Sephorah Mangin

Wittgensteins Picture Theory of Meaning

The theory of meaning set out in Wittgensteins Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus is
one which attempts to locate the connection between language and the world in a
relation of picturing. Implicit in this theory is the belief that the basic goal of a
linguistic act is to represent the world accurately, to mirror it precisely. Overall,
Wittgensteins work rests on a conception of meaning which posits two distinct
realms - language and the world - which are somehow connected through this
mysterious picturing relation. Language is seen as capable of communicating facts
about the world precisely to the extent that its propositions are capable of mirroring
reality, rightly or falsely. One of Wittgensteins main tasks in the Tractatus is to
formulate exactly what properties a language must have in order to mirror reality,
hence to secure meaning, at all. These are the necessary conditions, he maintains, for
any language capable of producing meaningful sentences, not simply an ideal
language. They constitute the underlying structure or logic of language, hidden
beneath its surface appearance. One consequence of this conception is that instances
of language usage which fail to meet these basic requirements - those which violate
the logic of language - must be judged as lacking significant meaning.
If language and the world are set up as two distinct realms, the problem then arises of
what exactly is the relationship between them. As suggested, this is precisely the
question which occupies Wittgenstein in his earlier work. As the Tractatus unfolds, it
becomes clear that the connection between language and the world resides in the
picturing nature of propositions. A congruence, or isomorphism, is established
between language and the world, and this is the essence of the picture theory of
meaning. The entire schema mapped out in the early parts of the Tractatus simply
fills out the details of this language-world congruence. The world, Wittgenstein
writes, is made up of facts (T 1.1). The simples in language - names - correspond to
the simplest elements of the facts of the world - objects. Basic concatenations of
names - elementary propositions - correspond to the simplest configurations of
objects in the world - atomic facts. The elementary proposition pictures reality
through this correspondence of its elements to the objects in the world, together with
its bearing of the same logical structure as the atomic fact. The elementary
propositions, in turn, can be conjoined by truth-connectives to produce overall
propositions, which correspond simply to the facts which constitute the world.
Language overall is equal to the set of possible propositions, which in turn
corresponds to the totality of possible facts - the world.
The language-world relation can be construed as a kind of mapping, or
transformation, which takes a possible fact or state of affairs and subjects it to a
particular set of rules in order to yield a proposition as the result. This proposition
pictures the possible state of affairs. Of course, Wittgenstein does not attempt to
provide the entire set of rules for effecting such a transformation but rather the
minimum conditions which any such process must satisfy in order to be capable of
successfully producing meaningful sentences at all. The basic question can be framed
in this way: What are the minimum conditions for effecting a successful (ie.
meaningful) leap from the world into language? These are the universal conditions

Sephorah Mangin

for meaningfulness. Presumably, these conditions must enable us to get back from
language to the world, if communication is to be successful. Language, in the
picture theory of meaning, is not merely self-referential but must rather step outside
itself into the non-linguistic realm of actual facts. The minimum conditions for the
meaningfulness of propositions must therefore facilitate the unambiguous
determination of possible states of affairs in the world. If a sentence is to be
meaningful at all, it must enable us to know precisely what the world must look like what is the case - if it is true.
According to the picture theory of meaning, the proposition must determine reality
precisely, whether rightly or falsely. In the proposition, Wittgenstein writes, a state
of affairs is, as it were, put together for the sake of experiment. (T 4.031) In this
respect it would be misleading to think of true propositions as mirroring a possible
state of affairs accurately, and false propositions, inaccurately. For in order to be a
legitimate proposition at all, a statement must picture a possible state of affairs in a
determinate way. It must pinpoint exactly those conditions which are necessary and
sufficient to render the proposition true - ie. its truth-conditions. What the
proposition asserts is that these conditions are satisfied, and this is what may be
judged true or false depending on the actual facts of the world. Wittgenstein writes,
The proposition determines reality to this extent, that one only needs to say Yes or
No to it to make it agree with reality. (T 4.023) The proposition is akin to an
arrow pointing to an exact place; it determines a place in logical space (T 3.144; T
3.4). In this way, even false sentences must precisely mirror the world of possible
facts, for they also determine a logical place - or possible state of affairs - but
simply one which happens not to be the case in reality.
It is essential to the very nature of the proposition that its truth-conditions be
pinpointed in a determinate way because they constitute precisely the sense of the
proposition. Wittgenstein writes: The sense of a proposition is its agreement and
disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic
facts. (T 4.2) If we understand a proposition at all, ie. recognise its sense, we must
know exactly what is the case, if it is true (T 4.024). Since for Wittgenstein sense
resides in the truth-conditions of a proposition, and since it is only complete
propositions that can be declared true or false according to the agreement or
disagreement of their truth-conditions with reality, it is only complete propositions
that can possess a sense. Only a complete proposition can determine a particular point
in logical space, by being a picture of a possible state of affairs. In the picture theory
of meaning, the elementary proposition is therefore a self-contained and irreducible
unit of sense.
The basic units of meaning, elementary propositions, can be conjoined to form
complexes of meaning through the use of truth-connectives. All propositions, in fact,
are seen as truth-functional by nature. Wittgenstein writes, All propositions are the
results of truth-operations on the elementary propositions. (T 5.3) Truthoperations are those which take elementary propositions as bases and yield complex
propositions as truth-functions of these. To determine the truth-value of a
proposition, it suffices therefore to reduce the proposition to its constituent elementary
propositions, which represent the possibility of the existence and non-existence of
certain atomic facts. The truth-values of these elementary propositions are
2

Sephorah Mangin

independent of each other, because atomic facts are independent. If the truth-values
of the elementary propositions have already been established by reference to the
atomic facts, the truth-value of the proposition as a whole can also be determined.
This is because the truth-value of the proposition is simply a function of the truthvalues of the elementary propositions. Wittgenstein writes (T 5), Propositions are
truth-functions of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truthfunction of itself.)
What is pivotal to the proposition is not simply that it pictures a possible state of
affairs, but specifically that it is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs. In order
to be meaningful at all, the proposition must mirror the logical properties of the
possible state of affairs; it must share its internal structure. Every picture,
Wittgenstein claims, is also a logical picture. For a picture must have something in
common with what it pictures in order to be capable of representing it at all - rightly
or falsely - and this common property is termed the logical form (T 2.18). For the
picture is itself a fact, and the congruence between a proposition and the possible
state of affairs it represents lies in the shared logical form of these two facts.
The logical form is something rather mysterious and inexpressible, yet if we were to
attempt to define it we might say that it is that which all pictures must share with what
they represent in order for them to be pictures at all. For it is the minimum condition
of picturing; it is that which is essential to the representing relation. The logical form
is, in fact, the very possibility of structure of the atomic fact, rather than
simply the accidental structure of a particular atomic fact.
Significantly, the definitive aspect of the representing relation - the shared logical
form of the proposition and what it pictures - is something which cannot itself be
pictured. It cannot be said; rather, it is shown. Propositions cannot say anything
about themselves, they cannot describe their own essential properties, for in order to
do this they would have to contain themselves and this is impossible. Wittgenstein
writes, No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign
cannot be contained in itself (T 3.332) A picture cannot represent the representing
relation itself - ie. the fact of the shared logical form of the picture with what it
pictures - since this picture would itself have to bear the logical form of representation
in order to be a picture at all. Pictures, that is, such as propositions, cannot step
outside themselves to a higher level in order to describe their own necessary
properties. There are no meta-propositions which are capable of speaking about the
set of all propositions. This is partly what Wittgenstein means when he asserts the
fundamental equality of propositions (T 6.4): All propositions are of equal value.
The properties of propositions cannot be asserted by the propositions themselves;
rather, they are shown forth by the propositions. For example, the fact that two
propositions contradict one another is shown by their contradictory structures, just as
the fact that one proposition follows from one another is shown by their structures.
Significantly, the very task which Wittgenstein embarks on in the Tractatus, as
described earlier, is that of seeking out and clearly delineating the essential properties
of meaningful propositions. The basic question addressed is that of the minimum
conditions of meaningfulness, ie. the question of what properties a proposition must
have in order to be capable of picturing of a possible state of affairs at all. Yet in this
respect Wittgenstein is apparently violating the very conditions of meaningfulness
3

Sephorah Mangin

which he himself sets out. For he appears to speaking on a higher level about the
set of propositions in describing their essential properties, such as the fact that they
must share with what they picture the same logical form, and the fact that All
propositions are of equal value. Yet by Wittgensteins own arguments, these facts
cannot be pictured at all; they cannot be asserted in language, but only shown forth.
This paradox, at the core of the Tractatus, is acknowledged by the author when he
concludes that when his propositions are completely understood, they must
themselves be recognised as nonsensical (ie. as not being legitimate propositions after
all).
Nonsensical propositions, for Wittgenstein, may not always be recognised
immediately as such. For another of the main themes of the Tractatus is that the
logical form of any given proposition is not immediately recognisable from the mere
surface appearance of the propositional sign. It is possible, however, to dig beneath
the surface and to discover by a process of analysis the true thought lying concealed
beneath the propositional sign. It may turn out, as is the case with nonsensical
sentences, that they conceal no significant proposition at all. Such statements,
Wittgenstein would argue, are mere sequences of words which trick us into believing
they are genuinely meaningful through the external similarities they bear to legitimate
propositions. Some statements are merely without sense (sinnlos). They do not
present any possible state of affairs at all, and may be either tautologies or
contradictions. The so-called propositions of logic fall under this category. For
they speak not of how the world is - they are mere tautologies which are
unconditionally true and hence have no truth-conditions are therefore no sense (T
4.461). Importantly, however, despite being without sense (sinnlos), tautologies
and contradictions are not entirely nonsensical (unsinnig). They are limiting cases;
a part of the symbolism. Statements which are not significant propositions, however,
and yet which are neither tautologies nor contradictions, are not merely without
sense but are indeed entirely nonsensical - simply meaningless strings of words.
Wittgenstein views the so-called propositions of philosophy in this way. Like other
meaningless linguistic constructions, they arise from the fact that we do not
understand the logic of our language (T 4.003). Significantly, Wittgenstein concedes
that, in speaking about the logic of our language, he is himself guilty of producing
meaningless sentences. Interestingly, he chooses to employ the stronger word
unsinnig and not merely sinnlos in describing his own assertions in the Tractatus.
This means that the paradox concerning the status of Wittgensteins own assertions
cannot be evaded by construing them simply as tautologies, which are senseless, but
not entirely nonsensical.
Nonsense arises when violate the logical grammar of language, not just the linguistic
grammar. Any sentence whose corresponding proposition fails to picture, in a
determinate way, a possible state of affairs must be construed as simply a meaningless
string of words. Sentences which are grammatically in order fail to adhere to the
logical grammar of language not by bearing an inadequate structure, but specifically
by the fact that certain of its signs do not bear a legitimate reference. A statement is
meaningless, in the picture theory of meaning, because we have not designated an
object as the meaning of certain elements of the proposition, even if we believe that
we have done so. Wittgenstein writes, The proposition is senseless because we have
not made some arbitrary determination, not because the symbol is in itself
4

Sephorah Mangin

impermissible. (T 5.473) For example, the sentence Socrates is identical bears the
external grammatical form of a legitimate proposition. Yet it is senseless because it
pictures no possible state of affairs. We cannot state its truth-conditions; we cannot
say what the world must be like if it were true. The sentences lack of meaning arises
because we have given no meaning to one of its constituent parts, the term identical,
as an adjective.
Just as nonsense reduces to a lack of determination of the specific meanings of
particular words in a sentence, the basic conditions of meaning as outlined in the
Tractatus revolve around the fixed connection of names to actual objects in the world.
Naming is the pivotal aspect of the picture theory of meaning: it is the fixed point
around which the entire language-world relation revolves. The congruence of names the simplest elements of language - and objects - the simple elements of the world forms the unchanging, solid foundation of the entire picturing relation. (The
possibility of naming is what is important, not the actual, accidental distribution of
names amongst objects at any given point in time.) Naming is seen as primary, and
from this unshakable bond between language and the world, every other aspect of the
language-world connection simply falls into place. The elementary proposition,
which is the building block of language, is simply a connexion, a concatenation, of
names. (T 4.22)
The determinateness of sense, which Wittgenstein seeks to establish the minimum
conditions for, finds its basis in the naming relation. The apparently solid and
unshakable nature of the connection between names and the objects they signify
constitutes precisely the firm foundation for meaningfulness which Wittgenstein is
anxious to establish. If the meaning of a proposition is to be determinate, there must
first be one and only one complete analysis of the proposition. Further, the basic
elements we get to when we progressively divide the complex into the simple,
through analysis, must be fixed and sharply delineated. Names must signify unique
objects, and each object must have a unique name. If this is the case, then there is no
ambiguity in the end - ie. when we get down to the most basic level of the languageworld relation.
In this way, the name-object relation is the foundation of the picture theory of
meaning, and the means for securing determinateness of sense at the most basic level.
In fact, the entire approach of the Tractatus to language is one of progressively
dissecting it, dividing it up into its most basic elements. To begin with, the world
divides into facts (T 1.2). These correspond to the propositions. The facts then divide
into atomic facts, which correspond to the elementary propositions, the independent
and irreducible units of sense. The atomic facts in turn divide into the simples of the
world, objects. The objects are linked to the simplest elements of the elementary
propositions through the naming relation. The name is simple and irreducible,
pinpointing a singular, discrete point in logical space. We have now reached, finally,
the limiting elements of language - its basic constituent parts which cannot be further
divided up.
With regard to possible objections to the picture theory of meaning, the supposed
solidness of the foundations of meaning which the naming relation purportedly gives
is perhaps a weakness of the theory rather than a strength. For in placing so much
5

Sephorah Mangin

weight on the name-object relation, Wittgenstein betrays a disregard for all other
elements of language, expecting that they will simply take care of themselves. In
particular, the linguistic acts such as questions, exclamations, etc., which are not
simply descriptive sentences appear to have no place in Wittgenstein picture theory of
meaning. For only descriptive sentences can be propositions which picture states of
affairs. Since only those combinations of words which can be pictures of reality, with
determinate truth-conditions, can be attributed with sense, then presumably only
descriptive sentences can be meaningful. The picture theory of meaning, therefore,
cannot adequately account for meaning in those types of linguistic expression which
are not merely descriptive.
Furthermore, in seeking out the general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein
attempts to find the essence of the proposition, the basic form which all propositions
must have in order to be logical pictures of reality at all. Every possible sense should
be able to be expressed by a symbol which falls under this general propositional form,
and every possible symbol which falls under it should be capable of expressing a
sense (T 4.5). The general form of the proposition is, Wittgenstein argues, Such and
such is the case (T 4.5). Yet in attempting to provide a description of that which is
common to all propositions, Wittgenstein does not only violate his own conditions for
meaningfulness. Moreover, he simplifies and truncates language to fit a particular
model, confounding the vastly different types of descriptive proposition and thereby
obscuring important differences. Not only, that is, does Wittgenstein focus
exclusively on descriptive sentences, choosing to neglect other, perfectly meaningful
types of linguistic expressions, but in addition he collapses the heterogeneous set of
descriptive propositions into a single common form.

Bibliography
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1995.