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Three principles
Denying one or more of these principles
Three principles
The Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) and Principle of Excluded Middle
(PEM) are frequently mistaken for one another and for a third principle which
asserts their conjunction.
Given a statement and its negation, p and ~p, the PNC asserts that at most
one is true. The PEM asserts that at least one is true. The PNC says "not both"
and the PEM "not neither". Together, and only together, they assert that
exactly one is true.
Let us call the principle that asserts the conjunction of the PNC and PEM, the
Principle of Exclusive Disjunction for Contradictories (PEDC). Surprisingly, this
important principle has acquired no particular name in the history of logic.
PNC
PEM
PEDC
Clearly the PEDC is not identical to either the PNC or the PEM, and the latter
two are not identical to one another.
The PEM is simple inclusive disjunction for p and ~p. The PNC is the denial of
their conjunction. Conjoining these gives us exclusive disjunction: at least one
of the contradictories is true (PEM) and not both are true (PNC).
Because the PEDC is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the PNC and
PEM, that is, because PEDC
(PNC PEM), whatever implies the PEDC implies
the two other principles as well. Many logical principles, axioms, and
unacknowledged choices imply the PEDC. From ordinary logic, the principle of
double negation (p
~~p) implies the PEDC. So does the initial selection of a
two-valued logic that requires every proposition to take exactly one of two
truth values.
In a standard two-valued logic, then, one should not be surprised that the
statements of the PNC and PEM are equivalent to one another and to the
PEDC.
PNC
~(p ~p)
PEM
p ~p
PEDC
~p
These are logically equivalent because they are all tautologies, and all
tautologies are logically equivalent. This equivalence does not mean that the
principles are the same, however. They bear the same truth-value, not the
same meaning. Under De Morgan's theorem, the PNC can be transformed into
the PEM and vice versa, but this only shows that De Morgan's Theorem
presupposes the PEDC. (Logics that deny the PEM must deny some forms of De
Morgan's theorem.)
The PNC and PEM need not be equivalent in n-valued logics when n > 2,
although the principles must be reformulated for those logics and could look
very different. Even in two-valued logics these three formulas are distinct as
soon as we replace p and ~p with (for example) p and q. The relations they
assert are only equivalent in the special case when the relations are asserted
of contradictories.
If we use a standard two-valued logic, the three principles are already present
even if they do not appear as axioms. The three principles can be proved in
such a logic, but any such proof would be viciously circular.
PEM
Case 1
true
false
Case 2
false
true
Case 3
false
false
Case 1. If the PNC were true of the world, and the PEM false, then there
would be some pairs of contradictories for which neither member was true.
The world would be underdetermined. The world would be thinner and more
abstract than the PEDC would have it.
Case 2. If the PEM were true of the world and the PNC false, then there would
be some pairs of contradictories for which both members were true. The
For example, Goldbach's famous conjecture states that every even number
(except 2) is the sum of two primes. For two centuries it has tantalized
mathematicians because, while its assertion is simple, it has never been
proved or disproved. Non-intuitionists would accept the conjecture as
disproved if it implied a contradiction. Intuitionists would accept it as
disproved only if one could actually produce a counterexample: an even
number that is not the sum of two primes.
More generally, intuitionists will admit p ~p (PEM) as a theorem of a system
only if p or ~p, that is, only if we have already proved p or ~p. In the world of
metamathematics, the intuitionists are not at all exotic, despite the
centrality of the PEDC (hence the PEM) to the ordinary sense of consistency.
Their opponents do not scorn them as irrationalists but, if anything, pity them
for the scruples that do not permit them to enjoy some "perfectly good"
mathematics.
"Contraries" are statements that can both be false, but that cannot both be
true; for example (1) all S is P, and (2) no S is P. "Subcontraries" are
statements that can both be true, but that cannot both be false; for example
(3) some S is P, and (4) some S is not P.
Just to round things out, there are pairs of statements that can both be true
or both be false, such that one member of the pair implies the other but not
vice versa; they are called "alternatives". Within such a pair, the
"superalternative" implies the "subalternative". Propositions (1) and (3),
above, are alternatives, as are (2) and (4). Observe that propositions (1) and
(4) are contradictories, as are (2) and (3).
Contraries, subcontraries, and subalternatives only possess the properties
ascribed to them here in a non-empty universe (in which there is at least one
S to be or not be P.