FACILITATING A BASIS FOR A

UNITY OF PURPOSE
BETWEEN THE VANGUARDS OF THE BANGSAMORO PEOPLE IN
THE
MINDANAO PEACE PROCESSES

An Initiative of:
Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC

PAGE NO

Background of the Proposal

The Solidarity Initiative

The Consolidated and Validated Outputs Constituting the Proposal to

Enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity

11

Bangsamoro Multi-Sectoral Declaration for Solidarity

15

Annexes

20

BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSAL

INTRODUCTION
An amirul mujahideen once said, Only people with the same goal and mission in life and
who see things from the same lens can work together. In respect to revolution he further
said, Only those who have strong commitment, steadfast and are willing to sacrifice will
sustain the work of jihad, while those with vacillating tendencies and easily cowed will drop
like falling leaves.
Another Moro revolutionary leader commented, The process of revolution teaches a
revolutionary to live a simple life and moulds him the right attitudes, exemplifying the ideal.
Thus revolution is in itself a change agent. He continued, Revolutionaries, even if they
share the same mission, may at some point in time stop to continue to work together
strategically for some reasons, but nothing can stop them from engaging tactically for a
common cause.
The words from these leaders inspire us in the civil society to untiringly call for solidarity, if
not unity, among the Bangsamoro leaders, especially the revolutionary leaders as the key to
pursue a united solution to the Mindanao problem. It offers us to see possibilities of
bringing together the leaders of the Bangsamoro fronts so that they consolidate their stand
in light of the on-going peace process in Southern Philippines.
The history of splits within the Philippine revolutionaries is not uncommon. During the
Philippine colonial period, splits in the Filipino revolution already existed, as in the case of
the Aguinaldo group which bolted from Bonifacios. This is also true in the contemporary
revolutions in other parts of the world: in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, etc.. Sometimes a
multi-split happens in a revolutionary group. It can divide itself several times, as in the case
of the CPP-NDF and similarly that of the MNLF. In the early 70s the CPP-NDF once served as
a single revolutionary group fighting for national democracy and reform in the Philippines.
Now, there is a faction, the so-called rejectionist group which bolted from the main NDFCPP and also divided into several groupings.
The Monolithic MNLF bannering freedom and independence of the Bangsamoro survived as
a single and united Bangsamoro liberation front in the early 70s. The Bangsa Moro Army
(BMA), the armed wing of the MNLF sustained its armed struggle from its inception up to
the time of the signing of the now infamous 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Four years later, the
split in the united MNLF started to occur.
In 1980 the short-lived MNLF-Reformist group and the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization
(BMLO) separated from the mainstream MNLF. Their leaders later on either joined the
government or retired completely. In 1984, the now MILF also bolted from the MNLF. Later
on, the so-called ICC command, the Alvarez wing MNLF came into their own existence. It is
also common knowledge that some of the leaders of the so-called Abu Sayyaf were former
combatants of the MNLF. The Executive council of 15 (EC) which took over leadership
from the ousted Nur Misuari and made the latter chairman emeritus also became a big
1

issue. More recently, a new MNLF chairman was elected that had replaced the then
incarcerated and now bailed-out MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
The gathering in Davao city and other parts of Mindanao attended by thousands of MNLF
leaders and their sympathizers from different parts of Mindanao, proved that the MNLF-led
Misuari is still a force to reckon with. The on-going tripartite review of the 1996 Peace
Accord in Africa attended by the Misuari-led MNLF also shows that indeed, after all, the
MNLF led by Misuari is not the breakaway group. Be it as it may, the break-ups within in the
MNLF is real.
Taking into account the given situation of splits both in the case of the NDF-CPP experience
and the Moro fronts, the basic question however remains whether the split serves the cause
of revolution better, or is it counter-productive. To what extend does a split in a
revolutionary organization adversely affect the advancement of the cause they promote?
What factors could have caused the split and the lack of cooperation among the
Bangsamoro Fronts? Is it still possible for the fronts to re-unite or at least work tactically for
a common cause? Is the split a blessing or a disaster to the Bangsamoro? Will this
divergence lead to the achievement of self-determination or self-destruction? These are
some of the questions that an ordinary Bangsamoro asks which the fronts need to answer.

THE SPLIT OF THE MORO FRONTS

The split in the Moro fronts on one hand, and the possibility of working tactically or
strategically on the other hand, can be best analyzed through understanding their mission,
their mandate and legitimacy, their strategic options, leadership style and their
organizational culture, among others. To some extent, the role of international communities
in the dynamics of the fronts can also be an important input.
Firstly, let it be admitted that all the Moro fronts share the same goal and mission. That is
To liberate the Bangsamoro from national oppression and the vision to establish a society
where the words of Allah are supreme. One People, One Objective says a streamer
hanging in some strategic places in Cotabato city. They also share the same revolutionary
option of armed struggle as an approach to achieving this mission, although all of them
are now talking peace with the government.
The Tausogs summarize the bases of the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination as a
struggle in defence of Bangsa, Hulah, Agama (Land/Territory, People/Nation and
Religion/Identity). This is also interpreted as the struggle for ancestral domain. This
commonality is seen as binding rather than a dividing factor.
Secondly, the Moro fronts get their mandate and legitimacy from the Bangsamoro. The
fronts, by assuming the role of being duty-bearers, also act as vanguards, representatives
and guardians of the Bangsamoro. As duty-bearers, the fronts draw their legitimacy from
the right-holders the Bangsamoro. By this inference, the fronts are morally obliged to
listen to the Bangsamoro and abide by what they feel should be the right thing to do. This
2

position and obligation shall make the fronts even more conscious of genuinely consulting
the masses of the Bangsamoro as the one who gave them the mandate that legitimizes their
actions.
Thirdly, the long existence of the fronts has been made possible through the support of the
people whose interests the former had sworn to defend, protect and safeguard. The
Bangsamoro provides moral, human and financial support to the fronts. Simply stated, the
strength of the fronts emanates from the Bangsamoro. It is the same Bangsamoro the
MNLFs and the MILF serve.
From the above, we see clearly that the fronts are one in their mission, sources of legitimacy
and support. It is the Bangsamoro who gave them the mandate. Hence, they are responsible
to the people.
Is the basic difference among the fronts found in their strategic political options and the
means of achieving them? Or, is it in their way of managing their organizations and ways of
resolving contradictions within?
At this point in time, what are the inclinations and tendencies of the different fronts on a
strategic political option? One group of the MNLF feels that the tripartite meeting, which is
aimed at resolving the controversial 1996 Peace Accord is being overtaken by events and an
alternative option in pursuing the strategic development of the Bangsamoro is through the
installation of a federal structure of governance in the country. This is premised in some
reports that the MNLF is no longer interested in the ARMM. The other MNLF wing on the
other hand aims at tactically working with the government in improving delivery of services
and good governance in the ARMM. The MILF, in the other equation, is pursuing the
attainment of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which covers a larger geographical area,
more political authority, and a substantial control of resources. Clearly these respective
positions of the fronts are not contradictory. They are in progression. At the best, they are
reconcilable. One continues from where the other ends. So, where does the contradiction
lie?
Organizational centralism and handling of internal contradiction
There is no safe way of analyzing how the fronts conduct their internal affairs. Whether or
not they manage their respective organization consultatively, democratically or dictatorially
cannot be determined by outsiders. The dynamics within an organization is the way how
that certain organization manages its internal affairs. This involves participation of
members, culture of doing things and democratic consultations, fund and conflict
management, and regular summing up, etc. How democratic the decision-making process is
within the organization is only known to them.
But the culture of an organization, even revolutionary fronts, also takes into consideration
how they relate with the people they ought to serve, defend and protect in the conduct of
their affairs. When and how they consult the people is a very important question because
this is one barometer of the respect of the peoples mandate, without which it only suggests

that the fronts are operated like private organizations as in cooperatives or corporations
that only serve its members.
What is the role of personality in the split? Has ethnicity something to contribute in the
split?
If the fundamental contradiction and difference among the fronts is neither in their mission
and mandate nor in their political strategy or organizational culture, is it in the difference of
the personality of their leaders that divide them? Is it the one which holds them from
working tactically or strategically? If indeed it is, is personality thicker than the cause of
freedom and self-determination?
Clearly, sharing the same mission and resources and serving the same people is a potential
reason for the fronts to collaborate and cooperate either tactically or strategically. The
areas on strategy in achieving their mission, while they differ, cannot stop them from
working together. The complementation of ones strategy with that of the other can help
the organizations reach their goal. Complementation should not be looked at as an
imposition but an important means of bridging gaps.

COMMON THREAT
While the fronts are on their individual struggle, the government is making all attempts to
defeat them both politically and militarily. Politically, the MNLF is now completely deprived
and eased out from the ARMM which they once served. The ARMM is the sweat and
blood of the Bangsamoro mujahideen as the famous line goes. Without control of the
ARMM, the demand for downloading what the government had not delivered yet in the
1996 FPA does not make sense. Thus, the review of the 1996 Peace Agreement does not
serve its purpose without the MNLF at the helm of the ARMM.
The MILF on the other hand found a dead-end when the government at the end of their 11year old peace talks and after all consensus points had been agreed upon, insisted that
only through a constitutional process can the MILF attain self-governance in some parts of
Mindanao. As a form of warning, the government is ready to use force should the MILF
insist on self-governance outside of the constitutional process. This is clearly a negotiation
on the basis of strength. As part of the three-point government strategy, the military is
always ready to take action should pacification campaigns and peace talks fail.
Forum Shopping
The divide and rule tactic being employed against the fronts is becoming effective only
because they allowed them to be. The strength of the enemy is always measured against
the weakness of the fronts. The vulnerability of the fronts to be divided and its susceptibility
to outside influence are among its weaknesses. Added to this, the government enjoys
forum shopping on which group to support and the only criterion is lowest bidder. This
happens because the fronts have not come out with a common agenda/demand.

The irony is that the fronts are talking to the government but they are not talking to each
other. While the fronts listen to foreign advice, as in the case of an MNLF-MILF unity effort a
few years ago and unsustained for whatever reasons, and the latest efforts at bringing
together the MNLFs in Tripoli Libya, they hardly lend an ear to their own people who are
incessantly calling for a working solidarity. At the expense of giving what can be best to their
people, they continue to snub efforts to put their acts together by the same people who
have given them their mandate and legitimacy.
The best way to keep them divided, or at least prevent them from working together, is by
giving attention to one front and set aside the other. Being divided, one can be a spoiler to
the other at given circumstances. This will prevent the fronts from working against a
common threat.
This state of affairs should be considered as a common threat by the fronts in pursuit of a
compromised peace.
So, what are the fundamental differences that prevent them from joining hands? Are these
differences irreconcilable? Are not the leaders of the fronts good Muslims?

THE URGENT CALL

Indeed, it is to the greater interest of the Bangsamoro that the fronts work together, even
tactically, if not strategically. This is easier said than done, but divided fronts beget a divided
people and a divided people are always vulnerable to defeat.
If and when the fronts put their act together and face the government in a negotiating table
pushing for a common agenda, it will make a difference. The government cannot do forum
shopping and snub a common demand of a united Bangsamoro.
As the diplomatic process becomes imperative in the pursuit for self-governance, the only
option left for the Bangsamoro is to come up with a common demand and this will only
happen when they start to talk using shura as an instrument for decision-making. Without
this, the struggle for freedom is nearing its end. And unless a new band of Muslims will
come out to rescue the fate of the Bangsamoro, self-determination shall only remain as a
state of mind.
Solidarity and unity does not become an empty rhetoric when the fronts talk and push for a
common agenda. They need not merge their organizations, but they can organize a
solidarity front to carry their demands. After all, they share the same vision and Goal: THE
LIBERATION OF THE BANGSAMORO AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MUSLIM SOCIETY
GOVERNED BY THE SHARIAH.
The Bangsamoro Solidarity for Freedom and Self-determination (Bangsa Moro-Solidarity)
The Bangsa Moro Solidarity (BMS) is a concrete expression of the solidarity and unity of the
Bangsamoro in advancing the cause of self-determination through the peace process.
5

Through this common platform and tactical alliance, which will provide an opportunity for
consensus building among the major stakeholders, the BM shall be able to put forward a
unified and mutually agreed position in the peace process. This alliance neither dissolves the
existing fronts, nor merges them into one. Their respective positions vis--vis the on-going
peace process shall be consolidated and made into one position to be submitted to the
government for consideration.
The BMS will define areas of cooperation, collaboration and coordination. They come to
terms on how they deal with each other even without physically coming together. Its urgent
task is to consolidate their stance and come up with a consensually agreed position that
embodies the ideals of a Bangsamoro society.
With the common mission and vision of the BM leaders, the BMS will be able to surmount
obstacles on its way, thus paving the way towards the attainment of its avowed goal.
We, the CBCS will exert our utmost effort to make the Bangsamoro, their leaders, and the
fronts understand that only in solidarity and in a unity of purpose will Allahs help be
forthcoming. This is our urgent task. We will celebrate that time when the leaders of the
Bangsamoro will come together for the sake of the Bangsamoro and work together for our
general good.
We look at these sayings as a source of our strength:
Is personality thicker than the mission for freedom and independence?
It is good to be alone (divided?) than in the company of the evils, it is an evil to be away
from the company of good doers.
A band of few people will come out to save you from oppression and exploitation. Which
group may this be?
Hold unto the rope of Allah all together and dont be divided
Self-determination or Self-destruction?
Allahs help will come to a united people who want to help themselves.

THE SOLIDARITY INITIATIVE

OVERVIEW
This intra-solidarity campaign for the Bangsamoro exclusively focuses on enumerating and
legitimizing a set of issues and concerns that directly affect the greater Bangsamoro people
in relation to their struggle to regain their Right to Self-Determination. In particular, this
initiative sought to facilitate the identification of areas of cooperation, coordination and
collaboration (CCC) that the MNLF and MILF may work on.
These areas of CCC were culled from the various perspectives of key personalities
representing the different sectors and groups that comprise the whole Bangsamoro
spectrum and were consolidated into a proposal that may serve as guide or framework for a
more concrete solidarity of work between the two fronts as they separately engage with
the GRP.

REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLIES

In developing this solidarity of work framework, a series of consultative assemblies were
conducted. This utilized a data gathering process.
A total of thirty-five (35) representatives from the different communities, sectors and
leaders from each of the eight (8) regions of CBCS coming from the whole Bangsamoro
spectrum were invited and asked certain questions. These questions focused on observable
and/or known issues, concerns, problems and recommendations directly affecting the
Bangsamoro people in terms of their struggle to regain their RSD, which they believe the
MNLF and the MILF can work together on as a mutual or common stand in their separate
peace processes with the GRP.
The gathered data were collated and consolidated into a draft Proposal to Enhance
Bangsamoro Solidarity.
Objectives
In general, the Regional Consultation Assemblies aim to come up with a set of issues that
would protect and uphold the identity, security, community, and vitality of the Bangsamoro
people, which the MNLF and MILF leadership and membership may agree on to collaborate
and work on commonly vis--vis their respective peace negotiations with the GRP. This will
be taken out from the thoughts, views, insights and recommendations of relevant sectors of
the Bangsamoro society.

Specifically, this series of consultation-assemblies aims to:

1. Provide a perspective on the history of the Bangsamoro struggle to regain its right to
self-determination, highlighting the experiences of the MNLF and MILF in their
separate peace processes with the GRP;
2. Discuss the relevance, importance and urgency of a unity of purpose or a
solidarity in work between and among the Bangsamoro in relation to attaining its
RSD using as reference pertinent Quranic verses; and
3. Gather insights, views, perspective and recommendations that would enhance a
commonality of position among the two fronts that would continue to uphold the
greater interest of the Bangsamoro mass base in the peace negotiations with the
GRP.
Area of Coverage
The eight (8) Regional Consultation Assemblies were conducted in the following areas:
Region
1. Dabaw Region
2. Kutawato Region
3. Ranaw Region
4. Sibugay Region

5. Samboangan Region
6. Basilan Region
7. Lupah Sug Region
8. Rajah Buayan Region

Area Covered
Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte,
Compostella Valley, and Davao Oriental
Cotabato City, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and
Shariff Kabunsuan
Marawi City, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and
Lanao del Sur
Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga
Sibugay (eastern half), and Zamboanga del Norte
(eastern half)
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga Sibugay (western
half), and Zamboanga del Norte (western half)
Isabela City, Lamitan City, and Basilan
Jolo and Sulu
Gen. Santos City, Sarangani, South Cotabato, and
Sultan Kudarat

Date
January 22
January 26
January 28
January 29

February 1
February 3
February 5
February 8

Issues and Concerns Clarified and Resolved

1. A Solidarity Summit cum Validation Workshop will be conducted to finalize what
would be the draft Proposal on Enhancing Bangsamoro Solidarity.
2. The data gathered will be treated with utmost confidentiality on the part of CBCS
and shall be deliberated whether parts of the outputs can be considered for public
dissemination.

3. Five (5) key delegates from each region who had actively participated in the regional
consultative assemblies will be invited to the Solidarity Summit cum Validation
Workshop for the finalization of the Proposal on Enhancing Bangsamoro Solidarity.
4. From among the five (5) one (1) or two (2) will be invited again to be part of the
official delegation that would deliver the Finalized Proposal on Enhancing
Bangsamoro Solidarity.
Challenges Encountered
1. Reluctance of some invited participants to attend in the Regional Consultative
Assemblies due to their misconception that the overall impression was that CBCS
was presuming to advise the MNLF and MILF on what to do in the peace process.
2. Reluctance of some participants in the Sulu and Basilan region who are leaning or
sympathetic to the MNLF to attend the Regional Consultative Assemblies due to
their misconceptions that CBCS was leaning or sympathetic to the MILF.
Measures Initiated
1. Due effort was made on the part of CBCS and the TWG to clarify to those
participants who carried the misconception that this initiative was tantamount to
CBCS wanting to advise the MNLF and MILF on what to do in the peace process
that this was simply not the case. In this particular endeavor, CBCS was a mere
facilitator, collecting and consolidating what was culled from the key
representatives of the Bangsamoro spectrum and packaging this for transmittal to
the respective leaderships of the MNLFs and the MILF. In this role, no imposition or
undue influence can be made by CBCS at the risk of damaging its credibility.
2. The same amount of effort was made by CBCS and the TWG in clarifying to the
participants who thought that CBCS was leaning towards the MILF that CBCS came
from the Bangsamoro, is made by the Bangsamoro, and is for the Bangsamoro,
regardless of whether one is pro-MNLF, pro-MILF, non-aligned, or whatever.

BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY SUMMIT AND VALIDATION WORKSHOP

After the Consultative Assemblies were conducted, the gathered data were collated and
consolidated into a draft Proposal to Enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity.
Then a Solidarity Summit cum Validation Workshop was conducted, which was participated
by key and select participants from the consultative assemblies. The participants validated
the consolidated outputs/ collated data from all the consultative assemblies and finalized
the draft proposal.

Objectives
In general, this Bangsamoro Solidarity Summit and Validation Workshop aims to validate the
set of issues that have been deemed requisites to protect and uphold the identity, security,
community, and vitality of the Bangsamoro people, which the MNLF and MILF leadership
and membership may agree to collaborate and work on commonly vis--vis their respective
peace negotiations with the GRP.
Specifically, this series of consultation-assemblies aims to:
1. To provide a perspective on the history of the Bangsamoro struggle to regain its right
to self-determination, highlighting the experiences of the MNLF and MILF in their
separate peace processes with the GRP;
2. To discuss the relevance, importance and urgency of a unity of purpose or a
solidarity in work between and among the Bangsamoro in relation to attaining its
RSD using as reference pertinent Quranic verses; and
3. To gather insights, views, perspective and recommendations that would enhance a
commonality of position among the two fronts that would continue to uphold the
greater interest of the Bangsamoro mass base in the peace negotiations with the
GRP.
After this has been done, a delegation that have equal representation from each of the
consultations were formed. This delegation will present to the respective leadership of the
MNLF and the MILF the finalized solidarity proposal for reactions, comments and/or advice.
Finally, for purposes of transparency, the reactions and/or advices of each leadership will be
presented to the other leaderships for consideration.

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THE CONSOLIDATED AND VALIDATED OUTPUTS CONSTITUTING

THE PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY
CHALLENGES TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE BANGSAMORO RIGHT TO SELFDETERMINATION
On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination
Poor education on Bangsamoro history and right to self-determination
o Filipinos
o Moros, especially the youth
o International community
Stereotypes
o Media bias against the Moros
o Filipino bias against the Moros
Misconceptions/ misunderstanding
o Bangsamoro as native inhabitants of Mindanao
o Bangsamoro as a people and a nation
On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes
Government Strategies/ Shortcomings:
o Divisive peace (simultaneous, etc.) talks by Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GRP) to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
o Counter-insurgency projects
o Offering of incentives (money, position)
o Invoking of constitutional framework
o Assimilation of the Bangsamoro to the Filipino body-politic (e.g. Filipinization
through the mainstream educational system and teaching Makabayan
subject in government-funded Madaris)
o GRPs use of MNLF integrees in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in
its war against the MILF
o None full-implementation of the GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996
by the GRP
o GRPs backing out of the GRP-MILF Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain
o Lack of government comprehensive peace program in dealing with rebels
Lack of support/ participation
o Many sectors
o Key/ influential Moro leaders/figures
Misinformation/ disinformation/ intrigues/ hearsays

11

On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity

Differences in goal and perspectives
Attitudinal or un-Islamic mentality:
o Judgmental
o Subjective
o False pride
o Personal vested interest
o Un-Islamic leadership
o Betrayals
o Lack of mutual trust
o Respect
o Understanding
Perceived assumption of non-recognition of past gains in the Bangsamoro struggle
for the attainment of RSD (individuals/ fronts/ issues)
o Intrigues
o Misconception
o Hearsays
Divisive factors
o Tribalism
o Regionalism
o Factionalism
o Difference in expressions of ideological principles
o Power struggle
o Disunification
On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity
Attitudes:
o Judgmental
o Subjective
o False pride
o Personal vested interest
o Betrayal
o Power struggle/ craving for power/authority
o Crab mentality
o Destructive criticism
o Lack of trust
o Dishonestly
o Greediness
o Competition
Moro vs. Moro stereotypes
Hard core support to one front, instead of emphasis to the overall Bangsamoro
goal to attain right to self-determination

12

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination
Dawah on Islam
Bangsamoro history
Bangsamoro identity (as people & nation)
Bangsamoro right to self-determination
Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines
On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes
Highlighting previous agreements with the Philippine Government (Tripoli
Agreement, Jeddah Accord, etc)
GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996
GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, Bangsamoro Juridical Entity)
Recognition of the gains achieved by the two fronts in the pushing for Bangsamoro
right to self-determination
Documentation of breaches in agreements, lessons learned, etc.
Strengthening of conflict resolution, justice system, reconciliation, human rights
watch, advocacy & education
Community-based advocacies
Internationalization/ continuous international guarantee of the peace process
Organizing or sustaining mobilizations of multi-sectoral groups
Conduct of conferences or seminars
On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity
Advocacy for
o Tactical alliance between the two fronts
o Communication/ dialogue
o Fora/ conference
o Consultations
o Discipline among the fronts' rank and file
o Revisiting the fronts original goal for the Bangsamoro
Formation of a body to facilitate the solidarity process, if possible
On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity
Dawah or Islamization
Strengthening conflict resolution and justice system
Inter-ethnic or intercultural exchange initiatives
All-out support to the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination
Education about Bangsamoro history and right to self-determination

13

ROLES THAT THE MORO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS CAN PLAY TO CONTRIBUTE TO
THE OVER-ALL GOAL OF ACHIEVING THE BANGSAMORO RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
On Education on Bangsamoro History and Right to Self-Determination
Bangsamoro history
Bangsamoro identity (as people & nation)
Bangsamoro right to self-determination
Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines
Dawah on Islam
Anchoring their Vision, Mission, Goals and Objectives (VMGO) on the Bangsamoro
struggle for right to self-determination
Assessment or evaluation of the present status of the Bangsamoro struggle for the
attainment of its right to self-determination
On Information-Education-Campaign on the Peace Processes
Campaign for the completion of the review and full implementation of GOP-MNLF
Final Peace Agreement of 1996
Popularization of the GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE)
Activities to elicit the support of:
o Many sectors
o Prominent/ influential figures/ leaders
Documentations of lessons learned, breaches in agreements, etc
Wide peace consultations and advocacy
Initiatives for MNLF-MILF solidarity or unity of purpose
Popularization of the peace processes in all levels of society
On Initiatives for MNLF and MILF Solidarity
Serve as bridge/ convener/facilitator/mediator between the two groups
Documenter
Never quits till mission is accomplish.
On Initiatives for Moro Mass Base Solidarity
Education and Dawah
Unity of Bangsamoro Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
Alliance/ networking/ partnership
Strengthening conflict resolution and justice system
Capability training
Strengthening and sustaining solidarity of Bangsamoro leaders
Strengthening of the ulama towards contextualization of their role and mobilizing
them in the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-determination

14

BANGSAMORO MULTI-SECTOR DECLARATION FOR SOLIDARITY

Prior to the coming of the foreign colonizers, the Bangsamoro have been acclaimed as the
First Nation in Asia who had been freely exercising and enjoying their inalienable right to
self-determination as sovereign people and nation. With the vast resources of their
ancestral homeland, the Bangsamoro had been living with prosperity, dignity and honor and
are historically known as a peace-loving people in the far east.
However, with the incursion of foreign colonialism, this prosperous and happy life was
shattered by war and terrorism. Pushed against the wall to defend themselves and their
homeland, the Bangsamoro became a freedom fighter. Our ancestors and forefathers
fought a gallant stand for many centuries to resist colonialism and preserve their way of life.
Because of superior firepower of the enemy, they may have been colonized, but they were
never subjugated.
This struggle was carried on until the present generation. First, the struggle was re-echoed
by the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and later rekindled by the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Aware, that the ongoing struggle of the Bangsamoro people to restore its inalienable right
to self-determination is being hampered by divide and rule tactics of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP);
Cognizant, that the MNLF at present is being confronted by difficult internal dynamics that
challenge its solidarity and integrity as a vanguard of the Bangsamoro that have caused
adverse effect to the entire Bangsamoro, especially to the ordinary people;
Recognizing, that the GRP has no sincerity and no political will to address the Moro issue;
Realizing, that the gravity of the problem of continuing pacification and mainstreaming of
the Bangsamoro highlights the urgent need to consolidate the Bangsamoro and strengthen
the unity of our Fronts to move forward until victory is at hand;
Reaffirming, that the MNLF and the MILF have the prior mandate of the Bangsamoro people
to spearhead the struggle to restore their inalienable right to self-determination, as well as
to engage with the GRP on their behalf in the peace process;
Reaffirming further, the vital role of the Moro civil society organizations to intertwine with
other social groupings with similar or identical agenda for the Bangsamoro;

15

For and in consideration of the above, we, the undersigned representatives of various
sectors of the Bangsamoro spectrum from Dabaw Region, Rajah Buayan Region, Kutawato
Region, Ranaw Region, Sibugay Region, Samboangan Region, Basilan Region, and Lupah Sug
Region, have resolved to participate in a series of facts-and-perceptions-gathering regional
consultative assemblies towards Developing a proposal to enhance Bangsamoro Solidarity
to identify issues and areas for more effective coordination, collaboration and cooperation
that would be contributory to the struggle for RSD and which would redound to the greater
benefit of the Bangsamoro people.
NOW THEREFORE, based on the outputs culled from the regional consultative assemblies
and the solidarity summit and validation workshop, we hereby make the following
declarations:
We express deep concern over several perceived DIVERGENCES among us that may
threaten our common struggle to restore our right to self-determination from being
attained. These include, but are not limited to:
1. Among the Bangsamoro people at large: factionalism, ethnocentrism/ tribalism,
regionalism, lingual differences, different principles, ideological differences, clan
conflict/ family feud, political alignment/ affiliation.
2. Between the MNLF and the MILF: Association of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement to
the MNLF only and the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain to the
MILF only, when in fact both documents redound to the benefit of all the
Bangsamoro, whether MNLF, MILF or otherwise.
3. The unbecoming conduct of some Mujahideen of the rank and file of the two Fronts.
4. There is poor or lack of information, or education and there is disinformation
campaign about the Bangsamoro History, Bangsamoro identity/nationality,
Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination as expressed through the GOP-MNLF Final
Peace Agreement of 1996 (Review) and the GRP-MILF Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE),
and about the Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines.
5. The GRP has consistently institutionalized various strategies that effectively prevent
and deny the Bangsamoro from restoring their right to self-determination, such as:
divisive peace talks with the MNLF and the MILF, counter-insurgency projects,
offering of incentives (money and position), invoking of constitutional framework,
assimilation (Filipinization through the mainstream educational system and the
introduction of the subject Makabayan in government-funded Madaris), the use of
MNLF integrees in the AFP in the war against the MILF, the none full-implementation
of the FPA by the GRP and their backing out of the MOA-AD, and the lack of
consistent and comprehensive peace policy in dealing with revolutionary groups.
6. There is a lack of support and participation from different sectors and key influential
Moro leaders or figures.

16

7. There is stereotyping among the Moro tribes (e.g. tribal chauvinism), as well as
between Moro and non-Moro (e.g. branding the Moros as terrorists).
8. There are prevailing attitudes that do not conform to Islam, such as: being
judgmental, subjective, have false pride (distorted maratabat), personal vested
interest, betrayal, power struggle, crab mentality, destructive criticism, lack of trust,
dishonesty, greed and competition.
In response to the perceived divergences, we present the following recommendations that
would contribute to a more meaningful SOLIDARITY WORK towards attaining our common
struggle to restore our right to self-determination to the two Fronts for consideration. These
include, but are not limited to:
1. Information-Education-Communication/ popularization in all levels of the following:
Bangsamoro History, Bangsamoro identity/nationality, Bangsamoro Right to SelfDetermination, GOP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 (Review), GRP-MILF
Peace Process (MOA-AD, BJE), Bangsamoro situation in the Philippines;
2. Recognizing, valuing, honoring and treasuring the gains made by the two Fronts in
pushing for Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination;

3. Initiatives for unity of purpose of the Fronts, which may include:

opening of and continuing constant communication between the two
Fronts, the conduct of fora and consultations and conference on issues
that relate to the struggle and to the peace process, the forming of a
tactical alliance in both struggle for RSD and in the peace process;
4. Promotion and practice of discipline among the rank and file Mujahideens of the two
Fronts;
5. Continuous dawah or Islamization that would promote Islamic values and practices,
to promote inter-ethnic and inter-cultural exchanges; strengthening conflict
resolution, justice system, human rights watch and advocacies.
It is fervently hoped and prayed that the above-mentioned declarations be considered and
reflected on by the two Bangsamoro Fronts for any possible action that would contribute to
the enhancement of Bangsamoro solidarity, with the end goal of strengthening the overall
struggle to restore our inalienable right to self-determination.
Let this be our common slogan and continuing reminder: One Bangsamoro, One Belief, and
One Qiblah!
Adopted this 26th day of April, 2009, during the BANGSAMORO SOLIDARITY SUMMIT and
VALIDATION WORKSHOP, held at Hotel Camila, Pagadian City.

17

(Sgd.)
Ligaya C. Abubacar
Bangsamoro Women for Peace
Davao City

(Sgd.)
Ishaq G. Daud
Al-Ihsan Foundation
Cotabato City

(Sgd.)
Abdulmutalib S. Esmael
SUBATAGEN
General Santos City

(Sgd.)
Assib M. Ibrahim
MAP-Southphil-Agrimarines Indusries
Maguindanao

(Sgd.)
Mistiri D. Tarami
Bantey Basilan
Basilan

(Sgd.)
Tu Alid Alfonso
United Youth for Peace and Development
Cotabato City

(Sgd.)
Arthur D. Baul
CBCS Basilan
Basilan

(Sgd.)
Badjolon M. Barotoc
Salam Davao
Davao City

(Sgd.)
Ismael M. Gonzales
LIDA Inc.
San Isidro, Bunawan, Davao City

(Sgd.)
Sami M. Buat
CBCS Davao

(Sgd.)
Hazar Muarip-Ahmad
Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women
Baas, Lamitan, Basilan
(Sgd.)
Hanah M. Ahmad
Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women
Basilan
(Sgd.)
Nahan B. Insung
Yakan Intergrated Devt Foundation Inc.
Lamitan, Basilan
(Sgd.)
Bayan M. Marwin
BUSC- Basilan
Tipo-tipo Basilan
(Sgd.)
Ma. Emily A. Trumata
CBCS Basilan

(Sgd.)
Mike G. Kulat
CBCS Central Office
Cotabato City
(Sgd.)
Ferrer T. Marcaban
Ummah Fi Salam
Pagadian City
(Sgd.)
Abdulmutalib S. Esmael
SUBATAGEN
General Santos City
(Sgd.)
Ebrahim D. Sandigan
HICCI
General Santos City
(Sgd.)
Oscar A. Sulaiman
MAGMOFFI
Kiamba, Sarangani Province
18

(Sgd.)
Isnira A. Baginda
PMDS/ SUBATAGEN
General Santos City

(Sgd.)
Estella R. Natingga
Phil Foundation Resources for Mgt. (PFRM)
Marawi City

(Sgd.)
Almisri F. Kunting
Islamic Foundation for Development
Tetuan Highway, Zamboanga City

(Sgd.)
Janimah S. Datu
ALGADAI
Marawi City

(Sgd.)
Fatima A. Salih
Womens Federation
Campo Muslim, Zamboanga City
Ben-Omar J. Jadjaie
Lundang Panun
Zamboanga City

(Sgd.)
Elias I. Macarandas Jr.
Philippine Muslim Welfare Society
Marawi City

(Sgd.)
Amir Abdulla H. Maing
ZNUCI/ SAEDI/ IP
Sirawai, Zamboanga del Norte
(Sgd.)
Jumda S. Saba-ani
MURID
Jolo, Sulu
(Sgd.)
Maimona K. Muan
Partabangan a Kasambuhansin Raayat (PKR)
Jolo, Sulu
(Sgd.)
Sitti Alhada U. Abayan
BAGGUT, Lundan Panun
Patikul, Sulu
(Sgd.)
Raisah C. Cayoga
IMERGG Ranaw
Marawi City
(Sgd.)
Bainari S. Cali
Kalimudan Foundation Inc.
Marawi City

(Sgd.)
Dipunudun Marohom
CBCS Ranaw
Marawi City
(Sgd.)
Salem C. Demis
LKCMFI
Davao City
(Sgd.)
Mohamad Omar
CBCS Central Office
Cotabato City
(Sgd.)
Danilo Mocsin
CBCS Central Office
Cotabato City
(Sgd.)
Ahmed Harris Pangcoga
CBCS Central Office
Cotabato City
(Sgd.)
Sammy Maulana
CBCS Central Office
(Sgd.)
Sultan Maguid Maruhom
Ummah Fi Salam
Pagadian City
19

ANNEXES

20

QUESTION # 1:

What concrete expressions of solidarity work do you observe

and see that would enhance the Bangsamoro struggle to regain
its right to self-determination?

Dabaw Region

BM History & situation in the Philippines (for inclusion in the Madaris

curriculum)
Fronts to revisit their original goal
Lessons learned from failures and successes on the ongoing Bangsamoro
struggle
Fronts to banner the real Bangsamoro interest only
BM solidarity/linkaging (familiarization & strengthening of relationships; family
reunions)
Islamization: Empowerment of Islamic institutions/ upliftment of Islamic moral
values, customs and traditions.
Fronts Harmonious relationship: Open communication /consultations/ no barrier
or factionalism / good understanding
Focus on the main course of the VMGO of org (inspired by the Bangsamoro RSD
& Islamic principles for the Muslims)
Forums/ seminar related to enhancing the Bangsamoro RSD
Active participation in the Peace Process (updates/ monitoring)
Reflections (individual/group)
Enhancement and empowerment of skills of the Bangsamoro
Unification/ harmonization of Ulama interpretation, re: BM struggle for RSD

Kutawato Region

Performing religious obligations (salah, zakah, etc.)

Islamic education/ Daawah/ religious advocacy works (teaching what is right &
forbidding what is prohibited)
Strengthening conflict resolution/ justice system/ reconciliation
Continuous dialogue of fronts (operationally; caucus of fronts' senior leaders to
arrive a point of agreement; understanding the bangsamoro benefits)
Community based advocacies
Active participation in the PP (EIC/Education on MOA-AD, BM History, History of
the Prophet & Daawah)

Ranaw Region

Faith in Islam (Islam as a uniting force)

Moro nationality (nationalism)
IEC on BM History vis--vis BM RSD- the original petition of BM forefathers to
America to exclude Mindanao from RP when RP was granted independence
(Dansalan Declaration, etc. be highlighted in BM history)
Financial & moral support to the BM struggle (rooted on the question whether
there is a mass base support for the fronts)
Organization of multi-sectoral groups in support to the SD goal
2

Holding peace rallies/ demonstrations in support to the BM struggle

Bangsamoro solidarity (pushing for unity)
Conference must be strengthened and sustained
Focus: BM History/RSD- Moro struggle for SD since time immemorial
Importance of MNLFs support- The MNLF will give way to the MILF-GRP peace
negotiation
Presence of unity of purpose- The MILF &MNLF including the Civil Society
claimed and have taken pride in fighting for the attainment of Bangsamoro RSD
for the cause of Islam
Recognition of achievements and roles
International guarantees (internationalization)
Unity in preservation of Muslim culture in RP as pursued in RP Congress ever
since
MILFs resolve - The MILF is firm on its resolve not to negotiate again
government unless they sign the MOA-AD

Sibugay Region

Islam as a unifying force (Quran & Sunnah)- inclusive of peace and mercy for all;
no discrimination and oppression among different ethno-liguistic groups
Massive consultation/dialogue/transparency/ communication- involve the
Bangsamoro masses
Cooperation-enhancing initiatives (to promote initiatives to attain cooperation
among BM sectors; initiatives to sustain BM sectors cooperation)
BM peoples education on their RSD
Unity & support to the fronts for a common cause by the BM masses
Participation of all BM sectors for the attainment of RSD
Inter-front talks: consultation/ dialogue among leaders
Recognition (gains achieved by the fronts)
Brotherhood (faith & nationality)
Awareness on/ avoiding divide and rule tactics
Open communication among the ranks and files- Close contacts with the fronts
Two-pronged approach/fair play- by waiting and giving way to whom the
government concentrated on IEC
Active participation
GRPs insincerity
Push for upholding the gains of the peace process (signing of MOA-AD/ review of
FPA)

Samboangan Region

Islam as unifying force

Reconciliation & unification of the two fronts (unity of purpose; focus on BM
RSD)
3

Inter-ethnic unity & cooperation

Research works
BM rights as a people (socio-cultural, political, economic, etc)
Consultation (for proper info dissemination)
Education on BM History
Education on BM RSD
Attitude: Sincerity, Persistence
Proper consultation to the people
Dialogue between the two fronts
Lessons learned
Firm stance
Continuation of the Peace Processes
Advocacy works/ IEC
Education about Islam
Attitude: Sabar
Peace advocacy
Formation of consultative body (Empowerment of peace council)

Basilan Region

Intensive EIC/ Media advocacy works on BM History and RSD

Islamic education/ values (Shariah)
Unity of purpose by the different Moro sectors
Engage in capability trainings
Educate themselves
Open communication line
Common agenda of the revolution
Revisit or settle any differences
Reality check: genuine struggle for Bangsa and Agama
Massive EIC on FPA, BJE/ MOA-AD
Resume peace talks with GRP
Internationalization of the BM History and RSD (United Nations)
Enhance transparency by the fronts on the peace processes
Involve more sectors in the panel
Not to walk out on our RSD

Lupah Sug Region

Religion (Islam)
Nationality (Bangsamoro identity)
History of the Bangsamoro Struggle
Human rights watch, advocacy & education
Longing for sustainable peace
Unity of purpose/ ideology
4

Tactical alliance
Continuation of the struggle for attainment of RSD
Longing for freedom
Formation of a group consisting of representatives from the two fronts for
exploratory talks
Massive IEC (Increased level of recognition; napapakinggan ang Bangsamoro
kumpara dati)
Peace advocacy & education
CSO representation in the peace process (Moro CSO observer status)
Support for the peace processes

Rajah Buayan Region

Application of concrete Islamization strategies (Islamization & Daawah with

wisdom)
Unity/ presence of ethnic groups in religious activities
Inter-ethnic cultural immersion (area visit/ participation)
Introduction of BM History and RSD in Madaris
Series of consultations
Create/expand/sustain Bangsamoro solidarity conference/orgs/ assoc
Tactical alliance between two fronts
Continue peace talks with international guarantee
Support RSD-based legal and peaceful mobilizations

QUESTION # 2:

What concrete expressions of divergence do you observe and

see that would render the Bangsamoro Struggle for RSD
vulnerable to divide and rule tactics?

Dabaw Region

Lack in observance of proper discipline among the fronts rank and file
Lack of transparency thru information drive about the peace process & the
peace negotiations
Less/lack of proper/correct info on BM RSD
Intrigues/ misconceptions/hearsays- (individuals/ fronts/ issues)
Attitudinal (un-Islamic mentality): Judgmental/ subjective/ false pride/ personal
vested interest/ un-Islamic leadership/ betrayals, lack of mutual trust, respect &
understanding
Tribalism/ regionalism/factionalism/ difference in expressions of ideological
principles/ power struggle/ disunification

Kutawato Region

Counterinsurgency (projects) efforts by INGOs & GOs

Over-bureaucratization of bidding of projects by INGOs & GOs
Family feuds
Politics/ power
Drug addiction
Culture/ beliefs (tribalism, politics, maratabat, self-interest)
Fronts operations: PP, FPA, MOA-AD, superiority (local/ foreign)
Lack of info on the PP & MOA-AD
PP as source of division also
Attitude: Suspicions; jealousy
Job insecurity
Division among people
Insecurities
1996 FPA- end of BM struggle; did not end conflict; it paved the way for MNLF
demobilization (MILF still pursuing BM RSD); recognizes RP supremacy over
BM; abandoning BM RSD
Invoking affiliation by front as it connotes divisiveness

Ranaw Region

Personal and ethnic interest

Tribalism
Disunity among BM leaders
Group interest
Ideology differences in the process of attaining objective
Internal conflict between & among MNLF factions (middle, bottom levels)
Different approaches in the attainment of the goal
Insincerity of GRP
7

Apparent monopoly by MNLF top leadership in representing MNLF to GRP

interest (More democratic representation of the organization)
Aborted signing of MOA-AD (violent reactions by some MILF groups; the voice of
the BM members to the GRP peace panel were subdued by government)

Sibugay Region

Lack of participation of some sectors

Personal interest
Tribalism
Lack of EIC
Lack of coordination and unity
By pushing and concentrating of their own leadership
Personal interest
Perceived assumption of non-recognition of past gains in the BM struggle for the
attainment of RSD
Wait and see attitude of BM masses
Lack of support from the influential people (prominent Moros, etc.)
Constitutional process as GRPs weapon
Divided leaders means divided mass base

Samboangan Region

Spiritual foundation
Lack of education (RSD, History, Peace Process)
Sense of apathy by Muslim masses
Dividing factors: tribalism, regionalism, ideological differences
Improper consultation
Differences in goal and perspectives; not united in terms of goal
Un-Islamic morals: self-interest, power struggle, crab mentality
Assimilation policies of government (involving money and position)

Basilan Region

Education on Bangsamoro History and RSD (for common understanding)

Differences in principle by the BM
Different vision by leaders (un-Islamic)
Superiority complex (tribal in nature)
Differences of stance/ principle by the fronts leaders
Disinformation campaign by media
Incentives and perks offered by GRP, thereby forgetting the common mission
and goals (self-interest/ personal aggrandizement)
Lack of dialogue/ consensus by the fronts
8

Lupah Sug Region

Cultural and traditional differences

Tribalism/Ethnocentrism (discrimination of marginalized groups)
Clan Conflicts/ Rido
Western/Philippine educational system (Philippine-agenda-centric/carrier of
Philippine bias/ Filipinization of the Bangsamoro/ material orientation)
Weakening of faith
Media Bias (accusing the BM as terrorists)
Regionalism
Language differences
Destructive Criticism
Attitude: Absence of trust & honesty; crab mentality; greediness; politicizing;
competition; craving for power, money & authority)
Factionalism
Lack of communication, trust & recognition
Media Bias: freedom fighters vs. terrorists
GRPs agenda (hidden yet obvious)
Lack of tactical alliance between the fronts
Difference in leadership
Rivalry
Organizational chauvinism
Presence of vast natural resources (hot topic in the peace talks)
Influence of business tycoons (properties)
Lack of recognition of gains achieved in struggle RSD (MNLF=FPA; MILF=MOAAD)
Disinformation campaign
Government insincerity
Stereotyping/ Cultural biases against the Bangsamoro (Filipino vs Moro; intraMoro)
Divided fronts; divided mass base support to peace talks

Rajah Buayan Region

Weak/low level of Islamization

Tribalism
Personal interest
Introduction of Makabayan in government-funded Madaris
Weakening Bangsamoro nationalism
Simultaneous negotiations by GRP to the two fronts (negative: cause of
divisiveness)
Factionalism (exclusivist attitudes of the fronts in terms of maximizing BM
peoples participation)
Lack of tactical alliance
9

Openness to third party opportunism

GRPs use of MNLF integrees in AFP in war against MILF
None full-implementation of the FPA by GRP
GRPs backing out of the MOA-AD

10

QUESTION # 3:

What role can the Moro civil society organizations play to

sustain and enhance Bangsamoro solidarity and the struggle for
RSD?

11

Dabaw Region

Conduct of Information drive (seminars, etc.) on BM unity

IEC on RSD/ Media hopping (researchers for Moro devt; writeups)
Campaigning for Advocacy on RSD
Propose & conduct activities/ programs/ strategies that could solidify BM
Play as convener for activities/ programs on enhancing BM solidarity & struggle
for RSD
Drafting/ formulation of resolutions for lobbying, recommendations to enhance
BM struggle
Collate data/ documents that happen in the community related to BM struggle
Promote & advocate transparency on peace process & peace negotiation
Active participation in peace process
Active involvement in BM RSD IEC (Popularization of BM RSD)
Act as instruments in BM fronts unification of purpose (focus on bridging gaps,
unifying purpose, advocating harmony & transforming values towards more
Islamic orientation; not necessarily structural)

Kutawato Region

Convener/ facilitator/ mediator/ coordinator/ documenter in conflict resolutions

among the BM
Mediator/conciliator/facilitator between fronts
lessons learned
IEC/ Ventilating critical issues, esp. PPs (MOA-AD, FPA)
Solidarity based on or highlighting BM History - Attempt to solidarity and
unification shall be founded in the premise of the injustices committed by the
Filipinos against the Bangsamoro people which is the Illegal and Immoral
Annexation of the Bangsamoro Homeland in the Philippines Independence.
Solidarity based on Islam
Solidarity/unification is for the good and benefit of the Bangsamoro people and
its generations. Working with full strength against the common enemy
Lessons learned from the 2 PPs
Highlighting GRP insincerity
Enhancement principles of Give and Take
Revisiting by orgs of their respective VMGOs and be anchored on BM RSD
Slogan: One Bangsamoro, One Belief, and One Qiblah.

Ranaw Region

Advocacy Campaign (forum, seminar, dialogue among Moros, conferences,

rallies, etc); conducting solidarity (initiatives/activities) forum, conferences,
seminar, study tour, advocacy, IEC, and sponsoring dialogue among Muslim
leaders
12

International level- Sourcing seminars from international sources and local

Lessons learned- Visitation of conflict-affected areas
Documentation- Monitoring and reporting the situation
Bridging between and among the MNLF, MILF and GRP in pursuit of peace
Advocacy/ continuous IEC on the BM history/ struggle for RSD or Moro
problems; provision of right info to Moro and non-Moro
CSOs may serve as bridge to unite Mujahideen, religious groups and politicians
Leveling off among different groups/ consultations (MASOWARA- consultative
council [for shura]; Development and Production of Modules for the series of
consultations/ leveling off)
In order for us to successfully attain our struggle for RSD for the cause of Islam,
we are strongly recommending to the OIC to push for unity of MILF&MNLF, and
in doing so, there is a need to create a council (majlis). The council is tasked to
select from among themselves a leader of the Bangsamoro through series of
consultations among different sectors of the Bangsamoro
EIC- Agreements in PP documents

Sibugay Region

Active participation in organization (to participate in proper way to push forward

the organization; to be an active if you are a member of your org)
Giving of all-out support to the BM struggle for the attainment of RSD
Organizing of activities (dawah; cultural preservation)
Initiatives for constant dialogue among the Mindanaoans (interfaith dialogue)
Sustained mechanism to promote RSD
Active role in the peace process: consultation, adoption, participation,
information drive, daawah
Massive education on BM RSD
Active participation in peace and development efforts

Samboangan Region

Education on BM history and identity as people and nation

Education on Bangsamoro RSD
Proper consultation to all stakeholders (forum, assembly)
Strengthen spiritual foundation based on Quran & Sunnah
Initiatives towards: the fronts unity of purpose, advocating tactical alliance
between the two fronts;, continuous negotiation
Education about Islam
Education on the Peace Process
Advocating
Networking, alliance, partnership in all levels

13

Basilan Region

Membership to CBCS
Massive education on RSD
Anchor their VMGOs on BM RSD
Strategic efforts for unity in purpose of the fronts (BM RSD);
Serve as bridge/mediator between the two groups
More political education
More capability buildup trainings
Islamic education/ Islamization

Lupah Sug Region

Massive education campaign on Bangsamoro RSD (lobbying for RSD inclusion in

curriculum)
Equipping the Bangsamoro with proper knowledge and skills
Strengthening the religious sector
Sectoral solidarity
Facilitation of reconciliation of the two fronts
Facilitation/tactical mediation of concrete alliance by the two fronts
Advancing RSD as the core of the Bangsamoro struggle
Sustain advocacy works
Pan-Moro CSOs solidarity (fronts-leaning; working conference; planning)
Bridging leadership (bridging gaps)
Mechanisms to CSOs involvement in working for BM solidarity
Decolonization of the Bangsamoro (culture-appropriate curriculum)
We will never take no for an answer from the two fronts on the topic of
reconciliation

Rajah Buayan Region

Wide peace consultations and advocacy

Pushing for upholding the gains/ full implementation of the peace agreements
(e.g. submission of resolutions to GRP & fronts)
Awareness on existence of different peace frameworks (GRP, religious groups,
academe, etc.)
Mediate/facilitate/initiate Bangsamoro solidarity activities (including the fronts)
Popularize RSD (education, mass mobilization, etc.)
Assessor/evaluator on Bangsamoro RSD (status)
Work for unified Moro CSOs voice (Pan-Moro CSO assembly)

14