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AD-A223 381

INSIGHT'S FROMi MATHEMATICAL


MDELING IN SOVIET MISSION
ANALYSIS (Part II)

Peter Almquist______________

and
Stephen M. Meyer

Research Report No. 86-6

K-or

SU619
ELECTFD

CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

INSIGHTS FTnN. MATHEMATICAL


.)DEiLING IN SOVIET MISSION
ANALYSIS (Part II)

Peter Almquist
and

Stephen N. Meyer

Research Report No. 86-6

Department of Political Science


and
Center for International Studies
Mssachusetts Institute of Technology
April 1985

|-

....
-- -

90 O6

EXECUTIVE S.IMAR Y

late 1960s,

the

In

strategic

evaluating

megatonnage remaining
the "correlation

forces

to each

side after an initial

importance

targeting

provided

population

Soviet

evaluating

the

centers.

military

balance

of

effort

to an
In

planners
strategic

an

forces,

the

forces

to "punish" an acversary

addition,

with

of

and means,"

enemy's nuclear

destroying an

targeting and rapidly

of

This model,

This includes

the essence of Soviet strategic thinking.

and war making potential as opposed


by

strike.

of ratios of "forces

terms

equivalent

of

ratio

the Soviet tradition

within

forces," fits

of nuclear

measuring the military balance in


and captures

the

on

based

nuclear

for

model

developed an exchange

analysts

Soviet

this

analytic

"objective"
tool

tool

basis

for

they had apparently

lacked prior to tie late 1960]s.


Tn
Soviet
were
ad

order

to

strategic

developed
sio

and

that,

structure was

potential

planning,

certain
were

of the

influence

a number of

aarameters
subjected

possi'Ie

and role of this model


alternate

(alert rates,

to

sensitivity

Soviet options,

model.

doninant

When

force

analyses.

the actual
to

rates,
it

was

Soviet

te

in

structures

penetration

ore of the 'test i.hn evaluated accorcing

of nuclear forces
other

the

force

hardness)

deternr.ed

force,

test

force

correlation

SALT constraints were inposec on the Soviet

alternative

force

structures

were

eliminated

and

by

the

the actual force was apparently the maximizing alternative.


was also

It
Soviets
words,
at a

gave
if

the

fourd

advantage

the US were

significant

that

first

disadvantage

the actual
to

whichever

to strike,
as

force

the

side

selected

structure
struck

first.

Soviets would

find

In

l For

"nFo

otner

themselves

a result of the current force mix.

ITe
A.

t.)"

Soviets could have selected other force mixes


--

US advantage

but chose not to.

maintained

by

fear

"bolt

a US

Soviet

strategic

from

the

This

forces)

Soviet leaders will be able

(coupled with the low alert rates


suggests

but expect

blue,"

that would have reduced the

to accurately

that

that,

gauge

the

ii,

Soviets

do not

the event

the nature

and

of war,

course of

the war and, if necessary, be the first to successfully employ strategic


nuclear strikes.
The attacker's
degree
has

on

advantage,

the adversary's

the advantage.

an increase in

improve

the

US

fr'ction

of

its

forces

resources

in

and

in

this

the

United

States

and in

bombers would represent

the Soviet EXT and correlation.

On the other

the US alert or on station rates would substantially

position,
total
model

th.e

to

posture,

to a corslr=r--l

contingent

the vast majority of Soviet LMT based on ICBMS,

increase in

an increase

nuclear

alert

is

Soviet alert rates on SLBMs

only a marginal
hand,

With

however,

as

EMT.

US ICBM

force

Similarly,

also

air

the

helps

defense

the

explain

mission,

comprises

use

of

continued

despite

the

a much

correlation

Soviet

Soviet

smaller
of

devotion

of

vulnerability

to

mi*ssile at tack.
T'he

co re=atfon

effi cacious
is

that

of

improvements
more
Soviet

and

area

of

nuclear

in w;. i

to

counter-SSBN
by

more

the
US

breakthrough

significantly change

model

concentrate

survivable

increasingly
EMT

strategic

is
ASW,

suggests

ti'at

thpe

most

Soviet break ou t-related researcin

anti-submarine

Soviets

in

forces

warfare
reap

deployed

(ASW).

only
in

according

Further

marginal

gains,

submarines.
to

this

the correlation to the Soviet benefit.

ICBM

model,

as

A major
could

PROJECT OVERVIEW

military

U.S.

which

on

mission

performance,

to

military
of

Soviet

innovation

Soviet weapons

the ability of the

Ulso examines

It

weaponry.

project

level

technological

the

in

changes

not

to

The

innovations

weapons

Soviet

of

contributions

the

focuses

innovations.

Soviet weapons

of

implications

military

the

and responded

interpreted

effectively

policy has

the extent to

to examine and assess

The objective of this project is

process to offer a militarily significant breakout option.

is

This

work

initial

contributions
capabilities ,

hiar-'are can curperf:rz


mission

of

weapons

nn

not

with

given

the previous technolcgical generation.


involves

contributions

interaction

w ,ic.h

measuring

towards

efforts

to

extent

to

approach

innovation

ine

ct.er weapons

comparing

quantities

assigned

systems

process

the Soviet Urion.

in

Soviet

tie

anal'yzing

art

we

Second,

nission

process)

literature.

selection

armaments

the

influence

the wEapons innovation

(and hence

relative

that

- d biases

assumptions,

it

preferences,

the

understand

better

to

us

enables

evaluation

and weapons

planning

their force

in

portrayed

innovation as

wcapons

to

Soviet approach

examining the

we are

First,

pursued.

being

are

inquiry

of

lines

related

three

Accordingly,

to

the

of

the

improving
piece

of

Assessing
arms

given mission,

and
as

well as the qualitative characteristics of new weaponry.


Third,
capacity

for

capai'lities
The

we

in

t-_-eat of a

are

assessing

"breakout"

--

the

degree

significantly

a short period of time -Soviet

to whicn

"technological

tne

improving

through weapons

surprise",

in

Soviets
their

have

the

military

innovation.

particular,

has been

a constant U.S. fear.


Part

I of

described.
impact

this

How do

of weapons

mathematical

Lhe

report addressed
Soviets

innovations?

modeling plays

in

one

aspect

of

the
to

mathematical models

use

Specifically,

it

seconc

examined

task

measure

the role

the
that

Soviet military analysis and some of its

applications in the area of air defense analysis.

In this second part of

the report, we take a closer look at Soviet mathematical modeling related


to

notions

of

strategic

technology

innovation

and

strategic

development from their efforts to measure the auclear balance?

---

A--

1_ rce

This report was produced by the Soviet Security Studies Working Group
under contract to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DoD,
contract number MDA 903-82-K-0107 and 903-84-K-0136.

C 1986

Soviet Security Studies Working Group, MIT.

No part of this publication may be reproduced,


All rights reserved.
transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated
into any human or computer language, in any form or by any means
whatsoever, without the express written permission of the author.
The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of
the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of
Defense position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other
official documentation.

Conten ts

1.0 SOVIET STRATEGIC FOKCE DEVELOPM12;T ................................


1.1 Evolution of Soviet Strategic Thinking .......................

1.2 The Soviet ICBM Program ......................................

2.0 MEASURDI G THE CORRELATION .........................................


2.1 The Correlation of Nuclear Forces ...........................

10

2.2 Running the Correlation

13

Model ...............................

3.0 CONCLUSIONS A D LMPLIC.ATIONS .....................................

22

3.1 Implications of the Model ...................................

22

3.2 Strategic Offense ...........................................

24

3.3 Strategic Defense ..........................................

2
.

3.3.1 The Anti-Air .ission ......................................

29

3.3.2 Te

30

ntiballistic

1 low-on
3.5.

APP.DL.

S rategic

Yissile

Mission .........................

Cffense.................................

A Finl- Cbse.'aicn .........................................

A Assued

APPENDX E:

Fo-rces , 1965-195................................35

Sc.iet ICBM Costs ........................................

NOT- S ................................................................

39

44

1.0 S&VIET SIRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPME'T

"Objective"
already

quite

aggregate

measures

common

in

equivalent

launchers,

intercontinental

West.

Throw-weight,
counter

of warheads

are

the nuclear balance.

Soviets have been


balance,

the

the

megatonnage,

and numbers

used to gauge

of

reticent

relying

on

about

military
just

generalizations

about

the

numbers of

many

indices

and as expectea --

they

measure

the

are

megatonzage,

potential,

few of

detailing how

balance

aggregate

contrast --

in

nuclear

the

the nuclear
state

01

aefine

the

current

"parity..I
Certainly,
strategic
Soviets

environment

sought an

compensation
Scviets

static

-iliarv writers
mili-tary
het

fcrces"

in

certain
to

co

(in

away

withi

central

cf

ilitary fo rces

frienf- y military means


tanks,

artillery

personnel,
relative

to

etc.

Such

combat

power

assessments.

So

at

to

artillery,

in

measures,

however,

in

to

for

example,

the

In

call

SALT

in
the

relative

II,

tact,

the

Sovitt

"correlation o.

combat

capabilitv

dealing with. conventional warfare,


presentec as a con arison

correlations

least

of

means.

This

to

aircraft,

aircraft

and seem

I,

to

in numbers of launchers as

what they

enemy military

between elementary approaches


Static

Is

SALT

inequalities,

measure

'nen

Soviets

advantages.

such
tc

In

favor)
US

the

by

sense.

their

fre-uentiv refer
as

used

perceived

e- t-o cp:osin..z sices.

corr'ation

are

general

imbalance

for

agreed

measures

are

considered

figure

this

respect,

of ratios c:

can be

there

is

ta-~s

Der scnnel

objective

prominantly in

t-ie

indices

to
to
o:

Soviet military
some

similarity

the East and the West.


are

the

simplest

and

probably

the

least

relative

or vulnerabilities

capabilities

provide no

they

Analytically,

In

selection.
to

models

control,

and

command

examine

weaponry,

evaluate

in Part I of t.,is
tlho

meant the use of mathematical

dynamic analysis

particular,

or

planning anc armaments

posture

force

for

analysis

of dynamic

importance

usec

Soviet military planners began to recogize

by the mid 1960s

report,

As aescribeo

use.

their

being countec.

might be

forces

of how

indication

from

what result might emerge

the haraware

of

the

about

say nothing

they

for

balances,

military

to assess

useful way

stuc>

anc

combat engagements.
In

this

of nuclear

respect,

forces

unreward-ing.

proposed

Anureyev

Anureyev

forces.
in

But

strategic
not

Saviet

military

we

--he

believe

will

strategic

was

argued

what it

cr

w::icp

this

this

describe

in te:-;als,

to

of

analysis.
was

morel

the

the

setting

AcadeMy

1953,

the developing

The

nuclear
provlce

how

it

model will next be


forces
a

from

serfes

1965
of

discussed

protinence

curing

was

model,

in

thie 1970s,

this

developed:

or

paper
Soviet

Soviet strategic force and

and the threat perceived by Soviet

will be considered:

nuclear

nuclear balance.

forces
it

of

significan C:

particular

wl 1 clh

in

General-Major

reasons

continuec

nuclear

provec

play an important role

triinkig on assessing te
of

that

For several

holds

(Lm'!)

correlation

could

Staff

correlation

tne

charges"

basis

Anureyev's

the Genral

measure

"nuclear

a model

corre.lation

thinking af-er

of

such

to

conceptual

measure

force

at

of

this

and

Soviet mltarv

measures.

correlation

from

that

analvsis

model itself

ratios

dy.namic

thoughts on thei.r use,


thie

simple

least

exaning

first

it

that

unmders z-=ding
n

with

planning

below,

Soviet efforts

initial

reflects
used

planners.

Soviet tlhinking and

to examine

throug&h
"snapshots"

Then

19b4,
of

the
at
th e

changing
five

year

evolving

correlation

,hese results will

courses not chosen, in

an effort

::

procurement

guide

to

procurement
Soviets

actual

policy

has

been

maximizing

been

of

Soviet
that

Soviet

against

of

"strategic"

in

order

Strategic

th-,e key
e:.er:v's

bombing

forces

would

Sovie-t

'.cn

of

tP.e

-to

5_

....

:--a.e

weapons.

weapoas
weapon.
bv

T'.at

to

u
uestios

he

--erican

Soviet
nuclear

--. d

the

the

learrship

thus

weapons

cfensive

the

development

increasec

of

Soviet

as

haC
well

to

tn-e

States

Ujnion

tested
to
as

the
to

n--

t-,ecr\
-:

Ltitec

or

ability

c:

to

ideas
cities

enemy's

damage

was

the

war.

in

Lress

s et

tLne

its

tne

.:cre

:cr7t
c

first

first
botn

freed c.

,erMa,-ent.v

dev eoce_, t

acnress
th e

victory,

fznalv

raisee

ar

tLne war. 2

e.

COuLC

Soviet

potential that nuclear weapons


% 1-h

Aorlc

Western

aeso-ing

m-iitary

allege:

ill

Europe ,

Soviet

Second

capabilities

enemy's

ersc. al

ne

year,

the

to continue

S-,ic.

sane

the

haG

this offen~sive was

Insteac,

both

'Y.s

w .:.

actual

implications

rejectec

industrial

in
'e. 1953,

a:ors
c...

....
e

expect

tie

the

Soviets

internally.

after

and that

The

eiey's

wil

as

:n2se

Ect

ccncluceu

weaken

''t . Stalin's

one woulo

if

Thinking.

forces.

tre enemv

as well

might serve

determine

Finally,

to success,

thie

sufflcientlv

what

possible

be addresseC.

ha

the

to weaken

with

of

the mooel

to

and

correlation.

li.arytnig

the offensive was

be waged

practices

line

the

a number

to assess how well

in

suggested by the model will

1.1 Evolution

compared with

be

nL
nuclear

t"hern-uclear
t.e threat

military

posec

political

and

provicec to tne Soviet Union.


nuclear

weapons,

I,.king.

the

Nuclear

importance
weapors,

cf

because

the
c

potential

their
even

a war,

rapidy

to

became

Soviet ability

to

the

US nuclear weapons

and

targets

for

of its

own

lacked

Soviet

of a battle or
offensive.

but

Geveloping nuclear potential

with an analogous

time lacking allies in


(it

the

could not counter

Soviets

(the

in Europe

at the

technology

primary

course ana outcome

the

take advantage

was limited by geography

hemisphere,

alter

the deployment of

aeployment in the western

comparable

the US)

proximity to

elive.ry

intercontinental

meaningful

capability).
these

But

limitations

were

to

not

last.

The

Soviet

Lnion

captured a number of German rocket scientists at the ed of lorld


and,

based

the V-2

and,

design --

with th'eir
7 1e

tc

their
in

work,

1955,

the SS-3.

inaccurate,

capable

or,

.ie7c

carrying

sweering

charges

ea

deploy missiles

were

missiles were
potentially

first

var i,

similar

(MRBM)

of

to

Soviet

expectea to be very
able

to

compensate

for t-e inaccuracy of the delivery system.


develpment

t:.ez

tne

--

reappraisal

S -vitt
zilitary

to

at tlie time,

thermonuclear
large

able

a medium range ballistic missile


,le
i

simutanecus
cf

was

nac

of nucl.ear

:7s'.

in

"evclution

of m itarv
s one

warheads

the

=missiles

'ilitarv Ai:airs"

doctrine
Sovet author

and

and military

art

--

_e:

by

thne

notec,

"~e
f:rs: n. in
t t ecome obvious was tne discreoe~cv bet ween such
powerful weax:, as th-"e nuclear bomb and the olc celivery Veiicle
for this
bom-.,
the airplane
r p
.
, wc.ih was vulnerable '3 to air
defense weapons.
A totally
rew meliver
vehicle was neeec.
a

:t

was decided

that missiles,

counter-measures,

due

and all-weather

to their high speed,


capability,

invulnerability

to

were the the most eiective

way to =ahe use of nucLep.- weapons.


Nuclear-armed

missiles

tradiftional route to victory

nace

it

in war.

possible

to

Prior

the Revolution

to

completely

r-.verse
in

the

Miitarv

Affairs,

victory was

Such

level victories.
in

acomplished
tactical
and

turn led to strategic

of nuclear

missiles,

Soviet

operational and

tactical

first

successes

achieving a number of low

lea

specialists

considered

successes,

which

successes

at

the

ones,

to operational

it

level

lower

possible
both

would

which

the use

Through

political victory.

finally

strategic

to

immediately

through

to

jump

facilitate

and speec

a more

rapid final political victoryStrategic


bring

could

targets were defined as those whose capture or

about

a rapid

in

change

According to Soviet authors,

naval bases,
2.

Other

course
in

these were,

The enemy's nuclear

i.

the

destruction

and outcome

order of importance:

forces,

including launchers
3
and associated C

major groupings of

forces,

such

the war.

of
5

and air

concentrations

as

and

of

conventional forces, and associated C3 .


3.

Nodes of military and political

4.

Yiitary-industrial

hierarchty

i~s

So-.iet

.2 The Sov'iet
the

founded
threat

in
by

Scviet

as

in

well:

missile
Soviet

Forces

principle

cestroying

changed

required,

continued

to

this

plants.
Oaly

the

(KVSN)

was

"day.

h*em has char7.ec with time.

destrcy

"Rocket

its

1959,

shifted

as

has

such as war materiel

CBY. Progr

Soviets

such

targets

of

c attack and

ability

Wren

facilities,

control.

LS

and

character
weapons

silos

from

planners

Strategic Desigration"

mission

allied

capable

were

of

was

to

the

As

threat

airbases.

bombers

to

required.
emphasizec

Unable

the

missiles,

of destroying

-5-

counter

smaller,
to

the

bomber
to

the

requirements

"point" targets

achieve

large-yield

LS

t-he

ea pons

accuracy
for

counter-silo

capability,

while simultaneously

for the purpose of destroying softer


The

by

the US

in

would not be

point at which it
of the

Soviet

the United
the

force.

States in
in

lX missile,

attacking

force

Soviets
own

their
They

were

which
to

land-based
force
nuclear

would

tne

missiles,
no

forces

idea

of a

on ICBMs

develop MIRVs
posed

longer
i-hreatenec

it

became

ensure

its

many

to

by

the

desire

as well as
their

clear

that

to

to

System

both

by

the

sheer
The

US

in

1970.

preserve
MIRVing.

MIRVing

size

for

the

with

began

in

for an

targets

limit US

force

survivability.

to shift against them.

which

the

reappearea

changed

course,

by the United States,

threat
a.i

of

to

even most,

or

Multiple Aim-Point

be simply too

frustrated

countered

US capabilities

"strategic sponge"
the

This,

destroy.)

to

as

there would

apparently

capability

recognized

(This

to be

capable of destroying all,

t-he late 1970s

deployment of MtIRVs
The

that would have

stretching

event of an attack,

the

.issiles) also

(about 1000

force

SS-11

large

weapons

targets.

the number of targets

to increase

served

of a

deployment

developing sraller

of

of

their

correlation

of

2.0 MEASURING THE CORRELATION

As was noted,

forces

enemy nuclear
its

ICBM force

hardening

the

dispersing

Soviet targeting has


first

are

them,

to

The

priority.

one step ahead of a


silos

a distinctive hierarchy in

first

withstand

then

provicing

and further hardening

the silos.

Soviet

for

US has

25

then

alternative

This

to keep

attempted

threat since
300

the late

1950s,

pressure

psi

launch

whic,

control

effort has recently

and

centers

taken on new

importance with the completion of the deployment of the fourth generation


of

Soviet

ICBMs,

has

resulted in

MX

ICBM,

which are seen


a number

among

them

as

of well-known

mobile

the

threatening

proposals

launchers,

US ICBM force.
for protecting

multiple

This
the new

protective

systems,

the

that

"deep-basing," and "dense-pack" or cluster-basing.


The
Soviets
to

pursuit of survivable
have a

destroy

devastate
arguaed

the

US !CBX

the rest

thiat

through

thneoretical

ti'e

th.e

ICBM

force

be at

deveiopent

of

Soviet
seems

these scenarios

variance

with

methocology
to be

one

wile

US deterrent

classified

General

YMjor I.

withi whicLn

maintaining

belief
they

a reserve

no

longer

force

credible

capa_!e

of

an

military

measuring

journal,

Anureyev

can

the

threaten

sufficient

to

some have

requires

threatening

are based on strategic analysis

published in

Staff's

by

repair

t.e

Soviet

while protecting US weapons.

Soviet

for

driven

Taking the ICbM balance alone,


is

is

capability

of the US.

ICBMs in a similar fashion,


But

basing

the

the June,
Fsilitarv

of the

thought.

The

stategic

intercontinental

1967

issue

Thought.

General

-7-

only

that appears

of the

publicly

known

balance

Soviet General

The article,

Staff Academy,

to

written

argues

that

by
the

correlation
factors
a

of

nuclear

forces

such as command

rough

measure

remaining

to

correlation

of

be

side

after

nuclear

forces

conflict.

Hard

up

of

number

of

intangible

the "moral-political" factor,

derived

destruction potential each side


a nuclear

made

skill and

can

each

is

by

an

calculating

initial

the

strike.

reflects

the

In

ratio

deliverable
other

of

woros,

soft

area

possesses at a given point in

target

aestruction

is

only

but that

one

D1
the

target

time auring
part

of

the

measure.
As

noted

earlier,

the

with a long tradition of


Patriotic

lWar"

correlation
equipment

with

of

Nazi

(eg, tanks vs.

tanks),

Rather

of

about

it

Anureyev

planners

various

and,

battles

Anureyev

model

is

is

or D'T,

it

have

examined

ratios,

of

that

it

is

those

dynamic

of forces,

that assumptions be

forces

tight be usec.

the capabilities

of forces,

static measures.

suggested

that

of

to Anurevev,

first

the

of firepower.

requires

in

consistent

Since the "Great

by

more recently,

for differentiation

lost in

the actions

in response

in

warheads,

allows

something that Is

planning

the

Soviet

how a war would be waged and how

n addition,

forces

than simply looking at the pre-conflict balance

measured by launchers,
made

Germany,

forces

aspect

of nuclear

Soviet thinking about warfare.

military

The novel
model.

correlation

the

forces.
make it

model

night

The article,

be

especially

anc

useful

that which

fcr

ollowea

clear that

the method used by General Major I. Anureyev with some additions can
be used successfully
in
calculating
the correlation
of nuclear
forces in nuclear weapons for operations on a large scale and also
for planning a first
nuclear strike as well as for accomplishing
other specific missions. 9
The

clear

correlation

implication
of

nuclear

is

that

forces

targeting
is

the

_A6-

to

proper

maximize
planning

the

post

srrateg'.

attack
The

used

to

in

not explicit

corollary,

plan

the

is

text,

that if

military operations,

actual

correlation might be

the

might also be used to

it

guide

procurement.
of the Anureyev model

The precise place


is

Some

unclear.

several letters

factors

Ue

on

are subsumed

the fundamental

in

only a

the

that

Part

were

I,

built

capture

it
into

of

criticized

was

article

but

Staff Academy,

the
10

model

--

There was

few variables.

underlying

thinking on strategic

furmulation offered by Anureyev


in

structure

the simple

Soviet strategic planning

many

in

these

complex

no attack

on

logic of the model.

suspect

Soviet military

Anureyev's

later,

by other members of the General

focused

critiques

months

in

is

likely
tLe

that

the

force analysis,

Soviet military

tenants of

of

not used today.

is

foundation

tne fundamental

concepts

Anureyev's

of

art
work.

even if

reflect

the

precise

For reasons
and

discussed

military
Thus,

Soviet strategic thinking.

-C

Go

mocel

it

science
may well

2.1 The Correlation of Nuclear Forces

The correlation

of forces is

military

journals,

specific

engagements

characterized
variables

as

such

as

it

is

in

as

often

I-orld

decisive,
skill

a familiar concept

War II.

for

or

used

that

in

to readers of Soviet

assessing

While
would

the

results

correlation

leave

"moral-political"

the

no

room

factors,

it

of

is

never

for

human

proviaes

an

important opportunity to the side with the advantage.


Two

nuclear

forces

delivery vehicles,

and

are
B,

assumed:

with J

A,

with

different

types

different

of

types

delivery

of

vehicles.

The following formulae are then used:

QiA
(eimt--that

is,

the

yield

of

megatonnage

equivalent

. [in i ] [(qi)2/3]

the warhead

to

the

2/3

power)

in

the

i-t h

type weapon for side A.

rr.n . L

>

-=

equivalent

E1

in

the

j-th

i-th

(or

-- h)

type

type weapon for side B.


r,

(or

nunzmer

of

warheads

cf

weapon for side A (B).


n4

(or

-)

qi

(or

q j)

=nunber

of

i-th

yielc

in

megatons

each

side

(or

J--h)

type weapon

for

sice

(B).
=

of

one

warhead

for

the

i-th

(j-th) type weapon.

The

total

EXT

for

QiA or

Q iB) is

representet

by

QA or QB'
At

time

t-o,

ie, prior

to any exchange,
~0

is

merei>

the ratio

of EMT:

[QA]/[QB.

-.

correlation

of nuclear

forces at time I (sice

A attacks; side B defends).


=

ratio

of

relative

change

in

the

distribution

of

forces

between the two sides as a result of A's attack on B.

(Fi A) (Wi A) RA)_UiA)

Z(FjB)(Wj B)(Rj B)(UjB)


FiA

[QiA]/QA at to

FjB = [QjB]/QB at to.

WiA = warhead penetration capability of i-th type weapon of siae A.


WjB = warhead penetration capability of j-th type weapon of side B.
RiA = reliability of i-th type weapon.
.A
R.. = reliability of j-th type weapon.
iA = percentage
V

of i-tb type weapon not consumec in attacking B.

= percentage of j-zb type weapon not destrovec in attacK by b.

-i!-

i
Table 1:

Soviet ICBM Characteristics*


for Selected Years

Missile

Year

# RVs

Yieid/

EMT/

CEP

RV (mr)

missile

(nm)

Reliability

SS-7

1965
1970

1
1

3
6

2.1
2.3

1.5
1.25

.5
.5

SS-8

1965
1970

1
1

3
5

2.1
2.9

1.0
1.0

.5
.5

SS-9

1970
1975
1980

1
1
1

25
25
25

8.5
8.5
8.5

.75
.5
.5

.8
.8
.8

SS-11

1970
1975
1980

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1.25
.8
.8

.8
.8
.8

SS-13

1970
1975
1980

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1.0
1.0
1.0

.8
.8
.8

$5-17/1

1975

.75

3.3

.24

.85

1980

.75

3.3

.24

.85

1984

.75

3.3

.24

.85

SS-17/2

1983

3.3

.23

.85

SS-18/1

1975

25

6.5

.23

.85

1983

20

8.5

.19

.85

SS-'8/2

19b3

.9

7.4

.23

.85

SS-.8/4

3.984

10

.5

6.3

.14

.85

SS-19/1

1975
1980

6
6

.55
.55

4.0
4.0

.19
.14

.85
.85

SS-19/2

1980

2.9

.21

.85

SS-19/3

1984

4.0

.14

.85

*Soviet ICBM
an
presented wi2t

5
.55

are
characteristics
precision.
artificial

difficult to
In addition,

-2-

juage
(see

and
next

often
page)

2.2 Running the Correlation Model

To

examine

the

how

correlation

exchanges were run for 1965,


force

structures

model

run assumes

for

both the

forces:

defense

SAMs.

as

ICBMs,
In

II

force

1980,

simulated

time,

and 1984 using the actual

and the United

States.

1he

attack

involving

the

bombers,

and SLBMs,

as well as strategic

addition,

structures were developed,


and 1984.

1975,

over

changed

Soviet Union

full scale

intercontinental
such

1970,

has

several

entire

hypothetical

range

Soviet

force

with a different mix of forces in 1970,

There was also one alternative US case,

of

1980,

in which the Minuteman

(450 missiles) was replaced with Ninuteman III missiles (as the

Soviets

expected

penetration

to

take

capability.

place),
for

and several

each

case,

variations

acLual

and

on

US

bomber

hypothetical,

the

correlation was examined after both a US and a Soviet first strike.


The CoF model
destroyed

--

reliaili-.

that

specifies
is,

targeting

target's

Bomber'-

were

targeted

coutering hard
ICBMs.

by

SL3 s ,

taken

forces

enemy reliable

was

based

on

on

alert

were

its

BY.1

LkM
anu

assumed

to

soft targets such as air and naval bases

whle

iCBMs,

targets effectively,

[For details of the forces,

(*continued) -hey are basec


from tests taking place in

maximize

priority

submarine

survive owing to their mobility;

to

were

the

only

genera-ly

forces

capable

used against

of

enemy

see Appendix A

on a sometimes small number of samples ana


artificial conditions. Yields and CEPs are

from declassified intelligence estimates anc public sources such as


and Aviation 1keek.
Rel iability,
perhaps
thie most
difficult
parameter about whic,
to obtain "hard" data, is
here set somewhat
arbitrarily and based on the assumption that Soviet reliability is a bit
lower than that of US ICBMs.
There are reports, however, that Soviet
ICBM reliability is much lower t-.Ln that of the US.

IISS

The results

of the running of

the correlation

are shown

in Table 2,

ano

graphically in Figure 1.
Clearly,
over time.

the

position of the Soviet Union has

The reasons

increased its EMT,


8.5 EMT/missile),

are

missiles

(in

since 1975,

the

SS-19 (with 2.9 -

and

particular,

the

SS-18

improved the capability

of the Soviets

silos.

the new

SiMultaneously,

and SS-9
and

(with 6.3 -

SS-18

4 EMT/missile)

(with only 1 EMI)

ramaticaily

Soviet ICBM force has

as the S5-17 (with 3.3 EM/missile),

and less reliable SS-11


new

clear:

improves

replace

the

(with 8.5 EMT).

SS-19)

have

oloer
1hese

substantially

to destroy US ICBM forces in

Soviet ICBMs have been hardened

their

from 300

psi to a reported 2500 psi, making them less vulnerable to a US strike.

Table 2: Actual Correlations of Forces


Attacking

correlation of forces after attacker's first

co U :rv

1965

United States
Soviet Union

44.0
.1

strike

1970

1975

19b0

19 84

2.9
.5

2.6
1.2

2.0
3.9

2.4
4.4

The correlation of nuclear forces is


tne ratio of the atnacker's
deliverable E.'to th.at of the enemy after a first
strike.
Thus, a
correlation of 2.9 in 1970 means that after a US first
strike,
-he US
would retain 2.9 times the reliable, deliverable L"Yl as hela by =he
Soviets.
Sinilarly, a correlation of .5 suggests tnat the Soviets, after
launching
a
first
strike
in
1970,
would have
about one-half
the
deliverable &MT available to tne US.

Several hypothetical
ant 1980.

To do so,

the

Soviet

Then

total
thie

nunber

cases were also

considered

for

the

cost estimates were used for the ICB!_s

expenditure
of

for

missiles

the
were

-14-

missiles

involved

varied,

keeping

years

invoivec-,

was
the

1970
anc

calculated.
lev el

of

mmn
mw

(-U
LL_

w-z.-

"

44

-'

oo

4-,""

"

/ .
~:'
~-

>

expenditures
to

constant

hypothesize

[see

different

(dictated by the actual

all

remaining

force
force).

missiles were varied in


force

B].

This

mixes

within

ie,

cases

approach
an

maoe

assumed

For all but one case,

that

are

actually

shown

in

it

possi-be

cost

ceiling

only two types

of

with the remainder of the

case,

each hypothetical

constant,

the hypothetical

Appendix

deployed.

Table 3.)

For

(The

results

1970,

four

of

such

cases were examined:


1500 SS-lls and no SS-9s
460 SS-9s and no SS-lls
100 SS-9s and 1190 SS-lls

(A)
(B)
(C)
As

can be seen

correlations

Soviets,

it

puzzling

result.

In

suggests

was

the

during

tLne best
several

for

nuclear

After

t-e

vwhen

1950's
cisar ng

weapons

$5-9 either

Soviet

planners

launchings.
against
that the

US

seemed

served a
were

There
ICBM

the

the

US

launch

LS

did

strategic

China
to

prescribe

evidence

it.

other

that

the

defensive

the

Soviets

to the
not

the

it

that

attack

the

Korean

control. centers

(LCCs).

US

war,

SS-11s

not

h.ave

Lnicn

ensured

faf!ea
even

to

though

or

to counter
actually

the

the

Soviet

possibility

were
If

perspective.

have

attacking ICBMs

SS-9's

of

may

the

could

would be able
the

initially

point of alloing

A second

than

--

up completely

1ikewise,

during

purpose

States

superiority

strike.

confident

is

First,
strike,

the

the option selectea by the

made
from

the resulting

on either side of that

United

force

Soviets

'CS first

all,

:irst

.gainst

military doctrine
the

for

possibilities.

advantage.

successful

best

Interestingly,

been very concerned about a


an

and Table 3,

the event of a US attack,

seems,

would have been

US

(Figure 1)

for the Soviet attack would have been

actually chosen.

This

from the graph

Soviets

a
use
US

is

tlat

that

the

US ICBM
targeted
assumed

destruction of a given LCC would disable several ICBM launch-ers,

-15-

then

this

possible

alternative
other

such as a

targeting

factors

desire

technological

led

them

Then,

This

attendant
last

detailed

in

half

acquisition
it

is

i,

the

initial
1960s

to

the

interesting.

was

Soviet

extent by

probably
thinking

efforts

were

develop

part
about

undertaken

systematic

hypotlieti cal

S-1s

1980

no SS-l

III SS-IT s an: U

cases,

variatin

cf ::.e SS-lb and


: -C

)5J S%-rs
753S4
-Is

S-1_

72S
s and .'5

(J)(

also

they

SS-9

and

forces

aic,

it

the

timing

of

SS-il

model

(it

ever

of

war.

beginning
to

ana

did).

campaign

nuclear

approach

however,

cf the SS-17 and SS-19 :orce

85

(cl)

as

is

a hedge against

about

any influence

to some

It

force

561- SS-17s and no SS-19s


:,
_sS-s anz no SS-?s

(F)

- .:

no SS-lbs

SS-19s
-l ":

r' e

n
--:
9
a"nd
nc SSo-lbs
^ dno
'-19s

150 SS-Is and 530 SS-19s


410 SS-ibs and 150 SS-19s

variation

in

the US force

100i Minuteman ills

variations
(N)
(0)
(p)
(Q)
(R)
(S)

SS-9

These wcre:

variations

(M)

sense.

in

the
to
As
tue

weapons

ano development.

is

(K)
(L)

the

decisions

gaine

whichL

into

made

correlation of nuclear

supported

analvsis

Part
of

thinking

deploy

the

the

(miod-1967),

article
objective

second

of

possibility

Anureyev
inject

mode

have

than one iCBM design as

too,

procurement were made before


the

to

to deploy more

risk.

would

i:

US bomner

and no kQut

penetration and alert rates

751 penetration
50%. penet-ratic-.
25'. penetration
US bombers at 5,'
alert
US bo .hers at 67% alert
US bombers at 7-% alert
-1lb-

that

pro-e

more

Q_)

N
(N,_.

variations in Soviet submarine alert rates


(T)
(U)

25% of Soviet SSBNs out of port


50% of Soviet SSBNs out of port

Variations
expenditures
constant;
for

in

the

for

Soviet ICBM forces were based on estimated

ICBMs.

The

only relative

two

missile

(with

of

the

States

ard

correlation of nuclear
1977,
to

when

United

unclear.

Both

bv

being

the

advantage

is

Wrat
tr, e

solution,
on.y

C"

one

K --

--

(more

in

missiles

the

Deferse

Forces.
a

wtin

hav'e

cevotion

Daly optio-.

better

F).

then

In

only

devising

ignored,

the

was

because

correlation

- -' -

such

is

constra

solutions
Soviet

The relative

surpassed

measure,

about

first

that

however,

gain

that
is

the aavaatage
relative

1977,

the

force

posture which

nct
ts

the
the

of

that

tne 410 SS-19/no


manipulating

(E,

N,

maxi:izing

pulat in

protise
K,

of the

greater

arent

SALT

strike

violation

-17-

would

to be allowed).

by

positions

Uion.

significant_!y
E,

the

had reversed.

since

while

that by 1980

Soviet Union

however,

required

no:

the

but

te

of a

than

and

of striking first

the 5viet

A=ong

case

remainec

favor of the Soviet Union around

of

and

seeCte ,

the event

requirec

provided

favor

interesting,

would

MIRVed

meaning

strike,

to

dozinant

Union

Soviets

first

forces

correlation

the

The

actua'ly

is

to

of

figure 1 is

Soviet

StaLts

rore

Sov ets

from

tLne Un.ited

i.

missiles

constraints were

forces shifted in

States.

-ifted

exception

SALT II

the

the advantage

the

the

are the focus of this study.

fact apparL'.t

United

the

force mixes,

potential Soviet achievements


The first

of

deployment quantities were varied,

systems

these alternative

capabilities

Soviet

N,

SAL

0,

only

0,

II

better
and P),

agreement

and P would

resources
SS-17

force,

the

ICBM

to

the

have
Air

would have
force

but

without violating

possibilitieb.

several

responsible
on

the

for

considered.
technological
important

eggs

Yangel bureau),

factor

technological
burden

of

risk

innovation.

accuracies,

it

or

two

no

Given

Obviously,

design.

production

of

before

the

SS-19)

served

in

simply

failed

Or

the

the

part

to
to

begun

match

the

too

spreading

carry

and

the

an
of

total

loading

and

different

retooling

the

SS-19

be

did not match up to


to

seven

55-17

begin
months

deployment

expenses.

(or,

in

Soviet
been

and SS-19 have

and

oevelopnent

expectations

always

flight-testing

soon,

should

warhead

front-end design

had

influence

the

The

in

that SS-17

(which

justify

has

bureau

locatec

all

would

differences

decision

made

placing

design

the

is

regime)

systems

perhaps

been

the bureau's

policy.

single

the SS-17

SS-17
had

new

may reflect

aes ign

bureau

avoid

procurement

that

or

the

Brezhnev's

to

can safely be assumed

"front ends."
SS-19

one

Soviet

means

under

desire

chosen

maintain

(Yangel's

region

only

in

to

apparatus

the

in

E was not

(the

favored

Moreover,

that

need

decision-making
a

and

The

the SS-17

Dnepropetrovsk,

the

any agreements

of

150

performance

performance

surpassed

expectations).
Given

uncertain :ty

in

thne

es timates

cnaracteristics,

sensitivity analysis

exsting

Soviet

force

mix.

should also be noted

an

It
impact

on

tne

structure

Soviet

in

that

strategic

limits bounded an-y improvement in


The

option

drawback:
correlation

it

selected

allows
of nuclear

thie

by

tne

United

forces

of

Soviet

shows that witi-n error


1980

the

may actually
SALT process

programs.

Acceptance

States

tnrough

-18-

however,
to

first

is

obtain

its

strike

as

t.e

maximizing
to have had

of the

the correlation of nuclear


Soviets,

linits,

be the

appears

weapons

SALT

!I

forces.

not

witnoLt

best
well,

its

possible
withn

one

exception.
the

The

full

exception would,

MIRVing

of

the

US

Minuteman

selected by the Soviets reflects


in

the event the

United

Soviet correlation
this

trade-off

leadership is
go first
As
nuclear
the

in

is

words,

the

mix

first

strike.
strike

Soviet

In

return,

first.

political

the

Of course,
and

military

that the Soviet Union will be the one to

by the 1984

forces begins to
of

The

the

is

increase

completion
is

about

as

forces

correlatio,

aliw

=nder
in

good

US

first

as

is

war

lnited

This

to a US

"Dolt out of the blue."

suggests

that tine

Soviets
The

-19-

in

the 1980s,

Soviet

SS-17,

whose

attainable

within

This

should be waged.

States

a very

Gecice,

do not

in

high

fits

has

and SS-19
preemptive
existing
well with

Soviet leaders
correlation

exchange

and are able,

ascribe

of

while

position

SS-18,

force

strike scenario,

Soviets

trend of correlation

constraints.

t he eve-t the Soviets

first.

the

s trategic

political

tne

time

deployment of

of how a nuclear

to

appear

for

Soviet

and

the

marginally.

of its
a

economic,

Soviet discussions

cata,

flatten out

US

result

technological,

h-+

the

other

Soviet action:

for maximized US correlation

the Soviets

if

certain

In

not

a nuclear conflict.

shifted with the

nuclear

launches

acceptable

demonstrated

capability

force.

a tolerance

also high if

reasonably

position

ICBMs.

is

States

require US,

however,

cf

for a very
to s

ike

a high lIkelihood

Table 3: Summary of Correlations For

Actual and Hypothetical Force Postures

Correlation of Forces
US attacks
first

SU attacks
first

Case

Mix

1965
1970

Actual 1965
Actual 1970

0.1
2.9

1500 SS-11s, no SS-9s


460 SS-9s, no SS-lls
100 SS-9s, 1180 SS-Is

2.4
2.7
2.7

.8
.2
.7

1975
1980

Actual 1975
Actual 1980

2.6
2.0

1.2
3.9

D
E
F

560 SS-17s,
410 SS-19s,
865 SS-19s,
no SS-17s
225 SS-17s,
280 SS-17s,
510 SS-18s,
750 SS-19s,
150 SS-18,
41C SS-18s,

1.7
1.9

3.0
4.2

225 SS-19s
205 SS-19s
no SS-19s
no SS-l8s
530 SS-19s
150 SS-19s

1.8
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.5
1.8
1.9

3.7
3.7
-.7
3.1
3.7
4.0
3.6

no MY .1

2.4

4.0

75% US bomber penetration


50% US bomber penetration
US bomber penetration
25

1.8
1.5
1.2

4.1
5.4

Q
R

US bombers at 50% alert


US bombers at 66% alert

2.0
2.0

3.1
2.6

US bombers at 75% alert

2.0

2.4

25. of Soviet SSNs out

1.9

3.9

50' of Soviet

SSNs out

1.b

3.9

1984

Actual 1984

2.4

4.4

A
B
C

G
i
J
K
1

M000
N
0
p

Y'

no SS-19s
no SS-17s
no SS-18s,

:1,

-2 C-

44.0
.5

4.7

Table 3: Summary of Correlations For

Hypothetical force Postures (cont'd)

Correlation of Forces
US attacks
first

SU attacks
first

Case

?-ix

1984

75% US bomber pen


Soy. silos @ 2500* psi

1.8

4.1

50% US bomber pen


Soy. silos @ 2500* psi

1.4

4.7

25% US bomber pen


Soy. silos @ 2500* psi

1.1

5.4

*Hardness of thne SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 silos; the hardness of the
SS-11 and SS-13s are considered to be 1000 psi.

-21-

3.0 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

correlation

Anureyev's
conceptual

framework

nuclear

of

rather

forces

as

than

an

explicit

intriguing because of some of the insights it


in

decisions

Soviet

model

Anureyev
integrates

strategic

produces a

strategic

force

offense and

forces,

perhaps

this

serve

as

as opnosed

is

the

--

algorithm

In

for

that

The

fact

that

the

to have maximized the correlation of

used by the

a useful analogue

the

balance

to other measures such as RVs, suggests

tool

a
is

particular,

the nuclear

strategic defense.

actual Soviet force posture appears


nuclear

of

as

taken

may offer into innovation

planning.

measure

dynamic

--

model

either

Soviet

planners,

the model

or

that

that it

may

they do use or their

thought process.
If

this

measure

nuclear balance,

captures

then it

the essence

of

Soviet assessments

should also provide useful

of the

insights into

their

perceptions of breakout threats and opportunities.

3.1 implcations of t e

If
planning,

the model,

its

fundamental

structure,

serves

as

a guide

to

then Soviet strategic targeting should place a premium on the

destruction
examle,

or

boA

of

the

enemy's

LU, as

of the enemy's RVs.

opposed

to

None of Anureyev's

the

destruction,

critics

suggested

for
that

there was an error in the UMT empiasis in the model.


The model

is

open-ended:

to improve one's position.

each additional

This factor

continued retention of systems

equivalent

megaton serves

may serve as an incentive to the

that appear

obsolete.

The SS-7 and SS-8,

-22-

..
.....

..

....

although

vulnerable

and of questionable

of the Soviet EMT until


they

would

destroy

have

survivable

they were withdrawn in

required

them.

In

the

US

addition,

EMT serves

as

as

flexibility

to

the

and

expend

to

provided

10

the late 1970s.

some

model's

a stimulus

MIRVed versions of the SS-17,


well

reliability,

to 15%

Moreover,

of

its

own

forces

to

emphasis

on

the

ratios

of

fractionate

one's

missiles.

The

SS-18, and SS-19 have greater total DAI (as

efficiency

in

the

use

of

force)

than

their

single-RV models.
But Anureyev's
except

in

model

relation

fails

to an

to

give guidance as

adversary.

The

to sizing of forces,

correlation

value

itself

is

ratio, and tells little about the utility of the forces remaining to each
A correlation of 2 could be 2 EMT to 1, 200

side.
to

1 million.
the

which
concept

a result, the index alone gives no natural ceiling at

As

"curve"

of

the

"sufficiency"

of

size of the force is

correlation
independent

to

the

flatten

out,

enemy's

capabilities.

In

and

no
The

as each attempts

tnis respect, the correlation


in

thus

that it

to

of nuclear

pushes

each side

try to better the ratio.

forces

as

conflicts,
tanks

in

while

this
well,

have
the

defense

indeed,

The
one

is
and

true

can
tank

-n the non-nuclear

Soviet

determined

successful

advantage.
(if,

of

a true "FYT" arms race model,

Cf course,
of

might

driven by that of the adversary,

improve the ratio cf forces.


foices model is

to 100, or 2 million

certain

generally

based

ratios
defeat

as
two

offensive requires

"optimum" ratio
exists

planners,

at all),

desired
but

models

for

given

on

of the correlation
their

aesirable.
to

For

four

or

nuclear

five
forces

the cestructive

to
is

of

example,

three attacking

even a few nuclear weapons, it might be expected to be large.

-23-

analysis

tanks,

one

tank

unknown

potential

of

and

survivability

of

defense

the

of

deliverability

Because

and the

capabilities,

the
its

by

penetration,

system,
That

the

or simply by
Soviets

and bomber

EMT concentrated in

fraction of the entire


as

the model

in

shifting
putting

EMT
a

from

larger

forces

Thus,

a weapon's reliability,

vulnerable

fraction

on alert may reflect

a given

being of equal value.

of

technical

to

the

put a greater

have not strived to

penetration

forces,

non-haraened

of

could be achieved by improving

same results

Ihis

well.

as well as active

(such as silo-hardening)

rates

treated

system are

weapon

as

important

systems).

alert

Reliability,

is

the

factor,

major

another

is

forces

Soviet

includes both passive measures


(such as anti-aircraft

EMT

survivable

force

on

alert.

fraction of the SLBM

constraints,

or simply

that they do not expect a "bolt from the blue" by the United States.
it

may reflect

force,

the

decision

to

capable,

zost

cost-effective method for

continue

concentrating

easily

controlled,

EMT

into

and,

the

Or
ICBM

apparently,

the delivery of Soviet nuclear weapons.

3.2 Strategic Offense


The

Anureyev

mocel

strategic balance.
and
This
Thus,

phasing
is
if

in

of

prcauces

Tha: is

nuclear

contrast

the Anureyev

to say,

employment

to static
model

assessing the nuclear balance,


--

scenario

assunptions
of

both

measures,

does reflect

tie

about tne

characteristics

afiects

are scenario

strategic posture

--

ew strategic force requirements

--

the danger posed by US strategic

-24-

the

results.

independent.

Soviet military approach

then their perceptions of

tae viability of their

the

measure

sides

'which

c:

c. pencent

programs

to

I
will

depend

heavily

on

the

scenarios

they

use

to

structure

their

contingency planning.
In

to

reduced
in

seemingly

equal-cost

the American

preemptive

pursue

for a

Soviet strategic
Until

separate

been

warheads

Soviet

from

the

for

missiles.

Until

air

or ground alert.
were

missiles

strategic

concern.

Soviet

introduction

of

Soviet

kept
fourth

fraction

only a relatively small

and 1975,

late 1974

generation ICBMs in

placed on

the

of

of lack

evidence

bombers have never

mid-1960s,

the

other

is

there

strike,

first

regarding US plans

of Soviet propaganaa

light of the constant barrage

surprising

may seem

this

Vhile

threat.

have

could

that

structures

force

ICBM

chose not

the Soviets

that

data shows

force

Soviet strategic

alternative

model using actual and

our analysis of the Anureyev

this respect,

12
of

Soviet

ICBMs

were

kept

on

the

good explanations

Soviet

leaderslhip's

vulnerability
have

done

to

to

day-to-day

tLe

end

1960s

Defense

US

t-.at

Troops

--

model

the

context

suggests

top

strategic
strike,

from

suggests

of

that

many

threat.

to

The

that

Rocket

that hac

could

level

posture

have

their

they

low

Forces

they vill

there

reduce

things

Soviet military

Strategic

confidence

been

have

While

the fact remains

there were
tLat

SSBNs

to 20%.

10%

priority

the

the

Soviet

of

t-ircu-.,

to

the.Air

the

time

to

posture.
a

the

posture.

anomolies,

characterized

move to a generated alert


In

these

significantly

--

1973s

for

first

decrease

alert

alert rates --

maintained very low on-station


may be

an

generated
focus

of

alert,
Soviet

maximize

their

own preemptive _potential

rubric),

while

acting

external

constraints.

under

certain

our

analysis

military

(under

the

technological,

Their ICBM innovation

-25-

of the Anureyev

efforts

has

correlation

been
of

to

forces

organizational,

and deplovment activities

and
--

by the model --

as reflected

the Soviet leadership

should

they are reasonably

imminent,

is

that war

perceive

that,

suggest

distinct missions are implicit in

Three

will have the option to preempt.

they

that

confident

the Anureyev model:


offensive strikes against enemy strategic forces (with. priority
with priority weighting by EMT or ability to destroy Soviet
residual EMT),
retaliatory
subsequent)
(and
second
against
active
defense
strikes,
economicenemy
against
strikes
offensive
follow-on
and
industrial capabilities.

--

--

US

targeted

are

attacks

bomber

against

large-EMT

strikes

of

capability

since

Lne

requirements

and

SS-19.

of

capa!ilitv already e

1960s

of

US

the US

SSBNs.
EMT

and

large-EMT systems:
the Anreyev
have been
ICBMs.

Soviet

ICBMs

are

breakout
in

Up to

the

they have

is

there

part,

possibilities

EXT strikes of

need
as

tne

the

to

does

not

SS-18

consider

fundamental

the offensive mission involves

in

US

present,
had no

real

capability

Soviet targeting

in

comparison

to

seem

to have

been

-26-

action

SLBMs have held only about 20%


to

threaten

priorities

Soviet

dictated by

model would imply that blumting US SLBM capabilities

there

th e

until

the deployed force.

Soviet ICBMs.

concern

this

Systems

specifically,

here,

for

had

have

approxdmated

little

Also

prompt,

ICBMs).

SS-11

Soviet ICBMs;

generation

sts

the lesser

And

facilities

not

were

requirements

The single area of weakness


against

and C 3

and

(SS-9

C3 .

requirements

Systems

on ICBM silos are prompt moderate

nost

tihe

surprise

innovation

late

fourth

For

accuracy.

modest

These

deplovnent of t-he

SSBN bases,

bases,

for attacks

accuracy.

high

and foremost,

first

associated

their

related C 3 .

and

facilities

SSBN

targeted,

and

bases

ICBM

and

bomber

against

is

strike

offensive

The "counter-EMT"

should

countering LS bombers and


muclh

Soviet

activity

in

counter-SSBN operations in

US SSBNs under

the significance of countering

should increase greatly

correlation of nuclear

the

capabilities

to

increasingly

important

and

military

Soviet

to

It

about 1350).)

to

target.

track,

detect,

the EMT carried on US SLBMs

(By 1990,

by 90% (from about 700

increase

the

Trident 11 will hold substantial EMT and will directly

framework.

threaten Soviet large-EMT systems.


will

changes in

forthcoming

and II

zpecifically Trident I

US SLBM torce --

forces

However,

past.

the

destroy

US SSBNs

planners

and are

follows

that

should

grow
where

areas

innovation surprise and breakout could make a significant difference.

Report

#1)

could involve a

technology,

is

it

Thus,

case).

would

be

capabilities

and

in

most of it

based

technological

on

s.nthelic aperture radar

senscrs,

none of which are strong


take a long time

automated

usual

activity.

Building

application

innovation

destruction

of

SSBNs,

on

prior

would
given

Soviet

provide
that

-27-

engineering

and

One

for

aesigned

and

Such

area

submarine

innovations
co-puters --

innovations would
testing --

though

from observation.
be

requirea

systems,

suitable

they

the

innovation.

to develop and would require extensive

would not

develop

the development Cf

control systems,

Soviet technology areas.

innovation

the

technological

sigificant

would not be readily apparent

Technological

the

by

hampered

-However,

trac-ing.

be required

be

historically have constrained

that

the space-based

detection
would

not

necessarily

could

Soviets

the

if

that

not

is

this

(though

produced

possible

might

they

production hurdles
operational

mass

that could be custom

of systems

small number

activities

Such

tracking

and

detection

SSBN

relatively

than

rather

made,

in

be

would

innovation leading to breakout (see

to technological

conducive

Areas

for

design

capabilities

could be localized.

the dest:ruction
innovation
for

and

the rapic

Since

Soviet

military

production

products

capabilities
design

reflect

in

one

hand,

areas

weakness.

Very

production

to

initial

operating

times

areas:

air

systems.

geeral,

mid

which

was

composed

defense

command,

source

information

commands.)
the

and

in

but

short

the

other

hand,

develop the

to

moderate

proauction

expected,

given

the

',

active

_f nucear
in

model

strategic

particular.

defense

antiballistic missile systems,


this

subdivicing

of the

in

The

th.ree

and antI-space

stategic

defense

the structure of the National Air Defense Forces,

of
the

an

anti-air

anti-space

pertaining

The Anureyev
anti-missile

to

considerable

--

the Anurevev

efforts

1960s,

mission was mirrored in

in

and

defense systems,
tne

be

requirec

On

demands.

concentratec

(In

Cin

here,

can

defense ',.as a prominent rcle

have

times.

given localization.

Srateg

Soviets

in

task.

expected,

be

innovations will be needed

Defense

concept in

"new"

breakout

activities

demonstrated

capability

to

are

tracking

can

St-atezc

forces

breakout

innovations

times

capability

operating

initial

rapid

the counter-SSBN

have

Soviets

development

quantitative production

and

the

for destruction

capability

when

with respect

and

localization,

where
long

technological

and/or application

only design

strongest

fairly

significance

of greatest

detection,

technology

3.3

onerous

many

the

support

to

innovation,

their

counter-EMT offensive strike mission is

the

the

the area

sum,

at

could be made.

destruction potential
In

are

model

missions.

to

defense
defense
the

deals

comand,
command.

continuing

explicitly

While

-28-

one

might

an

anti-nissile

There

is

existence

with

only

implicitly

no open
of

the

these

anti-air

factor

the

IkI

mission

anti-space

the muael

into

it

work on space weaponry),

amount of

aid a consiaerable

(Anureyev

not a direct part of the analysis.

is

3.3.1 The Anti-Air Mission

have

experts

western

why

wondered

--

etc.

parties,

fortress

national

inertia,

strategic

EMr continued

strategic

bomber

this

translates

first

of t-he US

more than 50
force.

bomber

US

the

formulation,

its

third

over

model adds an analytic

of nuclear forces

to be held in

bureaucratic

concerns

strategic

the introduction of ICBvs,

Even after

and

organizational

mentality,

the correlation

rationale.

Anurevev

--

auvanced

been

have

explanations

possible

many

kile

warheads.

missile-delivered

of

thousands

on

to many

completely vulnerable

their country is

strategic air defense when

military resources

of their

portion

to spend a substantial

continues

and

continuea

military

Soviet

the

Many

cruise missiles.

E21T delivered by aircraft and

enemy's

the

reduce

to

of course,

is,

mocel

the Anureyev

defense in

The role of the air

would

force

uncer

Thus,
be

the

weightec

very heavily.
As
tne

descri*.ed above,

initial

ccizter-D:

offensive

tcne

residual

to

expected

rec uce

significantly

large

in

changes

Anureyev

model.

reduced
the

US

that

bomber

Soviet

the nuclear

in
It

air

priority

defense,

EMI.

That

is

is
say,

to

the benefit of thie

Therefore,

relatively

"barrier"

produces

of

as

forces

Lie cost-effectiveness

defense system may look more reasonable within

-29-

thlen,

system will most likely engage

threat.
defense

targeting in

air

they will have

correlation

follows that

Active

bomber-hela

Soviet air defense

the

strike,

improvements

US

Soviet expectations

given apparent
preemptive

strike.

into

small

relatively

measured

by

the

of the Soviet air

this framework.

Since EMT is

a surrogate measure for lethality to soft area

the Anureyev

model

effectively

concentrated

economic-industrial
on

the

subject,

ground force

suggests

in

assets.

that

strategic

that

(This

assumes,
targets

are targeted

agrees with doctrinal statements

in

that

most

protecting

for

line with Soviet writings


(for

in

would be

defense

defense

zoe

soft military

concentrations)

air

targets,

example,

and

airbases

the initial strike.)

This

primary task of the Troops of

the

the Anti-Air Defense (the new name of the National Air Defense Forces)
to protect and preserve the

potential of the economic-industrial base of

the USSR.

Soviet possibilities for technological,

innovation

leading

to

is

breakout

should,

design,

therefore,

be

or application

assessed

in

the

context of this specific mission.


Part I of this report looked at the air defense mission and so there
is no need to repeat the analysis here.
that

tie

question

revolve

aroiund

tar gets.

T-:s

recogized,
Defense

on

model,

is
is

forces.

automated

Soviet

air

the struggle

as

detection

of

It

and

control

the task is

refIected
felows

observable

thne

Soviet

the recen.

that special

from

should be emphasizec
and
(and

breakout will
low

ni litary

reorganization

emphasis

technologies
Again,

it

innovation

low

ha t
in

trac&ing
systems.

defense

against

c, an ge

However,

is

(sensors

likely

and

the perspective

altit-uae)

has
of

air eacy

the

Air

be placec

to

processing)

and

of the Anureyev

to reuce furt-her US surviving air-breathing EXT.

3.3.2 The Antiballistic Missile !ission


Our

general

observations

about

Soviet

interest

in

the

ABM mission

follows along a line similar to that of the air defense mission.


discussions

of the ABX usually

talk

in

-30-

terms

of two missions:

Ies tern

aefense

of

is

--

already

seen,

missile

site

of Soviet

ICBMs

forces

in

this

but as

we

have

first.

Thus,

assumption.

Soviet

the

be

appear

not

would

defense

nuclear

of

strikes

US

to

seem

not

does

this

the

that

allows

one

unless

respect,

the protection

ie,

correlation

the

to

contribute

not

does

--

defense

Ballistic missile

array.

target

soft

side's

each

to

threat

relative

of

terms

in

assessed

the balance

strikes,

counter-EMT offensive

the initial

following

rubric,

forces

nuclear

of

correlation

the

Under

zones.

economic-industrial

to

interesting

of

defense

and

defense)

missile

(ballistic

sites

missile

military

Soviet

planners within this strategic framework.

zones.

This

forces'

framework

ABS: mission
US

missile

the

"balance"

measures

it.

Similar

sy7 erg," between

improvements

desigr. and application


c-ear v
against

trderstood,

the

in

the

thnat

capability.

Therefore,

of

of

the

strike)
model

the

is

model

Anureyev

be
It

made

by

shoul-

be

strongly

weighis

significantly affect

can

marginal

in

improvements

the
ABh,

even a marginal ABM breakout involving design and

innovation w 'jid require


covertly

could

mission

defense systems.

(which

for

forces)

nuclear

of

ABX

on air

diverting air defense assets

application

mission,

defense

expectation

explicit

innovations

however,

correlation

stocks

The

D,:.

nuclear

tie strategic offense and strategic defense missions.

marginal

Very

the air

to

of

correlation

the residual (following the Soviet first

to renuce

delivered

the

as

is

economic-industrial

targets:

area

soft

affect

does

is

of

protection

towards

oriz--ted

moel,

Anureyev

the

in

reflected

as

mission,

ABM

Soviet

The

stored

equipment

the rapid
beyond

deployment

that

of very

requireo

for

large

the

air

defense mission.
Design

innovation

on

existing ABM systems

-31-

could

enhance

Soviet ABM

capabilities,

but

production,

even

-testing,

marginal

and

storage

breakout
of

large

Medium- and long-term equipment storage is


and Troops of Anti-Air Defense,
A

truly

Anureyev

significant

model,

thousands

especially

of

true

vulnerable

tracking,
and

number

of

targetable
force,

will have

and discrimination.
Automated

covert

equipment.

the Ground Forces

as

defined

simultaneous

which

is

to

be

in

control

are

systems

the

dispersed among

currently

This
the

is

least

The first series

the

Here again, we are

by

technological

reentry vehicles.

counter-LmT offensive strikes.

innovations

computers.

practiced in

ti.e

of

that US missile-held EMI is

SLBM

the

to Soviet

technological

independently
of

quantities

capability,

breakout

require
is

demand

but often produces reliability problems.

ABM

The reason

innovations.
many

will

would

of

areas

of detection,

talking

about sensors

emphasized

by

Soviet

military specialists.
The second

series

kill mechanisms.
--

muclear

will have
is

innovations

innovations

will have

technology

that

area

wel

witinia

Soviet

science

production may be a bottleneck


geographic

full

systems

kinetic energy "missiles", mesh umbrellas,

requirement

operational

breakout

for

(due

to

non-exotic

deployment

is

force.

be in

to

for non-exotic kill

to be implemen ted on a quantitatively large

extensive

means

Technological

explosives,

capabilities,
The

of technological

hile

and

--

et--.

this

engineering

quality

control).

ABM kill
likely

to

systems
take

considerable amount of time, and be highly observable.


systems -

Technological innovations in exotic kill


beams,

rail

guns,

etc

--

will

place

science and engineering

capabilities.

most

and,

demanding

of

all

we

much

Space-based

believe,

-32-

greater

are

lasers, particle
demands

systems

very

far

on

Soviet

would be
beyond

the

Soviet

II

'

operational longevity,

and

computing,

continuous

automated

are

failure

all

control,

areas

without

and onboard sensing,

where

the

exception.

(To

Soviets
some

and

reliability

miniaturization,

for

Requirements

capabilities

have

extent,

processing

experienced

these

hurdles

could be lessened by a manned weapons platform.)

Ground-based exotic ABM

kill systems,

technological

while

still

representing

onerous

are much more consistent with Soviet science,

barriers,

engineering, and production

ca pab ili ties.

3.4 Follow-on Strategic Offense


This

mission
targets.

industrial
Soviet

military

counter-value
However,

While

deter

the eneny

strikes

not

preclude

strikes

against

suggests

presentation

thinking is

(counter-E-_MT)

This would spare major


cot

does

potential

offensive

Soviet military

post-

the
our

strategy

strategic

a very high
could

involves

that

might

economic-

phasing

the

occur

in

time,

counter-EMT

simultaneously.

also consistent with the notion

strike

correlation

from launchizng retaliatory

and

of nuclear

that

forces

counter-value strikes.

segments of the economic-industrial

base of both

ries.
Significant

could

be

breakout

attained

application

in

without

this mission

any

(beyond

technological

existing capabilities)

innovation.

Design

and

innovation could provide the basis for a very large covertly

deployed ICBM force assigned to counmter-value


very reliable

and

potent

force,

since

it

targeting.

This would be a

would represent minor

design

improvements on long-deployed systems.

3.5. A Final
observation
Western

strategic

thinking

attempts
-33-

to

distinguish

between

"good**

and "bad" strategic weapons.


that enhance
general,

deterrence

and without

these are weapons

to adopt a launch

threatening

that do not

on warning posture --

(bombers

and

cruise

strategic

forces of the

are defined as

Good strategic weapons

missiles)
other

or

create
ie,

side with a

strategic stability.
incentive

for

either weapons

weapons

those

that

prompt

cannot
disarming

either

In
side

that are slow


threaten
first

the

strike

(current SLBMs).
If

the Anureyev model

measuring
that

the

their

concept

correlation of nuclear
strategic

behind

the

countervalue

threats.

heavy

do

ICBMs

does reflect accurately the Soviet approach

not

thinking
Anureyev
As
take

does

not

model

such,
on

forces,

the

then it
make

integrates

extensive

is

this
the

deployments

intensely

negative

readily apparent
distinction.

The

counter force
of

highly

connotation

attributed to them in WYestern strategic thinking.

-34-

to

and

NIRVed
often

Appendix A:
Assumed Forces

Because
adjust
for

characteristics

the numbers

each

sources,
It

year

should
in

calculation,

as well as

examined.

and some

calculation,
US

force

change

technical

These

be

noted

that

which

yields

it

estimates

was necessary
of weapons

from

to

systems

variety

of

are subject to wide variations.


this

study

which all yields are raised to


in

time,

capabilities

represent

(especially reliability)
also

over

above 1

uses

the 2/3

mt are

raised

the

Soviet

power,
only

EMI

unlike
to

the

the 1/2

power.

System

Number

RVs/system

emt/RV

Rel.

Pen.

CEP (nm)

F*

Soviet Systems

1965
SS-7
SS-8
Bison
Bear/b
Bear/m

199
23
56
35
75

1970
SS-7
SS-8
SS-9
SS-11
SS-13
Bison
Bear/b
Bear/m
SS-N-6

190
19
228
770
30
56
35
75
224

*F

is

the fraction

2
2
2.9
2.9
1.6

.5
.5
.5
.5
.5

1
1
.7
.7
.9

1.5
1.0
na
na
na

.36
.04
.15
.09
.1i

1
1
.
1
1
1
1
1
1

3.3
2.9
8.5
1
1
2.9
2.9
1.6
.8

.5
.5
.8
.8
.8
.5
.5
.5
.75

1
1
1
1
1
.7
.7
.9
1

1.25
1.0
.75
1.25
1.0
na
na
na
1.0

.,5
.01
.47
.19
.01
.04
.03
.03
.04

of EMIT on a given weapon system.

-35-

i
System

Number

RVs/sys tern

emt/RV

Rel.

Pen.

CEP (nm)

1975

SS-7
SS-8
SS-9
SS-11
SS-13
SS-17/1
SS-18/1
Ss-19/1
Bison
Bear/b
Bear/m
SS-N-6
SS-N-8

186
19
276
840
60
10
32
50
56
35
70
528
150

1
1
1
1
1
4
1
6
1
1
1
1
1

3.3
2.9
8.5
1
1
.83
8.5
.67
2.9
2.9
1.6
.8
.9

.5
.5
.8
.8
.8
.85
.85
.85
.5
.5
.5
.75
.75

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
.7
.7
.9
1
1

1.25
1.0
.5
.8
1.0
.24
.23
.19
na
na
na
1.0
.84

.11
.01
.44
.1b
.01
.01
.05
.04
.03
.02
.02
.09
.03

1980
SS-9
SS-11
SS-13
SS-17/1
SS-17/2
SS-18/3

30
460
60
130
20
26

1
1
1
4
1
1

8.5
1
1
.83
3.3
8.5

.8
.8
.8
.85
.85
.85

1
1
1
1
1
1

.5
.8
1.0
.24
.23
.19

.05
.08
.01
.08
.00
.04

SS-18/2
SS-19/1
SS-19/2
Bison

282
270
30
43

8
6
1
1

.93
.67
2.9
2.9

.85
.85
.85
.5

1
1
1
.7

.23
.14
.21
na

.33
.18
.02
.03

Bear/b
Bear/m
S -6
SS-N-8
SS-i;-18

38
75
436
292
160

1
1
1
1
3

2.9
1.6
.8
.9
.3

.5
.5
.75
.75
.7

.7
.9
1
1
1

na
na
i.0
.84
.7b

.02
.02
.06
.05
.03

SE-I
SS- 13
SS-17/3
SS-18/4

520*
60
150
308

i
4
10

1
1
.83
.63

.8
.8
.85
.85

1
1
1
1

.8
1.0
.24
.14

.09
.01
.09
.34

SS-19/3
Bison
Bear/b
Bear/m
SS-N-6
SS-N-8
SS-IN-18

360
43
38
75
368
292
224

6
1
1
1
1
1
3

.67
2.9
2.9
1.6
.8
.9
.3

.85
.5
.5
.5
.75
.75
.7

1
.7
.7
.9
1
1
1

.14
na
na
na
1.0
.84
.76

.26
.02
.03
.02
.05
.05
.04

1984

*The number of SS-lls available for intercontinental


assumed to have increased with the deployment of the S-20.

-36-

missions

is

US Systems
System

Number

CEP (nm)

emt/RV

Rel.

Pen.

1
1

4.3
1

.7:
.8

1
1

.7
1.0

na

RVs/svstem

1965
i-1
MM-i

59
795

B-52

630

A-i

80

A-2

208

A-3

176
54
490
500
10

1
1
i
3

517
128
512
16

4
1
3 (MRV)
10

54
450
550
369
66
48
208
400

54
45D
50M-2

.Ob
.20
.63

.9

.85

.9

.6

.5

.9

.85

.5

.05

3 (MRV)

.34

.9

.5

.04

4.3
1
1.1

.75
.8
.85

.7
1.0
.3

.06
.12
.13

.3
.9
.34
.12

.90
.9
.85
.9
.9

1
1
1
1
.85
1
1
1

.18
na
.5
.5
.27

-.50
.03
.13
---

1
1
3
4/4
2/4
1
3 (MRV)
10

4.3
1 .1
.3
1
1
.9
.34
.12

.75
.85
.90
.9
.9
.85
.9
.9

1
1
1
.85
.85
1
1
1

.7
.3
.18
na
na
.5
.5
.27

.07
.14
.14
.41
.06
.01
.06
.13

4.3

1
1
.34
.12
.22

.75
.85
.90
.90
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9

.7
.3
.12
.1
na
na
.5
.27
.23

.07
.15
.12
.04
.3b
.04
.02
.15
.04

4.3
1 .1
.3
.48

.75
.85
.90
.90

1
1
1
1

.02

1970

T-I
KM-I
KM-2
KM-3
B-52
A-2
A-3
C-3
1975
T-lI
Mv-2
MY.-3
B-52
FB-IlI
A-2
A-3
C-3
1980

KM -3
.- 3/B-52
FB-Ill
A-3
C-3
C-4

5O
100
316
66
80
416
80

1
3
3
4/4
2/4
3 (MRV)
10
8

1984
T-i
vM2
KM-3
YM-3/m

35
450
250
300

1
1
3
3

1.7

.3
.48

-37-

1
1
1
.85
.85
1
1
1

.5
.2
.12
.1

.04
.14
.06
.12

1984 (coott'd)
B-52
14
B-52
FB-1II
r-3
C-4

258
66
304s
312

12 cm
4 bmb
4 bmb
2 bmb
10
8

.34
1
1
1
.12
.22

-38-

.90

.75

na

.90
.9
9
.9

.75
.85
1
1

na
na
.21
.23

.33
.04
.10
.16

Appendix B:
Soviet ICBM Costs

There
costs,

are

spanning

incongruous,
SS-9,

several
almost

ie,

different
20

years.

the superior

for

sources

Unfortunately,

SS-18 apparently

of

Soviet

ICBM

costs

often

seem

more than

the

estimates
the

costs little

produced 8 years previously.

Techniques
The only specific information available
Soviet ICBM costs
the DoD (DDRS

(of which I

[78] 137),

in

contained in

is

am aware)

on techniques

for estimating

a 1964 study by

which

by
"It was found that the cost of Soviet ICBMs could be fit
ANWk where A is
$10 M [million 1964 3--PA]
per 1 KP
(l2.5
M per
missile in inventory
[kilo-pound -- PA]
reliable missile), N is tne number of Soviet missiles, W is
the payload per missile in kilopounds (KP), and k - .4.'
Otherwise, the

costs

are generally

presented in the aggregate, ie,

the cost for the full deployment of ICBMs over a given number of years.
Es tima te s
The
SS-8,

DoD =et:-oz

SS-9,

SS-i0,

of

kNWk

was

applied

in

the DoD study

and a hypothetical missile

to the

that resembles

SS-7,

the SS-ll.

These gave the following results:

missile

A(::$)

SS-7
SS-8
SS-9
SS-ll

$10
410
$10
$10

N
23
288
1030

k)

ANW[k]

4
4
9.5
1.5

'Al,[k]
$17.4
$17.4
$24.6
S1.8

The second source of information is a series of hearings held in the


early

1970s,

in

wh-ch

Albert

vohlstctter

-39-

testified

on

th e

cost-

I
three

compared

his

different estimates of the SS-9's cost,

unclassified.

one

In

system.

ABM

proposed

the

of

effectiveness

In

his

addition,

cost

for

the Minuteman was

that

the

SS-Il

ten-year

million

$i

about

suggested

comments

that

cost exceeded

two classified ana


ten-year

that the

and

dollars,

then-year

in

ne

presentation,

of the Minuteman

by between

two and three times.


While Tohlstetter

studies, he did reveal enough


studies

to

to work

backwards

of the two

classified

about the ratios of costs of the

classified

the

did not reveal

the unclassified

details

of the ABM systems to make it

costs

the

and approximate

gave

Each

estimates.

classified

possible

the following:

Missile

Initial

,ear

context it

for

the

dollar

appears likely

A New York Times


p.

8F)

10 year cost
347-50 million

332-33 million

SS-9 triplet

The

Investment

estimates

not

given;

from

however,

the

that these are 1971 or 1972 dollars.

article

quoted intelligence

was

of roughly the same period (April 27,

sources

as

suggesting

that the

SS-1l

1969,

cost

was

appro~zatel1 /4 tnat of the SS-9.


The
which I

final
am aware

SS-19 ICBMs,
9,

source

1979).

counterforce

is
in

that

for

estimates

deals witi

an article in
it,

Aspin

tie

!CBM

costs,

and the only one

fourth generation

SS-17,

SS-18,

of
and

the Congressional Record by Les Aspin (July

includes

cost effectiveness

of

table

(p.

3453)

of the US and Soviet ICBMs,

-40-

comparing

the

arguing that

the

US

capability

Economic

is

Analysis

much

Center

more

cost-effective.

memo

to

him

(June,

Citing a CIA
1979),

Aspin

Military

quotes

the

following information:
"Cost

of

respectively,

SS-17/-18/-19

through 1982,

(33.75,

$10.26,

plus an additional

and

$7.86

billion,

$1 billion each

year from

then to 1985)..."

assumed

Aspin
will

be

deployed.

maintenance
and

that

the

estimate

After

(0&M)

number

by 1982,

of
of

200

SS-17,

calculating

$1.2 million

(ie,

"missile-years"

the f7llowing costs,

the
$1

of

$14 million

SS-18

328 million

SS-19

$19 million

addition,

19-1,

the

(Bzok

was

2,

Par-

the

SS-17

would

cost

cf

repaclaced
count,

it

there are twc

K_%C

"additional

MLRVed

fractionantion

of

tcld
-

SS-19

its

R&D)

the

each

withn

were

entire

Kally
a new

per

it

in

force,

312

SS-19,

operations

and

is

possible

to

1978$:

that may be useful.

on

the

Burke

Posture

tnat

missile

with

additional RV,

deployed
ICBM

of

and

diviced by 820 silos)

ICBM,

hearings
by

$5.95 million

ICBMs"

billion

other references

during

cf 6;

and

cost/silo

presumed to be in

SS-17

In

308 SS-18,

cosL/RV

Statement

the

Soviets

a higher

and if

conjunction
the

if

I.

.MIRV

unspecified

with
would

further
be

$3.85

million per additional RV.


The

Senate

Appropriations

Commitee

was

cost/RV to the Soviets was about $3.5 million.

-41-

also

told

in

1981

that

the

SRF Budget data


Working from the CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures,

it

is

possible to estimate SRF percentages of the Soviet defense expenditures:


1965
1966
1967
1968

7.9%
9.8%
9.8%
8.6%

1973
1974
1975
1976

7.4%

1977

7.7%

1970
1971
1972

5.7%
4.3%
3.8%

1978
1979
1980

8.6%
b.6%
7.4%

5.0%
5.7%
5.7%
7.2%

Using similar data, it is possible to estimate the cost/RV for the Soviet
ICBM, SLBM, and IRA forces for selected years, in millions of 1978$:
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
(a) 7.1
(b) 69.6
(c) 2.7

6.9
33.7
2.8

4.8
16.5
2.8

3.6
9.7
2.9

3.0
8.7
2.9

(a) is ICBMs
(b) is SLBMs
(c) is long range bombers

-42-

3.3
8.5
2.9

3.8
8.7
2.9

3.1
7.1
2.9

2.9
5.8
2.9

2.4
4.3
2.9

References for Appendix B


Aspin, Les.
"Are We Standing Still?--US Strategic Nuclear Forces in the
Congressional Record, July 9, 1979, pp. E 3448-E
1970s and early 1980s."
3'.53.
US Central Intelligence Agency.
1971-80: A Dollar Cost Comparison.
US Central Intelligence Agency.
US Defense Activities, 1967-77.
US Department of Defense.
1981 and 1983 editions.

Soviet and US Defense


GPO: Washington, DC, 1981.

A Dollar Cost Comparison


GPO: 1Washington, DC, 1978.

Soviet Military Power.

GPO:

Activities,

of Soviet and
Washington,

DC,

Department of
US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services.
GPO:
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981.
Washington, DC, 1980. Pages 1869, 1872-1873.
US Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in
Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China
Government.
GPO: Washington, DC.
(annual volumes since 1975).
Soviet Defense Expenditures and
US Senate, Comwittee on Armed Services.
GPO: lkashington, DC, 1980.
Related Programs.
Authorization for hilitarv
US Senate,
Committee on Armed Services.
and Keserve
Fiscal Year 1971,
Research and Development,
Procurement,
Pages 2271, 2395, 2405-2409.
Strength. GPO: %asningtor., DC, 1970.

-43-

Notes
1.

Although in discussing nuclear weapons in Europe, they have reliied


on the number of launchiers as the measure oi parity, arguing that
both NATO and the Iftarsaw Pact have almost 1000 nuclear armec
bombers, missiles, and submarines allocated in Europe or
for
European targets.

2.

For general discussions of the evolution of Soviet military thinking


in the late 1950s, see Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military, Strategy in
the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1958) and 1Ii.S. DinersteiL,
r
and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1962).

3.

M. Cherednichenko,
"Military Strategy
Mili tary Thou ght , 1;4, 1973, p. 47.

4.

See Nikolai Lomov, "Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the


Development of Mlitary Art," Comntmnist of the Armed Forces, Nov.,
1965, translated in W.R. Kintner and harriet Past Scott, The Nuclear
Rc;olution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman, Cklahoma: Uiversity
of Oklaho,,-a Press, 196b), p. 161; K.S. Moskalenko, 'Raketnye Voyska
na Strazhe Bezopasnosti Rodini" (Rocket Troops on Guard Over the
Security of the Motherland),
rasnaya Zvezda, Sept. 13, 1961, p. 3;
and Nikolai Erylov, "Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniye"
(Rocket Troops
of
Strategic
Designation),
Voyenno-lstoricheskii
Zhurnal, 07, 1967, pp. 16-23.

5.

For a quick review of Soviet targeting, see the CIS SSSW.G researLr.
memo by Peter Almoui-st "Strategic Targeting and the Soviet RVSN.'
For Soviet exampies anid ciscussion, see K. S. Moskalenko, "kaketzye
Vovs:-a na 1t-azhe Bezopasnosti Rodini," FErasnava Zvezda,
September
13, l5,.2
..
iruo,"-aketno-vaaz rnoe Qruzznte i 1>jevavaGotov-nost','
Krasnaya Zvezda,
Dec.
4, 1962,
p. 2; N.l. Kryl ov,
"Stratesgic
Ro C..ze s
r rnsla te c in 'alter
Clemens, ecs.,
V,0r
Pescies o 7 nternational Politics (boston: LiJ'ttle, Brow,
9t5)
pp. 25&-5L
Kr 10ov
",a i.e tave
Vovska
ragceoo
Nazra c eniva,
Vcven n
s to rich esk ii Lnrma I, v 7 , 19 6 7, pp. 15- _2;
yr' cv , 'Th.e Nuclear
&ssleS.iei;c
,f the Soviet State ," Milit-ary,
:oui&
ll
1957,
p: .
:s2;
and
M.
CherecLiEnko,
"Gb
Q)s be:'-cs-.-vakh
Razviti va
Vovenncgo
Iskusst-va
v
?'-oslevcvennv
Period," Vovenno-istoricheskii Z-.urnal, f#6, 1970, pp. 19-30.

6.

See Gerard Smii-,


Doubeday, 1980),
Soviet

and

Military

Technology,"

LoublEtalk: The Stor-x of SALT I (Garclen City,


chapter 4; and iRaymond Garthoff, "SAL-T and

Ylitary," Problems of Com.ism, #1-2, 1975, pp. 24-37.

7.

1. Anurevev,
"Determining
Nuclear lfeapozs," Miiar

8.

Anurevev (1967),

p. 21'13.

L44

the Correlation of
hought, v'6, 1967.

Forces

in

Terms

NY:
thne
of

9.

B. Khabarov, N. Bazanov, Ye.


Orlov, and L. Semeyko, "Methodology of
Determinig the Correlation of Nuclear Forces," Military Thought, I/b,
1968, pp. 55.

10.

Khabarov et al,

11.

This is
the only hypothetical case in
estimates, were used for sizing the force.

12.

For information on the low Soviet alert rates maintained for ICBMs
(a reportud 25-30%), see Walter Pincus,
"Debut of Soviet Missiles
Could Color US, NATO Politics," The Washington Post, June 26, 1980,
p. 2; and Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 25, 1979, p 22.

p. 50-57.

-45-

which

numbers,

not

cost