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The Red Brigades were a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that emerged in Italy in 1970. They were the largest and most violent left-wing armed group in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, responsible for 145 killings. The Red Brigades aimed to overthrow capitalist society and establish communist rule. Their tactics escalated over time from property damage to political assassinations, most notably the 1978 kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Repression by the Italian state and loss of public support led to the Red Brigades' decline in the late 1980s.
The Red Brigades were a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that emerged in Italy in 1970. They were the largest and most violent left-wing armed group in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, responsible for 145 killings. The Red Brigades aimed to overthrow capitalist society and establish communist rule. Their tactics escalated over time from property damage to political assassinations, most notably the 1978 kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Repression by the Italian state and loss of public support led to the Red Brigades' decline in the late 1980s.
The Red Brigades were a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that emerged in Italy in 1970. They were the largest and most violent left-wing armed group in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, responsible for 145 killings. The Red Brigades aimed to overthrow capitalist society and establish communist rule. Their tactics escalated over time from property damage to political assassinations, most notably the 1978 kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Repression by the Italian state and loss of public support led to the Red Brigades' decline in the late 1980s.
in Italian; hereafter BR), which emerged in October 1970, are to be found in the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano (CPM), formed in Milan in September 1969 with the support of various local workers and students committees. Among other left-wing armed groups operating in Italy since the early 1970s the BR was the largest, the leading organization in terms of degree of political violence deployed, claiming 145 killings, and most long-lived, lasting, despite splitting up into various groups and wings, until the end of the 1980s. It was strictly organized into city columns: Milan and Turin were the first, which were subdivided into brigades with three- to five-member cells. Over time the city columns expanded into Rome, Genoa, Naples, and Venice. Over the 1970s and the 1980s it was estimated as being composed of over 400 full-time members, plus an unknown number of supporters. Italian left-wing political violence originated out of the increasing fear that a possible coup detat was just around the corner and from the conviction that the state was part of a conspiratory anticommunist strategy of tension, facilitated by the Italian secret service, parts of the army, and the American CIA. This influenced the collective decision of some extraparliamentary left-wing groups to resort to violence as a weapon of political competition (della Porta 1995). They saw an armed response as the only way to oppose the total domination of the Italian working class, which was seen to have been abandoned by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), unwilling to serve any longer in the vanguard of the struggle for the proletariat in its drive to become a credible democratic force. An opportunity existed for a champion of revolution to emerge on the left of the PCI, and the BR identified
themselves completely with this role (Melucci
1981). Marxist-Leninist in its ideology and organizational structure, the BR aimed to perpetuate and even radicalize the 1969 labor conflict, providing armed support to striking workers. Capitalist society, controlled nationally by the Christian Democrat (DC) establishment and globally by American imperialism, was, in its leaders view (among others, Renato Curcio, Alberto Franceschini, Mara Cagol, and Mario Moretti) a monster preparing to demolish the world, against which the use of force to undermine the status quo was legitimate in order to bring a communist upheaval led by a revolutionary proletariat. Acts of physical violence soon followed their bellicose rhetoric. Initially the groups main activities were fairly low level. They did not go beyond damaging company properties, setting fire to numerous automobiles owned by business executives, security staff, and heads of sections, or the brief kidnapping of industrial managers and right-wing trade unionists. In those factories where they were present (Sit Siemens, Alfa Romeo, Magneti Marelli, Pirelli, and FIAT) members of the BR carried out what they termed counterinformation: the exposure of the hidden maneuvering of capitalist power. The development of the BR towards the adoption of more specifically radical repertoires came about gradually. The new task of the organization, by the mid 1970s, was that of attacking and destroying capitalist power by striking against the heart of the Italian state, seen as the imperialist collection of multinational corporations (Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali, SIM). Violent action shifted from the factory to more directly political objectives, the DC. In 1976 the BR killing of General Public Prosecutor of Genoa, Francesco Coco, and two members of his bodyguard, marked an ominous change in its tactics. The declining social protest movement
The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements,
Edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781405198431.wbespm376
re d br i g a de s ( i taly )
in Italy during the 1960s and early 1970s;
activists everyday conflicts with the police; the beginning of the historic compromise between the DC and PCI that caused widespread indignation in the extraparliamentary Left; and the competition within this same milieu with other left-wing armed groups, like the Front Line and the Fighting Communist Front (for recruits, financial support, and attention), were all important factors in the further radicalization of the BR repertoire (della Porta 1995). The most famous and emblematic crime of the BR was the kidnapping in 1978 and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro (with five bodyguards killed), who had twice served as prime minister and was one of the most important leaders of the DC. The sociopolitical conditions of the late 1970s and the new repressive emergency measures, which constrained organizational resources and recruitment capacities, brought a further radicalization of the BR, leading to a sort of encapsulation from the outside world, in order to survive, keeping its organizational integrity, but at the cost of becoming more and more out of touch with political reality (della Porta 1995). The increasing brutality of its actions ended up disgusting not only the broader public, but also its own constituency. Public disapproval of the killing of Moro and other extreme crimes gave the state the opportunity to regain its legitimacy. The trade unions and the PCI engaging in proactive campaigns against left-wing underground groups; internal conflict over strategy; state antiterrorist measures of heavy military repression; and the onset of penitence or active collaboration (repentance law of 1980) by a number of
captured militants from early 1980, were all
factors which progressively drove the BR to its end: a process that took almost a decade to complete, from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. The organization never announced a complete cessation of its military activities, but essentially folded due to a lack of armed activists, given that most of them were either dead, in prison, or had decided to quit (Bosi & della Porta forthcoming). A new group with few links with the BR performed the last violent attacks, in 1999 killing Massimo DAntona, and in 2002 Marco Biagi, both labor advisors to the Italian government. This armed group, the BR-Partito Comunista Combattente, deserves a totally separate analysis, despite its claim to links with the old organization. SEE ALSO: Direct action; Marxism and social movements; Radicalism; Terrorist movements; Violence and social movements. REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS Bosi, L., and della Porta, D. (forthcoming) Processes out of political violence: A comparative historical sociology of Italian left-wing underground organizations and the Provisional IRA. In Gunning, J. (ed.), How Does Terrorism End? Routledge, London. della Porta, D. (1995) Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Melucci, A. (1981) New movements, terrorism, and the political system: Reflections on the Italian case. Socialist Review 56, 97136.
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