Table of Contents

Abstract.2
1. Introduction...............3
2. Aim....3
3. Motivation.........3
4. Problem Formulation and Research Questions.........4
5. Methodology..........4
5.1. Choices of Theory...............4
5.2. Empirical Approach.9
5.2. Analytical Approach..10
6. Theories and their application...10
6.1. A Changing World after the Fall of the Iron Curtain.11
6.2. Transition in the ex Communist Countries11
6.3. From Communism to a Western Dream.13
6.4. Migration from a Theoretical Perspective..17
6.5. Invasion of the Eastern Migrants19
6.6. The Impact of the EU Enlargement.21
6.7. A New Era in European Migration..22
6.8. The Crisis Effect...24
6.9. Constructing a European Identity.25
6.10. The Way to a European Citizenship?.............................26
6.11. Why Construct a European Identity? 29
7. Empirical Chapter...............32
7.1. National Identity versus European Identity.....33
7.2. European Citizenship...............42
8. Analysis..53
8.1. The Promise of a Better Life...53
8.2. Cultivating Humanity..............54
8.3. Why Cultivate Humanity?...............................................55
8.4. How Efficient are the Measures Taken so Far?...............56
8.5. The European Identity, Stagnating...56
8.6. The European Citizenship, a More Attractive Concept58
9. Conclusions..60
Bibliography.61

Constructing a European Identity in a divided EU

Abstract
The European Union has been going through a lot of changes in the last
decades. It enlarged from 15 to 27 states and it incorporated many ex
Communist countries. The enlargement lead to a wave of migrants from East
to West and that eventually created a tensed environment between the two
sides of the Iron Curtain.
Despite these tensions, the EU and many national authorities have been
making efforts to construct a common European Identity. For this, they have
been using two types of measures: education programmes and media
campaigns. Their approach starts from the hypothesis that national
identities are not fixed but rather fluid and changeable. Therefore, they can
be modified in school and they can be influenced by the press.
It is a difficult task and a long term project, rather meant for the next
generation. But nonetheless, it is seen as a vital task for a better future in
the EU. If the European Identity is constructed in schools, the next
generation of Europeans might have a stronger sense of their common
values and common destiny. This way, the Union could function better and it
could be stronger in the face of outside threats.
However, the European Identity is far from being mature. It seems to be
present in the minds of citizens at least to some extent. But it is still in its
early stages of evolution and it is very unstable.
We can conclude from here, that the measures taken so far for the
construction of the European Identity did have some effects. They planted
the seeds of a common identity in the hearts and minds of the EU
population. However these effects were limited and they could be temporary.
Whether or not the European Identity survives and consolidates in the future
depends on what is done from now on.

1. Introduction
"All eyes on Europe!" This expression has been making the headlines more and more
often in the last years. Due to the recent Greek debt crisis, the whole world has been
watching the European Union with interest, if not worry. The debt crisis is by far the most
serious turmoil that EU has faced in recent history but it is not the first one. The EU has
been going through deep changes and inter-nationality tensions for years. After the fall of
Communism, the body started a process on enlargement and incorporated 12 new
members from the former Socialist block. That led to a wave of migrants from East to
West and created tensions between the two sides of the former Iron Curtain. These
problems may not have been as serious as the current debt crisis, but they did, however
shape the EU into what it is today. Over the last 20 years, Europeans changed not only
the way they interacted with each other but also the way they saw themselves. It has been
a period of evolution for the national identities in the Union and a time when EU
authorities took important measures for the creation of a European Identity.

2. Aim
The aim of this paper is to provide the reader with an insight on the efforts made by the
European Union and the national authorities of the member states, for the construction of
a European Identity. By "European Identity" I mean an identity common to all the people
inside the EU. It does not cover the European countries outside the Union, like Russia or
Ukraine. Although Europe extends, geographically, beyond the borders of the EU, the
attempts made to create a common identity have been focused primarily on the 27
member states. That's why, I will concentrate on a European Identity limited to these 27
states and I will use the terms "EU Identity" and "European Identity" as inter-changeable.
The construction of a European Identity is attempted in the context of a divided and
tensed EU. After the fall of Communism, Eastern states experienced a change in national
identities and slowly evolved from totalitarianism towards Western and European
integration. This lead to a change in migration patterns in Europe, because more and
more Eastern citizens moved to the West looking for a better life. This wave of migrants
created some serious tensions between the two sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain.
Therefore, I will present the efforts to construct a common European Identity, against the
backdrop of these East-West tensions which make the task more difficult.

3. Motivation
I chose this topic because it seemed particularly interesting at this time, when the EU is
going through a period of deep turmoil. With the current debt crisis, many analysts and
3

journalists have been wondering if the European Union, as we know it, would survive. As
interesting as this question is, I don't pretend to try and answer it. I don't know if anybody
could answer it right now. However, my thesis could shed a light on how we got to the
situation we are in now. This knowledge could help avoid some of the same mistakes in
the future and maybe give ideas for an improvement.
The topic is close to me personally too. As a new EU citizen, I actually experienced the
change in national perception after 1989. I experienced the transition from Communism
to the dream of Western Integration. And now, when the dream has almost come true, it is
sad to watch the whole Union fighting to survive.

4. Problem formulation and research questions

My thesis will try to answer the following question: How can a European Identity be
built in the current climate, when the EU is so divided?
In order to answer this better, I will divide it in four research questions.
1. How did the European Union become so divided?
2. How is the EU trying to construct a European Identity?
3. Why is the EU trying to construct a European Identity despite the tensions East-West?
4. How successful have been the measures taken so far ?

5. Methodology
This paper will be written using theoretical academic works as well as second hand
information form Eurobarometre surveys and media articles.

5.1 Choices of theory

The theoretical approach will follow the main question stated in the problem
formulation : How can the European Identity be constructed, in a divided EU? I will start
with the theory choices that will answer the first research question: how did the European
Union become so divided?
Although this is not the main aim of the paper, the discussion about the factors that lead
to the current tensions inside the EU, is very important. It presents the context in which
the European Identity has to be built.

The tensed climate inside the Union is the result of two major developments in
Europe after the fall of Communism: On one hand, the evolution of national identities in
Eastern Europe from totalitarianism to Western Integration. And, on the other hand, the
changing migration patterns on the continent, after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Together,
these two developments created some important tensions between the Eastern and the
Western blocks of the EU.
I will use a constructivist approach to present the evolution of national identities in
Eastern Europe after 1989. I will argue that national identities are not fixed but rather
fluid and changeable. They can be shaped with the right actions and they can be
influenced through media campaigns. For this, I will use an article written by Lilian
Farrel (2010) "Pierre Bordieu on European Identity: Theories of habitus and cultural
capital." - where the author argues that national identities can be mould with the help of
education, media and other social conditionalities. She bases her concept on Pierre
Bourdieu's habitus theory - the theory of social conditioning - which states that social
order is progressively inscribed in peoples minds through cultural products
including systems of education, language, judgments, values, methods of classification
and activities of everyday life. These all lead to an unconscious acceptance of social
differences and hierarchies. It is a constructivist view on the national identity that leads to
a habituated national identity (Farrell, 2010, p.109) By the same principle, national
identities can be changed and adapted to the changing conditions in the world.
I will also use the work of Peter Weinreich (1992) who claims that, after the fall of the
Iron Curtain, Eastern European peoples went through some big changes in their national
identities because of the geopolitical metamorphosis that happened in their region. They
moved from being Communist countries to trying to be stable European states and
integrate in the Western world. Faced with the early 1990s ethnic conflicts, their
authorities made efforts to install and keep peace. They took measures to construct new
national identities, more suitable for the new post-Communist world. And they turned to
a westernization their national identities because Western Integration was seen as the
best if not the only option for stability, freedom and prosperity.
This move towards the West, however, happened under two influences. On one hand,
local authorities made efforts to construct new, pro-Western, national identities. And on
the other hand, Western states pumped funds, logistics and other resources, to push the
former Communist countries on a stable path towards Western integration. This leads us
to the next theory of my thesis, which is focusing on the Development-Security Nexus.
This is mainly based on an article written by Mark Duffield (2010) "The liberal way of
development and the development-security impasse: exploring the global life-chance
divide" . The author argues that, Western Governments often feel the need to intervene in
developing countries and take measures in order to reduce poverty and tackle population
sufferings.
This way, they eliminate potential factors that could lead to unwanted problems in the
developing world (such as civil wars, failed states and safe heavens for terrorists). If they

are not prevented, these problems could, eventually spill to the West. Therefore, by
decreasing the risks in developing states, Western Governments reduce the threats to their
own security.
In Eastern Europe, this need to intervene was more urgent than anywhere else, because of
the geographical position of the region. The former Communist block was situated right
in the doorstep of the Western world and any turmoil there could have spilled over to the
developed states very quickly. That's why, the West felt the need to take rapid measures to
push the ex Communist block on a steady path towards Western Integration.
(Papasotiriou, 2002)
The theory of national identity as a social construction and the development-security
nexus theory are both equally important for this paper. Together, they explain how and
why Eastern European states moved from Communism to Western Integration after 1989.
The next aspect of the thesis talks about a radical change in migration patterns in Europe,
during the last years. I will use a series of International Migration Theories to explain this
change.
The first theory is the Macro Theory of neo-classical economics. According to Masssey
& Al (1993), it states that migration is caused by wages disparities between different
geographical areas. People in countries with low wages tend to move to other states,
where they can earn more. This way, migration is seen as a process influenced
exclusively by macro-economic differences between states and regions. Other factors that
might have an impact on migration are not taken into account.
The second theory is the Micro Theory in neo-classical economics. It presents migration
form a micro, individual perspective. According to this theory, the decision to migrate is
an individual choice, made by a person because of a cost-benefit calculation that makes
them believe they would get a positive return. In this case, migration is a form of
investment. (Massey &All, 1993) People choose to move to a country with better
opportunities, but for that, they have to make an investment first. They invest in travel,
surviving while moving and looking for a job, the efforts to learn a new language and
culture, etc. In this case, the migrants take into account not only labour market and wage
differences but other factors too, such as cost of travel or efforts to adapt.
The third theory is the new economics of migration. It states that the decision to move
abroad is not taken individually, but by an entire family or household. This way, families
are not only looking to increase earnings but they also want to reduce risks. (Massey
&All, 1993)
For example, some members of the family are sent to work in the local market, while
others migrate abroad - even if the country of destination doesn't have higher wages than
the one of origin. This way, if local economy deteriorates and the household loses
income, the family can still rely on migrant remittances for support. This theory presents
the motivation being migration in a new light. There doesn't necessarily have to be a

wage disparity between states, for people to leave their country of origin. Migration takes
place even in the absence of these disparities because the migrants have other alternative
reasons to leave.
The fourth theory is the Dual Market Theory - which states that migration is caused by
the permanent demand for foreign workers in developed economies. It is not generated so
much by push factors in sending countries (such as lower wages or living standards) but
by pull factors in receiving states (the chronic and unavoidable need for migrant workers
derived from low birth rates or better social security programmes that give locals the
freedom to refuse certain low skilled jobs, etc) According to this theory, migration will
always exist as long as the current structures of developed economies exist.
And finally, the fifth theory is the World System Theory. It states that migration is the
natural outcome following the expansion of capitalism to peripheral zones. The
penetration of capitalism in agricultural societies leads to a technologization of the
production process. This way, some workers become redundant and they turn into mobile
population, prone to international migration.
These five theories are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. Together, they
explain the changes in the push and pull factors that lead to a radical change in intraEuropean migration after 1989. They explain why more and more Eastern Europeans
decided to move to the Western block.
I chose economic migration theories because the vast majority of the migrants inside
Europe, were driven by economic factors. Before 1989, the motivation behind East-West
migration was usually political. Eastern citizens would leave their countries because they
were persecuted. After 1989, this changed radically. People from the former Communist
block were not moving to the West to seek political asylum anymore. Now, they were
moving to the West, to look for a better life. In the 1990s, Eastern Europe went through a
period of deep political and economic instability. The population was living a difficult
life, that's why the inhabitants were pulled to the West, by better prospect of living
standards, higher wages, better health care, etc.
These theories of International Migration, corroborated with the constructivist approach
on national identity and the Development-Security Nexus, answer the first research
question of this thesis: Why is the European Union divided? Why there are tensions
between East and West?
I will then use a constructivist approach to present the efforts made to build a EU transnational identity. Here, I will use again Lilian Farrel's article (2010) "Pierre Bordieu on
European Identity: Theories of habitus and cultural capital" , which uses Pierre
Bourdieu's habitus theory to explain why this identity is desirable and how one should
attempt to construct it. Farrel argues that, today's people attachment to nation is
habituated and constructed. During the 19th century, young students were inoculated with
a sense of national conscience in schools, through the teaching of national history,
literature, etc. Now, a European Identity should be built with the help of the education
system. If the school is the place where social conditioning takes place, then the

education system can be used as a field to habituate a European Identity (Farrell, 2010,
p. 108). The best way to develop this trans-national identity is through extensive use of
study abroad programmes for students. This way, youngsters get the chance to see other
cultures, to live in other countries and to interact with their fellow citizens of the EU.
These experiences should help them overcome an exclusively national identity and
develop a multicultural sense of membership (Farrel, 2010, p.109) Also, training trips
abroad for teachers can be useful.
The idea of using the education system to construct a sense of trans-national
consciousness, is also expressed by Martha Nussbaum in her 1997 book Cultivating
Humanity: A Classical Defense for Reform in Liberal Education and in her 2003 article
"Education for citizenship in an era of global connection". She argues that, universities
around the world should educate young people to become global citizens, rather than
members of a certain national or ethnic group.
For this, the higher education system should promote, in students, three very important
abilities.
1. The ability to critically examine one's self and one's culture and traditions.
2. The ability to perceive ourselves as human beings, with ties and responsibilities
towards all the other human beings in the world - rather than seeing ourselves as
members of a certain ethnic or national group.
3. The ability to empathize with others and to put ourselves in others' shoes, even if the
others come from a totally different background than our own.
Martha Nussbaum's work is focusing on the construction of global citizenship that covers
the entire world. However, her ideas can easily be applied to support the construction of a
European Identity too. If the education system can be used to construct the global
citizenship, it can definitely be used to forge a EU Identity. After all, the EU is part of the
world.
These theories of transnational identities as social constructions are important to my
thesis because they help answer the second research question: how is the EU trying to
build the European Identity.
The next theory used in my thesis is Neoliberalism in International Relations. The
concept was first developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their book
Power and Interdependence (1977). It promotes the idea that states are not the only
players in international politics and economy but there are many other channels of
interaction: from informal Government ties to multinational companies, terrorist
organizations and NGOs. That's why, states are often forced to deal with players that
spread beyond national borders. Also, the current globalized world made states very
interdependent on each other. As a consequence, countries are often driven to co-operate
in order to protect their interests. The two authors called this concept complex

interdependence, a relation where two or more countries have to rely on each other for
mutually benefic purposes. In this situation, the use of military force is reduces or even
eliminated because war is not possible among interdependent states. (Keohane&Nye,
1977)
Given all this, the construction of a trans-national identity is very desirable because it
would make inter state cooperation easier.
Edgar Morin argues that, a common European consciousness and identity is necessary,
because of the common threats that are hovering over the continent. In his book "Penser
L'Europe" (1987) he states that Europe has to face menaces from new world powers such
as the USA and the Soviet Union and its only chance of resisting these menaces is for the
European states to stick together. Morin's book is rather old and some things have
changed in the world since 1987. The Soviet Union no longer exist while the USA is an
ally of most European states. However, there are other threats that the EU has to worry
about - from economic issues, to global warming or terrorist attacks. So the necessity of a
common European consciousness is still promoted, today, by scholars and politicians
alike.
Lillian Farrel (2010) also argues for the necessity of a common EU identity - which is
crucial both for the success of the EU project and for the economy. The education system
has to prepare workers that can compete in the global economy. For example, a cultural
competence, such as the ability to adapt and live abroad, can be extremely important. And
this competence can be developed in school, through study abroad programmes. Also,
students who go through exchange and study abroad experiences, usually gain additional
skills in the area of communication, behavior in an intercultural context and foreign
languages. All these skills are very sought after by the big international corporations but
they can also contribute to a more harmonized EU. The Union could be ruled in the future
by a new generation of politicians who have a stronger sense of their European Identity
and could make the Body function better.
The Theory of Neoliberalism in International Relations will answer the third research
question of my thesis: Why is the European Union trying to build a EU Identity despite
the tensions East-West?

5.2 Empirical approach

In the empirical chapter, I will compare some Eurobarometer surveys made over the
years to see what EU citizens think about a possible European Identity and a possible
European Citizenship.

In 1990, on the occasion of the first Inter-Governmental Conference on Political Union

in Rome, the Spanish Government put on the table a document which aimed at
introducing the idea of "European citizenship" into the new Union Treaty. Two years
later, three new questions were introduced in the standard Eurobarometre surveys, to find

out what people thought about a possible European Identity and European Citizenship.
I will analyze the answers given to these questions to see how they changed over the
years. This should show how people's feelings about a European Identity and a European
Citizenship evolved in time.
However, the questions were sometimes changed from one poll to the next. Also, the
numbers of the countries where the surveys were conducted changed every time the EU
enlarged. It stared with 12 states in 1992 and it ended with 27 in the present. Thus, some
of the comparisons should be regarded with caution.
The topic of my thesis is focused on a European Identity and not a European Citizenship.
However, I chose to analyze the Eurobarometre surveys on both these subjects, because
they help me make a clear distinction between European Identity and European
Citizenship. The two concepts are related but not identical.

5.3 Analytical approach

The analysis chapter will mainly try to answer the fourth research question of my thesis:
how efficient have been the measures taken so far for the construction of a European
Identity?

6. Theories and their application

From a theoretical point of view, this paper uses three main frames. The first one contains
mainly theories of national identities presented from a constructivist viewpoint. They will
be used to explain how and why Easter European peoples changed their national
identities after 1989 and moved from Communism towards Western integration. Here, I
will also present the Theory of Development-Security Nexus, to better explain this
change.
The second frame will present a set of economic theories of International Migration.
They will be used to explain how and why migration patterns in Europe changed in the
last years. Together, these two theoretical frames will offer a broader understanding of the
current tensed situation in the EU (the tensions between East and West)
The third theoretical frame refers to the construction of a common EU identity. It first
presents a constructivist approach to this topic, arguing that building a trans-national
identity in the EU is possible with the help of the education system and the media. This
will be used to explain how the EU is making efforts to forge a common identity.
I will then present the Theory of Neoliberalism in International Relations to explain why
the construction of the EU Identity is desirable, despite the tensions East-West.

10

6.1 A changing world after the fall of the Iron Curtain

1989 was the year that changed the face of Europe. One by one, the Communist regimes
fell, following uprisings from within and they were replaced by rulers who claimed to
seek a new path towards democracy and freedom. The Wall of Berlin was demolished
and the two sides of Germany were reunited. Even the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
Initially, the vast majority of the population, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, greeted
these changes with enormous joy. After almost half a century of Cold War, when people
feared a nuclear confrontation, the end of this war was welcomed by the ecstatic crowds.
(Toffler, 1995) Nuclear conflict and Communism were no longer a threat. Politicians
and scholars alike were singing odes to the new peace era. Some experts even predicted
that, war was about to become a museum exhibit or an old history lesson like slavery and
duels. (Toffler, 1995)
Unfortunately, this global feeling of joy didn't last long. The Cold War was over, but new
challenges developed quickly.
With the end of the Cold War, the civil conflicts, mass movements of population and
international crime replaced Communism as the major threat to Western security
(Duffield, 2010). As Heather Grabbe (2000) puts it, the West is more afraid now of
individuals than it is of tanks and armies. The newly freed Eastern countries became an
important source of migrants to the West and that created new tensions between the two
sides of the Iron Curtain.

6.2 Transition in the ex Communist countries

After 1989, the countries of the ex Communist block entered a period of deep
transformation. They were moving from totalitarian regimes, towards democracy and
market economy. Experts called this period, a transition period. In the 1990s, the whole
Eastern block was going through such a transition period. It was caught in a provisory
state, between the past and the future. (Klein, 2007)
It was not the first time scholars dealt with countries in transition. Latin America had
been through a similar process, a few decades before. However, transition here was quite
different from the one in Eastern Europe. South American countries were long established
states, where national integration had been largely achieved. (Kuzio, 2001). The state
institutions were relatively stable and there were no obvious ethnicity or nationality
issues. That's why, transition in this area was focused only on two aspects:
democratization and marketization (Kuzio, 2001) It was a so called "double
transition"(Kuzio, 2001, p.168).
In Eastern Europe, transition was happening in a completely different environment. Most
countries here were immature and they had a high level of cultural, linguistic and
religious pluralism (Kuzio, 2001). With the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the
former state of Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe became populated with many new countries,
11

who's state institutions were weak or still forming. Also, the new states were ethnically
diverse and faced internal tensions or even civil conflicts. The only mono-ethnic
countries in the region were Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. (Kuzio, 2001) All the
rest had to deal with internal issues of national integration, of various intensity. They
inherited minorities and secessionist threats. They had to define the "we" from a national
point of view, on a very short time. And, they had to obtain quickly, the recognition of
their borders and to establish a constitutional framework. (Kuzio, 2001)
That's why, transition in Eastern Europe had to focus on more than just democratization
and marketization. It had to focus on "Stateness" as well. It was, what scholars called "a
triple transition" or even a "quadruple transition" if we take the issues of state and
nationality separately. (Kuzio, 2001, p. 169) According to Taras Kuzio (2001), it is better
to separate the problems of stateness and nationhood because, although overlapping, they
are conceptually and historically, different processes.
The creation of the state is considered to be mainly artificial. It is not associated with the
idea of nature and birth, as the nation building is, but with that of creation and craft.
(Lintz&Stepan, 1996)
State building has been happening for centuries. It was accelerated with the crisis of
feudalism and went on for hundreds of years before the idea of nation or nation-state
even came to the minds of intellectuals. (Lintz&Stepan, 1996) Until recently, this state
creation process was not based on national sentiments, ideas or consciousness. States
didn't require intense identification of their population with the territorial boundaries,
culture, language or history. Instead, state identification and loyalty were expected to be
transferable. (Lintz&Stepan, 1996)
On the other hand, the concept of nation belongs to the sphere of values. (Lintz&Stepan,
1996) A nation is a group of people, who have strong feelings of solidarity in the face of
other groups. Its members experience a psychological identification with the nation as a
whole and a powerful sense of belonging. They usually share a common history, language
and traditions.
A nation doesn't have official leaders. There are no clear rules about membership and no
clear rights and duties that can be legitimately enforced. (Lintz&Stepan, 1996)
A nation doesn't have resources like coercive powers or taxes nor does it have
organizational characteristics. (Lintz&Stepan, 1996) Only the state has theses type of
resources, to achieve national goals in a binding way. The nation has only the resources
derived from the psychological identification of the people who constitute it. A state can
exist on the basis of external recognition, while a nation requires some internal
recognition (Lintz&Stepan, 1996).
Therefore, a nation is not necessarily identical with the people of the state. It can be, but
it is not obligatory. The best example in this sense is Germany, before the reunification.
There were two states and only one German nation. (Lintz&Stepan, 1996). The issues of
stateness and nationhood should be given great attention in the context of Easter

12

European transition because they influenced the rate of success and the speed of
democratic consolidation (Lintz&Stepan, 1996).
Many post-Communist countries launched into democratization and marketization
without the state and national attributes considered necessary for the success of the
process. (Kuzio, 2001) Democracy can only be consolidated inside a state because
democracy is the form of governance of a state. If the state doesn't exist or there is such
an intense lack of identification with it among its population, that a large percentage of
the inhabitants would want to be independent or join another state, then, there can be no
consolidated democracy ( (Lintz&Stepan, 1996). Therefore, transition from a totalitarian
regime to free market economy, should be done in the following steps: first, state
consolidation, second, nation building, and only then marketization and then
democratization. This way the democracy should be stable because it is developed in a
country with strong state institutions and a sound economy that generates high per capita
income. Instead, in Eastern Europe, all four processes happened at once. (Kuzio, 2001)
There were many new countries resulted from the dismantle of the old big federations.
Their state institutions were still struggling to consolidate and they often faced ethnic
tensions or even civil wars. In all this chaotic environment, the new, frail states were
fighting to move from totalitarianism to democracy and free market economy. That's why
they faced very long and difficult transition periods.
According to Kuzio (2001), there was a double transition in the three mono-ethnic states
of Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. There were no nation or ethnic
issues there, the states had been long established (with the exception of Czech Republic
which was a new state but it inherited the infrastructure of the old Czechoslovakia) and
their institutions were somehow reliable. That's why, the transition focused mainly on
democratization and marketization. Today, they are considered some of the most
successful cases of post Communism development in Eastern Europe. The other states in
the area didn't have such a smooth path in their transition days.
The former Yugoslavian countries and the ex USSR states went through a quadruple
transition, that had to take into account issues of nationhood and stateness too. All the rest
of the Eastern block (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, etc) experienced a triple transition,
focused on democratization, marketization and stateness. The nationhood and ethnic
issues were less problematic here than in ex Yugoslavia and USSR but state institutions
were weaker than the ones in Poland or Hungary.

6.3 From Communism to a Western dream

These early state and ethnic issues shaped the later evolution of the entire region. The
Countries in the Centre and East of the continent suddenly found themselves faced with
the turmoil of disintegrating societal and political institutions in the former Communist
block (Weinreich, 1992). In the middle of that confusion and chaos, their peoples had to
rethink their futures and their national identities.
One of the first concepts that gained support in reshaping national identities was
13

ethnicity. After years of Communism, when they couldn't freely express their thoughts,
origins or ideas, people suddenly found the freedom to identify themselves from an ethnic
point of view. It is not the case that people have suddenly found "ethnicity" or that ethnic
identities have suddenly emerged anew, but that, when they were no longer in a
totalitarian state, they found the need and the opportunity to express their ethnicity loudly
and strongly (Weinreich, 1992).
So, in the 1990s, the ideas of the self-determination of ethnic groups and fulfilment of
their destinies as independent nations swept the European scene (Weinreich, 1992, p 2).
This enhanced ethnicity feeling was motivated by two facts. Firstly, there were the
policies of Communist authorities which didn't give much recognition to ethnic groups.
This denial of ethnicity didn't make ethnic issues disappear but rather, it made them
unavailable to public debate (Weinreich, 1992). Without informed discussion, people
were unable to formulate messages and discourses that could have diffused ethnic
tensions. As a result, these tensions were invisible or hidden during Communism and
they blew up after 1989. Even in Western societies, where there is a tradition of public
debate about ethnicity, there are still discriminations against some segments of the
population. In the East, where such a debate had been absent, the tensions rose along with
the newly found freedom of expression (Weinreich, 1992).
The second reason for the intensification of ethnic feelings was the deplorable economic
situation in Eastern Europe in early 1990s. Faced with great difficulties, people thought
they would be better off as independent nations, than struggling to survive in countries
with failed economies and institutions (Weinreich, 1992).
The most tangible example of hyper- ethnicity could be found in former Yugoslavia.
Shortly after the fall of Communism, the country split into several smaller states and a
wave of inter - ethnic wars started.
The bloody conflicts made people think twice about defining their identity through
ethnicity. National authorities in ex Communist countries used Yugoslavia as an example
to be avoided and they made great efforts to create alternative national identities that
would be less violent. They used public opinion and communication channels for that.
Public opinion issues are generally about perceived societal or widely shared individual
problems. They can take different forms but two large categories can be identified:
1. Intolerable conditions of existence in the immediate future
2. Anxieties about the loss of tolerable conditions in the future
The second category could be found in West Germany, after the reunification. The
country was united with a less developed territory, where the population had lower living
standards. That's why, citizens in the West were afraid they would have to support the
poor East, and suffer a drop in their living conditions.
In post-Communist Eastern Europe, however, the issues present in the public opinion
were from the first category: the danger of intolerable conditions in the immediate future.

14

National economies were already in crisis and state institutions were failing. Now, civil
war was also looming above the region, so the immediate future didn't look well. That's
why, authorities decided to take measures to combat the hyper-ethnicity present in the
area and offer the population an alternative dream: the dream of European and Western
integration. For that, officials organized many campaigns promoting the return of the
former Communist states to Europe and the restoration of normality in the area
(Vachudova & Snyder, 1996). The idea was for Eastern states to take steps towards
joining the European Union, NATO and other Western organizations. This way, their
population would have the chance to a better future, with higher living standards,
freedom of movement across the borders and other advantages.
The media offered the ways for the public opinion issues to be presented and set in order
of priority. (Weinreich, 1992)x. Eastern peoples gradually put aside their ethnic and
racial fights and started thinking of a greater dream: the Western dream.
The old state institutions were failing so they had to be replaced with new ones. The new
institutions were created by individuals who were trying to offer solutions to problems of
material and existential survival (Weinreich, 1992). That's why, they eventually gained
public support and acceptance. The population embraced the new European path as a
solution for survival, stability and prosperity.
When people identify with new institutions and new leaders they incorporate new values
and beliefs. Inevitably, some of their new identifications will conflict with the earlier
ones and, in their efforts to eliminate this conflict, people will redefine their identities
(Weinreich, 1992). That's how, Eastern European peoples changed their national identities
and moved slowly from totalitarianism, to perceiving themselves as Europeans.
This change in self perception of the Eastern European peoples goes along the idea that
national identities are not fixed but rather changeable and fluid (Farrell, 2010). People's
redefinition of their ethnic or national identity is a continuous process of elaboration.
They need to accept some components of common history or ethnicity, but these
components may be interpreted and reinterpreted differently, depending on the
circumstances (Weinreich, 1992).
The process of identity development and redefinition is based on people's interactions
with others (Weinreich, 2003). Individuals interpret their experiences or they identify
with other people and with social institutions. This way, their identity becomes fluid and
changeable, depending on their experiences and interpretations. By the same mechanism,
national identities are also flexible, only, in this case, the metamorphosis is more complex
and it touches many areas such as psychology, sociology, political science and social
policy (Weinreich, 2003).
The transformation here doesn't have to be accidental or unsupervised but rather coordinated by the authorities in order to construct the national identity and shape it in a
desirable way. According to Lillian Farrell (2010), if we believe Pierre Bordieu's habitus
theory we can conclude that any national identity can be forged through education,

15

media and other social conditionalities. Bordieu writes that social order is progressively
inscribed in peoples minds through cultural products including systems of education,
language, judgments, values, methods of classification and activities of everyday life.
These all lead to an unconscious acceptance of social differences and hierarchies. That's
how many of the current national identities have been created and planted in the minds of
the citizens.
By this principle, the same national identities can be modeled and changed with the help
of school and media. Young students can be taught to see themselves in a different way,
their identities can be modernized and adapted to the current world. Also, the general
views of the population regarding their national identity can be influenced through media
campaigns. This way, the population would be lead to habituated national identity
(Farrell, 2010, p.109).
There was also another important factor that pushed Eastern European States to the West:
a massive political and financial support from the developed world.
Alarmed by the inter-ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, the big Western players started
thinking of ways to reinstall peace and prevent the spilling of violence.
Inter-ethnic wars were not unusual at that time, we could see them in most parts of the
world. What was different about the wars in Yugoslavia was their geographical position
(Papasortiriou, 2002). They were not happening in Africa or in a far away region. They
were happening in Europe, right at the door step of the West and they had the potential to
spill and destabilize the entire area. That's why, all big powers wanted the conflicts to
stop and the former Communist countries to move slowly but surely towards EU and
NATO integration (Papasortiriou, 2002).
So both Western Europe and the USA took radical measures to put an end to the conflicts
in former Yugoslavia. These measures included peace conferences, negotiations,
mediation and even a brutal military intervention on Belgrade in 1999, which eventually
forced President Slobodan Milosevic out of power. Milosevic was considered to be the
driving force behind many ethnic wars that involved Serbs in ex Yugoslavia and his
departure from power was seen as necessary for the violence to end.
Also, Eastern states recieved financial and logistical support to fulfill the requirements
necessary for joining the EU and NATO. There was substantial development aid pumped
in the area, with the intention to push the countries in Eastern Europe, on a steady way
towards Western integration. Many governments thought that, reducing the suffering
through satisfying people's basic needs could also reduce ethnic and social tensions.
(Duffield, 2010). And that would eventually reduce the threat of violence spilling to the
developed world. Western societies kept repeating a familiar refrain: tackling poverty was
not only ethically correct but not doing so, could lead to civil wars, failed states and safe
heavens for terrorists. (Duffield, 2010). That's why, by mid 1990s, the main international
donor Governments had redefined their aid budgets as strategic tools for conflict
management (Duffield, 2010).

16

All these measures were meant to ensure long term stability in Europe and in the Western
World. They were measures consistent with the Development-Security Nexus Theory.

6.4 Migration from a theoretical perspective

While the people in Eastern Europe were embracing the Western integration dream with
enthusiasm, fear was growing on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Fear of migrants who
would invade Western territory, steal jobs and spread trans-border criminality.
There is more than one type of Theories of International Migration which can explain
why people decide to leave their own countries and move abroad. However, the
Economic theories are the ones that stood behind the massive migration movements
inside Europe, after 1989.
The oldest theory of this type is the Macro Theory of neo-classical economics. It explains
labour migration in the process of economic development. (Massey &All, 1993)
According to this theory, migration is caused by wages disparities between different
geographical areas. People in countries with low wages tend to move to other states,
where they can earn more. This means that, the elimination of wage differences would
also lead to the end of migration.
According to this theory, the labour market is the primary mechanism by which
international migration is induced. Other markets have very little impact on it. Therefore,
states can influence migration by influencing the labour markets.
Another theory, part of the neo-classic economic group is the Micro Theory. It describes
the decision to migrate as an individual choice, made by a person because of a costbenefit calculation that makes them believe they would get a positive return. In this case,
migration is a form of investment. (Massey &All, 1993) People choose to move to a
country where they can earn more, but for that, they have to make an investment first.
They invest in travel, surviving while moving and looking for a job, the efforts to learn a
new language and culture, etc. Potential migrants often estimate the costs and benefits of
moving to many alternative destinations and they choose the one that offers the most
advantages.
In this case, the migrants take into account not only labour market and wage differences
but other factors too, such as cost of travel or efforts to adapt. Governments can try to
control the phenomenon by policies that influence many areas. They can impose
restrictions on the labour markets, that would reduce the likelihood of a migrant finding a
job. They can increase the wage levels of the sending countries through long term
development programmes. Or they can take measures to increase the actual cost of
migration, both financially and psychologically. (Massey &All, 1993)
The third theory is the new economics of migration. It states that the decision to move
abroad is not taken individually, but by an entire family or household. This way, families
are not only looking to increase earnings but they also want to reduce risks (Massey
17

&All, 1993). Unlike an individual, a family has the possibility to control risk, by
diversifying resources such as family labour. For example, some members of the family
are sent to work in the local market, while others migrate abroad - even if the country of
destination doesn't have higher wages than the one of origin. This way, if local economy
deteriorates and the household loses income, the family can still rely on migrant
remittances for support.
In developed countries, such risks are managed through private insurance or Government
programmes. In developing states however, these institutional mechanisms are imperfect,
absent or inaccessible to poor families (Massey &All, 1993). That's why, households turn
to migration as a way to diversify risks.
In this case, migration occurs whether or not there is a difference in wages between the
sending and the receiving states, because people have other alternative motivations to
leave. Here, authorities can influence migration by improving the risk insurance markets
or the Government programmes in the sending area.
The fourth theory is the Dual Market Theory. According to this theory, migration is
caused by the permanent demand for foreign workers in developed economies. It is not
generated so much by push factors in sending countries (such as lower wages or living
standards) but by pull factors in receiving states (the chronic and unavoidable need for
migrant workers derived from low birth rates or better social security programmes that
give locals the freedom to refuse certain low skilled jobs, etc)
According to Massey &All (1993) in this situation migration can't be stopped or
influenced substantially unless a radical change occurs in the structure of the developed
economies. The entire system should be change, in order to modify migration patterns.
And finally, the fifth theory is the World System Theory. It states that migration is the
natural outcome following the expansion of capitalism to peripheral zones. In their hunt
for higher profits, big international corporations entered poor states in the periphery, to
look for land, raw materials, cheap labour, etc. That's how agricultural societies became
more modern. They bought new technologies to work the land and that made some
workers redundant in the production process. These workers became mobile population,
prone to international migration.
Also, there were new factories opened in poor countries, because multinational
companies were attracted by the cheap local labour. These factories employed many local
people, but the wages were low and the work hard. Therefore, the workers only stayed for
a few years then they decided to look for better opportunities. Already uprooted from
their initial agricultural communities, these workers also became mobile population,
prone for international migration.
According to the World System Theory, migration is deeply favoured by globalization,
better transport system and mass communication. All these create cultural and ideological
links between sending and receiving countries that make integration of migrants easier.
These theories are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. (Massey &All,

18

1993) It is possible to have migration motivated by all the factors above, at the same
time. It is possible for an individual to act in order to maximize income, while a family
takes measures to minimize risks. And both these decision can be taken in the context of
globalization and a permanent need for workers in developed countries. (Massey &All,
1993)
All these theories explain how the push and pull factors changed in Europe in the last 20
years and how migration patterns evolved. There have been differences in wages between
Eastern and Western Europe that made the Eastern population consider migration. The
fall of the Iron Curtain and the enlargement of the EU Eastwards made travel from one
block to another easier. There was deep economic turmoil in Eastern Europe in the early
1990s, that prompted families to turn to migration as a way to minimize risks. There has
been a strong need for foreign workers in Western Europe during the boom years while
Governments encouraged the "import" of Eastern migrants because they were preferable
to the non white non Christian labourers from outside Europe. All these facts lead to a
change in migration patterns in Europe and increased the tensions between East and West.

6.5 Invasion of the Eastern Migrants

After the fall of Communism, people have often blamed the dismantle of the East-West
barrier for the proliferation of transnational crime and other problems (Grabbe, 2000).
Eastern Citizens moving to the West have been perceived as job snatchers or people who
propagate transborder criminality. But despite the public's hostility towards migrants,
they were desperately needed in many Western states.
In the 1990s, numerous Western governments turned to migration, as a way to tackle
work force and demographic problems (Favell & Hansen, 2002). With an ageing
population and an acute lack of workers in certain domains, they tried to attract
foreigners to fill in the empty places. Even states self-proclaimed as "zero migration
countries", such as Great Britain and Germany, were forced to accept aliens on their
territories (Favell & Hansen, 2002). Migration in Europe, at that time, was governed by
the market rather than politics. Global economic forces were pushing towards regional
integration and this regional integration was represented in Europe, by the concept of EU
integration (Favell & Hansen, 2002). It was built on the encouragement of cross border
mobility and it put the free movement of workforce, capitals, goods and services, at the
heart of its economic dynamic (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
On the other hand, there was a general feeling of fear among the Western population, that
the fall of Communism would bring about cohorts of migrants from the East. During the
second half of the 20th century, the Iron Curtain was the most obvious, brutal and
uncompromising form of migration control (Favell & Hansen, 2002). For 40 years, a
journey from Vienna to Bratislava or Budapest, was almost unthinkable. This way,
Western Europe was isolated from possible migration East-West. The only type of
migrant from the Communist block to the West was a refugee. And "refugee" was
19

synonymous in Western eyes with "defector" (Favell & Hansen, 2002, p. 584). The few
refugees that managed to leave the Soviet block were usually welcomed by the West,
because they were financially costless and politically rewarding (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
They were coming in very low numbers, thanks to the strict border controls in the East,
so they didn't require much financial effort. On the same time, from a political point of
view, they were a very good way to emphasize the West's moral superiority over
Communism (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
That all changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Early predictions after 1989, showed
that the West could be flooded by Eastern migrants, recently freed to dream about a better
life on the other side (Favell, 2008). That spread fear and reluctance among old EU
citizens, who thought their entire lifestyle could be altered by the new comers. In an
attempt to address those fears and calm the population, politicians adopted tough stands
on migration. Their discourses however, were empty words. The policies implemented in
the field of migration, were telling a different story (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
Authorities were confronted with many economic and demographic problems, due to a
low birth rate and an ageing population. There were many jobs that locals refused to do,
because they were undesirable. The so called "3D jobs" - dirty dangerous and dull
(Favell, 2008). Also, most EU countries were facing a demographic time bomb. Birth
rates were way below replacement levels so authorities had to turn to migration to tackle
these issue or at, at least to make them less acute (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
Before 1989, Western states filled their needs for workers by turning to controlled
migration programmes from peripheral states or former colonies, such as Turkey, Algeria
or Morocco. However, many of the migrants who came to Europe this way, refused to
return home as planned (Favell & Hansen, 2002).
After the fall of Communism, Western countries saw an opportunity to bring in Eastern
migrants who were culturally closer to them. There were strong suspicions that West
European states were happy to reduce their reliance on non-white workers, by developing
a regional labour market (Favell, 2008). Who better to fill in the "3D jobs" (dirty,
dangerous and dull) than the European neighbours from the East who are likely to be
temporary rather than permanent and are ethnically similar or culturally proximate?
(Favell, 2008, p.704)
Migration in Europe was driven by market concerns despite political hostility. But the
more white, more westernised migrants from the former Communist block seemed more
acceptable for the hostile public than the non-European foreigners (Favell & Hansen,
2002). That's why, EU member states started adopting migration policies that encouraged
migration from the East, while closing the doors to others (Favell & Hansen, 2002). In
the 1990s, there were large numbers of workers from Central and Eastern Europe, in EU
15. Legally, they still had working and moving restrictions, but in reality they were
needed. So they were either tolerated as illegal workers or they managed to find semilegal ways to access the jobs. According to official statistics, there were 421,000 Poles,
160.000 Romanians and 23,000 citizens from the Baltics in EU, at the beginning at the
1990s. And their number increased steadily over the years, due to the economic needs of
the receiving countries.
20

Initially, they were wanted for low skills, low wage jobs, with harsh conditions and little
prestige like construction, cleaning or agriculture. However that changed in mid 1990s,
when authorities in Western states started looking for high skilled migrants also. Inspired
by the American model of brain draining policies, EU countries tried to attract highly
educated people for labour shortage domains such as IT or medicine (Favell & Hansen,
2002). Naturally, they turned to Eastern Europeans who had already proved to be well
trained, talented and ambitious workers (Favell, 2008).

6.6 The impact of the EU enlargement

This East-West migration peaked after the EU enlargement of 2004. 10 Eastern European
countries joined the Union on May 1st 2004, putting the total number of member states at
25. The new entries added 74 million inhabitants to the Union's population which grew
to 455 million citizens. It was the biggest enlargement in EU's history and it had a
significant impact.
The 10 new members of the EU had less competitive economies, lower GDP per capita
and significantly lower wages than the old 15. That's why, their adhesion to the Union
caused public concern about East-West migration flows. (Munz, 2006) These differences
in wages and living standards are generally classic push and pull factors in population
movement. People from the less developed area decide to move to the more developed
region, hoping for a better life.
To tackle this concern, many EU 15 countries negotiated a transition period of up to 7
years during which, the citizens of the new members wouldn't have access to their
labour market. However, these restrictions didn't stop the migration. Eastern citizens
could still move to the West as students, self employed persons or for family reunion
(Munz, 2006). Also, they went to the EU 15 states and took jobs on the black market or
they set up their own companies in the receiving countries.
Besides, there were three states in the West who left the door open for Eastern workers
Sweden, UK and Ireland. As a result, the flow of migration was diverted from states like
Austria or Germany (who have common borders with the new EU members and had been
traditional destinations for working migration) to countries with a more friendly policy on
labour market, like UK and Ireland (Barrell &al, 2007). This had a dramatic impact on
the Irish and British economy.
One year after the 2004 enlargement, 1.5 of the Irish population was made up of Eastern
migrants. That's about 2.2 of the workforce. Also, in UK the number of migrants jumped
from 50 thousand a year in the 1990s, to 150 thousand a year, after 2004.
This invasion of migrants was way over the expectations and the changes it brought were
much bigger than anticipated before the enlargement. Authorities had used as a models to
21

predict migration flows, the previous enlargements to the South (in 1981 and 1986),
involving Greece, Spain and Portugal. The adhesion of the three countries had a
beneficial effect on the EU economy. The flow of migrants was manageable and there
was a high level of circulatory migration between the old and the new member states
(Favell, 2008). However, the 2004 enlargement had a much bigger impact. The number of
new members was a lot higher and naturally, the migration flow was more intense. The
initial predictions, based on the adhesion of Greece, Spain and Portugal, proved to be
unreliable and failed to estimate the full scale of migration that followed.
As a consequence, the capital required for the additional workers that came in the EU 15
was not in place so the new entries displaced existing local workers or they became
unemployed. Because of that, unemployment rate raised immediately after the 2004
enlargement, by 1% in Ireland and by 1.4% in UK (Barrell &al, 2007).
In Austria, authorities had imposed restrictions to the labour market, but they didn't prove
entirely efficient. Between 2003 and 2005, the number of self employed persons in the
country doubled. According to official statistics, this increase was due to an infusion of
Eastern citizens. There were four times more Poles activating as self employed in Austria
after 2004 than before that year, while the number of Hungarian self employed persons
grew by 43% (Barrell &al, 2010). In many cases, the self employed contracts were just
legal covers for people who were actually employed by domestic companies. This way,
the new comers managed to go around the restrictions and enter the labour market,
through the back door. The same thing happened in many other EU 15 states. This
phenomenon made Western citizens and some far right politicians embrace tough views
on East-West migration.
In this already tensed atmosphere, the European Union extended again Eastwards, in
2007. Then, it absorbed two new member states, Romania and Bulgaria, which brought
an additional 30 million inhabitants inside the borders. This time, all Western countries
imposed working restrictions on the new entries. Great Britain, a state that had lead an
open door policy during the 2004 enlargement, was the first to announce restrictions on
Romanians and Bulgarians, in 2007. And all the other EU15 states followed.
However that didn't keep the Romanians and Bulgarians away. Many citizens of the two
countries had already been working in the West before joining the EU. They were usually
working illegally and the restrictions imposed on them in 2007, only meant that, they
couldn't regularize their status or begin paying taxes (Favell, 2008).

6.7 A new era in European migration

These two waves of enlargement completed a geopolitical shift in Europe that poses the
biggest demographic change and challenge since the devastation of the Second World
War, in terms of population movement (Favell, 2008). One by one, borders and
restrictions are coming down or eluded and a new East-West migration system is being
established on the continent. These dramatic changes represent a new frontier in
European migration research (Favell, 2008).
22

The classic models of post-war migration, involving mostly guest worker schemes and
asylum seekers, are no longer up to date. The EU enlargement Eastwards represents the
beginning of a new chapter in the international migration research. The classic patterns of
movement North-South have changed. The new East-West migration in Europe is rather
comparable to the Mexico-US scenario (Favell, 2008). A system based on market and
economic needs, totally different from the humanitarian migration related to refugees or
based on old colonial ties that defined the old migration from outside the continent.
During the boom years, European economies resembled more and more the USA system where immigrants filled in a vast range of undesirable positions, that locals didn't want to
do (Favell, 2008).
Europe has, in normal economic years, an almost desperate structural need for an
increased intra-continent population movement (Favell, 2008). If we take into account the
current birth rates, this need will persist for at least 20 or 30 years and it could get worse.
That's why, this new migration pattern might extend beyond the EU member states, into
neighbouring and candidate countries (Favell, 2008).
For example, the European Neighbourhood Policy is a programme known mostly for its
security aspects. But it is also creating regular cross-border markets, to enable new
member states which are losing workforce due to East-West migration, to replace it with
foreigners from outside the EU (Favell, 2008). This way, Poland attracted Ukrainians
after 2004, to fill in the places left empty by those who moved to the West.
Idealist pro-Europeans think this economic migration as a win-win situation. West
European economies benefit from the labour of the migrants, Eastern citizens cash in
higher wages in the more developed EU 15 states and they send remittances back home.
This way, the East European economies get to develop also, thanks to the 2 way
circulation of capital and talent (Favell, 2008). The pro-European optimist think that the
EU can manage these migration flows, through political action at supranational level
(Favell, 2008).
However, this optimist view is not shared by everybody. Common citizens in the West
tend to see this migration as a threat. They fear Eastern foreigners would steal their jobs
or contribute to the decrease of the wages by accepting lower payments. Also, they are
afraid of the proliferation of trans-border criminality.
As a consequence, many local politicians are tempted to embrace populist discourses of
migration hostility, in order to attract voters (Favell, 2008).
This tendency towards hostility has reached record levels in the last years, due to the
global economic crisis.

6.8 The crisis effect

23

Since 2008, European economies have been shrinking and unemployment has been
rising. The worst situation is in Spain and Greece, where unemployment among under
25s was over 50% at the beginning of 2012. (Daily Telegraph, 2012) n total, over 5,4
million people are without a job in Spain. A figure that prime minister Mariano Rajoy
called "astronomical". In Greece, the number of unemployed persons is a little over a
million. That's about a fifth of the total working age population (Reuters, 2012). Similar
problems can be found in most Western countries. According to official statistics, one in
five Brits, aged between 16 and 25, is on state benefits. A labour market specialist from
The Bank of England named the situation "a national disaster"( Daily Mail, 2012)
Faced with these problems, Western citizens turned from fearing migrants to openly
hating and resenting them, because they steal precious jobs in such difficult times. That's
how, the far right parties started gaining more and more support all over Europe. They
attracted many fans, thanks to an anti-migration platform. This has been "a wider
European trend, as voters concerned about the economic crisis and integration of
Muslims turn to rightist parties." (Reuters, 2010) As The Guardian Newspaper puts it,
"Europe's mainstream political parties are engaged in a worsening feud over how to deal
with the growing power of extreme rightwing anti-immigrant movements. In many
countries, extremist organizations have joined coalition governments to sell their
political support for tougher immigration rules.
In other states, the Far Right is not officially part of the governing coalition but the
authorities in power rely on it for support. That's the case with the Dutch PVV party
(Party for Freedom) which is lead by a well known far right politician named Geert
Wilders. The party has been known for its anti-Islamic views for years but recently, it
turned more hostile towards Eastern Europeans.
Far right is also growing rapidly in Sweden, Austria, Germany and Great Britain. Not
even Switzerland the ever neutral country- remained immune to this trend. A
referendum held in November 2010 approved the expulsion of foreign citizens who
commit felonies in the state. The measure was initiated by the far right Switzerland
People Party.
Attracted by this growing popularity, many centre right politicians in the West, embraced
far right discourses to win votes. The best example of this is the French President,
Nicolas Sarkozy. Although he was officially a Conservative candidate, he ran a
presidential campaign for the April 22 elections, on an extremist platform. He promised
to cut migration to France by half if he is re-elected and he repeatedly said that there were
too many foreigners in his country that can't be properly integrated. All these affirmations
infuriated the far right candidate, Marine Le Pen, who accused Sarkozy of stealing her
ideology.

6.9 Constructing a European Identity

24

In this tensed atmosphere, the EU has been trying to construct a transnational European
Identity. According to Lillian Farrel (2010) Pierre Bordieu's theories of habitus explain
why this identity is desirable and how one should attempt to construct it. Farrel argues
that, a EU Identity can be built with the help of the education system, especially crossnational exchange trips and teacher-training. It is a constructivist view of the identity, that
can and should lead to a new European Identity, learned through education and social
conditioning (Farrel, 2010).
Bordieu's theories of habitus allow us to see today's people attachment to nation as
learned and habituated. (Farrel, 2010, p.108). Throughout 19th century, young people
were innoculated with a sense of national consciousness in schools, through the teaching
of national history, literature, civics, etc. That's how they came to identify themselves in
terms of the nation they belong to. However, this attachment to nation is open to
reconstruction and modification, because it is learned and habituated.
Pierre Bordieu writes that social order is progressively inscribed in peoples minds
through cultural products including systems of education, language, judgments, values,
methods of classification and activities of everyday life. These all lead to an unconscious
acceptance of social differences and hierarchies.
By the same principle, Lillian Farrell argues that a European Identity can and should be
constructed mostly with the help of the education system. If the school is the place where
social conditioning takes place, then the education system can be used as a field to
habituate a European Identity (Farrell, 2010, p. 108)
In the last years, there have been many policies that encouraged schools to include a
European dimension to their curricula. (Farrel, 2010). The best way to do this was
considered the extensive use of exchange and study abroad programmes for students.
This way, young persons of the new generation get to know people from other cultures,
they get to live in foreign countries and they can better understand other or relate to
others.
Through exchange trips, the students get the chance to relate to their fellow citizens in
the EU. This interaction helps them overcome an exclusively national identity and allows
them to develop a multicultural sense of membership (Farrel, 2010, p.109) This is how
the habitus of the students is slowly changed and the trans-national European Identity
becomes more attainable. (Farrel, 2010)
The flagship EU programme for exchange and higher education abroad is the Erasmus
programme. It was named after the Dutch philosopher Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdama known opponent of dogmatism who lived and worked in many European countries.
The programme was initiated in 1987, after a European Commission proposal. It started
with 3000 grants a year and it extended constantly, to a current 200.000 grants per year.
Today, 4000 higher education institutions are part of the Erasmus network and even more
are waiting to join. They are located in 33 countries - the 27 EU members plus candidate
25

states like Croatia and members of the European Economic Community and the European
Free Trade Association (such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland). The annual budget of
the programme is over 450 million euro.
Erasmus offers the opportunity for European students to live, study and even work or go
through professional training abroad. It started as a programme for students and teachers
but now, it also involves other professionals (such as CEOs) who wish to teach in other
states. It is considered the most successful programme ever implemented by the European
Commission. It had a huge impact on the young generation of Europeans and some
academics have speculated that former Erasmus students could prove to be a powerful
force in creating a pan-European Identity. The German political scientist Stefan Wolff
talked about "the Erasmus Generation" and said that "for the first time in history were
seeing the seeds of a truly European identity. Give it 15, 20 or 25 years, and Europe will
be run by leaders with a completely different socialization from those today. I'm quite
optimistic that in the future there will be less national wrangling, less Brussels-bashing
and we'll see more unity in EU policy making - even if that is hard to picture today."
(The New York Times, 2005)
Studying and living abroad not only enriches students' lives form a professional and
academic point of view but it also improves language learning, intercultural skills, selfreliance and self-awareness. According to the European Commission, these experiences
gave students a sense of what it means to be a European Citizen.
Several young people who went through the Erasmus programme described the
experience like this:
"I realised that the experience made a whole new person of me and that I would
never look at the world and Europe, my home, as I did before."
"It is true when you're in ERASMUS, you find out a lot about yourself."
"ERASMUS is a lot more than a studying experience. For me it is a way to
look at the world with new eyes, to feel and discover new emotions and learn
what is not written in the textbooks." (Cited on europa.eu)

6.10 The way to a European Citizenship?

Lillian Farrel talks about constructing a European Identity through education, rather than
a European Citizenship. The citizenship would have more legal aspects and it would
require the definition of some common rights and responsibilities. However, the measures
to forge it would be very similar to the ones used for the construction of the European
Identity.
The idea of using the education system to create a sense of trans-national citizenship is

26

expressed by Martha Nussbaum in her 1997 book Cultivating Humanity: A Classical

Defense for Reform in Liberal Education and in her 2003 article "Education for
citizenship in an era of global connection"
She argues that, the higher education systems throughout the world should educate young
people to become global citizens, rather than members of a certain national or ethnic
group. In this sense, the purpose of liberal education is to cultivate humanity. (Nussbaum,
1997) In order to achieve this goal, the education system should promote in students three
very important abilities.
1.The ability to critically examine one's self and one's culture and traditions. This way, a
person leads what Socrate called "an examined life" (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 290) That
means, a life that doesn't accept beliefs as authoritative just because they have been
handed down by tradition or they have become familiar through habit. A person has to
question all beliefs and accept only those who survive reason's demand for consistency.
(Nussbaum, 2003)
2. The ability to perceive ourselves as human beings, with ties and responsibilities
towards all the other human beings in the world - rather than seeing ourselves as
members of a certain ethnic or national group.
3. The ability to empathize with others and to put ourselves in others' shoes, even if the
others come from a totally different background than our own. This ability is known as
"narrative imagination" and it can be cultivated by studying other cultures and by
interacting with them. In other words, through study abroad programmes.
Also, "narrative imagination" can be developed through courses in literature and arts
because they train the "muscle of imagination" (Nussbaum, 2003, p.300)
If these three abilities are cultivated at a large scale, the education system stops producing
narrow citizens, who have problems understanding people different from themselves and
who's imagination rarely ventures beyond their local settings. Instead, it produces global
citizens.
The aim of a global citizenship is followed today, with regularity in modern education
systems. Universities are shaping future citizens in an age of increasing
internationalization and cultural diversity. That's why, education system in both Europe
and USA are changing rapidly.
New topics are introduces in the curricula, such as history and culture of non-western
peoples, feminist studies or gay rights. New teaching methods are introduced, in order to
facilitate the development of reasonable capacities. Classes are more focused on debate
and individual research. Professors make filed trips to see personally the cultures they are
supposed to teach about. All these changes constitute an attempt to cultivate our
humanity.
The higher education system is not simply professional anymore, but also a place to
cultivate reasonable, deliberative, democratic citizenship. (Nussbaum, 2003, p.291)
27

The new emphasize on diversity in colleges and universities curricula is a way to produce
adults who can function as citizens not only of some local regions or groups, but also as a
complex, interlocking world. (Nussbaum, 2003) This is necessary because of the
changing requirements of citizenship in an era of global connection.
We have the opportunity to create, with the help of the education system, better citizens,
who argue with tradition, are capable of thinking for themselves and can understand, with
sympathy, the ways of life different from their own. That is the cultivation of humanity.
(Nussbaum, 2003, p.300)
Lillian Farrel and Martha Nussbaum propose very similar methods for the construction
of a European Identity and for building a global citizenship. Both processes require the
heavy involvement of the education system. And, in both cases it is necessary for the
students and the professors to go on study abroad experiences, to be in contact with other
cultures and to better understand people from different backgrounds than their own.
If we take this into account, the construction of a common EU Identity might go hand in
hand with the construction of a future European Citizenship. If people share a common
identity, the legal aspects of a citizenship could be easier to implement.
The concept of a possible European Citizenship is not totally absent from the literature or
from official documents. In 1990, at the first Inter-Governmental Conference on Political
Union, the Spanish Government drafted a document aimed at introducing the idea of
"European citizenship" into the new Union Treaty. This document defined the citizenship
of the European Political Union as "personal and unalterable status of the nationals of the
member states who, because of their belonging to the Union, have special rights and
duties specific to the framework of the Union, which are exercised and are specifically
protected within the borders of the Community, but this does not prejudge the possibility
of claiming the status of European Citizen as much outside those aforementioned
borders". (Cited in the Standard Eurobarometre 37, from April-March 1992)
After this proposal, the EU introduced three new questions in the standard
Eurobarometres, to see what people thought about a possible European Citizenship.
The first question was focusing on the perception of National Identity versus European
Identity and the last two concerned the feeling of being a European Citizen.
The last two questions were dropped from the polls after the first year and the surveys
continued to focus on European Identity only. However, the issue of a EU citizenship was
brought up again later, in a few special Eurobaromoetres. I will show the results of these
surveys in the following empirical chapter.

6.11 Why construct a European Identity?

28

Besides the possibility of developing a full European Citizenship, the EU Identity is also
desirable for other reasons.
In 1992, Torsten Husen published a book, named "Schooling in modern European
Society", following a study about the school system in Europe. The author emphasized
the necessity for the European education system to promote a European Citizenship, a
European Identity and a European consciousness. He states that, the rapid development of
communications, travels and labour migration, as well as the easier access to international
media, exposed people to other languages and cultures than their own. That's why,
students should learn at school how to deal with all these diversified messages.
In certain respects, this was seen as a task similar to the one over a century ago, when
school was meant to serve the nation states and promote national identities.
Lillian Farrel (2010) also argues that, a trans-national EU Identity is necessary both for
the success of the EU project and for the economy. By changing students' habitus, the
cultural capital required to make an effective workforce at an European level, can be
created (Farrel, 2010). That means, the education system has to prepare workers that can
compete in a globalized world. For example, a cultural competence, such as the ability to
adapt and live abroad, can be an advantage for its owner. And this competence should be
cultivated during education years, through study abroad experiences.
Besides, students who go through exchange and study abroad programmes usually gain
additional skills in the area of communication, behavior in an intercultural context and
foreign languages. All these skills are very sought after by the big international
corporations but they can also contribute to more harmonized EU. If we change the
habits of the young people, we could educate a new generation of EU politicians, who
might make the Union function better in the future.
Edgar Morin also thinks that, a common European consciousness and identity is
necessary, but, for different reasons. In his book "Penser L'Europe" (1987) he states that
Europe has to face menaces from new world powers such as the USA and the Soviet
Union and its only chance of resisting these menaces is for the European states to stick
together. For this, it is necessary to innoculate the feeling of a common destiny, among
European citizens. This feeling has to become more than just a series of bureaucratic
meetings in Brussels or the endless rivalry between French and Dutch pork. The necessity
of a common destiny has to get closer to the population, it has to win support and
acceptance among the average people. That's why, the construction of a common transnational identity is vital.
Morin's view is consistent with the Theory of Neoliberalism in International Relations.
This theory states that, in the current globalized world, countries are forced to co-operate
in order to ensure security and sovereign interests. In this situation, the concepts of
Sovereignty and Autonomy had to be rethought because of the "complex
interdependence" between states (Keohane&Nye, 1977).

29

Besides, states are not the only important players in International Politics and economy
anymore. There are many non-state entities (such as multinational corporations, terrorist
groups or NGOs) that can influence the way things go. That's why a trans-national
approach to identity is considered more appropriate and more successful nowadays.
Edgar Morin's book is rather old and some things have changed in the world since 1987.
The Soviet Union no longer exist while the USA is an ally of most European states.
However, there are other threats that the EU has to worry about, from economic issues to
terrorist attacks or global warming. So, the necessity of a common European
consciousness and destiny is still promoted, today, by scholars and politicians alike.
Also, a transnational EU Identity is important because it can be related to legitimacy in
the EU. (Risse, 2003) For the European Union to be a legitimate body it needs at least a
common public sphere to rely on. It is known that democracies rely upon many channels
of inter mediation between private actors and civil society in order to ensure legitimacy
of governance. If we accept that the European union is an emerging democracy beyond
the nation state, then the necessity of a European public sphere is obvious. (Risse, 2003)
According to Risse (2003) this European public sphere emerges out of the interaction and
exchanges between the national public spheres. Therefore, the ideal European public
sphere appears when
1. The same European themes are discussed at the same time and at similar levels of
interest across different national media.
2. Similar frames and references (structures and patterns of interpretation) are used across
different national public spheres.
3. If a transnational community of communication emerges where speakers and listeners
recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse
Risse analyzes the emergence of the European public sphere from two perspectives.
Firstly, judging by the amount of European issues that get attention across different
national media. From this point of view, the prospects of a EU public sphere seem rather
pessimistic. Most journalists find EU issues as non interesting and the European
problems get very little space in newspapers and TV news bulletins. How can we talk
about a European public sphere in a meaningful sense if citizens don't know what it is
going on because the media doesn't report on it? (Risse, 2003, p.3)
On the other hand, there are a few controversial issues- like corruption scandals in
Brussels or the EU enlargement that tend to get a lot of media attention in most national
media outlets. According to Risse, this shows precisely the emergence of that European
public sphere where different national media are interested in the same issues. They
select the same problems to report on and they seem to use similar frames in their
reports. In other words, they have a similar understanding of what they are talking about
regardless of their political standpoint (Risse, 2003)
So, even if most European issues don't get media attention in the member countries, when
they do report on EU problems, journalists from different states tend to be interested in
the same things and frame them in the same way. This is, in Risse's opinion, the proof
that the European public sphere is emerging. It is still in early stages, but it has the
potential to grow. By this definition, the European public sphere is a social
30

construction. It does not fall from Heaven and does not pre -exist outside social and
political discourse. (Risse, 2003, p2) That' s why, it could be constructed in time, along
with the European Identity.
Risse dismisses some critics saying that a European Public sphere can't emerge because
of the huge cultural and language differences existing inside the Union. He challenges
this position from two points of view. Firstly, there is no reason why people should all use
the same language and the same media in order to be able to communicate cross national
borders in a meaningful way. Nobody can claim that Switzerland lacks a public sphere
because it has a three language community (Risse, 2003). Besides, English has become
"lingua franca" all over the EU, and it is extensivly used by many citizens in different
member states, in their communication.
Secondly, the view that the emergence of a European public sphere is almost impossible
is based on an idealized picture of homogenous national public spheres (Risse,2003, p.
4) Many national public spheres are fragmented but still, people are capable of
meaningful communicating to each other.
According to Jacobs and Robert Maier (1998), the trans-national European Identity will
have to be based on diversity if not even opposites.
The 21st century Europe seems to be based on three projects that sometimes go against
each other and can influence the shaping of the new common identity.
The first project is trying to restore Europe as an important power factor in the world.
This is seen more of an economic project, where Europe emerges as a single market and a
financial pool capable of competing with USA, Japan and other important players.
The second project is also based on an economic dimension, but it stresses the social
character of a future Europe. It focuses on human rights and democracy, on fighting
poverty and inequalities rather than creating a supranational actor who would be engaged
in ruthless competition with other economic powers (Jacobs and Maier, 1998)
Both these projects have one thing in common. They would support the creation of a
united Europe form a political point of view, a supranational form of governance that
would facilitate the implementation of the necessary economic measures. They are
strongly opposed to the third project, which defends the existing national states and even
pleads for straightening them. This view is mostly promoted by far right wings in most
countries while the other two seem to be favoured by the EU authorities.
The current European Identity is a hybrid between the three projects (Jacobs and Maier,
1998) and it is still changing. In the end, the European Identity would reflect a European
Union that could at one extreme be a super state and at the other, a loose federation of
national states (Jacobs and Maier, 1998).

7. Empirical chapter
In 1990, on the occasion of the first Inter-Governmental Conference on Political Union
31

in Rome, the Spanish Government put on the table a document which aimed at
introducing the idea of "European citizenship" into the new Union Treaty. Two years
later, there three new questions introduced in the standard Eurobarometre surveys, to
find out what people thought about a possible European Identity and European
Citizenship.
The first question was focusing on the European Identity. It was formulated like this:
In the near future, do you see yourself as:
Nationality only
Nationality and European
European and nationality
European only
It appeared regularly in the polls from 1992 to 2004 and then again, in 2010. I will
compare the answers given to this question over the years, to see how people's feelings
towards a European Identity evolved. However, a note here is important.
As it was formulated in the surveys, the question didn't make a clear distinction between
seeing oneself as European and seeing oneself as a member of the European Union
Therefore, it is impossible to say for sure, whether the respondents talked about an
appurtenance to the continent of Europe or to the EU.
From 2005 to 2009, a special chapter about the European Identity continued to be
published in most standard Eurobarometer surveys. However, the questions asked here
were totally different from the one introduced in 1992. They concerned mostly citizens'
attachment to the EU and how people perceived the advantages and disadvantages of
being part of the Union. Therefore, a comparison between the answers given before and
after 2004 is impossible.
The other questions introduced in the surveys in 1992 were meant to interrogate people
about a possible European Citizenship.
The first one asked the respondents how often they thought of themselves not only as
citizens of their country but also as citizens of the Europe. The second one asked the
subjects how often they thought of themselves not only as their nationality (British, Irish,
Italians) but as Europeans also.
Both these questions were dropped from the polls in the next year (1993) but the issue of
a European Citizenship was brought up again in a special Eurobarometer in 1995 and in
several polls in 2005, 2006, 2010 and 2011. I will compare the answers given on these
occasions, to see how people's feelings about a EU citizenship evolved. However, the
questions asked were formulated slightly different from one survey to another, so the
comparison should be regarded with caution.

7.1 National Identity versus European Identity

In 1992, the following question was asked in a Standard Eurobarometer, for the first time:

32

In the near future, do you see yourself as?

Nationality only
Nationality and European
European and nationality
European only
The answers given to this question show that national feelings were much stronger than
the European ones. 38% of the respondents at a European Community level said they felt
only their nationality. 48% felt their nationality first and Europeans second, 7% felt
Europeans first and their nationality second and 4% felt exclusively Europeans.
The country with the strongest national feelings was UK, where 54% of the citizens felt
only British. UK was followed by Ireland (52% felt only Irish) and Netherlands (42% felt
only Dutch)
At the other end of the spectrum was Italy where only 24% of the citizens felt exclusively
Italians. It was followed by Luxembourg (27%) and France (31%).

Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
UK
EC 12

Nationality
Only
37.00%
40.00%
41.00%
38.00%
34.00%
31.00%
52.00%
24.00%
27.00%
42.00%
38.00%
54.00%
38.00%

Nationality +
European
46
46
43
55
52
55
38
57
53
45
54
35
48

European+
Nationality
9
4
9
4
5
6
5
7
10
7
3
4
7

European
Only
3
1
3
2
4
6
2
5
6
3
1
4
4

A socio - demographic analysis of these answers is not available.

The Eurobarometre surveys kept asking this question every year between 1992 and 2004
and then again in 2010. The results can be seen in the following table.
However, in 2004 the question was posed in two different forms. Therefore, the answers
for that year, will be presented separately.
In the near future do you see yourselves as: a. Nationality only. B. Nationality and
European. c. European and Nationality. d. European only.
Answers at EU level: (1992-2003 + 2010)

33

1992
Nat. 38.00
only %
nat+E 48.00
U
%
EU+n 7.00
at
%
EU 4.00
only %

1993 1994
40 +2 33
-7
45
46
-3
+1
7
10
+3
4
7
+3

1995
40
+7
46
6
-4
5
-2

1996
46
+6
40
-6
6

1997
45
-1
40
6

1998
44
-1
41
+1
6

1999
45
+1
42
+1
6

4
-1

2000
38
-7
49
+7
7
+1
4

2001
44
+6
44
-5
6
-1
3
-1

2002
38
-6
49
+5
7
+1
3

2003
40
+2
47
-2
7

2010
46
+6
41
-6
7

As a general trend, the number of those feeling only European or European first and
Nationality second, remained steady between 1992 and 2010. On the other hand, the
percentage of those feeling only their nationality grew by 8%, mostly on the expense of
those feeling nationality first and European second (which dropped by 7% from 1992 to
2010)
In 2004, half of the respondents were asked the exact same question as in 2003 :
In the near future, do you see yourself as: Nationality only? Nationality and European?
European and Nationality? D. European only
The other half had to answer the same question, but without being given the opportunity
to choose the European and Nationality response.
Answers at a EU level, for the first half
Nationality Only
Nationality and European
European and Nationality
European Only

Year 2004
41.00%
46.00%
5.00%
2.00%

Answers at a EU level, for the second half

Nationality Only
Nationality and European
European Only

Year 2004
42.00%
50.00%
6.00%

In the first half, there were 5% of the respondents who felt European first and Nationality
second and 2% who felt only European. In the second half, the percentage of those who
felt only European grew to 6%. That is consistent with the hypothesis that, without
having the opportunity to choose the European and Nationality response, those who felt
European first and their nationality second, chose the European only answer which

34

they saw as the closest to their feelings.

Answers by country (1992-2003 + 2010)
Specifications:
1. The question started being asked before the enlargement of the EU Eastwards. The
Eurobarometre surveys were not being conducted in Eastern Europe at that time. That's
why, the data available before 2004, only cover the old EU 12 (between 1992 and 1994)
and the old EU 15 (from 1995).
2. The survey conducted in 2010 is the only one covering all the current 27 member states
and it will be presented separately.
3. The results from the 1992-2003 period are sometimes incomplete. In some years, the
statistics offer data only at EU level without giving country by country figures.
4. I chose to leave the 2004 results out because the double formulation of the question
would have made a comparison impossible.
In the near future do you see yourselves as: a. Nationality only. b.Nationality and
European.c. European and nationality. d. European only.
1. Nationality only
1992
Austri a
Belgiu 37.00
m
%
Denm 40.00
ark %

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

53
51
-2
32
29
47
50
-5
-3
+18 +3
50
48
56
57
55
+10 -2
+8
+1
-2

1998
50
-1
43
-7
48
-7

1999
47
-3
41
-2
56
+8

2000
51
+4
41

France31.00
%
Finlan d
Germa 41.00
ny
%
Greec 38.00
e
%
Irelan 52.00
d
%
Italy 24.00
%
Luxe 27.00

32
+1
-

22
-10
-

29
-12
46
+8
38
-10
25
-1
17

31
-1
56
-1
49
+2
56
+2
53
+3
28
-5
31

39
+8
61
+5
48
-1
60
+4
53

48
-4
26
+2
36

56

33
+11
59
+3
49
+20
61
+15
50
+12
35
+10
26

32
-1
57
-2
47
-2
54
-7
50
33
-2
23

26
-2
23

49
-7

2001
46
-5
45
+4
41
-8

2002
40
-6
36
-9
37
-4

2003
46
+6
40
+4
37

32
-7
54
-7
38
-10
50
-10
46
-7
23
-3
15

34
+2
59
+5
40
+2
58
+8
55
+9
31
+8
22

31
-3
56
-3
37
-3
52
-6
41
-14
22
-9
18

35
+4
57
+1
38
+1
51
-1
49
+8
25
+3
24

35

mbour %
+9
g
Nether 42.00 lands %
Portug 38.00 al
%

-19

+7

-3

+8

-8

-8

+7

-4

+6

33
-9
41
+3

43
+10
52
+11

42
-1
58
+6

45
+3
62
+4

44
-1
52
-10

40
-4
49
-3

45
+5
51
+2

40
-5
46
-5

43
+3
51
+5

Swede n
Spain 34.00
%
UK 54.00
%

64

64

57
+8

61
+2
31
-8
67
+7

54
-7
20
-11
62
-5

50
-4
38
+18
71
+9

48
-2
29

49
-10

43
+9
60
+3

59
+2
39
-5
60
+3

50

34

57
-7
44
+1
57
-3

59
+5

29
-8
65
-6

62
-3

These figures show a few trends. The number of those feeling their nationality only
dropped in most countries in 1994 compared to 1992.(Data from 1993 are unavailable or
incomplete) It increased only in two states: in Greece, by 8% and in Portugal, by 3%.
Also, it remained unchanged Spain, at 34%. The drop was huge in some states like
Luxembourg (19%), Germany (12%) or France (10%).
This trend was reversed in 1996 when the number of those who felt only their nationality
increased in virtually all the EU member states (except for Sweden where it stayed the
same) Again, in some cases, the change was quite spectacular. There was a 20% growth
in Germany, 18% in Belgium and 15% in Greece.
After 1996 the statistics were relatively stable. By 2003, the percentage of those who felt
only their nationality was again, close to the initial starting point, of 1992 or 1995 in most
countries. This means that, overall, between 1992 and 2003 the European Identity didnt
gain or lose much support in the minds and hearts of the citizens.
There were, however a few exceptions: In Greece and Portugal, the number of those
feeling only their nationality, grew from 38% in 1992 to 51% in 2003. Also in UK, these
figures increased from 54% in 1992 to 62% in 2003.
In Sweden, there was a considerable drop from 64% in 1995 to 48% in 2003.
The most nationalistic country throughout the years has been the UK. It has always
recorded one of the highest percentages of people who felt only British.
On the other hand, the state with the strongest European feelings has been Luxembourg.
Here, the percentage of those seeing themselves only as Nationality, has always been low.
Luxembourg is closely followed in this trend by Italy.
The next three tables show the percentages of those feeling European to some extent, by
country:
In the near future do you see yourselves as: a. Nationality only. b. Nationality and

36

European. c. European and nationality. d. European only.

2. Nationality and European

1992
Austri a
Belgiu 46.00
m
%
Denm 46.00
ark %
France55.00
%
Finlan d
Germa 43.00
ny
%
Greec 55.00
e
%
Irelan 38.00
d
%
Italy 57.00
%
Luxe 53.00
mbour %
g
Nether 45.00
lands %
Portug 54.00
al
%
Swede n
Spain 52.00
%
UK 35.00
%

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

33.00 38
%
+5
42
36
34
-4
-6
-2
44
36
40
-2
-8
+4
52
49
50
-3
-3
+1
35.00 39
%
+4
43
35
33
-8
-2
34
42
-11 +8
50
40
42
+12
-10 +2
55
52
52
-2
-3
51
44
46
-2
-7
+2

1998
37
-1
38
+4
45
+5
49
-1
37
-2
35
+2
39
-3
37
-5
55
+3
43
+3

1999
42
+5
42
+4
37
-8
48
-1
35
-2
37
+2
38
-1
38
+1
56
+1
41
-2

2000
40
-2
40
-2
44
+7
55
+7
40
+5
46
+9
42
+4
43
+5
65
+9
52
+11

2001
43
+3
40

46
-2
28
-6
37
-2
49
+6
25
-4

49
+3
42
+14
35
-2
53
+4
24
-1

48
-1
43
+1
40
+5
65
+12
27
+3

45
-3
43

1998
7
+1
8

1999 2000 2001

5
5
6
+2
+1
8
8
8

50
+5
48
-6
-

51
-1
34
-1

48
-2
40
-8
35.00
%
44
-7
26
-8

48
34
-6
39
+4
43
-1
29
+3

54
+10
50
-5
36
-4
43
-3
35
-7
38
-5
57
-8
45
-7

36
-4
52
-13
22
-5

2002
46
+3
44
+4
57
+3
54
+4
40
+4
47
+4
42
+7
49
+11
65
+8
51
+6

2003
43
-3
42
-2
56
-1
50
-4
40

49
+4
47
+4
40
+4
56
+4
27
+5

48
-1
43
-4
40

2002
9
+3
11
+3

2003
7
-2
9
-2

45
-2
42
43
-6
60
-5
43
-43

59
+3
28
+1

3. European and Nationality

1992 1993
Austri a
Belgiu 9.00% m

1994 1995 1996 1997

8.00% 6
-2
4
7
8
-5
+3
+1

37

Denm 4.00% ark

France6.00% Finlan d
Germa 9.00% ny
Greec 4.00% e
Irelan 5.00% d
Italy 7.00% Luxe 10.00 mbour %
g
Nether 7.00% lands
Portug 3.00% al
Swede n
Spain 5.00% UK

4.00% -

12
+6
-

15
+6
4

6
+1
12
+5
13
+3

9
+2
4
+1
-

7
+3

3
-1
8

8
-4
5.00% 2
-3
6
9
-9
+3
3
1
-1
-2
4
3
-2
-1
6
6
-6
14
11
+1
-3

9
+1
4
+2
7
-2
3
+2
4
+1
7
+1
7
-4

7
-2
3
-1
8
+1
2
+1
4

4
+1
8
+1
4
+1
9
+1
3
+1
4

9
+2
11
+4

7
-2
9
-2

5
5
-4
3
2
-1
-1
6.00% 4
-2
5
3
-2
6
3
-1
-3

6
+1
2

5
+1
2

3
-1
4
+1
5
+2

4
+1
6
+2
3
-2

7
+2
3
+1
4
7
+1
3

9
+1
3
-1
9

4
+1
3
-1
6
-1
14
+5

3
10
+1
4

6
+2
9
2
-1
10
4

6
+3
8
+2
15
+1

4
-2
8

6
-1
2
-1
5
+1
4
-3
4
+1

7
+1
3
+1
3
-2
5
+1
3
-1

2001
3
+1
5
-2
2

2002 2003
3
3

5
+1
1

3
-2
1

4
-1
2

3
-1
`2

14
-1

3
5
+2
6
+1
5
+2

4. European Only
1992 1993
Austri a
Belgiu 3.00% m
Denm 1.00% ark
France6.00% Finlan d
Germa 3.00% ny
Greec 2.00% e

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

3.00% 3
2
3
-1
+1
10
6
5
7
7
+7
-4
-1
+2
3
2
2
2
3
+2
-1
+1
11
7
5
6
4
+5
-4
-2
+1
-2
1.00% 2
2
1
+1
-1
9
5
6
5
4
+6
-4
+1
-1
-1
2
2
2
1
1
-1

2000
2
-2
7
2
-1
4
1
5
+1
2
+1

6
+1
2

6
1
-1
3
1
4
+1
2

38

Irelan 2.00% d
Italy
Luxe 6.00% mbour
g
Nether 3.00% lands
Portug 1.00% al
Swede n
Spain 4.00% UK

4.00% -

3
-1
4
-1
12
+6

13
+1

3
+1
5
-1
13
-3

2
-2
6
+2
16
+3

6
+3
3
+2
-

3
-1
2
-1
2

1
-2
2

5
+1
7
+3

4
4
+2
4
3
+1
-1
3.00% 2
-1
5
6
+1
5
5
-2
+1

3
-3
5
-1

4
+1
3
-2

4
+1
4

6
+1
20
+7

2
-1
3
-3
13
-7

16
+3

14
-2

3
+2
3
+1
2

3
-1
2
-1

2
-2
1
-2
1
-1
4
+1
3
+1

3
2

1
-1
4
+1
15
+1
2
2
+1
1
-1
4
3

These figures also show a few trends. The number of those feeling Nationality and
European remained relatively steady over the years. There were fluctuations sometimes,
but they were always temporary. The changes registered one year, generally reversed the
next year so, in the end, the figures remained stable over a longer period of time. There
were however, a few exceptions.
In Greece, the number of those feeling Nationality and European, dropped from 55% in
1992 to 42% in 2003. The same trend is found in Portugal, where the figures dropped
from 54% to 43% between 1992 and 2003.
As shown earlier, in these two countries, the percentages of those feeling Nationality only
grew by 13% over the same period of time. Therefore, we can conclude that, many
Greeks and Portuguese who felt both their Nationality and their European Identity in
1992, ended up feeling only their Nationality by 2003.
In Luxembourg, the number of respondents feeling Nationality and European, also
dropped considerably from 53% in 1992 to 43% in 2003.
During the same period of time, the percentage of those feeling only European grew by
9% (from 6 to 15%) Thus, we can conclude that many citizens of Luxembourg who
started by feeling both their Nationality and their European Identity in 1992, ended up
feeling only the European Identity by 2003. As a result, Luxembourg is by far the country
where the construction of the European Identity had been the most successful between
1992 and 2003. According to the Eurobaromtre reports, this is due to the fact that the
state has had, for a long time, a high number of foreign residents.
There was also a slight increase in the number of Swedish people feeling Nationality and
European, on the expense of those feeling Nationality only. Otherwise, the rest of the
Eurobarometre results showed no significant changes between 1992 and 2003.

39

Results by country in 2010 (in all the 27 member states)

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
UK

Nationality Only Nationality +

European

European +
Nationality

European
Only

49.00%
33.00%
51.00%
39.00%
59.00%
45.00%
49.00%
48.00%
42.00%
39.00%
50.00%
47.00%
58.00%
45.00%
52.00%
60.00%
22.00%
39.00%
36.00%
44.00%
45.00%
50.00%
41.00%
55.00%
35.00%
48.00%
70.00%

6
10
5
7
3
4
4
6
9
8
5
5
4
8
6
3
12
4
8
6
6
13
10
4
6
5
2

1
6
2
6
1
1
3
1
3
4
2
1
2
2
3
2
16
2
2
1
2
6
3
3
5
1
2

42
46
36
44
36
52
43
44
44
47
41
47
34
41
33
32
40
54
52
48
46
16
45
37
50
44
24

UK remained the most nationalistic state in 2010, with 70% of the respondents saying
they felt only British. The figure is up by 8% from 2003. Great Britain was followed by
two new member states Lithuania (60%) and Czech Republic (59%) and by Ireland
(58%, 9% more than in 2003)
At the other end of the spectrum, Luxembourg remained the most European nation. Only
22% of the respondents identified themselves by their nationality exclusively (down 2%
from 2003). Luxembourg was followed by Belgium, where 33% of the people said they
were feeling only their nationality (down 7% from 2003). These results can be explained
by the fact that both Belgium and Luxembourg have a fairly international population with
40

many foreign residents.

Italy switched from being one of the most European-feeling countries to a more
nationalistic approach. 45% of the respondents said they felt only Italians in 2010,
compared to 25% in 2003. Like Ireland, Italy was one of the biggest migrant receiving
states after the EU enlargements Eastwards. This infusion of migrants could explain
people's turn to nationalism.
As a general trend, National identities were still stronger than the European Identity in
2010. There was no significant difference between the old and the new member states.
Some Eastern European countries are situated among the most nationalistic states, right
behind UK (such as Lithuania) while others are fairly European (such as Malta, where
only 39% of the respondents said they felt their nationality exclusively)
In some years, the Eurobarometre survey was accompanied by a socio-demographic
analysis of the answers. It is not available each year but it does show a general trend:
older people tend to feel their nationality only, more often than the youth. Also,
respondents who were more educated and situated higher on the social order were more
likely to feel European to some extent.

7.2 European Citizenship

In 1992, two questions regarding the European Citizenship were introduced in the
Eurobarometre.
The first one, asked to 49% of the respondents, was formulated like this:
Do you ever think of yourself as not only as (NATIONALITY), but also European ? Does
this happen often, sometimes or never ?
This question is very similar to the one about a European Identity. The main difference is
the introduction of a frequency element: often, sometimes or never. This element makes
respondents think of certain clear moments when they felt European Citizens, because
this European Citizenship brought them rights or responsibilities. That's how, through the
introduction of this frequency element, the question was turned from one about identity
into a question about citizenship. The second citizenship question, posed to 51% of the
respondents, was formulated like this:
Do you ever think of yourself as not only a citizen of your nationality, but also a citizen of
Europe ? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?
Over half of the respondents (51%) at a EC 12 level said they never thought of
themselves as European citizens. The most numerous were again in UK 71% of those
asked the first question and 66% of those who were posed the second question.

41

Ireland was on the second place. 64% of those asked the first question and 61% of those
asked the second question said they never thought of themselves as European citizens.
Germany was third on this top, with 59% of respondents saying they never felt
Europeans, on both versions of the question.
On the other end of the spectrum we find Portugal where people felt European citizens
most often. Only 33-34% of the Portuguese said they never thought of themselves as
Europeans. Luxembourg was next with 33-34% and Spain third with 37-38%.
The next table shows the results by country:
Question A:
Do you ever think of yourself as not only as (NATIONALITY), but also European ? Does
this happen often, sometimes or never ?
Question B:
Do you ever think of yourself as not only a citizen of your nationality, but also a citizen of
Europe ? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?
1st column :
Question A results

OFTEN

2nd column: Question

B results
BELGIUM
17
DENMARK
14
GERMANY
8
GREECE
23
SPAIN
24
FRANCE
16
IRELAND
15
ITALY
16
LUXEMBOURG
22
NETHERLANDS
11
PORTUGAL
15
UK
10
EC12
14

12
18
8
22
22
14
14
18
21
9
17
12
14

SOMETIMES

NEVER

41
36
29
37
34
36
20
41
39
28
51
18
32

40
49
59
39
37
47
64
41
34
59
33
71
51

39
35
29
39
36
40
25
39
43
35
47
21
33

45
46
59
38
38
46
61
41
35
55
44
66
51

A socio-demographic analysis is not available.

The issue of a European Citizenship was brought up again in a special Eurobarometre in

42

1995. Then, the question was formulated like this:

"Do you often, sometimes or never happen to feel both a European Citizen and a citizen
of your nationality? In your opinion does <being a European citizen> mean something?
"
The survey was conducted in the EU 15 states, compared the EC 12 from 1992. Sweden,
Finland and Austria were added to the list. 58% of the respondents at a EU 15 level said
they felt Europeans at least sometimes. Only 38% of the subjects said they never thought
of themselves as Europeans. That's 13% less than in 1992.
The countries that were closest to the European Citizenship were Luxembourg (35% felt
European citizens often and 43% sometimes), Spain (28% often and 42% sometimes) and
Italy (33% often and 37% sometimes)
At the other extreme, people from the UK were again the most skeptical about a
European Citizenship. 60% of the British subjects said they never thought of themselves
as European citizens. The same percentage (60%) is also found in Netherlands. Also, only
8% of the Dutch people felt European citizens often and 27% sometimes. In UK, the
figures were 13% often and 26% sometimes.
Results by country:
"Do you often, sometimes or never happen to feel both a European citizen and a citizen
of your nationality?. In your opinion does <being a European Citizen> mean
something?"

OFTEN

SOMETIMES

NEVER BUT
<BEING A
EUROPEAN
CITIZEN> DOES
MEAN
SOMETHING

BELGIUM
DENMARK
GERMANY WEST
GERMANY EAST
GREECE
SPAIN
FRANCE

25.00%
16.00%
28.00%
19.00%
19.00%
28.00%
22.00%

28
19
34
29
39
42
42

14
16
13
16
13
17
13

NEVER AND
<BEING A
EUROPEAN
CITIZEN>
DOESN'T MEAN
ANYTHING

25
35
21
26
27
8
21

43

IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
PORTUGAL
UK
AUSTRIA
FINLAND
SWEDEN
EU 15

14.00%
33.00%
35.00%
8.00%
13.00%
13.00%
24.00%
16.00%
14.00%
23.00%

32
37
43
27
50
26
36
34
28
35

15
8
12
20
6
8
8
19
11
12

28
16
7
40
26
52
25
27
38
26

The results show that, most people who never felt European citizens think that the
European Citizenship doesn't mean anything. Therefore, they are rather unclear about
the European Citizenship than opposed to it. Because the question was formulated in
three different ways, a country by country comparison between 1992 and 1995 is
impossible.
At a socio-demographic level, people of different ages tend to react the same way at the
European Citizenship concept. There are no significant differences between age groups
when it comes to feeling a European Citizen.
However, those with higher education tend to be closer to this concept than people with
lower education. This is explained in the Eurobarometre analysis by the fact that,
educated people can better understand a complex idea like a transnational citizenship.
In 2005 and 2006, the question about a European Citizenship was formulated like this:
Do you ever think of yourself not only as a <Nationality> but also as a European? Does
this happen sometimes, often or never?
The survey was conducted this time in the EU 25 countries, after the 2004 enlargement
Eastwards. At a EU level, the answers were slightly different from the ones given in
1995. In 2005, 42% of the respondents said they never felt Europeans (compared to 38%
in 1995) This figure grew to 43% in 2006. Also, in 2005, 55% of the subjects felt
Europeans often or sometimes, compared to 58% in 1995. In 2006, this figure dropped to
54%.
Results at EU 25 level in 2005 and 2006:
Do you ever think of yourself not only as a <Nationality> but also as a European? Does
this happen sometimes, often or never?

2005

OFTEN
17.00%

SOMETIMES
38.00%

NEVER
42.00%

44

2006

16.00%

38.00%

43.00%

SOMETIMES
34.00%
33.00%
38.00%
40.00%
36.00%
41.00%
41.00%
33.00%
38.00%
46.00%
43.00%
40.00%
39.00%
42.00%
35.00%
41.00%
38.00%
38.00%
39.00%
50.00%
40.00%
46.00%
46.00%
39.00%
24.00%
38.00%

NEVER
28.00%
38.00%
37.00%
33.00%
42.00%
36.00%
37.00%
45.00%
42.00%
33.00%
38.00%
41.00%
40.00%
40.00%
48.00%
37.00%
40.00%
46.00%
45.00%
34.00%
46.00%
41.00%
41.00%
49.00%
66.00%
42.00%

ANSWERS BY COUNTRY IN 2005:

LUXEMBOURG
MALTA
GREECE
ITALY
FRANCE
FINLAND
DENMARK
HUNGARY
BELGIUM
POLAND
CYPRUS
NETHERLANDS
AUSTRIA
GERMANY
ESTONIA
SPAIN
IRELAND
SWEDEN
LITHUANIA
SLOVAKIA
LATVIA
SLOVENIA
PORTUGAL
CZECH REP.
UK
EU 25

OFTEN
38.00%
27.00%
25.00%
24.00%
22.00%
22.00%
21.00%
20.00%
19.00%
19.00%
18.00%
18.00%
18.00%
16.00%
16.00%
15.00%
15.00%
15.00%
14.00%
14.00%
13.00%
12.00%
11.00%
10.00%
8.00%
17.00%

Luxembourg remained the closest country to a European Citizenship. Here, only 28% of
the respondents said they never thought of themselves as Europeans. Luxembourg was
followed in this top by two new entries to the EU: Poland (33%) and Slovakia (34%).
Poland shared the second place with Italy, where the percentage of those who never felt
Europeans was also 33%.
The most euro-skeptic nation was still the same, UK. Here, 66% of the respondents said
they never thought of themselves as Europeans. It was followed by Czech Republic
(49%) and Estonia (48%).
In 2006, the country by country analysis only offers figures for Often plus

45

Sometimes answers. The exact percentage of those saying they never felt Europeans is
not available.
Do you ever think of yourself not only as a <Nationality> but also as a European? Does
this happen sometimes, often or never?
Often plus sometimes results in 2005 and 2006
LUXEMBOURG

2005
72.00%

2006
67.00%
-5%
62%
+2
72%
+9
59%
-5
55%
-3
68%
+5
61%
+1
57%
+4
60%
+3
65%

MALTA

60.00%

GREECE

63.00%

ITALY

64.00%

FRANCE

58.00%

FINLAND

63.00%

DENMARK

62.00%

HUNGARY

53.00%

BELGIUM

57.00%

POLAND

65.00%

CYPRUS

61.00%

NETHERLANDS

58.00%

AUSTRIA

57.00%

GERMANY

58.00%

ESTONIA

51.00%

SPAIN

56.00%

IRELAND

53.00%

SWEDEN

53.00%

57%
-4
59%
+1
58%
+1
57%
-1
52%
+1
57%
+1
52%
-1
53%

LITHUANIA

53.00%

53%

46

SLOVAKIA

64.00%

64%

LATVIA

53.00%

SLOVENIA

58.00%

PORTUGAL

57.00%

CZECH REP.

49.00%

UK

32.00%

51%
-2
50%
-8
61%
+4
54%
+5
32%

EU 25

55.00%

54%
-1

In 2006, there was a slight change in the top of the closest countries to the European
Citizenship. Greece came on first place with 72% of the population feeling sometimes or
often European (compared to 63% in 2005). Finland came second (68%, up from 63% in
2005). Luxembourg was third (67% compared to 72% in 2005).
At the other end of the spectrum, UK remained the most Euro-sceptic country with only
32 percent of the population feeling sometimes or often European. It was followed by
Latvia (51%, down 2% from 2005) and Estonia ( 52%, 1% up from the previous year)
The socio-demographic analysis from 2006 show that younger people tended to feel
European more often that the old ones. Also, more educated people and those still
studying were closer to the European Citizenship than those with lower education.
Results by socio-demographic criteria:
A. by age
Age:15-24
Age:25-39
Age:40-54
Age:55+

Often
15.00%
17.00%
17.00%
16.00%

Sometimes
42.00%
42.00%
41.00%
33.00%

Never
42.00%
40.00%
41.00%
48.00%

Often
12.00%

Sometimes
32.00%

Never
54.00%

14.00%

37.00%

48.00%

B. by level of education:
End of education at
15End of education at

47

16-19
End of education at
20 +
Still studying

24.00%

46.00%

29.00%

18.00%

`44%

36.00%

In 2010, the European Citizenship question was changed again. It was formulated like
this:
Tell me, how much you agree with the following affirmation: You feel a citizen of the EU.
a. totally agree, b. rather agree, c. rather disagree, d. totally disagree

EU 27

Totally agree
21.00%

Rather agree
41.00%

Rather disagree Totally disagree

25.00%
12.00%

According to these results, a vast majority of the respondents tended to feel EU citizens
in 2010, at least to some extent.
Again, the closest country to this feeling was Luxembourg, where 87% of the
respondents said they totally agreed with the affirmation. It was followed by Slovakia
(79%) and Finland (76%)
UK remained the country with the weakest feeling of a EU citizenship. Only 41% of the
population totally agreed with the affirmation. UK was followed by Latvia (44%) and
Greece (48%). However, a complete country by country analysis is not available.
In 2011, the Eurobarometre asked the same question, but with different answer options.
It was formulated like this:
Tell me, how much you agree with the following affirmation: You feel a citizen of the EU.
a. totally agree, b. totally disagree.
EU27 in 2011

Totally agree
62.00%

Totally disagree
36.00%

Answers by country in 2011.

Tell me, how much you agree with the following affirmation: You are a citizen of the EU.
a. totally agree, b. totally disagree.

Totally agree

Totally disagree

48

Luxembourg
Slovakia
Finland
Malta
Germany
Poland
Ireland
Spain
Slovenia
Belgium
Denmark
Portugal
Sweden
Estonia
Cyprus
Netherlands
Austria
Italy
France
Romania
Lithuania
Hungary
Czech Rep.
Latvia
Greece
Bulgaria
UK
EU 27

88.00%
79.00%
77.00%
73.00%
73.00%
72.00%
71.00%
70.00%
70.00%
69.00%
69.00%
68.00%
67.00%
67.00%
65.00%
64.00%
63.00%
61.00%
58.00%
57.00%
56.00%
55.00%
51.00%
48.00%
44.00%
44.00%
41.00%
62.00%

11.00%
20.00%
23.00%
25.00%
26
24.00%
28.00%
30.00%
29.00%
31.00%
30.00%
31.00%
32.00%
32.00%
35.00%
36.00%
37.00%
38.00%
41.00%
40.00%
43.00%
45.00%
48.00%
51.00%
56.00%
55.00%
46.00%
36.00%

Unlike the European Identity, the European Citizenship seems to be more popular among
the EU population. The vast majority of the respondents tend to feel EU citizens at least
to some extent. In 2011, there are only four countries in the Union, where the percentage
of those feeling EU citizens was under 50% : UK (41%), Bulgaria (44%), Greece (44%)
and Latvia (48%)
At the other end of the spectrum we find again Luxembourg with 88% of the population
feeling EU citizens at leas once in a while. It is followed by Slovakia (79%), Finland
(77%) and Malta (73%)
Because the questions have been changed all the time, it is impossible to make a clear
comparison between the first results from 1992 and the last ones from 2011. However, a
few general trends can be identified.
1. The EU Citizenship became more and more popular over the years. The number of those
seeing themselves as European citizens, grew constantly.
2. Luxembourg and UK remained steadily on the top and the bottom of the country by
49

country hierarchy Luxembourg being the closest state to a EU Citizenship and UK, the
furthest.
3. Greece changed from one of the most enthusiastic nations about a European Citizenship,
to one of the most sceptical. This change occurred between 2006 and 2011 due probably
to the deep economic crisis that hit the country.
4. The same thing happened in Italy, but at a lower scale than in Greece. Here the reasons
vary from the financial crisis to a wave of Eastern Migrants. ( Italy has also registered a
turn to nationalism in the surveys about National and European Identity )
The socio-demographic analysis show the same trend as before: younger and educated
people tend to feel European Citizens more often than the older and uneducated.
Results by age in 2011:
Age: 15-24
Age: 25-39
Age: 40-54
Age: 55+

Totally agree
69.00%
64.00%
63.00%
56.00%

Totally disagree
29.00%
35.00%
36.00%
42.00%

Results by level of education in 2011:

Studies ended at 15Studies ended at 16-19
Studies ended at 20+
Still studying

Totally agree
50.00%
60.00%
71.00%
76.00%

Totally disagree
48.00%
39.00%
28.00%
22.00%

8. Analysis
During the last decades, the construction of the European Identity has been done in two
ways: through media campaigns and through education. Normally, both education and
media can be used simultaneously for the purpose of forging a transnational identity.
However, the construction can take different forms, depending on which becomes central
over the other (education over media or media over education)

8.1 The promise of a better life

The construction through media was generally used in Eastern Europe immediately after
the fall of Communism. National authorities chose it because it was a fast method of
construction and it had a strong immediate impact. Faced with the wave of inter-ethnic

50

conflicts in former Yugoslavia, officials had to come up with a quick, efficient way to
change national identities. Time was very important. Eastern states were on a very short
deadline. Their authorities had to act quickly and get results, before the civil wars could
spill to the entire region.
In that climate of urgency, media campaigns were the most effective way of influencing
national identities. Changing a National Identity through education is a long term process.
It targets young people and it is expected to show results on the next generation. It
requires time and Eastern European countries didn't have time.
That's why, officials turned to media campaigns as a faster way to change people's
perception of themselves. Ethnic radical platforms of the early 1990s, were quickly
replaces in the press by EU integration programmes. The authorities used the media to
promote the Western dream. (see chapter From Communism to Western Integration)
These media campaigns were efficient for two main reasons. Firstly, they offered the
promise of a better life, to a poor society, threatened by ethnic violence. That was an
irresistible promise and the population embraced it eagerly.
The campaigns basically sent people in Eastern Europe the following message: Do you
want a peaceful and prosperous life like in the West or do you want to live in a conflict
torn region? It's your choice! And, obviously, the population chose the Western life.
The second reason for the efficiency of the campaigns was the fact that the message was
coming from the national authorities and not from international organisations or other
foreign entities. Western powers supported the westernisation of the former Communist
block, but they did it indirectly. They offered advice, logistic and financial support. But
the actual construction of the new national identities was made by the local authorities.
Neither the EU nor other international organisations directly intervened in the process.
(Serbia was an exception and its path has been different from the rest of the block.)
The absence of direct international involvement was very important in a region with high
ethnicity tensions. (see chapter From Communism to Western Integration) It helped
keep things calm and unnecessary conflicts were avoided.
However, the construction of a European Identity through media campaigns has some
flaws too. It was very efficient in Eastern Europe in the 1990s because of the existing
conditions there and then. The immediate threat of civil war and the economic chaos
made people very open to a pro-European discourse. However, the method would not be
efficient in today's EU.
The old promise of a better life is no longer enough to rally the population behind a
European Identity. Neither in Eastern nor in Western Europe.
The threat of ethnic conflict is no longer valid in Eastern Europe. Younger generations
don't even remember what it was like in the really 1990s. They live in a peaceful and
51

stable area and they take the EU membership and its privileges for granted. Therefore,
any campaign to promote a transnational identity would have to promise more than just
the chance of free movement across borders and a Western lifestyle.
The same thing can be said about the Western Block. Nobody can promise the British or
the French people a better life through European Integration. On the contrary. The
adhesion of the former Communist Block has had so far many negative impacts on their
lives, from waves of job stealing migrants to fears about border security. ( see chapters
Invasion of the Eastern Migrants and The Impact of the EU Enlargement)

8.2 Cultivating humanity

Therefore, a new discourse is needed to promote the European Identity on both sides of
the Iron Curtain. According to many authors, this discourse should go along the lines of
Let's make the world a better place , Let's cultivate humanity.
This type of identity construction can be best done through education. Most often,
through study abroad experience for students and teacher training programmes. (see
chapters Constructiong a European Identity and The way to a European Citizenship?
) This is a long term process and, most likely, a project for the next generation. It is also
a transnational effort that has to be done simultaneously in all EU member states. That's
why, the European Union is directly involved in it. It takes part in the construction
through exchange programmes such as Erasmus or other measures. (see chapter
Constructing a European Identity) It is actively involved in the process, not just a side
supporter, offering financial or logistic help.
National Authorities are no longer the main players in constructing the European Identity.
The EU institutions are. National authorities still play a role, but it is not the main role
any more. The main role is played by EU bodies. And, the most active institution in this
matter is the European Commission which is the body charged with defending the EU
interests as a whole.
According to the EU official website, the three most important bodies involved in setting
the Union's agenda and in law making are The European Parliament, The Council of the
European Union and The European Commission.
The Parliament represents EU citizens and it is directly elected by them. Therefore, the
MPs are usually concerned with the interests of the people who voted for them. Each
member of the Parliament represents a limited number of persons, generally situated in
the same geographical area. And their interests might be in contradiction with those of
another limited group, represented by another MP.
The Council of the European Union represents the Governments of the individual
member states. Here, national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and
coordinate policies. Since it is a body made up of national representatives, negotiations
52

are often influenced by the national interests of each member state.

The European Commission is the one that represents the Union's interests as a whole. It
has 27 commissioners, one from each member state. However, the commissioners are not
representing their countries of origin. They are not there to defend national interests.
They are rather experts working at a EU level, trying to make the common policies work.
Each commissioner is responsible for a certain political or economic area. For instance
there is a commissioner responsible for Foreign Affairs, one for Economic and Monetary
Affairs, one for Transport, etc. Their job is to coordinate the domain they are in charge of,
and make it functional at EU level. They are not guided by national interest but by the
idea of a well functioning EU.
Considering this, the Commission is the most appropriate EU institution to take measures
for the construction of a European Identity. However, other EU bodies are often involved
in this process as well.

8.3 Why cultivate humanity?

This type of discourse, promoting the cultivation of humanity, can be successful for many
reasons. Firstly, it appeals to the sensibility of the population. Even in the worst of crisis,
people can empathize with each other. The idea of a better world (or in this case a better
Europe) for everybody could be embraced by some of the citizens even in the most
difficult of times. It is an emotional reaction that can make people more open to the
concept of a trans-national identity.
Secondly, it encourages the feeling of moral superiority. During the Cold War, this
superiority was shown in the West through the acceptance and warm welcoming of
Eastern dissidents. (see chapter Invasion of the Eastern Migrants) Now, that moral
superiority doesn't have to stay in the West anymore. It has to be passed on. The
Communism fell, the borders are open so Western principles have been exported all over
Europe. The entire continent has become a place of free and democratic societies, guided
by the same principles. These principles can be used as foundation for the construction of
a common identity.
However, these are rather emotional reasons why the construction of the European
Identity through education might be successful. The most obvious motives are more
pragmatic.
The most efficient way of constructing the European Identity is through exchange and
study abroad programmes. Students who go through such experiences also acquire
language and inter-cultural skills. Skills that are very sought after in the current,
globalized labour market. In other words, the construction of a European Identity is also
the way to properly prepare tomorrow's work force. (see chapter Why construct a
European Identity?)

53

Besides, a transnational identity offers a sense of solidarity among EU states, that could
prove useful in front of external threats. This idea is promoted by Robert O. Keohane
and Joseph S. Nye (1977) in their Theory of Neoliberalism in International Relations.
(see chapter Why construct a European Identity?)

8.4 How efficient are the measures taken so far?

So, back to the initial question: How can a European Identity be constructed in a divided
EU? Through education and media campaigns. Both national authorities of the member
states and European institutions have been involved in this construction, for decades. But,
how efficient have been the measures taken so far ? Can we talk about an existing
European Identity, at least in its early stages?

8.5 The European Identity, stagnating

According to the Eurobarometre surveys, the answer is different from one country to
another. If we look at UK, the European Identity is extremely week, almost non-existent.
(see chapter National Identity versus European Identity) Whatever measures were
taken to construct the EU Identity, were inefficient here. An overwhelming majority of
the British population still identifies only by their nationality.
However, UK has one particularity that could explain people's hostility towards a
European Identity. The Eurobarometre question asked the respondents whether they felt
Europeans, not members of the EU. (see chapter National Identity versus European
Identity)
UK is not part of mainland Europe. It is an island outside the main continent. So, when
people said they didn't feel Europeans, they could have referred to a geographical
appurtenance to the continent.
Another area with low support for the European Identity is in the Baltic states, especially
in Lithuania. Here, the explanation may lay in the history of the region. Before 1989, the
Baltic countries were under Soviet occupation. That's why, citizens may be now very
attached to their newly found independence and nationhood.
In Italy, the situation is different. The population started as one of the most enthusiastic
about the European Identity and it ended up being one of the most Euro-sceptic. This
evolution can be explained by the increasing number of migrant-related problems in
recent years.
At the other extreme, if we look at Luxembourg and Belgium, we can say that the
European Identity is there and it is getting stronger every year. This openness of the
population towards a EU Identity can be explained by the fact that both Belgium and

54

Luxembourg have a fairly international population and they host some of the EU
institutions.
In conclusion, the efficiency of the measures taken for the construction of a European
Identity, depends on the conditions existing in each country. Where conditions are
favourable, the EU Identity is stronger. Where conditions are hostile, the European
Identity is still very weak.
However, we can say that, the first steps towards a common EU Identity were taken.
Generally, in most member states, there is a certain percentage of the population who feel
European at least to some extent. But this feeling is still unstable and it doesn't seem to
grow in time. Between 1992 and 2010, the figures at EU level don't show a consolidation
of the European Identity. On the contrary, they show a slight increase in the number of
those who felt only their nationality. (see chapter National Identity versus European
Identity)
The good news comes from the socio-demographic analysis. Young people are usually
more inclined to feel European than the elderly. Thus, the EU Identity might gain more
support and become stronger in the future, when the old generations disappear.
This could also be an argument in favour of the theory that constructing a European
Identity through education works. Young generations, those who actually participated in
the Erasmus programme, tend to feel more European than their parents and grandparents.
Therefore, the programme is efficient at least to some extent. The efficiency is also
obvious if we look at some of the declarations made by former Erasmus Students.
"I realised that the experience made a whole new person of me and that I would never
look at the world and Europe, my home, as I did before."
"It is true when you're in ERASMUS, you find out a lot about yourself."
"ERASMUS is a lot more than a studying experience. For me it is a way to look at the
world with new eyes, to feel and discover new emotions and learn what is not written in
the textbooks." (Cited on europa.eu)
Obviously, the study abroad experience changed the way they understood other cultures
and the way they saw their own lives. According to Martha Nussbaum (1997), this is
exactly what should happen during education years, in order for students to become
global citizens rather than just representatives of their ethnic and national groups. (see
chapter The way to a European Citizenship? )
Another proof that the European Identity could be constructed in schools, is the
Eurobarometre analysis by level of education. People with higher education are more
likely to feel Europeans than those with lower education. Generally, those who spent
more time in school, experienced a longer exposure to the measures taken for the
construction of the EU Identity. Also, education helped them understand better a complex
concept like a transnational identity. As a result, they are more likely to embrace the

55

European Identity. If the education system keeps promoting this EU Identity among the
students, it could become more and more popular over the years.

8.6 The European Citizenship, a more attractive concept

However, for now, EU population seems to be more open to the idea of a European
Citizenship. The issue of a European Citizenship was brought up in several
Eurobarometre surveys in the last years. The results of the polls show that, people grew
more and more attached to this concept, from one year to the next. If in 1992, over 50%
of the respondents said they never felt European Citizens, in 2011 this percentage
dropped to 36%. (see chapter European Citizenship )
Generally, the population seems to appreciate the rights given by a EU citizenship. Even
if they don't share a strong European Identity, people see the right to move, work or study
abroad, as an advantage. It gives them extra freedom and better opportunities. That's why,
they have positive feelings towards the idea of a European Citizenship.
The closest country to this feeling is again Luxembourg. It is one of the states that
benefited the most from the free movement of goods, services and persons inside the EU.
During the boom years it attracted a lot of foreign workers who were badly needed for the
economy. Also, Luxembourg is known for being a tax heaven and for having a non
transparent banking system. That's why, it keeps attracting a steady financial flow from
all over Europe.
Another EU tax heaven for companies is Ireland. After joining the Union, Dublin
authorities introduced a series of tax rebates that were very appealing for international
groups. That's how, the country came to host the European headquarters of many big
transnational companies. This lead to a considerable economic growth and the creation of
many jobs. After 2008, Ireland was hit hard by the current economic crisis. Faced with a
huge public debt, the Government got a saving financial package from the EU.
Considering all this, it is no surprise that Irish is one of the nations with the strongest
feelings of being European citizens. 71% of the population said they felt EU citizens,
although the percentage of those feeling the European Identity was rather low.
Many nations from the former Communist block are also close to the concept of a
common citizenship. Among them, Slovakia, Malta, Poland and Slovenia, which ranked
in the top six. In this case, the motivation is different. Eastern people tend to support the
European Citizenship because it gives them the freedom to live and work in the West.
At the other extreme, the nation with the lowest support for a European Citizenship is
UK. This can be explained by many factors. Firstly, the free movement right is not very
dear to the British because they generally don't migrate to other EU states. If they decide
to move abroad, their preferred countries of destination are Australia, USA and Canada.
Therefore, the EU citizenship doesn't help them much.

56

Also, London authorities have been leading a policy of isolation form the rest of the
Union. That's why, the British population tends to consider itself somehow different.
UK is followed in this top by Bulgaria, which is considered the poorest country of the
Union. This poverty is actually the best explanation for the lack of support for a EU
Citizenship. People in Bulgaria are too poor to migrate. Therefore, the most important
advantage of a the EU membership, the freedom of movement across borders, is
inaccessible to them.
The next country with low support for a European Citizenship is Greece. Here, the
explanation lays in the harsh crisis that hit the state recently.
In conclusion, we can say that, the construction of a European Citizenship depends on the
existing conditions in each member state (just like the construction of the European
Identity). However, as a general trend, people tend to have positive feelings towards the
EU Citizenship and their attachment to this concept has been growing over the years.
But this positive view could vanish if the population was faced with the responsibilities
of a EU Citizenship. So far, people have been able to enjoy the rights, without taking into
consideration the full scale responsibilities of such a concept. There is no official EU
Citizenship in place.
That's why, many national authorities had the opportunity to adopt protectionist measures
against other member states. Western countries imposed work restrictions for Eastern
citizens after the enlargement. UK has been known to get exceptions from many
important EU treaties. And lately, more and more voices have been talking about a
possible Greek exit from the EU because of the economic crisis in Athens.
All these wouldn't be allowed in a region with an official, common citizenship. Citizens
have rights and they would have to be respected. Central authorities couldnt just kick a
chunk of the population (like Greece) out because they face economic hardship. Nor
could they stop citizens from one region to move and work in another (like it happened
after the enlargement Eastwards).
Instead, the leadership would have to try and help the troubled regions, recover.
Eventually, this would lead to a situation similar to the one in Germany after
reunification. Richer parts of the EU would have to support the poor ones. And that could
create tensions and make people become more sceptical about a possible European
Citizenship.

9. Conclusions
Both the European Identity and the European Citizenship seem to be present in the
population's mind, at least to some extent. However, they are still in their early stages of

57

evolution and they are highly unstable. It is still unclear whether or not they will survive
in the future. The answer to this question depends on many factors, most of them
economic.
There is no obvious cultural or identity-related incompatibility between the different
countries of the EU. On the contrary. They seem to be culturally similar and their citizens
can easily adapt and interact to each other. The educational programmes and the media
campaigns have been very efficient from this point of view.
However, there is still a big obstacle in the evolution of a European Identity and a
European Citizenship: economic disparities. They have been at the heart of tensions
between Eastern and Western Europe for 20 years and they have already affected the
efforts to construct a common identity. Now, they may continue to threaten these efforts
for a long time, especially in the context of the current economic crisis.
This doesn't mean the European Identity or the European Citizenship can't be constructed.
But, the efforts to construct them should include a large economic component, in order to
become more efficient. A component meant to reduce or eliminate economic disparities
between the different regions of the Union. This way, the risk of mass migration would be
lowered and the tensions between the blocks would be avoided.
In conclusion, the European Identity and eventually the European Citizenship could be
constructed efficiently through three types of measures taken simultaneously: though
education, through media campaigns and through effective development programmes.

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