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October 29, 1953 (En Banc)

Ponente: Montemayor, J.
- Villanueva was found guilty of Treason and Murder (Art. 114)
- Sentences him to suffer death penalty and indemnify the heirs and pay costs of proceedings
- Villanueva appealed under Rule 118 Sec. 9 of RoC which provides to review all cases in which
death penalty shall have been imposed, whether the defendant appeal or not
- Stenographic notes containing testimonies of the case could not be located. SolGen suggested
the case to be remanded to CFI to retake testimonies
- President granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including cases that
were pending appeal provided that said appeal be withdrawn
- Villanueva asked he be allowed to withdraw his appeal
- CFI returned the case to SC for it to decide given that SC still needs to review the case
regardless of the existence of an appeal
- SC granted the withdrawal of appeal without knowing the nature of the case
- Incidentally, on the same day, after the granting of the resolution, defendant reiterated his
request to withdraw appeal with attachment of the Presidents order which brought to the SCs
knowledge the nature of the case
- Defendants withdrawal of appeal does not remove the Courts jurisdiction over it. Trail
Courts decision in death penalty are not final until the case has been passed upon by SC en
consulta; therefore, the review could not be waived or evaded
- Furthermore, when the case was remanded to CFI the case virtually remanded for new trail
therefore, requires new decision
- SC found that though defendants name appear on the list of prisoners pardoned conditionally,
the pardon refers to remission of unexpired portions of the prison sentence terms and the
SC It is highly doubtful that that the pardon intended appellant to be included because his
sentence is not merely prison sentence which expires but death sentence. A death sentence is not
served but rather executed.
- SC -- Moreover, Exhibit B says that "those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal
shall be released only after their appeal has been withdrawn." In the case, there is no definite
conviction or sentence until and after SC has reviewed the case and rendered its own decision
affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision of
the trial court based on the new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in which case there
would be no automatic review by us.


G.R. NO.L-1446

MARCH 4, 1949


Before the people court the appellants Filemon Delgado was charged with treason under
five counts was found guilty under four counts of "the crime of treason complexed with
the crime of murder", and sentenced to death penalty by electrocution with all the
accessories of the law. He is appealing from that decision.
As a measure of reprisal on July 29 1944, a mass arrest or concentration of the male
inhabitants of Dolho, Talisay, Mambaling and Basak was affected. Many Japanese
soldiers accompanied by Filipino spies and undercover men among them the appellant
Filemon Delgado.
Tereso Sanchez, a guerrilla soldier, was shot and Patricio Suico, who was suspected of
being a lieutenant in the volunteer guards, was tortured and finally killed by the appellant
Filemon Delgado.
The theory of the defense is that the appellant could not have been possibly present in the
arrest investigation could not have been possibly present in the arrest investigation torture
and shooting committed by Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercover men for the reason
that at the time he was under detention in the Constabulary barracks after he had been
arrested by the Japanese forces and was made to work in the Japanese air field in Cebu
and later delivered to the Constabulary for custody. It was also claimed that Filemon
Delgado mentioned who participated in the arrest investigation and torture made and
committed Delgado mentioned and referred to by prosecution witnesses was a person
different from the appellant though bearing the same name.
The people Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The
Solicitor General however maintains that offense committed is simple treason citing the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of People vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138) but
accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under article 14 paragraph 21, of the
Revised Penal Code and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance and he
recommends the imposition of the penalty of death.


The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen.

The alibi defense is entirely flimsy as the assertion made by the witnesses for the defense
that the person named Filemon Delgado who participated in the mass arrest and looted
the inhabitants of Mambaling and Basak was different from the herein defendant. That he

has been thoroughly identified on the record to be the very one who committed the overt
acts testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution is obvious.
His adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by
acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow
and compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose information about the
guerrillas has been fully established.
SC - agree with the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this Court in the
case of People vs. Prieto supra the appellant may be convicted only of treason and that
the killing and infliction of Physical injuries committed by him may not be separated
from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of
treason although, as stated in said case the brutality with which the killing or physical
injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance."
But while a good number of the justices participating in these proceeding believe that the
appellant is deserving of the death penalty imposed by the trial court because of lack of
the required number of votes, said penalty is hereby reduced to life imprisonment. In
addition the appellant will pay a fine of P20,000. With this modification the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Juan Crisologo a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines was accused
of treason in the Peoples Court in 1946.
But before the petitioner be brought under the jurisdiction of the Peoples court, he was
already been tried and convicted of treason before a military court and was given a
sentence of life imprisonment in 1947.
The Peoples court have been abolished in 1948 therefore the case pending in the
Peoples court has been transferred under the jurisdiction of the Court of First instance of
Being arraigned now in the CFI of Zamboanga, Crisologo filed then a motion to quash to
dismiss the case pleading Double Jeopardy saying that he has already been tried and
sentenced in the military court.
OSG opposed saying that this is not Double Jeopardy.
OSG claimed that offense charged in military court is different from that which is
charged in the civil court even granting that they are identical the military court had no
jurisdiction on the matter because the Peoples court is the first one to acquire jurisdiction
over the case therefore rendering the conviction in the military court void.
OSG added that there are overt acts added to the complaint of treason filed in peoples
court which makes it different from the treason filed in the military court.
WON further prosecution in CFI may prosper.

overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not
specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general
charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally
liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "he has done or
might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense."
In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an
enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before
the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves
constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly
held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of
overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered
separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are not
separate offense distinct from that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof.
in the present case no new facts have supervened that would change the nature of
the offense for which petitioner was tried in the military court, the alleged
additional overt acts specified in the amended information in the civil court having
already taken place when petitioner was indicted in the former court.
As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the
rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court
first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This
rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first
been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. The record in the present
case shows that the information for treason in the Peoples Court was filed on March 12,
1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody of the court
the warrant of arrest had not even been issued - when the indictment for the same offense
was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in
the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court priority to take
cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the
information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of defendant.
It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is
the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts
derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military
court to the petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a
bar to petitioners further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales.

G.R. NO. L-2189 NOVEMBER 3, 1906

The appellants, Francisco Bautista, Aniceto De Guzman and Tomas Puzon were
convicted in in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to
overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in the
Philippines for the purpose of establishing in its stead a government to be known as the
Republica Universal Democratica Filipina during the latter part of the year 1903, with
Prim Ruiz as the head and Artemio Ricarte as the chief military forces.

Based on evidence on record, Bautista was an intimate friend of Ricarte and that he
aided the latter in his journey by sending him 200 pesos, partaking in the meetings of the
conspirators and that in one of the meetings, assured Ricarte that the necessary
preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness."

Puzon joined with the conspirators through Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to be a
prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte. Puzon, in one of the
meetings held with Muoz, accepted the offer as brigadier-general of the signal corps and
later did his part in organizing the troops.

At the trial, Puzon denied being united with the conspirators and that he had only
accepted the appointment on account of friendship and without intention of taking any
further action. Such statements, however, were belied by his written statement when he
was first arrested. It appears that the statement was voluntarily made and not the result of
violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency.

The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The
finding of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one
of the conspirators.

Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony
of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a
conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case.

The crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime of treason. Hence, the counsel for appellants contention is not applicable in the
case at bar.

It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the

military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against the
appellant (US vs. Antonio delos Reyes). But the case at bar is different for the records
clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the appointment in

question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that
the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, whereas in the case cited the accused was
charged with treason.

The doctrine laid down in US vs. De la Serna, "that the mere possession of such an
appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor executed some external act by the
virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant does
not apply in this case.

Wherefore, the judgment and sentence in so far as it affects Aniceto De Guzman is

reversed, with his proportionate share of the costs of both instances de oficio; and that
judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and
Tomas Puzon, is hereby affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary imprisonment in
the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines.

G.R. No. L-4663
October 9, 1909
Ponente: J. Moreland

The defendants, Pedro Cabola, et al. were charged with the crime of violating Sec. 4 of
Act No.292 of the Philippine Commission which is enacted to punish this who should
enter into a conspiracy to destroy the Government of the United States in the Philippine
15 Jan 1908- The defendants, except for Nicolas Abalos, Martin Soriano, Blas Ramos
and Domingo Caguioa, declared guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to various
terms of imprisonment. They were tried in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Only defendants Celedonio Ramos and Inocencio Torio filed their appeal.
On August 1907- Cabola and other individuals in Pangasinan, by means of pacto de
sangre organized a Katipunan Society which aims to destroy by force the Governments of
the United States in the Philippines and establish another form of government- military
organization, Cabola as the supreme head while the other defendants held other positions
of the said organization. Under this government, the Province of Pangasinan was divided
into 6 zones or military districts.
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of conspiracy to destroy the Government of the
United States in the PH islands.

Yes. Based on the evidence presented, the defendants clearly showed that they attended
various meetings of the Katipunan Society at which Cabola made revolutionary and
seditious speeches and signed a document- seditious in character, indicating the
destruction of the Government of the United States in the PH Islands.
Many of the defendants were found in possession of commission from Cabola appointing
them officers in the military government. Moreso, several defendants confessed their
guilt to the public officials and related facts connecting other defendants with the society
in question.
Both Ramos and Torio were present during meetings of the society.
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the appellants.

People v. Tulin
G.R. No. 11709
August 30, 2001
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and
diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates includingthe accused Roger P.
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the
vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong.
Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with qualified
piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters).
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at

Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind,
who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
They were subsequently convicted of the crime of the ff:
- Manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns
- conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another
- Wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the
Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products,
together with the complement and crew members
- employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things
Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were
done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.

(1)WON the accused has committed the crime of piracy
(2)WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the accused, arguing that the crime was
committed beyond Philippine waters.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must
be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters."
On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of
the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of
the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the

presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.
As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
(2) As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,
suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
(renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its
cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accusedappellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that
the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified
piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).