1 vicarious-ly=kanh by ji jay ty kayal maslan

kitab parhanday manho uhy sabh characters pan

san mukhatib kando ahy.
2Rationalize=kanjos manho charity na day aien
po chavy ta in karn san uhy sust th weenda ya
wari hik p pahinjy put man kanh ji b kavar kadhi
chavy ta man hin jay bhaly laye kayo
3Gregarious socially active
4Obsequious= kanh ji tabi karn jien hik waiter
tip Milan laye kary.
5Maudlin=a person who is super sentimental or
gushing
6Panderer= buri halat chalet san khush karn ,
bharwo
7Sublimate=transform into a purer form
8Wanton=lewd=lascivious azadana khyal wari
aurat , sex jay bary me
9Effete=waran botan jo sari khatam thyan ya
agar insan laye istimal kabo ta kamzor thyan ya
wari agar kanh past event laye uho tabah thyo
barbad thyo
Houthi insurgency in Yemen
The Houthi insurgency in Yemen,[63][64] also known as the Houthi rebellion, Sa'dah War, or Sa'dah
conflict, is a civil war in northern Yemen.[65] It began in June 2004 when dissident cleric Hussein

Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi Shia sect, launched an uprising against the Yemeni
government. Most of the fighting has taken place in Sa'dah Governorate in northwestern Yemen
although some of the fighting spread to neighbouring governorates Hajjah, 'Amran, al-Jawf and the
Saudi province of Jizan.
The Yemeni government alleged that the Houthis were seeking to overthrow it and to implement
Shareligious law. The rebels counter that they are "defending their community against
discrimination" and government aggression.[66] The Yemeni government has accused Iran of directing
and financing the insurgency.[67]
In August 2009, the Yemeni army launched a fresh offensive against the Houthis in the northern
Sa'ada province. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced by the fighting. The conflict took
on an international dimension on 4 November 2009 as clashes broke out between the northern
rebels and Saudi security forces along the two countries' common border and Saudis launched an
anti-Houthi offensive. The rebels accuse Saudi Arabia of supporting the Yemeni government in
attacks against them. The Saudi government denied this.[68] Houthi leaders claim that United
States involvement in the war started on 14 December 2009 when the US launched 28 air raids. [9]
General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar commanded the Yemeni security forces during the conflict and led all
the government offensives from 2004 until 2011, when he resigned his post to defend protesters
during theYemeni Revolution.[69]
A Houthi power grab in Sana'a escalated on 20 January 2015, the rebels attacked the president's
residence and swept into the presidential palace. President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi was inside
the residence as it came under "heavy shelling" for a half-hour, but he was unharmed and protected
by guards, according to Information Minister Nadia al-Sakkaf. Presidential guards surrendered the
residence after being assured that Hadi could safely evacuate. The U.N. Security Council called an
emergency meeting about the unfolding events. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki
Moon expressed concern over the "deteriorating situation" in Yemen and urged all sides to cease
hostilities.[70][71] On 22 January, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled
Bahah tendered their resignations to parliament, which reportedly refused to accept them. [72]

Motives and objectives[edit]

When armed conflict for the first time erupted back in 2004 between the Yemenis government and
Houthis, the then Yemenis president accused Houthis and other Islamic opposition parties of trying
to overthrow the government and the republican system. However, Houthi leaders for their part
rejected the accusation by saying that they had never rejected the president or the republican
system but were only defending themselves against government attacks on their community.[74]
According to a February 2015 Newsweek report, Houthis are fighting "for things that all Yemenis
crave: government accountability, the end to corruption, regular utilities, fair fuel prices, job
opportunities for ordinary Yemenis and the end of Western influence."[75]

In an interview with Yemen Times, Hussein Al-Bukhari, a Houthi insider said that Houthi's preferable
political system is a republic with elections where women can also hold political positions, and that
they do not seek to form a Shia cleric-led government after the model of Islamic Republic of Iran for
"we cannot apply this system in Yemen because the followers of the Shafi [Sunni] doctrine are bigger
in number than the Zaydis [Shia]."[76]

Alleged foreign involvement[edit]

Iran and Hezbollah[edit]

There have been a number of alleged Iranian involvements in the insurgency to aid the Houthis,
including:

The Saudi and Yemeni governments both accuse Iran of helping the Houthis. Iran, they say,
has secretly landed arms on the Red Sea coast. In October, 2009, Yemens government said its
navy intercepted an arms-carrying Iranian vessel. Yemens state-controlled press claims Houthi
rebels have been trained in an Iranian-run camp across the Red Sea in Eritrea. Yemens
president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, says members of Lebanons Iran-backed Hezbollah militia are
teaching them. The Yemeni authorities also darkly note that the Houthis' long-time leader,
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who died in battle in 2004, used to visit Qom, one of Shia Islam's
holiest places.[188] None of these accusations have yet been borne out by independent observers
and the Iranians deny any involvement.

Saudi-owned Al Arabiya claimed that "well-informed sources" are saying that "the president
of the former South Yemen (Ali Salim al-Bidh) conducted a secret visit to the Lebanese
capital Beirut last October (2009), and tried to contact figures close to Hezbollah aiming to win
its support for the Houthi rebels, and for South (Yemen's) secession." The sources added that
those Hezbollah-allied figures "informed al-Bidh that the party's top officials do not want to meet
with him and that they do not approve the attribution of Hezbollah's name with what is happening
in Yemen, or to appear as supporting to any rebellion." Ibrahim al-Mussawi, Head of Hezbollah's
Media Unit, told Alarabiya.net that his party denies the report about an alleged secret visit. [189]

High-ranking officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were said to have secretly met
with Houthi rebels and Hezbollah in Yemen to coordinate joint military operations against Saudi
positions along the border. Pan-Arab Asharq al-Awsat daily said Arab and Egyptian sources
uncovered that a number of intelligence services in the region have learned of the three-way
meeting which also aimed at developing a plan to escalate the military situation along the SaudiYemeni border. It said the high-level meeting which took place in November, 2009 was the most
prominent evidence of "direct Iranian involvement" in the support of Houthi rebels financially,
militarily and logistically.[190]

Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi on 13 December 2009 urged Iran to crack down
on Iranian groups he accused of aiding Houthi rebels in northern Yemen and held Iran's

government partly to blame. He said: "Religious (Shiite) circles and groups in Iran are providing
aid to the Huthis," However, Iran has repeatedly denied such accusations. [191]

After IRAN Pakistan? By munir akram 12-4-2015

ALTHOUGH most Iranians are celebrating their nuclear deal with the
P5+1, the framework `understanding`, once implemented, will effectively
block Iran`s ability to develop a nuclear weapons
capabilityfortheforeseeablefuture.
Hardly a week after the Iran deal was announced, theNew York Timeswhichoften reflects official US policy editorially propagated that attention be
turned to constraining Pakistan`s nuclear and strategic capabilities. The
issue was also covered by other US media.
The NYT arguments, taken from the Indian hymnbook, were not surprising;
the timing of the proposal to target Pakistan is significant. If the editorial
indeed reflects official US thinking, it would confirm the view of many in
Pakistan and the Muslim world that America`s aim is to denuclearise all
Islamic countries. With Iran neutralised, Pakistan remains the only nuclearcapable Islamic nation.
Pakistan has fought off numerous US attempts, initially to prevent and, after
1998, to retard Pakistan`s nuclear and strategic programmes.
Pakistan`s `establishment` is confident that future attempts will fail also.
But, it would be a mistake to become complacent.
The US is engaged in a strategic contest with China. It sees India as a
`strategic partner` in this Asian power game. India can challenge China
effectively only once it has neutralised Pakistan. The Indian lobby in the US is
now second in influence only to the Israeli lobby. Thus, unless persuaded
otherwise, Washington can be expected to do all that is possible to assist
India in neutralising Pakistan`s power.
The following stratagem, used against Iran and others, may be used to
restrict Pakistan: First, concerns about Pakistan`s programmes will be spread
through the media and diplomatic channels. Then, Islamabad would be
pressed to give assurances and accept constraints ostensibly to assuage
these `concerns` Next, an effort would be made to translate these restraints
and restrictions into binding commitments, including through the Nuclear
Suppliers` Group, the IAEA and the UN Security Council.
If Pakistan then `violates` such restrictions, it would be subjected to

multilateral or unilateral sanctions.Numerous grounds will be cited to restrain

Pakistan. Previously, it was argued that Pakistan was a nuclear proliferator;
that its nuclear weapons could be captured by `Islamist terrorists`; that the
Pakistan Army could turn `Islamist`. The new tack, reflected in the editorial,
is that: Pakistan should no longer be `obsessed` with India, which is now
preoccupied with becoming `a regional economic and political power`
Pakistan`s nuclear and military deployments against India are destabilising;
and; Pakistan is descending into chaos.
These motivated assertions need to be refuted effectively. Pakistan`s
diplomacy should be actively mobilised for the purpose.
First, the world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains
`obsessed` with India. As the editorial itself observes (almost approvingly),
Prime Minister Modi has threatened `retaliation` against Pakistan `if Islamic
militants carry out a terror attack in India` irrespective of whether or not the
Pakistan government is responsible for this. Given Modi`s aggressive policies
in Kashmir and the BJP`s persecution of Indian Muslims, such a `terrorist`
attack appears almost inevitable, sooner or later. If Modi`s doctrine is
applied, an India-Pakistan conflict also becomes inevitable.
The Indian threat is real `on the ground`. Over 70pc of India`s land, air and
sea forces are deployed against Pakistan. India`s capability for aggression
against Pakistan is being rapidly enlarged by the $100 billion in advanced
weaponry being sold to it including by the US, Europe and Israel. Indian
generals have not disavowed their `Cold Start` doctrine envisaging a sudden
and massive attack against Pakistan.
Pakistan`s is not the `fastest growing nuclear arsenal`. In fact, with the
revival of their Cold War post the Ukraine crisis, the US and Russia have
deployed the largest number of additional nuclear weapons last year.
Pakistan`s warheads are estimated in the Western media by assuming that
all of its fissile material production capacity is being transformed into nuclear
warheads. On the same assumption, India`s arsenal would be much larger
than projected, since foreign nuclear fuel supplies, authorised by the
Suppliers` Group, enable India to use all of its indigenous uranium for
weapons purposes.The size of nuclear arsenals is relevant for mutual
deterrence. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union built over
20,000 warheads. Several US `experts` have asserted that with its capacity
to build a larger arsenal, and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, and a
`second strike` capability, India would be able to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear
and strategic capabilities in a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Pakistan can best
preserve nuclear deterrence by developing larger and survivable numbers of
nuclear warheads.
Likewise, Pakistan`s recently tested long-range missiles are defensive;

designed to ensure that India cannot threaten Pakistan with impunity from
the Nicobar and Andaman Islands or its long-range nuclear submarines.
Similarly, the deployment of nuclear-capable tactical missiles was in direct
response to India`s growing and advanced military deployments and
repeated threats to attack Pakistan. (It is similar to Nato`s deployment of
battlefield nuclear weapons during the Cold War against the larger
conventional forces of the Soviet Union.) The assertion that Pakistan is
`descending into chaos` is palpably false. Today, the politics of the street is
over; the economy has stabilised, and a concerted civil-military campaign is
under way to combat TTP terrorism and the Baloch insurgents, with the
cooperation of the new Afghan government.
(Meanwhile, 17 insurgencies simmer within India, unremarked by the
Western media.) The potentially disastrous consequences of the IndiaPakistan nuclear and military stand-off cannot be left to be debated in the
news media. But India refuses to discuss this seriously.
Under the circumstances, it would be wise for Pakistan to ask the US: if India
indeed threatens to launch an attack against Pakistan after a `terrorist`
incident, will the US intervene to prevent the conflict, or to prevent Pakistan
from resorting to nuclear deterrence? The central question which Pakistan
must pose to the world is: if the aim is to prevent a South Asian catastrophe,
is it not better for the world powers to promote an equitable solution to the
Kashmir dispute and an agreement on mutual military restraint between
Pakistan and India? The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.