is recommended to provide a means to
discharge produced water form the 2nd stage desalter to
the water treatment plant.

4.

A blocked outlet condition downstream of the 1st stage

desalter recycle pumps would result in overpressure of the
piping. The HAZOP team recommends that the piping
system be upgraded or adequate protection as per code
requirements should be provided.

5.

In the proposed design of stabilizers, there were no

isolation valves between the stabilizer column and the reboiler, two side re-boilers and oil heater. This would
make it impossible to carry out any maintenance on a heat
exchanger (e.g. a flange leak) without having to drain the
complete inventory of the stabilizer. Recommendations
were been made to install adequate additional isolation.

6.

A number of recommendations were made in relation to

isolation for maintenance of various equipment such as
avoiding the use of ESD valves for maintenance isolation.

7.

There is no shut down valve between the desalter and the

stabilizers. They are located in the same fire zone.
However, the entire inventory of the two desalters would
be fed to a fire in the stabilizer area. It was recommended
to evaluate the need for a shut down valve to limit the
amount of hydrocarbon released on loss of containment
should be evaluated in the fire assessment study.

8.

More than one scenario was identified whereby the

ejector motive gas can find its way to the flow suction
tanks and disposal tanks and result of overpressure of the
tank. A number of recommendations were made to deal
with this scenario.

9.

A scenario was identified whereby a contingency causing

a relief load in the HP flare would overpressure the Flow
Suction tanks as well as the disposal tanks. Effectively,
there is a short circuit between the atmospheric tank flare
system and the HP flare system. The HAZOP team
recommended that the system design be revised to
eliminate this risk.

10. The design basis of the closed drain vessel was not well
defined. A recommendation was made to clarify and
document the basis of design of the system. The design
should be based on the draining of the largest vessel
inventory at a given time.

11. The design shows the closed drain vessel and the pumps
were in a concrete pit with the pumps at about 6 meters
below grade. Due to the presence of H2S in the fluids,
confined entry procedures have to be applied.
Furthermore, Al Dabbiya has higher water table (2 meters
below grade) and the pit can accumulate rain water and
sand. A recommendation is made to install the vessel
buried with two top mounted submersible pumps, one
duty and one stand-by.
12. The FEED HAZOP was based on two flares; HP and LP
flares. This was later replaced with a combined flare
system referred to as the HP flare. The HAZOP team
analyzed several scenarios to check the operability of the
current design. Some recommendations were made to
ensure that flare system pressure will not exceed the back
pressure necessary for the safe operation of other
equipment (e.g. the requirements form the compressor
vendor for the gas seals).
13. To carry out a pipeline repair job, it would require
depressurization of the entire gas injection network. For
example, in order to repair a leaking isolating spool in an
injection trunk line, oil export from both Rumaitha and
Dabbyia would have to be stopped. This is because
flaring is not allowed. A recommendation was made to
provide positive isolation (double block, bleed and
spectacle blind) on each of the four injection trunk lines.
Furthermore, each injection trunk line must have its
dedicated depressurization line to the plant flare.
14. There is no tank for the hot oil system. The current
design calls for manual filling of the system inventory
(some 150 m3) using 200-liter drums. Draining of the
inventory is done manually through the sump to the
trucks.
The oil medium has toxic fumes. A
recommendation was made to provide a storage tank sized
to handle the full system inventory.
15. A scenario has been identified whereby a reverse flow
from the water injection system would overpressure the
water disposal system. A recommendation was made to
protect the disposal water system by a relief valve.
16. Start-up issues were addressed during the HAZOP
session. The recommended approach to commissioning,
which is similar to what was used in other ADCO gas
projects, is to introduce sweet lean gas after nitrogen
purging. The system pressure is then increased gradually
for leak testing by running the compressor train on lean
gas.

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SPE 93723

Recommendations were made to provide connections for

lean gas upstream the vapor recovery compressor, MP
compressor and for the rich make-up gas network.
17. Several recommendations were made to revise the piping
spec break at the blow-down valves between the normal
carbon steel and the low temperature piping class to avoid
brittle fracture.
18. To do maintenance work at the clusters on the piping of
the gas producing wells and test separators, the high
pressure fluids have to be depressurized to the closed
drain vessel. This is done via class 150 drain piping.
Plugging of these drain piping as a result of debris,
corrosion products, hydrates or condensate flashing /
choking flow, would overpressure the drain system. The
team recommends that the class rating of the drain piping
be upgraded to the source pressure.
19. Several recommendations were made to the pig launchers
and receivers. These include motorization of valves and
the provision of a second kicker line to allow the
introduction of mutli-pig train required for intelligent
pigging of the gas injection lines. This is required when
using ultra-sonic pigs for the intelligent pigging of the
heavy wall thickness injection pipelines.
20. Numerous recommendations were made regarding the
operating and, maintenance aspects of the facilities.
These would be captured and incorporated where
applicable in the relevant documents and manuals.

where as during the EPC phase, any small change can have
cost, schedule and contractual implications.
Some of the recommendations made were not strictly HAZOP
issues, but more of design issues. The tight project schedule
meant that there was not enough time for complete design
review of the P & IDs before the HAZOP. The temptation to
combine design review with the HAZOP study should be
avoided. This can compromise the concept of HAZOP being
an independent process safety and operability review [4].

Conclusions
Based on the authors experiencing in leading the HAZOP
study for the NEB project and other projects, the following
conclusions are made. They are particularly relevant when
applying HAZOP studies in a project environment.

The HAZOP study is part of the overall HSE

Management of the project. It is therefore a Project
Mangers responsibility.
A successful HAZOP
requires commitment from the Project Manger of
both the Client and the Contractor.

The HAZOP of the FEED (Front End Engineering

Design) is the most important HAZOP of the project.
Deferring part of the HAZOP scope to the EPC phase
of the project will have cost, schedule and contractual
implications.

There is a tendency in the E & P industry to

underestimate the HAZOP duration. The duration of
the HAZOP study depends on many factors such as
the complexity of the process and the number of P
&IDs. Advice from HAZOP specialists should be
sought before fixing a HAZOP duration in the project
schedule.

To ensure that there is no conflict of interest, the

HAZOP Leader should be appointed by the Operating
Company rather than be part of the contract with the
Engineering Company.

Particular attention should be given to drain system

and vendor packages. This is because these systems
are not usually ready till towards the end of the
engineering phase. The temptation to do short cuts
in the HAZOP studies of these systems, for schedule
reasons, should be resisted.

During the engineering phase of the project, it is

usually more efficient if the HAZOP study is
conducted at the Home Office of the Engineering
Contractor. The SIL (Safety integrity Level) review
should follow the HAZOP study. Ideally, the team
for the SIL review should be selected from the
HAZOP team to ensure continuity and consistency.

Implementation of the HAZOP recommendations

The EPC Contractor is responsible for implementing the
HAZOP recommendations. Where there is disagreement, a
justification is issued and discussed with the project and
HAZOP teams. A close-out report shall be issued by the EPC
Contractor documenting the actions taken. As noted before,
the HAZOP study of the EPC phase resulted in a substantial
number of recommendations. This is due to a number of
reasons. The FEED HAZOP study was conducted half the
way through the FEED phase. It was done over a period of
two weeks only and did not cover all the systems. Many
changes were introduced after that HAZOP. Other changes in
the facilities design were introduced during as a result of the
clarifications for the bidders for the EPC contract. All these
changes were not hazoped prior to awarding the EPC contract.
While the EPC Contractor scope includes implementing the
HAZOP study recommendations, it is inevitable that there will
be items that the EPC Contractor will consider to be a change
in the project scope. This can result in cost and schedule
impact. This type of problems can be minimized by
developing well engineered P & IDs during the FEED phase
of the project and then conducting a detailed HAZOP study.
Implementing changes during the FEED stage of the project
involves primarily additional engineering man-hour costs,

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SPE 93723

Acknowledgement

2.

The author wishes to thank the Management of Abu Dhabi

Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) for permission
to publish this paper.

Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP Studies)

Application Guide, IEC 61882, First edition, May
2001.

3.

HAZOP Manger, Version 5.0, Lihou Technical &

Software Services, UK.

References

4.

Jones, D. W., Lessons from HAZOP Experiences,

Hydrocarbon Processing, April 1992, pp.77-80.

1.

Kletz, T.A., HAZOP & HAZAN, The Institution of

Chemical Engineers, second edition, 1986.

Parameter

Key word

Definition

Flow

More

Quantitative increase

Less

Quantitative decrease
(Includes no flow)

Pressure

Reverse
More

Opposite direction
More than normal operating

Temperature

Less
More

Less than normal operating

More than normal

Level

Less
More

Less than normal

More than normal

Others

Less
Different from

Table 1

Less than normal

Isolation, draining, venting,
maintenance, start-up,
corrosion, fire

HAZOP guide words

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SPE 93723

Arabian Gulf
Qatar
NEB

Abu Dhabi

United Arab
Emirates
Saudi Arabia

Figure 1 Location Map

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Oman

SPE 93723

Arabian Gulf
Cluster-A
D

Dabbiya

Dabbiya
CPP

Abu Dhabi

L
M
C

N
P

Rumaitha
R
Cluster-A
B

Rumaitha
CPP

D
C

Jebel Dhanna
M

G
H

Figure 2 Field Layout

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SPE 93723

LP

Rumaitha Gas

Gas Wells

Lean Gas

HP 1

MP

HP 2

WAG & GI
network

Dehydration Column

Local
Wells

Train 1
VR

1st Stage
Separator

Clusters

Train 2

2nd Stage
Separator

Export
1st Stage
Desalter

Manifold

Figure 3

2nd Stage
Desalter

Pump
Stabilization
Column

Tank

Schematic of Central Processing Plant (CPP) at Al-Dabbaiya

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