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Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands
b
Department of Economic and Social Psychology, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Received 19 May 2004
Abstract
People experience regret when they realize that they would have been better oV had they decided diVerently. Hence, a central element in regret is the comparability of a decision outcome with the outcomes forgone. Up to now, however, the comparison process
that is so essential to the experience of regret has not been the subject of psychological research. In this article, we tune in on the comparison dependency of regret. We argue that factors that reduce the tendency to compare attenuate regret, and demonstrate that
uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes (Experiment 1), and incomparability of counterfactual and factual outcomes (Experiments 2 and 3) produce such eVects.
2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Regret; Comparability; Uncertainty
0749-5978/$ - see front matter 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.04.001
E. van Dijk, M. Zeelenberg / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 97 (2005) 152160
comparison process that elicits regret. The Wrst issue pertaining to this process is that whereas people will often
be certain about the factual outcomes they obtained, the
outcomes they could have obtained will typically be surrounded with uncertainty. For example, we may know
the salary we currently earn, but we are often not certain
about the exact salary we would have obtained if only
we had studied Wnance rather than psychology. How
does this potential uncertainty about what might have
been aVect regret?
The second issue is that even if we are certain about
what we missed out on, these counterfactual outcomes
may be of a diVerent kind than the outcomes we actually obtained. What diVerence does it make whether
after buying a car, one Wnds out that a similar car was
available for $100 less, or whether a dissimilar car was
available for $100 less? How does reduced comparability between actual and factual outcomes aVect regret?
This is a basic question that taps directly into the comparison that is believed to be so central to the emotion
of regret, but to our knowledge it has not been
addressed before.
Using an experimental setup, we will argue and demonstrate that both uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes and comparability of counterfactual outcomes
with the factual outcome are factors that have a direct
impact on the emotion regret.
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Certain
CD
Walkman
4.41a
5.96b
7.04c
6.89c
E. van Dijk, M. Zeelenberg / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 97 (2005) 152160
155
Method
Table 2
Mean regret ratings per condition, Experiment 2
Own prize
Book token
Liquor store token
Missed prize
Book token
4.71
3.64
3.91
4.64
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Table 3
Mean regret ratings per condition, Experiment 3
Comparison
orientation
Missed prize
Same category
(book token)
DiVerent category
(liquor store token)
Method
Low
High
6.30
6.42
4.60
6.45
First-year Social Science students at Tilburg University (11 males, 63 females; and Mage D 19.42 years) participated voluntarily. They were randomly assigned to
one of the four conditions of (Missed prize: D50 book
token vs. D50 liquor store token) 2 (comparison orientation: low vs. high) factorial design.
In the beginning of the academic year, we administered the IowaNetherlands comparison orientation
measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) to a group
of Wrst-year students ( D 0.69). The INCOM consists of
11 items that measure the comparison orientation (e.g.,
I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things; I always like to know
what others in a similar situation would do).
Eight months later, we contacted the students whose
score fell in the highest 30-percentile range of the social
comparison scores (i.e., those with a relatively high need to
compare) and the students whose score fell in the lowest
30-percentile range (i.e., those with a relatively low need to
compare). We asked them to participate in a study and we
presented them with the scratch card scenario.
Participants read the scenario of Experiment 2, in
which now all participants read that they had won a
book token for D15. As in Experiment 2, participants
read that the remaining scratch card was bought by
someone else, and that this other person won a book
token [liquor store token] of D50. After this, participants
were asked how much regret they would feel (1 D not at
all; 9 D very much).
General discussion
E. van Dijk, M. Zeelenberg / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 97 (2005) 152160
tainty, and introducing a novel connection between counterfactual thinking and nonconsequential reasoning.
Prior research on counterfactual reasoning implicitly
assumed that if people generate counterfactuals (either
because they generate these themselves or because they
are oVered some counterfactuals by the researcher), these
counterfactual outcomes are consequential in the sense
that they will be entered as an input in the comparison of
what is with what could have been. The literature on nonconsequential reasoning (ShaWr & Tversky, 1992; Van
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003) stresses that people do not
always engage in consequential reasoning, and that one
crucial aspect to consider is the (un)certainty people may
experience regarding outcomes. The current Wndings suggest that the fact that people may not think through the
consequences of uncertain counterfactual outcomes may
be a blessing because it may protect people from the aversive feeling of regret.
The second and third experiments on the comparability of counterfactual and factual outcomes illustrate a
similar process in the sense that people may be less likely
to engage in comparative reasoning if comparisons are
more diYcult to make. In this article, we show how the
diYculty to compare may aVect feelings of regret. In particular, the Wndings suggest that if outcomes are diYcult
to compare, people may be less likely to experience
regret. As Experiment 3 shows, however, this regretreducing aspect of the diYculty to compare can be overcome if the motivation to compare is high.
On a more general level, our insights can be related to
Tversky and GriYns (1991) contrast and endowment
model of well-being that states that current well-being is
not only dependent on current outcomes, but also on
past experiences. The eVect of endowment represents a
direct eVect of past outcomes: positive experiences make
us happy and negative experiences make us unhappy.
The contrast eVect is more indirect. Satisfaction with
current outcomes may be increased if the outcomes are
preceded by a negative experience, because people may
contrast their current outcome with their negative experience. Satisfaction with current outcomes may be
decreased if the outcomes are preceded by a positive
experience, because people may contrast their current
outcome with their positive experience. This contrast
eVect is fueled by comparison. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Tversky and GriYn also reasoned that comparability of the past with the present may moderate the
contrast eVect. Contrast diminishes as the comparability
of the past with the present diminishes: a bad meal at a
Chinese restaurant has less eVect on our reactions to a
subsequent meal if we enjoy that meal in a French restaurant than if we enjoy it in a Chinese restaurant. The
current Wndings are not only supportive of that reasoning, they also suggest that the basic reasoning extends
beyond the temporal context of past versus current outcomes and well-being.
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