DIgest

DG 509

fire engineering in tunnels

David Charters,

BRE Global

Pressure on the use of land and environmental

protection increasingly mean that new road and
rail transport infrastructure is being placed
underground in tunnels, with all the inherent fire
challenges that this presents. The purpose of this
Digest is to provide background information and
good practice guidance on the application of fire
safety engineering principles to tunnels. It briefly
covers a range of issues related to tunnel fire
safety, fire safety engineering and consideration
of some tunnel-specific issues related to the
sub-systems of fire safety engineering.[13] It also
lists references for further reading and where to
obtain further information.

1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

According to international accident statistics, rail tunnels
have a good safety record and road tunnels are safer than
the surface roads to which they connect.[4] However, with
a long enclosed space like a tunnel, fire statistics indicate
that wherever there are people and a sufficient fire load
present, there is always the potential for a large multifatality fire incident.[5-7]
In response to these documented multi-fatality fires,
improvements to tunnel fire safety have been made:
Vehicle and rolling stock engineers have investigated
crash-worthiness.
Reaction to fire of materials and first-aid fire fighting.
Mechanical and electrical engineers have specified
ventilation and smoke extraction systems.
New forms of automatic fire detection and emergency
lighting/way-finding
Civil engineers have developed twin bore tunnels,
evacuation shafts, escape tunnel and cross-passages.

All these advances have made tunnels safer, but if tunnels

are to remain cost-effective and safe, there is a need to
select the best combinations of fire precautions as part of
a fire strategy. Fire safety engineering provides a structured
and formal way of developing a fire strategy. Because
multiple fatalities are the events of concern for tunnel fire
safety, most fire engineering involves a quantitative fire
risk analysis.
As tunnels are not all the same, it is important to
consider a wide range of tunnels and tunnel types when
deciding on a fire strategy. For example, tunnels variations
include different:
tunnel functions
tunnel contents
tunnel occupants
tunnel layout and arrangements.

FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

Tunnel functions

Tunnel occupants

For example:
road tunnels
rail tunnels:
metro
heavy rail.
services:
cable
pipelines
conveyor belt eg raw materials in mines or suitcases
at airports.
for pedestrians
a combination of all or some of these functions.

Tunnel occupants (staff and emergency services personnel)

can vary in terms of their:
number: eg high numbers in rush-hour urban road
tunnels or a handful of staff in rail freight tunnels
location: eg distributed in different vehicles along a
road tunnel or contained in a set of train carriages
proportion with a disability: estimates vary between
6% and 30% of the population depending on the
definition of disability
familiarity with the tunnel: eg road tunnel operators or
rail passengers
their commitment to their journey or their vehicle: eg
commuters on their way to work or tourists
degree of autonomy: eg road drivers or rail passengers
training: eg in first-aid fire fighting, emergency
response, leadership
role: staff or passenger.

Tunnel contents
Tunnel contents tend to follow their function and include
a wide range of sources of fuel and ignition sources, eg:
vehicles
road:
passenger vehicles: cars and people carriers, and
buses and coaches
goods vehicles: light and heavy goods vehicles
(with or without hazardous goods).
rail:
metro (normally electrically powered)
heavy rail (sometimes diesel powered): passenger
carriages and freight.
services
cables
pipelines
raw materials
personal possessions.

Tunnel layout and arrangements

Equally, tunnel arrangements can vary significantly and
these variables can include its:
location: eg urban or rural (such as under a mountain
or lake)
length: a few hundred metres or tens of kilometres
number of bores: single or twin bore
dimensions: shape (circular, square and rectangular)
and cross-sectional area (eg circular or square, 10 m2
to 150 m2 in diameter)
depth: a few metres to tens or hundreds of metres
entrance/portal locations: urban or remote rural
interconnectivity: many doors in a dividing wall or a
few widely spread cross-passages
construction: cut and cover or bored, rock, cast-iron or
concrete lining
operating philosophy: manned or unmanned.

Distance from fire

Smoke front
Place of safety
Casualties

Premovement time

Toxic dose exceeded

Detection time
Fire fighting
Fire prevention

Time from ignition

Fire location/ignition

Casualties

No ventilation

Evacuation envelope

Figure 1: Spacial/temporal map of the development of a high consequence tunnel fire.[8]

Tunnel spalling

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Start

Qualitative
design
review

Quantitative
analysis

Compare results
with acceptance
criteria

Does
design pass
criteria?

Yes
Report and
present

No
Figure 2: Fire engineering process.

Figure 1 shows a spacial/temporal map of the potential

development of a high consequence tunnel fire (eg
involving casualties and tunnel spalling). The vertical axis
shows the distance from the fire and the horizontal axis
shows the time, where the intersection of the axes is
the time and location of ignition. Figure 1 shows typical
post-ignition events, such as detection and evacuation, to
the right of the vertical axis. It also indicates the potential
role of fire protection measures in reducing these
consequences through fire engineering.

2 FIRE ENGINEERING PROCESS

Fire safety engineering can be defined as the: application
of scientific and engineering principles to the protection
of people, property and the environment from fire.[1]
Fire engineering has been applied in the design of
buildings since the 1970s and there are now international
and national codes of practice on the application of fire
engineering, such as ISO TR 13387[2] and BS 7974.[1]
These codes of practice have largely been focused on the
design of buildings, so although the general principles
and process are applicable to the design of tunnels, there
are several specific aspects of tunnels that merit detailed
consideration and many of these are identified in this
Digest. Figure 2 shows the general fire engineering process.
At the start of the fire engineering process, a qualitative
design review (QDR) is undertaken to characterise the
nature of the tunnel, to identify design challenges, and
potential fire safety issues and possible design solutions
(see section 3 of this Digest).
One of the functions of the QDR is to set and agree
the acceptance criteria and what quantitative analysis
(QA) should be undertaken. Generally, there are two
kinds of life safety acceptance criteria:
Comparative: where the level of risk for a comparable
activity eg travel by similar surface transport (or a
design to a prescriptive standard) is compared to the
level of risk of the proposed tunnel design.
Absolute: where some countries have set levels of
risk, for example 1 x 10-4 per year for workers or and
1x10-6 per year for members of the public.
Most countries fall into the former of these two categories
and so national standards and international good
practice for fire safety in tunnels can be important in

setting benchmark risk or design standards. National and

international standards for tunnel fire safety include:
road:
PIARC[9]
BD 78/99[10]
NFPA 502.[11]
rail:
EU[12]
NFPA 130.[13]
There are individual company standards for fire safety
in tunnels produced by operators such as London
Underground and MTRC (Mass Transit Rail Corporation
in Hong Kong). It should also be noted that each of the
prescriptive standards listed above contains an implicit
fire strategy. For example, some of the standards (where
urban tunnels are the norm) contain greater provisions
for the intervention of fire and rescue services than others
where remote tunnels are most common.
Once the QDR has been completed, the QA can be
undertaken. This can take various forms, including QA of
fire growth, smoke movement, detection and activation
of systems, response and movement of people, fire and
rescue service intervention and behaviour of structure.
Tunnel-specific aspects of this analysis are discussed in
section 4 of this Digest.
Once the QA has been completed, the output can be
compared with the acceptance criteria and a judgement
made on the adequacy or otherwise, of the proposed
fire safety solution. Where complex fire-engineering
analysis is used, there may be a need for an independent
third party review to provide an expert view on the
appropriateness of the analysis.[14]

3 QUALITATIVE DESIGN REVIEW

The QDR (also known as the fire engineering design brief
or fire engineering brief) can be described as a process
for ensuring that all the individual aspects of the tunnel
design can be considered in the context of the fire safety
objectives (such as life safety, property protection and
business continuity) and that the impact of proposed
design solutions on other aspects of the tunnel design are
fully appreciated.
The QDR should include a meeting with the tunnel
project fire safety stakeholders. Tunnel projects tend to

FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

have different stakeholders from buildings. For example,

there is generally no architect and the lack of a central
coordinating role can make it difficult to integrate fire
safety engineering in the design process. Instead of a
developer, the clients for many tunnel projects are local or
national governments and they have specific governance
and due diligence needs; depending on their location
they may not have previous tunnel project experience.
The QDR should follow the general procedures set out in
one of the codes of practice on fire safety engineering, eg:
review of the design of the tunnel
establish tunnel fire safety design objectives
identify fire hazards and possible consequences
establish trial fire safety designs
identify acceptance criteria and methods of analysis
establish scenarios for analysis.

Design fires can also be challenging to define. There are

only a limited amount of full-scale experimental data.
Data that do exist are often for a different type of rail
carriage built to different standards. However, there are
sources of information that may be useful in defining a
design fire.

The QDR should also take into account the variables

listed in section 1 of this Digest.

The review of literature relating to fires in similar tunnel

systems will provide insight into the experience of other
tunnels with similar fire hazards. Cone calorimetry can
provide a bench-scale measurement of the potential rate
of heat release which can be useful in providing bounding
values of peak rate of heat release. Furniture calorimetry
can provide information on potential fire growth rates
and the likely interaction of different material in a realistic
arrangement/orientation.
Each approach has its limitations and if the additional
information from tasks 1 to 3 does not provide a
robust basis for consensus on the design fire(s), then
consideration can be given to computer fire modelling
and full-scale fire experiments.
Computer fire modelling (using data from the cone
and furniture calorimetry) can provide insight into the
interaction between the growing fire and the carriage/
ventilation openings. Full-scale fire experiments can
provide the evidence of the performance of the whole
carriage assembly or typical road vehicles.Throughout the
approach outlined above, consideration should be given
to the potential for more than one design fire because
this:
reflects the likely experience of a tunnel system
resolves the design fire dilemma by allowing explicit
consideration of more frequent as well as less likely
(larger) fire sizes
ensures that the design is robust against a range of fire
scenarios (bigger design fires do not always err on the
side of safety)
will naturally support a probabilistic safety case, if this
is required for the new tunnel system.

4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This section discusses some of the challenges in
undertaking a QA for fire engineering in a tunnel. There
is also useful information and data contained in a number
European tunnel fire research projects, such as UPTUN,
FIT and SAFE-T.[15-21]

Initiation and growth of fire

The QDR will have identified the fire hazards relevant to
the tunnel system under consideration, eg:
road tunnel: largely uncontrolled and uncontrollable,
with the possible exception of hazardous materials
which can be controlled. It should be noted that
many of the multi-fatality road tunnel fires involved
HGVs that were carrying loads that are not normally
considered major hazards, such as flour, margarine,
tyres and furniture.
rail tunnel: more controlled (eg reaction to fire testing
of vehicle materials) and staff action (eg first-aid fire
fighting).
The operating mode of the tunnel may have an impact
on fire hazards. For example, some tunnels only allow
transport of hazardous materials to take place overnight
when the tunnel is closed to passengers.
The most important consideration around the initiation
and growth of fire in tunnel fire safety engineering is
the definition of one or more design fires. Design fire
sizes play a significant role in the fire safety strategy and
the required performance of fire protection systems
used in railway systems. For example, the sizing of jet
fans in tunnels or the evacuation strategy from stations.
Therefore, there may be a need to define design fires, for
example:
a growing internal carriage fire for evacuation from the
train
a steady state fully developed carriage fire for the
design of ventilation systems and protection to the
tunnel structure.

Design fires
There is no definitive method of defining a design fire
for a tunnel system, however, the following sources of
information are relevant:
1. Review of literature relating to fires in similar tunnel
systems.
2. Cone calorimetry (eg ISO 5660-1[22]).
3. Furniture calorimetry of sub-assemblies such as a
typical seating and wall/ceiling corner arrangement.

One of the myths of design fires is that bigger is always

safer. There may situations where this assumption may
break down illustrated in the following scenarios.

Scenario 1
In one situation, a very large and fast-growing fire was
selected for the design of a tunnel rail system. The
designers identified a base design and alternative designs
that included additional fire precautions. They then
undertook a quantitative risk analysis to compare the
base and alternative designs. However, this analysis found

 FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

that there was no safety benefit from the additional fire
precautions (because of the severity of the design fire).
Whereas, against a range of more realistic fires, the analysis
is more likely to have shown some reduction in risk for the
designs incorporating additional fire precautions.

Scenario 2
A large design fire indicated that longitudinal ventilation
would have been beneficial in reducing risk. However,
when a range of fire sizes and their likelihoods were
analysed, this showed that an alternative natural
ventilation strategy was safer because of the risk
associated with smaller, more frequent fires.

Other design considerations

Other tunnel design fire points should be considered:
There is some evidence that longitudinal ventilation
may increase the rate of heat release of a tunnel
fire.[8] Some very high multiples are presented in the
literature, but the true extent of this increase is not
clear given the current scientific evidence.
There is some evidence that thermal instabilities
determine fire spread between packages of fuel such
as vehicles.[8]
Tunnel safety management can have a large impact
on tunnel fires. For example, the Channel tunnel fire
in 1996[23] only apparently stopped spreading when
it encountered an HGV trailer load containing tinned
pineapples. Although tinned pineapples are not yet a
standard fire precaution, Channel tunnel freight trains
now stagger combustible and non-combustible loads,
when possible, to reduce the potential for fire spread
between trailers.

Smoke movement
One of the main forms of QA for fire safety engineering
in tunnels is the modelling of smoke movement. Smoke is
the main hazard to life in most fires and the geometry of
most tunnels can lead to very rapid uni- or bi-directional
flow of smoke.
There are two main approaches to the modelling of
smoke movement in tunnels: zone modelling, such as
FASIT, and computational fire dynamics (CFD), such as
JASMINE.
Zone and CFD modelling of tunnel smoke movement
are described in the literature.[8, 21, 24] Zone modelling is
usually used where there are a large number of cases to
be analysed in the early design stages of a tunnel project.
Variations that need to be considered include:
fire scenario (size and location)
ventilation conditions (natural, normal, forced and
emergency)
emergency evacuation scenario
fire strategy.
These variations can lead to a significant number of
combinations of variables. CFD modelling is usually used
later in the design process when there are fewer variables
and cases, and where details of the flow and visualisation
of the results are much more important.

Computational fluid dynamics

For CFD modelling, it is worth noting that not all models
are the same and two types of turbulence model are
currently used:
Reynolds averaging numerical simulation (RANS) eg
k- which provides a prediction of the average flows
resulting from turbulent eddy formation and break-up.
Large eddy simulations (LES), which attempt to predict
the flow of large eddies.
Competent CFD users can make an informed choice as to
the type of turbulence CFD model to use. For example,
LES CFD models have been developed more recently
and provide a strong visual image of turbulent mixing,
whereas RANS CFD models have been applied to a wide
range of fire applications and are typically more widely
validated against full-scale experiments.
When presented with CFD simulations (some of the
animations can be quite seductive), it is also worth asking:
to what extent has the modelling been validated for
tunnels?
are the solutions independent of the CFD grid?
are the boundary conditions realistic and conservative?
Additional guidance on good practice in CFD modelling is
given by Kumar S.[21]

Tunnel ventilation and fire plume interactions

Another important consideration in the movement of
smoke in tunnels is the speed with which the smoke
might start to affect occupants. Recent research indicates
that there may be a dynamic interaction between the
tunnel ventilation conditions and the fire plume, which
can cause the smoke layer to descend very rapidly.[25]
There is strong eye-witness and other circumstantial
evidence that one of the factors that contributed to the
loss of life in the Mont Blanc and Tauern tunnel fires
was the rapid loss of a clear layer once rapid fire growth
of a high fire load HGV occurred. Computer modelling
and experiments have shown how a rapid reduction of
clear layer height and a reverse of the clear layer flow
downwind of the fire can occur. The tunnel section may
become rapidly filled with hot toxic smoke and processes
such as diffusion, turbulent mixing or loss of buoyancy
have traditionally been identified as the cause. A previous
study proposed that plume entrainment and continuity
may also contribute to the effect.[26]
A numerical study, using the CFD fire model JASMINE,
covered a range of parametric simulations of various
fire scenarios in longitudinally ventilated road tunnels
with rectangular and arch cross-sections. A tunnel
section extending 700 m downstream was modelled.
The fire modelled was indicative of an HGV fire of
varying intensity and was based on previous published
information[8] and the Runehamar tunnel fire tests.[27, 28]
Peak heat release rates were in the range 30 MW to
150MW. Figure 3 shows the smoke visibility for a tunnel
fire growing to 70 MW and the resultant rapid loss in
visibility (note the rapid loss between 5 and 7 minutes
along 400 m of the tunnel).

FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

At critical velocity

Minutes

10

5m

15
100

200

Light grey = visibility <5 m

Red = visibility <1.5 m

300

400

500

600

700

Metres

Figure 3: Loss of visibility in a tunnel fire.

Fire engineering analysis that takes account of a range

of ventilation conditions (ambient and mechanical) and
fire scenarios and included tenability analysis[29] should
address this effect.

Smoke extraction systems

With longitudinal smoke control systems in tunnels,
there is always the dilemma of when to activate it and
which way to blow the smoke.[29] Quantitative fire risk
analysis can inform these decisions, but the challenge for
the operator to make the right decision on the day, with
limited and perhaps conflicting information, and under
time pressure, remains.
Therefore, some road tunnels in Europe are now
being fitted with smoke extraction systems. Some tunnels
use semi- or fully transverse ventilation systems which
are operated in a smoke extraction mode during a fire.
If configured correctly, these should improve tunnel
conditions, but most of them only extract a small fraction
of a m3/s per metre length of tunnel from the tunnel and
so their effectiveness, against for example an HGV fire,
should be analysed carefully.
Other tunnels are incorporating dedicated smoke
extraction systems that are intended to restrict the
presence of smoke to, for example a 100 m section of
the tunnel covered by typically three extraction points.
Some systems also use jet fans on either side of the fire
to increase the efficiency of the extraction system and
balance the flow. Many road tunnel extraction systems
are being designed to deal with a 30 MW fire. Although
a 30MW fire may equate to a bus fire, its effectiveness
against an HGV fire (which may be up to 100 MW[8])
should be analysed.

Fire resistance
The structural stability of the tunnel lining is a key
safety factor in the event of a fire. In many modern
tunnels, high-strength concrete is used as the tunnel
lining material. Concrete contains a high percentage
of water chemically bound into its structure and when
exposed to high temperatures (greater than 400C), the
water is released and turns to steam. Without a route
to atmosphere, the pressure of the steam can build up
within the concrete and lead to spalling. With highstrength concrete this spalling can be explosive.
The use of high-strength concrete has increased
worldwide in recent years. The reduced section sizes
resulting from the increase in material strength provide
the potential for significant savings in construction costs.
There is a very real concern, however, regarding the
performance of such concretes in fire. Research has
shown that high-strength concrete is prone to explosive
spalling failure on heating.[30, 31] Such failure could lead to
catastrophic collapse and represents a significant threat to
the life safety of those in and around the tunnel or to the
tunnel itself.
Previous research and commercial testing has shown
the potential for polypropylene fibres to be used in
conjunction with high-strength concrete to achieve the
necessary performance requirements in relation to fire
resistance. Tests on high-strength concrete columns
with compressive strengths up to 100 N/mm, as well as
elevated temperature testing of tunnel lining segments,
have been undertaken for different projects including
the Channel tunnel rail link and Heathrow terminal 5.
It is important that any testing undertaken incorporates
transient temperature tests including a range of nominal
fire curves in conjunction with steady-state loading
conditions to demonstrate the suitability of specific design
solutions. It is also important that the residual strength of

 FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

Figure 4: Concrete specimens (without and with polypropylene fibres) after they have been fire tested.

cores from the test specimens is tested. Figure 4 shows

concrete specimens (without and with polypropylene
fibres) after they have been fire tested.

Activation of fire detection and suppression

Fire detection

One of the main factors in ensuring a safe outcome to

a tunnel fire is early detection. Many fires are detected
by tunnel occupants, who raise the alarm at emergency
extinguisher/call points in road tunnels or emergency
communication systems in railway carriages. Other fires
may be hidden from tunnel occupants during their early
stages. There are a range of technologies that can be
applied to automatically detect fires in tunnels.[8] There
are, however, some aspects of the tunnel environment
that make the detection of fires more challenging and
these include:
The fire may be moving. This makes detection more
difficult because the products of combustion (heat
and smoke) are diluted, which makes the fire harder
to detect. It also means that if the fire is detected, it
is no longer in the same location as the products of
combustion that have been detected.
Strong and fluctuating air movements due to rolling
stock/vehicle movements or atmospheric differences
between the tunnel portals will also dilute and move
the products of combustion.
Mechanical ventilation in road tunnels to dilute carbon
monoxide from vehicle exhausts may also dilute and
move the products of combustion. Feedback loops
in these systems may, in effect, hide the fire by trying
to maintain a low concentration of carbon monoxide
with increased ventilation velocities.
The atmosphere may be corrosive, hot, dirty and dusty.
There may be electrical interference of electronic
devices, cables and boards.

Temperatures can change through external conditions

in the portal area.
The fire detection system must be resistant to cleaning
machines.
There may be hot exhaust fumes from trucks (with high
exhaust pipes) held up in traffic jams.
There may be mechanical forces from high speed
trains, goods lost from HGVs or a sailing boat mast
touching the tunnel ceiling.
Added to these challenges is the fact that there is no failsafe operation for a tunnel fire detection system. There
are risks to tunnel occupants if a fire detection system
operates when there is no fire, and if there is a delay in
detection or the system fails to detect a real fire.

Fire suppression
Fire suppression in most tunnels is by first-aid fire fighting
with fire extinguishers by tunnel occupants and by the
fire and rescue service response to a fire. Some heavy rail
power cars also have a suppression system built in.
Recently there has been increased interest in
automatic fire suppression systems in tunnels, particularly
those road tunnels that are used by HGVs. Some road
tunnels incorporate manually operated water deluge
systems and these have been reported to have operated
effectively in some fire events.[32] Again, these systems are
not without their challenges, as:
many tunnel fires are covered (eg they may be under
the roof of a road vehicle or rail carriage)
they introduce water to the road surface
they reduce visibility.
One rail tunnel system, dedicated to the transport of
freight, also incorporates a sprinkler system to deal with
releases of flammable liquids.[33]

FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

Other more innovative suppression systems have been

proposed and some have been tested.[15] These include:
oxygen depletion
water mist
inflatable tunnel plugs.
There is some design analysis that indicates that
suppression systems can be highly effective in ensuring
business continuity in strategically important tunnel links.
The fire in the Channel tunnel in 1996 resulted in an
extensive outage of the incident bore and so resulted in
significantly reduced operation and subsequent loss of
revenue.[23]
Some research and project design life safety fire risk
analysis have indicated that the cost of an automatic
suppression system usually far outweighs the reduction
in risk, ie the level of risk to life without the suppression
system is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
This outcome of the risk/cost-benefit analysis for life
safety is generally due to the low level of risk in most
tunnels. The result may be different if the frequency
and/or consequence of fires increase or the analysis takes
business continuity and/or sustainability into account.

Fire service intervention

When considering access and facilities for the fire and
rescue service, consideration should be given to the
potential extent and duration of tunnel fire incidents. The
1996 Channel tunnel and Mont Blanc tunnel fires burned
for many hours before being suppressed.
In safety philosophy, there can be two strategic
options: a safe place or safe person. An example of a
safe place philosophy in tunnel fire safety is maintaining
a tenable atmosphere through an emergency ventilation
system, whereas the safe person alternative might be
breathing apparatus. Although a safe place philosophy
is usually preferred in tunnel fire safety, it is not always
possible or practicable.
Another aspect of tunnels that can have a significant
impact on fire service intervention is the tunnels
remoteness. The tunnel portals may be in a remote rural
part of a country or the tunnel may be so long that much
of its length is remote from the portals. In some tunnels,
specially designed emergency access vehicles or trolleys
have been provided. It is also worth considering that not
all prescriptive codes provide for the same access and
facilities for the fire and rescue service. Some tunnel fire
codes, written in countries with many rural tunnels and a
lower provision of emergency intervention, may prescribe
very little in the way of access and facilities for the fire
and rescue service.

The behaviour of people in tunnel fires shows many

similarities to that in other types of buildings:
Recognition, response/pre-egress activities and
evacuation stages apply in both cases; a persons role
has a major effect on the behaviour they will exhibit,
and people cluster in family, social or ad-hoc groups.
Communication between people occurs throughout
the incident, in order to raise the alarm, and give
instructions/directions to the exits.
Pre-egress activity includes similar actions to those
performed in building fires, eg investigation, firefighting, searching for, warning and rescuing others.
Rapidly-worsening conditions in tunnel fires may,
however, reduce the options available to people.
During evacuation, people usually head away from the
fire, although they may often find themselves moving
through smoke. Tunnel portals (familiar routes) will be
preferred to side exits unless directions to the contrary are
given, or smoke/darkness leaves no choice.
Some differences from other building fires are that
drivers are very reluctant to abandon their vehicles, and
in rail tunnels, passengers are reluctant to abandon their
luggage. Another difference is the consideration of which
language(s) tunnel will understand. Depending on the
location and use of the tunnel, one or two languages
may be understood sufficiently well to follow simple
emergency instructions. Pictograms can also be very
useful in communicating emergency messages.

Fire risk analysis

Quantitative fire risk analysis

Response of people and evacuation

Quantitative fire risk analysis is widely used in the design

and operation of tunnels for a range of reasons,[4, 37]
including:
Tunnel fire experience indicates that it is highly
probabilistic in nature, eg the London Underground
operated relatively safely for nearly 100 years until the
Kings Cross fire killed 30 people in 1987.
Tunnel fire experience also shows that tunnel fire
deaths are relatively rare, but that fatal fire events are
likely to involve large numbers of fatalities.[37] Society
naturally has a greater aversion to hazards that cause
multiple deaths in a single incident.
Many of the factors important in tunnel fire safety are
highly variable, including:
location of the fire
fire growth rate
peak rate of heat release
air flow velocity and direction
number, location and mobility of people present
response of occupants
reliability of systems.

Over 700 people have perished in the last 10 years in

serious tunnel fires across the world. Following these
disasters, a major research effort has reviewed the
behaviour of people in tunnel fire incidents, large and
small.[34, 35] This knowledge is useful when considering the
design and operation of the tunnel and it has also been
used to adapt a generic human behaviour and evacuation
simulation in order to model tunnel emergencies.[36]

The above factors mean that to avoid designing and

operating an unsafe tunnel, or an overly-expensive tunnel,
it is necessary to gain a broad understanding of the level
of safety (or risk) in a tunnel. Deterministic analysis alone
cannot provide insight into the combinations of factors
that can give rise to a range of fire outcomes. Only
quantitative fire risk analysis can provide a robust insight

 FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

Hazard
identification

Frequency
analysis

Consequence
analysis

Risk
reduction

Risk
evaluation

Risk
acceptable?

No

Yes

End

Figure 5: General process for a quantitative fire risk analysis.

to aid informed decision making.[4, 24, 37] Figure 5 shows the

process for a quantitative fire risk analysis.

Fire risk assessment using points schemes or risk

indices
Some organisations use points schemes or risk indices
to assess the level of fire risk in a tunnel.[38] The main
advantage of points schemes and risk indices is that they
are generally quick and easy to use. However, they often
have significant limitations including:
they give a fixed value to each type of fire precaution
and so have an inherent fire strategy. This will mean
that a safe tunnel using a different fire strategy will be
unfairly penalised.
these fixed values are based on arbitrary judgements of
contribution not physical measures.
these arbitrary values are combined in a way that is not
physically meaningful.
For example, a points score for emergency lighting might
be added, among other things, to a score for traffic
management. What are the units of these scores? What is
the meaning of their addition (other than more is better)?
Even so, in terms of risk ranking, this approach masks the
real value of each individual fire safety measure in the
context of each tunnel and so may be highly misleading.

5 CONCLUSIONS
The number and variety of tunnels has increased and
is continuing to increase. It is increasingly difficult to
apply prescriptive tunnel fire safety guidance to these
tunnels and ensure a safe and cost-effective solution.
Fire engineering offers a rational approach to identify
safe and cost-effective design solutions for tunnels.
Design fires are a crucial part of a tunnel fire
engineering design process or tunnel safety case. A
range of complementary techniques should be used
to identify robust and appropriate design fires. Design
fires should consider fire growth as well as a peak
rate of heat release. A range of design fires should
be identified for different scenarios (with different
likelihoods of occurrence).
The modelling of smoke movement should be
undertaken using models that are appropriate for
tunnels and well validated. The analysis should be
undertaken by people who are competent in the
application of the model to tunnel fire situations.
Multiple fire and ventilation scenarios, including the
fire growths stage, should be modelled to gain the
necessary insight into tunnel fire dynamics and the
resultant tunnel fire hazard development.
The potential effectiveness of smoke extraction systems
(and semi- and fully transverse ventilation systems)

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FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

should be assessed for credible fire scenarios for

tunnels.
The structural response of the tunnel lining should be
considered for the safety of fire fighters and business
continuity and for the safety of tunnel occupants in
tunnels under water. For concrete linings consideration
should be given to improving the linings resistance to
spalling.
The detection of fires and information on the
fires location are complex and require careful
consideration.This consideration should include the
specification and design of systems and their interface
with the operational procedures and training of tunnel
operators and staff.
There is some evidence that tunnel fire suppression
systems can be very effective in suppressing a
tunnel fire. Tunnel fire suppression systems may
also have unwanted side effects that should be
considered in their specification and operation. A
range of suppression systems have been proposed
for application in tunnels and experimental evidence
indicates that they have a wide range of performance.
Therefore, evidence of effectiveness should be sought
and thoroughly reviewed before a suppression system
is specified. [39]
Consideration should be given to the logistical
challenges of emergency intervention. Alternative
approaches to the design of access and facilities for fire
and rescue services can be very cost-effective, and for
some long remote tunnels they are essential.
The likely behaviour of tunnel occupants in a fire
should also be considered. Evidence indicates that
people in tunnels behave in a similar way to people in
buildings, eg they take time to recognise an emergency
and their first response is unlikely to be evacuation.
One major difference in human behaviour in tunnel
fires is that people tend to be very reluctant to leave
their vehicles and possessions. Tunnel emergency
communication systems have an essential role to
play in enabling occupants to make good and timely
decisions in a fire situation.
Quantitative fire risk analysis is essential in the
development of safe and cost-effective design solutions
for tunnels. They may also be a regulatory requirement
in tunnels that are only allowed to operate under a
safety case regime. Quantitative fire risk analyses allow
rational informed decisions to be made concerning
small frequent fires and larger more rare fires in a way
that can be communicated to stakeholders. Conversely,
fire risk assessments based on simple points schemes
have many limitations and drawbacks that can mean
that their results are at best misleading.

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shuttle 7539 on 18 November 1996. HMSO, London.

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11

[24] Charters D, 1992. Fire risk assessment of rail tunnels. In:

Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Safety in Road
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Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Madrid, April

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[38] Tetzner D, Foit W, 2001. Minimum protection measures

in the case of fire in road tunnels. In: Proceedings of 4th
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construction products, environmental profiles and assessments.
www.redbooklive.com.

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FIRE ENGINEERING in TUNNELS DG 509

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