PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 68635. March 12, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.

WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, v. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM, J.:

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres
R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22
October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First
Division of this Court, (incorporated herein by reference), and in feigned ignorance
of the Constitutional requirement that the Courts Divisions are composed of, and
must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to
effect a change of the Courts adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre
wrote in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Please forgive us for taking the liberty of addressing you this letter which we do
hope you will read very carefully.

"It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635
entitled Eva Maravilla Ilustre v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., by an
untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which
we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the
First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.

"We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second,
dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

"Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our
case before the Supreme Court (. . . THIS IS FINAL) There is nothing final in this
world. We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot. For at the
proper time we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the
members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that
are not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated. The people
deserve to know how the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the
task of decision making by affixing their respective signatures on judgments that
they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.

"Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice
under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who
participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For
the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with penal
sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the
division members are above the law.

"In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly the
members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation
of the resolution in question. That is why we are requesting you to inform us your
participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question. Even we who are
poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take advantage of our
poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however,
we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you
supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied).

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap,
Chairman of the First Division in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution dated 14
May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have the elementary courtesy of
putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the
promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended one, which he should
have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After
all he is the law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, counsel for respondents, now
the distinguished Solicitor General . . . indicative that even at this stage of the
proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. For
not withdrawing from the case formally Atty. Ordoez has manifested his
unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of Professional Ethics,
similar to the actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of
the First Division of the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates the growing
wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very
serious and dangerous implications.

"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division, Atty. Sedfrey
A. Ordoez already became the Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical
coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez in the law firm
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Padlan became the Chairman of the Division.

"(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some members of
the Division were still busy putting their respective offices in order and had possibly
have no idea about the Maravilla case.

Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division members that
Maravilla petition is without merit, and since the members the new ones knew
nothing about the case, readily agreed to the dismissal of the petition by a minuteresolution extended one. After all this was the case of the Solicitor General. If this
is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately had.

After all, the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an extended one,
does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The members should have
signed the resolution, after all, the Supreme Court had given the petition due
course, indicating whether they concur, dissent or otherwise abstain from
voting."cralaw virtua1aw library

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state.

"We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were
with the original 7-man First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio
Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case before another forum to hold
responsible the members of the Division who participated in the dismissal of the
case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective
that your conscience you are aware.

"We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the
promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question. Please do not take this matter
lightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do not hear from you
within a week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you supported
the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The
moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press
conference with TV and radio coverage Arrangements in this regard are being done.

The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain
justice.

"Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no
doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me
harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to the authorities
concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary."
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October
1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en banc.

On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the
case, found no reason to take any further action, and referred the case back to the
First Division "as set forth in the latters resolution of October 27, 1986." In this
Resolution, the First Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap
assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent
Chairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoez
was private respondents counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited
himself from further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated
Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement
of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division
(incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is
resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an unjust
decision or that it has been railroaded.

"This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice
without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa,

Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which
follow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never dreamed
that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consulta with the Honorable
Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to
promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us when considered in its
entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended and unsigned minuteresolution of 14 May 1986.

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: Did you or did you not
approve the dismissal of our petition under

"1)

The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"2)

The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"3)

The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended
merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to know to
properly guide us when we finally bring our case to the other forum of justice.

"Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First Division
referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consulta it was all your fault
that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsigned extended minute-resolution
that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the newly reorganized
Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as guilty of distorting
facts involved in our petition?

"This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why

"This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum of
justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the newly
reorganized Supreme Court. We are prepared to expose many more of this kind of
judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. Ponder upon this well
because it is our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the
distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their duties in
this most sensitive area of decision making.

"Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc (en consulta) or not,
the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this
case before another forum of justice where the members of the First Division, in fact
the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere untenable and
unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible
members of the First Division who took part in the promulgation of the untenable
and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who
promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from its very
inception on 14 May 1986.

"Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre
against the distinguished members of the First Division, in fact against the entire
membership of the newly organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc
unsigned extended minute-resolution that is without judicial integrity, dated 28
October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other
lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by
their firm conviction that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at all times in
the highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal
services when the legal confrontation begins.

"Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most fantastic,
most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states

". . . When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was unaware
that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez was private respondents counsel.

"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this
statement hook, line and sinker. For Justice Yap we say: Tell that to the marines. But
more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of Justice Yap.

"Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we are
learning a few as we prosecute our case within legitimate limits, we state here that
both resolutions that promulgated by the Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and
that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are nothing but a
desperate attempt, when both are considered in their respective entirety, to
maneuver without success, some semblance of justification on the untenable and
unjust 14 May 1986 extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of
judicial integrity.

"Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en banc
think for one minute that because of their respective 4-page minute but extended
resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit, deliberately unsigned that
exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we will now give up the fight, just forget
it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are prepared to carry
the fight before another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press
conference with TV and radio coverage, so that we can present to the entire nation
our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and influence and, at the

same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in which the members
of the highest tribunal of the land perform their respective individual and collective
functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of decision making.

"Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to

wit:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under

"a)

The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

b)

The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

c)

The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No." (Emphasis supplied).

True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on
16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this
Courts aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of
this Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her
opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates. Some Justices of the Court of
Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust
resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when their
Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously
charged with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing the
members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended
Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986."cralaw virtua1aw library

All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the
tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of
Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata
was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also

as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and
participate in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever
on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordoez to unduly influence the
members of the First Division.

The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was

allegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that has been closed to me by the
Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"CHARGE NO ONE

Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) persuading, inducing,

influencing the members of the newly organized First Division . . . into promulgating
their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, knowingly with
deliberate intent with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court based on insignificant issues and deliberately
evading/prevaricating the more important substantial ones raised in my petition, in
violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, . . .; and.

"(2) Under the same Section 3, subletter (e) of the same Republic Act . . . for
causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their
power and influence as Solicitor General and Associate Justice, respectively. . . .

"CHARGE NO. TWO

"Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas, members of
the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court

1)
For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in
the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No.
SP-13680, entitled Francisco Q. Maravilla, Et. Al. v. Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog,
Et. Al.in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code;"

2)
For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury by deliberately,
knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 . . . in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e) thereof.

"CHARGE NO. THREE

"Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division
of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres
Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, . . .

1)
For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust, extended MINUTE
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, . . . with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, now
the distinguished Solicitor General, the illegal owners of the vast estates of my
aunt Digna Maravilla . . .;

"2)
Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, . . . for
deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us of
our rights over my aunts vast estates because of their manifest and evident bad
faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14
May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez,
now the Solicitor General, the illegal owners of my aunt Digna Maravillas estates
when, under the law, these Ordoez clients are not entitled to own these vast
properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed succession."
(Emphasis supplied).

Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press,
which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any
copy furnished this Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the
Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline
reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"

thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other
respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was
actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case
thrice in this Court.

On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioners

Complaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein
incorporated by reference) that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismiss the
complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will continue evaluating the complaint
against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza, Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordoez, and the private respondents."cralaw virtua1aw library

The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last

page:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Copy Furnished:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA

Counsel for the Complainant

919 Prudencio Street

Sampaloc, Manila.

In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it

required:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within ten (10) days from
notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecited statements,
conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the
Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the
permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of
justice; and

"(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within ten
(10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court
and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his clients name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the
manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence
in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice." (pp. 383-384, Rollo).

(1)

In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre

prays that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in
essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the
Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character
and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there
(being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of
communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters were really contemptuous,
the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her,
and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped"
from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed
the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not in
the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest belief that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not
because of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their
services in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case
"was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao
Laureta," who prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radio
coverage; that she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court,
rather, she has challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing
distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in that (a)
there is no res judicata (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision declared that the
judgment of the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be set
aside, (c) her "opponents," clients of Atty. Ordoez, are not entitled to own her

aunts "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession or
mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Courts Resolution that the Court
of Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b)
the statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals
were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust
resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a prejudgment over a case over
which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in
the case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established not
only probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices
concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53-page Motion for Reconsideration before
the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer.

(2)

In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not
respondent Ilustres counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted
and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution of
her case, like Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he
just learned from other sources that respondent Ilustre was planning to bring her
case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who offered her their
legal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press
conference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the
performance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of
Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional
lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire to
protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest
tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what he
did" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not
a "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not
prepare respondent Ilustres letters to the individual Justices, "appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding;" that these letters were "never, at any time, considered
as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it
would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has
lost its right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and
it is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so,
this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and character that underlie its
present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of
judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme
Court is supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no
disregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last
resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is just

doing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard in their
proper light;" particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its
finality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court
would not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c) the
observation in the First Divisions extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that Justice
Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoez was private respondents counsel "defies every
vestige of human understanding;" that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself
from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yap
had "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have
done so when respondent Ilustres petition was taken up; Justice Yaps partner, Atty.
Ordoez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private
respondents even as he was already the Solicitor General; (b) finally, "appearances
to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not committed acts unworthy of his
profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever
small way for his acts and efforts taken by him to protect and uphold the honor and
dignity of the Honorable Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their
claims that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and
dignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and
"defy every vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed,
they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of
words." (Mathew 6:7).

Respondents reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters

addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First
Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court
en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise
of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause
order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc
of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of
their accusations.

The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice
had promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the
Supreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its resumption of
sessions on the first working day of the year."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is no vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority and duty under the
premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.

We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustres
letters to the individual Justices, nor with the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the
main petition, he stressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely
enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its extended
resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of the Supreme Court
unequalled in a manner of speaking. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p. 311,
Rollo), the same phrases were incarnated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par.
9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme
Court in so far as petitions given due course is concerned . . ." (Emphasis given).

Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by
respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents have
charged. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We consider the three minute resolutions . . . railroaded with such

hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics" (Ltr. to
Justice Narvasa, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 2).

"with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the

Supreme Court" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 5; ltr. to
Justice Cruz, p. 5)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).

Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court Corazon
Serevo the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1)

When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?

(2)

Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?

(3)
Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to
be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any?

(4)

Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).

Atty. Lauretas obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the
second letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the
supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry in our first letter. It is a very
simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition
under.

1)

The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

2)

The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

3)

The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No."cralaw virtua1aw library

(Emphasis original) (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice

Cruz, p. 1).

Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful

influence" by Atty. Ordoez and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and
mistaken references" ; "untenable minute resolution although extended" ; "unjust
minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and
re-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and
the Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden
hand of Atty. Laureta.

The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that
copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of
the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta,
who was heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was
following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the Tanodbayan.

Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustres lawyer had control

of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer,
"Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility.
Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should be reminded him that (a)
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to

their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a
client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation." (In
Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA
1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility. For all
intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in
denigrating the members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging
them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of
his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been rejected as
without merit by the Courts First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the
Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold
captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the
baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them
in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season.

We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.

They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the
First Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14, 1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina
M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust,
extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez (now
the Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby
causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Dignas eldest brother) undue injury by
depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three
before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez)
of having "persuad(ed), induc(ed) and influenc(ed) the members of the newly
organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution
of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the
"Division Resolution," for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A."

Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this
Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28,
1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include
Fernandez, Et. Al. v. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy
involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first
was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the
1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit A) is reversed and the said testament is
hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to law. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex
"B", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was
not a party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she and
other children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions
for Intervention. Respondent Ilustres participation in the estate involved, therefore,
harks back to that first case.

The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394,
entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, Et. Al. v. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, Et. Al." in a
Decision penned by Justice Venicio Escolin (hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin
Decision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing
intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et als., "for failure to show any right
or interest in the estate in question." Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for

mandamus, seek this Courts resolution on the petitioners motion for intervention
in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and memoranda, the parties
have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to
intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only to
avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted controversy between the parties
(PCIB v. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 2661. A resolution of this issue should render moot
and academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.

We agree with private respondents that petitioners motions for intervention are
devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any right or interest in the estate in
question. There is no dispute that the last will and testament of the late Digna
Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a final judgment which the
Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will,
Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as

The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla
over the residue of the decedents present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from
inheriting any part of the latters estate through intestate succession or mixed
succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix
had the absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such
freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code, which provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

ART. 842.
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have
no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement
thereof.

x"

The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November
9, 1977 and has become final. That was the second case involving the estate filed
before this Court.

Respondents contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that
the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the
facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to mislead.

The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, also finally
foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene
with her, may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms,
what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears
repeating:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla
over the residue of the decedents present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from
inheriting any part of the latters estate through intestate succession or mixed
succession. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979,
respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for
partition of Digna Maravillas estate and for damages against the heirs of Digna
Maravillas husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404),
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X,
presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring
defendants therein (private respondents in the petition under review) in default,
ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to their
trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and
Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision").
In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et als., (the
plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (private
respondents in the petition under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L58014, praying that the lower Courts declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404
and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and
that the dismissal of the complaint be ordered. on January 21, 1982, this Court
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
questions of fact being involved.

In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), 1 in
AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the "Busran Decision"), dismissed the
petition and denied certiorari slating in one breath that "the judgment subject of
assail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the
judgment below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was

that petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari,
which is not a substitute therefor.

On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents in

the petition under review), in that appealed case (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), the same
Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20,
1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the "Busran Decision"
and entered another one:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1.
Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April
1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and

2.
Dismissing private respondents complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and
ordering the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filed
on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before this Court involving the
same estate. Review was denied in an extended minute Resolution by the First
Division of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following
reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.

(1)
The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The Answer was filed only one day late besides the fact that when so
filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.

(2)
While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, Certiorari
may be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared in default (Omico
Mining & Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 300-301 [1975]),or where it is
necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [1975]).

(3)
More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404
declaring that the Testatrixs collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate
to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her sole and universal heir,
nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns the
pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case.

There being former judgments on the issues which have become final, rendered by
Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the said judgments
having been rendered on the merits, and there being between the prior and
subsequent action identity of parties, subject matter and substantial identity of
cause of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by
the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are null and void ab
initio and without any legal effect.

To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that
when a right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the Court, so
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia v. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).

ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Courts judgment in
CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order
and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision.
They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with such hurry/promptitude
unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that
have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded,
induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap.

Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution."

"The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices,
which initially gave it due course because the resolution of the Intermediate
Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered by the then Court of
Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study.

Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be considered
as the date when this case was submitted for resolution.

The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February,
1986 political upheaval. The last incident in the case was a motion for the early
release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19, 1985.

When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First
Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of petitioner
for early release of decision, the new First Division, then chairmanned by Justice
Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not
only as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among
others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings resolved,
on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition through an extended resolution which at the
same time recalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted
unanimously."cralaw virtua1aw library

The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a
common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition
which has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in this regard.
They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the "entire history" of the
Supreme Court.

As to the participation of Justice Yap in the case, the "Banc Resolution"

stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Justice Yap clarified that he was on official mission to Switzerland for the
Presidential Commission on Good Government after his appointment to the
Supreme Court on April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in the Supreme
Court until his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14,

1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez was private
respondents counsel.

On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was taken up
by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This
time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former partner, Atty. Ordoez, had submitted the
pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L. Paras was
designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in
his place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9, 1986.

Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986.

On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for

reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of the
May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986. Justice Yap again took
no part in the deliberation of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been
"unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez. They reacted by saying "tell
it to the marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and
Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so
many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during
deliberative sessions very often escape attention, concentration being centered on
the issues to be resolved.

Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordoez as counsel" for
their opponents in the case. In the same "Banc Resolution," it was
clarified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez as his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It
was not necessarily because the Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for
respondents" (at p. 4).

The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty.
Ordoez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the Court, which
inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez." No
withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty. Ordoez in the main
petition, his name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel
concerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court.

In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986,
July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3,
1986 denying leave to file a second motion for reconsideration since entry of
judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were
"unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division
Resolution, explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The aforesaid resolutions were by no means railroaded. The pleadings filed by the
parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division as
soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of
its deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day.

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is
resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an unjust
decision; or that it has been railroaded.

This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice
without fear or favor." (at p. 4)

Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own
words "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the genuineness and due
execution of said will, but not upon the validity of testamentary provision,
particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal
heir of Digna Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw library

On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the "Busran Decision" (AC-G.R.
SP No. 13680), aptly held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter
to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will of
Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the
will, while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this
observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will was
in effect declared not to have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased
Digna Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her
husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will. The declaration that private
respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are entitled to
her estate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will.
Private respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being
named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of
Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

"However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complained of by private

respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper for
them to have instituted a separate action in a court other than that in which the
probate proceeding was pending.

It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled
in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be
maintained in that court, or in any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir,
against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose
of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined. The very purpose of

the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those
questions, and until they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under
that section no action such as the present one can be maintained."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Considering that the "Escolin Decision," as affirmed by this Court on November 9,

1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3.
The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981
(referring to the Macandog Decision) unsettles and reviews issues which had long
been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals."cralaw
virtua1aw library

But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No.
L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of
whether the remedy of petitioners in that case was appeal and not certiorari had to
be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not
become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana
Resolution;" which reversed the "Busran Decision," held that Certiorari was proper
when a party has been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog
Decision" had not attained finality.

Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately

evaded/divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court
(in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of Appeals had held that
the "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravillas
husband could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on
indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit wifes vast estate
on the ground of utter unworthiness."cralaw virtua1aw library

The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It

was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the
judgment of assail (referring to the Macandog Decision) had long become final."
That was in the "Busran Decision," which was precisely reversed by the "Javellana
Resolution."cralaw virtua1aw library

As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the
"Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband,
Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate,
pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27
February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental
capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone
in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of
the required member of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the
act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the
Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring that
Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last will and
testament, nullifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole and universal
heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of
origin."cralaw virtua1aw library

The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and
"Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated
lawyer would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by
this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that
the First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it
unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled
the due course Order, which it had previously issued to give it "more time for
further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents
claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the
Tanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this Court collectively
with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended minute
Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her coheirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. 4

Respondents action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly
declared in the Chief Justices Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court
hereby adopts in toto," (I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power
to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust." It is
elementary that" (A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo v.
Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional
error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should
become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized
by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered
them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion
of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized
is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants,
and to determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v.
Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who
does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the
prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered
by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either
the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know
that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such
as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.

The Chief Justices Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial
power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per respondents puerile
contention, but a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers
and checks and balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz.
that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative and
judicial, are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere.
Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes v.
Chuoco, 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
1936 landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our
Constitution "as a definition of the powers of government placed upon the judiciary
the great burden of determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers and

when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments .. but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them."

As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal
principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of the
judiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve.
The independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more
so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in
the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and
undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to
the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in
him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of
this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can
be either respectable or useful." (Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or

division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are
beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of
enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, Et. Al. v.
Paredes, Et Al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Courts
pronouncement of the doctrine that" (I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive
[as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees]
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and
reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis
mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing

Primicias v. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias v.
Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls
for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge
their duties as they see fit" (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained
in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President
nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should
refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have
impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of
separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three
departments of the government. (Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members
acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard
or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions
and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To
allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine
the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment
of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final
determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power
to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds
of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause
Resolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the
language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in
the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the
Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her
ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can
no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically

considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition
had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt
committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot
be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the
Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum"
to effect a change of the Courts adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and
exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad
faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments
(Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least,
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements,
conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre,
notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them,
which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated;
for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set
forth in this Courts Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of
last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other
respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when
the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled
litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this
Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments
of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this
Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in
the Courts.

Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and
his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970];
Castaeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975]).

In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether

or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the
light of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public
confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time when
the Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence in our courts after the
trauma and debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose
upon him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and
opportune time, that he shall have once again regained the fitness to be allowed to
resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA
562).

ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and
is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle of
punishment; and.

(2)
Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of
law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J., no part

U.S. Supreme Court

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)

INS v. Chadha

No. 80-1832

Argued February 22, 1982

Reargued December 7, 1982

Decided June 23, 1983*

462 U.S. 919

Syllabus

Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either
House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch,
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a

particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. Appellee-respondent

Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a
nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the United States after his visa had expired
and was ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause
why he should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the deportation,
and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to 244(a)(1) of the
Act, which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend
deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress as
required by 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution pursuant to 244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the Immigration
Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate the
proceedings on the ground that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge held
that he had no authority to rule on its constitutionality, and ordered Chadha
deported pursuant to the House Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no power to
declare 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then filed a petition for review of the
deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INS joined him in arguing that
244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that 244(c)(2) violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and accordingly directed the
Attorney General to cease taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon the House
Resolution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 462 U. S. 920

Held:

1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under 28
U.S.C. 1252, which provides that "[a]ny party" may appeal to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of "any court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit, or proceeding" to which the United States
or any of its agencies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the United States"
for purposes of 1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or
proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the
proceeding below, and the judgment below held an Act of Congress
unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes of deciding whether the INS was "any
party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in 1252, the INS was sufficiently
aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action it would
otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party under 1252 is not
altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in
question is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S. 929-931.

2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of 244. Section 406 of the Act
provides that, if any particular provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of
the Act shall not be affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not
intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon
whether the veto clause of 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption is supported by
244's legislative history. Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if
what remains after severance is fully operative as a law. Here, 244 can survive as
a "fully operative" and workable administrative mechanism without the one-House
veto. Pp. 462 U. S. 931-935.

3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), since he

has demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 79. Pp. 462 U. S. 935-936.

4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him does not
preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), especially where
the other avenues of relief are at most speculative. Pp. 462 U. S. 936-937.

5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 106(a) of the Act, which provides
that a petition for review in a court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive
procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against
aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings" under
242(b) of the Act. Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the final deportation
order is contingent, rather than only those determinations made at the deportation
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 462 U. S. 921

hearing. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged
veto, the final deportation order having been entered only to implement that veto.
Pp. 462 U. S. 937-939.

6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the time of the House's
formal intervention, there was concrete adverseness, and prior to such intervention,
there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS
and Chadha. The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact
that the INS would have deported him absent the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Moreover, Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a
Government agency, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with
plaintiffs that the statute is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S. 939-940.

7. These cases do not present a nonjusticiable political question on the asserted

ground that Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the
Naturalization and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution. The presence
of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically
invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the
constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by the
courts simply because the issues have political implications. Pp. 462 U. S. 940-943.

8. The congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S.

944-959.

(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, 1 -- requiring all legislative
powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives -- and 7 -- requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate,
before becoming law, to be presented to the President, and, if he disapproves, to be
repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House -- represents the Framers' decision
that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an
integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. Pp. 462 U. S.
944-951.

(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to 244(c)(2) was essentially
legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was subject to the procedural
requirements of Art. I, 7, for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentation to the President. The one-House veto operated to overrule
the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislative
character is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants; i.e.,
absent the veto provision of 244(c)(2), neither the House nor the Senate, or both

acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien
once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 462 U. S. 922

delegated authority, had determined that the alien should remain in the United
States. Without the veto provision, this could have been achieved only by legislation
requiring deportation. A veto by one House under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as
an attempt at amending the standards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244
as applied to Chadha. The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House
veto further manifests its legislative character. Congress must abide by its
delegation of authority to the Attorney General until that delegation is legislatively
altered or revoked. Finally, the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact
that, when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone
and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely
defined the procedure for such action in the Constitution. Pp. 462 U. S. 951-959.

634 F.2d 408, affirmed.

BURGER, C.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL,

BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 959. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 462 U. S. 967. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 1013. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 462 U. S. 923

www.chanrobles.com

EN BANCchanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee, vs. EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of

Prisons, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo
E. Torres and Solicitor Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring
that the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid
Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is
illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of
discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to
whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate
committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer
has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for

the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines. The purchase was effected on October 21, 1949 and the price paid for
both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines
adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine

"whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price
involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other
facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the investigation
conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee
was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee
resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant
at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal
until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the
name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto. In G.R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of the
confinement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari filed in this Court. He contended
that the Senate of the Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he delivered P440,000., that the
Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the
legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer
is an incriminating question which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the
abovementioned contentions were adversely passed upon by the decision of this
Court, so his petition for release was denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitionerappellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his
life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates
by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of
Jess D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special
Committee, the latter subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of
Jess D. Santos, and after said investigation and questioning the Committee adopted
Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR
OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN
CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA,
RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF
THE SENATE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines, transcending
divisions of party and faction in the national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering
the detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the New Bilibid Prison in

Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of contempt of the Senate by
revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and by answering other pertinent
questions in connection therewith;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said Jean L.
Arnault, and the report thereon rendered by the Senate Special Committee on the
said deal, the Senate holds and finds that, despite numerous and generous
opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the said Jean L.
Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person
to whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other pertinent
questions in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
deal;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault
has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the
Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean
L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L.
Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the
Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be
condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct
investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to whom the
said Jean L. Arnault gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and the further information which the Senate requires
and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and contumaciously withholds, is
required for the discharge of its legislative functions, particularly so that adequate
measures can be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon the
Government and the People of the Philippines and to recover said amount;
andchanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy, the
Senate holds and finds that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and
contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is trifling with its
proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of the
Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at
any time by revealing the truth; now therefore, be itchanrobles virtual law library

Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find, as it
hereby holds and finds, that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of contempt of
the Senate, and has in no way altered his situation since he has committed to
coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th day of May,
1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of Prisons to hold the
said Jean L. Arnault, in his custody, and in confinement and detention at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment, until he should have
purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to the satisfaction, and until order to that
effect, of the Senate of the Philippines or of its Special Committee to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)

In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitionerappellee alleges: (1) That the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not illegal
nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the
Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the
Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period
longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed
under the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that petitionerappellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that
the one to whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence
in corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the
petitioner-appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence
submitted to it; (5) that the legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate
ordered the confinement may be considered as having been accomplished, and,
therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued
confinement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial
to the government and is neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our
minds, two questions are decisive of this case. The first is: Did the Senate Special
Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not,
may the court review said finding? And the second is: If the Senate did not believe
the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the petitionerappellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?chanrobles
virtual law library

On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and
refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially
charged since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate
Special Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the
name of the persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other
pertinent questions related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the Senate
Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that the person to whom he
delivered the abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The
court a quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held
that the "petitioner has satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D. Santos
actually and physically existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of
the Senate Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the
investigation, that the Senate abused its discretion in making its conclusion and
that under these circumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to
petitioner is to order his release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution
branch of the judicial department for investigation and prosecution as the
circumstances warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.

The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental
discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the
legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it may employ to
promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and

appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the

courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature
are the only means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for
such course would best the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial
department. It has been said that the methods, regulations, and restrictions to be
imposed to attain results consistent with the public welfare are purely of legislative
cognizance, and the determination of the legislature is final, except when so
arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in
the absence of a clear violation of a constitutional inhibition, the courts should
assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. (11 Am. Jur., pp.
901-902).

These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority
to do, much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the
judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation
of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct
conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke
are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has
been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.

Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among
three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the
executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its
authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the
popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et
al 65 Phil., 56; See also Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139)

All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner
prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due
process has been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and
this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be
deprived life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such
right has fully been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity
to be heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of
the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine
Senate have the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued
confinement of the petitioner? In the supposition that such power and authority
exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the
name Jess D. Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the
Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the
name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was
delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly
and contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a
punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the
intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact
partly unitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that
petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an
affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way, therefore, the petitioner's
assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the language of the
resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us in whether the Senate has the power
to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case.
This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201,
Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had
ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer
a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information,
i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contended by
petitioner that if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the
legislative body, because he refused to reveal the identity of the person in
accordance with the demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not
punish him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought through the
ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the institution of a criminal action in a court
of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to
punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise
by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate
functions (Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of
the United States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its
earlier decision (See Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the
United States two decades ago held that such power and authority exist. In the case
of Jurney vs. MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was

whether or not the Senate could order the confinement of a private citizen because
of the destruction and removal by him of certain papers required to be produced.
The court said:

First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to punish for
contempt may never be exerted, in the case of a private citizen, solely qua
punishment. The argument is that the power may be used by the legislative body
merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the performance of its
duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been
removed, or its removal has become impossible; and hence that there is no power
to punish a witness who, having been requested to produce papers, destroys them
after service of the subpoena. The contention rests upon a misconception of the
limitations upon the power of the Houses of Congress to punish for contempt. It is
true that the scope of the power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is of a
nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of the legislature. This may be lack
of power, because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there
was no legislative duty to be performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243
U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371,
the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to obstruct the legislative
process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative
process, the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal
has become impossible is without legal significance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was exerted by
Congress as early as 1795; and since then it has been exercised on several
occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the colonial assemblies, in
intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the Continental
Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L.
ed. 242, decided in 1821, it was held that the House had power to punish a private
citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has been found in which an
exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been successfully challenged on
the ground that, before punishment, the offending act had been consummated or
that the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The statement in the opinion in
Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F. 279
Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the
light of the particular facts. It was there recognized that the only jurisdictional test
to be applied by the court is the character of the offense; and that the continuance
of the obstruction, or the likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the
discretion of the legislators in meting out the punishment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with
vindication of the established and essential privilege of requiring the production of
evidence. For this purpose, the power to punish for a past contempt is an
appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col. Cas. 296, Fed.
Cas No. 10375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed
from time to time in congressional debates, in opposition to particular exercise of
the contempt power concerned, not the power to punish, as such, but the broad,
undefined privileges which it was believed might find sanction in that power. The
ground for such fears has since been effectively removed by the decisions of this
Court which hold that assertions of congressional privilege are subject to judicial
review. Melbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that the
power to punish for contempt may not be extended to slanderous attacks which
presents no immediate obstruction to legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon,
243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 731
supra.

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate
said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of
such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of
separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full
and complete, independently of the other's authority and power. And how could the
authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the
judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity.
The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in
order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished
from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for
the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The
former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain
of the courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of the legislative
power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of
the criminal law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the
legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the
legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a
mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
(Marshall vs. Gordon, supra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of
contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he
had previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be
considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should
have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the
inquiry. No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood;
this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D.
Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made.
The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the
person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held
that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it.
Furthermore, the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be
taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable members of the body that
conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not have been
clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in
contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary
power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the
period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law
punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now
entitled to be released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was
originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951,
he executed his affidavit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the
Senate Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952,
and he presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e.,
five months after the last resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner
committed another contempt. It is not true, therefore, that the petitioner's
punishment is beyond the full period prescribed in the criminal
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the
sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the
fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippine
Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record,
it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse
of the legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative
discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing
the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby
ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the
petitioner-appellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, Defendant-Appellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

JOHNS, J.:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay,
rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and
sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,

conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,
to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules
and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:chanrobles
virtual law library

( a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or
corn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the

commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government
itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( d) . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct
the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices
thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn
within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any
basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations,
orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a
fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of
companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally
liable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the
provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of
other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily
suspended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily
suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall
not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such
termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the
period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at

which rice should be sold.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging
him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of

the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation
with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act
No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be
of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in
imposing the sentence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was
approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the
1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August,
1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August,
1919.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as
it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It
will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under

what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the
question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is
"an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of
State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define
what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary
rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall
take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion
of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what
is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this
state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation
fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or
without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts
and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States
all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the
Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and
the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution
only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for
the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price
at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that
power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate
legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power
is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature
cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto
itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the GovernorGeneral to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On

the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94
U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public

interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative
control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their
charters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of
charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads
of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
or to that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility,
and that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable
maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota
in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to
hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of
this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned
and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:

Regulations of railway tariffs - Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. - Under Laws

1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as
to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons
and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus
to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them,
no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Same - constitution - Delegation of power to commission. - The authority thus given

to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement,
what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides -

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and
property shall be equal and reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to
investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate.
Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the commission a
crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held -

That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well
settled to require either argument or citation of authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to
adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to
carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed
equal and reasonable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what
the law shall be, - which would not be allowable, - but have merely conferred upon it
an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under
and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has

passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is
intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make
nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of
the law, and with no other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be
issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its
terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States
vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a
forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as
will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and
use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the
provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be
punished, . . ."chanrobles virtual law library

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated
terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the
proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the
Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative,
power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent
to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of
proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring
upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, - not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.
None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had
legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could
give to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the
details" by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation
of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by
penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally

recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution."chanrobles virtual law library

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants
drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they
were making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby
made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set
apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from

depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy
and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable
rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the
Secretary, but by Congress."chanrobles virtual law library

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating
legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a
railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility,
and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just
and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the
legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the
facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with
such power was not a delegation of legislative power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of
fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as
a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated."chanrobles virtual law library

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations
which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the
forest reserve.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot
delegate it legislative authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any
other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental
principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government established by the constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it
may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or
event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be
suspended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain
closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the
president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100, 1 the Supreme Court of that State
says:

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to
confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the
ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly
situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power
vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot
delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a
law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon
the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In
the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide

arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is
an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point

here.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules
and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could
sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a
crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at
any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it
was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Executive order 2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time
being as follows:

In Manila -chanrobles virtual law library

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per

ganta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per

ganta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per

ganta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the
Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary
handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial
treasurers or their deputies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the
maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila
price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and
the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasurers or their deputies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate
with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and
Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in
their respective localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or
special law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative
power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General
was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub
delegation of that power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the
Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only

purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a
law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the
law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the
Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a
mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that
there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and
that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act
No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the
proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling
price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and
is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it
will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of
the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other
things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the
numerous other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or
special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General
could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens,
coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature
of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there
would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be
equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the
discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime
to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or
quality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause"
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price
at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation
does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty

centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No.
53."chanrobles virtual law library

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes
to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional
and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and
profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an
emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a
particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or
against, its constitutionality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects

the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection
ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental
question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to
be and live under a republican form of government. We make the broad statement
that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms
and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the
power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can
never be delegated under a republican form of
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not
dealing with government property. It was dealing with private property and private
rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained,
upon the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize
the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the
Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any
other or different price.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision
of the Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all
times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was

in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United
States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour
should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared
war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it
is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States
commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or
constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour,
and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the
personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers.
The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any
interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the
public, but the members of this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and
defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing
winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a
republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under
the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice,
and make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by
analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular
portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject
only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the
Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the GovernorGeneral to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the
manner power in violation of the organic law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right
of the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the
price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that
portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the
constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So
ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library

I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first
place, as to the facts, - one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law
and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged violation
thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was
not published until August 13, 1919, and the order was not published until August
20, 1919. In the second place, as to the law, - one cannot be convicted of a violation
of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order
fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company
[1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10,
1917, as amended, invalid.)chanrobles virtual law library

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would
respectfully invite attention to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the legislative
regulation of the prices charged by business affected with a public interest, and to
another decision of the United States Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs.
Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which adopts as its own the principles laid down in the
case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a
subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

G.R. No. 114714

April 21, 1995

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL

SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP.,
EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS
SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY, INC. , LAINE
SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT.,
INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL.
GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC.,
TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, Petitioners, v.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR
AND THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, Respondent.chanrobles virtual law library

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of
1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on
the grounds that:

(1)
The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates
affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in oceangoing vessels; only Congress can.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

(2)
Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the
standards for its exercise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(3)
The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because
they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts
clauses of the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(4)
The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by law has
not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA.

Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January 1994, 1 read as follows:

GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF

1994.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Administration to afford protection to Filipino

overseas contract workers, including seafarers and their families, promote their
interest and safeguard their welfare;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the Administration under its mandate has the power and function to
secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers
land ensure compliance therewith;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the minimum compensation and other benefits in cases of death,

disability and loss or damage to crew's effects provided under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for seafarers which was revised in 1989 are now becoming
very much lesser than the prevailing international standards and those given to
unionized seafarers as provided by their collective bargaining
agreements;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, the Tripartite Technical Working Group convened for the purpose of
deliberating the compensation and benefits provided under the POEA Standard

Employment Contract for seafarers has recommended for the upgrading of the said
compensation and benefits;chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, for the interest of Filipino seafarers and their families, there is an urgent
need to improve and realign the minimum compensation and other benefits
provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers in order to
keep them at par with prevailing international standards and those provided under
collective bargaining agreements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

NOW, THEREFORE, the POEA Governing Board, in a meeting duly convened, hereby
resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified
under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which shall henceforth read as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library

I.

Section C.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

1.
In case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of
twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared
warzone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled. The employer
shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance coverage for this purpose.

xxx

xxx

xxx

III.
The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted to
US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the
seafarer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

IV.
Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided
shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel, provided, that the cause of
action occurs after this Resolation takes effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

V.
This Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 1994 2 by POEA Administrator

Felicisimo Joson and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies,
shipownersl managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed them .that
Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and other
benefits in Part II, Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and
Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which
adjustments took effect on 20 March 1994, and that:

VI.
Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits shall apply to any
Filipino seafarer already on-board any vessel provided, that the case of action
occurs after the said compensation and benefits take effect;

The Tripartite Technical Working Group mentioned in the Resolution, which convened
on 7 January 1994, was composed of the following:

1.

DA Crescencio M. Siddayao, POEA

2.

Dir. Angeles T. Wong, POEA

3.

Dir. Jaime P. Jimenez; POEA

4.

Dir. Lorna O. Fajardo, POEA

5.

OIC Salome Mendoza, POEA

6.

Capt. Gregorio Oca, AMOSUP

7.

Atty, Romeo Occena, PSU-ALUI-TUCP

8.

Mr. Vicente Aldanese, FAME

9.

Capt. Emmanuel L. Regio, PAMSS

10.

Atty. Rexlito Bermudez, COMMA

11.

Atty. Alexandro W. Cruje, POEA

12

Hr. Jay Rosauro Baluyot, POEA

13.

Ms. Magdalena Sarcos, POEA

14.

Atty. Augusto Arreza, FSA 3

In their, comment. the public respondents contend that the petition is without merit
and should de dismissed because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution and
memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or
power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA; 4 (b) the "non-appointment" of the third member of the
Governing Board bees not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has
been functioning "under the advisement of t the Tripartite Technical Working Group
which group is incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e., seafarer
employers and/or associations of manning agencies including herein petitioner," for
which reason "the third member complement . . . has been substantially
represented by said technical working group"; 5 and(d) the consensus on the
increase in the rates of compensation and other benefits was arrived at after
appropriate consultations with the shipowners and the private sector; the Board
therefore soundly exercised its discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

In view of the importance of the issues raised, we gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioners
while the public respondents opted to adopt their comment as their
memorandum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on

impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by
the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
vs. POEA. 6 The petitioner in that , case assailed the constitutionality of
Memorandum Circular No. 02 of the POEA (effective February 1984) which
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas. The challenged resolution
and memorandum overseas employment circular here merely further amended

Memorandum Circular No. 02, which was earlier amended in 1989 per Memorandum
Circular No. 41, 7 series of 1989.

In sustaining the rule-making authority of the POEA and in holding against the
claimed infirmity of delegation of legislative power, Eastern first considered the
history of the charter of the POEA and then discussed separately the above
constitutional issues thus:chanrobles virtual law library

[T]he petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as

violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

. . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall

promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as
earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the
same as the format adopted by the POEA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may been forced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

. . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major

powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power because of the many instances when delegation is permitted. The occasions
are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."chanrobles virtual law library

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

. . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The podel

contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases
without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA, (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is
a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment
practices.8chanrobles virtual law library

The POEA mandate referred to as providing the reasonable standard for the exercise
of the POEA's rule-making authority is found in the statement of powers and
functions of the said office in paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit:

(a)
The Administration shall formulate and undertake in coordination where
necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic program for
promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into
consideration domestic manpower requirements, and to protect their rights to fair
and equitable employment practices. It shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen. This adjudicatory function shall be,
undertaken in appropriate circumstances in consultation with the Construction
Industry Authority of the Philippines. The governing Board of the Administration, as
hereinunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.

It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may
be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 9
This is the principle of subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in

People vs. Rosenthal 10 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service

Commission. 11 Thus in Calalang vs. Williams, 12 this Court stated:

In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to
observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices"
prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed. 13

There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the
Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim
discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen
and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class. 14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between
land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual
activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate
the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social
justice provisions of the 1973. Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and
expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article. 15 The
Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by the
President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice-Cecilia Muoz-Palma.
16 Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state
and requires the extensive use of such power. 17 In Calalang vs. Williams, 18 this.
Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice thus:

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the Humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not

absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts
with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe
asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and
involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.

It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting
regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or
general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected,
for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to
regulate and control them. 19

Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect
them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to
change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require,
or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity. 20 And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to
the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are
impresses with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:

Art. 1700.
The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts lust yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of

E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot
be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold
otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the
police power to the contract clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The last issue concerns the contention that without the appointment by the
President of the third member of the governing board, the POEA cannot legally
function and exercise its powers. This contention merits scant consideration. Section
4 of E.O. No. 797 indubitably declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Thus
upon the effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the POEA attained its juridical personality. The
appointment of the third member "who shall be well versed, in the field of overseas
employment," provided for in paragraph (b) of the said Section, was not meant to
be a sine gua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the validity of the acts of
the Board. As a matter of fact, in the same paragraph the President is given the

"discretion [to] designate a Deputy Administrator as the third member of the

Board."chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 85642

February 12, 1990

EMILIO C. MACIAS, II, Petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

Lenin R. Victoriano and Victoriano L. Tizon for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law

library

Pablo E. Cabahug for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Questioned in this petition for certiorari are the orders of the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated September 12, 1988 and October 26,
1988 denying petitioner's (then protestee) motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration, respectively. Petitioner contends that respondent COMELEC,
through its First Division, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing said questioned
orders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Emilio Macias II and private respondent Herminio G. Teves both ran for the
position of Governor of Negros Oriental during the elections held on January 18,
1988. Petitioner was proclaimed Governor by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
The proclamation was actually held, as found by respondent COMELEC, on January
25, 1988 (p. 82, rollo), although the "Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation"
evidencing said proclamation was dated January 24, 1988. (Annex "B-11," p. 30,
Rollo) chanrobles virtual law library

On January 24, 1988, or the day before the proclamation, private respondent filed a
"Pre-Proclamation Protest Appeal" with the COMELEC, docketed as SPC Case No. 88212. On January 26, 1988, or the day after the proclamation, private respondent
also filed with respondent Commission a "Petition to Set Aside, Suspend the Effects
of or Annul the Proclamation of [the Petitioner] as Governor of Negros Oriental." The
COMELEC dismissed the private respondent's aforesaid protest and petition on
January 30, 1988 and denied his Motion for Reconsideration on April 26,
1988.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 4, 1988, the private respondent filed a post-election protest with the
COMELEC, docketed as Election Protest Case No. 88-14, and paid the docket fee of
P200.00, as charged by the Electoral Adjudication Board. On February 12, 1988, the
private respondent filed an "Amended Petition-Protest." The petitioner filed his
Motion to Dismiss to the Original Petition and Amended Petition on February 23,
1988 and March 3, 1988, respectively. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective
memoranda. On September 12, 1988, the COMELEC issued an Order denying the
petitioner's motion to dismiss. The COMELEC also denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on October 26, 1988.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Hence, this Petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In a resolution dated February 28, 1989, the petition was given due course and the
parties were required to file simultaneously their respective
memoranda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner raises the following issues:

(1)
Whether or not the election protest was seasonably filed; and chanrobles
virtual law library

(2)
Whether or not the failure of herein private respondent to allege in his
original petition that it was being filed by a candidate who has duly filed his
certificate of candidacy and to pay the correct filing fee of P300.00 at the time of
the filing of the original petition are jurisdictional defects which deprived the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over his election protest. (p. 131, Rollo)

Petitioner submits that the COMELEC should not have taken cognizance of the
private respondent's election protest since the same was filed on February 4, 1988
or eleven (11) days after the petitioner's proclamation on January 24, 1988,
Petitioner anchors his first argument on the following:

(a)
the date typewritten in the "Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation" which is
the best evidence is January 24, 1988; and chanrobles virtual law library

(b)
that under Sec. 250 of BP 881, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,
a sworn petition contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official,
shall be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Italics ours)

Petitioner's submission holds no water. As found by respondent COMELEC, the date

of proclamation was January 25, 1988. Undeniably, this issue is factual, and as We
have held time and again, "where the issues raised are factual, the same is not
reviewable by the Supreme Court on certiorari (Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, 166
SCRA 657). And therefore, the election protest filed on February 4, 1988, which is
the tenth (10th day from the date of proclamation, January 25, 1988, was wellwithin the prescribed period. Assuming however that the date of proclamation was
January 24, 1988, the filing of the protest on February 4, 1988 was still within the
period since Private respondent filed a "Pre-Proclamation Protest Appeal" on January
24, 1988 effectively suspending the running of the period for filing an election
protest as provided for in Section 248, Article XX of BP 881:

Sec. 248.
Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.-The
filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of
any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an
election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that because private respondent failed to
allege in his original petition that he "duly filed a certificate of candidacy,"
respondent COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over the election
protest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's argument is untenable. As correctly held by the COMELEC in the

assailed Decision:

The Commission, First Division, notes that the above-mentioned legal provision does
not require that a protest must state that it is being filed "by a candidate who has
duly filed his certificate of candidacy." Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code only

provides that a protest must be filed by a candidate who has duly filed his
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, without requiring in
said section that this matter must be specifically alleged in the protest. The
Commission however notes that the original petition and/or protest filed by
petitioner on February 4, 1988, pertinently alleges that the petitioner was a
candidate for the position of Governor in the Province of Negros Oriental and was
voted upon by the electorate during the election held on January 18, 1988. The
Commission rules that this allegation substantially complies with the requirements
of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code. Be that as it may, the defect if any in the
preliminary allegations of the original protest pertinent to the requirements of
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code was cured when protestant filed his
amended protest on February 12, 1988, before an answer could be filed by any
protestee. Protestee's answer was filed only on February 23, 1988, as disclosed by
the records of this Commission. (pp. 3-4, Order; pp. 84-85, Rollo)

Petitioner also contends that because private respondent only paid P200 instead of
P300 as required under COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, the Commission should have
dismissed the protest. The COMELEC countered that the "blame however, should
not be laid on the protestant for failure to pay in full the P300.00 docket fee on
February 4, 1988, when the protest was filed considering that the docket clerk of
the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department charged the said amount which
protestant duly paid. Injustice will result if the instant protest is dismissed for failure
of the protestant to pay the full amount of P300.00 docket fee on February 4, 1988,
when he filed the original protest considering that it was not protestant's fault that
there was underpayment of the docket fee." (p. 84, Rollo) We agree with the
contention of the respondent COMELEC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 27, 1988 is
LIFTED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 179271 : April 21, 2009]

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.

[G.R. NO. 179295 : April 21, 2009]

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION,

COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and
ABONO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 - Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) - in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being
moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 - Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) - in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3
assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made
a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition
in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. NOS. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members
of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would
apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no
intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19
July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna,
Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela),
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and
Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of

Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially
canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List
System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National
Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes
cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand
one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i.

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii.
Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass
deferred)
1,337,032

iii.
Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet
submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in
part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided,
that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list
votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v.

COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving
more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be
determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at
least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are
as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION

VOTES

RECEIVED
1

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC 760,260

GABRIELA

APEC 538,971

A TEACHER 476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL 405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

11

BATAS 386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13

ARC

14

ABONO

610,451

390,029

338,194
337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST
NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before
the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one
seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the

Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166,
7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to
certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System:

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

CIBAC

Gabriela Women's Party

GABRIELA

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

APEC

6
Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc. A TEACHER
7

Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party AKBAYAN

Alagad

Luzon Farmers Party

10

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

11

Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12

Alliance of Rural Concerns

13

Abono ABONO

ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO

ARC

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent
(2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to
render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans
formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the

National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold
of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of
16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the
National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of
July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not
included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes
expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected
maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC 755,964

GABRIELA

APEC 622,489

A TEACHER 492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL 409,298

977,476

621,718

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12

ARC

13

ABONO

375,846
340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained
the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v.
COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the

party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may
be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party

Total votes for party-list system =

Proportion of votes of first

party relative to total votes for

party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off)
shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received

by the first party

Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
16,261,369 =

0.07248 or 7.2%

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

Additional seats for

a concerned party =

No. of votes of

concerned party
No. of votes of
first party

No. of additional

seats allocated
to first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List

Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC 1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC 1.05

1.65

A TEACHER 0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL 0.69

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS 0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0
0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus

Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and
other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC 1
GABRIELA

APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent
(2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one
(1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,

furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List

Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations
and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number - - twenty percent (20%) - - of Party-List representatives as

mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes,

should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section
12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list
representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; andcralawlibrary

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast
in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are
entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.

7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative
prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re
"In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results."rbl rl l lbrr

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as

it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot
and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An
Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations
have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay 3

1.2

Bayan Muna 2

1.3

CIBAC 2

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC 2

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis 1

1
1

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono 1

1.14

AGAP 1

1.15

AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration
and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of
Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section

5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?cralawred

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

cralawred

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?cralawred

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in
their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in
the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First
Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as

provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the FirstParty Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same
being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are
constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of
RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments
set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),

Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?cralawred

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?cralawred

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?cralawred

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?cralawred

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?18

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list

election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have
a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation' the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical

interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives

shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.rbl rl l lbrr

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in
Veterans, thus:

Number of seats
available to legislative districts
.80
x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.

220
.80

x .20 =

55

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System.
Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent
in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following
procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,

finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. - The

COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the
2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure
as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220
District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list
groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their
total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum
three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.23

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote

requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of

votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25
Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's second
interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the
party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in
the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna,
Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the
votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number
of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of
seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given
their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the

remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled
up.26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes garnered during the elections.27

Rank Party Votes Garnered

Rank Party Votes Garnered

BUHAY

48

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

49

CIBAC 755,686

50

BP

78,541

GABRIELA

51

AHONBAYAN 78,424

APEC 619,657

A TEACHER 490,379

53

PMAP 75,200

AKBAYAN

466,112

54

AKAPIN

ALAGAD

423,149

55

PBA

71,544

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

56

GRECON

10

BUTIL 409,160

57

BTM

60,993

11

BATAS 385,810

58

A SMILE

58,717

12

ARC

59

NELFFI

57,872

13

ANAKPAWIS 370,261

60

AKSA 57,012

14

ABONO

61

BAGO 55,846

1,169,234

621,171

374,288

52

339,990

KALAHI

BIGKIS

88,868

APOI 79,386

77,327

74,686

62,220

15

AMIN 338,185

62

BANDILA

16

AGAP 328,724

63

AHON 54,522

17

AN WARAY

18

YACAP310,889

65

AGBIAG!

19

FPJPM 300,923

66

SPI

50,478

20

UNI-MAD

67

BAHANDI

21

ABS

ADD

45,624

22

KAKUSA

228,999

69

AMANG

23

KABATAAN

228,637

70

ABAY PARAK 42,282

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

71

BABAE KA

25

ALIF

SB

34,835

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

73

27

AT

197,872

74

PEP

33,938

28

VFP

196,266

75

ABA ILONGGO

29

ANAD 188,521

76

VENDORS

30

BANAT

31

ANG KASANGGA

32

BANTAY

169,801

79

AANGAT KA PILIPINO

33

ABAKADA

166,747

80

AAPS 26,271

34

1-UTAK

164,980

81

HAPI 25,781

35

TUCP 162,647

36

COCOFED

37

AGHAM

38

ANAK 141,817

85

39

ABANSE! PINAY

130,356

40

PM

87

321,503

245,382

235,086

217,822

68

72

177,028

64

77

170,531

ASAHAN MO 51,722
50,837

46,612

43,062

36,512

ASAP 34,098

33,903

33,691

ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
78

ALMANA

AAWAS

22,946

155,920

83

SM

20,744

146,032

84

AG

16,916

119,054

82

54,751

AGING PINOY
86

APO

BIYAYANG BUKID

32,255

16,729
16,421
16,241

29,130

41

AVE

110,769

ATS

14,161

42

SUARA

110,732

89

UMDJ 9,445

43

ASSALAM

110,440

90

BUKLOD FILIPINA

44

DIWA 107,021

91

LYPAD 8,471

45

ANC

92

AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46

SANLAKAS

47

ABC

99,636

88

97,375

93

KASAPI

8,915

6,221

90,058

TOTAL15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat
to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for
illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes
garnered over the total votes for the party-list.28

Rank Party Votes Garnered

Guaranteed Seat

Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in %

BUHAY

7.33%1

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

CIBAC 755,686

4.74%1

GABRIELA

APEC 619,657

A TEACHER 490,379

3.07%1

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%1

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%1

1,169,234

621,171

6.14%1

3.89%1

3.88%1

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

10

BUTIL 409,160

2.57%1

11

BATAS29

12

ARC

13

ANAKPAWIS 370,261

2.32%1

14

ABONO

2.13%1

15

AMIN 338,185

2.12%1

16

AGAP 328,724

2.06%1

17

AN WARAY

385,810

374,288

2.57%1

2.42%1

2.35%1

339,990

321,503

2.02%1

Total

17

18

YACAP310,889

1.95%0

19

FPJPM 300,923

1.89%0

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified partylist candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled
to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we
distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners' and intervenors'
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent

threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed
50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."30

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11

of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage
of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number
of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat
to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank Party Votes Garnered

Total Votes for Party List, in %
(A)

Guaranteed Seat

(First Round)
(B)
Seats

Additional

Votes Garnered over

(Second Round)
(C)

(B) plus (C), in whole integers

(D)

Applying the three seat cap

(E)
1

BUHAY

1,169,234

N.A.

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%1

2.33

CIBAC 755,686

4.74%1

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

1.48

APEC 619,657

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%1

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%1

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%1

1.01

N.A.

931

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%1

10

BUTIL 409,160

2.57%1

N.A.

11

BATAS 385,810

2.42%1

N.A.

12

ARC

2.35%1

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS 370,261

2.32%1

N.A.

14

ABONO

2.13%1

N.A.

15

AMIN 338,185

2.12%1

N.A.

16

AGAP 328,724

2.06%1

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

2.02%1

18

YACAP310,889

1.95%0

N.A.

19

FPJPM 300,923

1.89%0

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

1.54%0

21

ABS

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

1.44%0

621,171

374,288

3.89%1

3.88%1

339,990

321,503

245,382

235,086

7.33%1

1.47%0

228,999

1.48

2.79

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%0

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%0

N.A.

25

ALIF

N.A.

26

217,822

1.37%0

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%0

27

AT

197,872

1.24%0

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%0

N.A.

29

ANAD 188,521

1.18%0

N.A.

30

BANAT

1.11%0

N.A.

31

ANG KASANGGA

1.07%0

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%0

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%0

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%0

N.A.

35

TUCP 162,647

N.A.

36

COCOFED

0.98%0

177,028

170,531

1.02%0

155,920

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Total

17
55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all

political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party
list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?cralawred

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the
party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?cralawred

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?cralawred

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says
that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?cralawred

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
cralawred

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the
party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?cralawred

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan
ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under
this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
cralawred

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
cralawred

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties
and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDPLaban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties
can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive
to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will
be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation,
the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment
will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the
political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in
the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations
affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that
they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming
effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote
with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the
Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and
mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each

other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral
representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector
to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of
contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political
parties.

x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology

or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of

citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral

parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with,
sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a
problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing
to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk

nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban
poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No.

7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The

three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list

organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties
from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE,we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in
party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 86-87. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

3 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 103-108. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

5 396 Phil. 419 (2000).

6 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-986; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-815. PartyList Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.

7 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 70.

8 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 88-92.

9 Id. at 150-153.

10 Id. at 86-87.

11 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), p. 112.

12 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 158-159. NBC Resolution No. 07-74, 24 July 2007.

13 Id. at 160-161. NBC Resolution No. 07-87, 3 August 2007.

14 NBC Resolution No. 07-97, 4 September 2007.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certification should have
included An Waray, which was proclaimed on 4 September 2007 under NBC
Resolution No. 07-97.

16 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14.

17 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22.

18 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.

19 Supra note 5 at 424.

20 Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First
Party Rule:

Formula for Determining

Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The
only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total
votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes
of first party
Total votes for
party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to

total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then
the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional
or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the
allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme
case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are
entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House
of Representatives.

xxx

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received
a significantly higher amount of votes - say, twenty percent - to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional

Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:

Additional seats
for concerned party

No. of votes of

concerned party
Total No. of votes
of party-list system
No. of votes
of first party
Total No. of votes
of party-list system x

No. of additional

seats allocated
to the first party
In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional seats
for concerned party

No. of votes of

concerned party
No. of votes
of first party x
seats allocated to
the first party
xxx

No. of additional

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero.
The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties
as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

21 Id. at 475-481.

22 The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as
provided in Section 10 of R.A. No. 7941.

23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.

24 Id. at 48.

25 Id. at 1076.

26 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.

27 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. PartyList Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.

28 Id.

29 Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.

30 Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

31 The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties
ranked nine and below is less than one.

32 II Record, Constitutional Commission 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August

1986).

33 Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang
Bagong Bayani - OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 350 (2001).

34 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).

35 Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:

History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their voice,
even as they are relegated to the sidelines as genuine functional representation
systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying premise that the partylist system was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is within this

context that I register my dissent to the entry of major political parties to the partylist system.

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec1
with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major
political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the
majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of
Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct
congruence with theirs, hence this dissent.

To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI, Section 5 of
the Constitution reads:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.2

It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the
disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented, and not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the
occasion, the Court ruled through then Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban,
that while any duly registered political party, organization or group may participate,
the role of the Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and

underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-style" partylist elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a social justice vehicle, the
Court batted for the empowerment of the masses, thus'

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted - to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past - the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory
achieved by the marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong Bayani. In
permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list system, Mr.
Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list system is open to all
political parties, as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors.3 Buttressing his view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that the major
political parties also fall within the term "political parties" in the Definition of Terms
in Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he
holds that the qualifications of a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the
said law do not specify any financial status or educational requirement, hence, it is
not necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity."5 It is then concluded that major political parties may now participate in
the party-list system.

With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when
we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to the democratic
sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which
the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in
interpreting the Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of

the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.6

Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the
whole instrument, its every section and clause.7 We should strive to make every
word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some words idle and
nugatory.8 The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related constitutional
provisions will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the party-list
system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions,9 the President was
permitted to fill by appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation
under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the respective
sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the elected
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa
tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral
representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status of
dignity as those elected by the people.10 rbl rl l lbrr To avoid
this bias against sectoral representatives, the President was given all the leeway to
"break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that
the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the
process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of
sectoral representation."11 Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the
marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the
election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to
"reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good";12 the right
of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making;13 the right of women to
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation;14 the right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role
as a primary social economic force;15 the right of teachers to professional
advancement;16 the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration
of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and

policies,17 and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national
economy.18

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our
traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list
elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to
campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission19 that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which
participated, the seven major political parties20 made it to the top 50. These seven
parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted,
yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58%
each. Of these seven, three parties21 or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would
have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast,
only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155
parties garnered more than 2%.22

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the
time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the
party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In
ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and
powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who
have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow
major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we
will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the
graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.

Endnotes:

1 G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.

2 Id.

3 II Record, Constitutional Commission, 25 July 1986, pp. 256-257.

4 Section 3.

5 Main opinion, p. 33.

6 G.R. No.83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337.

7 Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.

8 Id.

9 Article XVIII.

10 V Record, Constitutional Commission, 1 October 1986, p. 332.

11 Id. at 330.

12 Article XIII, Section 1.

13 Article XIII, Sec. 16.

14 Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to section 14.

15 Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to Article II, Sec. 18.

16 Article XIV, Sec. 5.

17 Article XIV, Sec. 17.

18 Article II, Sec. 20.

19 Id., at 562.

20 As noted in Bagong Bayani: Nationalist People's Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP,

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, Aksyon Demokratiko, Partido ng Masang Pilipino,
Partido Demokratikong Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan and Liberal Party.

21 Nationalist People's Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP and Laban ng Demokratikong

Pilipino.

22 Party List Canvass Report No. 26, Commission on Elections.

SEPARATE OPINION

NACHURA, J.:

I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2%
threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House
of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79411 is unconstitutional. This
minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party list system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats
the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in
the enabling law, to allow the people's broadest representation in Congress,2 the
raison d etre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Article VI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.3

This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system4 of

representation by allowing different sectors, parties, organizations and coalitions to
win a legislative seat. It diversifies the membership in the legislature and "gives
genuine power to the people."5 As aforesaid, the Constitution desires the people's
widest representation in Congress.

To determine the total number of seats that will be allocated to party-list groups
based on the foregoing constitutional provision, this Court, in Veterans Federation
Party v. Commission on Elections,6 declared:

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the

determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives,
including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

.80

x .20 =

No. of party-list representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives,
as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats.

On the basis of this formula, the number of party-list seats is not static; it could add
up to a substantial figure depending on the additional number of legislative districts
which Congress may create. Thus, for instance, the ponencia states that "since the
14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives," based on the following computation:

220
.80

x .20 = 55

To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 117 of which sets, among others, the inviolable
parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition, must obtain at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to claim one

seat in the House of Representatives. This is referred to as the threshold vote, or the
minimum vote requirement.

Here lies the crux of its unconstitutionality.

Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives which may be occupied by party-list representatives can never
exceed fifty (50), because:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list system)
2%

= 50
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list
representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district representatives.

I see a scenario in the future when, because of the inexorable growth in the
country's population, Congress should see fit to increase the legislative district
seats to 400. If that happens, there would be a corresponding adjustment in partylist representation that will translate to 100 party-list seats, applying the formula in
Veterans Federation Party, viz:

400
.80

x .20 = 100

Yet, by virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of seats that the
political parties, organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system
could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50.

This is not an unlikely scenario. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court's
decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats

are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that
figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement
makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.

This, to my mind, stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941. A

legal provision that poses an insurmountable barrier to the full implementation and
realization of the constitutional provision on the party-list system should be
declared void. As Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno says in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, "(W)e should strive to make every word of the fundamental law
operative and avoid rendering some word idle and nugatory."8

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold

vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in
careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion
in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote
requirement is needed '

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a
fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their
seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the

elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; andcralawlibrary

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list
seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts,
and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no
longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come
with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents
the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides
a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law,
R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the
constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike
down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not
simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the
duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all
times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment
that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, what then do we use as the norm for a
minimum vote requirement to entitle a political party, sectoral organization or
coalition, to a party-list seat in the House of Representatives?cralawred

I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to the
minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we abide by the sensible standard of
"proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote
requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats.
Thus, at present, considering that there are 55 seats allocated for party-list groups,
the formula should be:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
55 party-list seats

= 1.818%
The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list
seats increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we presented above should ever come
to pass, and there are 100 seats allocated for party-list groups, then the threshold
vote should be 1%, based on the following computation:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
100 party-list seats

= 1%
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the
inevitable changes in the composition of the House of Representatives; it would
open opportunities for the broadest people's representation in the House of
Representatives; and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution.

Time changes and laws change with it.10 And the Constitution - - -

must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from being a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned
to the heartbeat of the nation.11

Thus, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I
join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with
the Constitution should be invalidated.12

Endnotes:

1 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES

THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR,"
approved on March 3, 1995.

2 Section 2, R.A. 7941, provides:

"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members
of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives,
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (Emphasis supplied.)

3 Emphasis supplied.

4 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698, 716.

5 Id. at 717.

6 G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000; 342 SCRA 244.

7 In full, the provision reads:

"Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives

shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.

"In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:

"(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."

8 Citing Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.

9 Id. at 290.

10 Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530
SCRA 235, 314-315.

11 Isagani A. Cruz, "A Quintessential Constitution," San Beda Law Journal, April
1972.

12 Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704, 730-731

[G.R. No. 190582 : April 08, 2010] ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN
BY ITS CHAIR, DANTON REMOTO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 190582 : April 08, 2010]

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIR, DANTON REMOTO,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that

others may make different choices - choices we would not make for ourselves,
choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us.
However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different,
and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a
core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal.
Yet herein lies the paradox - philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not
harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the
8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual

attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did
change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men,
leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men
with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that
recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!"
(7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2,
2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the
Petition's par. 6F: `Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age'. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: `In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or

accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal
Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as
`Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: `The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public

order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that `Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy' are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, penalizes `Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows' as follows:

Art. 201.Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent

shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1.Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form;
the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the
establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live
or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1)
glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to
abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order,
morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.

Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article
that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn
the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlad's Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking
for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating
that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even
assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it
cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of
the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation's - only that their interests have not been brought to
the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time
comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation
under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine

jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals
(LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held
that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that
"nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or
promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race
or religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is

elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim

religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group's
moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based,
but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim
and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions
have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon
"Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and
indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is
clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age' It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: `In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it
would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25,
2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11]
Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat
surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner's application.
[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position,
we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary

restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-inIntervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to
intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which
motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties' Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines'
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred
in denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELEC's allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC
as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of
petitioner's freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG
maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of

the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it
was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not
exist in almost all provinces in the country."[21]

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/partylist representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioner's accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions.
This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged
non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the
First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated
afterthought, a change in respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's
right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of

Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:"

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) - Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City - Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion - Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) - Metro Manila
Cebu Pride - Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association - Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) - Metro Manila
Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG) - Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) - Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association - Iloilo City
Kabulig Writer's Group - Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA - Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association - Metro Manila

Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) - Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association - Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) - Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. - Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association - Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family - Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) - Metro Manila
Soul Jive - Antipolo, Rizal
The Link - Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association - Quezon
Women's Bisexual Network - Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association - Zamboanga City[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD
LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of
these regions. In fact, if COMELEC's findings are to be believed, petitioner does not
even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of
business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad's morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to

Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."[24] Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."[25] We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed
in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may
be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based
its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would
not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved
are second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as

expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"

and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a
compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal
and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian
in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose
and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society,
however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious
liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to

Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and

homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of
LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it
is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing
wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad
example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized
society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is

not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure - religious beliefs,
convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike
or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless,
we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a
finding by the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are
committing immoral acts."[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a

different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to
immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands
full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly
this is not the intendment of the law.[31]

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate
matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that
the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental
to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with
the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another,
without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of
morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil
action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of

the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
"nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said
Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons."[33] The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that "[i]n
our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the `rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient

reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we
were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted
state interest here - that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority - is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated
claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would
benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or
dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today.
Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as
all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in

the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every
aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have
equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is
finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences
of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act
of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies - including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small - not only for
a majority, however large - but for each of us" - the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not
illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming
public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions
have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds,
citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international
texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that
have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly

illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine

courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled
that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive
conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint."[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in
the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic
means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The
ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and
whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if
such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of
the population.[44] A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks
to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of
satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the
protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood,
believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are
morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even

at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims
and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality
through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of
their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly

denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list
system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section
4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not
be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionallyguaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that

the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if
not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate
in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and - as advanced by the OSG itself - the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the
extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's

action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an
equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates,
we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental
rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and
groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,
international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general

application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a
status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights

Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed
to include "sexual orientation."[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies
have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by

universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to

electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the
right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government
is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity
to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government
based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any
kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain
the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international
law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of

international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society - or a certain segment of
society - wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is
unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader
context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further
claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has
the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants"
are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are - at best - de
lege ferenda - and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed,
so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no
more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or
opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this
case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its
own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as
best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that
our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission

on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT
petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., pls. see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., joins J. Abad's concurring opinion.
Brion, J., join dissent of J. Corona.
Abad, J., certify that J. Abad wrote a separate concurring opinion.

Endnotes:
[1] 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).

[2] Rollo, pp. 33-40.

[3] Id. at 41-74.

[4] An Act Providing For The Election Of Party-List Representatives Through The
Party-List System, And Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).

[5] Rollo, pp. 89-101.

[6] 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

[7] Ang Ladlad outlined its platform, viz:

As a party-list organization, Ang Ladlad is willing to research, introduce, and work

for the passage into law of legislative measures under the following platform of
government:

a) introduction and support for an anti-discrimination bill that will ensure equal
rights for LGBTs in employment and civil life;
b) support for LGBT-related and LGBT-friendly businesses that will contribute to the
national economy;
c) setting up of micro-finance and livelihood projects for poor and physically
challenged LGBT Filipinos;
d) setting up of care centers that will take care of the medical, legal, pension, and
other needs of old and abandoned LGBTs. These centers will be set up initially in the
key cities of the country; and
e) introduction and support for bills seeking the repeal of laws used to harass and
legitimize extortion against the LGBT community. Rollo, p. 100.

[8] Id. at 36-39. Citations omitted. Italics and underscoring in original text.

[9] Id. at 77-88.

[10] Id. at 50-54. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

[11] Id. at 121.

[12] Id. at 129-132.

[13] Id. at 151-283.

[14] Id. at 284.

[15] Id. at 301-596.

[16] Id. at 126.

[17] Id. at 133-160.

[18] Id. at 288-291.

[19] Id. at 296.

[20] Supra note 6.

[21] It appears that on September 4, 2009, the Second Division directed the various
COMELEC Regional Offices to verify the existence, status, and capacity of petitioner.
In its Comment, respondent submitted copies of various reports stating that ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT did not exist in the following areas: Batangas
(October 6, 2009); Romblon (October 6, 2009); Palawan (October 16, 2009);
Sorsogon (September 29, 2009); Cavite, Marinduque, Rizal (October 12, 2009);
Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi (October 19, 2009); Biliran,
Leyte, Southern Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar (October 19, 2009);
Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon (October
25, 2009); Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, La Union, Pangasinan (October 23, 2009); North
Cotabato, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat (October 23, 2009); Aklan,
Antique, Iloilo and Negros Occidental (October 25, 2009); Bohol, Cebu, Siquijor
(October 24, 2009); Negros Oriental (October 26, 2009); Cordillera Administrative
Region (October 30, 2009); Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Dinagat Islands,
Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur (October 26, 2009); Cagayan de Oro, Bukidnon,
Camiguin, MIsamis Oriental, Lanao del Norte (October 31, 2009); Laguna (November
2, 2009); Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro (November 13, 2009); Quezon
(November 24, 2009); Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela
Valley, Davao Oriental (November 19, 2009); Caloocan, Las Pinas, Makati,
Mandaluyong, Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Paranaque, Pasay, Pasig,
Pateros, Quezon City, San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela (December 16, 2009). Rollo,
pp.323-596.

[22] Id. at 96.

[23] Id. at 96-97.

[24] BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 346

(2009).

[25] Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003), citing Smith, S., "The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse", 140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW, 149, 160 (1991).

[26] 455 Phil. 411 (2003).

[27] Id. at 588-589.

[28] Rollo, p. 315.

[29] In Anonymous v. Radam, A.M. No. P-07-2333, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA
12, citing Concerned Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004,
443 SCRA 448, we ruled that immorality cannot be judged based on personal bias,
specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on
"cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the
realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time,
the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be
observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the
majority.

[30] Rollo, pp. 178.

[31] Id. at 179-180.

[32] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 699.

[33] Politics VII. 14.

[34] Abakada Guro Party v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1,
2005, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 139.

[35] In BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY

139-140 (2009), Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. writes:

For determining the reasonableness of classification, later jurisprudence has

developed three kinds of test[s] depending on the subject matter involved. The
most demanding is the strict scrutiny test which requires the government to show
that the challenged classification serves a compelling state interest and that the
classification is necessary to serve that interest. This [case] is used in cases
involving classifications based on race, national origin, religion, alienage, denial of
the right to vote, interstate migration, access to courts, and other rights recognized
as fundamental.

Next is the intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny test which requires government to

show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that
the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest. This is
applied to suspect classifications like gender or illegitimacy.

The most liberal is the minimum or rational basis scrutiny according to which
government need only show that the challenged classification is rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest. This is the traditional rationality test and it
applies to all subjects other than those listed above.

[36] 487 Phil. 531, 583 (2004).

[37] Id. at 584. See also Mid-States Freight Lines v. Bates, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 568.

[38] The OSG argues that "[w]hile it is true that LGBTs are immutably males and
females, and they are protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens

alike, it cannot be denied that as a sector, LGBTs have their own special interests
and concerns." Rollo, p. 183.

[39] Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances."

[40] Supra note 26.

[41] In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the US Supreme Court first upheld
the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that criminalized oral and anal sex in
private between consenting adults when applied to homosexuals. Seventeen years
later the Supreme Court directly overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), holding that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today."

In Lawrence, the US Supreme Court has held that the liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter into intimate
relationships, whether or not said relationships were entitled to formal or legal
recognition.

Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning
the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by
unmarried as well as married persons.

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not
easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship

that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.

In similar fashion, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the avowed
state interest in protecting public morals did not justify interference into private acts
between homosexuals. In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court held that laws
criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct violated the right to privacy enshrined in the
European Convention.

The Government are in effect saying that the Court is precluded from reviewing
Ireland's observance of its obligation not to exceed what is necessary in a
democratic society when the contested interference with an Article 8 (Art. 8) right is
in the interests of the "protection of morals". The Court cannot accept such an
interpretation. x x x.

x x x The present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life. Accordingly,
there must exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of
public authorities can be legitimate x x x.

x x x Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be

shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual
acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is
consenting adults alone who are involved. (Norris v. Ireland (judgment of October
26, 1988, Series A no. 142, pp. 20-21, 46); Marangos v.Cyprus (application no.
31106/96, Commission's report of 3 December 1997, unpublished)).

The United Nations Human Rights Committee came to a similar conclusion in

Toonen v. Australia (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)), involving a complaint that Tasmanian laws

criminalizing consensual sex between adult males violated the right to privacy
under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
Committee held:

x x x it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by

the concept of `privacy' x x x any interference with privacy must be proportional to
the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.

[42] See Toonen v. Australia, (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the European Court of Human Rights,
construing the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms);
Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep.
485 (1993). See also, L. and V. v Austria (2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55) and S.L. v
Austria (2003-I 71; (2003) 37 EHRR 39), where the European Court considered that
Austria's differing age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations was
discriminatory; it `embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual
majority against a homosexual minority', which could not `amount to sufficient
justification for the differential treatment any more than similar negative attitudes
towards those of a different race, origin or colour'.

[43] See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (1980) and Gay Student Services v. Texas
A&M University, 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984).

[44] Case of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria
Application No. 5941/00; Judgment of January 20, 2006. Note that in Baczkowski and
Others v. Poland, Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of May 3, 2007, the ECHR
unanimously ruled that the banning of an LGBT gay parade in Warsaw was a
discriminatory violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, which provides:

The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.

It also found that banning LGBT parades violated the group's freedom of assembly
and association. Referring to the hallmarks of a "democratic society", the Court has
attached particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In
that context, it has held that although individual interests must on occasion be
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views
of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the
fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant
position.

[45] Case of Freedom & Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, Application No.
23885/94; Judgment of December 8, 1999.

[46] Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) provides:

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of

association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.

No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on September
21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1, 1990, and November 1, 1998,
respectively.

*Note that while the state is not permitted to discriminate against homosexuals,
private individuals cannot be compelled to accept or condone homosexual conduct
as a legitimate form of behavior. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. (515 U.S. 557 (1995)), the US Supreme Court
discussed whether anti-discrimination legislation operated to require the organizers
of a private St.Patrick's Day parade to include among the marchers an Irish-

American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group. The court held that private citizens
organizing a public demonstration may not be compelled by the state to include
groups that impart a message the organizers do not want to be included in their
demonstration. The court observed:

"[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of
the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexualsx
x x. The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be
so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have
some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade. But
whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a
particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's
power to control."

So, too, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (530 U.S. 640 [2000]), the US Supreme
Court held that the Boy Scouts of America could not be compelled to accept a
homosexual as a scoutmaster, because "the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will
not "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose

views the group does not accept, the organization's message is undermined; the
organization is understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the
persons linked with them. The scoutmaster's presence "would, at the very least,
force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."

[47] Rollo, pp. 197-199.

[48] In Toonen v. Australia, supra note 42, the Human Rights Committee noted that
"in its view the reference to `sex' in Articles 2, paragraph 2, and 26 is to be taken as
including sexual orientation."

[49] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has dealt with
the matter in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it issues to explicate
the full meaning of the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. In General Comments Nos. 18 of 2005 (on the right to work) (Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The right to work,
E/C.12/GC/18, November 24, 2005), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water) (Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to
water, E/C.12/2002/11, November 26, 2002) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the
highest attainable standard of health) (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of
health, E/C.12/2000/4, August 14, 2000), it has indicated that the Covenant
proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex and sexual orientation.

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the issue in a
General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it stated that, "State
parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the
rights set forth in the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination
(Article 2), including with regard to ``race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status''. These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation". (Committee on the
Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in
the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 1, 2003,
CRC/GC/2003/4).

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), has,

on a number of occasions, criticized States for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. For example, it also addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and
recommended that, "lesbianism be reconceptualized as a sexual orientation and
that penalties for its practice be abolished" (Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding
Kyrgyzstan, February 5, 1999, A/54/38 at par. 128).

[50] General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights
and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25) December 16, 1996.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7.

[51] The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law
in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international

principles relating to sexual orientation and gender identity, intended to address

documented evidence of abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 Principles adopted by human rights practitioners
and experts, together with recommendations to governments, regional
intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the United Nations.

[52] One example is Principle 3 (The Right to Recognition Before the Law), which
provides:

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal
capacity in all aspects of life. Each person's self-defined sexual orientation and
gender identity is integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects
of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo
medical procedures, including sex reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal
therapy, as a requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity.No status,
such as marriage or parenthood, may be invoked as such to prevent the legal
recognition of a person's gender identity. No one shall be subjected to pressure to
conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity.

States shall:

a) Ensure that all persons are accorded legal capacity in civil matters, without
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and the
opportunity to exercise that capacity, including equal rights to conclude contracts,
and to administer, own, acquire (including through inheritance), manage, enjoy and
dispose of property;
b) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to fully respect
and legally recognise each person's self-defined gender identity;
c) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that
procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity papers which indicate a person's
gender/sex -- including birth certificates, passports, electoral records and other
documents -- reflect the person's profound self-defined gender identity;
d) Ensure that such procedures are efficient, fair and non-discriminatory, and
respect the dignity and privacy of the person concerned;

e) Ensure that changes to identity documents will be recognized in all contexts

where the identification or disaggregation of persons by gender is required by law or
policy;
f) Undertake targeted programmes to provide social support for all persons
experiencing gender transitioning or reassignment. (Emphasis ours)

[53] See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Health, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265, where we explained
that "soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth
in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It
is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fall under this category.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:

I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice

Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion to
underscore some points that I deem significant.

FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul
of the non-establishment clause[1] of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on
the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal - much less constitutional terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party
principally on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e.,
Christian[2] and Muslim[3]) beliefs." To be sure, the COMELEC's ruling is completely
antithetical to the fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality expressed in the law
is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit
the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions."[4] As we
explained in Estrada v. Escritor,[5] the requirement of an articulable and discernible
secular purpose is meant to give flesh to the constitutional policy of full religious
freedom for all, viz.:

Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to
know, but often, to act in accordance with man's "views of his relations to His
Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment of
this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative
"establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the "war of all sects
against all"; the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social contract
produced by religious truce.

Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or "public morals" in the Revised
Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral character" in the
Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred to
in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs
in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would
require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion;" anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it

appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.[6] (citations omitted and italics supplied)

Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the

constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.[7] Ang Ladlad's right of political participation was unduly
infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices
of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or
worse, a morality police.

The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement"[8]

with religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing,
whether Christian or Muslim"[9] since the "moral precepts espoused by [these]
religions have slipped into society and ... are now publicly accepted moral
norms."[10] However, as correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the
Philippines has not seen fit to disparage homosexual conduct as to actually
criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has legislated to this effect, the law is
vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy grounds.[11] These alleged "generally
accepted public morals" have not, in reality, crossed over from the religious to the
secular sphere.

Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and
offensive. Nevertheless, private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be
attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United
States (U.S.) Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas,[12] opined:

It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which
thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power
of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the ...

law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."[13]

SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad's definition of the term "sexual
orientation,"[14] as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex
with men,[15] as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates
sexual immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual
individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of
personal liberty. For, the "ability to [independently] define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all
depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others."[16] As Mr. Justice
Blackmun so eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick[17]
(overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen years later in Lawrence
v. Texas[18]):

Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality[.]"[19] The fact that individuals
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right"
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.[20]

In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of

giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the
fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in holding
that the clearly important state interest in public education should give way to a
competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling
threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption that
today's majority is `right' and the Amish and others like them are `wrong.' A way of
life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is
not to be condemned because it is different."[21] The Court claims that its decision
today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest
all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with
others. (italics supplied)

It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.[22] Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.[23] These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process
clause.[24] At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.[25] Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.[26] Lawrence v. Texas[27] is again instructive:

To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.

This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice. (italics supplied)

THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals
and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of
judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only
show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest.

I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual

orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of
review.

Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection

challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[28]
However, Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
[29] carved out an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial scrutiny
than mere rationality, viz.:

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require
a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)

Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our
fundamental law, the Court ruled in favor of the Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. in this wise:

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power,
we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

xxxx

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is
also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of
the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the

class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated
upon.

Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:

xxxx

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees
from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly...

xxxx

The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant

changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny
relates to the constitutionality of the classification -- albeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other laws -- between the rank-and-file of the
BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage
of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rankand-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as
to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity
manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be

invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a

discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and
(b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters
of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis- -vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among
several similar enactments made over a period of time?

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on

the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on
a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest
on a policy determination -- even those that have been declared to contravene the
Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a
statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper.
There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress
or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the
Constitution.

xxxx

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the
SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-andfile so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied
(not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the
law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven
other GFIs.

xxxx

The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the
other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination
-- no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when
such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis.

xxxx

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and
its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.
There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society.
Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special
status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation -- all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in
favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more
reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of

work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace -- the factory,
the office or the field -- but include as well the manner by which employers treat
their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment

opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to
both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes
to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in

Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long

honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational
basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right,
or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down
any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from
the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages
that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are
limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank -- possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement -- are given higher compensation packages to
entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees
consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they -- and not the officers -- who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of
the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services,
extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves
strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and italics
supplied)

Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal
protection grounds is subject to one of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of

review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classification utilized and the
nature of the right affected.[30]

If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the

exercise of a "fundamental right," then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the
statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.[31] Over the
years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for
equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage,
national origin, and ancestry.[32] The underlying rationale of this theory is that
where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of
constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken
down.[33] In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the
government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.[34]

On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless
gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a
"quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.
[35] To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important
governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the
justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.[36] Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasisuspect classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.[37]

If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be
tested for mere rationality.[38] This is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the
Court's awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task and an unavoidable one.[39] The presumption is in favor of the
classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate
grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State acted.[40]

Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative

classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has looked to four factors,[41] thus:

(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the
legislation;[42]

(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class
member's ability to contribute to society;[43]

(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond the class

members' control;[44] and

(4) The political power of the subject class.[45]

These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a

suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain weight.[46] The
U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither
required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case.[47] Indeed, no single
talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive
to the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict
scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide.[48]

In any event, the first two factors - history of intentional discrimination and
relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute - have
always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied.[49] They have
been critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding
a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.[50] However, the last two factors immutability of the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group - are
considered simply to supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need
for heightened scrutiny exists.[51]

Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex
or gender - albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis - have been previously held
to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classification on the basis
of sexual orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect
classification that prompts intermediate review.

The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful

unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation.[52] One cannot, in good
faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to

be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual
orientation.[53] Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration for
party-list accreditation in fact state:

6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence perpetuated

against the LGBT Community, among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or guardians to
make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior;

(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch lesbians to be
raped[, so as] to "cure" them into becoming straight women;

(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school, NGOs, and choirs
because of their identity;

(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused admission from (sic)
certain schools, are suspended or are automatically put on probation;

(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits once one's sexual
orientation and gender identity is (sic) revealed;

(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of
age, are broken up by their parents or guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;

(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on gays and
lesbians to "reform" them;

(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric counseling and
therapy to cure them[,] despite the de-listing (sic) of homosexuality and lesbianism
as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;

(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-identity as women
and dress as such, are denied entry or services in certain restaurants and
establishments; and

(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against gay men,
but were not acknowledged by police as hate crimes or violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified that as a
young gay person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of sexual abuse
and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not report to [the] police
[or speak of] to his own parents.

Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden

placed on lesbian and gay people as a class is "more likely than others to reflect
deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective."[54]

A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the

person's ability to contribute to society.[55] Heightened scrutiny is applied when the
classification bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor
indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice.
[56] Insofar as sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health,[57] viz.:

The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person's
ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts have
acknowledged, as well. x x x If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of
impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire
phenomenon of `staying in the [c]loset' and of `coming out' would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. x x x In this critical respect, gay persons
stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasisuspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the
distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or
capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in
society.[58]

Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears

no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society."[59] Indeed,
because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities";[60] the
observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national
origin -all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection"are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy"[61] is no less applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)

Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform

and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation.[62]

A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a
class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is whether
the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise
beyond their control.[63] Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay
persons from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete
group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal
ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex.[64]

Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the

inability of a person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different
treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "`basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility.'"[65] However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor
is not reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is
absolutely impossible to change.[66] That is, the immutability prong of the
suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when the identifying trait is "so central to a
person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for
refusing to change [it]."[67]

Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to

repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory
treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's
identity.[68] Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all]
only at the expense of significant damage to the individual's sense of self,"
classifications based thereon "are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or

quasi-suspect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an
immutable characteristic."[69] Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type
of human trait that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the
barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help.[70]

The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or
politically powerless."[71] However, the political powerlessness factor of the levelof-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness.
[72] Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the group lacks
sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination
through traditional political means."[73]

Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political
progress.[74] The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and
severe - even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to
contribute to or perform in society - that it is highly unlikely that legislative
enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination.[75] Furthermore,
insofar as the LGBT community plays a role in the political process, it is apparent
that their numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority.[76]

It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping.[77]

In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the
intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and
intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected[78] (that is, lesbian, gay,
bisexual and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based
classification undertaken for its own sake cannot survive.[79]

FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the
party-list system because it is not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector"
enumerated either in the Constitution[80] or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941.[81]
However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party

v. COMELEC,[82] where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and

underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.

I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT
community as marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history
(and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my
humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation encompasses
social marginalization as well. To hold otherwise is tantamount to trivializing socially
marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the State's benevolence" and
denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of representative
democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them."[83] The party-list
system could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

Endnotes:
[1] Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: "No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

[2] The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passage
from the Bible to support its holding: "For this cause God gave them up into vile
affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is
against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman,
burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was
meet." (Romans 1:26-27)

[3] The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passages
from the Koran to support its holding:

"For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women: ye are indeed a

people transgressing beyond bounds." (7:81)

 "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the
end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7.84)

"He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief!" (29:30)

[4] Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003).

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

[8] Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

[9] COMELEC's Comment, p. 13.

[10] Id.

[11] See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472.

[12] Id.

[13] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 112 S.Ct.
2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

[14] Ang Ladlad defined "sexual orientation" as a person's capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations
with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
gender." (italics supplied)

[15] Paragraph 24 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration stated, in relevant part:
"In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated at
670,000."

[16] Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, as cited in the
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, infra.

[17] 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841.

[18] Supra note 11.

[19] Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2638, 37 L.Ed.2d
446 (1973); See also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685,
97 S.Ct. 2010, 2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977).

[20] See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 637 (1980); cf.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153, 93 S.Ct., at 726.

[21] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1537, 32 L.Ed.2d 15
(1972).

[22] Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 11.

[23] Id.

[24] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, supra note 13.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Supra note 11.

[28] Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487
Phil. 531, 583 (2004).

[29] Id.

[30] Pace Membership Warehouse, Div. of K-Mart Corp. v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504.

[31] 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 857, citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
108 S. Ct. 1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 9 Ed. Law Rep. 23
(1983); Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997); Baker v. City of
Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1997); Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 282
Mont. 424, 938 P.2d 658 (1997); Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 563
N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1997).

[32] Murray v. State of Louisiana, 2010 WL 334537. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Ford, 112 S.Ct. 2184, 2186 (1992) (holding classification based on religion is a
suspect classification); Graham v. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (1971) (holding
classification based on alienage is a suspect classification); Loving v. Virginia, 87
S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967) (holding classification based on race is a suspect
classification); Oyama v. California, 68 S.Ct. 269, 274-74 (1948) (holding
classification based on national origin is a suspect classification); Hirabayashi v.
U.S., 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943) (holding classification based on ancestry is a suspect
classification).

[33] Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974).

[34] Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S. Ct. 557, 21 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1969); McLaughlin v. State
of Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964).

[35] Supra note 31.

[36] United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d
735, 751 (1996).

[37] Murray v. State of Louisiana, supra note 32. See Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982) (holding classifications based on
gender calls for heightened standard of review); Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S.Ct. 1459,
1463 (1977) (holding illegitimacy is a quasi-suspect classification).

[38] Supra note 31.

[39] Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S. Ct. 1898,
52 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); Costner v. U.S., 720 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.
1983).

[40] Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996); Cornerstone Christian Schools v.
University Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 243 Ed. Law Rep. 609 (5th Cir.
2009); Independent Charities of America, Inc. v. State of Minn., 82 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
1996); Bah v. City of Atlanta, 103 F.3d 964 (11th Cir. 1997).

[41] Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009) citing the following passage from
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1982):

Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as

"suspect." Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.
Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with
the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is
entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to be
irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the
same groups, have historically been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." The experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may
manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our response to that experience is
reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation
imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances
beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or caste" treatment that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.

[42] See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32, 116 S.Ct. at 2274-75, 135
L.Ed.2d at 750 (observing `long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination"
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d
583, 590 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion))); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638,
106 S.Ct. 2727, 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d 527, 533 (1986) (noting subject class had "not
been subjected to discrimination"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432 at 443, 105 S.Ct. at 3256, 87 L.Ed.2d at 332 (mentally retarded not victims of
"continuing antipathy or prejudice"); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313,
96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976) (considering "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 40 (1973))).

[43] See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320
(certain classifications merely "reflect prejudice and antipathy"); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1098
(1982) ("Care must be taken in ascertain-ing whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions."); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. at 2566,
49 L.Ed.2d at 525 (considering whether aged have "been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan,

J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society.").

[44] Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives "do
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as
a discrete group"); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. at 3255-56, 87
L.Ed.2d at 322 (mentally retarded people are different from other classes of people,
"immutably so, in relevant respects"); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct. at 2396, 72
L.Ed.2d at 801 (children of illegal aliens, unlike their parents, have "legal
characteristic[s] over which children can have little control"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 49 L.Ed.2d 651, 660 (1976) (status of
illegitimacy "is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes
not within the control of the illegitimate individual"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93
S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[S]ex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth....").

[45] Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives of
primary household are "not a minority or politically powerless"); Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. at 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d at 324 (refusing to find "that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S.
at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d at 40 (considering whether minority and poor
school children were "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process").

[46] Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289
Conn. 135, 957 A.2d 407 (2008).

[47] Varnum v. Brien, id., citing, among others, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 43334, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882-83, 80 L.Ed.2d 421, 426 (1984) (foregoing analysis of
political power); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2125 n. 11,
53 L.Ed.2d 63, 71 n. 11 (1977) (jettisoning immutability requirement and
scrutinizing classification of resident aliens closely despite aliens' voluntary status
as residents); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505-06, 96 S.Ct. at 2762-63, 49 L.Ed.2d at 66061 (according heightened scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy despite
mutability and political power of illegitimates); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14, 96 S.Ct.
at 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525 (omitting any reference to immutability); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 25, 93 S.Ct. at 1292, 36 L.Ed.2d at 38 (omitting any

reference to immutability); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1770-71, 36

L.Ed.2d at 591-92 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (scrutinizing classification based on
gender closely despite political power of women); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-42 (1971) (foregoing
analysis of immutability); see also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91
L.Ed.2d at 533 (referring to whether members of the class "exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group").

[48] Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall in Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., infra.

[49] Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[53] Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, id.

[54] Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41.

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Supra note 46.

[58] See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct.
3249 (for purposes of federal constitution, mental retardation is not quasi-suspect
classification because, inter alia, "it is undeniable ... that those who are mentally
retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world");
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (age is
not suspect classification because, inter alia, "physical ability generally declines
with age"); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115
L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ("[i]t is an unfortunate fact of life that physical [capacity] and
mental capacity sometimes diminish with age").

[59] L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) 16-33, p. 1616.

[60] Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.Supp. 1543, 1548 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 1985 Resolution of
the American Psychological Association), 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993).

[61] Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249.

[62] Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41.

[66] Id.

[67] Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[68] Id. citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.

[69] Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[70] Id.

[71] Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[72] Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41, citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public
Health, supra note 46.

[73] Id.

[74] Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

[75] Id.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620.

[79] Id.

[80] Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states, in relevant part:

SECTION 5. x x x x

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector. (italics supplied)

[81] On the other hand, Section 5 of RA 7941 provides:

SECTION 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (italics supplied)

[82] G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.

[83] Id.

DISSENTINGOPINION

CORONA, J.:

Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I

believe the basic issue here is simple: does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
qualify, under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the party-list system?

The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks

accreditation by the respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization
of a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding
that petitioner is not a marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on
Elections denied its petition.

A SYSTEM FOR MARGINALIZED

AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS

The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a

tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording
opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the
shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the
proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors
contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nation's
democratic ideals.

But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list
system was designed?

THE TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND OF RA[1] 7941

The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the
fundamental law be consulted. Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the
course of our present inquiry. It provides:

SEC. 5. x x x

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of Representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector. (emphasis supplied)

The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may
qualify as "marginalized" to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law
provides:

Section 2. Declaration of policy. -- The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to

become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

xxxxxxxxx

Section 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen
(15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than
sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The COMELEC may, motu

propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (emphasis
supplied)

THE COURT'S PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS

As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list
system and defined its meaning in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections:[2]

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. x x x

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"
the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and

parties; and
who lack well-defined constituencies; but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to
the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by
the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of

government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with
the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of
the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of
the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the partylist system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may
be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

xxxxxxxxx

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to
treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list
system as representatives of their respective sectors.

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is
that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past - the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

xxxxxxxxx

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the
chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the

law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that
flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every
discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the partylist system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in
the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
professionals and even those in the underground movement who wish to come out
and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized
and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy
although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as
vital to the national interest. That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of
"marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole."

How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national
interest (and therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole) be determined? Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno's opinion[3] in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections[4] offers
valuable insight:

... Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the
major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is
aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making

processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary
social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights
of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions
and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the
indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.

As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to
national interest and therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole because the
Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these sectors in the
nation's life. In other words, the concept of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete
examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition. They are
essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of
specific provisions in the Constitution, namely, labor,[5] peasant,[6] urban poor,[7]
indigenous cultural communities,[8] women,[9] youth,[10] veterans,[11] fisherfolk,
[12] elderly,[13] handicapped,[14] overseas workers[15] and professionals.[16]

The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet
traditionally and historically marginalized sectors promotes the national interest.
The Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.

The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their

respective interests are intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the
national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a
particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine
society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in
governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say
something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their
traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.

A UNIFYING THREAD

Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise of
its function as official interpreter of the Constitution, the Court should always bear
in mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe the Constitution
from what appears upon its face.[17]

With regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and underrepresented

sectors under the party-list system, Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." On the other hand, the law speaks of "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."[18]

Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and

underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941)
cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the
Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party's eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties,
sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941."[19]

For this reason, I submit the majority's decision is cryptic and wanting when it
makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner:

The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether
a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-tocase basis not tethered to the enumeration of the Constitution and of RA 7941
invites the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless firmly anchored on the
fundamental law and the implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship
floating aimlessly in the ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves of flux
and tipped by shifting winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups.
Surely, the Constitution and RA 7941 did not envision such kind of a system.

Indeed, the significance of the enumeration in Section 5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is clearly explained in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party:

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to
the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by
the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

xxxxxxxxx

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the partylist system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with

which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may
be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.[20]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

More importantly, in defining the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3(d) of RA

7941 limits "marginalized and underrepresented sectors" and expressly refers to the
list in Section 5 thereof:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. -- x x x

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector, x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA

7941. (Its charges of violation of non-establishment of religion, equal protection,
free speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed resolutions of the
Commission on Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must
rise or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.

Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with
established rules of statutory construction and the Court's pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the
party list system is limited and qualified. Hence, other sectors that may qualify as
marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to the sectors
mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system refer only
to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and
other related or similar sectors.

This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the

fundamental law and of its implementing statute. It is coherent with the mandate of
the Constitution that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list
system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may
be provided by law" duly enacted by Congress. It is also consistent with the basic

canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general

word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.[21] Moreover, it reins in the subjective
elements of passion and prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral
or religious implications as it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue
policy-making.

What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system? What are the family
resemblances that would characterize them?[22]

Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the
pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT,
the following factors are significant:

(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;

(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically regarded
as vital to the national interest but they have long been relegated to the fringes of
society and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national
policy;

(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of sectors
to those expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 is a constitutional provision
specifically recognizing the special significance of the said sectors (other than
people's organizations, unless such people's organizations represent sectors
mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941)[23] to the advancement of the national interest
and

(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have regional or
national presence to ensure that their interests and agenda will be beneficial not
only to their respective sectors but, more importantly, to the nation as a whole.

FOR PURPOSES OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,

PETITIONER IS NOT A MARGINALIZED SECTOR

In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a marginalized

and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. However, the Commission
on Elections disagrees.

The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the

contentious issues of morality, religion, equal protection, and freedom of expression
and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules that
petitioner is a qualified marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing
its accreditation and participation in the party-list system.

I disagree.

Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly
considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not
included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the
LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed,
petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it
represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and
agenda.

Second, petitioner's interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of

its members' sexual orientation as a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an
interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest.
At best, petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual
orientation on the national human rights agenda. However, an emergent awareness
is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition.[24] Moreover,
even the majority admits that there is no "clear cut consensus favorable to gay
rights claims."[25]

Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It lacks
the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that
specifically recognizes the LGBT sector as specially significant to the national
interest. This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary link of
a particular sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.

Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the promotion
of the LGBT agenda and "gay rights" as a national policy as beneficial to the nation
as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from extensively invoking
foreign practice and international conventions rather than Philippine laws) states:

We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims....[26]

This is so unlike the significance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA

7941 which are, without doubt, indisputable.

Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court
can only apply and interpret the Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to create
policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political
departments if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread
on the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.

In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law
instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and
fidelity to the Court's duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that
only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system. That is the
tenor of the Court's rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT. As
there is no strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a
similar conclusion in this case.

The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering
to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors
as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to
amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation.
The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine "such
other [marginalized] sectors" qualified to participate in the party-list system to
Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and
other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress' determination on the
matter is proper.

A FINAL WORD

To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner's claim
of discriminatory and oppressive acts against its members. I am in no position to
make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or
to access our political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the
interests of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and other moral issues
may change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens
that its view of such matters is the best.[27] But persuading one's fellow citizens is
one thing and insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is something
else. Considering the facts, the law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly
insist on its entitlement to use the party-list system as a vehicle for advancing its
social and political agenda.

While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given
no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has
a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors
whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation's but which interests
have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors'
underrepresentation.

Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court's task is to respect
that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly
expand such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an
act of political will and not of judicial judgment.

Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.

Endnotes:
[1] Republic Act.

[2] 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

[3] The Chief Justice's stance is the official stance of the Court on the matter
because majority of the members of the Court sided with him on the issue of
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.

[4] G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258-259.

[5] Section 18, Article II; Section 3, Article XIII.

[6] Section 21, Article II; Section 4, Article XIII.

[7] Section 9, Article II; Section 10, Article XIII.

[8] Section 22, Article II; Section 5, Article XII.

[9] Section 14, Article II; Section 14, Article XIII.

[10] Section 13, Article II; Section 3(2), Article XV.

[11] Section 7, Article XVI.

[12] Paragraph three of Section 2, Article XII, Section 7, Article XIII.

[13] Section 11, Article XIII.

[14] Sections 11 and 13 XIII.

[15] Section 18, Article II; Section 3, Article XIII.

[16] Section 14, Article XII.

[17] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.83896, 22 February 1991,
194 SCRA 317, 337.

[18] See proviso of the first paragraph of Section 5, RA 7941.

[19] Supra note 2 at 342.

[20] Supra note 2.

[21] Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999).

[22] The notion of family resemblances (familienhnlichkeit) was introduced by the

leading analytic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his book Philosophical
Investigations. As used in this opinion, however, family resemblances specifically
refer to the DNA, the basic component unit, that identifies a sector as a member of
the family of marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.

[23] The reason behind this exception is obvious. If all people's organizations are
automatically considered as marginalized and underrepresented, then no sector or
organization may be disqualified on the grounds of non-marginalization and lack of
underrepresentation. The Court's guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
would have been unnecessary after all and, worse, the constitutional requirement
that the sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system be determined by
law would have been merely superfluous and pointless.

[24] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), (Scalia, J., dissenting).

[25] Decision, p. 23.

[26] Id.

[27] Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 29 (J. Scalia, dissenting).

SEPARATE OPINION

ABAD, J.:

I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the same conclusion following a
different path.

I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more
about what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the
party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming
overnight proliferation of sectoral parties.

The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a
direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[1] the Court laid down guidelines for
accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can
pass for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.

Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for
sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for
it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly
discussed this point.

What I am more concerned about is COMELEC's claim in its comment on the petition
that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not marginalized and underrepresented
since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors specified in the
Constitution and in R.A. 7941.[2] Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a
marginalized and underrepresented group of people like those representing labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. This is
effectively the COMELEC's frame of mind in adjudicating applications for
accreditation.

But, the COMELEC's proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is

inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of
Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court's reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the
COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941
is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of
society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and
underrepresented in general.

As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the identity
of the sectors that will make up the party-list system is found in the examples it
gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural
minorities, the women, and the youth segments of society. Section 5(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution provides:

(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." (Underscoring supplied.)

Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in
Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard for screening and identifying those who
may qualify for the party-list system. Thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in

the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied.)

The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or

organizations x x x lack well defined political constituencies x x x who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as the
Court said in Ang Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining

whether the party seeking accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and

underrepresented."[3]

Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term "marginalized and
underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong
Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in
adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term--marginalized and
underrepresented--from its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution
itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the
labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women,
and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by
examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987
Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.

For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an
elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a gathering of "animals." Here, it
looked at the samples of qualified groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural minorities, women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes
through them all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the
"marginalized and underrepresented."

So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The

examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women,
and youth) should be the starting point in any search for definition. Congress has
added six others to this list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the
veterans, the overseas workers, and the professionals.[4] Thus, the pertinent
portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides:

Sec. 5. Registration. - x x x Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified

parties, it should be evident that they represent the working class (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically
deprived (urban poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the
vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans).

This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are
marginalized and underrepresented.

The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just
lobby or interest groups. They must have an authentic identity that goes beyond
mere similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their
members belong to the same industry, speak the same dialect, have a common
hobby or sport, or wish to promote public support for their mutual interests. The
group should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting
basic human rights as these apply to their groups. This is in keeping with the
statutory objective of sharing with them seats in the House of Representatives so
they can take part in enacting beneficial legislation.

It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941
merely provide by examples a sense of what the qualified organizations should look
like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not
exclusive. For instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because
they advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the
extreme left of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants,
as qualified sectors.

Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather
than a specific definition of the class of people they seek to represent. For example,
the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower definition than the broad and
more abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more specific and
concrete definition like "carpenters," "security guards," "microchips factory
workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor"
group. See the other illustrations below.

Broad Definition
*Narrow Definition
Specifically Defined Groups
Working Class
Labor
Carpenters, security guards, microchip factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers

Economically Deprived
Urban Poor
Informal settlers, the jobless, persons displaced by domestic wars
The Vulnerable
Women
Working women, battered women, victims of slavery
Work Impaired
Handi- Capped
Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on wheelchairs

*The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.

Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A.
7941 for the party-list system is the second, the narrow definition of the sector that
the law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is
that, if any of the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the
microchips factory workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within
the sector desires to apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete
with other sub-groups for the seat allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of
Representatives. This is the apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.

An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek

election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in
the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will
defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough
votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle
drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the
legislature.

In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in
the party-list system must state if they are to be considered as national, regional, or
sectoral parties. Thus:

Sec. 5. Registration. - Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, x x x.

This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors
provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-list
applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural minorities)
or a national presence (all the rest).

The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces,
cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group representing the sugar plantation workers
of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not represent the
inherently national character of the labor sector.

Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim
that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It
must present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history,
authenticity, advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject
those who put up building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of
sectoral presence so they can get through the door of Congress without running for
a seat in a regular legislative district.

In sum, to qualify for accreditation:

One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and
underrepresented," exemplified by the working class, the service class, the
economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or
some such similar class of persons.

Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine
issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.

Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as
shown above. If such party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with
other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.

Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent
regional or national presence.

And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party
applying for accreditation must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.

In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the
universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a
certain kind,[5] the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite
this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the
mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang
Ladlad's petition on religious and moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.

Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have
been documented. At home, effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical
abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of
behavior, while lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived affliction.
LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are suspended and put on
probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or benefits
which are otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is
bigotry for their group.

Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party
accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the
youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a
concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay
beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a
national presence.

The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are
our brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who have suffered in silence all these
years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance
or acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a
marginalized and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement
in crafting legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity
for true and effective representation which is the very essence of our party-list
system.

For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Endnotes:
[1] 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

[2] Comment, pp. 2-6.

[3] "In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who
are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino style." Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission
on Elections, supra note 1, at 334.

[4] Section 5. Registration.--x x x Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

[5] http://www.aglbical.org/2STATS.htm.

[G.R. No. 191998, December 07 : 2010] WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO.
192769] LIZA L. MAZA AND SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JUAN MIGUEL

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 191998, December 07 : 2010]

WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 192769]

LIZA L. MAZA AND SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 192832]

BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY TEODORO CASINO, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO OF ANG GALING
PINOY PARTY-LIST, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the three (3) consolidated[1] special civil actions for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition that commonly aim to disqualify respondent Juan Miguel
"Mikey" Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May
10, 2010 elections.

The Factual Antecedents

The common factual antecedents, gathered from the pleadings, are briefly
summarized below.

On November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently,
on March 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the
Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.[2]

On March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807[3]which prescribed
the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for
purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.[4]

Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees
must submit documentary evidence[5] to duly prove that the nominees truly belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It likewise provides
that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups and nominees to
make the required documentary submissions, if not already complied with prior to
the effectivity of the Resolution, not later than three (3) days from the last day of
filing of the list of nominees.[6]

Under Section 10 of the same Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio effect the
disqualification of party-list nominees who violate any of the limitations mentioned
in Section 7 of the Resolution.[7] Section 8 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure also states that the COMELEC may cancel motu proprio the registration of
any party registered under the party-list system for failure to comply with applicable
laws, rules or regulations of the Commission. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
8646,[8] in relation to Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, the deadline for submitting

the requirements mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was on March 29,
2010.[9]

On March 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna
Party-List, represented by Teodoro Casio, (collectively referred to as certiorari
petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification[10] against Arroyo,
pursuant to Resolution No. 8696,[11] in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941[12] (the Party-List System Act).[13]

The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization
factually and truly represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the
nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this regard the case of
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC[14] . On this basis, the certiorari
petitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP
represents - tricycle drivers and security guards - because he is not only a member
of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of
Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the House's Energy Committee; and, (c) a
member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture,
Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security,
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.[15]

In his Answer, Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over
issues involving the qualifications of party-list nominees; Section 9 of RA 7941
merely requires that the party-list nominee must be a bonafide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election.[16]

When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the May 10, 2010 elections
with their respective Nominees," Arroyo was listed as AGPP's first nominee.

On March 30, 2010, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Neri
Colmenares, filed with the COMELEC another petition for disqualification against
Arroyo.[17] It alleged that Arroyo is not qualified to be a party-list nominee because
he (a) does not represent or belong to the marginalized and underrepresented

sector; (b) has not been a bona fide member of AGPP ninety (90) days prior to the
May 10, 2010 elections; (c) is a member of the House of Representatives; and that
(d) AGPP is not a legitimate and qualified party-list group and has no authority to
nominate him.[18]

In his Answer, Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over
cases involving the qualifications of party-list nominees. He stated as well that he is
a bonafide member of AGPP at least ninety (90) days prior to the elections.[19]

Meanwhile, on April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales
(mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting for
a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance with Section
6 of Resolution No. 8807. On the same day, the COMELEC Law Department replied
that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence
required by Resolution No. 8807.[20]

Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested the
COMELEC and its Law Department to act, consistently with Section 10 of Resolution
No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP for their failure
to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807.[21] They also
wrote the COMELEC on April 20, 2010, reiterating their letter-request dated April 7,
2010. The COMELEC failed to respond to both letters.[22]

The CQMELEC Second Division Ruling

In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo.[23] It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941
merely requires the nominee to be "a bona fide member [of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the elections."[24]It found that Arroyo (a) became a member of the party
on November 20, 2009; (b) actively participated in the undertakings of AGPP and
adhered to its advocacies; and, (c) actively supported and advanced the projects
and programs of the AGPP by regularly attending its meetings, livelihood and skills
program, and farmers' day activities.[25]

The COMELEC en banc Ruling

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division's ruling in its July
19, 2010 consolidated resolution.[26] It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in
order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and must likewise be at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.[27] The COMELEC en banc also held that
Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is
not found in RA 7941.[28] Thus, it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the
requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.[29]

On May 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners filed with this Court their Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction,[30] docketed as G.R. No. 191998.[31] They sought to compel
the COMELEC to disqualify motu proprio the AGPP nominees for their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from
giving due course to the AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On July 23 and 29, 2010, the certiorari petitioners elevated their case to this Court
via two (2) separate petitions for certiorari,[32] docketed as G.R. Nos.
192769[33]and 192832,[34] to annul the COMELEC Second Division's

May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC en banc's July 19, 2010 consolidated
resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPP's
nominee.

In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage
of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP's first
nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives.[35]

On July 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPP's duly-elected party-list representative in the House of
Representatives.[36] On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP's
Representative, before Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes. His name
was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.[38]

On July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto[39] were filed
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo's
eligibility as AGPP's representative in the House of Representatives. On September
7, 2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing
Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.[40]

The Petitions

The mandamus petitioners in G.R. No. 191998 argue that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in failing to order the motu proprio
disqualification of AGPP despite its failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807; and, (b) in giving due course
to the participation of AGPP and its nominees in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On the other hand, the certiorari petitioners in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832
contend in common that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in
failing to disqualify Arroyo as AGPP's nominee since: (1) he does not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he claims to represent; (2) he is not a
bona fide AGPP member for at least ninety (90) days preceding the May 10, 2010
elections; (3) in light of these preceding reasons, he would not be able to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislations for the sector he seeks
to represent; and (4) his nomination and acceptance of nomination as AGPP's
nominee violate AGPP's continuing undertaking upon which its petition for
registration and accreditation was based and granted.

In G.R. No. 192832, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the Court:
(a) direct the COMELEC en banc to review all its decisions in cases for
disqualification of nominees and cancellation of registration of party-list groups filed
in the May 10, 2010 elections, as well as those which have not been resolved, in line
with the eight-point guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani;[41] and (b) order
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Elias
R. Yusoph to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for their open
defiance of the Court's Decisions in Ang Bagong Bayani[42] and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC.[43]

The Case for the Respondents

In G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832, Arroyo counter-argues that the petitions should be
dismissed outright because upon his proclamation, oath and assumption to office as
a duly elected member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction over issues
relating to his qualifications now lies with the HRET as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives.

Similarly, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), prays for
the dismissal of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 for lack of jurisdiction
in view of Arroyo's proclamation and assumption to office as a Member of the House
of Representatives.

Despite notice, the OSG failed to comment on the G.R. No. 191998 petition.

We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of the parties' submissions.

Issues

The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to
disqualify AGPP's nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2)
whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPP's
participation in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPP's votes, and
proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question
of Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his proclamation and assumption
to office as a member of the House of Representatives.

Our Ruling

We dismiss the petitions.

For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners
must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent.

In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition
that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807
(quoted below), any interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against a party-list nominee:

Section 2. Grounds for Disqualification. - Any nominee (a) who does not possess all
the qualifications of a nominee as provided for by the Constitution, existing laws or
(b) who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a nominee.

Section 4. When to file Petition. - The petition under item (a) of Section 2 shall be
filed five (5) days after the last day for filing of the list of nominees, while under
item (b) thereof shall be filed any day not later than the date of proclamation.

Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any interested party may file a verified
complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list organization:

SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The COMELEC may motu

proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" that
the mandamus petitioners should have taken. Specifically, they should have filed
the proper petition for disqualification, pursuant to Section 2(b) of Resolution No.
8807, any day not later than the date of proclamation.

As to the remedy of filing a complaint for cancellation of registration, we note that

neither Section 6 of RA 7941 nor Section 8, Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure specifies the period within which a complaint for cancellation of
registration should be filed. Whether or not the mandamus petitioners can still file a
petition for cancellation of AGPP's registration at this point in time, however, is a
question we are not prepared to rule upon; in fact, we need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

We note that in lieu of filing the above formal petition that Resolution No. 8807 and
RA 7941 provide, the mandamus petitioners opted to confine themselves to writing
letters to ask the COMELEC to act in accordance with

Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807. While these moves are technically objections to
Arroyo and to the AGPP's registration, they cannot in any way be considered formal
petitions for disqualification, unlike the present petition which is a formal petition
(whose clear intent is similarly to disqualify Arroyo), Unfortunately for the
mandamus petitioners, a petition for mandamus is not the correct remedy under the
circumstances as the immediately applicable remedy is a petition for
disqualification or for cancellation filed with the COMELEC, as pointed out above.

In filing the present petition, the mandamus petitioners also violated the rule on the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts.[44] While this is not an ironclad rule as it admits of
exceptions,[45] the mandamus petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions
apply. The filing of a petition for mandamus with this Court, therefore, was
premature. It bears stressing that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, may be
used only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are
powerless to afford relief.[46]

Thus, we find the mandamus aspect of G.R. No. 191998 improperly filed under the
standards of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Even the substantive merits of the mandamus petition in G.R. No. 191998, i.e., its
patent intent to disqualify Arroyo, fail to persuade for the reasons more fully
discussed below, in relation with the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and
192832.

As to the prohibition aspect of G.R. No. 191998 - i.e., to prevent the COMELEC from
canvassing AGPP's votes, and from proclaiming it a winner - we find that this has
been mooted by the supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP
after it secured the required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections. The
prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in
light of the supervening events. A moot case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration

thereon (in this case, the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done.
Under the circumstances, we have to recognize the futility of the petition and to
dismiss it on the ground of mootness since we cannot provide the mandamus
petitioners any substantial relief.[47]

We move on to the principal issue raised by the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos.
192769 and 192832 - whether jurisdiction over Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP
nominee should now properly be with the HRET since Arroyo has been proclaimed
and has assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,[48] the Court said:

This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The
consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. In Abayon
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court said:

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
"members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x
x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is
the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or

organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar

party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to
which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives" thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in

the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the
House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote
for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

The Court also held in the same case that:

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bonafide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent." It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee - the need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the
facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo
and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that
they presumably embody.

xxxx

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Similarly applicable is our ruling in Perez v. Commission on Elections[49] where we

acknowledged that the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility
of the private respondent who was already a member of the House of
Representatives. We said:

As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was
decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10 1998 The following day,
May II, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private
respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16,1998 and had taken his oath of
office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22,
1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not
be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed.
The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the

proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner's

action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on
June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of
Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI,
17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private
respondent's ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.[50]

In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPP's first nominee, has already
been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions for quo
warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the HRET. Thus, following the lead of
Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present
petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
rule upon Arroyo's qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

In light of these conclusions, we see no need to further discuss the other issues
raised in the certiorari petitions.

WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 191998 for

prematurity and mootness. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 are
likewise DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
[*]On official leave, per Special Order No. 916 dated November 24, 2010.

[1] Per our October 12, 2010 Resolution.

[2] Rollo (GR. No. 192769), p. 106.

[3] Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List

Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections. [4] Rollo (GR. No. 192769), p. 107. [5] Which may include but not
limited to the following:
Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the
nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;

Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/s showing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);

Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bonafide member of the party-list group/
organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and

In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized

and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of
the party-list/organization but is/are also a bonafide member/s of said marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

[6] COMELEC Resolution No. 8646 provides that March 26, 2010 is the last day for
party-list groups to submit the names of the party's nominees.

[7]Section 7. Limitations to party-list nominations. - The following are the limitations

to the list of nominees filed by a registered party.
A person may be nominated by one (1) party in one (1) list only;
Only persons who have given their consent in writing and under oath may be
named in the list;
The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office in the same election,
or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately-preceding election; and
No change of name or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
list has been submitted to the Commission, except in valid substitution.

[8] Calendar of Activities and Periods of Prohibited Acts in Connection with the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections.

[9] Supra note 6.

[10] Docketed as SPA No. 10-001 (DCN).

[11] Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections, promulgated on November 11, 2009.

[12] Entitled "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through
the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."

[13] Rollo (G.R. No.192769), p. 38.

[14] G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.

[15] Rollo (GR. No. 192769), p. 38.

[16] Id. at 39.

[17] Docketed as SPA No. 10-003 (DCN).

[18] Rollo (G.R. No. 192832), pp. 55-56.

[19] Id. at 56.

[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 191998), p. 6.

[21] Ibid

[22 ]Id. at 6-7.

[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), pp. 37-43.

[24 ]Hat 41-42.

[25] Id. at 42-43.

[26 ]Id. at 60-88. The Consolidated Resolution was penned by Commissioner

Nicodemo Ferrer; and concurred in by Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph, Lucenito N.
Tagle and Armando C. Velasco; while Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal dissented. Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, on the other hand,
abstained from voting.

[27 ]Id, at 71.

[28] Ibid.

[29 ]Id. at 72.

[30] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

[31 ]Rollo (G.R. No. 191998), pp. 3-15.

[32] Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

[33 ]Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), pp. 3-34.

[34] Rollo (G.R. No. 192832), pp. 3-50.

[35] Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 125. Proclamation dated July 21, 2010, Annex "1" of
Arroyo's Comment.

[36] On May 31, 2010, the COMELEC issued NBC Resolution No. 10-009, proclaiming
AGPP as one of the winning party-list organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections,
having obtained 269,009 votes and entitled
to
one
(1)
seat
in
the
House
of
Representatives.
See
http://comelee.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/nbc_res_IO-009.pdf (last visited
November 19, 2010).

[37] Id. at 126. Oath of Office dated July 21, 2010, Annex "2" of Arroyo's Comment.

[38] Id. at 127. Certification dated July 21, 2010, Annex "3" of Arroyo's Comment.

[39 ]Id. at 108. HRET Case No. 10-060, entitled uRisa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Petitioner v. Juan Miguel 'Mikey' Arroyo, Respondent," and HRET Case No. 10-061,
entitled "Danilo Antipasado, Petitioner v. Juan 'Mikey'Arroyo andAngGatingPinoy,
Respondents."

[40] Ibid.

[41]Supra note 14.

[42]Ibid.

[43] GR.No. 179295, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA211.

[44 ]Republic of the Phils, v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 424 Phil. 372, 399
(2002).

[45] These exceptions are:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 573.)

[46] ACWS, Ltd. v. Dumlao, 440 Phil. 787, 803 (2002).

[47] Quizon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008, 545
SCRA 635, 640.

[48]G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010.

[49] 375 Phil. 1106(1999).

[500]Id. at 1115-1116.

EN BANC
G.R. NO. 203766 : April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC,Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President
Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas
Kida, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
(ARARO), Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST,
represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party's Secretary
General, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 204002

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly
PGBI, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its
Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC,Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as
AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General,
Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua
Causing, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,
President, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet"
Martin, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204158

ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S.

BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND
ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva,
Jr., Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC,Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH
(GREENFORCE), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented
by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204321

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C.
Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante
Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA,Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its
President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS
(AAMA),Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its
Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT
KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T.
Tuazon, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204374

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle
Lorenz, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER,
JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner, v.COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary
General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE
(PACYAW), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol,
Jr., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING
FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE
COMMISSION, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALAEH),Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT
S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC
Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204428

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella,
Jr.,Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T.
Suplico, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo,Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(ALONA), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st
KABAGIS), Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20
November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

chanroble svirtualawlibrary

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R. NO.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC

Division's resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng
Sining (ASIN)

- The "artists" sector is not

considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers
Savings and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be
considered marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)

- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)

- Failure of the nominees to

qualify: although registering
as a regional political party,
two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay

- Failure of the group to show

Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

that its nominees belong to

the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya
(AAB)

- Failure to represent a
marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7

204436

12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo
Party (AI)

- Failure to show that the

party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of
Organizations,
Networks and Associations of
the Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)

- Failure to establish that the

group can represent 14
sectors; - The sectors of homeowners'
associations, entrepreneurs
and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Division's resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)

- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
- Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

10 204402

12-061 (PP)

Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)

- The group reflects an

advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11 204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

- Failure to prove
membership base and track
record;
- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and
- The nominees do not belong
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12 204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa
Pinoy (PPP)

- Failure to show that the

group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and

- Failure to show a track

record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to
uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 20
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These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941
and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the
following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

G.R. NO.

SPP
No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1

20381819

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum,
Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and

- The party failed to file its

Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural Concerns
(ARC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United
Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
- The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.

Cancelled registration
- The party is a military
fraternity;

20426

12-257
(PLM)

(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)

- The sector of community

volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

Blessed
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)

Cancelled registration
- Three of the seven
nominees do not belong to
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)

Cancelled registration
- The sector of rural energy
consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The party's track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10 203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of
Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

11 204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party
( AT )

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The incumbent

representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230
12 203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural and
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
and urban poor sectors that
the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

13 204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)

Cancelled registration
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14 203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig
ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;

and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)

Cancelled registration
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

16 204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at
Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

17 204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True
Marcos Loyalist
(for God,
Country and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18 204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor Youth
Advancement
and Welfare
( PA C YAW )

Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and

- The nominees are not

members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)

Cancelled registration
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20 203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng
mga Nakulong
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

21 204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing
Pinoy (AG)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22 204094

12-185

Alliance for

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)

accreditation
- Failure to represent an
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for

the Environment
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24 204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K
Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25 204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League
of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party's
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and

- Three of the nominees do

not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of
Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)

Cancelled registration
- The sector it represents is a
specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
registration under the party-list system; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27 204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)

Cancelled registration
- The nominees are
disqualified from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28 204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of
Bicolnon Party
(ABP)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction
industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29 204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party
List (BAYANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of

professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura
Natin Isulong
(AANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party's nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31 204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng
Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are members of the
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona
fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

32 204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

33 204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod
Party-List
(ABANG
LINGKOD)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to establish a track
record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34 204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood for Active
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation - Failure to show that the
party is actually able to
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35 204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng
mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party receives
assistance from the
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

36 204356

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers
Party (BUTIL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that the

agriculture and cooperative

sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party's nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat ng
Bayan
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
(1st
KABAGIS)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
- Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38 204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United
Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party's nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39 204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM),
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of
Senior Citizens
in the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

Cancelled registration
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had a term-sharing
agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS)
were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of
these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

G.R. NO.

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(APEC)

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(AKMA-PTM)

203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)

204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

12-229

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

(PLM)

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.

(BANTAY)

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)

204263

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

204239

12-060

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

(PLM)

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social Movement for Active Reform and

Transparency (SMART)

204356

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455

12-041

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

(PLM)

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(1AAAP)

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

204436

12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484

11-002

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)
The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether
the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However,

since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC
in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or
her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions
on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the
party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which
sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that
certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation
No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as

"sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors.
And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14
sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become
because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had
the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there
are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that
sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid
these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats
for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party
list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative
of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization
or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties,
organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that
list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in
Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the
votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does not have to be a political party
and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of
the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the
party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can
get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to
submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the
National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us
say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party gets 2 1/2
percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned
among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide
gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts,
we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has
a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a
party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they
should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the
Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will
have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups
or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were

always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system
though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from
any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties.
My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they
can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can
prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from
running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or
isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter
are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not
the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." 53
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In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As
clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
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The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution
took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20
per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by
some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive
that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing
babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately
gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system
for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections).
The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that
the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further
whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors
which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal
for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups,
was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved
seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the
multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended
the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes
that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not
compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
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Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive
terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively
for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for
sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half
of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
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Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941
further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a
political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
andprofessionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not
even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may
"lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel
the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
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(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

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(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

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(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or
require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and
underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
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The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
thesectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House
of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party
system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will
have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will
also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend
sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in
the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties
under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy
of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the
House of Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that
"the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified
major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistencyin Ang
Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly
prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral
wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating
in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent
party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose
members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will
facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so
as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major
political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the partylist system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral
wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition.
This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a
special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang
Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list
system:
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First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." x x x.
xxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:
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"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

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(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

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(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
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"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
abona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, 60abandoning even
the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major
political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system
through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61The
experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list
system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must
now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list
system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT,
this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation
which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not

declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this
purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the
COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
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1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because
as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of

petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging
in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status
Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they
shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted
mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

Under Rule 64 in relation to Rules 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 1079-1080.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204094), pp. 176-177.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204141), pp. 145-148.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 203766), unpaginated.
Id.
Id.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204379), pp. 26-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
8

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204455), pp. 38-55; rollo (G.R. NO. 204426), pp. 127-144. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting; Commissioner Armando C.
Velasco also concurred except for Ala-Eh.
9

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204435), pp. 47-55. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
10

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204367), pp. 30-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
11

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204370), pp. 37-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
12

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204436), pp. 45-57. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
13

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204485), pp. 42-49. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and
Elias R. Yusoph dissenting. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
14

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204139), pp. 505-512. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
15

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204402), pp. 22-33. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.
16

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204394), pp. 59-62. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
17

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Rollo, (G.R. NO. 204490), pp. 71-78. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and
Rene V. Sarmiento concurred but took no part in Ang Ating Damayan. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
18

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Rollo, (G.R. NO. 204484), pp. 42-45. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
19

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PBB's petition is docketed as G.R. NO. 204484 before this Court, and as SPP No. 11-002 before the
COMELEC.
20

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In the Matter of Clarifying the Inclusion in the Party-List Raffle of New Groups Denied Accreditation but
were Able to Obtain a Status Quo Ante Order from the Supreme Court.
21

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(2) To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for purposes of determining
their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong
Bayani case, and, if non-compliant, cancel the registration of the following:
22

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(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited and will participate in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has not passed upon the grant of their
respective Petitions for Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of Registered Party-List
Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and which have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections. (Boldface and italics in the original)
23

412 Phil. 308 (2001).

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Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 83-87. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
24

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 203766), pp. 75-99; rollo (G.R. NO. 203981), pp. 47-70; rollo (G.R. NO. 204002), pp. 5376; (G.R. NO. 204318), pp. 23-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
25

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Rollo, (G.R. NO. 204100), pp. 52-67; rollo (G.R. NO. 204122), pp. 36-51; rollo (G.R. NO. 204263), pp.
28-43. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco. Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
26

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 203960), pp. 61-68. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no
part.
27

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 203922), pp. 92-101. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned a
Separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
28

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204174), pp. 158-164. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but did not
sign. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned an extended opinion.
29

Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203976), pp. 21-37. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph
also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
30

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204240), pp. 47-69; rollo (G.R. NO. 203936), pp. 128-150; rollo (G.R. NO. 204126), pp.
51-73; rollo (G.R. NO. 204364), pp. 34-56; rollo (G.R. NO. 204141), pp. 31-53; rollo (G.R. NO. 204408),
pp. 46-68; rollo (G.R. NO. 204153), pp. 24-46; rollo (G.R. NO. 203958), pp. 26-48. Signed by Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle. Armando C. Velasco.
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but
inhibited in KAKUSA. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
31

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204428), pp. 35-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor but was on official business at
the time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
32

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204094), pp. 30-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
33

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Rollo, (G.R. NO. 204239), pp. 25-42; rollo (G.R. NO. 204236), pp. 57-74; rollo (G.R. NO. 204341), pp.
29-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
34

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204358), pp. 140-148. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
35

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204359), pp. 42-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S.
Lim also concurred but was on official business at the time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
36

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204238), pp. 54-58. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
37

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204323), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
38

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204321), pp. 43-51. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
39

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204125), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C.
Velasco was on official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
40

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204216), pp. 23-28. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Christian
Robert S. Lim penned a separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official
business.
41

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204220), pp. 39-44. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
42

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204158), pp. 59-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
43

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204374), pp. 36-41. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
44

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204356), pp. 56-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
45

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204486), pp. 42-47. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
46

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204410), pp. 63-67. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle penned a
Dissenting Opinion and joined by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph. Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
47

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204421), pp. 43-50; rollo (G.R. NO. 204425), pp. 21-28. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
48

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49

50

51

52

53

54

G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.

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II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 566-567 (1 August 1986).

II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986).

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II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986), 256-257 (25 July 1986).
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 257 (25 July 1986).
412 Phil. 347, 350 (2001).

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Party-List System: The Philippine Experience, Fritzie Palma Tangkia and Ma. Araceli Basco Habaradas,
Ateneo School of Government and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Philippine Office, April 2001,
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50076.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).
55

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Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
56

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date
it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis supplied)
57

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The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSDB) classifies the population into three income groups: the
high income, the middle income, and the low income group. See Table 2. Annual Family Income of the Low,
Middle, and High Income Classes: 1997, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/papers/contributed
%20papers/cps-12/cps12-01.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).
58

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59

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 provides in part:

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x x x For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x.
60

G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258 citing CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.

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61

62

Id. at 251.

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Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:
The party-list system is primarily a Tool for social justice.
I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and underrepresented of
this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and regional parties or organizations to
invade what is and should be constitutionally and statutorily protected space. What the ponencia fails to
appreciate is that the party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not
about mere political plurality, but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.
The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was not done in a vacuum. It
comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still is struggling to come to terms with much
social injustice that has been perpetrated over centuries against a majority of its people by foreign invaders
and even by its own governments.

This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled during the Martial Law
years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus,
any reading of the 1987 Constitution must be appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose. As
stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:
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A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the frames of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.1 (Emphasis supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is apropos since it is a document that
not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To harken to the words of Cecilia Muos-Palma,
President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
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THE PRESIDENT: My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:

xxx

xxx

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xxx

My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in favor of the Constitution drafted by this
Constitutional Commission because I believe that the document is a worthy and inspiring legacy we can
hand down to the Filipino people of today, tomorrow, and for posterity.
The reason I will give have been given by most of the Members of this Constitutional Commission this
evening. But permit me to restate them just to stress the reason why I am voting in favor.
For the first time in the history of constitution- making in our country, we set forth in clear and positive
terms in the Preamble which is the beacon light of the new Charter, the noble goal to establish a just and
humane society. This must be so because at present we have to admit that there are so few with so much
and so many with so little. We uphold the Rule of Law where no man is above the law, and we adhere to the
principles of truth, justice, freedom, equality, love and peace. Yes, for the first time and possibly this is the
first Constitution where "love" is enshrined. This is most significant at this period in our national life when
the nation is bleeding under the forces of hatred and violence, brothers fighting against brothers, Filipinos
torturing and killing their own countrymen. Without love, there can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of government with three branches each
independent and coequal of each affording a check and balance of powers. Sovereignty resides in the
people.
xxx

xxx

xxx

For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only Constitution which provides for the creation of a
Commission on Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of investigating violations of civil and
political right by any party or groups and recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter also sets forth
quite lengthily provisions on economic, social and cultural rights spread out in separate articles such as the
Articles on Social Justice, Education and Declaration of Principles. It is a document which in clear and in
unmistakable terms reaches out to the underprivileged, the paupers, the sick, the elderly, disabled, veterans
and other sectors of society. It is a document which opens an expanded improved way of life for the

farmers, the workers, fishermen, the rank and file of those in service in the government. And that is why I
say that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of the new Charter.2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good."3 As explained by this Court:
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Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of
effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims
"equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in
Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality .
There is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort
towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Cur present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized
groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in
life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.
Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.4(Emphasis supplied)
This is also why the 1987 Constitution is replace with other social justice provisions, including Sections 9,
10, 13, 14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5 (1) (2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5,
6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of Article XII, and Article XIII. As aptly pointed out by Commissioner Guingona in his
sponsorship speech for the approval of the entire draft of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was the
underlying philosophy of the drafters when crafting the provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:
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MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution which is reflective of the spirit of our time a
spirit of nationalism, a spirit of liberation, a spirit of rising expectations.
On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and women from different walks of life with
diverse backgrounds and orientations, even with conflicting convictions, but all sharing the same earnest
desire to serve the people and to help draft a Constitution which will establish a government that the people
can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that guarantees individual rights and serves as a
barrier against excesses of those in authority.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its authenticity and authority from the sovereign will;
the power of the people precedes it. As such, it should reflect the norms, the values, the modes of thought
of our society, preserve its heritage, promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished liberties and

guard against the encroachments of would-be dictators. These objectives have served as the framework in
the work of drafting the 1986 Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is concerned, refers to the composition of the
members of the House of Representatives. Representation in the Lower House has been broadened to
embrace various sectors of society; in effect, enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted by
members who shall be elected in the traditional manner, representing political districts, as well as by
members who shall be elected through the party list system.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The institutions through which the sovereign people rule themselves are essential for the effective operation
of government. But these are not enough in order that the body politic may evolve and progress. There is
need for an underlying socio-economic philosophy which would direct these political structures and serve as
the mainspring for development. So it is that the draft Constitution contains separate Articles on Social
Justice and National Economy and Patrimony.
Talk of people's freedom and legal equality would be empty rhetoric as long as they continue to live in
destitution and misery, without land, without employment, without hope. But in helping to bring about
transformation, in helping the common man break away from the bondage of traditional society, in helping
restore to him his dignity and worth, the right to individual initiative and to property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission President, the Honorable Cecilia Muos Palma, refers to
as the "heart of the Constitution," provides that Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that would reduce social, economic and political inequalities. The same article addresses the
problems of (1) labor local and overseas, organized and unorganized recognizing the rights of all workers in
the private as well as in the public sector, the rank and file and the supervisory, to self-organization,
collective bargaining and peaceful and concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with
law; (2) the farmers, the farm workers, the subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers, through agrarian
and natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement arcas, through urban land reform and housing; (4) the health of the people, through an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health development; (5) the women, by ensuring the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and (6) people's organizations, by facilitating the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
xxx

xxx

xxx

These are some of the provisions which we have constitutionalized. These are some of the innovations that
we have introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions which we have drawn and which we trust
would serve as the foundation of our society, the keystone of our national transformation and development,
the driving force for what we pray would be our irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is what the men
and women of the 1986 Constitutional Commission have drafted under the able, firm and decided leadership
of our President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument suited to the circumstances of our time. It is
also a Constitution that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in the words of U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." As we present the proposed fundamental
law, we pray that our efforts would pave the way towards the establishment of a renewed constitutional
government which we were deprived of since 1972, that these efforts would ensure that the triumph at

EDSA so deserving won by the people shall continue to be enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that
these efforts would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution a Constitution that enshrines people's
power and the rule of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair land a community
characterized by moral regeneration, social progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and
concern for one another; a Constitution that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure for the
people a better life founded on liberty and welfare for all.
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commission's Sponsorship Committee, I have the honor to move for
the approval of the draft Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second Reading. 5
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It is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other provisions so that contours of
constitutional policy is made clear.6
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The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for the realization of the
ideals on social justice in the political arena.7
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The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:

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First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is that representatives should be
selected to mirror the characteristics of those being represented in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other
such characteristics judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some
recent democratic debates focused on the need for special representation of disadvantaged and underrepresented social groups within democratic assemblies. The applicability of this idea of mirror
representation is not confined to debates about representing marginalized minorities within nation-states;
Iris Young further applies this model of representation to global politics, arguing the global representation
should be based on representation of the various peoples' of the world, each of which embodies its own
distinctive identity and perspective . In practice, special representation for certain social groups within a
mirror framework can be combined with election mechanisms in various ways such as by according quotas
of elected representatives to designated social groups. But since the selection of these social groups' for
special representation would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting legitimate
representatives, occurring prior to the electoral process, such mirror representation is still recognizable as a
distinct mechanism for selecting representative agents. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Two months after initial debates on the form and structure of government that would best promote equality,
the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political equality and provided for sectoral representation
in the party-list system of the legislature. Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list
system.9
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MR. VILLACORTA: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our
national history by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system sought to address: 10

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MR. TADEO: Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people's power. Kaya kami naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil
sa people's power nasa amin ang people, wala sa amin ang power. Ganito ito kahalaga.
The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the needs and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Ganoon kahalaga and National Assembly kaya t napakahalaga noong Section 5 and Section 31 ng ating
Constitution. Our experience, however, has shown that legislation has tended to benefit more the propertied
class who constitutioes a small minority in our society than the impoverished majority, 70 percent of whom

live below the poverty line. This has come about because the rich have managed to dominate and control
the legislature, while the basic sectors have been left out of it. So, the critical question is, how do we ensure
ample representation of basic sectors in the legislature so that laws reflect their needs and aspirations?
RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Not only is it a "social
justice tool", as held in Ang Bagong,11 but it is primarily so. This is not mere semantics but a matter of
legal and historical accuracy with material consequences in the realm of statutory interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections. I shall discuss below my position
in relation to the second, fourth and sixth parameter enunciated in the ponencia.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Under the second parameter, "national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral parties or organizations, and not national and regional
parties or organizations.
I dessent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of "marginalized and
underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. To argue otherwise is to divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the
primary objective of attaining social justice, which objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies
the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
Second, Second 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become members
of the House of Representatives" On its face, it is apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented"
qualifies "sectors", "organizations" and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the import of "social
justice" that has developed in various decisions is that when the law can be interpreted in more ways than
one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be favored. 12
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Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is a countervailing
means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more
entrenched and well-established political parties. To quote:
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MR. OPLE: So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a prty list system is that it is a
countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society, if they want to seek seats in the
legislature, to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and wellestablished political parties, but he is concerned that the mechanics might be inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD: Not only that; talking about labor, for example I think Commissioner Tadeo said there are
10 to 12 million laborers and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8 million or 4.5 million if the
laborers get together, they can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would have 10 seats under the party
list system.

MR. OPLE: So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open to all and would not agree to a
party list system which seeks to accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral groups that are
predominantly workers and peasants?
MR. MONSOD: If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within the 50, and I am assuming
that maybe there are just two major parties or three at the most, then it is already a form of operating it up
for other groups to come in, All we are asking is that they produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The whole
purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who have a national constituency who
may never be able to win a seat on a legislative district basis. But they must have a constituency of
at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the National Assembly.13(emphasis supplied)
However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well-established political parties and
organizations to complete with the weaker segments of society, which is the very evil sought to be guarded
against.
The ponencia's second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941, and the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to allow national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations to participate in the party-list system. To require national and regional parties and
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented makes them effectively sectoral parties
and organizations and violates this intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations
the same by requiring that they represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," they become the same.
By analogy, people can be treated similarly but that does not make them identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only 50%
of the seats are allocated during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution to representatives from the labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows that the
other 50% would be allocated to representatives from sectors which are non-marginalized and
underrepresented.
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the former is true. This is not so
since the latter 50% can very well include representatives from other non-enumerated sectors, or even
national or regional parties and organizations, all of which can be "marginalized and underrepresented."
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, from participating in the party-list system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties are necessarily non
marginalized or underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how "marginalization and
underrepresentation" is defined. The ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived notion that
"marginalized and underrepresented" refers only to those "economically" marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented," primarily because it already constitutes sufficient legislative standard to guide the
COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of its discretion to determine the qualification of a
party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC must be upheld. This is
consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that

only those Filipinos that are marginalized and underrepresented become members of the Congress under the
party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these regulations are germane to the objects and purposes of
the law and not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then the
standards may be deemed sufficient.14
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We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those who are marginalized and
underrepresented today may no longer be one later on. Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever
evolving concept, created to address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of
our Constitution.15 Confining its definition to the present context may unduly restrict the COMELEC of its
quasi-legislative powers which enables it to issue rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to
exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. 16
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Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution, because the legislature is
certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying laws
into effect.17 The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subject of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws,
but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. 18 This is the principle
of subordinate legislation discussed in People v. Rosenthal19 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public
Service Commission.20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the COMELEC is to see to
it that only those Filipinos that are marginalized and underrepresented become members of the Congress
under the party-list system."
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel registration under Section 6 of RA
7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the party "violates or fails
to comply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it must be first established that
"marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue
here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of "marginalization and
underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry sufficient legal
significance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of a legislative standard to guide the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers. This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the change of complete abdication may
be hard to repel. A standards thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. 21 Consequently, we have held that
"public welfare"22 and "public interest"23 are examples of such sufficient standards. Therefore, that it appears
only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could even be an implied one.

National, regional and sectoral Parties or organizations must both Represent the "marginalized
and Underrepresented" and lack "well- Defined political constituencies". The fourth parameter in
the ponencia states:
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4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a "well-defined political constituency" as a requirement
along with "marginalization and underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative.
Thus, underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and
organizations intending to run in the party-list elections must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it means to be
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political constituency." For reasons
discussed above, the exact content of these legislative standards should be left to the COMELEC. They are
ever evolving concepts, created to address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice"
policy of our Constitution.
The disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it
meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters
set in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I would like to explain my
position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:

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6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is
only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominee's qualifications.Otherwise,
the disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it
meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters
set in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons explained below.
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that word benefit them. Consistent therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve proportional
representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to complete for and
win seats in the legislature."24 Because of this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6
(5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso
facto disqualify party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single nominee.

It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying
circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation of election laws, it must be
demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for the
rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on the
disqualification of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee's
qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers declaring "untruthful
statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should have at least one qualified
nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections. This is because if
all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to
participate in the elections, and should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it would still
have no one to represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee
through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on "the list of
names submitted by the respective parties x x x according to their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a
party-list group's nominees is determined by the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the last
paragraph of which reads:
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x x x No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the names shall have
been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case them name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last
in the list.
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to change the
ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed through
substitution, which according to Section 8 is done by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the
list. In this case, all the names that come after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution
takes effect, the new list with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among the
nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the first to the last, in accordance with Section
13.
If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their ranking remains
the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in determining the one/s that will represent
the winning party-list group in Congress. This means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the partylist group is able to join the elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take
the first nominee's place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets enough
votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can represent it.
Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong
Bayani25(alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it qualifies as a national, regional
or sectoral party or organization) and has established the qualification of at least one (1) of its top three (3)
nominees, to participate in the elections is a better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with the
policy of developing and guaranteering a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve
proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature""26 while providing sufficient disincentives for party-list groups
to flood the COMELEC with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires that they submit not less
than five (5).
It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system introduce in BANAT v.
COMELEC,27 will allow more party-list groups to be represented in Congress.

Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.

The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes the following facts: (1) 35
party-list groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million votes were cast for the party-list system; and
(3) there are 50 seats in Congress reserved for the party-list representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to distribute the 50 seats
reserved in the House of Representatives given the foregoing facts and the number of votes obtained by
each of the 35 party-list groups.

Rank

Party-list group

AAA

BBB

CCC

DDD

EEE

FFF

GGG

HHH

III

10

JJJ

11

KKK

LLL

Votes
Garnered

1st Round
(guaranteed
seats)

2nd Round
(guaranteed
seats)

Total #
Of seats

1,466,000

7.33%

1,228,000

6.41%

1,040,000

4.74%

1,020,000

3.89%

998,000

3.88%

960,000

3.07%

942,000

2.92%

926,000

2.65%

910,000

2.57%

796,000

2.57%

750,000

2.42%

738,000

2.35%

12

13

MMM

14

NNN

15

OOO

16

PPP

17

QQQ

18

RRR

19

SSS

20

TTT

21

UUU

22

VVV

23

WWW

24

XXX

25

YYY

26

ZZZ

27

I-A

718,000

2.32%

698,000

2.13%

678,000

2.12%

658,000

2.06%

598,000

2.02%

482,000

1.95%

378,000

1.89%

318,000

1.54%

294,000

1.47%

292,000

1.44%

290,000

1.43%

280,000

1.37%

274,000

1.37%

268,000

1.34%

256,000

1.24%

248,000

1.23%

28

I-B

29

I-C

30

I-D

31

I-E

32

I-F

33

I-G

34

I-H

35

I-I

238,000

1.18%

222,000

1.11%

214,000

1.07%

212,000

1.06%

210,000

1.05%

206,000

1.03%

194,000

1.02%

20,000,000

17

33

50

We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a seat to the party-list
groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system." In our
hypothetical scenario, the party-list groups ranked 1st to 17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes
cast for the party-list system. In effect, all 17 of them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of
these so-called guaranteed seats to the "two percents" is what BANAT calls the "first round of seat
allocation."
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats allocated to the two percenters
will be subtracted from "20% of the members of the House of Representatives" reserved by the Constitution
for party-list representatives, which in this hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two
percenters were able to establish the qualification of their first nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed
in what BANAT termed as the "second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the distribution/allocation of
these seats are fairly simple. If a party-list group's percentage is multiplied by the total number of additional
seats and the product is no less than 2, then that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to
keep in line with the 3-seat limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top
two party-list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming, again, that the 2nd and 3rd
nominees of both AAA and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left for distribution.
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of votes cast in favor of the
remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the only thing that matters is the group's
ranking. The party-list group that comes after BBB will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one
seat per party-list group, per rank, continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat

allocation stops at this point. In the table above, the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list group that
ranked 31st in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified. What happens if one or
some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the proposed method, if one two of the party-list groups
with guaranteed seats have a disqualified first nominee, their second nominee, if qualified, can still
represent them in Congress based on the second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groups'whether or not entitled to guaranteed seats'are
disqualified, then those party-list groups, which without the disqualification of these nominees would not be
entitled to a seat, would now have a higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed seat and the additional
seats for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1. With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now
qualify to obtain a seat in its favor, assuming that its first nominee is qualified. If I-E's first nominee is
disqualified, then we will proceed to the party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. This method is followed down
the line until all 50 seats are allocated.
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list groups represented in
Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time using a "non-two
percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at least 2% of the total votes. However,
in the second round of seat allocation, it was granted 1 seat. To be able to send a representative in
Congress, RRR's first nominee should be qualified to sit. Assuming that its first nominee was disqualified, its
second or third nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will now go to
I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the elections despite the
disqualification of some of its nominees, provided that there remains a qualified nominee out of the top
three initially submitted. Not only is this the better policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by
law.
Only nine of the petitions should be Remanded.
Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand of all petitions to the
COMELEC for reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz:

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x x x Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencia's guidelines focus mainly on two (2) grounds used by the
COMELEC to cancel registration: (1) the standard of marginalized and underrepresented as applied to
national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations; and (2) the qualification of nominees. From such
examination, we can conclude that, ir relation to the other grounds used by COMELEC to cancel registration
(other than those two grounds mentioned above), the doctrines remain unchanged. Thus, a remand of those
petitions is unnecessary, considering that the acts of the COMELEC pertaining to their petitions are upheld.

The ponencia even admits that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose registration was cancelled on
the basis of applying the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the qualification of nominees
wherein the "new parameters" apply. If other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those with "new
parameters," say, for example, failure to prove track record, a remand would be uncalled for because the
doctrine pertaining to the other grounds remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9) petitions should be
ordered remanded to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions, the COMELEC cancelled the registration of
the party-list groups solely on the ground that their nominees are disqualified. In making such a
pronouncement, the COMELEC merely used as yardstick whether they could qualify as advocates, and for
this reason, I recommend that the following cases be REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:
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1.

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reonstruction, Inc. (ARARO)

2.

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)

3.

Aangat Tayo (AT)

4.

A Blessed Party-List (a.k.a. Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc.) (A
BLESSED)

5.

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

6.

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

7.

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO
BAHAY)

8.

Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)

9.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)

Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponencia's take that the phrase "marginalized
and underrepresented" qualifies only sectoral parties, still, a remand of all the petitions remain uncalled for.
Out of the 52 petitions, there are only 11 party-list groups which are classified as national or regional
parties.28 Thus, if we were to strictly apply the ponencia's guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to be
remanded.
The COMELEC did not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC can decide election
cases en banc. To recall, the Resolution allows the COMELEC en banc, without a motion for reconsideration,
to conduct (1) an automatic review of a decision of a COMELEC division granting a petition for registration of
a party-list group or organization; and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for those already accredited and
which have manifested their intent to participate in the 2013 national and local elections for the purpose of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong
Bayani29 guidelines.

Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers which can be found in
Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary
hearing is an exercise of COMELEC's administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for
reconsideration in Section 3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2 (5) is not quasi-judicial
but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true distinction between the two. In a number of
cases, this Court has had the opportunity to distinguish quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus,
in Limkaichong v COMELEC,30 we held that:
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The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially management, as by managing

or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons of things." It
does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. This is to be distinguish from "quasi-judicial function", a term which
applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. (emphasis supplied)
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor, that also entail the "opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon," but are not considered quasi-judicial in the proper sense of the term. As held
in Bautista v CA:31
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Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial

function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del
Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like
quasi- judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer security will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial
proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking."
xxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has so purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot
be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgement on the
accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing
of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the
power to resolve appeals with finally only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceedprision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case. (emphasis supplied)

While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an opportunity to be heard,
the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is
that the exercise of the former has for its purpose the adjudication of rights with fianlity.32 This makes it akin
to judicial power which has for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.33
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Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for reconsideration is to look at it
through the lens of an election case. The phrase "all such election cases" in Section 3 has been read in
relation to Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, viz:
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What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the
Constitution which states:
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Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

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xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
allcontests involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 34
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As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the penumbra of election as
follows:
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Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election

contests consists of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies,
would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.
xxx
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications
of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. (Emphasis supplied)35
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In Panlilio v Commission on Elections,36 it was also held that the primary purpose of an election case is the
ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before
there can be an election before there can be an election case. Since the national and local elections are still
to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under the
Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under
Section 3 is not required.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-IPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM,
BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitioners of all the other Petitioners should be dismissed.

Endnotes:

G.R. NO. 83896, 83815, 22 February 1991.

Vol. V, R.C.C. No. 106, 12 October 1986.
Emphasis supplied.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

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Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. NO. 148208, 15 December 2004.

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VOL V, R.C.C. 106, 12 October 1986.

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See Chavez v. JBC, G.R. NO. 202242, 17 July 2012.

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CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO, EQUAL DIGNITY & RESPECT: THE SUBSTANCE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2012), 265 [hereinafter, PUNO].
7

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TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND REPRESENTATION BEYOND

LIBERAL STATES (2008), at 166-167.
8

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Puno, 265.

10

11

Id.

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G.R. NO. 147589, 26 June 2001.

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See Perez-Rosario v. CA, G.R. NO. 140796, 30 Jun 2006; BERNAS, PRIMER ON THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
(2006), 488.
12

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13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Volume II, R.C.C., 258-259, 25 July 1986.

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Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. NO. 76633, 18 October 1988.

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Gandara Mill Supply v. NLRC, G.R. NO. 126703, 29 December 1998.

Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 179830, 3 December 2009.

?r?l??l?br?r

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Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, G.R. NO. 114714, 21 April 1995.
Id.

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G.R. NO. 46076, 46077, 12 June 1939.

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20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

G.R. NO. 47065, 26 June 1940.

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Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Ople, G.R. L-67573, 19 June 1985.

Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940).
People v Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (1939).
Section 2, Republic Act No. 7941.
Supra.

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Section 2, Republic Act No. 7941

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G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009.

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The national parties are Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), Bantay Party-List (BANTAY), and
Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP). On the other hand, the regional parties are Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB),
Akyson Magsasaka Partido Tining ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), Ako an Bisaya (AAB), Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN), 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), Partido ng Bayan
and Bida (PBB), and Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP).
28

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29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

G.R. NO. 147589, 25 June 2001.

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G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41, 1 April 2009.

G.R. NO. 143375, 6 July 2001.

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Dole Philippines v. Esteva, G.R. NO. 161115, 30 November 2006.

1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1.

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Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 191084, 25 March 2010.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 161434, 3 March 2004.

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G.R. NO. 181478, 15 July 2009.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views on the various questions submitted to the Court
through consolidated petitions before us.

For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out under the following
structure:
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I. The Case and the Issues

II. Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions
A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani
2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
B. Nominees
C. On the observation of the Chief Justice
D. Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III. Preliminary Matters
A. The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of jurisdictional error that warrants reviewing COMELEC's action
B. COMELEC's power to register and to cancel registration of a party-list group is an exercise of its
administrative powers
IV. Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text.
b. Constitutional text summarized
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. Ang Bagong Bayani
b. Banat
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and
its errors
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.

a.2. From the statutory perspective

b. Party participation under the party-list system
b.1. Impact on political parties
c. The parties and their nominees
c.1. Refusal or cancellation of registration due to nominee problems
c.2. party nominee relationship
E. Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for COMELEC Action
I.A The Cases
The Court resolves fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions for certiorari/prohibition filed under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations. They commonly assail the COMELEC's
resolutions, either cancelling their existing registrations and accreditations, or denying their new petitions for
party-list registration.
Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by new party-list applicants under Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (dated February 21, 2012). These petitions were denied by the
COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the COMELEC Division's resolutions.
The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought by previously registered and accredited party-list
organizations whose registrations/accreditations have been cancelled. These petitioners participated in
previous elections and cannot participate in the May 2013 election if the cancellation of their
registration/accreditation would stand.
The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC and the
disregard of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and RA No. 7941, variously questioned
a. the COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of
its Division's rulings despite the absence of motions for reconsideration, in disregard of Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
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b. with respect to the cancellation of previous registration/accreditation of party-list groups or organizations,

the denial of due process and the violation of the principle of res adjudicata; further, the COMELEC's
cancellation of their existing registration/accreditation is claimed to be an exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers that the COMELEC Division, not the COMELEC En Banc, can exercise at the first instance;
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c. the COMELEC En Banc's appreciation of facts and its application of the guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani,
which either addressed defects or deficiencies on the part of the parties or of their nominees and which
resulted in the refusal or cancellation of registration/accreditation.
I.B. The Issues
Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court's consideration may be condensed as follows:

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1. Whether the COMELEC En Banc may automatically review the decision of the COMELEC Division without
the requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying or cancelling the registration/accreditation
of the petitioners, mainly relying on the eight point guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS
II.A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC's 1 intrinsically flawed interpretation of the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions is the main source of the present controversy. Its constricted
interpretation of the statutory phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" has invited more questions than
answers that the framers of the 1987 Constitution in fact sought to avoid.
II.A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani.
I take the position that it is time to re-visit this oft-cited ruling before the party-list system is further led
astray.
First, the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional framers' intent to reform
the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and underrepresented parties (i.e. those who cannot
win in the legislative district elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to
elect themselves there, but who nationally may generate votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative
district election would garner) the chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to
the House of Representatives through a system other than the legislative district elections.
Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text and made a slanted reading of the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. By these means, it erroneously concluded that the party-list system is primarily
intended as a social justice tool, and was not principally driven by intent to reform electoral system. Thus,
under its First Guideline, Ang Bagong Bayani solely viewed the party-list system from the prism of social
justice, and not from the prism of electoral reform as the framers of the Constitution originally intended.
Second. In the constitutional deliberations, the proponents of the electoral reform concept were opposed by
those who wanted a party-list system open only to sectoral representation, particularly to sectoral groups
with social justice orientation.
The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents nevertheless opened the system to sectoral
representation and in fact gave the social justice groups a head-start by providing for their representation
through selection in the first three elections.
In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution made a textual commitment to open the party-list
system to registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Article on the Commission
on Election also pointedly provided that there shall be a "free and open party system," and votes for parties,
organizations or coalitions shall only be recognized in the party-list system.
II.A.2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System

Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties may run in the party-list elections but maintains under
its Second Guideline that they must qualify as marginal and underrepresented as this phrase is understood
in the social justice context. This is totally incorrect.
Based on the reasons discussed above and further expounded below, even major political parties can
participate in party-list elections because the party-list system is open to all registered political, national,
regional, sectoral organizations and parties, subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and
by law. Further, both political and sectoral parties have equal roles and participation in the party-list system;
again, they are subject to the same limitations imposed by law (the Constitution and RA No. 7941) and are
separately burdened only by the limitations intrinsic to their respective natures. To summarize:
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a) For political parties (whether national or regional): to be classified as political parties, they must advocate
an ideology or platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of government. The application of
the further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing the adoption of
their principles of governance, they must regularly nominate and support their leaders and members as
candidates for public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district elections) and
lack of constituency requirements fully apply, but there is no reason not to presume compliance with these
requirements if political parties are not participants in any legislative district elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot participate in the partylist elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list
elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the party-list system forbids directly
(i.e., participation in both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a
coalition. No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they can form with party-list parties,
organizations or groups running for the party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal
alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-list elections.
b) For sectoral parties and organizations, they must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice
characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their sectors although they do
not require or need to identify with any social justice characteristic. In either case, they are subject to the
"marginalized and under-represented" and the "constituency" requirements of the law through a showing,
supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is actually characterized as marginal and underrepresented.
These parties and organizations are additionally subject to the general overriding requirement of electoral
marginalization and under-representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but there is no
reason why compliance with these requirements cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any
legislative district elections.
c) Compliance with COMELEC Rules. To justify their existence, all party-list groups must comply with the
requirements of law, their own internal rules on membership, and with the COMELEC's Rules of Procedure.
They must submit to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) their constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require.2
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To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the party-list system as principally espoused by
Commissioner Christian Monsod and duly approved by the Commission's vote maintained its electoral reform
objectives while significantly contributing to the social justice thrust of the Constitution.
It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Reflections, that this Separate Opinion is not
"appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987 Constitution] arose." I recognize the social
justice content of the party-list provisions in the Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these
provisions the primacy that both the framers of the Constitution and Congress did not see fit to accord.
B. On Nominees
Third. Considering the Constitution's solicitous concern for the marginalized and under-represented sectors
as understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941's requirement of mere bona fide membership of a
nominee in the party-list group, a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the
interest and concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a
nominee.
This classification of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations which are
marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns
or characteristics. To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of
the members of the party must actually belong to the sector represented, while nominees must be a
member of the sectoral party or organization.
Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona fide membership, in
accordance with the political party's constitution and by-laws, would suffice.
In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most tangible link of the nominees to
their respective parties and to the party-list system.
Subject to the above, the disqualification of the nominee does not necessarily mean the disqualification of
the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the qualification that the law's 3 requirement of the submission of a list containing at least five
(qualified) nominees is mandatory, and a party's inexcusable failure to comply with this requirement
warrants the refusal or cancellation of its registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C. On the Observations of the Chief Justice
As my fourth and final point, the "textualist" approach that the Chief Justice objects to, has been driven, and
is fully justified, by the above reading of the Constitution and the law.
As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and of the whole Judiciary)
is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and the law expressly provide. The framers of the
Constitution and Congress (through RA No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the
words of the Constitution and the law, and through the intents the framers; both were considered and cited
to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The whole Judiciary, including this
Court, can only apply these policies in the course of their assigned task of adjudication without adding
anything of our own; we can interpret the words only in case of ambiguity.
This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social justice or for any ideology for
that matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned to us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or

to formulate policies that fall within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of
our sworn duty.
D. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion
As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court suspended the Rules of Court
in considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of the clear and patent violation of the Constitution
that the Majority unanimously found.
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I vote to VACATE the ruling of
the COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our finding of patent violation of the Constitution
after revisiting and overturning the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my view that a grave abuse of discretion exists.
Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases namely, the petitioners and the COMELEC relied upon
and were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling. However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani
and its standards, in light of what the text and intents of the Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a
result different from what Ang Bagong Bayani reached.
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong considerations were used in ruling on the
consolidated petitions, resulting in gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the Constitution. This is
grave abuse of discretion that taints a decision maker's action, 4 infinitely made worse in this case because
the Constitution itself is involved.
An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion pertains specifically to the COMELEC's refusal or
cancellation of registration of the party-list group based, solely or partly, on the disqualification of the
nominee. As discussed below, this action and any refusal or cancellation of registration is completely devoid
of basis in fact and in law and in this sense constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC in accordance with the terms of
this Separate Opinion.
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The existence of jurisdictional error that warrants reviewing COMELEC's action
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or quasi-judicial powers, on
the other hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved party is the remedy of certiorari under Rule
64, in relation with Rule 65. Court action under this rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law,
the COMELEC en banc decision is final and executory and should stand unless nullified by this Court through
a writ of certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of discretion is in keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its
function is to keep the tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition, generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.5
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Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC merely complied with the
prevailing jurisprudence (in particular. with the Court's pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
and Banat v. COMELEC), then it could not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with
grave abuse of discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when the respondent is exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the present case.
This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound as the gross misinterpretation and misapplication of
the Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in its role and duty as guardian of the Constitution. Where a
misinterpretation or misapplication of the Constitution occurs, the result is a constitutional violation that this
Court cannot be prevented from addressing through the exercise of its powers through the available medium
of review under the Rules of Court. To hold otherwise is to countenance a violation of the Constitution a
lapse that cannot and should not happen under our legal system.
Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application of a prevailing rule or
doctrine negates a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a glaring error in the doctrine's
interpretation of the Constitution, then the Court would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying
down a new doctrine that would operate prospectively but at the same time dismissing the petition for
failure to show grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this is a course of action the Court cannot take if it
were to faithfully discharge its solemn duty to hold the Constitution inviolate. For the Court, action under
these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed to be heard about its right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter
and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The Court's previous ruling on a matter serves as
a guide in the resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind the
Court in its future actions. As the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands
through its past actions, particularly when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate
authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution. 6
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Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in stone and do not remain unerased and applicable for all times under all circumstances. The Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a
sense a continuing one as these are made and refined in the cases before the Court, taking into account
what it has said on the similar points in the past. This is the principle of stare decisis that fosters the
stability of rulings and decisions. This principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies even if an
incisive examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a faithful interpretation of the
Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation. In this excluded circumstance, both the rule of
reason and the commands of the Constitution itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need be,
overturned.7 Indeed, if the act done is contrary to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of
discretion cannot be doubted.8
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As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling does not rest on firm
constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of the text of the constitution and its myopic view of
constitutional intent led it to a grave error never envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the
new ruling laid down by the Court i.e., allowing political parties to participate in the party-list elections
without need of proving that they are "marginalized and under-represented" (as this term is understood in
Ang Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be
validly included in the list of nominees the Court would not be violating the principle of prospectivity.9
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The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity both in the application of law and of judicial decisions
enunciating new doctrines is the protection of vested rights and the obligation of contracts. When a new
ruling overrules a prior ruling, the prospective application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who
have relied in good faith on the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application in this case, for, a ruling overturning Ang Bagong
Bayani broadens the base of participation in the party-list system of election based on the text and intent of
the Constitution. Thus, no one can claim that the application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election
would operate to the prejudice of parties who relied on the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized and
under-represented sectors (as the term in understood in Ang Bagong Bayani) continue to be eligible to
participate in the party-list elections, subject to the determination of parties' individual circumstances by the
COMELEC.
B. COMELEC power to register and to cancel registration of a party-list group is an exercise of its
administrative powers
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 i.e., to conduct summary hearings
for the purpose of determining the registered parties' continuing compliance with the law and the regulations
and to review the COMELEC Division's ruling granting a petition for registration is appropriately an exercise
of the COMELEC's administrative power rather than its quasi-judicial power. In the exercise of this authority,
the COMELEC may automatically review the decision of its Divisions, without need for a motion to reconsider
the grant of a petition for registration; it may also conduct summary hearings when previously registered
party-list groups file their manifestation of intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al.10 already provides us ample guidance and insights into what
distinguishes administrative and quasi-judicial powers from one another. On the issue of whether the remedy
of certiorari (which can only be invoked when the respondent exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions)
would lie against a public school committee whose function was to determine the ranking of selected honor
students for its graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and said:
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From the foregoing, it will be gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in
turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however,
there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi
judicial functions.11 (citation omitted; emphases ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for registration or the
determination of a registered party's continuing compliance with existing laws, rules and jurisprudence
entails the assertion of a right or the presence of a conflict of rights. In a registration or compliance
proceeding, an applicant simply attempts to prove its possession or continued possession of the requisite
qualifications for the purpose of availing the privilege of participating in an electoral exercise. Thus, no real
adjudication entailing the exercise of quasi-judicial powers actually takes place.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata in these registration proceedings necessarily
weakens any claim that adjudication, done in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, is involved. Each
election period is sui generis - a class in itself, and any registration or accreditation by a party-list group is
only for the purpose of the coming election; it does not grant any registered party-list group any mantle of
immunity from the COMELEC's power of review as an incident of its power to register. To hold otherwise

would emasculate the COMELEC as an independent constitutional commission, and weaken the crucial role it
plays in our republican democracy.
IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS
I take the firm position that this Court should now revisit its ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani before our partylist system drifts any farther from the text and spirit of the constitutional and statutory commands.
These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting this approach and my conclusions.
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text.
The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with the party-list system of election are Section 5(1) and
(2) of Article VI, and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. The cited Article VI section
reads:
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Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. [emphasis, underscores and italics
ours]
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, is the article on the COMELEC, and the cited
sections quoted below are its provisions related to the party-list system.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

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xxx
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. x x x
xxx
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. [emphases and italics ours]

These provisions are specifically mentioned and shall be cited throughout this Separate Opinion as they are
the essential take-off points in considering, appreciating and implementing the party-list system.
b. The Constitutional Text Summarized
Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the Constitution relating to the party-list system essentially
provide that:
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1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected from legislative districts, and those
who are elected through a party-list system.
2. The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who are elected, as
provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation.
3. The members under the system shall be elected through registered national, regional, sectoral parties
and organizations, thus, textually identifying the recognized component groupings in the party-list system;
they must all register with the COMELEC to be able to participate.
4. To be voted under the party-list system are the component political parties, organizations and coalitions,
in contrast with the individual candidates voted upon in legislative district elections.
5. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives,
including those in the party-list.
6. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
7. The Constitution allows a free and open party system that shall evolve according to the free choice of the
people, within the limits of the Constitution.
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general in their terms. However, they are
not, in fact, as bare as they would seem, as the words used carry meanings and intents 12 expressed during
the deliberations and the voting that took place to determine what the Constitution would exactly
provide.13
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Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent that led to the modification of the system of
legislative district elections that the country has used even before the 1935 Constitution.
The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative district system that remains described in the
Constitution as election by district "apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."14
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The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list system in terms of its purpose,
as follows:15
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The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups
or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the Commissioner's subsequent statement when he
said The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who have a national constituency
who may never be able to win a seat on a legislative district basis. But they must have a constituency of at
least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the National Assembly.16 thus, leaving no doubt on what the partylist system conceptually is and why it was established.
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
Following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon Aquino appointed representatives of
the sectors mentioned in the Constitution, namely: labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
minorities, women, and youth, who acted as the party-list representatives for the first three (3) elections
under this Constitution.
In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law that would implement
the party-list election scheduled for May 1998. The law at the same time fleshed out the mechanics for
party-list elections, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided for:
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a. a declaration of the policy behind the law;

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b. a definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national, political, regional, and sectoral parties, and
their coalitions;
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c. the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal and cancellation of registration; and the
certified list of registered parties;
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d. the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives;

e. the manner of voting;

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f. the number and procedure for the allocation of party-list representatives; and
g. the proclamation of the winning party-list representatives, their term of office; the limitation on their
change of affiliation; their rights; and the provisions in case of vacancy.
Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the party-list system as:

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a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.17 (emphases and italics ours) and clarified the State's policy, objectives and means, as follows:
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a. the promotion of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof;
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b. with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives; and
c. for the development and guarantee of a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature under the simplest scheme possible. 18
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RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly defined the component groupings recognized by law in the party-list system,
as follows:
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(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes.19 (emphases and italics ours)
Notably, the definitions carried no significant qualifications, preferences, exclusions or limitations by law on
what the recognized party-list groupings should be, although Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined
the grounds for disqualification.
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. The Ang Bagong Bayani Case
In 2001, the first judicial test in the implementation of the party-list system came through the Ang Bagong
Bayani case where the petitioners sought the disqualification of the private respondents, among whom were
major political parties. The Court resolved, among others, the following issues:
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1. whether political parties may participate in party-list elections; and

2. whether the party-list system is exclusive to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors and
organizations.

The majority ruling held that political parties may participate in party-list elections, provided that the
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the Constitution and RA No.
7941. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies, identifying them, non-exclusively, as the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. The party-list nominees, as well, must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the guidelines for the party-list system, summarized
below:
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First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. x x x
xxx
Third, by an express constitutional provision, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. x x x
xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification.
xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be
a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 contains the qualifications of party-list nominees, with special age-related terms for
youth sector candidates.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x Under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. 20 (italics and emphases ours)

b. BANAT Case
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections 21 is
essentially a case on the computation of the allocation of seats based on the party-list votes. Despite the
Ang Bagong Bayani ruling, the question of whether the Constitution prohibits political parties from
participating in the party-list elections remained a live issue in this case.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to disallow major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly; thus, effectively reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major
political parties may participate in the party-list system, provided they represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno cited two reasons for disallowing the participation
of major political parties:
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1. Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from
participating in the election of their representatives are aligned with the constitutional mandate to reduce
social, economic and political inequalities and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
2. Allowing major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process will suffocate the
voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.
The minority view22 took the position that neither the Constitution nor RA No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. It maintained that, on the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings, and this Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from party-list elections, in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral
or political purposes. The other major political parties can thus organize or affiliate with their chosen sector
or sectors, provided that their nominees belong to their respective sectors. Nor is it necessary that the
party-list organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution, and infirmity," as there is no financial status
or educational requirement in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he must be a
fisherfolk, if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and
its errors
I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of the Constitution and of the law to stress these
terms for later comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani. In this manner, Ang Bagong Bayani's slanted reading of
the Constitution and the laws can be seen in bold relief. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of the
constitutional intent, based on the statements of a constitutional commissioner that were quoted out of
context, to justify its reading of the constitutional intent. 23 Specifically, it relied on the statements of
Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral representation, and glossed over those of Commissioner
Monsod and the results of the deliberations, as reflected in the resulting words of the Constitution. 24 Thus,
its conclusion is not truly reflective of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. This error is fatal as its
conclusion was then used to justify his interpretation of the statute, leading to a bias for the social justice
view.
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System

a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.

The aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is principally to reform the then
existing electoral system by adding a new system of electing the members of the House of Representatives.
The innovation is a party-list system that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to allow
those who could not win in the legislative district elections a fair chance to enter the House of
Representatives other than through the district election system.
Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral reform - not to provide a social justice mechanism that
would guarantee that sectors (described in social justice context by its constitutional deliberation proponents
as "marginalized") would exclusively occupy, or have reserved, seats in the House of Representatives under
the party-list system. This is one glaring error that is evident right from the opening statement of Ang
Bagong Bayani when it described the party-list system as "a social justice tool." While the party-list system
can indeed serve the ends of social justice by providing the opportunity through an open, multi-party system
for the social justice sector groups that have no chance to win in legislative district elections, the party-list
system was not established primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution itself which do not provide for
exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral groups in the party-list system. If at all, the
constitutional text only provided a guarantee of 50% participation for specified sectoral groups, but the
guarantee was only for the first three (3) elections after the ratification of the Constitution. 25
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The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted confirm the primacy of
electoral reform as against social justice objectives. The electoral reform view was espoused by the author of
the provision, Commissioner Monsod, and his proposed amendment 26 met vigorous objections from
Commissioner Eulogio Lerum and Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have guaranteed or
reserved seats for the "marginalized" sectors in order to prevent their "political massacre" should the
Monsod amendment be allowed.27
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When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized sector won. Eventually, what was
conceded to the latter was what the Constitution, as worded now, provides - i.e., "For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from" the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of "marginalized" would be applied to the party-list system, the term should apply to
the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that cannot win in the traditional legislative
district elections (following the explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming
marginalization in the social justice context or because of their special interests or characteristics. The term,
of course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional
legislative district elections. These aspects of the case are further discussed and explained below.
a.2. From the Statutory Perspective.
Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system innovation does not vary
or depart from the basic constitutional intents. The objective continues to be electoral reform, expressed as
the promotion of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. 28
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It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words "marginalized and underrepresented" made
their formal appearance in the party-list system. It was used in the context of defining one of the aims of

the system, i.e., to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory recognition that
accommodates the sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social justice senses) character into the
party-list system (i.e., in addition to the primary electoral reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution),
but nevertheless does not render sectoral groups the exclusive participants in party-list elections. As already
mentioned, this conclusion is not justified by the wording, aims and intents of the party-list system as
established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term "marginalized and underrepresented" (understood in the narrow sectoral
context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a party, group or organization for participation in the
party-list election, except for those in the sectoral groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or
organizations necessarily are subject to this requirement. For all parties, sectors, organizations or coalition,
however, the absolute overriding requirement as justified by the principal aim of the system remains to be a
party, group or organization's inability to participate in the legislative district elections with a fair chance of
winning. To clearly express the logical implication of this statement, a party, group or organization already
participating in the legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed for itself a fair chance of
winning and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections.
b. Party Participation under the Party-list System
The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who would be elected,
as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are likewise
constitutionally identified as the registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and are the
party-list groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free and open party system that should
be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people within the limits of the Constitution. 29
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From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster proportional
representation that would lead to the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack welldefined constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" has been partly discussed above and would merit further
discussion below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 30 on the other hand, defined the term
"proportional representation" in this manner:
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It refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the

enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural,
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 31
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As well, the case defined the phrase "who lack well-defined political constituency" to mean:refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit
of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented.32
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Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term "marginalized and underrepresented,"
clearly showing how, in its view, the party-list system is bound to this descriptive term. As discussed above,

Ang Bagong Bayani's use of the term is not exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of the party-list
system. This error becomes more glaring as the case applies it to the phrases "proportional representation"
and "lack of political constituency."
For clarity, Section 2 the only provision where the term "marginalized and underrepresented" appears reads
in full:
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Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a sectoral party, or a coalition of
parties (Section 3[b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from sectoral parties or organizations which
generally advocate "interests or concerns" a political party is one which advocates "an ideology or platform,
principles and policies" of the government. In short, its identification is with or through its program of
governance.
Under the verba legis or plain terms rule of statutory interpretation 33 and the maxim ut magis valeat quam
pereat,34 a combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3 shows that the status of being "marginalized and
underrepresented" is not limited merely to sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law.
The law itself recognizes that the same status can apply as well to "political parties."
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the party-list system comes to
mind as it provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with the relationship and inter-action between
sectoral representation and the party-list system as a whole:
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We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are
no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he
will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be
asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will
be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and
are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does
not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
xxx
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying
that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national
constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National
Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or

as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to
any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will
have votes on a nationwide basis.
xxx
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system
though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties
within the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much.35 (emphases and underscores supplied)
These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the discussion on the party-list system of election
resumed on July 25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod proposed an amendment 36 (that substantially became
Section 5[1], Article VI of 1987 Constitution) that further clarified what this innovative system is.
Thus, the words "marginalized" and "underrepresented" should be understood in the electoral sense, 37 i.e.,
those who cannot win in the traditional district elections and who, while they may have a national presence,
lacked "well-defined political constituency" within a district sufficient for them to win. For emphasis, sectoral
representation of those perceived in the narrow sectoral (including social justice) sense as "marginalized" in
society is encapsulated within the broader multiparty (party-list system) envisioned by the framers.
This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the concerns of the marginalized sector
(in the narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those "underrepresented" (in the legislative district)
as a result of the winner-take-all system prevailing in district elections a system that ineluctably
"disenfranchises" those groups or mass of people who voted for the second, third or fourth placer in the
district elections and even those who are passive holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of "underrepresented" when it used a broad qualitative
requirement in defining "political parties" as ideology or policy-based groups and, "sectoral parties" as those
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that contrary once again to what Ang Bagong Bayani
holds proportional representation refers to the representation of different political parties, sectoral parties
and organizations in the House of Representatives in proportion to the number of their national constituency
or voters, consistent with the constitutional policy to allow an "open and free party system" to evolve.
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself notably anchored on the "open and
free party system" mandated by Article IX-C of the Constitution. For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never
noted this part of Section 2 and its significance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor
provided by Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It appears to have simply and conveniently focused
on the first sentence of the Section and its constricted view of the term "marginalized and

underrepresented," while wholly fixated on a social justice orientation. Thus, it opened its ruling, as
follows:
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The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy.38 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood statement that offers little
opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely and exclusively can be misleading. To begin with, the
creation of an avenue by which "sectoral parties or organizations" can meaningfully join an electoral exercise
is, in and by itself, a social justice mechanism but it served other purposes that the framers of the
Constitution were addressing. Looking back, the appeal to the social justice concept to make the party-list
elections an exclusive affair of the "marginalized and underrepresented sector" (as defined in Ang Bagong
Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-system is antithetical to sectoral representation. This
was effectively the argument of the proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in the
constitutional party-list debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-determination
of the sectors' political massacre. This issue, however, has been laid to rest in the constitutional debates and
should not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it through the Judiciary.
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a multiparty system that
already includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral representation and multiparty-system under our
party-list system are concepts that comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system.
Thus, both the text and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral
representation under the party-list system; what was provided was an avenue for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the electoral system it is an invitation for these sectors to join and
take a chance on what democracy and republicanism can offer.
Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and exchange of ideas,
philosophies and interests within a broader context. By allowing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors who have the numbers, to participate together with other political parties and interest groups that
we have characterized, under the simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-list we have today,
the framers clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse among the greater portion of the society and hoped
to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1. Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political parties are not only "not
excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate. This
participation is not impaired by any "marginalized and underrepresented" limitation understood in the Ang
Bagong Bayani sense.
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral sense, i.e., they are parties
espousing their unique and "marginalized" principles of governance and who must operate in the party-list
system because they only have a "marginal" chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This
definition assumes that the political party is not also a participant in the legislative district elections as the
basic concept and purpose of the party-list innovation negate the possibility of playing in both legislative
district and party-list arenas.
Thus, parties whether national, regional or sectoral with legislative district election presence anywhere in the
country can no longer participate as the party-list system is national in scope and no overlap between the
two electoral systems can be allowed anywhere.

c. The Parties and Their Nominees

c.1. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party Registration Due to Nominee Problems
The COMELEC's refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of parties based on Section 6 of RA
No. 7941 is a sore point when applied to parties based on the defects or deficiencies attributable to the
nominees. On this point, I maintain the view that essential distinctions exist between the parties and their
nominees that cannot be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of Positions, however, the need to make a
distinction between the two types of nominees is relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations.
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners on the ground that their
nominees are not qualified implies that the COMELEC viewed the nominees and their party-list groups as one
and the same entity; hence, the disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the disqualification of
his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal reality that the party-list group, not the nominee, is
the candidate in the party-list election, and at the same time blurs the distinction between a party-list
representative and a district representative.
c.2. The Party-Nominee Relationship
That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is not a disputed point. Our
essential holding, however, is that a party-list group, in order to be entitled to participate in the elections,
must satisfy the following express statutory requirements:
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1. must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties;
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2. has no well-defined political constituencies; and

3. must be capable of contributing to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the House of Representatives are those who are elected
from legislative districts, and those who are elected through a party-list system (Section 5(1), Article VI)
where the votes are in favor of a political party, organization or coalition (Section 6, Article IX-C).
These requirements embody the concept behind the party-list system and demonstrate that it is a system
completely different from the legislative district representation. From the point of view of the nominee, he or
she is not the candidate, the party is the entity voted for. This is in far contrast from the legislative district
system where the candidate is directly voted for in a personal electoral struggle among candidates in a
district. Thus, the nominee in the party-list system is effectively merely an agent of the party.39 It is the
party-list group for whom the right of suffrage40 is exercised by the national electorate with the divined
intent of casting a vote for a party-list group in order that the particular ideology, advocacy and concern
represented by the group may be heard and given attention in the halls of the legislature.
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the infirmities of the nominee that do not go into the
qualifications of the party itself should prejudice the party. In fact, the law does not expressly provide that
the disqualification of the nominee results in the disqualification of a party-list group from participating in
the elections. In this regard, Section 6 of RA No. 7941 reads:
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Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
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(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

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(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. [italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be correctly applied, the law,
rules and regulations that the party violated under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself
to warrant refusal or cancellation of registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a party's failure to submit its list of five
qualified candidates, after being notified of its nominees' disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of
registration may be warranted. Indeed, if the party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this simple
requirement of the law (Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration deserves to be denied or an existing
one cancelled as this omission, by itself, demonstrates that it cannot then be expected to "contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." 41
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The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group to which he/she
belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the party-list group. However, unlike
the political parties' official candidates - who can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run as
an independent candidate - the linkage between a nominee and his party-list group is actually a one-way
mirror relationship. The nominee can only see (and therefore run) through the party-list group 42 but the
party-list group can see beyond the nominee-member.
While the nominee is the entity "elected" to Congress, a companion idea that cannot be glossed over is that
he only carried this out because of the nomination made by the party to which he belongs and only through
the unique party-list system. Note in this regard that the registration with the COMELEC confers personality
(for purposes of election) on the party-list group itself and to no other. Note, too, that what the Constitution
and the law envision is proportional representation through the group and the latter, not the nominee, is the
one voted for in the elections. Even the manner of his nomination and the duties his official relation to his
party entails are matters that are primarily determined by the party's governing constitution and by-laws. To
be sure, political dynamics take place within the party itself prior to or after the period of registration that
transcend the nominee's status as a representative. These realities render indisputable that a party has the

right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee who fails to keep his bona fide membership in the party i.e.,
keeping true to the causes of the party - even while the nominee is serving in Congress.
The preceding discussions show that the COMELEC's action of apparently treating the nominee and his party
as one and the same is clearly and plainly unwarranted and could only proceed from its commission of grave
abuse of discretion, correctible under Rule 65.
These distinctions do not discount at all the position or the role of the party-list nominee; it is from the list
of nominees submitted by the party that party-list representatives are chosen should the party obtain the
required number of votes. In fact, once the party-list group submits the list of its nominees, the law
provides specific grounds for the change of nominees or for the alteration of their order of nomination. While
the nominee may withdraw his nomination, we ruled it invalid to allow the party to withdraw the nomination
it made43 in order "to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his
name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the partylist organizations."44
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We also recognize the importance of informing the public who the nominees of the party-list groups are as
these nominees may eventually be in Congress. 45 For the nominees themselves, the law requires that:
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1. he has given his written consent to be a nominee;

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2. he must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

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3. he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
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4. he must be able to read and to write;

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5. he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election; and
6. he must be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link between the party and its nominee is only the latter's
bona fide membership in the party that wishes to participate in the party-list system of election. Because of
this relationship, membership is a fact that the COMELEC must be able to confirm as it is the link between
the party the electorate votes for and the representation that the nominee subsequently undertakes in the
House of Representatives. To illustrate, if a sectoral party's nominee, who does not "actually share the
attribute or characteristic" of the sector he seeks to represent, fails to prove that he is a genuine advocate of
this sector, then the presence of bona fide membership cannot be maintained.
To automatically disqualify a party without affording it opportunity to meet the challenge on the eligibility of
its nominee or to undertake rectifications deprives the party itself of the legal recognition of its own
personality that registration actually seeks.
The qualifications of a nominee at the same time that it determines whether registration shall be
granted.46When under the COMELEC's lights, the shadow cast by the party-list nominee is not truly reflective
of the group he/she is supposed to represent, what the COMELEC must do is to give the party the
opportunity to field in the five qualified candidates. The COMELEC acts with grave abuse of discretion when it
immediately cancels or refuses the registration of a party without affording it the opportunity to comply.

In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral representation, the law provides that a nomineerepresentative who changes his affiliation during his term forfeits his seat. Likewise, in providing for the rule
in case of vacancy for seats reserved for party-list representatives, the reason for the vacancy is broad
enough to include not only the valid causes provided for in the party's constitution and by-laws (such as the
non-possession of the necessary qualifications), but likewise includes the situation where the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal finds that the nominee-representative unqualified for failure to
measure up to the necessary statutory and other legal requirements. 47 If these can be remedied without
affecting the status of the party itself, no reason exists why the registration of a party-list group should
automatically be cancelled or refused by reason of individual failures imputable and affecting only the
nominee.
Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its nominees cannot be wholly
considered as one identifiable entity, with the fault attributable and affecting only the nominee, producing
disastrous effects on the otherwise qualified collective merit of the party. If their identification with one
another can be considered at all, it is in the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a reflection of the
other i.e., the party-list group acts in Congress through its nominee/s and the nominee in so acting
represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it is there for.
E. Observations on Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections.
Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not need to be further discussed at
this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One point, however, that needs to be answered squarely is
the statement that this Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it the
1987 Constitution arose." The Reflections asserted that the heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on
Social Justice," citing, in justification, the statements endorsing the approval of the 1987 Constitution,
particularly those of Commissioner Cecilia Munoz Palma, the President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission; President Munoz Palma described the Constitution as reaching out to the social justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a whole and did not focus solely
on the electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in the discussions above, I have no problem in
accepting the social justice thrust of the 1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole, shows special concern
for social justice compared with the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The Reflections, however, apparently
misunderstood the thrust of my Separate Opinion as already fully explained above.
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in the present case are the
Constitution's electoral provisions, specifically the elections for the House of Representatives and the
nation's basic electoral policies (expressed in the Article on the Commission on Elections) that the
constitutional framers wanted to reform.
What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to "open up" the
electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not otherwise participate under the then
existing system those who were marginalized in the legislative district elections because they could not be
elected in the past for lack of the required votes and specific constituency in the winner-take-all legislative
district contest, and who, by the number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district elections,
showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in the legislative district would garner.
This was the concept of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the "lack of political constituency" that
came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the Constitution. RA No. 7941
subsequently faithfully reflected these intents.
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those belonging to specifically-named
sectors (i.e., the marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice sense) should be given a head-start

a "push" so to speak in the first three (3) elections so that their representatives were simply to be selected
as party-list representatives in these initial elections.
Read in this manner, the party-list system as defined in the Constitution cannot but be one that is
"primarily" grounded on electoral reform and one that was principally driven by electoral objectives. As
written, it admits of national and regional political parties (which may be based on ideology, e.g. the
Socialist Party of the Philippines), with or without social justice orientation. At the same time, the system
shows its open embrace of social justice through the preference it gave to the social justice sectors (labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector) in the first three elections after ratification of the Constitution,
and to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals, in the RA No. 7941 definition of sectoral
party.
The objection regarding the "textualist" approach has been fully discussed in the Summary of Positions and
need not be repeated here.
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for the COMELEC
I close this Opinion by outlining the eleven-point parameters that should guide the COMELEC in the exercise
of its power to register parties under the party-list system of elections. For ease of application, these
parameters refer back to the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines, particularly on what points in these guidelines
should be discarded and what remains intact and effective.
In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on Elections (disqualifying political parties from
participating in the party-list elections), the petitioners understandably attempted to demonstrate, in one
way or another, that they represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as the term is
understood in Bagong Bayani. As discussed in this Separate Opinion, however, the requirement of being
marginalized and underrepresented should be understood, not only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also in
the broader electoral sense.
We likewise take note of the fact that this is the first time that the Court ever attempted to make a
categorical definition and characterization of the term "marginalized and under-represented," a phrase that,
correctly understood, must primarily be interpreted in the electoral sense and, in case of sectoral parties and
organizations, also partly in the special interests and social justice contexts. The COMELEC understandably
has not been given parameters under the present pronouncements either in evaluating the petitions for
registration filed before it, on one hand, or in determining whether existing party-list groups should be
allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Hence, the need for the following parameters as we order a
remand of all these consolidated petitions to the COMELEC.
1. Purpose and Objective of Party-list System. The primary objective and purpose of the party-list system
(established under the Constitution and RA 7941 is electoral reform by giving marginalized and underrepresented parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the legislative district elections and in this sense are
marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect themselves there, but who nationally may generate the
following and votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district election would garner), the chance
to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a
system other than the legislative district elections.
At the same time, the party-list system recognizes sectoral representation through sectoral organizations
(that, as defined did not require or identify any social justice characteristic but were still subject to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and the "constituency" requirements of the law), and through sectors
identified by their common "social justice" characteristics (but which must likewise comply with the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and "constituency" requirements of the law).

2. For political parties (whether national or regional): a) to be classified as political parties, they must
advocate an ideology or platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of government. The
application of the further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing
the adoption of their principles of governance, they must regularly nominate and support their leaders and
members as candidates for public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
b) The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district elections) and
the lack of constituency requirements fully apply to political parties, but there is no reason not to presume
compliance with these requirements if political parties are not participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party-list Elections. Major political parties, if they participate in the
legislative district elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with
party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the party-list system forbids directly
(i.e., participation in both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a
coalition.
No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they can form with party-list parties,
organizations or groups running for the party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal
alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-list elections.
The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of the political party evidently render the first and second Ang
Bagong Bayani guideline invalid, and significantly affects the fourth guideline. To stress, political parties are
not only "not excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate
without being limited by the "marginalized and underrepresented" requirement, as narrowly understood in
Ang Bagong Bayani
3. Sectoral parties, groups and organizations must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice
characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their sectors although they do
not require or need to identify with any social justice characteristic.
In either case, they are subject to the "marginalized and under-represented" and the "constituency"
requirements of the law through a showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is
actually characterized as marginal and under-represented.
Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are additionally subject to the general overriding requirement of
electoral marginalization and under-representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but there
is no reason why compliance with these requirements cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any
legislative district elections.
4. Registration with the COMELEC.
Political parties (whether national or regional, already registered with the COMELEC as regular political
parties but not under the party-list system) must register under the party-list system to participate in the
party-list elections. For party-list registration purposes, they must submit to the COMELEC their constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information that the COMELEC may require.48
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Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or organizations already registered under the general COMELEC rules for
registration of political parties (but not under the party-list system), must register under the party-list

system to be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, and must likewise submit relevant
documentation that the COMELEC shall require.
Political and sectoral parties, groups or organizations already previously registered and/or accredited under
the party-list system, shall maintain their previous registration and/or accreditation and shall be allowed to
participate in the party-list elections unless there are grounds for cancellation of their registration and/or
accreditation under Section 6, RA 7941.
5. Submission of Relevant Documents. The statutory requirement on the submission of relevant
documentary evidence to the COMELEC is not an empty and formal ceremony. The eighth (8th)
Ang Bagong Bayani guideline relating to the ability of the party-list group (not just the nominee but directly
through the nominee or indirectly through the group) to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation remains wholly relevant and should be complied with
through the required submissions the COMELEC shall require.
The platform or program of government, among others, is very important considering the significant role the
party-list group itself, as a collective body, plays in the party-list system dynamics even as its nominee or
nominees is the one who is considered "Member" of the House of Representatives. The statutory recognition
of an "appropriate legislation" beneficial to the nation injects the meaningful democracy that the party-list
system seeks to add stimulus into.
6. Party Disqualification. Political parties and sectoral parties and organizations alike must not possess any of
the disqualifying grounds under Section 6, RA 7941 to be able to participate in the party-list elections.
Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani guideline merely reiterates the first ground for cancellation or refusal
of registration under Section 6, RA 7941 that the party-list group is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for religious purpose and the same ground is retained under these
parameters.
7. Compliance with Substantive Requirements. To justify their existence, all party-list groups must comply
with the substantive requirements of the law specific to their own group, their own internal rules on
membership, and with the COMELEC's Rules of Procedure.
8. Prohibited Assistance from Government. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government. It must be independent of the government.
This is the fifth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline. While this requirement only contemplated of the marginalized
and underrepresented sector in the narrow sense in Ang Bagong Bayani, no reason exists not to extend this
requirement even to political parties participating in the party-list elections.
To emphasize, the general overriding requirement in the party-list elections is inability to participate in the
legislative district elections with a fair chance of winning. If a political party at the very least obtains the
assistance of the government, whether financially or otherwise, then its participation in the party-list system
defeats the broad electoral sense in which the term "marginalized" and "underrepresented" is understood as
applied to political parties.
9. Qualification of Party-list Nominee. The sixth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline, being a mere faithful
reiteration of Section 9 of RA 7941 (qualification of a party-list nomine), should remain. In addition, the
party-list nominee must comply with the proviso in Section 15 of RA 7941.
10. Party and Nominee Membership. For sectoral parties and organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong Bayani
guideline i.e., that the nominees must also represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors refers

not only to the actual possession of the marginalized and underrepresented status represented by the
sectoral party or organization but also to one who genuinely advocates the interest or concern of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector represented by the sectoral party or organization.
To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, majority of the members of the
sectoral party or organization must actually belong to the sector represented.
For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona fide member of the group they represent.
11. Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The disqualification of a nominee (on the ground that he is not a
bona fide member of the political party; or that he does not possess the actual status or characteristic or
that he is not a genuine advocate of the sector represented) does not automatically result in the
disqualification of the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the
party itself.
The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the finding of disqualification of its nominee
or to fill in a qualified nominee before cancellation or refusal of registration is ordered. Consistent with
Section 6 (5) and Section 8 of RA 7941, the party-list group must submit a list containing at least five
nominees to the COMELEC. If a party-list group endeavors to participate in the party-list elections on the
theoretical assumption that it has a national constituency (as against district constituency), then compliance
with the clear requirement of the law on the number of nominees must all the more be strictly complied with
by the party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured a Status Quo Ante Order
(instead of mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion in the ballots now being printed by the
COMELEC), the remand of their petitions is only for the academic purpose of determining their entitlement
to registration under the party-list system but not anymore for the purpose of participating in the 2013
elections.
Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40 petitions 49 that obtain the number of
votes required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives would still be subject to the determination
by the COMELEC of their qualifications based on the parameters and rationale expressed in this Separate
Opinion.

Endnotes:

412 Phil. 308, 342 (2001).

RA No. 7941, Section 5.
RA No. 7941, Section 8.

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Varias v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 189078, Feb. 11, 2010.

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Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 191938, July 2, 2010.

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See: De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. NO. 191002, March 17, 2010.

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See: Justice Arturo Brion's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council. See
also Justice Reynato Puno's Dissenting Opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 174153,
October 25, 2006, where he stated:
7

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" Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis
deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same
facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation,
while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed,
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution."
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
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Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 159139,
January 13, 2004.
8

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Articles 4 and 8 of the Civil Code reads:

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Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
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10

11

143 Phil. 209 (1970).

Id. at 219.

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In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (460 Phil. 830, 885-886), the Court held: "where there is
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. x x x
12

xxx
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers. [italics, emphasis and underscore supplied]
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The deliberations, together with voting on the various issues raised and the wording of the constitutional
text of the party-list provision, took place on July 22, 1986, July 25, 1986 and August 1, 1986.
13

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14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5(1).

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II RECORD of the CONTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 86.

Id. at 259.

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RA No. 7941, Section 3(a).

RA No. 7941, Section 2.

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RA No. 7941, Section 3(b) to (f).

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Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 342-345.

G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
See ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.

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II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, p. 561. Stated by Commissioner Villacorta prior to the
approval of the amendment that became Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
23

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Mr. Villacorta. I would like to report that the proponents of sectoral representation and of the party list
system met to thoroughly discuss the issues and have arrived at a compromise formula.
On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our national history by giving
genuine power to our people in the legislature. Commissioner Monsod will present to the Committee on the
Legislative the amendment to Section 5 which we have agreed upon. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The underlined and boldfaced portion was lifted out of context in Ang Bagong Bayani.

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See Dissent of J. Vicente V. Mendoza which discussed the Villacorta and Monsod positions, as well as the
statements of Commissioners Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople, based on the record of the Constitutional
Commission.
24

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25

26

1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5(2).

On July 25, 1986.

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II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 255, 561-562. See also the Dissents of Justice Jose C.
Vitug and Justice Vicente Mendoza in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4.
27

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28

29

30

See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.

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Pages 19-23 of this Separate Opinion.

Supra note 4.

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31

32

Id. at 333.

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Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 334.

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Per Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (supra note7, at 884-885): verba legis signifiesthat
"wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning exceptwhere
technical terms are employed. x x x We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum." (emphasis, underscore and italics ours)
33

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Id. at 887, "ut magis valeat quam pereat" - the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. "It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together." (Citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.)
34

In other words, the Court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the
polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof. (Id.)
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35

36

II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 85-86.

Id. at 252.

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See Justice Vicente Mendoza's Dissent in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4,
at 369-370.
37

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38

412 Phil. 322 (2001).

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Separate Dissenting Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,
supra note 4, at 354.
39

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1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V. In Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC (407 Phil. 618, 636 [2001]), the Court
characterized the requirement of registration as an "indispensable precondition" to the exercise of the right
of suffrage. The Court said: "Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could
be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not in
different and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the
times."
40

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41

See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.

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In fact, a nominee's change of party affiliation during his term results in the forfeiture of his seat in
Congress (see Section 15 of RA No. 7941). If the party-list group fails to obtain a seat in Congress, the law
nevertheless requires a nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group.
42

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Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385,
412.
43

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44

Ibid.

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Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4,
2007, 523 SCRA 1, 16-17.
45

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For party-list groups already previously registered, the COMELEC can determine the qualifications of their
nominees once they file a Manifestation of Intent to participate.
46

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See Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 42; and Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, supra note 45.
47

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48

RA No. 7941, Section 5.

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The petitioners in GR Nos. 204421 and 204425 refer to one and the same party-list group, only that they
are presented by different personalities, claiming to be the legitimate officers of the party.
49

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

REYES, J.:
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher
folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many
of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. 1
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The Court is tasked to resolve the fifty-three (53) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions
forCertiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court by various
party-list groups and organizations. The petitions assail the resolutions issued by the respondent

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that either cancelled their existing registration and accreditation, or
denied their new petitions for registration under the party-list system. 2
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Of the fifty-three (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are instituted by new applicants to the party-list system,
whose respective applications for registration and/or accreditation filed under Republic Act No. 7941 3 (RA
7941) and COMELEC Resolution No. 93664 dated February 21, 2012 were denied by the COMELEC En Banc
upon its review of the resolutions of a division of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by party-list groups or organizations that have been previously
registered and accredited by the COMELEC, with most of them having been allowed to participate under the
party-list system in the past elections. These 40 petitions involve the COMELEC's recent cancellation of their
groups' registration and accreditation, which effectively denied them of the chance to participate under the
party-list system in the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners' desire and intent to participate as candidates in the party-list system
of representation, which takes its core from Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
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Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
x x x (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters that shall govern the party-list system, including
the registration of party-list groups, the qualifications of party-list nominees, and the election of party-list
representatives. In 1998, the country's first party-list election was held. Since then, the Court has been
called upon on several instances to resolve controversies on the system, oftentimes on questions involving
the qualifications of party-list groups and their nominees. Among the landmark cases on these issues isAng
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC5 decided by the Court in 2001, wherein the Court laid down
the eight-point guidelines6 in the determination of the qualifications of party-list participants.
Pursuant to its specific mandate under Section 18 of RA 7941 to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act," the COMELEC issued on February 21,
2012 Resolution No. 9366. About 2807 groups, comprised of new applicants and previously-registered partylist groups, formally signified their intent to join the party-list system in the May 13, 2013 elections.

As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the registration of organized groups that are not yet
registered under the party-list system, among the groups that filed with the COMELEC their respective
petitions for registration were: (1) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204139; (2)
Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), petitioner in G. R . N o . 204367; (3) Ako An Bisaya (AAB), petitioner in G.R.
204370; (4) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204379; (5) Association of Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN),
petitioner in G.R. NO. 204394; (6) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204402; (7)
Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH), petitioner inG.R. NO. 204426;
(8) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), herein petitioner in G.R. NO. 204435; (9) Manila
Teachers Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204455; (10)
Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA), petitioner in G.R.
NO. 204485; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204490. The political parties
Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204436, and Partido ng Bida (PBB), petitioner in G.R.
NO. 204484, also sought to participate for the first time in the party-list elections, although their petitions
for registration were not filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.
Party-list groups that were previously registered and accredited merely filed their Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366. Among these parties were: (1) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), petitioner
in G.R. NO. 203766; (2) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203818-19; (3)
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), petitioner in G.R. NO. 203922; (4) Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), petitioner in G.R. NO. 203936; (5) Kapatiran ng mga
Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), petitioner in G.R. NO. 203958; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance for
Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), petitioner in G.R. NO. 203960; (7) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian
Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO), petitioner in G. R . No. 203976; (8) Association for Righteousness Advocacy
on Leadership (ARAL), petitioner in G.R. NO. 203981; (9) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC), petitioner
in G.R. NO. 204002; (10) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), petitioner in G.R. NO.
204094; (11) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204100;
(12) 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204122;
(13) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204125; (14)
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP), petitioner in G. R. No. 204126; (15) The
True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country, and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), petitioner
in G.R. NO. 204141; (16) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA), petitioner in G.R. NO.
204153; (17) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD), petitioner inG.R. NO. 204158; (18)
Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204174; (19) Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc (COCOFED), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204216; (20) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
LINGKOD), petitioner in G. R . No. 204220; (21) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K), petitioner
in G.R. NO. 204236; (22) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204238; (23) Green
Force for the Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE), petitioner in G.R. NO.
204239; (24) Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI), petitioner in G.R.
NO. 204240; (25) Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED PartyList), petitioner in G. R . No. 204263; (26) United Movement Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD),
petitioner in G.R. NO. 204318; (27) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI), petitioner in G.R. NO.
204321; (28) Bayani Party List (BAYANI), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204323; (29) Action League of
Indigenous Masses (ALIM), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204341; (30) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL), petitioner
in G.R. NO. 204356; (31) Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement for National Progress (AAMA),
petitioner in G.R. NO. 204358; (32) Social Movement for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART),
petitioner in G.R. NO. 204359; (33) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204364; (34) Binhi Partido ng mga
Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204374; (35) Pilipino Association for
Country Urban Poor Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204408; (36) 1United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204410; (37) Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204421 and G.R. NO.

204425; (38) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204428; and (39) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan
Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS), petitioner in G.R. NO. 204486.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which provides for additional rules on the
Commission's disposition of the new petitions and manifestations of intent that were filed with it under
Resolution No. 9366. Resolution No. 9513, entitled In the Matter of: (1) The Automatic Review by the
Commission En Banc of Pending Petitions for Registration of Party-List Groups; and (2) Setting for Hearing
the Accredited Party-List Groups or Organizations which are Existing and which have Filed Manifestations of
Intent to Participate in the 2013 National Elections, reads in part:
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WHEREAS, it is necessary and indispensable for the Commission En Banc to review and affirm the grant of
registration and accreditation to party-list groups and organizations in view of its role in ensuring that only
those parties, groups, or organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the partylist system is registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of representation;
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WHEREAS, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure authorizes the suspension of the Rules
or any portion thereof in the interest of justice and in order to obtain the speedy disposition of all matters
pending before it; and
WHEREAS, Section 19 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure on Motions for Reconsideration should be
suspended in order for the Commission En Banc to fulfill its role as stated in the Ang Bagong Bayani case.
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in
it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Republic Act No. 7941 or the "Party List System Act",
hereby RESOLVES to promulgate the following:
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1. In all pending cases where a Division grants the Petition for Registration of a party-list group or
organization, the records shall be forwarded to the Commission En Banc for automatic review within five (5)
days from the promulgation of the Resolution without need of a motion for reconsideration. It shall be
understood that a party-list group shall not be deemed accredited without affirmation from the
Commission En Banc of the Division's ruling. For this purpose, the provisions of Rule 19 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall besuspended.
2. To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for purposes of determining
their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong
Bayani case, and, if non-compliant, cancel the registration of the following:
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(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited and will participate in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has not passed upon the grant of their
respectivePetitions for Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of Registered Party-List
Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and which have filed their
respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13,
2013 Elections.
With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the COMELEC'S determination of the continuing compliance of
registered/accredited parties that have filed their manifestations of intent, the Commission En
Bancscheduled summary hearings on various dates, and allowed the party-list groups to present their
witnesses and submit their evidence.8 After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc issued the following
resolutions:
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1. Resolution9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and accreditation of AKB10 as a political party, but denied its
participation in the May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC's ruling is founded on several grounds. First,
the party does not represent or seek to uplift any marginalized and underrepresented sector. From its
constitution and by-laws, the party seeks to represent and uplift the lives of Bicolanos, who, for the
COMELEC, cannot be considered or even associated with persons who are marginalized and
underrepresented. Second, the provinces in the Bicol Region already have their respective representatives in
Congress. To allow more representatives for the Bicolanos and the Bicol Region would violate the rule on
proportional representation of "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number
of their inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 11 Third, AKB's nominees, a
businessman, three lawyers and an ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and underrepresented; thus, they
fail to satisfy the seventh guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution12 dated October 11, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-161 (PLM), SPP No. 12-187
(PLM), SPP No. 12-188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-220 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and UNIMAD.
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaum's 13 nominees do not belong to the sectors which the party
represents, i.e., the urban poor, consumer, women and youth. While these include the women and youth
sectors, five of the party's six nominees are all male, and all of its nominees are above 30 years 14 of age.
Further, the COMELEC ruled that the personal circumstances of the nominees belie the claim that they
belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its first nominee 15 served as vice-president in a multinational
corporation; (2) its second nominee16 is the owner of a corporation engaged in the business of pineapple
contract growing with Del Monte Philippines; (3) its third nominee 17 is the owner and manager of two
business establishments; and (4) its sixth nominee 18 is an electrical engineer and three-term member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Finally, the COMELEC cited the party's failure to file
its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures when it participated in the 2010 Elections, despite having
been ordered to do so during the summary evidentiary hearing.
In ruling against ARAL,19 the COMELEC cited the party's "failure to comply, and for violation of election laws,
rules and regulations pursuant to Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, in connection with the fourth, sixth, and
seventh guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani."20 The Commission explained that while the party seeks to
represent the women and youth sectors, only the first of its seven nominees is a woman, and only its second
nominee is below 30 years of age. The Commission further took note that: first, some of its activities were
jointly conducted with religious organizations, and second, its fifth nominee is a pastor. "Although these
circumstances are not sufficient proof that the organization is itself a religious sect, denomination or
association and/or is organized for religious purposes, one nevertheless cannot but hold doubt." 21
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The registration of ARC22 was cancelled for the failure of its nominees to qualify. The party claims to
represent landless farmers, agrarian reform beneficiaries, fisherfolk, upland dwellers, indigenous people and
Bangsa Moro people.23 However, none of its nominees belongs to any of these sectors. In addition, the party
failed to prove that a majority of its members belong to the sectors that it seeks to represent. The party's
advocacy for the "development of the rural sectors" is also not limited to the cited sectors, as it may even
include sectors that are not marginalized and underrepresented.
UNIMAD24 claims to represent "the marginalized and underrepresented sectors which include young
professionals like drug counsellors and lecturers, veterans and the youth, among others." 25 For the
COMELEC, however, such sectors are not marginalized and underrepresented. The fight against illegal drugs
is an issue that interests the general public, and not just particular sectors of the society. There are also
existing laws, such as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and various specialized government agencies, such as the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), that already address

the problem of illegal drugs. In cancelling UNIMAD's registration, the COMELEC also cited the party's failure
to establish its track record as an organization. Furthermore, while the party claims to represent the youth
and young professionals, none of its nominees is aged below thirty years.
3. Omnibus Resolution26 dated October 16, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-196 (PLM), SPP No. 12-223
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-257 (PLM)
The main reason for the cancellation of 1BRO-PGBI's 27 registration was its failure to define the sector that it
seeks to represent. An affidavit executed by its second nominee indicates that the party represents
professionals, while its Manifestation of Intent indicates that it is multi-sectoral. For the COMELEC, such
differing statements from the party reveal that 1BRO-PGBI does not really intend to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Instead, it only seeks to represent its members, and that it is
more of a "fraternity/brotherhood composed mostly of military men with esoteric learnings." 28 The party's
nominees also did not appear to belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector, being a barangay
captain, consultant, guidance counselor, lawyer and retired captain/security consultant.
The registration of 1GANAP/GUARDIANS29 was also cancelled, following the COMELEC's finding that it is a
military fraternity. The Commission also cited the following grounds: first, there is a "glaring similarity
between 1GANAP/GUARDIANS and 1BRO-PGBI;"30 second, "it wishes to protect the interests of its members;
however, it failed to establish x x x the group's service outside the walls of its brotherhood ;" 31third, the
"community volunteer workers" sector which it seeks to represent is too broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and fourth, its nominees do not appear to belong to the said sector.
A BLESSED Party-List32 claims to represent farmers and fishermen in Region XI. The COMELEC resolved to
cancel its registration after finding that three of its seven nominees are "not themselves farmers and
fishermen, and none of its nominees are registered voters of Region XI, the particular region which they
seek to represent."33
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4. Resolution34 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP No. 12-260

The COMELEC cancelled the registration of 1-CARE 35 on the following grounds: (1) rural energy consumers,
the sector which 1-CARE intends to represent, is not marginalized and underrepresented; (2) the party's
track record and activities are almost exclusively related to electric cooperatives and not to rural energy
consumers; and (3) its nominees, all of whom are/were high-level officials of various electric cooperatives in
the country, do not belong to the sector of rural energy consumers.
5. Resolution36 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-201 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of APEC37 on the following grounds: (1) a review
of its constitution and by-laws shows that it does not represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector,
as it is merely an economic lobby group for the electric power industry; and (2) all of its nominees, being an
employee, electrical engineer, sugar planter and retired government employee, do not appear to belong to
the sector that the party claims to represent.
6. Resolution38 dated October 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-232 (PLM)
In cancelling AT's 39 registration and accreditation, the COMELEC ruled that: first, the party, which represents
the sectors of women, elderly, youth, labor and urban poor, does not appear to have a bona fide intention to
represent all these sectors, as it has, in fact, failed to uplift the welfare of all these sectors through the
authorship or sponsorship by its incumbent representative in Congress of house bills that are beneficial to
the elderly, youth and urban poor; and second, its nominees, being all professionals, do not belong to any of
the marginalized sectors that the party seeks to represent.

7. Omnibus Resolution40 dated October 24, 2012, which covers SPP Case No. 12-288 (PLM)
The COMELEC's resolution to cancel ARARO's 41 registration and accreditation was founded on the following:
(1) the separate interests of the peasant and urban poor sectors, which the party both represents, differ and
even oftentimes conflict; (2) most of its nominees cannot be considered members of any of these sectors, as
they reside "in the gated subdivisions of Metro Manila" 42; hence, such nominees can be considered more as
landowners, and not farmers as they claim themselves to be; (3) the party failed to show that three of its
nominees43 are among its bona fide members; (4) Its nominee Quirino De La Torre (De La Torre) appeared
to be a farmland owner, rather than an actual farmer; and (5) It failed to present any document to show
that its Board had resolved to participate in the May 2013 elections, and that De La Torre was authorized to
sign and file with the COMELEC the documents that are required for the said purpose.
8. Omnibus Resolution44 dated October 24, 2012, which covers SPP Case No. 12-279 (PLM), SPP No. 12-248
(PLM), SPP No. 12-263 (PLM), SPP No. 12-180 (PLM), SPP No. 12-229 (PLM), SPP No. 12-217 (PLM), SPP
No. 12-277 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG
MASDA and KAKUSA.
In AGRI's 45 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for more than a year immediately after the May 2010
elections, AGRI stopped existing as an organization, and this constitutes as a ground to cancel registration
under Section 6 of RA 7941; (2) its nominees did not appear to actually belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of peasants and farmers, which the party seeks to represent; (3) it submitted a
list of only four nominees, instead of five as mandated by Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no showing
that it undertook meaningful activities for the upliftment of its constituency.
AKMA-PTM's 46 registration as a party to represent the farmers sector was cancelled for its failure to show
that majority of its members and officers belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented. There was
also no proof that its first to fourth nominees, 47 who were an educator and persons engaged in business,
actually belonged to a marginalized and underrepresented sector. Its fifth to ninth nominees, although all
farmers, had not been shown to work on uplifting the lives of the members of their sector.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP48 (formerly Ako Agila ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka, Inc. Ako
Agila) on the following grounds: (1) its Manifestation of Intent and Certificate of Nomination were not signed
by an appropriate officer of the party, as required by Section 3, Rule 2 of Resolution No. 9366; (2) it failed
to show that it has continued to work for the betterment of the lives of the members of the sectors it
represents, i.e. farmers and peasants; and (3) it failed to show that its nominees actually belong to the
sectors which the party represents, or that they have undertaken meaningful activities which address the
concerns of said sectors.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AKO BAHAY49 for its failure to prove that its nominees actually
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector that the party seeks to represent, i.e., the urban
poor, or to have engaged in meaningful activities that tend to uplift and enrich the lives of the members of
said sector.
BANTAY50 claims to represent the "peasants, urban poor, workers and nationalistic individuals who have
stakes in promoting security of the country against insurgency, criminality and their roots in economic
poverty."51 The COMELEC held that the party failed to prove that the majority of its members belonged to
the marginalized and underrepresented. In addition, there was no proof that its first and third nominees, a
dentist and private sector employee/businesswoman, respectively, actually belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors which BANTAY seeks to represent.

The registration of PACYAW52 was cancelled on the following grounds: first, since the party desired to change
the sector to represent, i.e., from the "urban poor youth" sector to the "urban poor" sector, it needed to file
a new application for registration; second, it failed to show a credible track record of working for the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented; third, it failed to prove that majority of its officers and
members were from the urban poor sector; and fourth, its nominees are also not members of the urban
poor sector.
PASANG MASDA's 53 registration was cancelled on two grounds. First, it represents both drivers and
operators, who may have conflicting interests that may adversely affect the party's mandate to represent
both sectors. Second, its nominees are all operators or former operators, making the COMELEC question the
party's capacity to represent the interests of drivers.
The registration of KAKUSA,54 a party "organized to represent persons imprisoned without proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt,"55 was cancelled by the COMELEC for lack of proof that majority of its officers and
members belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The Commission also took note of its failure to
show that its incumbent representative has been working on any legislation in Congress to uplift the lives of
those whom the group allegedly represents. The party showed no credible track record, and its nominees,
being persons engaged in business, did not appear to be marginalized and underrepresented.
9. Resolution56 dated October 30, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-256 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled AG's 57 registration and accreditation on three grounds. First, the party failed to
appear during the summary hearing scheduled by the COMELEC. For the Commission, such failure shows the
party's "wanton disregard for the rules and regulations of the Commission" 58 and constitutes a sufficient
ground to cancel its registration under Rule 2, Section 2 (f) 59 of Resolution No. 9366. Second, the party does
not intend to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector, as evidenced by its lack of track
record. In addition, nowhere in its constitution, by-laws and platform of government does it state the
marginalized and underrepresented sector that it seeks to represent. It is only in its Memorandum later
submitted to the COMELEC that it mentions aiding the marginalized sectors of security guards, drivers,
vendors, tanods, small-scale businesses and the jobless. Third, its nominees do not belong to any of the
mentioned sectors.
10. Resolution60 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-185 (PLM)
ANAD's 61 registration and accreditation were cancelled by the COMELEC on several grounds. First, it does
not represent an identifiable marginalized and underrepresented sector, judging from the party's declared
"advocacies to publicly oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society, in
industries, in the academe and in the labor sector; to publicly oppose, denounce and counter all acts of
terrorism and insurgency; to preserve, protect and promote the democratic principles of good government
and governance by peaceful and democratic means under a regime of law and order; to generate and
provide avenues for the development of skills of its members as aide in providing income opportunities;
develop and implement livelihood programs for its members."62 Second, the party submitted a list of only
three nominees, in violation of Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366 that requires the submission of a list
of at least five nominees. Third, its nominees do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.Fourth, it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
National and Local Elections.
11. Omnibus Resolution63 dated November 7, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-060 (PLM), SPP No. 12-254
(PLM) and SPP 12-269 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K and ALIM.

The ruling against GREENFORCE64 was based on the following grounds: (1) the party is only an advocacy
group composed of environmental enthusiasts intending to take care of, protect and save Mother Earth and
the country's natural reserves from destruction or degradation; (2) even if a liberal stance is adopted on the
meaning of sectoral representation, the accreditation of GREENFORCE still merits cancellation for the party's
failure to prove its continuing compliance with the track record requirement; (3) based on their certificates
of acceptance, the personal circumstances of GREENFORCE's nominees demonstrate that they cannot be
classified as marginalized citizens. The first and second nominees are businessmen, the third and fourth
nominees are lawyers, leaving only the fifth nominee, a fish farmer, as the only marginalized citizen among
the nominees.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of FIRM 24-K 65 after finding that its nominees do not belong to the
sectors which the party represents. It pointed out that while FIRM 24-K supposedly represents the urban
poor and peasants in the National Capital Region, only two of its nominees actually reside therein. Also, the
COMELEC held that FIRM 24-K failed to prove its track record as an organization; that the photographs it
submitted, showing its tree-planting activities, are self-serving and incapable of exhibiting an organized
program for the urban poor.
ALIM's 66 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish that its nominees, or at least a majority of
them, are members of the indigenous people sector which the party seeks to represent. Only its first
nominee submitted a certificate from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), which
confirmed his membership with the Itawes Indigenous Cultural Communities. In addition, the COMELEC
explained that while ALIM's president, Fatani Abdul Malik, testified that their party specifically represents the
indigenous masses from Mindanao and the Cordilleras, only two of the party's five nominees hailed from
those areas. Finally, the party had nominees who did not appear to belong to a "marginalized class," being a
businessman, lawyer and real estate developer.
12. Resolution67 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-204 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of AAMA,68 the COMELEC held that the sectors it represents, namely,
employees, either skilled or ordinary labor, professionals directly engaged in mining activities or occupation
incidental thereto and non-government groups advocating advancement of responsible mining for national
progress, is a specifically defined group which may not be allowed registration under the party-list system.
In addition, AAMA failed to establish that its nominees actually represent and belong to said sectors, that
they have actively participated in the activities of AAMA, that they truly adhere to its advocacies, and are
bona fide members of the party.
13. Resolution69 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-272 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of SMART70 after finding that its nominees are disqualified from
representing the sectors which the party represents, i.e., workers, peasants, youth, students, women,
professionals and those belonging to sectors such as domestic helpers, vendors, drivers and construction
workers, since: first, the party claims to represent the youth sector, yet four of its five nominees are more
than 30 years of age while its fifth nominee would be more than 30 years of age on May 13, 2013; second,
the party claims to represent the women sector, yet four out of its five nominees are male; and third, its
nominees are composed of businessmen, a doctor, an executive chef and a computer programmer, who are
thus not marginalized. Also, the COMELEC observed that the party's activities do not specifically cater to the
interest and needs of the sectors which it represents. Lastly, the lack of restrictions in the class of persons
who may join SMART casts doubt as to whether a majority its members are indeed marginalized and
underrepresented.
14. Resolution71 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-173 (PLM)

The COMELEC held that the registration and accreditation in 2010 of ABP 72 as a party-list group was
defective. The party was initially accredited by the COMELEC in 2009 as a regional political party. In
November 2009, it only filed a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 2010 elections, instead of a
petition for registration under Section 5 of RA 7941. Acting on the recommendation of its Law Department,
the COMELEC accredited ABP as a party-list group on January 15, 2010. The COMELEC then ruled that ABP
could not be accredited for the May 2013 Elections as a party-list group sans the filing of a petition for
registration. Also, the COMELEC held that ABP does not represent any sector. While it claimed during the
summary evidentiary hearing that it represents construction workers and professionals, its constitution and
by-laws indicate that its membership is composed of men and women in Region V. Lastly, none of ABP's
nominees are employed in the construction industry.
15. Resolution73 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-210 (PLM)
BAYAN I74 claims to represent "the marginalized and underrepresented professional sector comprised of
millions of jobless and underemployed professionals such as the registered nurses, midwives, engineers,
lawyers, certified public accountants, among others."75 Its registration and accreditation were cancelled by
the COMELEC on the ground of its failure to prove a track record of trying to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sector of professionals. In addition, the party's second nominee, 76 being a businessman,
was declared unqualified to represent the sector of professionals.
16. Resolution77 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-252 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of AANI78 were cancelled on several grounds. First, the party has failed to
establish a track record of enhancing the lives of the marginalized and underrepresented farmers which it
claims to represent. Its activities that include relief operations and consultative meetings did not appear to
primarily benefit the said sector. Second, more than majority of the party's nominees are not farmers,
contrary to the seventh guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani that a party's nominees must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector to be represented.
17. Resolution79 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-292 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of A-IPRA,80 which claims to represent and advance the interests of
indigenous peoples, were cancelled on the ground of its failure to prove that its five nominees are "indeed
indigenous people; have actively participated in the undertakings of A-IPRA; truly adhere to its advocacies;
and most of all, that the said nominees are its bona fide members." 81
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18. Resolution82 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-202 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of COCOFED 83 on several grounds. First, the party
is already affiliated with a number of coconut agencies, both private and government. COCOFED admits that
it sits in the board of the United Coconut Association of the Philippines (UCAP), the Philippine Coconut
Research and Development Foundation (PCRDF), Coconut Investment Co. (CIC), Cocofed Marketing
Corporation (CMC) and the Quezon Coconut Planters Savings and Loan Bank (QCPSLB). Such circumstance
negates the claim that it is still marginalized. Second, a party-list group must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded by the government. Contrary to this guideline, COCOFED openly
admits that it is assisted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in various farmer-oriented projects.
Third, COCOFED's nominees are not members of the marginalized sector of coconut farmers and producers,
which the party claims to represent.
19. Resolution84 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-238 (PLM)

ABANG LINGKOD's 85 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish a track record of continuously
representing marginalized and underrepresented peasant farmers. Further, the party failed to show that its
members actually belong to the sector which it claims to represent. As regards the qualification of ABANG
LINGKOD's nominees, there was a failure to show that they are themselves marginalized and
underrepresented, that they have actively participated in programs for the advancement of peasant farmers,
and that they truly adhere to the advocacies of ABANG LINGKOD.
20. Resolution86 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-158 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of ABROAD 87 were cancelled on several grounds. First, the party was
accredited as a regional multi-sectoral party to represent the sectors of labor, overseas workers,
professionals, urban poor and peasants. However, the documents submitted by the party indicate that it only
advances the welfare of the labor, overseas workers and professionals sectors, and fails to champion the
causes of the urban poor and peasants sectors. In addition, while the party was registered way back in
September 2009, the documents presented to prove its track record only show its activities beginning
January 15, 2011. The COMELEC held, "(w)hat transpired from September 4, 2009 to December 2010 is a
puzzle to us. ABROAD could have already carried out its purposes and platform of government in this period
of time to promote the interests of its members, but it did not." 88 Third, ABROAD's nominees do not fall
under any of the sectors which the party seeks to represent.
21. Resolution89 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-228 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of BINHI 90 on the following grounds: (1) the
party's component organization, the Cabanatuan City Seed Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CCSGMPC),
being a cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), cannot be
considered as a marginalized or underrepresented sectoral organization as it already receives ample
assistance, attention and protection from the State through the CDA; (2) being a cooperative, the party
receives assistance from the government through the Department of Agriculture, in violation of the fifth
guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani; and (3) while it may appear from the documents submitted during the
summary evidentiary hearing that BINHI/CCSGMPC indeed promotes the interests and concerns of peasants,
farmers and farm tillers, there is no proof, however, that the group, as a whole, is marginalized and
underrepresented.
22. Resolution91 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-136 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of BUTIL 92 were cancelled on two grounds. First, in the Judicial Affidavit
submitted by its Secretary General to the Comelec, it is stated that the party represents "members of the
agriculture and cooperative sector." For the COMELEC, BUTIL failed to establish that the "agricultural and
cooperative sectors" are marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the party's nominees neither appear
to belong to the sectors which they seek to represent, nor to have actively participated in the undertakings
of the party.
23. Resolution93 dated December 3, 2012 in SPP No. 12-194 (PLM)
1st KABAGIS94 was found by the COMELEC to have ceased to exist after the 2010 elections. The documents
which it submitted to prove its continued existence were substantially the same as those it presented to
support its petition for registration in 2009. Furthermore, 1st KABAGIS appeared to have "recycled the
documentation of its activities in 2009 to deliberately mislead the Commission to believe that it has existed
continuously."95 For the COMELEC, these circumstances constitute sufficient grounds for the cancellation of
the party's registration, as provided in Section 6 (6) and (7) of RA 7941 on a party's declaration of
untruthful statements in the petition and failure to exist for at least one year. Finally, the COMELEC took
note that while 1st KABAGIS intends to represent the labor, fisherfolks and the urban poor indigenous
cultural communities sectors, none of its five nominees belong to any of these sectors.

24. Resolution96 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-198 (PLM)

The COMELEC cancelled 1-UTAK's 97 accreditation, holding that: First, the party does not factually and truly
represent a marginalized sector considering that drivers and operators, which 1-UTAK seeks to both
represent, have diametrically opposing interests. The advocacy of drivers pertains to wages and benefits
while operators are mainly concerned with their profits. Second, the party's nominees do not belong to any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The party did not even include among its nominees a
representative from the drivers' sector.
25. Resolution98 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS,99 the COMELEC explained that, first, its nominees during
the May 2010 elections had agreed on a term-sharing agreement, which circumvented Section 7, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution that mandates a three-year term for members of the House of Representatives. The
term-sharing agreement was also declared contrary to public policy since a given term of public office
cannot be made subject to any agreement of the parties; it is not a commodity that can be shared,
apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. The Commission further cited Section 7, Rule 4 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, and emphasized that a violation or failure to comply with laws, rules and
regulations relating to elections is, pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA 7941, a ground for the cancellation of a
party's registration.
26. Resolution100 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 11-002
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant the registration and
accreditation of PBB101 as an NCR Political Party, but prohibited it from participating in the 2013 party-list
elections based on the following grounds: (1) the party does not represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as it is composed of businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and ordinary
citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social justice, and environmental protection and
utilization for sustainable development; (2) it failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and (3) it
failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of the
COMELEC divisions' resolutions favoring new registrants also resulted in the COMELEC En Banc's issuance of
several resolutions. It reversed the rulings of the Commission's divisions through the issuance of the
following:
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1. Resolution102 dated November 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-099 (PLM)

ASIN's 103 petition for registration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on the following grounds: first, the
"artists" sector, which is among the sectors which ASIN seeks to represent, is not considered marginalized
and underrepresented under RA 7941 and relevant jurisprudence; second, ASIN failed to prove its track
record as an organization, there being no sufficient evidence to show that it had performed acts that tend to
advance the interest of the sectors which it seeks to represent; and third, ASIN failed to show that its
nominees are qualified under the provisions of RA 7941 and the guidelines laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution104 dated November 27, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-041 (PLM) and SPP No. 12011 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied the registration of Manila Teachers and ALA-EH.

In denying Manila Teachers'105 petition, the COMELEC En Banc reasoned that a non-stock savings and loan
association cannot be considered a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system of
representation, for being neither a part of the "working class," "service class," "economically deprived,"
social outcasts," "vulnerable" and "work impaired."106 Furthermore, the COMELEC held that a non-stock
savings and loan association is mandated to engage, exclusively, in the legitimate business of a non-stock
savings and loan association; thus, the very foundation of its organization would be forfeited should it
pursue its party-list campaign.107 Even granting that Manila Teachers may seek registration under the partylist system as a group representing public school teachers, the fact that its first and second nominees are
not teachers by profession adversely affects the party's application.
The denial of ALA-EH's 108 petition was based on its failure to show that its members, particularly
businessmen, sports enthusiasts, donors and hobbyists, belong to an identifiable group of persons which the
law considers as marginalized. Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the group's nominees did not
appear to be qualified, as they were individuals doing financially well in their respective businesses that do
not contribute to the welfare of Filipino athletes and sports enthusiasts. 109
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3. Resolution110 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-057 (PLM)

The COMELEC En Banc denied 1AAAP's 111 petition on the ground of the failure of the party's nominees to
qualify. While the group seeks registration as a regional political party under Region XI, its third and fourth
nominees112 are not residents of the said region. For the COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance disqualifies
them as nominees, for "it would be difficult for the said nominees to represent the interest of 1AAAP's
supposed constituency who are residents and voters of Region XI." 113 In addition, the group failed to satisfy
the second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani, with the Comelec En Banc taking note that four 114 of its five
nominees do not belong to any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
4. Resolution115 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-104 (PL)
AKIN116 claims to be an organization of health workers and social workers from urban poor communities. The
denial of its petition is founded on the group's failure to show that its nominees belong to the urban poor
sector. Its first and second nominees117 are lawyers, its second nominee118 is a retired government employee,
its fourth nominee119 is an accountant/social volunteer worker, and its fifth nominee120 is a secretary.
5. Resolution121 dated November 29, 2012 in SPP No. 12-011 (PP)
AAB122 applied for registration as a regional political party in Region VIII, allegedly with "constituencies
composed of the men and women (registered voters) of Region VIII, its provinces, cities, municipalities and
all other Bisayans from the other parts of the Philippines whose roots can be traced to the Bisayan Regions
of Region VIII x x x."123 In denying AAB's petition, the COMELEC En Banc cited the following grounds: first,
the records do not show that the group represents a marginalized sector of the society, other than by its
claim to have formed a sectoral wing, the Association of Bisayan Farmers-R8 (ABF-R8), registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 4, 2012 and aiming to pursue legislation and programs
for the benefit of the Bisayan farmers in Region VIII; second, AAB's alleged constituencies in Region VIII are
not underrepresented because they already have their district representatives in Congress; third, granting
that ABF-R8 is a legitimate sectoral group of AAB, it has been in existence only since May 4, 2012, putting
into question its track record of representing peasants and farmers; and fourth, its nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants three are lawyers, and the two others are company employees.
6. Resolution124 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP Case Nos. 12-009 (PP) and 12-165 (PLM)
Although the COMELEC En Banc affirmed AI's 125 registration as a regional political party in Region VI, it
denied the party's registration under the party-list system on several grounds. First, the party failed to show

that it represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector, considering that the Province of Iloilo already
has "no less than five (5) incumbent district representatives in Congress." 126 Second, the party made
untruthful statements in the
Memorandum it filed with the COMELEC, when it claimed that some of its nominees are members of its
sectoral wings Patlad-Cayos Farmers' Association (Patlad-Cayos) and Alyansa ng Industriya ng Bigas (ANIB),
composed of farmers and NFA-accredited retailers, respectively. The COMELEC En Banc took note that none
of its nominees are farmers and food retailers, judging from their occupations or professions as declared in
the certificates of acceptance to their nominations. Third, AI's fourth nominee 127 has withdrawn his
acceptance to his nomination, while its first128 and fifth129 nominees have filed their certificates of candidacy
for local elective positions in Iloilo.
7. Resolution130 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-175 (PL)
ALONA131 claims to be an aggrupation of citizen groups composed of homeowners' associations, urban poor,
elderly organizations, young professionals, overseas Filipino workers, women, entrepreneurs, cooperatives,
fisherfolk, farmers, labor, transport, vendors and youth groups. In ruling against the party's petition, the
COMELEC En Banc cited: first, the group's failure to establish how it can represent all these fourteen (14)
sectors which have different, even conflicting, causes and needs; second, the sectors of homeowners
associations, entrepreneurs and cooperatives are not marginalized and underrepresented; and third, three of
the party's nominees, a businessman and two lawyers, do not belong to any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Among the petitioners, only the petitions for registration of ALAM, KALIKASAN, PPP and GUARDJAN were
denied by a division of the COMELEC in the first instance. The divisions' rulings were elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc by virtue of motions for reconsideration, which were resolved via the following
Resolutions:
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1. Resolution132 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP 12-127 (PL)

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's finding that ALAM 133 failed to sufficiently
prove its track record as an organization, and to show that it actually represents and seeks to uplift the
marginalized and the underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the myriad of sectors
which ALAM seeks to represent, i.e., community print journalists, news dealers, news sellers, newsboys,
tribesmen who learned to love the liberty of the press, B laan tribesmen who cry for ancestral lands, urban
poor or informal settlers, drivers and small-time operators of transport units, poor residents in urban
barangays, and labor and jury system advocates, is too broad and unrelated to one another. Although there
is no prohibition against multi-sectoral representation in the party-list system, a party, organization or
coalition which seeks registration must be capable of serving fully all the sectors which it seeks to represent.
2. Resolution134 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-061 (PP)
KALIKASAN,135 a group which claims to be a pro-environment political party representing the sectors of
workers, informal settlers, women, youth, elderly, fisherfolks, handicapped, overseas workers and ordinary
professionals who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and environmental
degradation,136was denied registration, on the following grounds: (1) the principles and objectives stated in
its constitution and by-laws reflect an advocacy for the protection of the environment rather than for the
causes of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent; (2) there is no proof that
majority of its membership belong to the marginalized and underrepresented; (3) it seeks to represent
sectors with conflicting interests; and (4) its nominees do not belong to any of the sectors which the party
claims to represent.

3. Resolution137 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP No. 12-145 (PL)

GUARDJAN's 138 petition for registration was denied on the ground of its failure to prove its membership base
and solid track record. The group failed to present the activities that sufficiently benefited its intended
constituency of guards, utility helpers, aiders, riders, drivers, domestic helpers, janitors, agents and
nannies. Its nominees were also found to be unqualified, as they do not belong to any of the sectors which
GUARDJAN seeks to represent; rather, they are the owner, consultant or manager of agencies which employ
security guards. For the COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance will only result in a conflict of interest
between the owners or managers of security agencies on one hand, and the security guards on the other.
4. Resolution139 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 12-073 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings of the COMELEC First Division, which cited in its Resolution 140the
failure of PPP141 to show a constituency of marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The group claims to
represent the entire four provinces and five cities of Region XII, all already belonging to eight congressional
districts, and already represented by eight district congressmen. Furthermore, the group has failed to show
a track record of undertaking programs that are aimed at promoting the welfare of the group or any sector
that it claims to represent.
The issuance by the COMELEC En Banc of the foregoing resolutions prompted the filing of the present
petitions, which delve primarily on the following contentions:
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First, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 9513. The petitioners challenge the COMELEC En Banc's authority
under the Resolution to conduct an automatic review of its division's resolutions notwithstanding the
absence of a motion for reconsideration. For the petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc cannot dismiss with the
procedural requirement on the filing of motions for reconsideration under Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure before it can review a decision or resolution rendered by any of its divisions in quasijudicial proceedings.
As regards the COMELEC's resolve to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, the continuing
compliance of previously-registered and accredited party-list groups, the COMELEC En Banc denied the
parties of their right to due process and has violated the principle of res judicata that should have otherwise
worked in the petitioners' favor. Further, the COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers, which they
claim to include the cancellation of existing registration and accreditation, could not have been exercised at
the first instance by the COMELEC En Banc, but should have been first decided by a division of the
Commission.
Second, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in refusing or cancelling the petitioners' registration and accreditation under the party-list
system. The petitioners assail the COMELEC En Banc's appreciation of facts and application of pertinent laws
and jurisprudence, especially the eight-point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani, in determining their sectors',
groups' and nominees' respective qualifications.
Given the common questions and the similarity in the issues that are raised in the 53 subject petitions, the
Court has resolved, through its Resolutions of November 13, 2012, November 20, 2012, November 27,
2012, December 4, 2012, December 11, 2012 and February 19, 2013 to consolidate the petitions, and
require the COMELEC to comment thereon.
With the petitioners' inclusion in their respective petitions of prayers for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court also ordered, via the afore-mentioned
resolutions, the issuance of Status Quo Ante Orders (SQAOs) in all the petitions.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the respondent COMELEC, filed its Consolidated
Comments on the petitions. In refuting the petitioners' claim of grave abuse of discretion against the
COMELEC, the OSG submitted the following arguments: 142
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First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing party-list groups' or organizations' compliance with the
requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by jurisprudence on the party-list system. The OSG
cites Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which enumerates the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, giving emphasis on paragraph 1 thereof that gives the Commission the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, and paragraph 5 that cites the
Commission's power to register political parties, organizations or coalitions.
Second, the COMELEC's review of the parties' qualifications was a valid exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc could have, even at the first instance, ruled on it.
Third, the requirements of due process were satisfied because the petitioners were given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC's resolve to suspend its own rules was sanctioned by law,
as it was aimed for a speedy disposition of matters before the Commission.
Furthermore, no petitioner had previously questioned the procedure that was adopted by the COMELEC on
the review of the parties' registration; instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the Commission's
jurisdiction and actively participated in its proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds for denial and cancellation of a group's registration, as
provided by statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG specifically cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and
the eight-point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Fifth, the COMELEC's findings of fact in each petitioner's case are supported by substantial evidence; thus,
are final and non-reviewable as provided in Section 5, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In prcis, the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions concern two main issues: the procedural issue as to the
COMELEC En Banc's power to automatically review a decision of its division without the requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration, and the substantive issue as to the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in denying or cancelling the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system of the petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencia's rulings on the procedural issue; however, consistent with afore-quoted
pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani,143 I signify my strong dissent on major points in the
ponencia's resolution of the substantive issue, including its discussions on the nature of the party-list system
and its disposition on the qualifications of political parties which seek to participate under the party-list
system of representation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the new standards that the ponencia now provides
for party-list groups, the remand of all 53 petitions to the COMELEC is unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect The Powers and Functions of the COMELEC
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and
administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history in the 1935 Constitution. From then,
the powers and functions of the COMELEC had continuously been expounded to respond to the call of
contemporary times. In Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, 144 the Court briefly noted:
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Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased
from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country's awareness of the need to provide
greater regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935
Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMEsLEC were defined as follows:
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SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free,
orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review
by the Supreme Court. x x x
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973 Constitution:

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(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution, x x x 145

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Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the authority of the COMELEC is evident in the grant of
several other powers upon the Commission, specifically under Section 2, Article IX-C thereof which reads:

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Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

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1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IX-C partakes of the
general grant of the power to the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The authority given to the COMELEC
under this provision encapsulates all the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in
providing this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide latitude in dealing with matters under
its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the performance of its functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent
of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 146 The rest of the enumeration
in the mentioned provision constitutes the COMELEC's specific powers.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELEC's powers can further be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and, in limited instances, judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the
Commission embraces the power to resolve controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to
be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement
the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.
Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. 147
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In Baytan v. COMELEC,148 the Court had the occasion to pass upon the classification of the powers being
exercised by the COMELEC, thus:
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The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of
Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative
powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers
in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions."
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed,
this has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx

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(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 149 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction on the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is crucial to the procedure which
has to be observed so as to stamp an official action with validity. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon
motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc. 150 Section 3 of Article IX-C states:
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Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon
directly by the COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through any of its divisions. 151
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The Issuance of Resolution No. 9513 as an Implement of the Power to Register Political Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions
One of the specific powers granted to the COMELEC is the power to register political parties, organizations
and coalitions articulated in Section 2(5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus:
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(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
xxx
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized. Registration and the formal recognition that
accompanies it are required because of the Constitution's concern about the character of the organizations
officially participating in the elections.152 Specifically, the process of registration serves to filter the applicants
for electoral seats and segregate the qualified from the ineligible. The purity of this exercise is crucial to the
achievement of orderly, honest and peaceful elections which the Constitution envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The COMELEC does not
simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes to its office and manifests its intent to
participate in the elections. Registration entails the possession of qualifications. The party seeking
registration must first present its qualifications before registration will follow as a matter of course.
Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political parties, organizations and
coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its general power to enforce and administer
election laws is being realized. The exercise of this power must thus be construed in a manner that will aid
the COMELEC in fulfilling its duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who
possess the qualifications set by the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it imperative to promulgate Resolution No. 9513. The
said Resolution seeks to manage the registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions that are
aspiring to participate in the 2013 National and Local Elections, with the objective of ensuring that only

those parties, groups or organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the partylist system are registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En Banc to automatically review all pending registration of
party-list groups, organizations and coalitions and to set for summary evidentiary hearings all those that
were previously registered to determine continuing compliance. To effectively carry out the purpose of the
Resolution, the COMELEC suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically the
requirement for a motion for reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number of applicants for registration as party-list group,
organization or coalition were denied registration by the COMELEC En Banc, while several others that were
previously registered and/or accredited were stripped of their status as registered and/or accredited partylist groups, organizations or coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that the action of the COMELEC En Banc was well-within
its authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble understanding of the nature of the powers being
exercised by the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed depends. Indeed, in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, the COMELEC En Banc does not have the authority to assume jurisdiction without the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. The filing of a motion for reconsideration presupposes that the case had been
heard, passed upon and disposed by the COMELEC Division before the same is subjected to review of the
COMELEC En Banc.
In Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,153 the Court defined quasi-judicial power, to wit:

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Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper
exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. 154
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To be clear, the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers in deciding election contests where, in the course
of the exercise of its jurisdiction, it holds hearings and exercises discretion of a judicial nature; it receives
evidence, ascertains the facts from the parties' submissions, determines the law and the legal rights of the
parties, and on the basis of all these, decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. 155
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However, the registration of political parties, organizations and coalitions stated in Section 2(5) of Article IXC of the Constitution involves the exercise of administrative power. The Court has earlier declared in Baytan
that Sections 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Article IX-C pertain to the administrative powers of
the COMELEC.156 It reiterated this pronouncement in Bautista v. COMELEC 157 where it further deliberated on
the distinctions between the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC. And recently, in
Magdalo v. COMELEC,158 it made a categorical pronouncement that the power of the COMELEC to register
political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character.159
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Distinguishing the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is relevant because of the different
set of rules that applies to each. For instance, in Canicosa v. COMELEC, 160 the Court stressed that matters
falling under the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En
Banc. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution underscores the requirement for a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action in quasi-judicial proceedings.
The COMELEC's determination as to whether a party is a political party entitled to registration is an exercise
of its constitutional power of administering the laws relative to the conduct of elections. 161 The same
principle applies in the registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions. In the process of
registration, the COMELEC determines whether the applicant possesses all the qualifications required under
the law. There are no contending parties or actual controversy. It is merely the applicant proving his
qualifications to participate in the elections.
The foregoing ratiocination, however, does not suggest that the COMELEC En Banc can forthwith act on
pending petitions for registration and subject previously-registered party list groups, organizations and
coalitions to summary evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance simply because it is
administrative in nature. Indeed, it may do so, but only with respect to the latter group.
I distinguish between (1) new or pending petitions for registration (referred to as the first group), and; (2)
previously registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations and coalitions (referred to as the
second group).
As regards the first group, the COMELEC En Banc cannot directly act on new petitions for registration as
there is a specific procedure governing the performance of this function. It bears noting that pursuant to the
authority vested in the COMELEC to promulgate rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of
cases,162 it drafted the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which will govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Commission. Under Section 32 of the said Rules, the registration of political parties or
organizations is classified under Special Proceedings, together with annulment of permanent list of voters
and accreditation of citizen's arms of the Commission. In relation to this, Section 3 of Rule 3 states:
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Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions - The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and
decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies,
contempt, and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arm of the Commission. (Emphasis
ours)
The same rule applies to the registration of party-list groups, organizations or coalitions. Thus, petitions for
registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions are first heard by the COMELEC Division before
they are elevated to the En Banc on motion for reconsideration. It is this requirement for a motion for
reconsideration of the resolutions of the COMELEC Division granting new petitions for registration that the
COMELEC suspended in Resolution No. 9513. In doing so, the COMELEC resorted to Section 4, Rule 1 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
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Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.
Surely, the suspension of the rule will serve the greater interest of justice and public good since the
objective is to purge the list of registrants of those who are not qualified to participate in the elections of
party-list representatives in Congress. Ultimately, it will help secure the electoral seats to the intended
beneficiaries of RA 7941 and, at the same time, guard against fly-by-night groups and organizations that are
seeking for the opportune time to snatch a chance. By virtue of the suspension of the requirement for
motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc may then automatically review pending petitions for
registration and determine if the qualifications under the law are truly met. It is a measure that was pursued

in order that the COMELEC may fulfill its duty to ensure the purity of elections. And, as the rules of
procedure are designed to facilitate the COMELEC's performance of its duties, it must never be a stumbling
block in achieving the very purpose of its creation.
With respect to the second group, the COMELEC En Banc may directly order the conduct of summary
evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance considering that there is no specific procedure on
this matter. The petitioners cannot invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure since
this provision relates only to new petitions for registration. Absent a special rule or procedure, the COMELEC
En Banc may directly act or perform an otherwise administrative function, consistent with our
pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject previously-registered and/or accredited party-list groups,
organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary hearing emanates from its general power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election 163 and duty to ensure "free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."164 Part and parcel of this duty is the maintenance of a list of
qualified candidates. Correlative to this duty of the COMELEC is the duty of the candidate or, in this case, the
registered party-list groups, organizations or coalitions to maintain their qualifications.
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring
participants in the party-list system of representation to satisfactorily show that they have the required
qualifications stated in the law and prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or organization
applying for registration in the first instance must present sufficient evidence to establish its qualifications. It
is only upon proof of possession of qualifications that registration follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration. Party-list groups and organizations that are previously
allowed registration and/or accreditation are duty-bound to maintain their qualifications.
In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 165 the Court emphasized:

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Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 166
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It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a candidate who was allowed to participate in the
elections and hold office does not give him a vested right to retain his position notwithstanding loss of
qualification. The elective official must maintain his qualifications lest he loses the right to the office he is
holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public office does not exempt him
from establishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for reelection. He must maintain and attest to
his qualifications every time he is minded to join the electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of
candidacy even if he is an incumbent elective official or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding
elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations and coalitions must also establish
their continuing compliance with the requirements of the law which are specific to those running under the
party-list system of representation. Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to participate in the
election. The basis of the right to participate in the elections remains to be the possession of qualifications.
Resolution No. 9513 is a formal recognition of the COMELEC's duty to ensure that only those who are
qualified must be allowed to run as party-list representative. It cannot be defeated by a claim of previous
registration.

Therefore, it is my view that the COMELEC cannot be estopped from cancelling existing registration and/or
accreditation in case the concerned party-list group or organization failed to maintain its qualifications. Being
the authority which permits registration and/or accreditation, it also has the power to cancel the same in the
event that the basis of the grant no longer exists.
Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and existing registration
and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has
been repeatedly cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. 167
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Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four (4) elements, viz.:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of
the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.168
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Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division, allowing the registration of the applicant party-list groups
and organizations do not partake of a final judgment or order. A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g. an adjudication on
the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is right. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as
far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. 169
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The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be considered an adjudication on the merits since they do
not involve a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts disclosed in
the pleadings or in the issues presented during the trial.170 They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that
the applicant party-list or organization possesses the qualifications for registration. They do not involve the
settlement of conflicting claims; it is merely an initiatory procedure for the conduct of elections. On the
other hand, previous registration and/or accreditation only attests to the fact that the concerned party-list
group, organization or coalition satisfactorily proved its qualifications to run as party-list representative in
the immediately preceding elections. It does not, however, create a vested right in favor of the registered
party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also become final as to exempt the party-list group or
organization from proving his qualifications in the succeeding elections. As in individual candidate, a partylist group, organization or coalition desiring to participate in the elections must possess the required
qualifications every time it manifests its intent to participate in the elections. It must prove and attest to its
possession of the required qualifications every time it bids for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even made more apparent by the fact that the group,
organization or coalition which was denied registration may still apply for registration in succeeding elections
and even be allowed registration provided that the qualifications are met.
The same holds true with previously registered and/or accredited party-list group, organization or coalition
which was stripped of its registration and/or accreditation.
Procedural due process was properly
observed.

There is even no merit in the petitioners' claim that their right to procedural due process was violated by the
COMELEC's automatic review and conduct of summary evidentiary hearings under Resolution No. 9513.
As regards the first group, I have explained why I deem the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules on
motions for reconsideration justified, given its duty to ensure that votes cast by the electorate in the partylist elections will only count for qualified party-list groups, in the end that the system's ideals will be
realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative proceedings is that a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side satisfies the requirements of due process. Its essence is embodied in the basic
requirements of notice and the real opportunity to be heard. 171
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Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the minimum requirements of due
notice and hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal and/or cancellation of a party,
organization or coalition's registration under the party-list system. It reads:
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Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
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x x x (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were denied of their right to procedural process. We shall
not disregard the proceedings that ensued before the COMELEC's divisions, before whom the groups were
given due notice and the ample opportunity to present and substantiate their plea for registration. The
COMELEC En Banc's resolution to later review the resolutions of its divisions did not render insignificant such
due process already accorded to the groups, especially as we consider that the En Banc decided on the basis
of the evidence submitted by the groups before the divisions, only that it arrived at factual findings and
conclusions that differed from those of the latter.
The second group's right to procedural process was also unimpaired, notwithstanding the COMELEC's
conduct of the summary evidentiary hearings for the purpose of determining the parties' continuing
compliance with rules on party-list groups. The notice requirement was satisfied by the COMELEC through its
issuance of the Order dated August 2, 2012172, which notified the party-list groups of the Commission's
resolve to conduct summary evidentiary hearings, the dates thereof, and the purpose for which the hearings
shall be conducted. The specific matters that are expected from them by the Commission are also identified
in the Order, as it provides:
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To simplify the proceedings, the party-list groups or organizations thru counsel/s shall submit the
following:
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1. The names of witness/es who shall be the Chairperson, President or Secretary General of the party-list
groups, organization or coalition;
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2. Judicial Affidavit/s of the witness/es to be submitted at prior to the scheduled hearing; and
3. Other documents to prove their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the
guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case.173 (Emphasis supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners' claim that they were not informed of the grounds for which their
existing registration and/or accreditation shall be tested, considering that the parameters by which the
parties' qualifications were to be assessed by the COMELEC were explained in the Order.

That the parties were duly notified is further supported by their actual participation in the scheduled
hearings and their submission of evidence they deemed sufficient which, in turn, satisfied the requirement
on the opportunity to be heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated petitions is that the COMELEC erred in assessing their
qualifications which eventually led to the denial of their petitions for registration and cancellation of their
registration and/or accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence is
imperative.
The Party-List System of
Representation
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch position that the party-list system, being a
complement of the social justice provisions in the Constitution, is primarily intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; the ideals of social justice permeates every provision in the
Constitution, including Section 5(2), Article VI on the party-list system.
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. 174 It is not simply a
mechanism for electoral reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working
and existing electoral system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from which the law
breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the underprivileged and allowing them an
opportunity to grow, they can rise to become partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.
The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically underscored in the 1987 Constitution. The strong
desire to incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the pillars of the present Constitution was brought
forth by the intent to perpetually safeguard democracy against social injustices, desecration of human rights
and disrespect of the laws which characterized the dark pages of our history. It is reminiscent of the unified
and selfless movement of the people in EDSA who, minuscule in power and resources, braved the streets
and reclaimed their freedom from the leash of dictatorship. The gallantry and patriotism of the masses and
their non-negotiable demand to reclaim democracy are the inspirations in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a state which recognizes social justice at the forefront of
its policies brought them to propose a separate article on social justice and human rights. Initially, the
proposed provision defined social justice as follows:
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SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic, political, moral imperative, shall be the primary
consideration of the State in the pursuit of national development. To this end, Congress shall give the
highest priority to the formulation and implementation of measures designed to reduce economic and
political inequalities found among citizens, and to promote the material structural conditions which promote
and enhance human dignity, protect the inalienable rights of persons and sectors to health, welfare and
security, and put the material wealth and power of the community at the disposal of the common good.

SECTION 2. Towards these ends, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its fruits, promote the establishment of self-reliant, socio-political and economic structures
determined by the people themselves, protect labor, rationalize the use and disposition of land, and ensure
the satisfaction of the basic material needs of all. 175 (Emphasis supplied)
In her sponsorship speech, Commissioner Nieva delved into the primacy of the promotion of social justice in
the ideals that the Constitution will carry. She explained:
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Our Committee hopes that social justice will be the centerpiece of the 1986 Constitution. The rationale for
this is that social justice provides the material and social infrastructure for the realization of basic human
rights the enhancement of human dignity and effective participation in democratic processes. Rights, dignity
and participation remain illusory without social justice.
Our February 1986 Revolution was not merely against the dictatorship nor was it merely a fight for the
restoration of human rights; rather, this popular revolution was also a clamor for a more equitable share of
the nation's resources and power, a clamor which reverberated in the many public hearings which the
Constitutional Commission conducted throughout the country.
If our 1986 Constitution would enshrine the people's aspirations as dramatically expressed in the revolution
and ensure the stability, peace and progress of our nation, it must provide for social justice in a stronger and
more comprehensive manner than did the previous Constitutions.
xxx
In Sections 1 and 2, the provisions mandate the State to give social justice the highest priority to promote
equality in the social, economic and political life of the nation through the redistribution of our resources,
wealth and power for the greater good.176
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Further in the deliberations, Commissioner Bennagen remarked on the aspects of social justice, viz:

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MR. BENNAGEN: x x x
We did not fail to incorporate aspects of attitudinal change, as well as structural change, and these are fairly
evident in the first two sections. As indicated in Section 1, we did emphasize that social justice should be a
social, economic, political and moral imperative. The moral component is important because we feel that a
justice provision should be on the side of the poor, the disadvantaged, the so-called deprived and the
oppressed. This is a point that has been raised a number of times especially by social scientists. Specifically,
I would like to mention Dr. Mahar Mangahas who, in his extensive studies on social justice, feels that the
State itself has been a major source of injustice and that, therefore, the State should be able to correct that
and must assume a moral stance in relation to the poor, the deprived and the oppressed, a moral stance
that we feel should also permeate the bureaucracy, the technocracy and eventually, with the changes in
structures, also the whole of our Philippine society.177 (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the ends discussed by the framers of the Constitution, they came up with Article XIII which
specifically deals with Social Justice and Human Rights. Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution carries the
positive command to the Congress to uphold social justice. It reads:
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Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
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One of the modes by which the Constitution seeks to achieve social justice is through the introduction of the
party-list system. Sections 5(1) and (2), Article VI thereof provide:
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Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that the provisions on party-list system of representation are not self-executing, the Congress
enacted RA 7941. The said law defined the parameters of the party-list system, the procedural guidelines
and the qualifications of those intending to participate in the exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature
did not mean to depart from the impetus which impelled the members of the Constitutional Commission to
provide for this scheme of representation -- social justice. The underlying principle remains to be the
reduction of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and political power. Certainly, there could be no
other intended beneficiaries for this provision than the powerless and underprivileged. It could not have
been intended for those who already have the power and resources who may be lesser in number but are in
command of the machinery of the government.
As so fervently declared in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system of is a social justice
mechanism, designed to distribute political power. In the said case, the Court held:
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The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy.178
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The objective to hold the party-list system for the benefit of the marginalized and underrepresented is
expressed in clear language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It reads:
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Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis ours)
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of registered national, regional and sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions in the party-list elections are qualified by three (3) limiting characteristics: (1)
they must consist of Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations or coalitions; (2) who lack well-defined political constituencies, (3) but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The term

"marginalized and underrepresented" effectively limits the party-list system to sectors which directly need
support and representation. The law could not have deemed to benefit even those who are already
represented in the House of Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the powerful and the
underprivileged. In empowering the powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality in favor of the
marginalized and underrepresented if genuine social justice must be achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and underrepresented, which was first articulated by former
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani, was later affirmed and reiterated by no less than
another former Chief Justice of this Court, Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite separate opinion in BANAT v.
COMELEC.179 He forcefully articulated:
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History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their voice, even as they are
relegated to the sidelines as genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of
this underlying premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is
within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of major political parties to the party-list system.
xxx
x x x With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when we interpret the
Constitution to give utmost deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people.
More than the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of the
Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in
interpreting the Constitution. x x x
xxx
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its
every section and clause. We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid
rendering some words idle and nugatory. The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related
constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus,
under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, the President was permitted to fill by appointment the seats
reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the
respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the elected Members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral representation
and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled
status of dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the
President was given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral
representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the
process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation."
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from
participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women
to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service
of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions
and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private
sector in the national economy.
xxx

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the
1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to
address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our
poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the
machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized,
frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the
graveyard of the party-list system.
The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of the law and the
sacred intention to hold inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the Constitution.
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral reform. It could not have
been that too simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral reform, the party-list system is one concrete
expression of the primacy of social justice in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only
implementing the specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged
from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned provision was not simply to reform the
electoral system but to initiate the equitable distribution of political power. It aims to empower the larger
portion of the populace who sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance to participate in legislation
and advance their causes.
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further elaborated by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, which
outlined the eight-point guidelines for screening party-list participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to
the qualifications of the (1) sector, (2) party-list group, organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These
key considerations determine the eligibility of the party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in
the party-list system of representation. Thus, for purposes of registration and continuing compliance, three
(3) basic questions must be addressed:
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(1) Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized and underrepresented?

(2) Is the party, organization or coalition qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sector?
(3) Are the nominees qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented party, organization or
coalition?
In seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be the key considerations for qualifying as a party-list
group, organization or coalition.
The sector must be marginalized and underrepresented.
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State in enacting the law. Tersely, the state aims to
promote proportional representation by means of a Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1) who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.180
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RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition must represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized and underrepresented sector is a group of
individuals who, by reason of status or condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote
from the core of institutional power, their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the
government's priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and social services and are oftentimes
victims of economic, social and political inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are subsumed under the term "marginalized and
underrepresented" and may register as a party-list group, organization or coalition. It states:
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SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors
shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours)
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12) sectors that are considered marginalized and
underrepresented: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The enumeration is, however,
not exclusive. During the drafting of our Constitution, the members of the Commission expressed reluctance
to provide an enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors because of their apprehension
that the longer the enumeration, the more limiting the law becomes. 181 Instead of an enumeration, then
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo suggested the criteria by which the determination of which sectors are
marginalized can be based, viz:
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1. The number of people belonging to the sector;

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2. The extent of marginalization, exploitation and deprivation of social and economic rights suffered by the
sector;
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3. The absence of representation in the government, particularly in the legislature, through the years;

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4. The sector's decisive role in production and in bringing about the basic social services needed by the
people.182
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The Constitutional Commission saw it fit to provide a set of standards which will approximate the sectors
that the Constitution regards as marginalized and underrepresented and evaded a definite enumeration. The
reason is that a specific enumeration is antithetical to the purpose of the party-list system. The party-list
system of representation endeavors to empower the underprivileged sectors, tap their innate potentials and
hone them to become productive and self-sustaining segments of the society. Sooner, they are expected to
graduate from their status as marginalized and underrepresented. During the process, some formerly selfsufficient sectors may drift to the bottom and regress to become the new marginalized sectors. The
resilience in the enumeration of the sectors accommodates this eventuality.
Qualifications of the Party-List
Group, Organization or Coalition

Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines for screening party-list participants in Ang Bagong
Bayani, five (5) pertain to the qualifications of the party-list group, organization or coalition. The first point
in the enumeration reads:
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First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of government and track record that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. 183
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Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to represent the marginalized and underrepresented to
qualify as a party-list group. There must be proof, credible and convincing, to demonstrate the group's
advocacy to alleviate the condition of the sector.
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence showing the party's relation to the causes of the
sector goes to the uniqueness of the party-list system of representation. In the party-list system of
representation, the candidates are parties, organizations and coalitions and not individuals. And while an
individual candidate seeks to represent a district or particular constituency, a party-list group vying for seats
in the House of Representatives must aim to represent a sector. It is thus important to ascertain that the
party-list group, organization or coalition reflects the ideals of the sector in its constitution and by-laws. It
must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to undertake in its platform of government. Moreover,
its track record must speak of its firm advocacy towards uplifting the marginalized and underrepresented by
undertaking activities or projects directly addressing the concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent various sectors, it must prove, however,
that it is able to address the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multisectoral party-list group undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the
sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented sectors it supposedly
represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a meaningful and effective representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Equally important is that the majority of the membership of the party-list group, organization or coalition
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the members of the
sector must actually possess the attribute which makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the
primary reason why party-list groups are even allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the
House of Representatives, who are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to the members
of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected. This intention is put to naught if at least the
majority of the members of the party-list do not belong to the same class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the party-list applicant to present all the evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a
convincing proof of legitimate membership of a majority of the marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to
believe otherwise and may thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing registration.
The second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani underscores the policy of the state to hold the party-list system
of representation exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented, a distinguishing feature which sets
our system apart from systems of party-list representation in other jurisdictions. The guideline states:
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Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." x x x184
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The second guideline was an offshoot of the declaration of policy in RA 7941. Specifically, Section 2 of the
statute emphasized the state's policy of promoting proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x to become members of the
House of Representatives. As it is exclusively for the marginalized and underrepresented, it is an inflexible
requirement that the group applying for registration must represent a sector. The rationale behind this
qualification was highlighted in Ang Bagong Bayani, thus:
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It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them not
only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new
hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot
now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. 185
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RA 7941 also provides that a party desiring to register and participate in the party-list elections must
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. While the law did not restrict the sectors that may be
subsumed under the term "marginalized and underrepresented", it must be construed in relation to the
sectors enumerated in RA 7941, the enabling law of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. Based on the foregoing, a mere association of individuals
espousing shared "beliefs" and "advocacies" cannot qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" is descriptive of the sector that may join the party-list
elections. A sector pertains to a "sociological, economic or political subdivision of the society" 186 which
consists of individuals identified by the activity, status or condition, or attribute that specifically pertains to
them. It is identified by a common characteristic pertaining to the individuals composing the same.
On the other hand, an association of individuals espousing a common belief or advocacy is aptly called a
group, not a sector. Specifically, advocacy groups consist of individuals engaged in the "act of pleading for,
supporting, or recommending active espousal"187 of a cause. Contrary to a sector which is identified by a
common characteristic of the members, advocacy groups are identified by the causes that they promote.
The members coalesced to pursue causes or fulfil patriotic ends that do not specifically pertain to them, but
even to those who are not part of their circle.
Certainly, it takes far more than beliefs and advocacies before a group of individuals can constitute a sector.
There are underlying sociological and economic considerations in the enumeration of the sectors in the
Constitution and RA 7941. These considerations must be strictly observed lest we deviate from the
objectives of RA 7941 of providing a meaningful and effective representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented. To relegate the contemplation of the law of what is a "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" to a mere association of individuals espousing a shared belief or advocacy, is to disregard the
essence of the party-list system of representation and the intent of the law to hold the system exclusive for
the marginalized and underrepresented.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, political parties may apply for registration and/or accreditation as a
party-list provided that they are organized along sectoral lines.188 This pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani
was expounded in BANAT by referring to the exchange between the members of the Constitutional
Commission, thus:
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MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x
We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate
in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from
running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may
be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.189 (Emphasis supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno expressed his approval of
keeping the party-list system of representation exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
To further safeguard the sanctity of the purpose of the law, he conveyed his vehement objection to the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system of representation because of the likelihood that
they will easily trump the organizations of the marginalized. He opined:
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Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from
participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women
to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service
of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions
and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private
sector in the national economy.
xxx
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in
the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties
were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties
made it to the top 50.190 (Citations omitted)
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided in BANAT to revert to its ruling in the 2000 case Veterans Federation
Party v. Comelec191 that major political parties are barred from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I maintain that major political parties have advantages over
minority political parties and sectoral parties in the party-list elections. By their broad constituency and full
resources, it is easier for these major political parties to obtain the required percentage of votes for partylist seats, a circumstance which, in turn, only weakens the minority parties' chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely disqualify from the partylist system the major political parties solely by reason of their classification as such. Nonetheless, the
privilege to be accorded to them shall not be without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be

allowed to participate in the party-list system if they do not field candidates in the election of legislative
district representatives. The justification therefor is reasonable. The party-list system was adopted by the
state purposely to enable parties which, by their limited resources and citizens base per district, find
difficulty in placing representatives in Congress. Major political parties that field candidates for district
representatives can do so with ease, given that they satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification, to wit: (a) the established record of the said
parties, coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into account, among other things, their showing
in past elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before
the election; (c) their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized
chapters; (d) the ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of the
President; and (e) other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and
strengths. As the Court explained in Ang Bagong Bayani:
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The purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system, in order to enhance chance of sectoral
groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold
within it those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme
possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it
those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.192
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The contemplated limitation against the major political parties who wish to participate may then allay the
fear contemplated by the justification given in BANAT for the disqualification.
Nonetheless, a guiding principle remains the same: the party-list system must be held exclusive for the
marginalized and underrepresented. Regardless of the structure or organization of the group, it is imperative
that it represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector. Thus, it is my submission that political parties
which seek to participate in the party-list system must observe two rules: (1) they must be organized along
sectoral lines; and (2) they must not field in candidates for district representatives.
The importance of the requirement for representation of marginalized and underrepresented sector cannot
be overemphasized. The very essence of the party-list system of representation is to give representation to
the voiceless sectors of the society. It is the characteristic which distinguishes party-list representatives from
the regular district representatives in Congress.
That a party-list group must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector is the only hurdle which
keeps all other organizations from joining the party-list elections. If this lone filter we have against fly-bynight organizations will be junked, then the COMELEC will be flocked with petitions for registration from
organizations created to pursue selfish ends and not to the benefit of the voiceless and neglected sectors of
the society.
The move to open the party-list system free-for-all will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the
doors even to illegitimate organizations. Organizations aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt
the law and organize themselves as a political party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The
organization need only to register as a political party to dispense with the stringent requirement of
representing a sector. It will automatically be off the hook from the danger of being disqualified on the
ground that it is not representing a marginalized and underrepresented sector. Other organizations, even

those organized as sectoral parties, may follow through and may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties
and opt to become political parties instead because it is the easier way to be allowed participation in the
party-list elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented are lagged
behind.
The second requirement for political parties is that they must not field in candidates for district
representatives. The reason is that the party-list system is solely for the marginalized and
underrepresented. Certainly, political parties which are able to field in candidates for the regular seats in the
House of Representatives cannot be classified as such.
The third guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani expresses the proscription against the registration of religious
groups as party-list groups. The idea is that the government acts for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.193 Despite the prohibition, members of a religious group may be nominated as
representative of a marginalized and underrepresented sector. The prohibition is directed only against
religious sectors registering as a political party194 because the government cannot have a partner in
legislation who may be driven by the dictates of faith which may not be capable of rational evaluation.
The fourth and fifth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani pertain to disqualifying circumstances which can justify
the denial of the petition for registration of party, organization or coalition, thus:
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Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:
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"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

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(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be
a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. x x x 195
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To be eligible for registration, the party, organization or coalition must prove that it possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications stated in the law. The grounds for disqualification stated in

Section 6 of RA 7941 pertain to acts, status or conditions which render the applicant group an unsuitable
partner of the state in alleviating the conditions of the marginalized and underrepresented. These
disqualifying circumstances are drawn to further implement the state policy of preserving the party-list
system exclusively for the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941.
On the other hand, the disqualification mentioned in the fifth guideline connotes that the party-list group
must maintain its independence from the government so that it may be able to pursue its causes without
undue interference or any other extraneous considerations. Verily, the group is expected to organize and
operate on its own. It must derive its life from its own resources and must not owe any part of its creation
to the government or any of its instrumentalities. By maintaining its independence, the group creates a
shield that no influence or semblance of influence can penetrate and obstruct the group from achieving its
purposes. In the end, the party-list group is able to effectively represent the causes of the marginalized and
underrepresented, particularly in the formulation of legislation intended for the benefit of the sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani bear on the qualifications of the nominees,
viz:
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Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
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SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. x x x 196
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Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are practically the same as those required of
individual candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He must be: (a) a natural-born citizen;
(b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; (d) able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days before the day of election; (f) at least
twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a nominee for the youth sector, he must
at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of election. Owing to the
peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be a resident or a
registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted for and not the appointed

nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list group at least ninety (90) days before
the elections.
The nominee must be a bona fide member of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied registration to the party, organization or coalition on the
ground that the nominee does not belong to the sector he wishes to represent. The quandary stems from
the interpretation of who are considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented." The
COMELEC supposed that before a person may be considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector," he must actually share with the rest of the membership that common
characteristic or attribute which makes the sector marginalized and underrepresented.
The construction seemed logical but to be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be harmonized with
Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned
provision, aside from the qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective
districts, the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when he
enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety (90) days before the election. From the
point in time when the person acquires the status of being a bona fide member, he becomes one "belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector."
It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees:

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1. One who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which makes the sector marginalized or
underrepresented (the first type);
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2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the causes of the sector he wishes to
represent (the second type).
The first type of nominee is one who shares a common physical attribute or status with the rest of the
membership. That he possesses this common characteristic of marginalization is what entitles him to
nomination as representative of the group. This is because of the reasonable presumption that those who
have experienced the inadequacies in the sector are the ones who can truly represent the same. However,
there are instances when this strict construction becomes impracticable, if not altogether impossible. For
instance, a representation from the organization of skilled workers working abroad is difficult to comply with
without the nominee being excluded from the literal definition of who belongs to the sector. The strict
interpretation also discourages growth, as in the nominee from the urban sector, since the moment he rises
from his status as such, he becomes disqualified to represent the party.
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An advocate or one who is publicly known to be pursuing
the causes of the sector is equally capable of fulfilling the objective of providing a genuine and effective
representation for the marginalized and underrepresented. He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has
always shown genuine concern for those who have less in life. Unlike the first type of nominee who shares a
common characteristic with the members of the group, the advocate shares with them a common aspiration
and leads them towards achieving that end. He serves as a catalyst that stirs movement so that the
members of the sector may be encouraged to pursue their welfare. And though not bound with the group by
something physical, he is one with them in spirit and heart. He is known for his genuine commitment and
selfless dedication to the causes of the sector and his track record boldly speaks of his advocacy.
At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing ratiocination translates to a more lenient entry for those
aspiring to become a nominee. However, the standard of scrutiny should not change and nominees shall still
be subject to the evaluation by the COMELEC of their qualifications. They bear the burden of proof to
establish by concrete and credible evidence that they are truly representative of the causes of the sector.

They must present proof of the history of their advocacy and the activities they undertook for the promotion
of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to demonstrate, through their track record, their vigorous
involvement to the causes of the sector.
The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove his advocacy through his track record. To be clear, the
track record is not a mere recital of his visions for the organization and the trivial activities he conducted
under the guise of promoting the causes of the sector. He must actually and actively be espousing the
interests of the sector by undertaking activities directly addressing its concerns.
In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC,197 the Court enumerated the list of evidence which the party-list group and its
nominees may present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
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The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the
Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
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a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent;
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b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the nominee/s
showing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
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c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at
least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization
but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector.198
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Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the first or second type, proof of his track record is required.
The requirement is even more stringent for the second type of nominee as he must convincingly show,
through past activities and undertakings, his sincere regard for the causes of the sector. The history of his
advocacy and the reputation he earned for the same will be considered in the determination of his
qualification.
Admittedly, the foregoing clarification partakes of a new guideline which the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration when it conducted automatic review of the petitions for registration and summary evidentiary
hearings pursuant to Resolution No. 9513.
Disqualification of the nominee and its effects
In a number of resolutions, the COMELEC disqualified some party-list groups on the ground that one or
some of its nominees are disqualified. Apparently, the COMELEC is of the impression that the group, upon
filing their petition for registration, must submit names of at least five (5) nominees who must all be
qualified. In the instances when some of the nominees were found to be suffering from any disqualification,
the COMELEC deemed the party to have committed a violation of election laws, rules and regulations and
denied its petition for registration.

I agree with the majority that the construction made by the COMELEC is misplaced.
It is the COMELEC's supposition that when the party-list group included a disqualified nominee in the list of
names submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5) 199of
RA 7941. This feeble deduction, however, is not within the contemplation of the law. The mentioned
provision does not suggest that all kinds of violations can be subsumed under Section 6 (5) and justify the
disqualification of the group. To warrant such a serious penalty, the violation must be demonstrative of gross
and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. It must be taken to refer to election offenses enumerated
under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code or any other acts or omissions that
are inconsistent with the ideals of fair and orderly elections. It does not intend to cover even innocuous
mistakes or incomplete compliance with procedural requirements.
Accordingly, it is a mistake on the part of the COMELEC to suppose that failure to comply with Section 8 of
RA 7941 is within the contemplation of Section 6 (5) thereof. Section 8 reads:
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Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.
xxx
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it must be given its plain and literal meaning. A reading
of the provision will show that it is simply a procedural requirement relating to the registration of groups,
organizations and coalitions under the party-list system of representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant
under the party-list system to submit a list of nominees, not less than five, at least forty-five (45) days
before the election. The group's compliance with this requirement is determinative of the action of the
COMELEC. In case of failure to comply, the COMELEC may refuse to act on the petition for registration. If the
applicant, on the other hand, tendered an incomplete compliance, as in submitting a list of less than five (5)
nominees, the COMELEC may ask it to comply or simply regard the same as a waiver. In no way can the
mere submission of the list be construed as a guarantee or attestation on the part of the group that all of
the nominees shall be qualified especially that the assessment of qualifications is a duty pertaining solely to
the COMELEC. In the same way, the provision did not intend to hold the group liable for violation of election
laws for such a shortcoming and to mete out the same with the penalty of disqualification. Such an absurd
conclusion could not have been the intention of the law.
Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to represent the group but
this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the
nominees the same significance which the law holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized and
underrepresented. It is worthy to emphasize that the formation of party-list groups organized by the
marginalized and underrepresented and their participation in the process of legislation is the essence of the
party-list system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still the fact that the partylist group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to consider. That one or some of its chosen
agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for the position should not unreasonably upset the existence of an
otherwise legitimate party-list group. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as
failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the partylist group itself with defect.
The point is that the party-list group must thus be treated separate and distinct from its nominees such that
qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former. The
features of the party-list system of representation are reflective of the intention of the law to treat them
severally.

To begin with, the electorate votes for the party-list group or organization itself, not for the individual
nominees.200 The nominees do not file a certificate of candidacy nor do they launch a personal campaign for
themselves.201 It is the party-list group that runs as candidate and it is the name of the group that is
indicated in the ballot. The list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC becomes relevant only when the
party-list group garners the required percentage of votes that will entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any
rate, the party-list group does not cease in existence even when it loses the electoral race. And, should it
decide to make another electoral bid, it is not required to keep its previous list of nominees and can submit
an entirely new set of names.
Further, there are separate principles and provisions of law pertaining to the qualifications and
disqualifications of the party-list group and the nominees. The qualifications of the party-list group are
outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while the grounds for the removal/cancellation of registration are enumerated
in Section 6 of RA 7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the qualifications of the nominees. As to their
disqualification, it can be premised on the ground that they are not considered as one "belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector" or that they lack one or some of the qualifications. They may
also be disqualified under Section 15202 and Section 8203 of RA 7941, particularly under the second paragraph
thereof. Even after the COMELEC's determination, interested parties may still question the qualifications of
the nominees through a petition to cancel or deny due course to the nomination or petition for
disqualification under Sections 1204 and 2,205 Rule 5 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the
party-list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the will of the
party.206 More often than not, the choice of nominees is grounded on trust and confidence, not on the vague
or abstract concepts of qualifications under the law. The method or process by which the members of the
party-list group choose their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or guidelines can be
imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their representatives lest we be charged of
unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the party-list groups' freedom to choose their nominees when it
disqualified some of them on the ground that their nominees are disqualified. While the COMELEC has the
authority to determine the qualifications of the nominees, the disqualification of the group itself due to the
failure to qualify of one or some of the nominees is too harsh a penalty. The nexus between the COMELEC's
outright disqualification of the group due to the disqualification of the nominees and the avowed objective of
RA 7941 of encouraging the development of a "full, free and open party-list system" is extremely hard to
decipher.
In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action of the COMELEC in disqualifying the party-list
group due to the disqualification of one or some of the nominees. There is simply no justifiable ground to
support this action. It is unthinkable how the COMELEC could have conceived the thought that the fate of
the party-list group depends on the qualifications of the nominees, who are mere agents of the group,
especially that the agency between them is still subject to the condition that the group obtains the required
percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives. Until this condition is realized,
what the nominees have is a mere expectancy.
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 207 the Court
emphasized the three-seat limit rule, which holds that each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled only to a maximum of three (3) seats. 208 The rule is a reiteration of
Section 11(b)209 of RA 7941. Relating the principle to Section 8, it becomes more apparent that the action of
the COMELEC was made with grave abuse of discretion. It bears noting that while Section 8 requires the
submission of the names of at least five (5) nominees, Section 11 states that only three (3) of them can
actually occupy seats in the House of Representatives should the votes they gather suffice to meet the

required percentage. The two (2) other nominees in the list are not really expecting to get a seat in
Congress even when the party-list group of which they are members prevailed in the elections. If at all, they
can only substitute incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate the office. Therefore, if the
right to office of three (3) of the nominees is based on a mere expectancy while with the other two (2) the
nomination is dependent on the occurrence of at least two (2) future and uncertain events, it is with more
reason that the disqualification of one or some of the nominees should not affect the qualifications of the
party-list group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated petitions, the party-list group submitted a list of
nominees, with less than five (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA 7941. In some other petitions, only some
out of the number of nominees submitted by the party-list group qualified. Again, Section 8 must be
construed as a procedural requirement relative to registration of groups aspiring to participate in the partylist system of representation. In case of failure to comply, as in non-submission of a list of nominees, the
COMELEC may deny due course to the petition. In case of incomplete compliance, as when the party-list
group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view that the COMELEC must ask the group to comply with the
admonition that failure to do so will amount to the waiver to submit 5 names. The implication is that if the
party-list group submitted only one qualified nominee and it garners a number of votes sufficient to give it
two (2) seats, it forfeits the right to have a second representative in Congress. Therefore, for as long as the
party-list group has one (1) qualified nominee, it must be allowed registration and participation in the
election. The situation is different when the party-list group submitted a list of nominees but none qualified
and, upon being asked to submit a new list of names, still failed to appoint at least one (1) qualified
nominee. In this case, the party can now reasonably be denied registration as it cannot, without at least one
qualified nominee, fulfill the objective of the law for genuine and effective representation for the
marginalized and underrepresented, a task which the law imposes on the qualified nominee by participating
in the "formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole." 210More
importantly, the party-list group's inability to field in qualified nominees casts doubt on whether the group is
truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. Considering that the majority of the group
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented, it should not have any trouble appointing a qualified
nominee.
Ruling on each of the petitions
As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL the petitions to the COMELEC,
completely disregarding the ground/s for the cancellation or denial of the party-list groups' registration, and
even on the supposition that the ponencia had substantially modified the guidelines that are set forth in the
Ang Bagong Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of the party-list groups whose remaining ground for denial or
cancellation of registration involves the new guideline on the qualifications of a party's nominees. While I
agree on modifying the qualifications of major political parties, no remand is justified on this ground since
none of the 52211 petitioners is a major political party. On all other issues, the standard of grave abuse of
discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued
the assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of discretion. 212 In Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,213 the Court recognized that along with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. 214
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Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS the petitions for failure to substantiate grave abuse of
discretion, and to AFFIRM THE COMELEC's DENIAL OR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION, of the
following party-list groups: GREENFORCE, KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1-CARE, ALA-EH,

1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN, Manila Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY, GUARDJAN,

PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD, AKMA-PTM, BAYANI, FIRM 24-K, KAP, COCOFED,
AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST KABAGIS, ARAL, BINHI, SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong
Paglaum, ANAD, PBB, PPP, 1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and AI.
The COMELEC's conclusion on the said groups' failure to qualify, insofar as the grounds pertained to the
sectors which they seek to represent and/or their capacity to represent their intended sector finds support in
established facts, law and jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in ruling on the
disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on the supposed failure of these
parties to substantiate their eligibility as a group, specifically on questions pertaining to their track record
and the sectors which they seek to represent.
Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence presented to it, in exceptional cases, as when the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse
of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one
of jurisdiction.215 To this exception falls the COMELEC's disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA,
BUTIL, AT and ARARO.
1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1-UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various transport drivers and operators associations
nationwide with a common goal of promoting the interest and welfare of public utility drivers and
operators.216 On the other hand, PASANG MASDA is a sectoral political party that mainly represents the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of jeepney and tricycle drivers and operators across the National
Capital Region.217 Contrary to the conclusion that was inferred by the COMELEC from the common
circumstance that 1- UTAK and PASANG MASDA represent the sectors of both public utility drivers and
operators, it is not a sufficient ground to cancel their respective registration as party-list group.
To a great extent, the supposed conflict in the respective interests of public utility drivers and operators is
more apparent than real. It is true that there is a variance in the economic interests of public utility drivers
and operators; the former is concerned with wages while the latter is concerned with profits. However, what
the COMELEC failed to consider is that the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and operators are aligned with each other in several
instances. To name a few: first, the effects of fluctuation in the prices of petroleum products; second, their
benefit from petitions for fare increase/reduction; and third, the implications of government policies affecting
the transportation sector such as traffic rules and public transport regulation. In these instances, it is
mutually beneficial for drivers and operators of public utility vehicles to work together in order to effectively
lobby their interests. Certainly, the interrelated concerns and interests of public utility drivers and operators
far outweigh the supposed variance in their respective economic interests.
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration
of 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA as party-list groups on the ground of the sectors which they aim to
represent.
BUTIL

Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discetion when it cancelled the registration of BUTIL on the
alleged ground that the party failed to prove that the "agriculture and cooperative sectors," which the party
represents, are marginalized and underrepresented218
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In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted that the Secretary-General of BUTIL, Wilfredo A.
Antimano affirmed in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL is an organization "representing members of the
agriculture and cooperative sectors." From this declaration, the COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture
and cooperative sectors are not enumerated in RA 7941, it is incumbent upon BUTIL to establish the fact
that the sectors it is representing are marginalized and underrepresented. Since the party failed to discharge
this burden, the COMELEC cancelled the party's I stress, however, that in determining whether the group
represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector, all of the evidence submitted by the party should be
duly considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimano's statement in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL
represents the "agriculture and cooperative sectors" should be read in conjunction with the other documents
submitted by the party, including the oral testimony that was given by the party's witness. Significantly,
during the clarificatory hearing conducted by the Commission En Banc on August 23, 2012, Antimano
explained:
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CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:

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Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:

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Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit na magsasaka at maliliit na mangignigsda sa
kanayunan.
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CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:

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Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang inyong nire-represent?
MR. ANTIMANO:

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Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:

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Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?

MR. ANTIMANO:

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Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:

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Pati maliliit na mangingisda?

MR. ANTIMANO:

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Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong
maliliit na mangingisda na nag-aalaga ng maliliit na 219
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It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that Antimano's reference to the "agriculture and
cooperative sector" pertains to small farmers and fishermen. Likewise, on the basis of the evidence on
record, the term "cooperative" in Antimano's affidavit should be taken to refer to agricultural cooperatives
which, by their nature, are still comprised of agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small agricultural workers as marginalized and underrepresented.
Based on the records, BUTIL appears to fully adhere to and work towards their cause. I also give due
consideration to the fact that since the party-list system was first implemented in 1998, the party had been
able to obtain the necessary votes for at least one seat in the House of Representatives. This affirms the
party's constituency that may deserve a continued representation in Congress.
AT
AT is an incumbent party-list group that claims to represent six (6) marginalized sectors labor, urban poor,
elderly, women, youth and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 220 In disqualifying AT, the COMELEC found that
its incumbent representative, Congresswoman Daryl Grace J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that
will uplift the welfare of all the sectors it claims to represent. 221
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In so ruling, however, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in failing to appreciate that effective
representation of sectors is not confined to the passage of bills that directly identify or name all of the
sectors it seeks to represent. In the case of AT, there is evidence that it adopted and co-sponsored House
Bills that advanced the interests, not only of the sectors it represents, but even other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.222 AT also established with sufficiency an exceptional track record that
demonstrates its genuine desire to uplift the welfare of all of the sectors it represents. 223 It is broad enough
to cover legislation which, while directly identifying only some of the sectors as main beneficiaries, also
benefits the rest of the sectors it seeks to represent.
ARARO
ARARO is a party-list group that seeks to represent peasants and the urban poor. It was disqualified by the
COMELEC on the ground that these two sectors involve conflicting interests, for instance, in the matter of
land use.
However, I do not see, and the COMELEC failed to show, how the issue of land use can be conflicting
between these sectors. Peasants generally belong to the class of marginal farmers, fisherfolk and laborers in
the rural areas. On the other hand, the urban poor, as the term connotes, are those in the urban areas.
While they may have different interests and concerns, these are not necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELEC's conclusion that ARARO's alliances with other sectoral organizations
"muddle" the sectors it represents.224 These are mere alliances, i.e., ties. Itdoes not necessarily follow that
ARARO, because of these ties, will also represent the interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO's platform
continually focuses on the enhancement of the welfare of the peasants and the urban poor, there can be an
effective representation in their behalf.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to nullify the COMELEC's cancellation of the
registration of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on the ground of these parties' supposed
failure to prove their eligibility to represent their intended sectors.

The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the outright cancellation of the five
parties' registration on the ground of the supposed failure of their nominees to qualify. I have fully explained
that the qualification of a party-list group shall be treated separate and distinct, and shall not necessarily
result from the qualification of its nominees.
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned actions of the COMELEC shall not be construed to
automatically restore the five parties' registration and accreditation, which would otherwise allow their
participation in the May 2013 elections. As has been discussed, each party must still be able to field in
qualified nominees, as it is only through them that the party may perform its legislative function in the event
that it garners the required percentage of votes for a seat in the House of Representatives. With this
circumstance, and considering a new guideline on nominees' qualifications, I then find the necessity of
remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM, A-IPRA, AKIN, A
BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY
The denial of the registration of AKIN, and the cancellation of the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A
BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY were based solely on the alleged failure of their respective
nominees to prove that they factually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector that their
parties seek to represent. I reiterate that a party-list group must be treated separate and distinct from its
nominees; the outright disqualification of the groups on the said ground is not warranted. The COMELEC's
ruling to the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the COMELEC's resolve to deny AKIN's registration and cancel
the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY. Nonetheless, as in the case of 1UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO, this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration
under the party-list system.
I submit that in view of my stand regarding the qualifications of nominees, specifically on the two types of
qualified nominees, it is only proper that the petitions that involve the ground of disqualification of the
nominees be remanded to the COMELEC to afford it the opportunity to revisit its rulings. In so doing, the
COMELEC may be able to assess the facts and the records, while being guided by the clarification on the
matter. It must be emphasized, however, that not all of the petitions necessitates a remand considering that
from the records, only ten (10) out of the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions solely involved the
disqualification of the party's nominees. The bulk of the petitions consist of cancellation or denial of
registration on the ground (1) that the party-list group does not represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, or; (2) that the group itself, on the basis of the pertinent guidelines enumerated in
Ang Bagong Bayani, failed to qualify. If the ground for the denial or cancellation of registration is
disqualification on the basis of sector or group, it is a futile exercise to delve into the qualifications of the
nominees since notwithstanding the outcome therein, the party-list group remains disqualified. It is well to
remember that the law provides for different sets of qualifications for the party-list group and the nominees.
The law, while requiring that the party-list group must have qualified nominees to represent it, treats the
former as separate and distinct from the latter, not to treat them as equals but to give a higher regard to the
party-list group itself. Thus, in the event that the nominees of the party-list group fail to qualify, the partylist group may still be afforded the chance to fill in qualified nominees to represent it. The reverse, however,
is not true. The lack of qualifications, or the possession of disqualifying circumstances by the group,
impinges on the legitimacy or the existence of the party-list group itself. Absent a qualified party-list group,
the fact that the nominees that are supposed to represent it are qualified does not hold any significance.
Even though the ponencia modifies the qualifications for all national or regional parties/organizations, IT
STILL IS NOT NECESSARY TO REMAND ALL THE PETITIONS. It bears stressing that of the 52 petitioners,

only eleven are national or regional parties/organizations. The rest of the petitioners, as indicated in their
respective Manifestations of
Intent and/or petitions, are organized as sectoral parties or organizations.
The party-list groups that are organized as national parties/organizations are:
1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD)225

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2. Bantay Party-List (BANTAY)226

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3. Allance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)227

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On the other hand, the following are regional parties/organizations:

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1. Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB)228

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2. Aksyon Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM)229

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3. Ako an Bisaya (AAB)230

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4. Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)231

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5. 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP)232

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6. Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)233

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7. Partido ng Bayan and Bida (PBB) 234

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8. Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)235

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Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencia's ratiocination, it does not follow that a remand of all
the cases is justified; as we have pointed out the ponencia has been able to explain the necessity of a
remand of only eleven petitions for further proceedings in the COMELEC, in addition to the ten petitions that
I have recommended for remand.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to:

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1. PARTLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. NO. 204410, G.R. NO. 204153, G.R. NO. 204356, G.R. NO. 204174,
G.R. NO. 204367, G.R. NO. 204341, G.R. NO. 204125, G.R. NO. 203976, G.R. NO. 204263 and G.R. NO.
204364. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-198
(PLM), SPP No. 12-277 (PLM), SPP No. 12-136 (PLM), SPP No. 12-232 (PLM), SPP No. 12-104 (PL), SPP No.
12-269 (PLM), SPP No. 12-292 (PLM), SPP No. 12-288 (PLM), SPP No. 12-257 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-180
(PLM) shall be NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright disqualification of the parties 1-UTAK,
PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY, respectively,
NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright disqualification of the parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA,
BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY, respectively, and their cases
shall be REMANDED to the COMELEC, which shall be DIRECTED to: (a) allow the party-list groups to present
further proof that their nominees are actually qualified in light of the new guideline on the qualification of
nominees, (b) evaluate whether the nominees are qualified to represent the group, and (c) grant or deny
registration depending on its determination;
cralawlibrary

2. DISMISS the petitions in G.R. NO. 204139, G.R. NO. 204370, G.R. NO. 204379, G.R. NO. 204394, G.R.
NO. 204402, G.R. NO. 204426, G.R. NO. 204435, G.R. NO. 204455, G.R. NO. 204485, G.R. NO. 204490,
G.R. NO. 204436, G.R. NO. 204484, G.R. NO. 203766, G.R. Nos. 203818-19, G.R. NO. 203922, G.R. NO.
203936, G.R. No.203958, G.R. NO. 203960, G.R. NO. 203981, G.R. NO. 204002, G.R. NO. 204094, G.R. NO.
204100, G.R. NO. 204122, G.R. NO. 204126, G.R. NO. 204141, G.R. NO. 204158, G.R. NO. 204216, G.R.
NO. 204220, G.R. NO. 204236, G.R. NO. 204238, 204239, G.R. NO. 204240, G.R. NO. 204318, G.R. NO.
204321, G.R. NO. 204323, G.R. NO. 204358, G.R. NO. 204359, G.R. NO. 204374, G.R. NO. 204408, G.R.
NO. 204421, G.R. NO. 204425, G.R. NO. 204428 and G.R. NO. 204486.

Endnotes:

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

?r?l??l?br?r

Resolutions dated November 13, 2012, November 20, 2012, December 4, 2012, December 11, 2012 and
February 19, 2013.
2

?r?l??l?br?r

"An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor"
3

?r?l??l?br?r

Rules and Regulations Governing The: 1) Filing of Petitions for Registration; 2) Filing of Manifestations of
Intent to Participate; 3) Submission of Names of Nominees; and 4) Filing of Disqualification Cases Against
Nominees or Party-List Groups of Organizations Participating Under the Party-List System of Representation
in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections Thereafter.
4

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Supra note 1.

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First, the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. x x x
6

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. x x x
xxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 x x x

xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
xxx
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominess. x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x
7

Consolidated Comment dated December 26, 2012, p. 54.

?r?l??l?br?r

Order dated August 9, 2012; rollo (G.R. NO. 204323), pp. 16-19.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203818), pp. 83-87; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
9

?r?l??l?br?r

10

11

SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM).

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203818), p. 86.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203981), pp. 47-70; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
12

?r?l??l?br?r

13

SPP No. 12-161 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Section 9 of RA 7941. x x x In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on thed day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.
14

?r?l??l?br?r

15

Rodolfo P. Pancrudo, Jr.

?r?l??l?br?r

16

17

18

19

20

21

Pablo Lorenzo III.

Victor G.. Noval.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Melchor P. Maramara.

?r?l??l?br?r

SPP No. 12-187 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203981), p. 59.

Id. at 60.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

22

23

24

25

SPP No. 12-188 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203981), p. 61.

SPP No. 12-220 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203981), p. 66.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204100), pp. 52-67; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christina Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
26

?r?l??l?br?r

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

SPP No. 12-196 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204100), p. 60.

SPP No. 12-223 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204100), p. 62.

Id.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

SPP No. 12-257 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204100), p. 65.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203960), pp. 61-68. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
34

?r?l??l?br?r

35

SPP No. 12-260.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203922), pp. 92-101; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
36

?r?l??l?br?r

37

SPP No. 12-201 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204174), pp. 158-164; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco; Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim
concurred; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
38

?r?l??l?br?r

39

SPP No. 12-232 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203976), pp. 21-37; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph, also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
40

?r?l??l?br?r

41

42

SPP No. 12-288 (PLM).

Id. at 28.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

43

Joel C. Obar, Jose F. Gamos and Alan G. Gonzales.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203958), pp. 26-48; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R.
Yusooph, also voted in favor; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
44

?r?l??l?br?r

45

46

SPP No. 12-279 (PLM).

SPP No. 12-248 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Margarita Delos Reyes Cojuangco, Datu Michael Abas Kida, Catherine Domingo Trinidad, Saidamen Odin
Limgas.
47

?r?l??l?br?r

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

SPP No. 12-263 (PLM).

SPP No. 12-180 (PLM).
SPP No. 12-229 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203958), p. 39.

SPP No. 12-217 (PLM).
SPP No. 12-277 (PLM).
SPP No. 12-015 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203958), p. 44.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204428), pp. 35-40; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle and Armando C. Velasco; Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert
S. Lim concurred; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, took no part.
56

?r?l??l?br?r

57

58

SPP No. 12-256 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204428), p. 36.

?r?l??l?br?r

Sec. 2. Grounds for opposition to a petition for registration. The Commission may deny due course to the
petition motu proprio or upon verified opposition of any interested party, after due notice and hearing, on
any of the following grounds: x x x f. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections; x x x.
59

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204094), pp. 30-40; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca, no part.
60

?r?l??l?br?r

61

62

SPP No. 12-185 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204094), p. 34.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204239), pp. 25-42; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, no part.
63

?r?l??l?br?r

64

65

66

SPP No. 12-060 (PLM).

SPP No. 12-254 (PLM).
SPP No. 12-269 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204358), pp. 140-148. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca; Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento on official business.
67

?r?l??l?br?r

68

SPP No. 12-204 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo, (G.R. NO. 204359), pp. 42-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
69

?r?l??l?br?r

70

SPP No. 12-272 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204238), pp. 54-58. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.
71

?r?l??l?br?r

72

SPP No. 12-173 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204323), pp. 44-48; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
73

?r?l??l?br?r

74

75

76

SPP No. 12-210 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204323), pp. 44-45.

Alvin V. Abejuela.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204321), pp. 43-51; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
77

?r?l??l?br?r

78

SPP No. 12-252 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G..R. No. 204125), pp. 44-48; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
79

?r?l??l?br?r

80

81

SPP No. 12-292 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G..R. No. 204125), p. 47.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204216), pp. 23-28; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
82

?r?l??l?br?r

83

SPP No. 12-202 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204220), pp. 39-44; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
84

?r?l??l?br?r

85

SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204158), pp. 59-64; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
86

?r?l??l?br?r

87

88

SPP No. 12-158 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204158), p. 62.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204374), pp. 36-41; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
89

?r?l??l?br?r

90

SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204356), pp. 56-64; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim, with
MariaGracia Cielo M. Padaca taking no part.
91

?r?l??l?br?r

92

SPP No. 12-136 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. 204486), pp. 42-47; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito
N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R, Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no
part.
93

?r?l??l?br?r

94

95

SPP No. 12-194 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. 204486), p. 46.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204410), pp. 63-67; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim, with Commisioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias
R. Yusoph dissenting, and Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca taking no part.
96

?r?l??l?br?r

97

SPP No. 12-198 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204421), pp. 43-50; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commisioners Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
98

?r?l??l?br?r

99

SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204484), pp. 42-45; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando c. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. lim and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca.
100

?r?l??l?br?r

101

SPP No. 11-002.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204379), pp. 26-35; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
102

?r?l??l?br?r

103

SPP No. 12-099 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204426), pp. 127-144; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco (concurred except for SPP No. 12-011 ALA-EH), Christian Robert S.
Lim (concurred with reservation on issue of jurisdiction) and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
104

?r?l??l?br?r

105

106

107

108

109

SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204426), p. 143.

Id at 133.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

SPP No. 12-011 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204426), pp. 134-135.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204435), pp. 47-55; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
110

?r?l??l?br?r

111

112

SPP No. 12-057 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong and Herculano C. Co, Jr.

?r?l??l?br?r

113

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204435), p. 53.

?r?l??l?br?r

1st Nominee, Atty. Pantaleon D. Alvarez, is a lawyer, business, former DOTC Secretary and Congressman;
2nd Nominee, Emmanuel D. Cifra, is a general manager/president; 3rd Nominee, Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong,
is a lawyer; 4th Nominee, Herculano C. Co., Jr., is a businessman.
114

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204367), pp. 30-35; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
115

?r?l??l?br?r

116

117

SPP No. 12-104 (PL).

?r?l??l?br?r

Camelita P. Crisologo and Benjamin A. Moraleda, Jr.

?r?l??l?br?r

118

Corazon Alma G. De Leon.

?r?l??l?br?r

119

120

Imelda S. Quirante.

?r?l??l?br?r

Flordeliza P. Penalosa.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204370), pp. 37-50; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
121

?r?l??l?br?r

122

123

SPP No. 12-011 (PLM).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204370), p. 44, citing AAB's Petition dated February 8, 2012.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204379), pp. 45-57; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
124

?r?l??l?br?r

125

126

127

128

129

SPP No. 12-009 (PP).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204379), p. 53.

Lyndeen John D. Deloria
Rolex T. Suplico.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Francis G. Lavilla.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204485), pp. 42-49; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim; with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and
Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
130

?r?l??l?br?r

131

SPP No. 12-175 (PL).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204139), pp. 505-512; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle and Armando C. Velasco; Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim voted in favor, but were on official business at the time of signing; Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
132

?r?l??l?br?r

133

SPP No. 12-127 (PL).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204402), pp. 22-33; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
134

?r?l??l?br?r

135

136

SPP No. 12-061 (PP).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204402), p. 35.

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204394); Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
137

?r?l??l?br?r

138

SPP No. 12-145 (PL).

?r?l??l?br?r

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204490), pp. 71-78; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
139

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140

141

142

143

144

145

146

Id. at. 61-70.

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SPP No. 12-073 (PLM).

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Comment dated December 26, 2012, pp. 35-36.

Supra note 1.

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G.R. NO. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692.

Id. at 709-710.

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Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 377 Phil. 297, 312 (1999).

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Dissenting Opinion of J. Pardo, Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 407 Phil. 618, 669, citing Digman v.
COMELEC, 120 SCRA 650 (1983).
147

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148

444 Phil. 812 (2003).

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Id. at 824-825, citing Commission on Elections v. Silva, Jr., 286 SCRA 177 (1998); Pimentel vs.
Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 586 (1998); Commission on Elections vs. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254
(1998); Domalanta vs. Commission on Elections, 334 SCRA 555 (2000).
149

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150

151

152

153

154

Bautista v. COMELEC, 460 Phil. 459, 476 (2003), citing Canicosa v. COMELEC, 347 Phil. 189 (1997).
Canicosa v. COMELEC, 347 Phil. 189, 201 (1997).

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Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections, 620 SCRA 393, 431 (2010).

G.R. NO. 161115, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 332.
Id. at 369-370.

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Mendoza v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692, 710, citing Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83578, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 348; Midland
Insurance Corporation v. IAC, No. L-71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA 458; Cario v. Commission on
Human Rights, G.R. NO. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, on the activities encompassed by the
exercise of quasi-judicial power.
155

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156

157

158

159

Supra note 155, at 824.

Supra note .157

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G.R. NO. 190793, June 19, 2012.

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Id., citing Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677 (2004).

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160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

347 Phil. 189 (1997).

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Santos v. COMELEC, 191 Phil. 212, 219 (1981).

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Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

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Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
G.R. NO. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 593.

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Id., citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.

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Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158, 169 (2003), citing Dinsay vs. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996)
Baricuatro v. Caballero, G.R. NO. 158643, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 70, 76.

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Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. NO. 178899, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 635, 648, citing
Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. NO. 75000, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 280.
169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

Supra note 175.

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See Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190529, April 29, 2010.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204323), pp. 16-19.
Id. at 19.

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Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1.

Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
Ibid.

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Supra note 1 at 322.

586 Phil. 210.
Id. at 333.

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Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2., July 22, 1986, RCC No. 36, p. 85.

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Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2., July 25, 1986, RCC No. 39, p. 255.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1 at 342.
Ibid.

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?r?l??l?br?r

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185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

Id. at 336-337.

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Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986), p. 2053.

Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 2A, p. 294.

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Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Volume 2, 7-25-1986, RCC No. 39, p. 257.
Id. at 247-248.

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Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno, BANAT v. Comelec, supra note 186 at 258-259.
396 Phil. 419 (2000).

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Supra note 1 at 337-338.

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Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NO. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32, 59.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1 at 343.
Id. at 343-344.
Id. at 345.

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G.R. NO. 193808, June 26, 2012.

Ibid.

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Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
199

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xxx
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules and regulations relating to elections;
xxx
Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385,
409.
200

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Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to December 5, 1994, Volume II, Nos. 2345, p. 143.
201

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Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, that if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
202

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203

Section 8. Nomination of Party-list Representatives. x x x

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may
be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost
his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. x x x
SEC. 1. Petition to deny due course and/or cancellation; Grounds. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course the nomination of nominees of party-list groups may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that a material misrepresentation has been committed in the qualification of the nominees.
204

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SEC. 2. Petition for disqualification, Ground; - A verified petition seeking the disqualification of nominees
of party-list groups may be filed by any person when the nominee has been declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
205

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a. Given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
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b. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

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c. Spent in the campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law;

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d. Solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Section 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the
Omnibus Election Code; or
e. Violated any of Sections 83, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to December 5, 1994, Volume II, Nos. 2345, p. 157
206

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207

208

209

396 Phil. 419 (2000).

Id. at 424.

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Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.

a. x x x
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party list system shall be entitled to one set each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
210

211

212

213

214

Section 2, RA 7941.

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The 53 consolidated petitions include 2 petitions filed by SENIOR CITIZENS.

Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319 (2002).
G.R. NO. 191938, June 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
Id. at 766-767.

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?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

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215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

Id. at 767.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204410), p. 79.

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204153), p. 5.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204356), p. 61.

Id. at 77-79.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204174), p. 173.

Id. at 160.

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Id. at 544-613.

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Id. at 839-1494.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 203976), p. 28.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204094), p. 146.

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204141), p. 74.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204238), p. 170.

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Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), p. 119.

Rollo (G.R. NO. 203936), p. 73.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204370), p. 92.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204402), p. 72.
Rollo (G.R. NO. 204435), p. 91.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204436), p. 186.

Rollo (G.R. NO. 204484), p. 60.

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Rollo (G.R. NO. 204490), p. 79.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in so far as there is no finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
National political parties may participate in party list elections, provided that they have no candidate for
legislative districts. The constitution disqualifies political parties, which have candidates for legislative
districts, from the party list system.1 I also agree that they need not be organized sectorally and/or
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented".
We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article VI section 5(1) and (2) in the light of article II
section 1 of the Constitution. We now benefit from hindsight as we are all witness to the aftermath of the
doctrines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 2 as qualified by Veterans
Federation Party v COMELEC3 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v
COMELEC4.
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always created space for "national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations" to join the party list system. It is textually clear that national political parties or
regional organizations do not need to be organized on sectoral lines. Sectoral parties or organizations belong
to a different category of participants in the party list system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the party list system "must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups" as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941 5. This law
is unconstitutional in so far as it makes a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the
Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support those who are candidates
for legislative districts and those that participate in the party list system. It is inconsistent for national
political parties who have candidates for legislative districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear
implication from the text of article VI, section 5(1) of the Constitution.
The insistence on the criteria of "marginalized and underrepresented" 6 has caused so much chaos to the
point of absurdity in our party list system. It is too ambiguous so as to invite invidious intervention on the
part of COMELEC, endangering the fundamental rights to suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with
the text of the Constitution makes more sense under the present circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi relevant to our present cases in the
case of Ang Bagong Bayani et al. v. COMELEC7 and BANAT v. COMELEC8.
I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, s. August 2, 2012.
This will have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty nine (39) existing party list groups that have
already registered for the 2010 elections especially those that have won seats in the current Congress. This
will also automatically remand the thirteen (13) cases of new party list registrants for proper processing and
evaluation by the Commission on Elections.
Textual analysis of the relevant provisions
Different kind of political party in the party list system
The core principle that defines the relationship between our government and those that it governs is
captured in the constitutional phrase that ours is a "democratic and republican state". 9 A democratic and
republican state is founded on effective representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the
electorate's choices that must be given full consideration. 10 We must always be sensitive in our crafting of
doctrines lest the guardians of our electoral system be empowered to silence those who wish to offer their

representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our people to mature as citizens in our
electorate.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the light of these overarching consideration.
Article VI, section 5(1) provides:

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"(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." (emphasis provided)
There are two types of representatives in the House of Representatives. Those in the first group are "elected
from legislative districts". Those in the second group are "elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations."
The differences in terms of representation are clear.
Those who are elected from legislative districts will have their name in the ballot. They present their persons
as the potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual qualifications that will be assessed by
COMELEC on the basis of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Should there be disqualification it would be
their personal circumstances, which will be reviewed, in the proper case, by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The individual representative can lose subsequent elections for various reasons,
including dissatisfaction from those that initially elected him/her into office.
Incidentally, those who present themselves for election by legislative districts may or may not be supported
by a registered political party. This may give them added political advantages in the electoral exercise, which
includes the goodwill, reputation and resources of the major political party they affiliate with. However, it is
not the nature of the political party that endorses them that is critical in assessing the qualifications or
disqualifications of the candidate.
The elected district representative in the House of Representative is directly accountable to his/her
electorate. The political party s/he affiliates with only shares that political accountability; but, only to a
certain extent. Good performance is usually rewarded with subsequent election to another term. It is the
elected representative, not the political party that will get re-elected. We can even take judicial notice that
party affiliation may change in subsequent elections for various reasons, without any effect on the
qualification of the elected representative.
The political party that affiliates those who participate in elections in legislative districts organize primarily to
have their candidates win. These political parties have avowed principles and platforms of government. 11But,
they will be known more through the personalities and popularity of their candidates. 12 Often, compromises
occur in the political party's philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate.
This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.
The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters
choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily. As provided in the
Constitution, the party list system's intentions are broader than simply to "ensure that those who are
marginalized and represented become lawmakers themselves". 13
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Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed individual candidate over
platforms and political programs.14 Political parties were convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates
from the national to the local level that gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the
resources to supplement the electoral campaigns of their members. 15 Most elections were choices between
competing personalities often with very little discernible differences in their interpretation and solutions for
contemporary issues.16 The electorate chose on the bases of personality and popularity; only after the
candidates were elected to public offices will they later find out the concrete political programs that the
candidate will execute. Our history is replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked
cohesion on the basis of principle.17 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and marginalized large parts
of our population.
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been intended to
enhance and further entrench the same system. It is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the
party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is
also the party list group that can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he
or she act inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their organization. In
short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable true
representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a "democratic and republican state".
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party list groups that have maintained organizational
integrity to pose candidates for higher offices, i.e. the Senate. We can take judicial notice that two of the
candidates for the 2013 senatorial elections--who used to represent party list groups in the House of
Representatives--do not have the resources nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the same mould as
many of the usual politicians who view for that position. It is no accident that the party list system is only
confined to the House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to mature genuine political parties and
give them the experience and the ability to build constituencies for other elective public offices.
In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by constitutionally entrenching the ability of political
parties and organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the benefit of those who have been
marginalized and underrepresented in the past. It makes it possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis
of their loyalty to principle and platform rather than their family affiliation. It encourages more collective
action by the membership of the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the party be controlled only
by a select few.
Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity"18 that the party list system was enacted. Rather, it was for everyone in so far as
attempting a reform in our politics.
But, based on our recent experiences, requiring "national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations"
that participate in the party list system to be representatives of the "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" and be "marginalized and underrepresented themselves" is to engage in an ambiguous and
dangerous fiction that undermines the possibility for vibrant party politics in our country. This requirement,
in fact, was the very requirement that "gut the substance of the party list system". 19
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Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to appreciate the true context of the party list system.
No requirement that the party or organization be "marginalized and underrepresented"
The disqualification of two "green" or ecological parties20 and two "right wing" ideological groups21(currently
part of the party list sector in the present Congress) is based on the assessment of the COMELEC en banc
that they do not represent a "marginalized" sector and that the nominee themselves do not appear to be
marginalized.

It is inconceivable that the party list system framed in our Constitution make it impossible to accommodate
green or ecological parties of various political persuasions.
Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those who are marginalized or
underrepresented. Neither do they only have for their constituency those "who wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity".22 In truth, all of us, regardless of economic class, are constituents of ecological advocacies.
Also, political parties organized along ideological lines--the socialist or even right wing political parties--are
groups motivated by a their own narratives of our history, a vision of what society can be and how it can get
there. There is no limit to the economic class that can be gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and
the resulting political platforms. Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they have the
constituency that can win them a seat will enrich the deliberations in that legislative chamber. Having them
voice out opinions--whether true or false--should make the choices of our representatives richer. It will make
the choices of our representatives more democratic.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are marginalized and underrepresented, but
they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic class. Just a glance at the history of strong political
parties in different jurisdictions will show that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will
provide their rationale and continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus,
inform their movement forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may care for the marginalized
and underrepresented, but they are not themselves--nor for their effectivity in the House of Representatives
should we require that they can only come from that class.
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement of their platforms.
Rather, it should be seen as clear examples where interests and advocacies, which may not be within the
main focus of those who represent legislative districts, cry out for representation. Surely, it should be the
electorate, not the COMELEC, which should decide whether their groups should participate in our legislative
deliberations. That these groups could be excluded even before the vote is not what the party list system is
all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly show why the text of
article VI, section 5 (2) provides:
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"(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sectors." (emphasis provided)
What is plain from a reading of the text is that the qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the
"three consecutive terms after the ratification" of the Constitution. Only one-half of the seats within that
period is reserved to the "sectors" that were enumerated, clearly implying that there are other kinds of party
list groups other than those who are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form or the other is clearly
and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its rationale and its actual effect is not in
accord with the spirit of these provisions.
Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani et al v COMELEC

We are aware of the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v Comelec. 23 In that case, the Court en banc declared that
political parties may participate in the party list system but that these political parties must be organized
sectorally to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented".
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from his fundamental principle that:

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"...The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party
list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941." 24
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The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation of a statute at par with the text of article VI, section
5 (1) and (2) the Constitution, thus:
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"The foregoing provision on the party list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law ; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in
granite the lofty objective of the Constitution."25
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The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other
provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made clear.26 To claim that the framers of the
Constitution left it to Congress to complete the very framework of the party list system is to question the
fundamental character of our constitution. The phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by
law" is not an invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent assembly that
crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from the text of the constitution in the light of
its context in the document and considering the contemporary impact of relevant precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the workings of the policy through law. The Constitution
remains the fundamental and basic law with a more dominant interpretative position vis-a-vis statute. It has
no equal within our normative system.
Article VI, sections 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete Constitutional framework for the party list
system.
Congress cannot add the concept of "proportional representation". Congress cannot pass a law so that we
read in the text of the Constitution the requirement that even national and regional parties or organizations
should likewise be sectoral. Certainly Congress cannot pass a law so that even the one-half that was not
reserved for sectoral representatives even during the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of
the Constitution should now only be composed of sectoral representatives.
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming from Justices Mendoza and Vitug when Ang Bagong
Bayani v. COMELEC was decided in 2001.27 Only six (6) justices concurred with the reasoning of the
ponencia. Two justices voted only in the result. Five (5) justices dissented. Four (4) of them joining the
dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza. There was no majority therefore in upholding the reasoning
and ratio decidendi proposed by the ponencia in that case. It was a divided court, one where there was a
majority to sustain the result but not enough to establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues were tackled in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC in
2009.28
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Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was to prevent major political parties from dominating
organizations of the marginalized. Citing the concurring and dissenting opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:

chanroble svirtualawlibrary

"....There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties
in the political arena. This is borne out in the party list elections held in 2001 where major political parties

were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties
made it to the top 50."29
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The premise of course was the argument that major political parties that support candidates for legislative
districts were to be allowed to participate in the party-list system. This is not the reading proposed today of
the Constitution. Furthermore, the opinion failed to foresee that even parties and organizations that claim to
represent the "marginalized" could crowd out each other further weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a clear vote, we also do so with the benefit of
hindsight.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe to the concept of "marginalized and
underrepresented". It is too ambiguous. There can be no consistent judicially discernible standard for the
COMELEC to apply. It thus invites invidious intervention from COMELEC to undermine the right of suffrage of
the groups that want to vie for representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of the
electorate. COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and beyond
its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a definition of what it is to be socially
marginalized. No empirical studies have informed COMELEC's determination as to which groups are
"underrepresented" in government. In fact, there is no indication as to what the characteristics of an
individual's or group's identity would lead the COMELEC en banc to consider that they were a "sector".
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following are not marginalized or underrepresented sectors:
"Bicolanos",30 "young professionals like drug counselors and lecturers", 31 rural energy
consumers,32"peasants, urban poor, workers and nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting
security of the country against insurgency criminality and their roots in economic poverty", 33 "persons
imprisoned without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt", 34 those who advocate "to publicly oppose,
denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society"; 35 "environmental enthusiasts
intending to take are of, protect and save Mother Earth", 36 "agricultural and cooperative
sectors";37 "businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people
empowerment, social justice, and environmental protection and utilization for sustainable
development";38 "artists";39
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"Bisayans";40 Ilonggos.41

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What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex cathedra sans any standard what were the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors." This, in my opinion, constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. We are now asked to confirm their actions. We are asked to affirm that COMELEC knew what a
"marginalized and underrepresented sector" was when they saw one.
COMELEC's process was a modern day inquisition reminiscent of the medieval hunt for heretics and witches,
a spectacle which may in a few cases weed out the sham organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless
fraught with too many vulnerabilities that cannot be constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our Constitution, we should not lend our imprimatur to
both the basis and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this case.

After all, we have a due process clause still in place. 42 Regardless of the nature of the power that COMELEC
deployed--whether it was administrative or quasi-judicial--the parties were entitled to have a standard that
they could apply in their situation so that they could properly discern whether their factual situation
deserved registration or disqualification.
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a standard. Even Rep. Act No. 7941 was ambiguously
worded.43 There was no workable definition of "marginalized", "underrepresented" and "sector." 44
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Neither would it have been possible for Congress to define these concepts. In the first place, our decisions
have not given them guidance. In the second place, we could not give guidance because it is not in the
Constitution and could not be derived from its provisions. This is also apart from the reality that "identity",
"sector", "marginalized" and "underrepresented" are heavily contested concepts in the fields of social science
and philosophy.45
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The fallacy of representation by "marginalized and underrepresented" groups

It is possible under our system for a party list group representing indigenous peoples to be elected by
peoples who do not belong to their sector but from a vote-rich legislative district. The same is true with a
party list group allegedly of security guards. 46 They, too, can get elected without the consent of majority of
all the security guards in this country but simply from the required number allowed by our formula in BANAT
v COMELEC.47
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In practice, we have seen the possibility for these "marginalized and underrepresented" party list groups
being elected simply by the required vote in some legislative districts.
This sham produces the failure in representation. It undermines the spirit of the party list system, violates
the principle of representation inherent in a democratic and republican state, and weakens--rather than
strengthen--the abilities of the "marginalized and underrepresented" to become lawmakers themselves.
Constitutional construction cannot lose sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will undermine the
very spirit of the text of our Constitution.48
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Allowing the existence of strong national and regional parties or organizations in the party list system have
better chances of representing the voices of the "marginalized and underrepresented. It will also allow
views, standpoints and ideologies sidelined by the pragmatic politics required for political parties
participating in legislative districts to be represented in the
House of Representatives. It will also encourage the concept of being multi-sectoral and therefore the
strengthening of political platforms.
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain full fealty to the textual content of our Constitution. It
is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." 49 Nothing
more, nothing less.
Requirements for Party List Groups
Preferably, party list groups should represent the marginalized and underrepresented in our society.
Preferably, they may not be marginalized themselves but that they may also subscribe to political platforms
that have the improvement of those who are politically marginalized and economically destitute as their
catapulting passion. But, this cannot be the constitutional requirements that will guide legislation and
actions on the part of the Commission on Election.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:

chanroble svirtualawlibrary

First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations;

cralawlibrary

Second, there is no need to show that they represent the "marginalized and underrepresented". However,
they will have to clearly show how their plans will impact on the "marginalized and underrepresented".
Should the party list group prefer to represent a sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani 50 and
BANAT51 will apply to them;
cralawlibrary

Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list system must not also be a participant in
the election of representatives for the legislative districts. In other words, political parties that field
candidates for legislative districts cannot also participate in the party list system;
cralawlibrary

Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms guided by a vision of society, an
understanding of history, a statement of their philosophies and how this translates into realistic political
platforms;
cralawlibrary

Fifth, the parties or organizations--not only the nominees--must have concrete and verifiable track record of
political participation showing their translation of their political platforms into action;
cralawlibrary

Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must be organized solely for the purpose of
participating in electoral exercises;
cralawlibrary

Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as three (3) years, prior to their
registration. Within that period they should be able to show concrete activities that are in line with their
political platforms;
cralawlibrary

Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active membership roster so as to be able to mount a
credible campaign for purpose of enticing their audience (national, regional or sectoral) for their election;

cralawlibrary

Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have participated in the political activities of the
organization;
cralawlibrary

Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is not only democratically elected but also
one which is not dominated by the nominees themselves;
cralawlibrary

Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected through a transparent and democratic
process;
cralawlibrary

Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the party or organization must be clear and
should not point to a few dominant contributors specifically of individuals with families that are or have
participated in the elections for representatives of legislative districts;
cralawlibrary

Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be able to win within the two elections
subsequent to their registration;
cralawlibrary

Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and

Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization.
Disqualification of existing registered party list groups Jurisdiction of the COMELEC

With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members..."
A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered political party list groups
should prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws.
Besides, that the HRET is the "sole judge" clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the
rest.52
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote to:

chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1.

GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC Resolution No. 9135 and all the COMELEC Resolutions
raised in these consolidated cases; and

2.

REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper proceedings in line with our decision.

Endnotes:

CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. (1).

?r?l??l?br?r

G.R. NO. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.

?r?l??l?br?r

G.R. NO. 136781, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.

?r?l??l?br?r

G.R. NO. 179271, April 21, 2009. 586 SCRA 211. But, by a vote of 8 joining the opinion of Puno, C.J. the
court upheld Veterans disallowing political parties from participating in the party list elections.
4

?r?l??l?br?r

Republic Act. No. 7941 (1995).

?r?l??l?br?r

Supra note 2, see first, second and sixth and seventh requirements:

chanroble svirtualawlibrary

"First, the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show--through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of government and track record--that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented ...
"Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors...to be elected to the House of
Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented..."

xxx
"Sixth, the party or organization must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so ..."
"Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees..."
7

Supra note 2.

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Supra note 4; Infra note 29.

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CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 1.

10

?r?l??l?br?r

See Moya v. Del Fiero, G.R. NO. L-46863, November 18, 1939,

?r?l??l?br?r

See for instance, Lande, Carl H., Parties and Politics in the Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 9 (Sep
1968) pp 725-747 or Teehankee, Julio, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in Electoral Politics in Southeast
Asia, Aurel Croissant, ed.,Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002.
11

?r?l??l?br?r

Id.; Lo, Barnaby, Fame, Family Dominate Key Philippines Election, CBS News, May 10, 2010,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20004523-503543.html> (visited March 7, 2013).
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

See CONSTITUTION, Art. IX(C), Sec. 6.

Supra note 11.
Id.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Supra note 12.

Supra note 11.
Supra note 2.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See Supra note 2. (This was the ostensible justification for not allowing all "national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations" as provided in the Constitution to participate).
19

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20

21

22

23

24

25

GREENFORCE in G.R. NO. 204239 and KALIKASAN in G.R. NO. 204402.

ANAD in G.R. NO. 204094 and BANTAY in G.R. NO. 204141.
Supra notes 2 & 4.
Supra note 2.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

Id., 359 SCRA 698, 717

Id., 359 SCRA 698, 718

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

26

27

Chavez v. JBC, G.R. NO. 202242, July 17, 2012.

See supra note 2 at 733-761.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See supra note 4. (Voting to disallow major political parties from participating directly or indirectly in the
party list system were eight justices, namely: Puno, Quisumbing Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Velasco, and Leonardo-de Castro. Voting to allow major political parties in the party list
system were seven justices, namely: Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin).
28

?r?l??

l?br?r

29

Id., per Puno Concurring and Dissenting opinion at 258-259.

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated October 20, 2012, SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM), G.R. NO.
203818 (Ako Bikol Political Party, AKB).
30

?r?l??l?br?r

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

COMELEC Omnibus Resolution dated October 11, 2012, SPP 12-220 (PLM), G.R. NO. 203981 (UNIMAD).
COMELEC Resolution dated October 16, 2012, SPP 12-260 (PLM), G.R. NO. 203960 (1-CARE).

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated October 24, 2012, SPP 12-229 (PLM), G.R. NO. 203958 (BANTAY).

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated October 24, 2012, SPP 12-015 (PLM), G.R. NO. 203958 (KAKUSA).
COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12-185 (PLM), G.R. NO. 204094 (ANAD)

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12-060 (PLM), G.R. NO. 204239 (GREENFORCE)
COMELEC Resolution dated November 28, 2012, SPP 12-136 (PLM), G.R. NO. 204356 (BUTIL)
COMELEC Resolution dated December 5, 2012, SPP 11-002, G.R. NO. 204484 (PBB)

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated November 29, 2012, SPP 12-011 (PP), G.R. NO. 204370 (AAB)
COMELEC Resolution dated December 4, 2012, SPP 12-009 (PP), G.R. NO. 204379 (AI)

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Sec. 2-3.

See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Sec. 3.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See for instance, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (2011).
ANG GALING PINOY (AG) in G.R. NO. 204428.
Supra note 4.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

COMELEC Resolution dated November 23, 2012, SPP 12-099, G.R. NO. 204379 (ASIN)

See CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See for instance Association of Small Landowners v. DAR, G.R. NO. 78742, July 14, 1989 [per Cruz J.] on
allowing payment of just compensation in cash and bonds: "...We do not mind admitting that a certain
48

degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered
institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement."
br?r

49

50

51

52

CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. 1.

Supra note 2.
Supra note 4.

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

?r?l??l?br?r

See Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. NO. L-45081, July 15, 193

THIRD DIVISION

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[G.R. No. 109493. July 2, 1999.]

SPOUSES SERAFIN AQUINO and RUMELIA AQUINO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from
the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1991, which dismissed the
appeal of herein petitioners.chanrobles law library

It appears that Civil Case No. 38-M-89 filed by herein petitioners against the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for specific performance, damages
and annulment with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12 was dismissed on March 27, 1989 on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the GSIS. 2

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal 3 with the RTC. Their appeal was dismissed
on July 25, 1991 for failure to file an appellants brief within the reglementary period
which expired on May 29, 1991 pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. 4

On September 1, 1992, the Court of Appeals 5 denied the motion of herein

petitioners to "recall Entry of Judgment and to reinstate appeal etc., there being no
showing therein of any reason to justify the failure of appellants counsel to file
appellants brief within the reglementary period and considering that the resolution
dated July 25, 1991 dismissing the appeal became final" 6cralawnad

On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals 7 denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of its September 1, 1992 Resolution on the ground that it was
beyond the power of the Court to modify the dismissal since the order dismissing
the appeal had become final and executory on August 19, 1991 and Entry of
Judgment was issued on November 4, 1991. 8

Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following

errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS NOT TO HAVE SERVED A COPY
OF ITS RESOLUTION OF DISMISSAL UPON THE APPELLANT DESPITE KNOWLEDGE
THAT THEIR FORMER COUNSEL OF RECORD HAD DIED.

II.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO SERVE COPIES OF
RESOLUTIONS UPON THE APPELLANTS FORMER COUNSEL DE PARTE.

III.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY APPELLANTS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THESE GROUNDS.

IV.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY ADMISSION OF THE
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT WHICH WAS ALREADY APPENDED TO THEIR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

V.
THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS AS ENUMERATED IN THE APPELLANTS
BRIEF FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES ON THE MERITS."
9chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petitioners argue that they were never notified by their counsel of record, Atty.
Mala, of the notice to file an appellants brief. Atty. Mala was incapacitated to notify
the petitioners of their obligation as he was in a coma when said notice was served
upon him. They argue that when the Court of Appeals was notified of the death of
Atty. Mala when it received the return of the assailed Resolution of July 25, 1991 10
bearing the notation "RETURN TO SENDER, REASON: Deceased 8-1-81", it should
have sent resolutions, notices and other processes to the petitioners themselves for

the reason that when the case was brought to the Court of Appeals, they had no
counsel of record and were filing and signing the pleadings themselves. They add
that although Atty. Rosalino Barican continued to be served with copies of
resolutions, etc., Atty. Barican withdrew as their counsel of record while the case
was still pending before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The petitioners also argue that
substantial justice demands that they be allowed to continue their appeal for the
reason that as soon as they learned of the dismissal of their appeal, they
immediately procured the services of new counsel who filed an appeal brief
together with a motion for reconsideration. As the procedural lapses were
attributable to the Court of Appeals and their former counsel, they should still be
accorded their right to appeal. Finally, they claim that on the merits, there are
compelling grounds to allow the appeal. 11

The respondents, on the other hand, argue that Atty. Barican did not make a formal
withdrawal as counsel of record of the petitioners. It is true that Atty. Mala assisted
the petitioners in filing their notice of appeal but said notice was signed by Serafin
Aquino himself. Moreover, Atty. Mala never entered his appearance as their counsel.
In addition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 12 filed by
the petitioners was signed by the petitioner spouses and only notarized by Atty.
Mala. If it was intended that he should be their counsel of record, he should have
signed the motion. The respondents also claim that this petition is already res
judicata as their appeal was dismissed and the decision became final and
executory; an entry of judgment was issued and the case was remanded to the
lower court for execution. Finally, the respondents maintain that the petitioners are
guilty of forum shopping and contemptuous behavior as shown by the different
cases filed by the petitioner against them.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In reply 13 , the petitioners reiterate that there was a failure of service of a copy of
the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 21553 dated July 25, 1991
dismissing their appeal since it never reached their lawyer, Atty. Mala, who died on
June 3, 1991; and that Atty. Barican was no longer their counsel of record. 14 They
also claim that CA-G.R. No. 21533 is not res judicata to G.R. No. 109493
since:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1.
There was no judgment on the merits in CA-G.R. No. 21533 since it was
dismissed on a mere technicality.

2.
There is no identity of subject matter since CA-G.R. No. 21533 sought a
review of the decision of the RTC-Malolos while G.R. No. 109493 seeks a review of
the dismissal of their appeal by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners also claim that they are not guilty of forum shopping since there was no
pending action when the second and subsequent cases were filed; and that it was
the GSIS who initiated one of the cases, Civil Case No. 301 for unlawful detainer;
and that the cases they filed involve different subject matters, which negates a
finding of forum shopping. 15chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In their rejoinder 16 , respondents assert that Atty. Baricans withdrawal was never
approved by the Court despite his certification that he withdrew as counsel, for
Petitioners.

We rule that there was a proper service of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 21553 dated July 25, 1991 on the petitioners.

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states the proper procedure for the
withdrawal of a lawyer as counsel in a case. It provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 26.
Change of Attorneys. An attorney may retire at anytime from
an action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He
may also retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and the written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party . . . ." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Unless the procedure prescribed in the above mentioned section is complied with,
the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies
of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible for the
case. 17 In cases of substitution of attorneys the following requisites must be
complied with:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1.

Written application for substitution;

2.

written consent of the client; and

3.

a written consent of the attorney to be substituted.

In case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there

must at least be proof that notice of the motion for substitution has been served
upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules. 18

In the present case, petitioners admit that Atty. Barican represented them in the
proceedings before the lower court but that Atty. Mala substituted Atty. Barican
when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. 19 No proof was presented by
the petitioners to show compliance with the above procedural requirements for the
withdrawal of Atty. Barican and the substitution of Atty. Mala in his stead; no written
application for substitution or written consent of the client was filed in court. The
Certification made by Atty. Rosalino C. Barican to the effect that he was the former
counsel of record of the petitioners but that he withdrew as their counsel is not
controlling in the absence of compliance with the above procedural requirements. It
is therefore irrelevant that Atty. Mala did not receive the copy of the resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1991 which dismissed their appeal since he was
not the counsel of record and had never entered his appearance as counsel of the
petitioners.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Accordingly, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 21533 dated
July 25, 1991, dismissing the petitioners appeal became final and executory
because their lawyer of record, Atty. Barican, was duly served with a copy of that
resolution. There was an effective service upon the petitioners for as far as the
Court of Appeals was concerned, Atty. Barican continued to be their counsel of
record.

The failure of an appellant to file an appellants brief is ground for the dismissal of
the appeal. 20 The dismissal becomes final and executory after fifteen days from
receipt of the judgment or order. In the present case, since it is not denied that Atty.
Barican, the counsel of record, received the copy of the resolution of the Court of

Appeals dismissing the petitioners appeal, the dismissal became final and
executory after the lapse of fifteen days.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

We agree with the petitioners that they are not guilty of forum shopping. There is
forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. 21 The rule
on forum shopping applies only when two (or more) cases are still pending. 22
There is only one case, G.R. No. 109493, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari, pending between the parties in the present case.

In view of the above conclusions, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the issue of res
judicata.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., abroad, on official business leave.

Endnotes:

1.

Rollo, at p. 28.

2.

Rollo, pp. 35-39.

3.

Rollo, p. 89.

4.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 28. Eight Division composed of
the ponente, J. Alfredo Marigomen; and the members, J. Lorna S. Lombos-De La
Fuente (Chairman) and J. Jainal D. Rasul, concurring.

5.
Former Eight Division composed of the ponente, J. Alfredo Marigomen; and
the members, J. Lorna S. Lombos-De La Fuente (Chairman) and J. Jainal D. Rasul,
concurring.

6.

Rollo, at p. 32.

7.
Former Eight Division composed of the ponente, J. Alfredo Marigomen; and
the members, J. Santiago M. Kapunan and J. Jainal D. Rasul, concurring.

8.

Rollo, p. 30.

9.

Rollo, pp. 13-14.

10.

Rollo, p. 28; The Resolution states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"For failure to file appellants brief within the reglementary period which expired last
May 29, 1991, the Court resolves to dismiss the appeal, as it is hereby dismissed,
pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

11.

Rollo, pp. 14-19.

12.

Rollo, pp. 90-92.

13.

Reply, Rollo, pp. 118-125.

14.
In their supplemental reply, petitioners attach a certification signed by
Attorney Rosalino C. Barican stating that he was the former counsel of record of the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 38-M-87 but he withdrew as their Counsel of Record;
Rollo, p. 133.

15.

Supplemental Reply, Rollo, pp. 128-129.

16.

Rollo, pp. 139-146.

17.

Cortez v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31 at p. 35 [1978].

18.

Ibid.

19.

Petition for Review, p. 15.

20.

1 (e), Rule 50, Rules of Court.

21.

Ibid. at pp. 394-395.

22.

Carlet v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 97 at p. 110 [1997].

G.R. No. 109493 July 2, 1999 - SERAFIN AQUINO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.