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Contemporary
Metaphilosophy
What is philosophy? What is philosophy for? How should philosophy be done? These are
metaphilosophical questions, metaphilosophy being the study of the nature of philosophy. Contemporary
metaphilosophieswithintheWesternphilosophicaltraditioncanbedivided,ratherroughly,accordingto
whether they are associated with (1) Analytic philosophy, (2) Pragmatist philosophy, or (3) Continental
philosophy.
ThepioneersoftheAnalyticmovementheldthatphilosophyshouldbeginwiththeanalysisofpropositions.
Inthehandsoftwoofthosepioneers,RussellandWittgenstein,suchanalysisgivesacentralroletologicand
aimsatdisclosingthedeepstructureoftheworld.ButRussellandWittgensteinthoughtphilosophycould
saylittleaboutethics.ThemovementknownasLogicalPositivismsharedtheaversionto normative ethics.
Nonetheless, the positivists meant to be progressive. As part of that, they intended to eliminate
metaphysics. The socalled ordinary language philosophers agreed that philosophy centrally involved the
analysis of propositions, but, and this recalls a third Analytic pioneer, namely Moore, their analyses
remained at the level of natural language as against logic. The later Wittgenstein has an affinity with
ordinarylanguagephilosophy.ForWittgensteinhadcometoholdthatphilosophyshouldprotectusagainst
dangerousillusionsbybeingakindoftherapyforwhatnormallypassesforphilosophy.Metaphilosophical
viewsheldbylaterAnalyticphilosophersincludetheideathatphilosophycanbepursuedasadescriptive
butnotarevisionarymetaphysicsandthatphilosophyiscontinuouswithscience.
The pragmatists, like those Analytic philosophers who work in practical or applied ethics, believed that
philosophyshouldtreatrealproblems(althoughthepragmatistsgaverealproblemsawiderscopethan
the ethicists tend to). The neopragmatist Rorty goes so far as to say the philosopher should fashion her
philosophysoastopromotehercultural,social,andpoliticalgoals.SocalledpostAnalyticphilosophyis
much influenced by pragmatism. Like the pragmatists, the postAnalyticals tend (1) to favor a broad
construal of the philosophical enterprise and (2) to aim at dissolving rather than solving traditional or
narrowphilosophicalproblems.
The first Continental position considered herein is Husserls phenomenology. Husserl believed that his
phenomenologicalmethod would enable philosophy to become a rigorous and foundational science. Still, on
Husserls conception, philosophy is both a personal affair and something that is vital to realizing the
humanitarianhopesoftheEnlightenment.Husserlsexistentialsuccessorsmodifiedhismethodinvarious
ways and stressed, and refashioned, the ideal of authenticity presented by his writings. Another major
Continental tradition, namely Critical Theory, makes of philosophy a contributor to emancipatory social
theory and the version of Critical Theory pursued by Jrgen Habermas includes a call for
'postmetaphysical thinking'. The later thought of Heidegger advocates a postmetaphysical thinking too,
albeit a very different one and Heidegger associates metaphysics with the ills of modernity. Heidegger
stronglyinfluenced Derridasmetaphilosophy.Derridasdeconstructiveapproachtophilosophy(1)aimsat
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clarifying,andlooseningthegripof,theassumptionsofprevious,metaphysicalphilosophy,and(2)means
tohaveanethicalandpoliticalimport.

TableofContents
1. Introduction
a. SomePreTwentiethCenturyMetaphilosophy
b. DefiningMetaphilosophy
c. ExplicitandImplicitMetaphilosophy
d. TheClassificationofMetaphilosophiesandtheTreatmentthatFollows
2. AnalyticMetaphilosophy
a. TheAnalyticPioneers:Russell,theEarlyWittgenstein,andMoore
b. LogicalPositivism
c. OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophyandtheLaterWittgenstein
d. ThreeRevivals
i. NormativePhilosophyincludingRawlsandPracticalEthics
ii. HistoryofPhilosophy
iii. Metaphysics:Strawson,Quine,Kripke
e. NaturalismincludingExperimentalismandItsChallengetoIntuitions
3. Pragmatism,Neopragmatism,andPostAnalyticPhilosophy
a. Pragmatism
b. Neopragmatism:Rorty
c. PostAnalyticPhilosophy
4. ContinentalMetaphilosophy
a. PhenomenologyandRelatedCurrents
i. HusserlsPhenomenology
ii. ExistentialPhenomenology,Hermeneutics,Existentialism
b. CriticalTheory
i. CriticalTheoryandtheCritiqueofInstrumentalReason
ii. Habermas
c. TheLaterHeidegger
d. Derrida'sPostStructuralism
5. ReferencesandFurtherReading
a. ExplicitMetaphilosophyandWorksaboutPhilosophicalMovementsorTraditions
b. AnalyticPhilosophyincludingWittgenstein,PostAnalyticPhilosophy,andLogicalPragmatism
c. PragmatismandNeopragmatism
d. ContinentalPhilosophy
e. Other

1.Introduction
ThemaintopicofthearticleistheWesternmetaphilosophyofthelasthundredyearsorso.Butthattopicis
broached via a sketch of some earlier Western metaphilosophies. (In the case of the sketch, Western
means European. In the remainder of the article, Western means European and North American. On
Eastern meta
philosophy, see the entries filed under such heads as Chinese philosophy and Indian
philosophy.) Once that sketch is in hand, the article defines the notion of metaphilosophy and
distinguishes between explicit and implicit metaphilosophy. Then there is a consideration of how
metaphilosophiesmightbecategorizedandanoutlineofthecourseoftheremainderofthearticle.

a.SomePreTwentiethCenturyMetaphilosophy
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Socratesbelievedthattheunexaminedlifetheunphilosophicallifewasnotworthliving(Plato,Apology,
38a). Indeed, Socrates saw his role as helping to rouse people from unreflective lives. He did this by
showing them, through his famous Socratic method, that in fact they knew little about, for example,
justice,beauty,loveorpiety.Socratesuseofthatmethodcontributedtohisbeingcondemnedtodeathby
the Athenian state. But Socrates politics contributed too and here one can note that, according to the
Republic (473cd), humanity will prosper only when philosophers are kings or kings philosophers. It is
notabletoothat,inPlatosPhaedo,Socratespresentsdeathasliberationofthesoulfromthetombofthe
body.
According to Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder, seeks the most fundamental causes or principles of
things,andistheleastnecessarybuttherebythemostdivineofsciences(Metaphysics,bookalpha,sections
13).Despitethepointaboutnecessity,Aristotletaughtethics,asubjectheconceivedasakindofpolitical
science (Nicomachean Ethics, book 1) and which had the aim of making men good. Later philosophers
continued and even intensified the stress on philosophical practicality. According to the Hellenistic
philosopherstheCynics,Sceptics,EpicureansandStoicsphilosophyrevealed(1)whatwasvaluableand
whatwasnot,and(2)howonecouldachievetheformerandprotectoneselfagainstlongingforthelatter.
The Roman Cicero held that to study philosophy is to prepare oneself for death. The later and neoplatonic
thinker Plotinus asked, What, then, is Philosophy? and answered, Philosophy is the supremely precious
(Enneads,I.3.v):ameanstoblissfulcontactwithamysticalprinciplehecalledtheOne.
Theideathatphilosophyisthehandmaidenoftheology,earlierpropoundedbytheHellenisticthinkerPhilo
ofAlexandria,ismostassociatedwiththemedievalageandparticularlywith Aquinas.Aquinasresumedthe
project of synthesizing Christianity with Greek philosophy a project that had been pursued already by
various thinkers including Augustine, Anselm, and Boethius. (Boethius was a politician inspired by
philosophybutthepoliticsendedbadlyforhim.InthoserespectsheresemblestheearlierSeneca.And,
likeSeneca,Boethiuswroteoftheconsolationsofphilosophy.)
[T]hewordphilosophymeansthestudy[orlovephilo]ofwisdom,andbywisdomismeantnotonly
prudence in our everyday affairs but also a perfect knowledge of all things that mankind is capable of
knowing,bothfortheconductoflifeandforthepreservationofhealthandthediscoveryofallmannerof
skills.ThusDescartes(1988:p.179).LockesEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding(bk.4.ch.19,p.697)
connectsphilosophywiththeloveoftruthandidentifiesthefollowingasanunerringmarkofthatlove:
ThenotentertaininganyPropositionwithgreaterassurancethantheProofsitisbuiltuponwillwarrant.
Humes Of Suicide opens thus: One considerable advantage that arises from Philosophy, consists in the
sovereignantidotewhichitaffordstosuperstitionandfalsereligion(Hume1980:97).KantheldthatWhat
canIknow?,WhatoughtItodo?,and,WhatmayIhope?weretheultimatequestionsofhumanreason
(CritiqueofPureReason,A805/B33)andassertedthatphilosophyspeculiardignityliesinprinciplesof
morality, legislation, and religion that it can provide (A318 / B375). According to Hegel, the point of
philosophyorofthedialecticistoenablepeopletorecognizetheembodimentoftheiridealsintheir
social and political lives and thereby to be at home in the world. Marxs famous eleventh Thesis on
Feuerbachdeclaredthat,whilephilosophershadinterpretedtheworld,thepointwastochangeit.

b.DefiningMetaphilosophy
Astheforegoingsketchbeginstosuggest,threeverygeneralmetaphilosophicalquestionsare(1)Whatis
philosophy?(2)Whatis,orwhatshouldbe,thepointofphilosophy?(3)Howshouldonedophilosophy?
Those questions resolve into a host of more specific meta
philosophical conundra, some of which are as
follows.Isphilosophyaprocessoraproduct?Whatkindofknowledgecanphilosophyattain?Howshould
oneunderstandphilosophicaldisagreement?Isphilosophyhistoricalinsomespecialordeepway?Should
philosophymakeusbetterpeople?Happierpeople?Isphilosophypolitical?Whatmethod(s)andtypesof
evidence suit philosophy? How should philosophy be written (presuming it should be written at all)? Is
philosophy,insomesense,overorshoulditbe?
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Buthowmightonedefinemetaphilosophy?OnedefinitionowestoMorrisLazerowitz.(Lazerowitzclaims
tohaveinventedtheEnglishwordmetaphilosophyin1940.Butsomeforeignlanguageequivalentsofthe
termmetaphilosophyantedate1940.Notefurtherthat,invariouslanguagesincludingEnglish,sometimes
the term takes a hyphen before the meta.) Lazerowitz proposed (1970) that metaphilosophy is the
investigationofthenatureofphilosophy.Ifwetakenaturetoincludeboththepointofphilosophyand
howonedoes(orshoulddo)philosophy,thenthatdefinitionfitswiththemostgeneralmeta
philosophical
questionsjustidentifiedabove.Still:thereareotherdefinitionsofmetaphilosophyandwhileLazerowitzs
definitionwillprovebestforourpurposes,oneneedsinordertoappreciatethatfact,andinordertogive
thedefinitionasuitable(further)glosstosurveythealternatives.
One alternative definition construes metaphilosophy as the philosophy of philosophy. Sometimes that
definitionintendsthisidea:metaphilosophyappliesthemethod(s)ofphilosophytophilosophyitself.That
ideaitselfcomesintwoversions.Oneisafirstorderconstrual.Thethoughthereisthis.Metaphilosophy,
as the application of philosophy to philosophy itself, is simply one more instance of philosophy
(Wittgenstein2001:section121Williamson2007:ix).Theotherversionthesecondorderversionofthe
ideathatmetaphilosophyappliesphilosophytoitselfisasfollows.Metaphilosophystandstophilosophy
asphilosophystandstoitssubjectmatterortootherdisciplines(Rescher2006),suchthat,asWilliamson
puts it (loc. cit) metaphilosophy look[s] down upon philosophy from above, or beyond. (Williamson
himself,whotakesthefirstorderview,prefersthetermthephilosophyofphilosophytometaphilosophy.
For he thinks that metaphilosophy has this connotation of looking down.) A different definition of
metaphilosophy exploits the fact that meta can mean not only about but also after. On this definition,
metaphilosophy is postphilosophy. Sometimes Lazerowitz himself used metaphilosophy in that way.
Whathehadinmindhere,moreparticularly,isthespecialkindofinvestigationwhichWittgensteinhad
describedasoneoftheheirsofphilosophy(Lazerowitz1970).SomeFrenchphilosophershaveusedthe
termsimilarly,thoughwithreferencetoHeideggerand/orMarxratherthantoWittgenstein(Elden2004:
83).
What then commends Lazerowitzs (original) definition the definition whereby metaphilosophy is
investigationofthenature(andpoint)ofphilosophy?Twothings.(1)Thetwophilosophyofphilosophy
construalsarecompetingspecificationsofthatdefinition.Indeed,thoseconstrualshavelittlecontentuntil
after one has a considerable idea of what philosophy is. (2) The equation of metaphilosophy and post
philosophy is narrow and tendentious but Lazerowitzs definition accommodates postphilosophy as a
position within a more widely construed metaphilosophy. Still: Lazerowitzs definition does require
qualification,sincethereisasenseinwhichitistoobroad.Forinvestigationofthenatureofphilosophy
suggeststhatanyinquiryintophilosophywillcountasmeta
philosophical,whereasaninquirytendstobe
deemedmeta
philosophicalonlywhenitpertainstotheessence,orverynature,ofphilosophy.(Suchindeed
is a third possible reading of the philosophyofphilosophy construal.) Now, just what does so pertain is
mootandthereisariskofbeingtoounaccommodating.Wemightwanttodenythetitlemetaphilosophy
to,say,varioussociologicalstudiesofphilosophy,andeven,perhaps,tophilosophicalpedagogy(thatis,to
thesubjectofhowphilosophyistaught).Ontheotherhand,weareinclinedtocountasmeta
philosophical
claims about, for instance, philosophy corrupting its students or about professionalization corrupting
philosophy(ontheseclaimsonemayseeStewart1995andAnscombe1957).
Whatfollowswillgiveamoderatelynarrowinterpretationtothetermnaturewithinthephrasethenature
ofphilosophy.

c.ExplicitandImplicitMetaphilosophy
Explicit metaphilosophy is metaphilosophy pursued as a subfield of, or attendant field to, philosophy.
Metaphilosophy so conceived has waxed and waned. In the early twentyfirst century, it has waxed in
Europe and in the Anglophone (Englishspeaking) world. Probable causes of the increasing interest
include Analyticphilosophyhavingbecomemoreawareofitselfasatradition,theriseofphilosophizingofa
more empirical sort, and a softening of the divide between Analytic and Continental philosophy. (This
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articlewillrevisitallofthosetopicsinonewayoranother.)However,evenwhenwaxing,metaphilosophy
generates much less activity than philosophy. Certainly the philosophical scene contains few booklength
pieces of metaphilosophy. Books such as Williamsons The Philosophy of Philosophy, Reschers Essay on
Metaphilosophy, and What is Philosophy? by Deleuze and Guattari these are not the rule but the
exception.
Thereismoretometaphilosophythanexplicitmetaphilosophy.Forthereisalsoimplicitmetaphilosophy.
To appreciate that point, consider, first, that philosophical positions can have meta
philosophical aspects.
Many philosophical views views about, say, knowledge, or language, or authenticity can have
implications for the task or nature of philosophy. Indeed, all philosophizing is somewhat meta

philosophical, at least in this sense: any philosophical view or orientation commits its holder to a
metaphilosophythataccommodatesit.Thusifoneadvancesanontologyonemusthaveametaphilosophy
that countenances ontology. Similarly, to adopt a method or style is to deem that approach at least
passable. Moreover, a conception of the nature and point of philosophy, albeit perhaps an inchoate one,
motivatesandshapesmuchphilosophy.Butandthisiswhatallowstheretobeimplicitmetaphilosophy
sometimesnoneofthisisemphasized,orevenappreciatedatall,bythosewhophilosophize.Muchofthe
metaphilosophy treated here is implicit, at least in the attenuated sense that its authors give philosophy
muchmoreattentionthanphilosophy.

d.TheClassificationofMetaphilosophiesandtheTreatmentthatFollows
One way of classifying metaphilosophy would be by the aim that a given metaphilosophy attributes to
philosophy. Alternatively, one could consider that which is taken as the model for philosophy or for
philosophical form. Science? Art? Therapy? Something else? A further alternative is to distinguish
metaphilosophiesaccordingtowhetherornottheyconceivephilosophyassomehowessentiallylinguistic.
Another criterion would be the rejection or adoption or conception of metaphysics (metaphysics being
something like the study of' the fundamental nature of reality). And many further classifications are
possible.
ThisarticlewillemploytheAnalyticContinentaldistinctionasitsmostgeneralclassificatoryschema.Or
rather it uses these categories: (1) Analytic philosophy (2) Continental philosophy (3) pragmatism,
neopragmatism, and postAnalytic philosophy, these being only some of the most important of
metaphilosophies of the last century or so. Those metaphilosophies are distinguished from one from
another via the philosophies or philosophical movements (movements narrower than those of the three
toplevel headings) to which they have been conjoined. That approach, and indeed the article's most
generalschema,meansthatthisaccountisorganizedbychronologyasmuchasbytheme.Onevirtueofthe
approachisthatitprovidesadegreeofhistoricalperspective.Anotheristhattheapproachhelpstodisclose
some rather implicit metaphilosophy associated with wellknown philosophies. But the article will be
thematic to a degree because it will bring out some points of identity and difference between various
metaphilosophiesandwillconsidercriticismsofthemetaphilosophiestreated.However,thearticlewillnot
much attempt to determine, on meta
philosophical or other criteria, the respective natures of Analytic
philosophy, pragmatism, or Continental philosophy. The article employs those categories solely for
organizationalpurposes.Butnotethefollowingpoints.
1. Theparticularplacingofsomeindividualphilosopherswithintheschemaisproblematic.Thecaseofthesocalled
laterWittgensteinisparticularlymoot.IsheAnalytic?Shouldhehavehisowncategory?
2. Thedelineationofthetraditionsthemselvesiscontroversial.ThenotionsoftheAnalyticandtheContinentalare
particularlyvexed.Thedifficultiesherestartwiththefactthathereageographicalcategoryisjuxtaposedtoamore
thematicordoctrinalone(Williams2003).Moreover,somephilosophersdenythatAnalyticphilosophyhasany
substantialexistence(Preston2007seealsoRorty1991a:217)andsomeassertthesameofContinentalphilosophy
(Glendinning2006:13andff).
3. EvenonlywithincontemporaryWesternhistory,therearesignificantapproachestophilosophythatseemtoatleast
somewhatwarranttheirowncategories.Amongthoseapproachesaretraditionalistphilosophy,whichdevotes
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itselftothestudyofthegrand[...]traditionofWesternphilosophyrangingfromthePreSocraticstoKant(Glock
2008:85f.),feminism,andenvironmentalphilosophy.Thisarticledoesnotexaminethoseapproaches.

2.AnalyticMetaphilosophy
a.TheAnalyticPioneers:Russell,theEarlyWittgenstein,andMoore
BertrandRussell,hispupil LudwigWittgenstein,andtheircolleagueG.E.MoorethepioneersofAnalytic
philosophy shared the view that all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions
(Russell1992:9firstpublishedin1900).InRussellandWittgensteinsuchanalysiswascentrallyamatter
of logic. (Note, however, that the expression Analytic philosophy seems to have emerged only in the
1930s.)
Russelliananalysishastwostages(Beaney2007:23and2009:section3Urmson1956).First,propositions

of ordinary or scientific language are transformed into what Russell regarded as their true form. This
logical or transformative analysis draws heavily upon the new logic of Frege and finds its exemplar in
Russellstheoryofdescriptions(AnalyticPhilosophy,section2.a).Thenextstepistocorrelateelements
within the transformed propositions with elements in the world. Commentators have called this second
stage or form of analysis which Russell counted as a matter of philosophical logic reductive,
decompositional, and metaphysical. It is decompositional and reductive inasmuch as, like chemical
analysis,itseekstorevolveitsobjectsintotheirsimplestelements,suchanelementbeingsimpleinthatit
itselflackspartsorconstituents.Theanalysisismetaphysicalinthatityieldsametaphysics.Accordingto
the metaphysics that Russell actually derived from his analysis the metaphysics which he called logical
atomismtheworldcomprisesindivisibleatomsthatcombine,instructureslimnedbylogic,toformthe
entities of science and everyday life. Russells empiricism inclined him to conceive the atoms as mind
independentsensedata.(SeefurtherRussellsMetaphysics,section4.)
Logicinthedualformofanalysisjustsketchedwastheessenceofphilosophy,accordingtoRussell(2009:
ch. 2). Nonetheless, Russell wrote on practical matters, advocating, and campaigning for, liberal and
socialistideas.Buthetendedtoregardsuchactivitiesasunphilosophical,believingthatethicalstatements
werenoncognitiveandhencelittleamenabletophilosophicalanalysis(seeNonCognitivisminEthics).Buthe
didcometoholdaformofutilitarianismthatallowedethicalstatementsakindoftruthaptness.Andhe
did endorse a qualified version of this venerable idea: the contemplation of profound things enlarges the
selfandfostershappiness.Russellheldfurtherthatpracticinganethicswaslittleusegivencontemporary
politics, a view informed by worries about the effects of conformity and technocracy. (On all this, see
Schultz1992.)
WittgensteinagreedwithFregeandRussellthattheapparentlogicalformofapropositionneednotbeits
realone(Wittgenstein1961:section4.0031).AndheagreedwithRussellthatlanguageandtheworldshare
acommon,ultimatelyatomistic,form.ButWittgensteinsTractatusLogicoPhilosophicusdevelopedthese
ideasintoasomewhatKantianandactuallyratherSchopenhauerianposition.(Thatbook,firstpublishedin
1921, is the main and arguably only work of the socalled early Wittgenstein. section 2.c treats
Wittgensteins later views.) The Tractatus taught the following. Only when propositions depict possible
states of affairs do they have sense. Propositions of science and of everyday language pass that test.
Propositions of logic do not quite do so. They have the form necessary for depiction but they depict
nothing because they boil down to either tautologies or contradictions. Hence they are senseless (in
WittgensteinsoriginalGerman:sinnlos).Astometaphysicalstatementsstatementsabout,interalia,the
meaningoflifeandGod,andstatementsofethicsandaestheticstheyarenonsense(Unsinn).Theytry
todepictsomething.Butwhattheytrytodepictisnopossiblestateofaffairswithintheworld.Wittgenstein
concludes that philosophy is a critique of language that detects and expunges metaphysical talk
(Wittgenstein1961:section4.0031).[W]heneversomeone[...]want[s]tosaysomethingmetaphysical,one
should demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions
(section 6.53). But there is a complication. Wittgenstein (section 6.547): anyone who understands me
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eventuallyrecognizes[myownpropositions]asnonsensical,whenhehasusedthemasstepstoclimbup
beyond them [...] He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. What we
cannotspeakaboutwemustpassoverinsilence.Still,Wittgensteinappliesthehonorificsmysticaland
higher (section 6.426.522) to his statements about the limits of language and to various other
metaphysical statements, including ethical ones. In the case of these (mystical/higher) nonsensical
propositions,thepointofremainingsilentaboutthemisnottodamnthembutrathertoleavetheirtruth
unprofaned.
LikeRussellandWittgenstein,Mooreadvocatedaformofdecompositionalanalysis.Heheldthatathing
becomes intelligible first when it is analyzed into its constituent concepts (Moore 1899: 182 see further
Beaney2009:section4).ButMooreusesnormallanguageratherthanlogictospecifythoseconstituents
and, in his hands, analysis often supported commonplace, prephilosophical beliefs. Nonetheless, and
despite confessing that other philosophers rather than the world prompted his philosophizing (Schilpp
1942:14),MooreheldthatphilosophyshouldgiveageneraldescriptionofthewholeUniverse(1953:1).
Accordingly, Moore tackled ethics and aesthetics as well as epistemology and metaphysics. His Principia
Ethica used the notespeciallycommonsensical idea that goodness was a simple, indefinable quality in
ordertodefendthemeaningfulnessofethicalstatementsandtheobjectivityofmoralvalue.Additionally,
Moore advanced a normative ethic, the wider social or political implications of which are debated
(Hutchinson2001).
Russells tendency to exclude ethics from philosophy, and Wittgensteins protective version of the
exclusion, are contentious and presuppose their respective versions of atomism. In turn, that atomism
reliesheavilyupontheidea,asmeta
philosophicalasitisphilosophical,ofanideallanguage(oratleastof
anidealanalysisofnaturallanguage).Latersectionscriticizethatidea.Suchcriticismfindslittletargetin
Moore.YetMooreisatargetforthosewhoholdthatphilosophyshouldbelittleconcernedwithwordsor
even,perhaps,withconcepts(seesection2.candtherevivalstreatedinsection2.d).

b.LogicalPositivism
Wewitnessthespiritofthescientificworldconceptionpenetratingingrowingmeasuretheforms
ofpersonalandpubliclife,ineducation,upbringing,architecture,andtheshapingofeconomicand
social life according to rational principles. The scientific worldconception serves life, and life
receivesit.Thetaskofphilosophicalworkliesin[...]clarificationofproblemsandassertions,notin
thepropoundingofspecialphilosophicalpronouncements.Themethodofthisclarificationisthat
oflogicalanalysis.
The foregoing passages owe to a manifesto issued by the Vienna Circle (Neurath, Carnap, and Hahn 1973:
317f.and328).LeadingmembersofthatCircleincludedMoritzSchlick(aphysicistturnedphilosopher),
Rudolf Carnap (primarily a logician), and Otto Neurath (economist, sociologist, and philosopher). These
thinkers were inspired by the original positivist, Auguste Comte. Other influences included the
empiricism(s) of Hume, Russell and Ernst Mach, and the RussellWittgenstein idea of an ideal logical
language. (The Tractatus, in particular, was a massive influence.) The Circle, in turn, gave rise to an
international movement that went under several names: logical positivism, logical empiricism,
neopositivism,andsimplypositivism.
Theclarificationorlogicalanalysisadvocatedbypositivismistwosided.Itsdestructivetaskwastheuseof
the socalled verifiability principle to eliminate metaphysics. According to that principle, a statement is
meaningfulonlywheneithertruebydefinitionorverifiablethroughexperience.(Sothereisnosynthetic
apriori.SeeKant,Metaphysics,section2,and APrioriandAPosteriori.)Thepositivistsplacedmathematicsand
logicwithinthetruebydefinition(oranalyticapriori)category,andscienceandmostnormaltalkinthe
categoryofverifiablethroughexperience(orsyntheticaposteriori).Allelsewasdeemedmeaningless.That
fate befell metaphysical statements and finds its most famous illustration in Carnaps attack (1931) on
HeideggersWhatisMetaphysics?Itwasthefate,too,ofethicalandaestheticstatements.Hencethenon
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cognitivistmetaethics(seeEthics,section1)thatsomepositivistsdeveloped.
The constructive side of positivistic analysis involved epistemology and philosophy of science. The
positivists wanted to know exactly how experience justified empirical knowledge. Sometimes the
positiviststookavarietyofpositionsonthatquestiontheideawastoreduceallscientificstatementsto
thoseofphysics.(See Reductionism.)Thateffortwentundertheheadingofunifiedscience.Sotoodidan
idea that sought to make good on the claim that positivism served life. That idea was that the sciences
shouldcollaborateinordertohelpsolvesocialproblems,aprojectchampionedbythesocalledLeftVienna
Circleand,withinthat,especiallybyNeurath(whoservedinasocialistMunichgovernmentand,later,was
a central figure in Austrian housing movements). The positivists had close relations with the Bauhaus
movement,whichwasitselfunderstoodbyitsmembersassociallyprogressive(Galison1990).
Positivismhaditsproblemsanditsdetractors.Thebelieverinspecialphilosophicalpronouncementswill
thinkthatpositivismdecapitatesphilosophy(comparesection4.abelow,onHusserl).Moreover,positivism
itself seemingly involved at least one special read: metaphysical pronouncement, namely, the
verifiability principle. Further, there is reason to distrust the very idea of providing strict criteria for
nonsense (see Glendinning 2001). Further yet, the idea of an ideal logical language was attacked as
unachievable, incoherent, and/or when used as a means to certify philosophical truth circular (Copi
1949).Thereweredoubts,too,aboutwhetherpositivismreallyservedlife.(1)Mightpositivismsnarrow
notion of fact prevent it from comprehending the real nature of society? (Critical Theory leveled that
objection. See ONeill and Uebel 2004.) (2) Might positivism involve a disastrous reduction of politics to
thediscoveryoftechnicalsolutionstodepoliticizedends?(ThisobjectionowesagaintoCriticalTheory,but
alsotoothers.SeeGalison1990andONeill2003.)
Positivismretainedsomecoherenceasamovementordoctrineuntilthelate1960s,eventhoughtheNazis
withwhomthepositivistsclashedforcedtheCircleintoexile.Infact,thatexilehelpedtospreadthe
positivistcreed.But,notlongaftertheSecondWorldWar,theascendancythatpositivismhadacquiredin
Anglophonephilosophybegantodiminish.Itdidsopartlybecauseofthedevelopmentstobeconsidered
next.

c.OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophyandtheLaterWittgenstein
Some accounts group ordinary language philosophy and the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein (and of
Wittgensteins disciples) together under the title linguistic philosophy. That grouping can mislead. All
previous Analytic philosophy was centrally concerned with language. In that sense, all previous Analytic
philosophy had taken the socalled linguistic turn (see Rorty 1992). Nevertheless, ordinary language
philosophyandthelaterWittgensteindomarkachange.Theytwistthelinguisticturnawayfromlogicalor
constructed languages and towards ordinary (that is, vernacular) language, or at least towards natural
(nonartificial)language.TherebythenewbodiesofthoughtrepresentamovementawayfromRussell,the
early Wittgenstein, and the positivists (and back, to an extent, towards Moore). In short and as many
accountsofthehistoryofAnalyticphilosophyputitwehavehereashiftfromideallanguagephilosophy
toordinarylanguagephilosophy.
Ordinarylanguagephilosophybeganwithandcentrallycomprisedaloosegroupingofphilosophersamong
whom the Oxford dons Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin loomed largest. The following view united these
philosophers. Patient analysis of the meaning of words can tap the rich distinctions of natural languages
andminimizetheunclarities,equivocationsandconflationstowhichphilosophersareprone.Soconstrued,
philosophyisunlikenaturalscienceandeven,insofarasitavoidedsystematization,unlikelinguistics.The
majorityofordinarylanguagephilosophersdidhold,withAustin,thatsuchanalysiswasnotthethelast
word in philosophy. Specialist knowledge and techniques can in principle everywhere augment and
improve it. But natural or ordinary language is the first word (Austin 1979: 185 see also Analytic
Philosophy,section4a).

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ThelaterWittgensteindidhold,oratleastcameclosetoholding,thatordinarylanguagehasthelastword
inphilosophy.ThislaterWittgensteinretainedhisearlierviewthatphilosophywasacritiqueoflanguage
of language that tried to be metaphysical or philosophical. But he abandoned the idea (itself
problematicallymetaphysical)thattherewasonetrueformtolanguage.Hecametothink,instead,thatall
philosophical problems owe to misinterpretation of our forms of language (Wittgenstein 2001: section
111). They owe to misunderstanding of the ways language actually works. A principal cause of such
misunderstanding, Wittgenstein thought, is misassimilation of expressions one to another. Such
misassimilation can be motivated, in turn, by a craving for generality (Wittgenstein 1975: 17ff.) that is
inspired by science. The later Wittgensteins own philosophizing means to be a kind of therapy for
philosophers, a therapy which will liberate them from their problems by showing how, in their very
formulationsofthoseproblems,theirwordshaveceasedtomakesense.Wittgensteintriestoshowhowthe
words that give philosophers trouble words such as know, mind, and sensation become
problematicalonlywhen,inphilosophershands,theydepartfromtheusesandthecontextsthatgivethem
meaning.Thusasenseinwhichphilosophyleaveseverythingasitis(2001:section124).[W]emustdo
away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place (section 124). Still, Wittgenstein
himselfonceasked,[W]hatistheuseofstudyingphilosophyifallthatitdoesforyouistoenableyouto
talkwithsomeplausibilityaboutsomeabstrusequestionsoflogic,etc.[...]?(citedinMalcolm1984:35and
93).AndinonesenseWittgensteindidnotwanttoleaveeverythingasitwas.Towit:hewantedtoendthe
worshipofscience.Fortheviewthatsciencecouldexpressallgenuinetruthswas,heheld,barbarizingus
byimpoverishingourunderstandingoftheworldandofourselves.
Muchmeta
philosophicalflackhasbeenaimedatthelaterWittgensteinandordinarylanguagephilosophy.
They have been accused of: abolishing practical philosophy rendering philosophy uncritical trivializing
philosophy by making it a mere matter of words enshrining the ignorance of common speech and, in
Wittgensteinscaseandinhisownwords(takenoutofcontext)ofdestroy[ing]everythinginteresting
(2001: section 118 on these criticisms see Russell 1995: ch. 18, Marcuse 1991: ch. 7 and Gellner 2005).
Nonetheless, it is at least arguable that these movements of thought permanently changed Analytic
philosophybymakingitmoresensitivetolinguisticnuanceandtotheodditiesofphilosophicallanguage.
Moreover, some contemporary philosophers have defended more or less Wittgensteinian conceptions of
philosophy. One such philosopher is Peter Strawson (on whom see section 2.d.iii). Another is Stanley
Cavell. Note also that some writers have attempted to develop the more practical side of Wittgensteins
thought(Pitkin1993,Cavell1979).

d.ThreeRevivals
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, there were three significant, and persisting, meta
philosophical
developmentswithintheAnalytictradition.
i.NormativePhilosophyincludingRawlsandPracticalEthics
During positivisms ascendancy, and for some time thereafter, substantive normative issues questions
abouthowoneshouldlive,whatsortofgovernmentisbestorlegitimate,andsoonwerewidelydeemed
quasiphilosophical. Positivisms noncognitivism was a major cause. So was the distrust, in the later
Wittgenstein and in ordinary language philosophy, of philosophical theorizing. This neglect of the
normative had its exceptions. But the real change occurred with the appearance, in 1971, of A Theory of
JusticebyJohnRawls.
ManytookRawls'booktoshow,throughitssystematicityandclarity,thatnormativetheorywaspossible
without loss of rigor (Weithman 2003: 6). Rawls' procedure for justifying normative principles is of
particular metaphilosophical note. That procedure, called reflective equilibrium, has three steps. (The
quotationsthatfollowarefromSchroeter2004.)
1. [W]eelicitthemoraljudgmentsofcompetentmoraljudgesonwhatevertopicisatissue.(InTheoriesofJustice
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itself,distributivejusticewasthetopic.)Therebyweobtainasetofconsideredjudgments,inwhichwehavestrong
confidence.
2. [W]econstructaschemeofexplicitprinciples,whichwillexplicate,fit,matchoraccountforthesetof
consideredjudgments.
3. Bymovingbackandforthbetweentheinitialjudgmentsandtheprinciples,makingtheadjustmentswhichseem
themostplausible,weremoveanydiscrepancywhichmightremainbetweenthejudgmentsderivedfromthe
schemeofprinciplesandtheinitialconsideredjudgments,therebyachievingapointofequilibrium,where
principlesandjudgmentscoincide.

The conception of reflective equilibrium was perhaps less philosophically orthodox than most readers of
Theory of Justice believed. For Rawls came to argue that his conception of justice was, or should be
construedas,politicalnotmetaphysical(Rawls1999b:4772).Apoliticalconceptionofjusticestayson
thesurface,philosophicallyspeaking(Rawls1999b:395).Itappealsonlytothatwhichgivenourhistory
and the traditions embedded in our public life [...] is the most reasonable doctrine for us (p. 307). A
metaphysical conception of justice appeals to something beyond such contingencies. However: despite
advocatingthepoliticalconception,Rawlsappealstoanoverlappingconsensus(histerm)ofmetaphysical
doctrines.Theideahere,orhope,isthis(Rawls,section3Freeman2007:324415).Citizensinmodern
democraciesholdvariousandnotfullyintercompatiblepoliticalandsocialideas.Butthosecitizenswillbe
abletouniteinsupportingaliberalconceptionofjustice.
Around the same time as Theory of Justice appeared, a parallel revival in normative philosophy begun.
This was the rise of practical ethics. Here is how one prominent practical ethicist presents the most
plausible explanation for that development. [L]aw, ethics, and many of the professionsincluding
medicine, business, engineering, and scientific researchwere profoundly and permanently affected by
issuesandconcernsinthewidersocietyregardingindividualliberties,socialequality,andvariousformsof
abuse and injustice that date from the late 1950s (Beauchamp 2002: 133f.). Now the new ethicists, who
insistedthatphilosophyshouldtreatrealproblems(Beauchamp2002:134),didsomethinglargelyforeign
topreviousAnalyticphilosophy(andtothatextentdidnot,infact,constitutearevival).Theyappliedmoral
theorytosuchconcreteandpressingmattersasracism,sexualequality,abortion,governanceandwar.(On
thoseproblems,seeEthics,section3).
Accordingtosomepracticalethicists,moralprinciplesarenotonlyappliedto,butalsodrawnfrom,cases.
Theissueheretherelationbetweentheoryanditsapplicationbroadenedoutintoamorethoroughly
metaphilosophicaldebate.For,soonafterAnalyticphilosophershadreturnedtonormativeethics,someof
themrejectedaprevalentconceptionofnormativeethicaltheory,andothersentirelyrejectedsuchtheory.
Thefirstcamprejectsmoraltheoryquadecisionprocedureformoralreasoning(Williams1981:ixx)but
doesnotforecloseothertypesofnormativetheorysuchas virtueethics.Thesecondandmoreradicalcamp
holds that the moral world is too complex for any (prescriptive) codification that warrants the name
theory.(Onthesepositions,seeLanceandLittle2006,Clarke1987,Chappell2009.)
ii.HistoryofPhilosophy
Foralongtime,mostanalyticphilosophersheldthatthehistoryofphilosophyhadlittletodowithdoing
philosophy.Forwhattheyaskedwasthehistoryofphilosophysave,largely,aseriesofmistakes?We
mightlearnfromthosemistakes,andthehistorymightcontainsomeoccasionalinsights.But(thelineof
thoughtcontinues)weshouldbewaryofresurrectingthemistakesandbewarethearchivefeverthatleads
totheideathatthereisnosuchthingasphilosophicalprogress.Butinthe1970samorepositiveattitudeto
the history of philosophy began to emerge, together with an attempt to reinstate or relegitimate serious
historicalscholarshipwithinphilosophy(compareAnalyticPhilosophysection5.c).
Thenewlypositiveattitudetowardsthehistoryofphilosophywaspremisedontheviewthatthestudyof
past philosophies was of significant philosophical value. Reasons adduced for that view include the
following (Sorell and Rogers 2005). History of philosophy can disclose our assumptions. It can show the
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strengths of positions that we find uncongenial. It can suggest rolesthat philosophy might take today by
revealing ways in which philosophy has been embedded in a wider intellectual and sociocultural
frameworks.Amoreradicalview,espousedbyCharlesTaylor(1984:17)isthat,Philosophyandthehistory
ofphilosophyareonewecannotdothefirstwithoutalsodoingthesecond.
ManyAnalyticalphilosopherscontinuetoregardthestudyofphilosophyshistoryasverymuchsecondary
to philosophy itself. By contrast, many socalled Continental philosophers take the foregoing ideas,
includingthemoreradicalviewwhichisassociatedwithHegelasaxiomatic.(Seemuchofsection4,
below.)
iii.Metaphysics:Strawson,Quine,Kripke
Positivism, the later Wittgenstein, and Ordinary Language Philosophy suppressed Analytic metaphysics.
Yetitrecovered,thanksespeciallytothreefigures,beginningwithPeterStrawson.
Strawson had his origins in the ordinary language tradition and he declares a large debt or affinity to
Wittgenstein(Strawson2003:12).Butheisindebted,also,toKantand,withStrawson,ordinarylanguage
philosophybecamemoresystematicandmoreambitious.However,Strawsonretainedanelementofwhat
onemightcall,inRaeLangtonsphrase,Kantianhumility.Inordertounderstandthesecharacterizations,
oneneedstoappreciatethatwhichStrawsonadvocatedundertheheadingofdescriptivemetaphysics.In
turn,descriptivemetaphysicsisbestapproachedviathatwhichStrawsoncalledconnectiveanalysis.
Connective analysis seeks to elucidate concepts by discerning their interconnections, which is to say, the
ways in which concepts variously imply, presuppose, and exclude one another. Strawson contrasts this
connectivemodelwiththereductiveoratomisticmodelthataimstodismantleorreducetheconceptswe
examine to other and simpler concepts (all Strawson 1991: 21). The latter model is that of Russell, the
Tractatus, and, indeed, Moore. Another way in which Strawson departs from Russell and the Tractatus,
but not from Moore, lies in this: a principal method of connective analysis is close examination of the
actual use of words (Strawson 1959: 9). But when Strawson turns to descriptive metaphysics, such
examinationisnotenough.
Descriptivemetaphysicsis,orproceedsvia,averygeneralformofconnectiveanalysis.Thegoalhereisto
lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure (Strawson 1959: 9). Those most general
featuresourmostgeneralconceptshaveaspecialimportance.Forthoseconcepts,oratleastthoseof
them in which Strawson is most interested, are (he thinks) basic or fundamental in the following sense.
Theyare(1)irreducible,(2)unchangeableinthattheycompriseamassivecentralcoreofhumanthinking
which has no history (1959: 10) and (3) necessary to any conception of experience which we can make
intelligible to ourselves (Strawson 1991: 26). And the structure that these concepts comprise does not
readilydisplayitselfonthesurfaceoflanguage,butliessubmerged(1956:9f.).
Descriptive metaphysics is considerably Kantian (see Kant, metaphysics). Strawson is Kantian, too, in
rejecting what he calls revisionary metaphysics. Here we have the element of Kantian humility within
Strawsons enterprise. Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought
abouttheworld,whereasrevisionarymetaphysicsaimstoproduceabetterstructure(Strawson1959:9
mystress).Strawsonurgesseveralpointsagainstrevisionarymetaphysics.
1. Arevisionarymetaphysicisapttobeanovergeneralizationofsomeparticularaspectofourconceptualscheme
and/or
2. tobeaconfusionbetweenconceptionsofhowthingsreallyarewithsomeWeltanschauung.
3. Revisionarymetaphysicsattemptstheimpossible,namely,todepartfromthefundamentalfeaturesofour
conceptualscheme.ThefirstpointshowstheinfluenceofWittgenstein.Sodoesthethird,althoughitisalso(as
Strawsonmayhaverecognized)somewhatHeideggerian.ThesecondpointisreminiscentofCarnapsversionof
logicalpositivism.Allthisnotwithstanding,andconsistentlyenough,Strawsonheldthatsystemsofrevisionary
metaphysicscan,throughthepartialvision(1959:9)thattheyprovide,beusefultodescriptivemetaphysics.
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Here are some worries about Strawsons metaphilosophy. [T]he conceptual system with which we are
operating may be much more changing, relative, and culturally limited than Strawson assumes it to be
(Burtt 1963: 35). Next: Strawson imparts very little about the method(s) of descriptive metaphysics
(althoughonemighttrytodiscerntechniquesinwhichimaginationseemstoplayacentralrolefrom
his actual analyses). More serious is that Strawson imparts little by way of answer to the following
questions. What is a concept? How are concepts individuated? What is a conceptual scheme? How are
conceptual schemes individuated? What is the relation between a language and a conceptual scheme?
(Haack1979:366f.).Further:whybelievethattheanalyticphilosopherhasnobusinessprovidingnewand
revealing vision[s] (Strawson 1992: 2)? At any rate, Strawson helped those philosophers who rejected
reductive (especially Russellian and positivistic) versions of analysis but who wanted to continue to call
themselves analytic. For he gave them a reasonably narrow conception of analysis to which they could
adhere (Beaney 2009: section 8 compare Glock 2008: 159). Finally note that, despite his criticisms of
Strawson, the contemporary philosopher Peter Hacker defends a metaphilosophy rather similar to
descriptivemetaphysics(Hacker2003and2007).
William Van Orman Quine was a second prime mover in the metaphysical revival. Quines metaphysics,
which is revisionary in Strawsons terms, emerged from Quines attack upon two dogmas of modern
empiricism.Thoseostensibledogmasare:(1)beliefinsomefundamentalcleavagebetweentruthsthatare
analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths that are synthetic, or
groundedinfact(2)reductionism:thebeliefthateachmeaningfulstatementisequivalenttosomelogical
constructionupontermswhichrefertoimmediateexperience(Quine1980:20).Against1,Quineargues
that every belief has some connection to experience. Against 2, he argues that the connection is never
direct.Forwhenexperienceclasheswithsomebelief,whichbelief(s)mustbechangedisunderdetermined.
Beliefsfacethetribunalofsenseexperiencenotindividuallybutasacorporatebody(p.41see Evidence
section3.c.i).Quineexpressesthisholisticandradicallyempiricistconceptionbyspeakingofthewebof
belief.Somebeliefsthoseneartheedgeofthewebaremoreexposedtoexperiencethanothersbut
theinterlinkingofbeliefsissuchthatnobeliefisimmunetoexperience.
Quine saves metaphysics from positivism. More judiciously put: Quines conception, if correct, saves
metaphysicsfromtheverifiabilitycriterion(q.v.section2.b).Forthenotionofthewebofbeliefimpliesthat
ontologicalbeliefsbeliefsaboutthemostgeneraltraitsofreality(Quine1960:161)areanswerableto
experience.And,ifthatisso,thenontologicalbeliefsdifferfromotherbeliefsonlyintheirgenerality.Quine
infers that, Ontological questions [...] are on a par with questions of natural science (1980: 45). In fact,
since Quine thinks that natural science, and in particular physics, is the best way of fitting our beliefs to
reality,heinfersthatontologyshouldbedeterminedbythebestavailablecomprehensivescientifictheory.
Inthatsense,metaphysicsisthemetaphysicsofscience(Glock2003a:30).
Isthemetaphysicsofscienceactuallyonlyscience?Quineassertsthatitisonlywithinscienceitself,and
notinsomepriorphilosophy,thatrealityistobeidentifiedanddescribed(1981:21).Yethedoesleavea
jobforthephilosopher.Thephilosopheristotranslatethebestavailablescientifictheoryintothatwhich
Quine called canonical notation, namely, the language of modern logic as developed by Frege, Peirce,
Russell and others (Orenstein 2002: 16). Moreover, the philosopher is to make the translation in such a
wayastominimizethetheorysontologicalcommitments.Onlyaftersuchatranslation,whichQuinecalls
explication can one say, at a philosophical level: that is What There Is. (However, Quine cannot fully
capitalizethoseletters,asitwere.Forhethinksthatthereisapragmaticelementtoontology.Seesection
3.a below.) This role for philosophy is a reduced one. For one thing, it deprives philosophy of something
traditionally considered one of its greatest aspirations: necessary truth. On Quines conception, no truth
can be absolutely necessary. (That holds even for the truths of Quines beloved logic, since they, too, fall
withinthewebofbelief.)Bycontrast,evenStrawsonandthepositiviststhelatterintheformofanalytic
truthhadcountenancedversionsofnecessarytruth.
Saul Kripke the third important reviver of metaphysics allows the philosopher a role that is perhaps
slightly more distinct than Quine does. Kripke does that precisely by propounding a new notion of
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necessity. (That said, some identify Ruth Barcan Marcus as the discoverer of the necessity at issue.)
According to Kripke (1980), a truth T about X is necessary just when T holds in all possible worlds that
contain X. To explain: science shows us that, for example, water is composed of H20 the philosophical
questioniswhetherthattruthholdsofallpossibleworlds(allpossibleworldsinwhichwaterexists)andis
therebynecessary.Anysuchsciencederivednecessitiesareaposteriorijustbecause,andinthesensethat,
theyare(partially)derivedfromscience.
Aposteriori necessity is a controversial idea. Kripke realizes this. But he asks why it is controversial. The
notions of the apriori and aposteriori are epistemological (they are about whether or not one needs to
investigatetheworldinordertoknowsomething),whereasKripkepointsouthisnotionofnecessityis
ontological(thatis,aboutwhetherthingscouldbeotherwise).Astohowonedetermineswhetheratruth
obtainsinallpossibleworlds,Kripkesmainappealistotheintuitionsofphilosophers.Thenextsubsection
somewhatscrutinizesthatappeal,togetherwithsomeoftheotherideasofthissubsection.

e.NaturalismincludingExperimentalismandItsChallengetoIntuitions
Kripke and especially Quine helped to create, particularly in the United States, a new orthodoxy within
Analytic philosophy. That orthodoxy is naturalism or the term used by its detractors scientism. But
naturalism (/scientism) is no one thing (Glock 2003a: 46 compare Papineau 2009). Ontological
naturalismholdsthattheentitiestreatedbynaturalscienceexhaustreality.Meta
philosophicalnaturalism
which is the focus in what follows asserts a strong continuity between philosophy and science. A
commonconstrualofthatcontinuityrunsthus.Philosophicalproblemsareinonewayoranothertractable
through the methods of the empirical sciences (Naturalism,Introduction).Now,within meta
philosophical
naturalism, one can distinguish empirical philosophers from experimental philosophers (Prinz 2008).
Empiricalphilosophersenlistsciencetoanswer,ortohelpanswer,philosophicalproblems.Experimental
philosophers(orexperimentalists)themselvesdoscience,ordosoincollaborationwithscientists.Letus
startwithempiricalphilosophy.
Quine is an empirical philosopher in his approach to metaphysics and even more so in his approach to
epistemology.Quinepresentsandurgeshisepistemologythus:Thestimulationofhissensoryreceptorsis
alltheevidenceanybodyhashadtogoon,ultimately,inarrivingathispictureoftheworld.Whynotjust
seehowthisconstructionreallyproceeds?Whynotsettleforpsychology?(Quine1977:75).Suchnaturalistic
epistemology in Quines own formulation, naturalized epistemology has been extended to moral
epistemology.Anaturalizedmoralepistemologyissimplyanaturalizedepistemologythatconcernsitself
withmoralknowledge(CampbellandHunter2000:1).Thereissuchathing,too,asnaturalizedaesthetics:
the attempt to use science to solve aesthetical problems (McMahon 2007). Other forms of empirical
philosophyincludeneurophilosophy,whichappliesmethodsfromneuroscience,andsometimescomputer
science,toquestionsinthephilosophyofmind.
Naturalized epistemology has been criticized for being insufficiently normative. How can descriptions of
epistemicmechanismsdeterminelicenseforbelief?Thedifficultyseemsespeciallypressinginthecaseof
moralepistemology.Wittgensteinscomplaintagainstnaturalisticaestheticsaviewhecalledexceedingly
stupidmayintendasimilarpoint.Thesortofexplanationoneislookingforwhenoneispuzzledbyan
aestheticimpressionisnotacausalexplanation,notonecorroboratedbyexperienceorbystatisticsasto
how people react (all Wittgenstein 1966: 17, 21). A wider disquiet about meta
philosophical naturalism is
this:itpresupposesacontroversialviewexplicitlyendorsedbyQuine,namelythatsciencealoneprovides
true or good knowledge (Glock 2003a: 28, 46). For that reason and for others, some philosophers,
includingWittgenstein,aresuspiciousevenofscientificallyinformedphilosophyofmind.
Nowtheexperimentaliststhephilosopherswhoactuallydosciencetendtousesciencenottopropose
new philosophical ideas or theories but rather to investigate existing philosophical claims. The
philosophical claims at issue are based upon intuitions, intuitions being something like seemings or
spontaneousjudgments.Sometimesphilosophershaveemployedintuitionsinsupportofempiricalclaims.
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Forexample,someethicistshaveasserted,fromtheirphilosophicalarmchairs,thatcharacteristhemost
significantdeterminantofaction.Anotherexample:somephilosophershavespeculatedthatmostpeople
are incompatibilists about determinism. (The claim in this second example is, though empirical,
construableasacertaintypeofsecondorderintuition,namely,asaclaimthatisempirical,yetmadefrom
thearmchair,abouttheintuitionsthatotherpeoplehave.)Experimentalistshaveputsuchhunchestothe
test,oftenconcludingthattheyaremistaken(seeLevin2009andLevy2009).Atothertimes,though,the
typeofintuitivelybasedclaimthatexperimentalistsinvestigateisnonempirical orat least not evidently
empirical. Here one finds, for instance, intuitions about what counts as knowledge, about whether some
feature of something is necessary to it (recall Kripke, above), about what the best resolution of a moral
dilemmais,andaboutwhetherornotwehavefreewill.Now,experimentalistshavenotquitetestedclaims
ofthissecondsort.Buttheyhaveusedempiricalmethodsininterrogatingthewaysinwhichphilosophers,
in considering such claims, have employed intuitions. Analytic philosophers have been wont to use their
intuitions about such nonempirical matters to establish burdens of proof, to support premises, and to
serveasdataagainstwhichtotestphilosophicaltheories.Butexperimentalistshaveclaimedtofindthat,at
least in the case of nonphilosophers, intuitions about such matters vary considerably. (See for instance
Weinberg,NicholsandStitch2001.)So,whyprivilegetheintuitionsofsomeparticularphilosopher?
Armchair philosophers have offered various responses. One is that philosophers intuitions diverge from
folkintuitionsonlyinthisway:theformeraremoreconsideredversionsofthelatter(Levin2009).But
mightnotsuchconsideredintuitionsvaryamongthemselves?Moreover:whyatalltrustevenconsidered
intuitions? Why not think with Quine (and William James, Richard Rorty, Nietzsche, and others) that
intuitionsaresedimentationsofculturallyorbiologicallyinheritedviews?Atraditionalresponsetothatlast
question (an ordinary language response and equally, perhaps, an ideal language response) runs as
follows.Intuitionsdonotconveyviewsoftheworld.Rathertheyconveyanimplicitknowledgeofconcepts
or of language. A variation upon that reply gives it a more naturalistic gloss. The idea here is that
(considered) intuitions, though indeed synthetic and, as such, defeasible, represent good prima facie
evidenceforthephilosophicalviewsatissue,atleastifthoseviewsareaboutthenatureofconcepts(seefor
instanceGrahamandHorgan1994).

3.Pragmatism,Neopragmatism,andPostAnalytic
Philosophy
a.Pragmatism
TheoriginalorclassicalpragmatistsaretheNorthAmericans C.S.Peirce(18391914), WilliamJames(1842
1910), JohnDewey(18591952)and,perhaps, G.H.Mead.Themetaphilosophyofpragmatismunfoldsfrom
thatwhichbecameknownasthepragmaticmaxim.
Peirce invented the pragmatic maxim as a tool for clarifying ideas. His best known formulation of the
maximrunsthus:Considerwhateffects,whichmightconceivablyhavepracticalbearings,weconceivethe
objectofourconceptiontohave.Then,ourconceptionoftheseeffectsisthewholeofourconceptionofthe
object(Peirce193158,volume5:section402).Sometimesthemaximrevealsanideatohavenomeaning.
Such was the result, Peirce thought, of applying the maxim to transubstantiation, and, indeed, to many
metaphysicalideas.Deweydeployedthemaximsimilarly.Hesawitasamethodforinoculatingourselves
against certain blind alleys in philosophy (Talisse and Aikin 2008: 17). James construed the maxim
differently. Whereas Peirce seemed to hold that the effects at issue were, solely, effects upon sensory
experience, James extended those effects into the psychological effects of believing in the idea(s) in
question.Moreover,whereasPeirceconstruedthemaximasaconceptionofmeaning,Jamesturneditinto
a conception of truth. The true is that which, in almost any fashion, but in the long run and on the
whole,isexpedientinthewayofourthinking(James1995:86).Asaconsequenceofthesemoves,James
thoughtthatmanyphilosophicaldisputeswereresolvable,andwereonlyresolvable,throughthepragmatic
maxim.
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None of the pragmatists opposed metaphysics as such or as a whole. That may be because each of them
held that philosophy is not fundamentally different to other inquiries. Each of Peirce, James and Dewey
elaboratesthenotionofinquiry,andtherelativedistinctivenessofphilosophy,inhisownway.Butthereis
common ground on two views. (1) Inquiry is a matter of coping. Dewey, and to an extent James,
understand inquiry as an organism trying to cope with its environment. Indeed Dewey was considerably
influencedbyDarwin.(2)Experimentalscienceistheexemplarofinquiry.Onefindsthissecondideain
DeweybutalsoandespeciallyinPeirce.Theideaisthatexperimentalscienceisthebestmethodormodel
of inquiry, be the inquiry practical or theoretical, descriptive or normative, philosophical or non
philosophical.PragmatismasattituderepresentswhatMr.Peircehashappilytermedthelaboratoryhabit
ofmindextendedintoeveryareawhereinquirymayfruitfullybecarriedon(Dewey1998,volume2:378).
Each of these views (that is, both 1 and 2) may be called naturalistic (the second being a version of
metaphilosophicalnaturalismq.v.section2.e).
According to pragmatism (though Peirce is perhaps an exception) pragmatism was a humanism. Its
purposewastoservehumanity.HereisJames(1995:2):nooneofuscangetalongwithoutthefarflashing
beams of light it sends over the worlds perspectives, the it here being pragmatist philosophy and also
philosophy in general. James held further that pragmatism, this time in contrast with some other
philosophies,allowstheuniversetoappearasaplaceinwhichhumanthoughts,choices,andaspirations
count for something (Gallie 1952: 24). As to Dewey, he held the following. Ideals and values must be
evaluated with respect to their social consequences, either as inhibitors or as valuable instruments for
socialprogressandphilosophy,becauseofthebreadthofitsconcernanditscriticalapproach,canplaya
crucialroleinthisevaluation(Dewey,section4).Indeed,accordingtoDewey,philosophyistobeasocial
hopereducedtoaworkingprogrammeofaction,aprophecyofthefuture,butonedisciplinedbyserious
thoughtandknowledge(Dewey1998,vol.1:72).Deweyhimselfpursuedsuchaprogramme,andnotonly
inhiswritinginwhichhechampionedapervasiveformofdemocracybutalso(andtohelpenablesuch
democracy)asaneducationalist.
Humanism notwithstanding, pragmatism was not hostile to religion. Dewey could endorse religion as a
meansofarticulatingourhighestvalues.Jamestendedtoholdthatthetruthofreligiousideaswastobe
determined,atthebroadestlevel,inthesamewayasthetruthofanythingelse.Peirce,forhispart,wasa
more traditional philosophical theist. The conceptions of religion advocated by James and Dewey have
beencriticizedforbeingverymuchreconceptions(TalisseandAikin2008:9094).Abroaderobjectionto
pragmatisthumanismisthatitsmakingofmanthemeasureofallthingsisfalseandevenpernicious.One
findsversionsofthatobjectioninHeideggerandCriticalTheory.Onecouldlevelthecharge,too,fromthe
perspectiveof environmentalethics.Ratherdifferently,andevenmorebroadly,onemightthinkthatmoral
and political ambitions have no place within philosophy proper (Glock 2003a: 22 glossing Quine).
Objectionsofamorespecifickindhavetargetedthepragmaticmaxim.CriticshavefaultedPeircesversion
ofthepragmaticmaximforbeingtoonarrowortooindeterminateandRussellandothershavecriticized
James'versionasamisanalysisofwhatwemeanbytrue.
Pragmatismwassuperseded(mostnotablyintheUnitedStates)oroccluded(inthoseplaceswhereittook
little hold in the first place) by logical positivism. But the metaphilosophy of logical positivism has
importantsimilaritiestopragmatisms.PositivismsverifiabilityprincipleisverysimilartoPeircesmaxim.
Thepositivistsheldthatscienceistheexemplarofinquiry.Andthepositivists,likepragmatism,aimedat
the betterment of society. Note also that positivism itself dissolved partly because its original tenets
underwent a pragmaticization (Rorty 1991b: xviii). That pragmaticization was the work especially of
QuineandDavidson,whoarelogicalpragmatistsinthattheyuselogicaltechniquestodevelopsomeofthe
main ideas of pragmatists (Glock 2003a: 223 see also Rynin 1956). The ideas at issue include
epistemologicalholismandtheunderdeterminationofvarioustypeoftheorybyevidence.Thelatteristhe
aforementioned (section 2.d.iii) pragmatic element within Quines approach to ontology (on which see
furtherQuinesPhilosophyofScience,section3).

b.Neopragmatism:Rorty
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ThelabelneopragmatismhasbeenappliedtoRobertBrandom,SusanHaack,NicholasRescher,Richard
Rorty, and other thinkers who, like them, identify themselves with some part(s) of classical pragmatism.
(KarlOtto Apel, Jrgen Habermas, John McDowell, and Hilary Putnam are borderline cases each takes
muchfrompragmatismbutiswaryaboutpragmatistasaselfdescription.)Thissectionconcentratesupon
thebestknown,mostcontroversial,andpossiblythemostmeta
philosophical,oftheneopragmatists:Rorty.
MuchofRortysmeta
philosophyissuesfromhisantirepresentationalism.Antirepresentationalismis,inthe
firstinstance,thisview:norepresentation(linguisticormentalconception)correspondstorealityinaway
that exceeds our commonsensical and scientific notions of what it is to get the world right. Rortys
argumentsagainstthesortofprivilegedrepresentationsthatareatissuehereterminateorsummarizeas
follows.[N]othingcountsasjustificationunlessbyreferencetowhatwealreadyaccept[...][T]hereisno
waytogetoutsideourbeliefsandourlanguagesoastofindsometestotherthancoherence(Rorty1980:
178).Rortyinfersthatthenotionofrepresentation,orthatoffactofthematter,hasnousefulrolein
philosophy (Rorty 1991b: 2). We are to conceive ourselves, or our conceptions, not as answerable to the
world,butonlytoourfellows(seeMcDowell2000:110).
Rortythinksthatantirepresentationalismentailstherejectionofametaphilosophywhichgoesbacktothe
Greeks, found a classic expression in Kant, and which is pursued in Analytic philosophy. That
metaphilosophy, which Rorty calls epistemological, presents philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason,
upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture (Rorty 1980: 4). More fully: philosophy judges
discourses, be they religious, scientific, moral, political, aesthetical or metaphysical, by seeing which of
them, and to what degree, disclose reality as it really is. (Clearly, though, more needs to be said if this
conceptionistoaccommodateKantstranscendentalidealism.SeeKant:Metaphysics,section4.)
Rorty wants the philosopher to be, not a cultural overseer adjudicating types of truth claims, but an
informed dilettante and a Socratic intermediary (Rorty 1980: 317). That is, the philosopher is to elicit
agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement (Rorty 1980: 318) between or within various
types or areas of discourse. Philosophy so conceived Rorty calls hermeneutics. The Rortian philosopher
doesnotseeksomeschemaallowingtwoormorediscoursestobetranslatedperfectlyonetotheother(an
idea Rorty associates with representationalism). Instead she inhabits hermeneutic circle. [W]e play back
and forth between guesses about how to characterize particular statements or other events, and guesses
aboutthepointofthewholesituation,untilgraduallywefeelateasewithwhatwashithertostrange(1980:
319). Rorty connects this procedure to the edification that consists in finding new, better, more
interesting,morefruitfulwaysofspeaking(p.360)and,thereby,toagoalhecallsexistentialist:thegoal
offindingnewtypesofselfconceptionand,inthatmanner,findingnewwaystobe.
Rortyselaborationofallthisintroducesfurthernotablemeta
philosophicalviews.First:Blakeisasmuch
ofaphilosopherFichteandHenryAdamsmoreofaphilosopherthanFrege(Rorty1991a:xv).ForSellars
was right, Rorty believes, to define philosophy as an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible
sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term (Sellars 1963: 1 compare
section 6, Sellars Philosophy of Mind presumably, though, Rorty holds that one has good philosophy when
suchattemptsproveedifying).Second:whatcountsasaphilosophicalproblemiscontingent,andnotjust
inthatpeopleonlydiscovercertainphilosophicalproblemsatcertaintimes.Third:philosophicalargument,
at least when it aspires to be conclusive, requires shared assumptions where there are no or few shared
assumptions,suchargumentisimpossible.
ThelastoftheforegoingideasisimportantforwhatonemightcallRortyspracticalmetaphilosophy.Rorty
maintainsthatonecanargueaboutmoralsand/orpoliticsonlywithsomeonewithwhomonesharessome
assumptions. The neutral ground that philosophy has sought for debates with staunch egoists and
unbending totalitarians is a fantasy. All the philosopher can do, besides point that out, is to create a
conception that articulates, but does not strictly support, his or her moral or political vision. The
philosopheroughttobeputtingpoliticsfirstandtailoringaphilosophytosuit(Rorty1991b:178)and
similarlyformorality.RortythinksthatnolessapoliticalphilosopherthanJohnRawlshasalreadycome
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close to this stance (Rorty 1991b: 191). Nor does Rorty bemoan any of this. The cultural politics which
suggestschangesinthevocabulariesdeployedinmoralandpoliticaldeliberation(Rorty2007:ix)ismore
useful than the attempt to find philosophical foundations for some such vocabulary. The term cultural
politicscouldmislead,though.Rortydoesnotadvocateanexclusiveconcentrationonculturalasagainst
social or economic issues. He deplores the sort of philosophy or cultural or literary theory that makes it
almostimpossibletoclamberbackdown[...]toalevel[...]onwhichonemightdiscussthemeritsofalaw,
atreaty,acandidate,orapoliticalstrategy(Rorty2007:93).
Rortys metaphilosophy, and the philosophical views with which it is intertwined, have been attacked as
irrationalist, selfrefuting, relativist, unduly ethnocentric, complacent, antiprogressive, and even as
insincere. Even Rortys selfidentification with the pragmatist tradition has been challenged (despite the
existenceofatleastsomeclearcontinuities).Sohavehisreadings,orappropriations,ofhisphilosophical
heroes, who include not only James and Dewey but also Wittgenstein, Heidegger and, to a lesser extent,
DavidsonandDerrida.Forasampleofallthesecriticisms,seeBrandom2000(whichincludesrepliesby
Rorty)andTalisseandAikin2008:140148.

c.PostAnalyticPhilosophy
PostAnalyticphilosophyisavaguelydefinedtermforsomethingthatisacurrentratherthanagroupor
school.Theterm(inuseasearlyasRajchmanandWest1985)denotestheworkofphilosopherswhoowe
muchtoAnalyticphilosophybutwhothinkthattheyhavemadesomesignificantdeparturefromit.Often
thedeparturesinquestionaremotivatedbypragmatistallegianceorinfluence.(Hencetheplacingofthis
section.)ThefollowingareallconsiderablypragmatistandareallcountedaspostAnalyticphilosophers:
RichardRortyHilaryPutnamRobertBrandomJohnMcDowell.Still,thosesamefiguresexhibit,also,a
turn to Hegel (a turn rendered slightly less remarkable by Hegels influence upon Peirce and especially
uponDewey).SomeWittgensteinianscountaspostAnalytictoo,asmightthelaterWittgensteinhimself.
Stanley Cavell stands out here, though in one way or another Wittgenstein strongly influenced most of
philosophersmentionedinthisparagraph.AnothercommoncharacteristicofthosedeemedpostAnalytic
isinterestinarangeofContinentalthinkers.Rortyloomslargehere.Butthereisalsotheaforementioned
interestinHegel,and,forinstance,thefactthatonefindsMcDowellcitingGadamer.
PostAnalytic philosophy is associated with various more or less meta
philosophical views. One is the
rejection or severe revision of any notion of philosophical analysis. Witness Rorty, Brandoms selfstyled
analyticpragmatism,andperhaps,meta
philosophicalnaturalism(q.v.section2.e).(Still:onlyrarelyas
inGrahamandHorgan1994,whoadvocatewhattheycallPostAnalyticMetaphilosophydonaturalists
callthemselvespostAnalytic.)SomepostAnalyticphilosophersgofurther,inthattheytend,oftenunder
theinfluenceofWittgenstein,toattemptlesstosolveandmoretodissolveorevendiscardphilosophical
problems.EachofPutnam,McDowellandRortyhashisownversionofthisapproach,andeachsinglesout
fordissolutiontheproblemofhowmindorlanguagerelatestotheworld.Athirdcharacteristicfeatureof
postAnalytic philosophy is the rejection of a certain kind of narrow professionalism. That sort of
professionalismispreoccupiedwithspecializedproblemsandtendstobeindifferenttobroadersocialand
cultural questions. One finds a break from such narrow professionalism in Cavell, in Rorty, in Bernard
Williams, and to an extent in Putnam (although also in such "public" Analytic philosophers as A. C.
Grayling).
Moreover,innovativeorheterodoxstyleissomethingofacriterionofpostAnalyticphilosophy.Onethinks
hereespeciallyofCavell.ButonemightmentionMcDowelltoo.Now,onecriticofMcDowellfaultshimfor
puttingbarriersofjargon,convolution,andmetaphorbeforethereaderhardlylessformidablethanthose
characteristicallyerectedbyhisGermanluminaries(Wright2002:157).Thecriticismbetokensthewayin
postAnalytic philosophers are often regarded, namely as apostates. PostAnalytic philosophers tend to
defend themselves by arguing either that Analytic philosophy needs to reconnect itself with the rest of
culture, and/or that Analytic philosophy has itself shown the untenability of some of its most central
assumptionsandevenperhapscometotheendofitsownprojectthedeadend(Putnam1985:28).
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4.ContinentalMetaphilosophy
a.PhenomenologyandRelatedCurrents
i.HusserlsPhenomenology
Phenomenology,aspursuedbyEdmundHusserldescribesphenomena.Phenomenaarethingsinthemanner

in which they appear. That definition becomes more appreciable through the technique through which
Husserlmeanstogainaccesstophenomena.Husserlcallsthattechniquetheepoche(atermthatowesto
Ancient Greek skepticism). He designates the perspective that it achieves the perspective that presents
one with phenomena the phenomenological reduction. The epoche consists in suspending the natural
attitude(anothertermofHusserlscoinage).Thenaturalattitudecomprisesassumptionsaboutthecauses,
the composition, and indeed the very existence of that which one experiences. The epoche, Husserl says,
temporarily brackets these assumptions, or puts them out of play allowing one to describe the world
solelyinthemannerinwhichitappears.Thatdescriptionisphenomenology.
Phenomenology means to have epistemological and ontological import. Husserl presents the
epistemological import to begin with that in a provocative way: If positivism is tantamount to an
absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the positive, that is to say, on what can be seized
upon originaliter, then we are the genuine positivists (Husserl 1931: 20). The idea that Husserl shares
with the positivists is that experience is the sole source of knowledge. Hence Husserls principle of all
principles:whateverpresentsitselfinintuitioninprimordialform[...]issimplytobeacceptedasitgives
itselfouttobe,butobviouslyonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitthuspresentsitself(Husserl1931:section
24). However, and like various other philosophers (including William James and the German Idealists),
Husserl thinks that experience extends beyond what empiricism makes of it. For one thing and this
reveals phenomenologys intended ontological import experience can be of essences. A technique of
imaginativevariationsimilartoDescartes'procedurewiththewax(see Descartes,section4)allowsoneto
distinguishthatwhichisessentialtoaphenomenonand,thereby,tomakediscoveriesaboutthenatureof
such phenomena as numbers and material things. Now, one might think that this attempt to derive
essencesfromphenomena(fromthingsinthemannerinwhichtheyappear)mustbeidealist.Indeedand
despite the fact that he used the phrase to the things themselves! as his slogan Husserl did avow a
transcendental idealism, whereby transcendental subjectivity [...] constitutes sense and being (Husserl
1999:section41).However,theexactcontentofthatidealismi.e.theexactmeaningofthephrasejust
quotedisamatterofsomeinterpretativedifficulty.Itisevidentenough,though,thatHusserl'sidealism
involves (at least) the following ideas. Experience necessarily involves various subjective achievements.
Those achievements comprise various operations that Husserl calls syntheses and which one might
(althoughhereoneencountersdifficulties)call'mental'.Moreover,theachievementsareattributabletoa
subjectivitythatdeservesthename'transcendental'inthat(1)theachievementsarenecessaryconditions
for our experience, (2) the subjectivity at issue is transcendent in this sense: it exists outside the natural
world (and, hence, cannot entirely be identified with what we normally construe as the mind). (On the
notionofthetranscendental,seefurtherKantstranscendentalidealismandtranscendentalarguments.)
Husserlarguedthatthedenialoftranscendentalsubjectivitydecapitatesphilosophy(Husserl1970:9).He
callssuchphilosophyobjectivismandassertsthatitconfinesitselftotheuniverseofmerefactsandallies
itselfwiththesciences.(ThusHusserlemployspositivismandnaturalismastermswithsimilarimportto
objectivism.)Butobjectivismcannotevenunderstandscienceitself,accordingtoHusserlforscience,he
maintains, presupposes the achievements of transcendental subjectivity. Further, objectivism can make
little sense of the human mind, of humanitys place within nature, and of values. These latter failings
contribute to a perceived meaninglessness to life and a fall into hostility toward the spirit and into
barbarity(Husserl1970:9).Consequently,andbecauseseriousinvestigationofscience,mind,ourplacein
nature,andofvaluesbelongstoEuropesveryraisondtre,objectivismhelpstocausenothinglessthana
crisisofEuropeanhumanity(Husserl1970:299).Thereisevensomesuggestion(inthesametext)that
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objectivismpreventsusfromexperiencingpeopleaspeople:asmorethanmerethings.
The foregoing shows that phenomenology has a normative aspect. Husserl did make a start upon a
systematicmoralphilosophy.Butphenomenologyisintrinsicallyethical(D.Smith2003:46),inthatthe
phenomenologisteschewsprejudiceandseekstodivinemattersforhimorherself.
ii.ExistentialPhenomenology,Hermeneutics,Existentialism
Husserlhopedtofoundaunifiedandcollaborativemovement.Hishopewaspartiallyfulfilled.Heidegger,
Sartre and MerleauPonty count as heirs to Husserl because (or mainly because) they believed in the
philosophical primacy of description of experience. Moreover, many of the themes of postHusserlian
phenomenologyarepresentalready,onewayorother,inHusserl.Butthereareconsiderable,andindeed
meta
philosophical,differencesbetweenHusserlandhissuccessors.Themeta
philosophicaldifferencescan
be unfolded from this: Heidegger, Sartre and MerleauPonty adhere to an existential phenomenology.
Existentialphenomenologyhastwosenses.Eachconstrualmattersmeta
philosophically.
In one sense, existential phenomenology denotes phenomenology that departs from Husserls self
proclaimedpureortranscendentalphenomenology.AtissuehereisthisviewofHusserls:itislogically
possiblethataconsciousnesscouldsurvivetheannihilationofeverythingelse(Husserl1999:section13).
Existentialphenomenologistsdenytheview.Fortheyacceptakindofexternalismwherebyexperience,or
theself,iswhatitisandnotjustcausallybydintoftheworldthatisexperienced.(Onexternalism,see
PhilosophyofLanguage,section4aand MentalCausation,section3.b.ii.)Variousslogansandtermswithinthe
workexistentialphenomenologistsexpresstheseviews.HeideggersBeingandTime presents the human
mode of being as beingintheworld and speaks not of the subject or consciousness but of Dasein
(existence or, more literally, beingthere). MerleauPonty asserts that we are through and through
compounded of relationships with the world, destined to the world (2002: xixv). In Being and
Nothingness,Sartreparenthesiz[es]thewordofwhenreferring,say,toconsciousness(of)atable[in
order]torejectthereificatoryideaofconsciousnessassomethingorcontainerdistinctfromtheworldin
themidstofwhichweareconscious(Cooper1999:201).
Existential phenomenology, so construed, has meta
philosophical import because it affects philosophical
(phenomenological) method. Being and Nothingness holds that the inseparability of consciousness from
theobjectsofconsciousnessruinsHusserlsmethodofepoche(Sartre1989:partone,chapteroneCerbone
2006:1989).MerleauPontymaynotgoasfar.HisPhenomenologyofPerceptionhasitthat,becausewe
aredestinedtotheworld,Themostimportantlessonofthereductionistheimpossibilityofacomplete
reduction (2002: xv). But the interpretation of this remark is debated (see J Smith 2005). At any rate
though this is one of the things that an interpreter of his stance on the reduction has to reckon with
MerleauPonty found a greater philosophical use for the empirical sciences than did Husserl. Heidegger
was more inclined to keep the sciences in their place. But he too partly because of his existential
(externalist) conception of phenomenology differed from Husserl on the epoche. Again, however,
Heideggersprecisepositionishardtodiscern.(Caputo1977describestheinterpretativeproblemandtries
tosolveit.)Still,Heideggersprincipalinnovationinphilosophicalmethodhaslittletodowiththeepoche.
Thisarticleconsidersthatinnovationbeforeturningtotheothersenseofexistentialphenomenology.
Heideggers revisions of phenomenological method place him within the hermeneutic tradition.
Hermeneutics is the art or practice of interpretation. The hermeneutic tradition (sometimes just called
hermeneutics) is a tradition that gives great philosophical weight to an interpretative mode of
understanding.MembersofthistraditionincludeFriedrichSchleiermacher(17681834),WilhelmDilthey
(18331911) and, after Heidegger, HansGeorg Gadamer (19002002) and Paul Ricur. Heidegger is
hermeneutical in that he holds the following. All understanding is interpretative in that it always has
preconceptions. One has genuine understanding insofar as one has worked through the relevant
preconceptions.Onestartswithapreliminary,generalviewofsomethingthisgeneralviewcanguideusto
insights, which then lead should lead to a revised general view, and so on (Polt 1999: 98). This
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hermeneutic circle has a special import for phenomenology. For (according to Heidegger) our initial
understanding of our relations to the world involves some particularly misleading and stubborn
preconceptions, some of which derive from philosophical tradition. Heidegger concludes that what is
necessary is a destructiona critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must
necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the [experiential, phenomenological] sources from
which they were drawn (Heidegger 1988: 22f.). But Heideggers position may be insufficiently, or
inconsistently,hermeneutical.ThethoughtisthatHeideggersownviewsentailathesisthat,subsequently,
Gadamerpropoundedexplicitly.Namely:Theveryideaofadefinitiveinterpretation[ofanything]seemsto
be intrinsically contradictory (Gadamer 1981: 105). This thesis, which Gadamer reaches by conceiving
understanding as inherently historical and linguistic, bodes badly for Heideggers aspiration to provide
definitive ontological answers (an aspiration that he possessed at least as much as Husserl did). Yet
arguably(compareMulhall1996:1925)thatveryresultgelswithanotherofHeideggersgoals,namely,to
helphisreaderstoachieveauthenticity(onwhichmoremomentarily).
Thesecondmeaningorconstrualofexistentialphenomenologyisexistentialism.GabrielMarcelinvented
thatlattertermforideasheldbySartreandbySimonedeBeauvoir.Subsequently,Heidegger,MerleauPonty,
Camus,KarlJaspers,Kafka,andothers,gotplacedunderthelabel.Atermusedsobroadlyishardtodefine
precisely.Butthefollowingfivetheseseachhaveagoodclaimtobecalledexistentialist.Indeed:eachof
the major existential phenomenologists held some version of at least most of the theses (although, while
Sartrecametoacceptthelabelexistentialist,Heideggerdidnot).
1. Oneslifedetermineseveranewthepersonthatoneis.
2. Oneisfreetodetermineoneslifeand,hence,onesidentity.
3. Thereisnoobjectivemoralorderthatcandetermineonesvalues.Oneencountersvalueswithintheworld(indeed,
oneencountersthemboundupwithfacts)butnothingrationallycompelsdecisionbetweenvalues.
4. 13perturb.Henceatendencytowardstheinauthenticity(Heideggersterm)orbadfaith(Sartresterm)which
consistsinthedenialorrefusalofthosepointsoftenbylettingsocietydetermineonesvaluesand/oridentity.
5. Therelationtoonesdeathaswellastocertaintypesofanxietyandabsurdityorgroundlessnessisimportant
fordisclosingpossibilitiesofauthenticexistence.

These theses indicate that for the existentialist philosophy must be practical. It is not, though, that
existentialismputsethicsattheheartofphilosophy.Thatisbecauseafurthercentralexistentialistideais
that noone, even in principle, can legislate values for another. True, Sartre declared freedom to be the
foundationofallvalues(Sartre2007:61)andhewroteNotebooksforanEthics.Accordingtotheethicin
question,towillonesownfreedomistowillthefreedomofothers.Butinnofurtherwaydoesthatethic
makemuchclaimtoobjectivity.Instead,muchofitturnsuponthegoodfaiththatconsistsinnotdenying
thefactofonesfreedom.
Whatofpolitics?LittleinHusserlfitsaconventionalunderstandingofpoliticalphilosophy.Sartrecameto
holdthathisexistentialethicsmadesenseonlyforasocietythathadbeenemancipatedbyMarxism(Sartre
1963: xxvxxvi). MerleauPonty developed a phenomenologically informed political philosophy and
disagreedwithSartreonconcretepoliticalquestionsandonthemannerinwhichthephilosophershouldbe
engaged(DiproseandReynolds:ch.8CarmenandHansen2005:ch.12).SartreandMerleauPontygive
onetothink,also,abouttheideaofartisticpresentationsofphilosophy(DiproseandReynolds:ch.s9and
18). What of Heidegger? He was, of course, a Nazi, although for how long how long after he led the
NazificationofFreiburgUniversityisdebated,asistherelationbetweenhisNazismandhisphilosophy
(Wolin 1993 Young 1997 see also section 4.c below). Now the Heidegger case raises, or makes more
urgent, some general meta
philosophical issues. Should philosophers get involved in politics? And was
GilbertRylerighttosayasallegedly,aproposHeidegger,hedidsay(Cohen2002:337n.21),thatashit
fromtheheelsupcantdogoodphilosophy?
The foregoing material indicates a sense in which phenomenology is its own best critic. Indeed, some
reactions against phenomenology and existentialism as such against the whole or broad conception of
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philosophyembodiedtheyrepresentowetoapostatesortoheterodoxphilosopherswithinthosecamps.
Wesawthat,ineffect,Sartrecametothinkthatexistentialismwasinsufficientforpolitics.Infact,hecame
to hold this: Every philosophy is practical, even the one which at first sight appears to be the most
contemplative [. . . Every philosophy is] a social and political weapon (Sartre 1960: 5). Levinas accused
phenomenologistspriortohimselfofignoringanabsolutelyfundamentalethicaldimensiontoexperience
(see Davis 1996). Derrida resembles Sartre and Levinas, in that, like them, he developed his own
metaphilosophy (treated below) largely via internal criticism of phenomenology. Another objection to
phenomenologyisthatitcollapsesphilosophyintopsychologyoranthropology.(Husserlhimselfcriticized
Heideggerinthatway.)Ratherdifferently,somephilosophersholdthat,despiteitsattitudetonaturalism,
phenomenologyneedstobenaturalized(Petitotetal1999).Astoexistentialism,ithasbeencriticizedfor
ruining ethics and for propounding an outlook that is not only an intellectual mistake but also and
Heideggeristakenastheprimeexhibitpoliticallydangerous(seeAdorno1986andch.8ofWolin).

b.CriticalTheory
CriticalTheorynamesthesocalledFrankfurtSchoolthetraditionassociatedwiththeInstituteofSocial
Research(Institutfrsozialforschung)whichwasfoundedinFrankfurtin1924.(SeeLiteraryTheorysection1
forawiderorlesshistoricalnotionofCriticalTheory.)AccordingtoCriticalTheory,thepointofphilosophy
isthatitcancontributetoacriticalandemancipatorysocialtheory.Thespecificationofthatideadepends
uponwhichCriticalTheoryisatissueCriticalTheoryisanextendedandsomewhatdiversetradition.Its
firstgenerationincludedTheodorAdorno,MaxHorkheimerandHerbertMarcuse.Mostofthemembersof
thisgenerationhadJewishbackgrounds.Forthatreason,andbecausetheInstitutewasMarxist,thefirst
generationfledtheNazis.TheInstitutereopenedinFrankfurtin1950.Withinthesecondgeneration,the
mostprominentfiguresareJrgenHabermasandAlbrechtWellmer.Withinthethird,AxelHonnethisthe
best known. There is a fourth generation too. Moreover, there were stages or phases within the first
generation (Dubiel 1985). To wit: materialism, 19301937 Critical Theory, 19371940 critique of
instrumentalreason,19401945andaprotostagewhereinCriticalTheorywasmoretraditionallyMarxist
thanitwassubsequently.WhatfollowscanconsideronlysomeoftheseversionsofCriticalTheory.
i.CriticalTheoryandtheCritiqueofInstrumentalReason
The term the critical theory of society (Critical Theory for short) was introduced only in 1937. It was
introduced by Horkheimer, who was director of the Institute at the time. He introduced it partly from
prudence.By1937theInstitutewasintheUnitedStates,whereinitwasunwisefortheInstitutetocallitself
Marxist or even to continue to call itself materialist. But prudence was not the only motive for the new
name. Horkheimer meant to clarify and shape the enterprise he was leading. According to Horkheimer
(1947), Critical Theory is social theory that is, first of all, broad. It treats society as a whole or in all its
aspects. That breadth, together with the idea that society is more independent of the economy than
traditionalMarxismrecognizes,meansthatCriticalTheorymustbeinterdisciplinary.(Theexpertiseofthe
firstgeneration encompassed economics, sociology, law, politics, psychology, aesthetics and philosophy.)
Next, Critical Theory is emancipatory. It aims at a society that is rational and free and which meets the
needsofall.ItistothatendthatCriticalTheoryiscritical.Itmeanstorevealhowcontemporarycapitalist
society,initseconomyanditscultureandintheirinterplay,deceivesanddominates.
Critical Theory so defined involves philosophy in several ways. (1) From its inception, it adapted
philosophical ideas, especially from German Idealism, in order to analyze society. Nonetheless, and
followingLukcs,(2)CriticalTheorythoughtthatsomepartsofsomephilosophiescouldbeunderstoodas
unknowingreflectionofsocialconditions.(3)Philosophytendstoenternotasthenormativeunderpinning
ofthetheorybutinjustificationforthelackofsuchunderpinning.Horkheimerandcompanylittlespecified
therationalsocietytheysoughtandlittledefendedthenormsbywhichtheyindictedcontemporarysociety.
WithMarx,theyheldthatoneshouldnotlegislateforwhatshouldbethefreecreationofthefuture.With
Hegel,theyheldthat,anyway,knowledgeisconditionedbyitstimeandplace.Theyheldalso,andagainin
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Hegelianfashion,thattherearenormsthatexist(largelyunactualized)withincapitalismnormsofjustice
and freedom and so forth which suffice to indict capitalism. (4) Critical Theory conceives itself as
philosophys inheritor. Philosophy, especially postKantian German Idealism, had tried to overcome
varioustypesofalienation.Butonlytheachievementofatrulyfreesocietycouldactuallydothat,according
to Critical Theory. Note lastly here that, at least after 1936, Critical Theory denied both that ostensibly
Marxistregimesweresuchandthatemancipationwasanywherenearlyathand.Consequently,thisstageof
Critical Theory tended to aim less at revolution and more at propagating awareness of the faults of
capitalismand(toalesserextent)ofactuallyexistingsocialism.
Thereisasenseinwhichphilosophyloomslarger(orevenlarger)inthenextphaseofthefirstgeneration
of Critical Theory. For this phase of the moment propounded that which we might call (with a nod to
Lyotard)a(very!)grandnarrative.AdornoandHorkheimeraretheprinciplefiguresofthisphase,andtheir
coauthoredDialecticofEnlightenmentitsmaintext.ThattextconnectsenlightenmenttothatwhichMax
Weberhadcalledthedisenchantmentoftheworld.Todisenchanttheworldistorenderitcalculable.The
Dialectic traces disenchantment from the historical Enlightenment back to the protorationality of myth
andforwardtomodernindustrialcapitalism(toitseconomy,psychology,society,politics,andeventoits
philosophies).Weberthoughtthatdisenchantmenthadyieldedaworldwhereinindividualsweretrapped
within an iron cage (his term) of economy and bureaucracy. Here is the parallel idea in the Dialectic.
Enlightenment has reverted to myth, in that the calculated world of contemporary capitalism is ruled, as
themythicworldwasruled,byimpersonalandbrutishforces.FurtheranalysisintheDialecticintroduces
instrumental reason. That term owes to Horkheimers Eclipse of Reason, which is something of a
popularizationoftheDialectic.TheDialecticitselfspeaksofsubjectivereason.Disenchantmentproduces
a merely instrumental reason in that it pushes choice among ends outside of the purview of rationality.
Thatsaid,theresultHorkheimerandAdornoargueisakindofinstrumentalizationofends.Endsget
replaced, as a kind of default, by things previously regarded merely instrumentally. Thus, at least or
especiallybythetimeofcontemporarycapitalism,lifecomestobegovernedbysuchmeansbecomeends
asprofit,technicalexpertise,systematization,distraction,andselfpreservation.
DotheseideasreallyamounttoCriticalTheory?Perhapstheyaretooabstracttocountasinterdisciplinary.
Worse:theymightseemtoexcludeanyorientationtowardsemancipation.True,commentatorsshowthat
Adornoofferedmorepracticalguidancethanwaspreviouslythought.Also,firstgenerationCriticalTheory,
including the critique of instrumental reason, did inspire the 1960s student movement. However: while
Marcuse responded to that movement with some enthusiasm, Adorno and Horkheimer did not. Perhaps
they could not. For though they fix their hopes upon reason (upon enlightenment thinking), they indict
thatverysamething.Theywrite(2002:xvi):
Wehavenodoubtandhereinliesourpetitioprincipiithatfreedominsocietyisinseparablefrom
enlightenment thinking. We believe we have perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very
conceptofthatthinking,nolessthantheconcretehistoricalforms,theinstitutionsofsocietywith
whichitisintertwined,alreadycontainsthegermoftheregression.
ii.Habermas
HabermasisaprincipalsourceofthecriticismsofAdornoandHorkheimerjustpresented.(Heexpresses
thelastofthosecriticismsbyspeakingofaperformativecontradiction.)Nonetheless,orexactlybecause
hethinksthathispredecessorshavefailedtomakegoodupontheconception,HabermaspursuesCritical
Theory as Horkheimer defined it, which is to say, as broad, interdisciplinary, critical, and emancipatory
socialtheory.
Habermas' Critical Theory comprises, at least centrally, his critique of functionalist reason, which is a
reworking of his predecessors critique of instrumental reason. The central thesis of the critique of
functionalistreasonisthatthesystemhascolonizedthelifeworld.Inordertounderstandthethesis,one
needs to understand not only the notions of system, lifeworld, and colonization but also the notion of
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communicative action and this being the most philosophical notion of the ensemble the notion of
communicativerationality.
Communicative action is action that issues from communicative rationality. Communicative rationality
consists,roughly,infreeandopendiscussion[ofsomeissue]byallrelevantpersons,withafinaldecision
beingdependentuponthestrengthofbetterargument,andneveruponanyformofcoercion(Edgar2006:
23).Thelifeworldcomprisesthoseareasoflifethatexhibitcommunicativeaction(or,weshallsee,which
could and perhaps should exhibit it). The areas at issue include the family, education, and the public
sphere. A system is a social domain wherein action is determined by more or less autonomous or
instrumental procedures rather than by communicative rationality. Habermas counts markets and
bureaucraciesasamongthemostsignificantsystems.Sothethesisthatthelifeworldhasbeencolonizedby
thesystemisthefollowingclaim.Theextensionofbureaucracyandmarketsintoareassuchasthefamily,
education,andthepublicspherepreventthosespheresfrombeinggovernedbyfreeandopendiscussion.
Habermasuseshiscolonizationthesistoexplainalienation,socialinstability,andtheimpoverishmentof
democracy. He maintains, further, that even systems cannot function if colonization proceeds beyond a
certainpoint.Thethinkingrunsthus.Partofthewayinwhichsystemsunderminecommunicativeactionis
by depleting resources (social, cultural and psychological) necessary for such action. But systems
themselves depend upon those resources. (Note that, sometimes, Habermas uses the term lifeworld to
refer to those resources themselves rather than to a domain that does or could exhibit communicative
action.) Still: Habermas makes it relatively clear that the colonization thesis is meant not only as
descriptivebutalsoasnormative.Forconsiderthefollowing.(1)Acritiqueasincritiqueoffunctional
reason is, at least in its modern usage, an indictment. (2) Habermas presents the creation of a
communicativelifeworldasessentialtothecompletionacompletionthathedeemsdesirableofwhat
he calls the unfinished project of modernity. (3) Habermas tells us (in his Theory of Communicative
Action,whichisthecentraltextforthecolonizationthesis)thathemeanstoprovidethenormativebasis
foracriticaltheoryofsociety.
HowfardoesHabermaswarrantthenormativity,whichistosay,showthatcolonizationisbad?Itishard
to be in favour of selfundermining societies. But (some degree of?) alienation might be thought a price
worthpayingforcertainachievementsandnoteveryoneadvocatesdemocracy(oratleastthesamedegree
ortypeofit).ButHabermasdoeshavethefollowingargumentforthebadnessofcolonization.Thereisa
normativecontentwithinlanguageitself,inthat[r]eachingunderstandingistheinherenttelosofhuman
speech and/but a colonized lifeworld, which by definition is not a domain of communicative action,
thwartsthattelos.(Habermas1992a:109andHabermas1984:287respectively.)
TheideathatlanguagehasacommunicativetelosisthecruxofHabermasthought.Foritiscentralbothto
hisphilosophyoflanguage(ortohissocalleduniversalpragmatics)andtohisethics.Toputthesecondof
thosepointsmoreaccurately:theideaofacommunicativetelosiscentraltohisrespectiveconceptionsof
bothethicsandmorality.Habermasunderstandsmoralitytobeamatterofnormsthataremainlynorms
of justice and which are in all cases universallybinding. Ethics, by contrast, is a matter of values, where
those values: express what is good for some individual or some group have no authority beyond the
individual or group concerned and are trumped by morality when they conflict with it. Habermas has a
principle,derivedfromaforementionedtelos,thatheappliestobothnormalnormsandethicalvalues.To
wit:anormorvalueisacceptableonlyifallthoseaffectedbyitcouldacceptitinreasonablerationaland
uncoerced discourse. This principle makes morality and ethics matters not for the philosopher but for
the discourse between citizens (Habermas 1992a: 158). (For more on Habermas moral philosophy his
discourseethics,asitisknownandonhispoliticalphilosophy,andalsoonthewaysinwhichthevarious
aspectsofhisthoughtfittogether,seeFinlayson2005.Note,too,thatinthetwentyfirstcenturyHabermas
hasturnedhisattentionto(1)thatwhichreligioncancontributetothepublicdiscourseofsecularstates
and(2)bioethics.)
Habermas denial that philosophers have special normative privileges is part of his general (meta)

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philosophical orientation. He calls that orientation postmetaphysical thinking. In rejecting metaphysics,


Habermasmeanstorejectnotonlyanormativeprivilegeforphilosophybutalsotheideathatphilosophy
can make claims about the world as a whole (Dews 1995: 209). Habermas connects postmetaphysical
thinking to something else too. He connects it to his rejection of that which he calls the philosophy of
consciousness.HabermasdetectsthephilosophyofconsciousnessinDescartes,inGermanIdealism,and
in much other philosophy besides. Seemingly a philosophy counts as a philosophy of consciousness, for
Habermas,justincaseitholdsthis:thehumansubjectapprehendstheworldinanessentiallyindividual
and nonlinguistic way. To take Habermas socalled communicative turn is to reject that view it is to
hold, instead, that human apprehension is at root both linguistic and intersubjective. Habermas believes
that Wittgenstein, Mead, and others prefigured and even somewhat accomplished this paradigm shift
(Habermas1992a:173,194).
Habermasianpostmetaphysicalthinkinghasbeenchargedbothwithretainingobjectionablemetaphysical
elements and with abandoning too many of philosophy's aspirations. (The second criticism is most
associatedwithKarlOttoApel,whononethelesshascooperatedwithHabermasindevelopingdiscourse
ethics. On the first criticism, see for instance Geuss 1981: 94f.) Habermas has been charged, also, with
makingCriticalTheoryuncritical.Theideahereisthis.Inallowingthatitisalrightforsomemarketsand
bureaucracies to be systems, Habermas allows too much. (A related but less meta
philosophical issue,
touchedonabove,iswhetherHabermashasanadequatenormativebasisforitssocialcriticisms.Thisissue
is an instance of the socalled normativity problem in Critical Theory, on which see Freyenhagen 2008
Finlayson2009.)
Herearetwofurthermeta
philosophicalissues.(1)Isitreallytenableordesirableforphilosophytobeas
intertwined with social science as Critical Theory wishes it to be? (For an affirmative answer, see Geuss
2008.) (2) Intelligibility seems particularly important for any thinker who means to reduce the tension
betweenhisowninsightandtheoppressedhumanityinwhoseservicehethinks(Horkheimer1937:221)
but Critical Theory has been criticized as culpably obscure and even as mystificatory (see especially the
piecesbyPopperandAlbertinAdornoetal1976).Adornohasbeentheprincipaltargetforsuchcriticisms
(andAdornodiddefendhisstyleseeJoll2009).YetHabermas,too,isveryhardtointerpret.Thatispartly
becausethisphilosopherofcommunicationexhibitsanunbelievablecompulsiontosynthesize(Kndler
Bunte in Habermas 1992a: 124), which is to say, to combine seemingly disparate and arguably
incompatibleideas.

c.TheLaterHeidegger
ThelaterHeideggeristheHeideggerof,roughly,the1940sonwards.(Somedifferencesbetweenthetwo
Heideggers will emerge below. But hereafter normally Heidegger will mean the later Heidegger.)
Heideggers difficult, radical, and influential metaphilosophy holds that: philosophy is metaphysics
metaphysics involves a fundamental mistake metaphysics is complicit in modernitys ills metaphysics is
enteringintoitsendandthinkingshouldreplacemetaphysics/philosophy.
Heideggers criterion of metaphysics is the identification of being with beings. Metaphysics seeks
somethingdesignatableasbeinginthatmetaphysicsseeksaprincipleorgroundofbeings.Metaphysics
identifiesbeingwithbeingsinthatitseeksthatgroundinsomethingthatititselfabeing,oracause,or
property, of some being(s). Thus, inter alia, the Idea in Plato, Aristotelian or Cartesian or Lockean
substance,variousconstrualsofGod,theLeibnizianmonad,Husserliansubjectivity,theNietzscheanwill
topower.Philosophyiscoextensivewithmetaphysics in that all philosophy since Plato involves such a
projectofgrounding.
NowHeideggerhimselfholdsthatbeingshaveadependenceuponBeing.YetthisBeingisnotGodandnot
a cosmic ground (Heidegger 1994: 234) nor any being or thing whatsoever. This distinction is the
ontologicaldifferencethedifferentiationbetweenbeingandbeings(Heidegger1982:17).Wemayputthe
contentionthus:pacemetaphysics/philosophy,being(dasSeinsometimestranslatedBeing,capitalized)
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isnonontic.Butwhat,then,isbeing?ItmaybethatHeideggeremploysdasSeinintwosenses(Young
2002:ch.1,Philipse1998:section13bcompareforinstanceCaputo1993:30).(1)Beingisthatbydintof
whichbeingsarerevealedorunconcealed,thatthroughwhichtheycometopresenceatallandinthe
particularwaystheydo.(AllthesetermsareHeideggers,orrathertranslationsofhisterms.)Sobeing is
somesortofconditionforbeingsbutnotanonticone.(2)Beingisthatwhichsendsordestinesbeing
in sense 1. It is that from which beings are revealed, the reservoir of the nonyetuncovered, the un
uncovered (Heidegger 1971: 60). The (YoungPhilipse) device of using uncapitalized being for the first
senseofdasSeinandcapitalizedBeingfortheotherisadoptedhere.(Wherebothsensesareinplay,this
articleresortssometimestotheGermandasSein.Note,however,thatthisdistinctionbetweentwosenses
ofHeideggerianSeinisinterpretativelycontroversial.)
In trying to understand the notion of being (uncapitalized), it helps to recall a view that persists into
Heideggerslaterworkfromhisearlierphenomenologicalperiod.[P]erceptionisalwaystheperceptionofa
meaningful being everything we encounter appears as a specific kind of thing (Braver 2009: 84). In
tryingtounderstandthenotionofBeing,ithelpstonotethatHeideggermeanstostressthefollowingpoint
(a point that perhaps reverses a tendency in the early Heidegger). Humanity does not wholly determine
howbeingsareunconcealed.Nevertheless,itmaybeamistaketoseekanexactspecificationoftheideasat
issue. For Heidegger may not really mean das Sein (in either sense) to explain anything. He may mean
insteadtostressthemysteriousnessofthefactthatbeingsareaccessibletousintheformthattheyareand,
indeed,atall.
Heideggerdoespositepochsofbeing,whichistosay,ahistoricalseriesofontologicalregimes(andhere
liesanotherdifferencebetweentheearlierandthelaterHeidegger).Theseriesrunsthus:(1)theancient
Greek understanding of being, with which Heidegger associates the word physis (2) the Medieval
Christian understanding of being, whereby beings (except God and artifacts) are divinely created things
(3)themodernunderstandingofbeingasresource(onwhichmorebelow).However,sometimesHeidegger
correlatesepochstoalonglistofmetaphysicalsystems.Thustheideaofahistoryofbeingasmetaphysics
(Heidegger2003:65).Thathistory,likethesimplertripartitescheme,doesnotmeantobeahistorymerely
ofconceptionsofbeing.Itmeanstobealsoahistoryofontologicalconceptionsthemselves.ButHeidegger
holds that each metaphysic absolutizes its corresponding ontological regime (Young 2002: 29, 54, 68).
Eachmetaphysicoverlooksthefactthatatothertimesinotherepochsbeingscouldbeunconcealedin
otherways.
Heideggerallowsalsoforsomeontologicalheterogeneitywithinepochs.HereoneencountersHeideggers
notion of the thing (das Ding). Trees, hills, animals, jugs, bridges, and pictures can be Things in the
emphaticsenseatissue,butsuchThingsaremodestinnumber,comparedwiththecountlessobjects.A
Thing has a worlding being. It opens a world by gathering the fourfold (dasGeviert). The fourfold is a
unity of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. (All Heidegger 1971: 179ff.). Some of this conception is
actuallyfairlystraightforward.Heideggertriestoshowhowabridgecanbesointerwovenwithhumanlife
and thereby with other entities that, via the world that comprises those interrelations (a world not
identicalwithanyparticularbeing),thereisacodeterminationofidentitybetweentheThing(thebridge),
persons,andnumerousotherphenomena.
Butinmodernityontologicalvarietydiminishes.InmodernityThingsbecomemereobjects.Subsequently,
indeed,objectsthemselvestogetherwithhumanbeingsbecomemereresources.Tobearesource(or
standingreserve Bestand) is something that, unlike an object, is determined wholly by a network of
purposesintowhichweplaceit.HeideggersexamplesareahydroelectricpowerplantontheRhineandan
airplane, together with the electricity and fuel systems to which those artifacts are connected. Heidegger
associates resources with modern science and with the metaphysics of subjectivity within which (he
argues) modern science moves. That metaphysics,which tendstowards seeingman as the measureof all
things, is in fact metaphysics as such. For anthropocentrism is incipient in the very beginnings of
philosophy,blossomsinvariouslaterphilosophersincludingDescartesandKant,andreachesitsapogeein
Nietzsche, the extremity of whose anthropocentrism is the end of metaphysics (pleonastically: the
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metaphysicsofsubjectivity)inthesenseofitscompletionorfullunfolding.Thatendreflectsthereignof
resources.[T]heworldofcompletedmetaphysicscanbestringentlycalledtechnology(Heidegger2003:
82).However,inHeideggersfinalanalysistheubiquityofresourcesowesnottoscienceormetaphysicsbut
to a mode of revealing it owes to an epochal ontological regime that Heidegger calls Enframing.
Nonetheless, Heideggers considered view seems to be this: the right comportment could mitigate
Enframingandprepareforsomethingdifferentandbetter.
Whatthoughiswrongwiththerealbeingrevealedasresource?Enframingismonstrous(Heidegger1994:
321).ItismonstrousHeideggercontendsbecauseitisnihilism.NihilismisaforgetfulnessofdasSein,a
Seinsvergessenheit.Somesuchforgetfulnessisnighinevitable.Weareinterestedinbeingsastheypresent
themselves to us. So we overlook the conditions of that presentation, namely, being and Being. But
Enframing represents a more thoroughgoing form of forgetfulness. The hegemony of resources makes it
especially hard to conceive that beings could be otherwise, which is to say, to conceive that there is
something called Being that could yield different regimes of being. In fact, Enframing actively denies
being/Being.ThatisbecauseEnframing,orthemetaphysics/sciencethatcorrespondstoit,proceedsasif
humanitywerethemeasureofallthingsandhenceasifbeing,orthatwhichgrantsbeingindependentlyof
us(Being),werenothing.Suchnihilismsoundsbearable.ButHeideggerlaysatitsdooranimpoverishment
ofculture,adeepkindofhomelessness,andthedevaluationofthehighestvalues(seeYoung2002:ch.2
andpassim).Heideggergoessofarastotracetheeventsofworldhistoryinthis[thetwentieth]centuryto
Seinsvergessenheit(HeideggerinWolin1993:69).
Heideggersresponsetonihilismisthinking(Denken).Thisthinkingisakindofthoughtfulquestioning.
ItsobjectthatwhichitthinksaboutcanbethepreSocraticideasfromwhichphilosophydeveloped,or
philosophyshistory,orThings,orart.Whateveritsobject,thinkingalwaysinvolvesrecognitionthatitis
dasSein,albeitinsomeinterplaywithhumanity,whichdetermineshowbeingsare.Indeed,Heideggerian
thinking involves wonder and gratitude in the face of das Sein. Heidegger uses Meister Eckharts notion of
releasementtoelaborateuponsuchthinking.Theidea(prefigured,infact,inHeideggersearlierwork)is
ofnonimpositionalcomportmenttowardsbeingswhichletsbeingstobewhattheyare.Thatcomportment
grant[s]usthepossibilityofdwellingintheworldinatotallydifferentway.Itpromisesanewgroundand
anewfoundationuponwhichwecanstandandendureintheworldoftechnologywithoutbeingimperiled
byit(Heidegger1966:55).Heideggercallsthedwellingatissuepoeticandonewayinwhichhespecifies
it is via various poets. Moreover, some of Heideggers own writing is semipoetic. A small amount of it
actuallyconsistsofpoems.Soitisnotentirelysurprisingtoencounterthisclaim,whichHeideggermade
whenhestillcountedhimselfaphilosopher:Allphilosophicalthinking[...]isinitselfpoetic(Heidegger
1991,vol.2:73).ThatclaimisconnectedtothecentralitythatHeideggergivestolanguage,acentralitythat
is summed up (a little gnomically) in the statement that language is the house of das Sein (Heidegger
1994:217).
Heideggerian thinking has been attacked as (some mixture of) irrationalist, quietist, reactionary, and
authoritarian(seeforexampleAdorno1973andHabermas1987b:ch.6).Arelatedobjectionisthat,though
Heidegger claimed to leave theology alone, what he produced was an incoherent reworking of religion
(Haar1993Philipse1998).Ofthemoreorlesssecularor(inCaputosterm)demythologizedconstrualsof
Heidegger,manyaresympatheticand,amongthose,manyfastenuponsuchtopicsastechnology,nihilism,
and dwelling (Borgmann 1984, Young 2002: ch.s 79 Feenberg 1999: ch. 8). Other secular admirers
including, notably, Rorty and Derrida concentrate upon Heideggers attempt to interrogate the entire
philosophicaltradition.

d.Derrida'sPostStructuralism
Structuralismwasaninternationaltrendinlinguistics,literarytheory,anthropology,politicaltheory,and
otherdisciplines.Itsoughttoexplainphenomena(sounds,tropes,behaviors,norms,beliefs...)lessviathe
phenomena themselves, or via their genesis, and more via structures that the phenomena exist within or
instantiate. The poststructuralists applied this structural priority to philosophy. They are post
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structuralistslessbecausetheycameafterstructuralismandmorebecause,inappropriatingstructuralism,
they distanced themselves from the determinism and scientism it often involved (Dews 1987: 14). The
poststructuralists included Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard and Lacan (and sometimes poststructuralism is
associated with postmodernism see Malpas 2003: 711). Each of these thinkers (perhaps excepting
Lacan)ishighlymeta
philosophical.Butattentionisrestrictedtothebestknownandmostcontroversialof
thepoststructuralists,namely,JacquesDerrida.
Derrida practiced deconstruction (Dconstruire, la Dconstruction Derrida adapts the notion of
deconstruction from Heidegger's idea of 'destruction', on which latter see section 4.a.ii above).
Deconstructionisatextualoperation(Derrida1987:3).Thenotionoftexthereisabroadone.Itextends
from written texts to conceptions, discourses, and even practices. Nevertheless, Derrida's early work
concentrates upon actual texts and, more often than not, philosophical ones. The reason Derrida puts
operation (textual operation) within scarequotes is that he holds that deconstruction is no method.
That in turn is for two reasons (each of which should become clearer below). First, the nature of
deconstructionvarieswiththatwhichisdeconstructed.Second,thereisasenseinwhichtextsdeconstruct
themselves. Nonetheless: deconstruction, as a practice, reveals such alleged selfdeconstruction and that
practicedoeshaveadegreeofregularity.Thepracticeofdeconstructionhasseveralstages.(Inpresenting
thosestages,textistakeninthenarrowsense.Moreover,itispresumedthatineachcaseasingletextis,
atleastcentrally,atissue.)
Deconstructionbeginswithacommentary(Derrida1976:158)withafaithfulandinteriorreadingofa
text(Derrida1987:6).Withinorviasuchcommentary,thefocusisuponmetaphysicaloppositions.Derrida
understandsmetaphysicsasthemetaphysicsofpresence(anothernotionadaptedfromHeidegger)and
an opposition belongs to metaphysics (pleonastically, the metaphysics of presence) just in case: (i) it
containsaprivilegedtermandasubordinatedtermand(ii)theprivilegedtermhastodowithpresence.
Presenceispresencetoconsciousnessand/orthetemporalpresent.Theoppositionsatissueincludenot
onlypresenceabsence(construedineitherofthetwowaysjustindicated)butalso,andamongothers(and
with the term that is privileged within each opposition given first) these: normal/abnormal,
standard/parasitic,fulfilled/void,serious/nonserious,literal/nonliteral(Derrida1988:93).
Thenextstepindeconstructionistoshowthatthetextunderminesitsownmetaphysicaloppositions.That
is:theprivilegedtermsrevealthemselvestobelessprivilegedoverthesubordinatetermslessprivileged
visvispresence,lesssimple,intact,normal,pure,standard,selfidentical(Derrida1988:93)thanthey
givethemselvesouttobe.HereisacommonwayinwhichDerridatriestoestablishthepoint.Hetriesto
showthataprivilegedtermessentiallydependsupon,orsharessomecrucialfeature(s)with,itssupposed
subordinate. One of Derridas deconstructions of Husserl can serve as an example. Husserl distinguishes
mental life, which he holds to be inherently intentional (inherently characterized by aboutness) from
language,whichisintentionalonlyviacontingentassociationwithsuchstates.TherebyHusserlprivileges
the mental over the linguistic. However: Husserls view of the temporality of experience entails that the
presence he makes criterial for intrinsic intentionality a certain presence of meanings to the mind is
alwayspartiallyabsent.OrsoDerridaargues(Derrida,section4).AsecondstrategyofDerridasistoapply
adistinctionontoitselfreflexivelyandthusshowthatititselfisimbuedwiththedisfavoredterm(Landau,
1992/1993: 1899). For example, Derrida shows that when Aristotle and other philosophers discuss the
nature of metaphors (and thereby the distinction between metaphors and nonmetaphors), they use
metaphors in the discussions themselves (idem) and so fail in their attempts to relegate or denigrate
metaphor.Afurtherstrategyinvolvesthenotionofundecidability(seeDerrida,section5).
A third stage or aspect of deconstruction is, one can say, less negative or more productive (and Derrida
himself calls this the productive moment of deconstruction). Consider Derridas deconstruction(s) of the
opposition between speech and writing. Derrida argues, initially, as follows. Speech and even thought,
understoodasakindofinnerspeechshareswithwritingfeaturesthathaveoftenbeenusedtopresent
writing as only a poor descendent of speech. Those features include being variously interpretable and
being derivative of something else. But there is more. Derrida posits something, which he calls archi
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criture, archewriting, which is fundamental to signifying processes in general, a writing that is the
conditionofallformsofexpression,whetherscriptural,vocal,orotherwise(Johnson1993:66).Indeed:as
well as being a condition of possibility, archewriting is, in Derridas frequent and arresting phrase, a
conditionofitsimpossibility.Archewritingestablishesorrevealsalimittoanykindofexpression(alimit,
namely, to the semantic transparency, and the selfsufficiency, of expressions). Other deconstructions
proceed similarly. A hierarchical opposition is undermined a new term is produced through a kind of
generalizationofthepreviouslysubordinatetermandthenewtermsuchassupplement,traceandthe
neologismdiffrance(Derrida,section3.ce)representsaconditionofpossibilityandimpossibilityfor
theoppositioninquestion.
What is the status of these conditions? Sometimes Derrida calls them quasitranscendental. That
encouragesthisidea:herewehaveanaccountnotjustofconceptsbutofthingsorphenomena.YetDerrida
himselfdoesnotquitesaythat.Hedeniesthatwecanmakeanysimpledistinctionbetweentextandworld,
between conceptual system and phenomena. Such may be part of the thrust of the (in)famous
pronouncement,Thereisnothingoutsideofthetext(ilnyapasdehorstexte Derrida 1976: 158). Nor
does Derrida think that, by providing such notions as archewriting, he himself wholly evades the
metaphysicsofpresence.Wehavenolanguagenosyntaxandnolexiconthatisforeigntothishistory
wecanpronouncenotasingledeconstructivepropositionwhichhasnotalreadyhadtoslipintotheform,
thelogic,andtheimplicitpostulationsofpreciselywhatitseekstocontest(Derrida1990:280f.).Still:if
noonecanescapethisnecessity,andifnooneisthereforeresponsibleforgivingintoit[...]thisdoesnot
meanthatallthewaysofgivingintoitareofequalpertinence.Thequalityandfecundityofadiscourseare
perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and to
inheritedconceptsisthought(Derrida1990:282).
Derrida retained the foregoing views, which he had developed by the end of the 1960s. But there were
developments of metaphilosophical significance. (1) In the 70s, his style became more playful, and his
approach to others text became more literary (and those changes more or less persisted Derrida would
want to know, however, just what we understand by playful and literary). (2) Again from the 70s
onwards,Derridajoinedwithothersinorderto:sustainandpromotetheteachingofphilosophyinschools
toconsiderphilosophysroleandtopromotephilosophythattransgresseddisciplinaryboundaries.(3)In
the80s,Derridatriedtoshowthatdeconstructionhadanethicalandpoliticalimport.Heturnedtothemes
that included cosmopolitanism, decision, forgiveness,law, mourning, racism, responsibility, religion, and
terrorismandclaimed,remarkably,thatdeconstructionisjustice(Derrida1999:15).Togivejustahint
of this last idea: Justice is what the deconstruction of the law an analysis of the laws conditions of
possibilityandimpossibility,ofitspresuppositionsandlimitsmeanstobringabout,wherelawmeans
legality, legitimacy, or legitimation (for example) (Caputo 1997: 131f.). (On some of these topics, see
Derrida,section7.)(4)Bythe90s,ifnotearlier,Derridaheldthatinphilosophythenatureofphilosophy
isalwaysandeverywhereatissue(seeforinstanceDerrida1995:411).
Despitehisviewsaboutthedifficultyofescapingmetaphysics,anddespitehisevidentbeliefinthecritical
and exploratory value of philosophy, Derrida has been attacked for undermining philosophy. Habermas
provides an instance of the criticism. Habermas argued that Derrida erases the distinction between
philosophyandliterature.HabermasrecognizesthatDerridameanstobesimultaneouslymaintainingand
relativizing the distinction between literature and philosophy (Habermas 1987b: 192). But the result,
Habermasthinks,isaneffacementofthedifferencesbetweenliteratureandphilosophy.Habermasadds,or
infers, that Derrida does not belong to those philosophers who like to argue (Habermas 1987b: 193).
Derridaobjectedtobeingcalledunargumentative.Heobjected,also,toHabermas'procedureofusingother
deconstructioniststhosethatHabermasdeemedmoreargumentativeasthesourceforDerridasviews.
Subsequently,HabermasandDerridaunderwentsomethingofarapprochement.Littlereconciliationwas
achieved in the socalled Derrida affair, wherein a collection of philosophers, angry that Derrida was to
receive an honorary degree from Cambridge, alleged that Derrida does not meet accepted standards of
clarityorrigor(quotedDerrida1995:420adetailedattackuponDerridasscholarshipisEvans1991).
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TheremightbeasenseinwhichDerridaistoorigorous.Forheholdsthis:Everyconceptthatlaysclaimto
anyrigorwhatsoeverimpliesthealternativeofallornothing(Derrida1988:116).Onemightrejectthat
view.Mightitbe,indeed,thatDerridainsistsuponrigidoppositionsinordertolegitimatetheprojectof
calling them into question (Gerald Graff in Derrida 1988: 115)? One might object, also, that Derridas
interrogationofphilosophyismoreabstract,moreintangible,thanmostmetaphysics.SomethingLevinas
said apropos Derrida serves as a response. The history of philosophy is probably nothing but a growing
awareness of the difficulty of thinking (Levinas 1996: 55 compare Derrida 1995: 187f.). The following
anxietymightpersist.DespiteDerridassocalledethicalandpoliticalturns,anddespitetheworkhehas
inspired within he humanities, deconstruction little illuminates phenomena that are not much like
anythingreasonablydesignatableasatext(Dews1987:35).Amoregeneralversionoftheanxietyisthat,
for all the presentations of Derrida as a philosopher of difference, deconstruction obscures differences
(Kearney1984:114Habermas1992a:159).

5.ReferencesandFurtherReading
Notethat,inthecaseofmanyoftheitemsthatfollow,thedategivenforatextisnotthedateofitsfirst
publication.

a.ExplicitMetaphilosophyandWorksaboutPhilosophicalMovementsor
Traditions
Anscombe,G.E.M.(1957)DoesOxfordMoralPhilosophyCorruptYouth?inherHumanlife,Action,andEthics:
Essays,pp.161168.Exeter,UK:ImprintAcademic,2005.EditedbyMaryGeachandLukeGormally.
Beaney,Michael(2007)TheAnalyticTurninEarlyTwentiethCenturyPhilosophy,inBeaney,Michaeled.The
AnalyticTurn.EssaysinEarlyAnalyticPhilosophyandPhenomenology,NewYorkandLondon:Routledge,2007.
Goodon,especially,thenotionsofanalysisinearlyAnalyticphilosophyandonthehistoricalprecedentsofthosenotions.

Beaney,Michael(2009)ConceptionsofAnalysisinAnalyticPhilosophy:SupplementtoentryonAnalysis,The
StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Summer2009Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.).
Beauchamp,TomL.(2002)ChangesofClimateintheDevelopmentofPracticalEthics,ScienceandEngineering
Ethics8:131138.
Bernstein,RichardJ.(2010)ThePragmaticTurn.CambridgeMAandCambridge.
Anaccountoftheinfluenceandimportanceofpragmatism.

Chappell,Timothy(2009)EthicsBeyondMoralTheoryPhilosophicalInvestigations32:3206243.
Chase,James,andReynolds,Jack(2010)AnalyticVersusContinental:ArgumentsontheMethodsandValueof
Philosophy.Stocksfield:Acumen.
Clarke,StanleyG.(1987)AntiTheoryinEthics,AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly24:3237244.
Deleuze,Giles,andGuattari,Flix(1994)WhatisPhilosophy?LondonandNewYork:Verso.Trans.GrahamBirchill
andHughTomlinson.
Lessofanintroductiontometaphilosophythanitstitlemightsuggest.

Galison,Peter(1990)Aufbau/Bauhaus:LogicalPositivismandArchitecturalModernism,CriticalInquiry,
16(4[Summer]):709752.
Glendinning,Simon(2006)TheIdeaofContinentalPhilosophy:APhilosophicalChronicle.Edinburgh:Edinburgh
UniversityPress.
Glock,HansJohann(2008)WhatIsAnalyticPhilosophy?CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Comprehensive.Illuminating.Notintroductory.

Graham,GeorgeandHorgan,Terry(1994)SouthernFundamentalismandtheEndofPhilosophy,PhilosophicalIssues
5:219247.
Lazerowitz,Morris(1970)ANoteonMetaphilosophy,Metaphilosophy,1(1):9191(sic).
Aninfluential(butveryshort)definitionofmetaphilosophy.

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Levin,Janet(2009)ExperimentalPhilosophy,Analysis,69(4)2009:761769.
Levy,Neil(2009)EmpiricallyInformedMoralTheory:ASketchoftheLandscape,EthicalTheoryandMoralPractice
12:38.
McNaughton,David(2009)WhyIsSoMuchPhilosophySoTedious?,FloridaPhilosophicalReviewIX(2):113.
Joll,Nicholas(2009)HowShouldPhilosophyBeClear?LoadedClarity,DefaultClarity,andAdorno,Telos146
(Spring):7395.
Joll,Nicholas(Forthcoming)ReviewofJrgenHabermasetal,AnAwarenessofWhatIsMissing(Polity,2010),
Philosophy.
TriestoclarifyandevaluatesomeofHabermas'thinkingonreligion.

Papineau,David(2009)ThePovertyofAnalysis,ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietySupplementaryVolume
lxxxiii:130.
Preston,Aaron(2007)AnalyticPhilosophy:TheHistoryofanIllusion.LondonandNewYork:Continuum.
Argues,controversially,thatAnalyticphilosophyhasneverhadanysubstantialphilosophicalormeta
philosophicalunity.

Prinz,JesseJ.(2008)EmpiricalPhilosophyandExperimentalPhilosophyinJ.KnobeandS.Nichols(eds.)
ExperimentalPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008.
Urmson,J.D.(1956)PhilosophicalAnalysis:ItsDevelopmentBetweentheTwoWorldWars.London:Oxford
UniversityPress.
Rescher,Nicholas(2006)PhilosophicalDialectics.AnEssayonMetaphilosophy.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYork
Press.
Centresuponthenotionofphilosophicalprogress.Containsnumerous,occasionallygrosstypographicalerrors.

Rorty,Richarded.(1992)TheLinguisticTurn:EssaysinPhilosophicalMethod,ChicagoandLondon:Universityof
ChicagoPress.Secondedition.
Ausefulstudyof1930sto1960sAnalyticmetaphilosophy.

Rorty,Richard,Schneewind,JeromeB.,andSkinner,Quentineds.(1984)PhilosophyinHistory:Essaysinthe
HistoriographyofPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Sorell,Tom,andRogers,C.A.J.eds.(2005)AnalyticPhilosophyandHistoryofPhilosophy.OxfordandNewYork:
Oxford.
Stewart,Jon(1995)SchopenhauersChargeandModernAcademicPhilosophy:SomeProblemsFacingPhilosophical
Pedagogy,Metaphilosophy26(3):270278.
Taylor,Charles(1984)PhilosophyandItsHistory,inRorty,Schneewind,andSkinner1984.
Williams,Bernard(2003)ContemporaryPhilosophy:ASecondLookinTheBlackwellCompaniontoPhilosophy,ed.
NicholasBunninandE.P.TsuiJames,pp.2537.Oxford:Blackwell.Secondedition.
Williamson,Timothy(2007)ThePhilosophyofPhilosophy,MaldenMAandOxford:Blackwell.
Adense,rathertechnicalworkaimingtoremedywhatitseesasameta
philosophicallackinAnalyticphilosophy.Treats,amongother
things,thesenotions:conceptualtruthintuitionsthoughtexperiments.

b.AnalyticPhilosophyincludingWittgenstein,PostAnalyticPhilosophy,and
LogicalPragmatism
Austin,J.L.,PhilosophicalPapers(1979).Thirdedition.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Burtt,E.A.(1963)DescriptiveMetaphysics,Mind72(285):1839.
Campbell,RichmondandHunter,Bruce(2000)Introduction,inR.CampbellandB.Huntereds.MoralEpistemology
Naturalized,Supple.Vol.,CanadianJournalofPhilosophy:128.
Campbellhasapublishedasimilarpiece,underthetitleMoralEpistemology,intheonlineresourcetheStanfordEncyclopediaof
Philosophy.

Carnap(1931)TheEliminationofMetaphysicsThroughLogicalAnalysisofLanguageinAyer,A.J.(1959)ed.Logical
Positivism.GlencoeIL:TheFreePress.
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Cavell,Stanley(1979)TheClaimofReason.Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,andTragedy.Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.
Cohen,G.A.(2002)DeeperintoBullshit,inBuss,SarahandOverton,Leeeds.ContoursofAgency:Themesfromthe
PhilosophyofHarryFrankfurt,Cambridge,MA:MITPress.
AdaptsHarryFrankfurtsconstrualofbullshitinordertodiagnoseandindictmuchbullshitincertainareasofphilosophicalandsemi
philosophicalculture(p.335).ReprintedinHardcastle,GaryL.andReich,GeorgeA.eds.BullshitandPhilosophy,ChicagoandLaSalle,
IL:OpenCourt,2006.

Copi,IrvingM.(1949)LanguageAnalysisandMetaphysicalInquiryinRorty1992.
Freeman,Samuel(2007)Rawls.OxfordandNewYork:Routledge.
Gellner,Ernest(2005)WordsandThings.AnExaminationof,andanAttackon,LinguisticPhilosophy.Second
edition.AbingdonandNewYork:Routledge.
Glock,HansJohann(2003a)QuineandDavidsononLanguage,ThoughtandReality.CambridgeandNewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Glock,HansJohanned.(2003b)StrawsonandKant.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Haack,Susan(1979)DescriptiveandRevisionaryMetaphysics,PhilosophicalStudies35:361371.
Hacker,P.M.S.(2003)OnStrawsonsRehabilitationofMetaphysicsinGlocked.2003b.
Hacker,P.M.S.(2007)HumanNature:theCategorialFramework.Oxford:Blackwell.
Hutchinson,Brian(2001)G.E.MooresEthicalTheory:ResistanceandReconciliation.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Kripke,SaulA(1980)NamingandNecessity.Oxford:Blackwell.RevisedandEnlargededition.
Lance,M.andLittle,M.,(2006)Particularismandantitheory,inD.Copp,ed.,TheOxfordhandbookofethical
theory,OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Loux,MichaelJ(2002)Metaphysics.AContemporaryIntroduction,seconded.Routledge:LondonandNewYork.
Malcolm,Norman(1984)LudwigWittgenstein:amemoir/byNormanMalcolmwithabiographicalsketchbyG.H.
vonWrightandWittgensteinsLetterstoMalcolm.Seconded.OxfordandNewYork,OxfordUniversityPress.
McDowell,John(1994)MindandWorld.CambridgeMAandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress.
PerhapstheparadigmaticpostAnalytictext.

McDowell,John(2000)TowardsRehabilitatingObjectivityinBrandomed.(2000).
McMahon,JenniferA.(2007)AestheticsandMaterialBeauty:AestheticsNaturalized.NewYorkandLondon:
Routledge.
Moore,G.E.(1899)TheNatureofJudgement,inG.E.MooreSelectedWritings,London:Routledge,1993,ed.T.
Baldwin.
Moore,G.E.(1953)SomeMainProblemsofPhilosophy.NewYork:HumanitiesPress.
Fromlecturesgivenin1910and1911.

Moore,G.E.(1993)PrincipiaEthica.CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Secondandrevisededition,containingsomeotherwritingsbyMoore.

Neurath,Otto,Carnap,Rudolf,andHahn,Hans(1996)TheScientificConceptionoftheWorld:theViennaCircle,in
Sarkar,Sahotraed.TheEmergenceofLogicalEmpiricism:from1900totheViennaCircle.NewYork:Garland
Publishing,1996.pp.321340.
AnEnglishtranslationofthemanifestoissuedbytheViennaCirclein1929.

Orenstein,Alex(2002)W.V.Quine.Chesham,UK:Acumen.
Pitkin,Hanna(1993)WittgensteinandJustice.OntheSignificanceofLudwigWittgensteinforSocialandPolitical
Thought.BerkeleyandLondon:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
Putnam,Hilary(1985)AfterEmpiricisminRajchmanandWest1985.
Quine,W.V.O.(1960)WordandObject.CambridgeMA:MITPress.
Quine,W.V.O.(1977)OntologicalRelativityandOtherEssays.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Newedition.
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Quine,W.V.O.(1980)FromALogicalPointofView.Harvard:HarvardUniversityPress.Newedition.
Quine,W.V.O.(1981)TheoriesandThings.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.
Rawls,John(1999a)ATheoryofJustice.Revisededition.CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.
Rawls,John(1999b)CollectedPapersed.SamuelFreeman.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.
Russell,Bertrand(1992)ACriticalExpositionofthePhilosophyofLeibniz.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.
Russell,Bertrand(1995)MyPhilosophicalDevelopment.Abingdon,UKandNewYork:Routledge.
Russell,Bertrand(2009)OurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorld:AsaFieldforScientificMethodinPhilosophy.
AbingdonandNewYork:Routledge.
Rynin,David(1956)TheDogmaofLogicalPragmatism,Mind65(259):379391.
Schilpp,P.A.ed.(1942)ThePhilosophyofG.E.MooreNorthwesternUniversityPress,EvanstonIL.
Schilpp,PaulArthured.(1942)ThePhilosophyofG.E.Moore.EvanstonandChicago:NorthwesternUniversityPress.
Schroeter,Franois(2004)ReflectiveEquilibriumandAntitheory,Nos,38(1):110134.
Schultz,Bart(1992)BertrandRussellinEthicsandPolitics,Ethics,102:3(April):594634.
Sellars,Wilfred(1963)Science,PerceptionandReality.Routledge&KeganPaulLtdLondon,andTheHumanities
Press:NewYork.
Strawson,Peter(1959)Individuals:AnEssayinDescriptiveMetaphysics.London:Methuen.
Strawson,Peter(1991)AnalysisandMetaphysics.AnIntroductiontoPhilosophy.OxfordandNewYork:Oxford
UniversityPress.
BothanintroductiontophilosophyandanintroductiontoStrawsonsownphilosophicalandmeta
philosophicalviews.

Strawson,Peter(2003)ABitofIntellectualAutobiographyinGlocked.2003b.
Weinberg,JonathanM.,Nichols,ShaunandStitch,Stephen(2001)NormativityandEpistemicIntuitions,
PhilosophicalTopics,29(1&2):429460.
Williams,Bernard(1981)MoralLuck.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Wittgenstein,Ludwig(1961)TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus.Trans.D.F.PearsandB.F.McGuinness.Routledge:
London.
Thetitlemeansschemaofphilosophicallogic.

Wittgenstein,Ludwig(1966)LecturesandConversationsonAesthetics,PsychologyandReligiousBelief.Oxford:
Blackwell.
Wittgenstein,Ludwig(1969)TheBlueandBrownBooks.PreliminaryStudiesforthePhilosophicalInvestigations.
Blackwell:Oxford.
Wittgenstein,Ludwig(2001)PhilosophicalInvestigations.TheGermanText,withaRevisedEnglishTranslation.
MaldenMAandOxford:Blackwell.Thirdedition.Trans.G.E.M.Anscombe.
ThemajorworkofthelaterWittgenstein.

Wright,Crispin(2002)HumanNature?inNicholasH.Smithed.ReadingMcDowell.OnMindandWorld.London
andNewYork:Routledge.

c.PragmatismandNeopragmatism
Brandom,RobertB.ed.(2000)RortyandHisCritics.MaldenMAandOxford:Blackwell.
Dewey,John(1998)TheEssentialDewey,twovolumes,LarryHickmanandThomasM.Alexandereds.Indiana
UniversityPress.
James,William(1995)Pragmatism:ANewNameforSomeOldWaysofThinking.NewYork:DoverPublications.
Lectures.

Peirce,C.S.(193158)TheCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,eds.C.Hartshorne,P.Weiss(Vols.16)andA.
Burks(Vols.78).CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.
Rorty,Richard(1980)PhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature.Oxford:Blackwell.
Rortysmagnumopus.

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Rorty,Richard(1991a)ConsequencesofPragmatism(Essays:19721980).HemelHempstead,UK:Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Rorty,Richard(1991b)ThePriorityofDemocracytoPhilosophy,pp.175196ofhisObjectivity,Relativism,and
Truth.PhilosophicalPapers,Volume1.Cambridge,NewYorkandMelbourne:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Rorty,Richard(1998)AchievingOurCountry.LeftistThoughtinTwentiethCenturyAmerica.CambridgeMAand
London:HarvardUniversityPress.
Rorty,Richard(2007)PhilosophyasCulturalPolitics.PhilosophicalPapers,Volume4.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Talisse,RobertB.andAikin,ScottF.(2008)Pragmatism:AGuideforthePerplexed.Continuum:LondonandNew
York.
Goodanduseful.

d.ContinentalPhilosophy
Adorno,TheodorW.(1986)TheJargonofAuthenticity.LondonandHenley:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1986trans.
KnutTarnowskiandFredericWill.
Adorno,TheodorW.andHorkheimer,Max(2002)DialecticofEnlightenment.PhilosophicalFragments.Stanford:
StanfordUniversityPress.Trans.EdmundJephcott.
Adorno,TheodorW.(1976)withR.Dahrendorf,J.Habermas,H.Pilot,andK.Popper,ThePositivistDisputein
GermanSociology,trans.G.AdeyandD.Frisby,London:HeinemannEducationalBooks.
DocumentsfromdebatesbetweenPopperians(whowerenot,infact,positivistsinanystrictsense)andtheFrankfurtSchool.

Baxter,Hugh(1987)SystemandLifeWorldinHabermas'TheoryofCommunicativeActionTheoryandSociety16:1
(January):3986.
Braver,Lee(2009)HeideggersLaterWritings.AReadersGuide.LondonandNewYork:Continuum.
Accessibleandhelpful,yetperhapssomewhatsuperficial.

Caputo,JohnD(1977)TheQuestionofBeingandTranscendentalPhenomenology:ReflectionsonHeideggers
relationshiptoHusserl,ResearchinPhenomenology7(1):84105.
Caputo,JohnD(1993)DemythologizingHeidegger.BloomingtonandIndianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress.
MoreContinentalthanonemightguessmerelyfromthetitle.

Caputo,John,D(1997)ACommentary,PartTwoofDerrida,Jacques(1997)DeconstructioninaNutshell.A
ConversationwithJacquesDerrida.NewYork:FordamUniversityPress.EditedandwithacommentarybyJohn
D.Caputo.
Carmen,Taylor,andB.N.Hanseneds.(2005)TheCambridgeCompaniontoMerleauPonty.Cambridge,Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Cerbone,David(2006)UnderstandingPhenomenology.Chesham,UK:Acumen.
Agoodintroductiontophenomenology.

Cooper,David(1999)Existentialism.AReconstruction2nded.Blackwell:OxfordandMalden,MA
Careful,argumentative,fairlyaccessible.

Davis,Colin(1996)Levinas.AnIntroduction.Cambridge:Polity.
NotonlyintroducesLevinasbutalsomountsastrongchallengetohim.

Derrida,Jacques(1976)OfGrammatology.BaltimoreandLondon:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Trans.G.C.
Spivak.
Derrida,Jacques(1987)Positions.London:Althone.Trans.AlanBass.
ThreerelativelyearlyinterviewswithDerrida.Relativelyaccessible.

Derrida,Jacques(1988)LimitedInc.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress.
ContainsDerridassideofan(acrimonious)debatewithJohnSearle.IncludesanAfterwordwhereinDerridaanswersquestionsputto

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himbyGeraldGraff.

Derrida,Jacques(1990)WritingandDifference.London:Routledge.Trans.AlanBass.
Derrida,Jacques(1995)Points...:Interviews,19741994.Trans.PeggyKamufetal.Stanford,CA:Stanford
UniversityPress.
Derrida,Jacques(1999)ForceofLawinDrucillaCornell,MichelRosenfeld,andDavidGrayCarlsoneds.(1982)
DeconstructionandthePossibilityofJustice,NewYork:Routledge.
Dews,Peter(1987)LogicsofDisintegration.PoststucturalistThoughtandtheClaimsofCriticalTheory.Londonand
NewYork:Verso.
Dews,Peter(1995)Morality,EthicsandPostmetaphysicalThinkinginhisTheLimitsofDisenchantment.Essayson
ContemporaryEuropeanPhilosophy.LondonandNewYork:Verso,1995.
Diprose,RosalynandReynolds,Jackeds.(2008)MerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Chesham,UK:Acumen.
Dubiel,Daniel(1985)TheoryandPolitics.StudiesintheDevelopmentofCriticalTheory.CambridgeMA:MITPress.
Edgar,Andrew(2006)Habermas.TheKeyConcepts.Routledge.LondonandNewYork.
Elden,Stuart(2004)UnderstandingHenriLefebvre:TheoryandthePossible.LondonandNewYork:Continuum.
Evans,J.Claude(1991)StrategiesofDeconstruction:DerridaandtheMythoftheVoice.Minneapolis:Universityof
MinnesotaPress.
DetailedcontestationofDerridasinterpretationof,especially,Husserl.

Finlayson,Gordon(2005)Habermas:AVeryShortIntroduction.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Finlayson,Gordon(2009)MoralityandCriticalTheory.OntheNormativeProblemofFrankfurtSchoolSocial
Criticism,Telos(146:Spring):741.
Freyenhagen,Fabian(2008)MoralPhilosophyinDeborahCook(ed.)TheodorAdorno:KeyConcepts.Stocksfield:
Acumen.
AgoodandsomewhatrevisionistsynopsisofAdornosmoralphilosophy.

Gadamer,HansGeog(1981)ReasonintheAgeofScience.CambridgeMA:MIT.Trans.FrederickLawrence.
Geuss,Raymond(1981)TheIdeaofaCriticalTheory.CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Geuss,Raymond(2008)PhilosophyandRealPolitics.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Glendinning,Simon(2001)MuchAdoAboutNothing(onHermanPhilipse,HeideggersPhilosophyofBeing).Ratio
14(3):281288.
Haar,Michel(1993)HeideggerandtheEssenceofMan.NewYork:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Trans.McNeill,
William.
Habermas,Jrgen(1984)TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,Volume1:ReasonandtheRationalizationofSociety.
Cambridge:Polity.Trans.McCarthy,Thomas.
Habermas,Jrgen(1987a)KnowledgeandHumanInterests.Cambridge:Polity.Secondedition.Trans.Jeremy
Shapiro.
Habermas,Jrgen(1987b)ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity:TwelveLectures.Cambridge:PolityPressin
associationwithBlackwellPublishers.Trans.FrederickLawrence.
OneofHabermas'moreaccessibleandmorepolemicalworks.

Habermas,Jrgen(1992a)AutonomyandSolidarity.InterviewswithJrgenHabermas.Ed.PeterDews.Revised
edition.
AgoodplacetostartwithHabermas.

Habermas,Jrgen(1992b)PostmetaphysicalThinking:PhilosophicalEssays.Oxford:PolityPress.Trans.William
MarkHohengarten.
Habermas,Jrgen(2008)BetweenNaturalismandReligion.PhilosophicalEssays.CambridgeandMaldenMa.:
Polity.Trans.CiaranCronin.
Heidegger,Martin(1962)BeingandTime.Oxford:Blackwell.Trans.JohnMacquarrieandEdwardRobinson.
TheearlyHeideggersmainwork.

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Heidegger,Martin(1966)DiscourseonThinking.AtranslationofGelassenheit.NewYork:Harper&Row.Trans.John
M.AndersonandE.HansFreund.
Heidegger,Martin(1971)Poetry,Language,Thought.NewYork:Harper&Row.Trans.AlbertHofstadter.
Heidegger,Martin(1982)TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology.BloomingtonandIndianapolis:UniversityofIndiana
Press.Reviseded.Trans.AlbertHofstadter.
CloseinitsdoctrinestoBeingandTime,butoftenconsiderablymoreaccessible.

Heidegger,Martin(1991)Nietzsche,4volumes.NewYork:HarperCollins.Trans.DavidFarrellKrell.
Heidegger,Martin(1994)BasicWritings.London:Routledge.Revisedandexpandededition.
ContainsWhatisMetaphysics?,LetteronHumanism,andTheQuestionConcerningTechnology,amongothertexts.

Heidegger,Martin(2003)TheEndofPhilosophy.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Trans.JoanStambaugh.
Held,David(1990)IntroductiontoCriticalTheory.Cambridge:Polity.
BroadbrushandfairlyaccessibleaccountoffirstgenerationCriticalTheoryandoftherelativelyearlyHabermas.

Horkheimer,Max(1937)TraditionalandCriticalTheoryinHorkheimer,CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays.London
andNewYork:Continuum,1997.
Horkheimer,Max(1974)EclipseofReason.NewYork:Continuum.
LikeHorkheimerandAdornosDialecticofEnlightenment,butmoreaccessible.

Husserl,Edmund(1931)Ideas.GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology.GeorgeAllen&UnwinLtd/Humanities
Press.Trans.W.R.BoyceGibson.
KluwerhaveproducedanewerandmoreaccurateversionofthisbookbuttheBoyceGibsonversionisslightlymorereadable.

Husserl,Edmund(1999)TheIdeaofPhenomenologyDordrecht:Kluwer.Trans.LeeHardy.
ProbablyHusserlsmostaccessible(orleastinaccessible)statementofphenomenology.

Husserl,Edmund(1970)TheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology.Evanston,IL:
NorthwesternUniversityPress.Trans.DavidCarr.
Husserl,Edmund(1999)CartesianMeditations.AnIntroductiontoPhenomenology.Trans.DorianCairns.Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Johnson,Christopher(1993)SystemandWritinginthePhilosophyofJacquesDerrida.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Johnson,Christopher(1999)Derrida.TheSceneofWriting.NewYork:Routledge.
Good,short,andorientatedaroundDerrida'sOfGrammatology.

Landau,Iddo(1992/1993[sic])EarlyandLaterDeconstructionintheWritingsofJacquesDerrida,CardozoLaw
Review,14:18951909.
Unusuallyclear.

Levinas,Emmanuel(1996)ProperNames.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.
Malpas,Simon(2003)JeanFranoisLyotard.Routledge.LondonandNewYork.
Marcuse,Herbert(1991)OneDimensionalMan.Secondedition.Routledge:London.
AclassicworkoffirstgenerationCriticalTheory.

MerleauPonty,Maurice(2002)PhenomenologyofPerception.NewYork:Routledge.Trans.ColinSmith.
MerleauPontysprincipalwork.

Mulhall,Stephen(1996)HeideggerandBeingandTime.Routledge:LondonandNewYork.
Outhwaite,William(1994)Habermas.ACriticalIntroduction.Cambridge.Polity.
Pattison,George(2000)TheLaterHeidegger.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.
AhelpfulintroductiontothelaterHeidegger.

Philipse,Herman(1998)HeideggersPhilosophyofBeing:aCriticalInterpretation.NewJersey:PrincetonUniversity
Press.
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Alarge,serious,andverycontroversialworkthatsetsouttounderstand,butalsotodemolishmuchof,Heidegger.Q.v.Glendinning
(2001)whichdefendsHeidegger.

Plant,Robert(Forthcoming)Thisstrangeinstitutioncalledphilosophy:Derridaandtheprimacyofmetaphilosophy,
PhilosophyandSocialCriticism.
Polt,Richard(1999)Heidegger:AnIntroduction.London:UCLPress.
Superbintroduction,butlightonthelaterHeidegger.

Russell,Matheson(2006)Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.LondonandNewYork:Continuum.
Excellent.

Sartre,JeanPaul(1963)TheProblemofMethod.Trans.HazelE.Barnes.London:Methuen.
Sartre,JeanPaul(1989)BeingandNothingness.AnEssayonPhenomenologicalOntology.London:Routledge.Trans.
HazelE.Barnes.
TheearlySartresmajorwork.

Sartre,JeanPaul(1992)NotebooksforanEthics.ChicagoandLondon:ChicagoUniversityPress.Trans.David
Pellauer.
Sartre,JeanPaul(2004)TheTranscendenceoftheEgo.ASketchforaPhenomenologicalDescription.Abingdon,U.K.
Sartre,JeanPaul(2007)ExistentialismandHumanism.London:Methuen.Trans.PhilipMairet.
Sartresphilosophyatitsmostaccessible.

Smith,David(2003)HusserlandtheCartesianMeditations.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.
Smith,Joel(2005)MerleauPontyandthePhenomenologicalReduction,Inquiry48(6):553571.
Wolin,Richard,ed.(1993)TheHeideggerControversy:ACriticalReader.CambridgeMAandLondon:MITPress.
ThecontroversyinquestionconcernsHeideggersNazism.SeealsoYoung1997.

Young,Julian(1997)Heidegger,Philosophy,Nazism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Young,Julian(2002)HeideggersLaterPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Aslimintroductionto,andanattempttomakecompelling,thethoughtofthelaterHeidegger.

e.Other
Borgmann,Albert(1984)TechnologyandtheCharacterofEverydayLife:APhilo
sophicalInquiry.Chicagoand
London:UniversityofChicagoPress.
Interestingandimpassioned.InfluencedbyHeidegger.

Descartes,Ren(1988)ThePhilosophicalWritingsOfDescartes(3vols).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Trans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch.Volumeone.
Feenberg,Andrew(1999)QuestioningTechnology.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.
ThisbookhasatleastonefootintheCriticalTheorytraditionbutalsoappropriatessomeideasfromHeidegger.

Hume,David(1980)DialoguesConcerningNaturalReligionandthePosthumousEssaysOftheImmortalityofthe
SoulandOfSuicide.Indianapolis:Hackett.Ed.RichardH.Popkin.
Kant,ImmanuelCritiqueofPureReason.Varioustranslations.
Asisstandard,thearticleabovereferstothisworkusingtheAandBnomenclature.Thenumber(s)followingAdenotepagesfrom
Kantsfirsteditionofthetext.Number(s)followingBdenotepagesfromKantssecondedition.

Locke,John(1975)AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
ONeill,John(2003)UnifiedScienceasPoliticalPhilosophy:Positivism,PluralismandLiberalism,StudiesinHistory
andPhilosophyofScience,vol.34(September):575596.
ONeill,JohnandUebel,Thomas(2004)HorkheimerandNeurath:RestartingaDisruptedDebate,EuropeanJournal
ofPhilosophy,12:175105.
Petitot,Jean,Varela,Francisco,Pachoud,Bernard,andRoy,JeanMicheleds.(2000)NaturalizingPhenomenology:
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IssuesinContemporaryPhenomenologyandCognitiveScience.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.

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