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Civil Code of the Philippines on Good faith: TITLE V CHAPTER 1

(http://www.gov.ph/downloads/1949/06jun/19490618-RA-0386-JPL.pdf)
Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. He is
deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the
foregoing. Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of
good faith. (433a)
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith
on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. (434)

G.R. No. 159578

February 18, 2009

ROGELIA DACLAG and ADELINO DACLAG (deceased), substituted by RODEL M.


DACLAG,
and
ADRIAN
M.
DACLAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ELINO MACAHILIG, ADELA MACAHILIG, CONRADO MACAHILIG, LORENZA HABER
and BENITA DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character, except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession
in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be
deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition,
it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. 8Such interruption takes place upon service
of summons.9
lawphil.net

G.R. No. 152319

October 28, 2009

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: CONCESA LIMENSE, Surviving


Spouse; and DANILO and JOSELITO, both surnamed Limense, children, Petitioners,
vs.
RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS, VIRGILIO DIAZ, IRENEO RAMOS,
BENJAMIN RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO, TRINIDAD RAMOS-BRAVO,
PAZ
RAMOS-PASCUA,
FELICISIMA
RAMOS-REYES,
and
JACINTA
RAMOS, Respondents.

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition; and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice
and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individuals personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not

conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and


freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.30
Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof.

In a litany of cases, we have defined a purchaser in good faith as one who buys property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property.5

G.R. No. 164801

June 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR AND DEOGRACIAS MILITAR, represented by
TRANQUILINA MILITAR,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 165165

June 30, 2006

SPOUSES
JOHNNY
LUCERO
AND
NONA
ARIETE, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR, DEOGRACIAS MILITAR, and TRANQUILINA MILITAR
(deceased), now represented by AZUCENA MILITAR, FREDDIE MILITAR, EDUARDO
MILITAR, ROMEO L. MILITAR, NELLY LY BOLANIO, LETICIA LY and DELIA LY SI
ASOYCO, Respondents.

Withal, in Sigaya v. Mayuga the Court said that "good faith consists in the possessors belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could
convey his title. Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the
contrary, requires a well founded belief that the person from whom title was received was
himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where there is an
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. Otherwise
stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned."19

He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing was the owner and could convey title to the property
G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
CIRCE
S.
DURAN
and
ANTERO
S.
GASPAR, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERLINDA B. MARCELO TIANGCO and
RESTITUTO TIANGCO,respondents.

Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in the possessor's belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey
his title (Arriola vs. Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is always to be
presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the
person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to
convey it (Santiago vs. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith where there is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage from another (Fule vs.
Legare, 7 SCRA 351). Otherwise stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to
the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In the case at
bar, private respondents, in good faith relied on the certificate of title in the name of Fe S.
Duran and as aptly stated by respondent appellate court "[e]ven on the supposition that the
sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be
valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for
We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine
to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT
of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger." (p. 147, Rollo)

INJUNCTION
G.R. No. 181930

January 10, 2011

MILAGROS
vs.
JOHN VELEZ and CLARISSA R. VELEZ, Respondents.

SALTING, Petitioner,

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be
protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there
must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicants
right must be clear and unmistakable.

G.R. No. 166558

March 28, 2007

NORA
BUENO
PASION, Petitioner,
vs.
SIMPLICIO R. MELEGRITO, represented by ANSELMA TIMONES, Respondent.

An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties
properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard. 23 However, the rule admits of the
exception that even a non-party is bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is
any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying
the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the
permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f)
member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. 24

A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a clear showing: (1) that there exists
a right to be protected, and (2) that the action sought to be enjoined is violative of that right. 29

ANGELINA
GARRIDO,
Petitioner,

PAHILA-

G.R. No. 156358

Present:
- versus ELIZA M. TORTOGO,
LEONILA FLORES,
ANANIAS
SEDONIO,
ADELINO MONET,
ANGIE MONET,
JUANITO
GARCIA,
ELEONOR GARCIA,
BENITA MOYA,
JULIO ALTARES,
LEA ALTARES,
CLARITA SABIDO,
JULIE ANN VILLAMOR,
JUANITA TUALA,
VICTOR
FLORES
III,
JOHNNY MOYA,
HAZEL AVANCEA,
SONIA EVANGELIO, and

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
August 17, 2011

GENNY MONTAO,
Respondents.
Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection
of substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely
a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be
redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for
the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that the
court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and
advisedly adjudicated. The application for the writ rests upon an alleged
existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order to
issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for
granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction
and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the
circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.[46]
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the
strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to
protect actual and existing substantial
rights.
Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the
absence of facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance,
the ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse,
which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for
the protection of substantive rights and interests. 12 An application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application
showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.

Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in
order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency
that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. 13 Under
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, 14 a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. 15
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.16 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters
must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. 17
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the
exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18 The burden is thus on petitioner to
show in his application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his
favor.19
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not exercise
judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner.
No clear legal right
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law.20 In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.21 The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing
right is not a ground for injunction.22
The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the court to order its execution. No court should interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to
restrain such execution.25 The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as the following: (1)
when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or
unjust; or (2) when there is a change in the situation of the parties that may warrant an
injunctive relief.26 In this case, after the finality of the RTC Decision, there were no
supervening events or changes in the situation of the parties that would entail the injunction
of the Writ of Execution.
G. R. No. 183367

March 14, 2012

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and LYDIA


MARCIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE, Respondent.

No irreparable injury
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy.27 In this case, petitioners have alleged that the loss of
the public market entails costs of about 30,000,000 in investments, 100,000 monthly
revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified but not unquantifiable in terms of the
alleged loss of jobs of APRIs employees and potential suits that may be filed by the
leaseholders of the public market for breach of contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by
petitioners are capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily
subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus,
a preliminary injunction is not warranted.28 With respect to the allegations of loss of
employment and potential suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to
substantiate them.
The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Motion for Injunction. In any case, petitioners may still seek recourse in their pending
Petition before the Court of Appeals.
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This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid
immediate execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may, as in this case, appeal said
judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus,
as held in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,43 even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases
are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. 44

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable


injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole
objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.45 Status
quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.46
As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of
manifest abuse.47 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must
have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.48
G.R. No. 128349 September 25, 1998
BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS


AUTHORITY, respondents.

The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has
gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. 16 No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to
restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions;
hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution
inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its
execution or prevent its enforcement. 17 So, also, a change in the situation of the parties
can warrant an injunctive relief. 18