Consti 2 Cases

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D.
GACAYAN
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
STATE
(Police Power)
1. Define:
police power---is the power vested in
the legislature by the Constitution to
make, ordain, establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws for the
good and welfare of the State and its
people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS.
CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
The basic purposes of police power are:
a.
to promote the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of
the people; (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL
LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175
SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil.
85
b.
to promote and preserve
public
health;
(VILLANUEVA
VS.
CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987;
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533
[NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF
HEALTH, 50 Phil. 595apprehend and
confine lepers in a leprosarium)
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS
COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE
GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
POLICE POWER/PUBLIC HEALTH;
RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
THE
Facts:
After
the
Professional
Regulations
Commission
(PRC)
released the names of successful
examinees in the Medical Licensure
Examination, the Board of Medicines
observed that the grades of the 79
Fatima College of Medicine successful
examinees
were unusually and
exceptionally high in the two (2) most
difficult subjects of the exam, i.e.,
Biochemistry and Obstetrics and
Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution
No. 19 withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from
Fatima College of Medicine. Compared
with other examines from other schools,
the results of those from Fatima were not
only
incredibly
high
but
unusually
clustered close to each other. The NBI
Investigation found that the Fatima
examinees gained early access to the test
questions.
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On July 5, 1993, the respondentsexaminees filed a petition for mandamus

before the RTC of Manila to compel the
PRC
to give them their licenses to
practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21,
1993, the Board of medicine issued
Resolution
No.
21
charging
the
respondents of immorality, dishonest
conduct,
fraud
and
deceit
and
recommended that the test results of the
Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of
Manila promulgated its decision ordering
the PRC to allow the respondents to take
the physicians oath and to register them
as physicians. The same was appealed by
the PRC to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
It must be stressed that the
power to regulate the practice of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation
cannot be exercised by the State in an
arbitrary, despotic or oppressive
manner. However, the regulating
body has the right to grant or forbid
such privilege in accordance with
certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution, their
exercise may be regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people.
As such, mandamus will not lie to compel
the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for
the respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice
of medicine, the qualifications of the
candidates for the board examination, the
scope and conduct of the examinations,
the grounds for the denying of the
issuance of a physicians license, or
revoking a license that has been issued. It
is therefore clear that the examinee must
prove that he has fully complied with all
the conditions and requirements imposed
by law and the licensing authority to be
granted the privilege to practice medicine.
In short, he shall have all the
qualifications
and
none
of
the
disqualifications. The petition is therefore
granted.
c.
to promote and protect
public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS.
JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
d.
to maintain and safeguard
peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE
VILLA)
e.
to protect public morals;
(DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA
569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY
MAYOR,
July
31,
1967;
JMM
PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319;
VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13,
1983)
f.
to
promote
the
economic
security of the people. (ICHONG VS.
HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 11155)
Not a valid exercise of police power:
a.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC
VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759; (6%)
b.
YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA
659; the Director of Animal Industry or
the Chairman if the National Meat
Commission may dispose of the carabeef
to charitable agencies as he may deem
fit. This is oppressive and unreasonable
since the owner is denied due process of
law and he is given so much discretion as
the law is not complete in itself nor is
there a standard to guide the official.
c.
DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123
SCRA 569
power of eminent domain
power of taxation
2. Differences and similarities
DIDIPIO
EARTH
SAVERS
MULTI
PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. DENR
SEC. ELISEA GOZU, ET AL., 485 SCRA
586
Chico-Nazario, J.
1.
The
power
of
eminent domain is the inherent right of
the State to condemn or to take private
property for public use upon payment of
just compensation while police power is
the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property without
compensation;
2.
In the exercise of
police power, enjoyment of a property is
restricted because the continued use
thereof would be injurious to public
welfare. In such case, there is no
compensable taking provided none of the
property interests is appropriated for the
use or for the benefit of the public.
Otherwise, there should be compensable
taking if it would result to public use.
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3.
Properties
condemned under police power are usually
noxious or intended for noxious purpose;
hence , no compensation shall be paid.
Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.
While the power of eminent domain often
results in the appropriation of title to or
possession of property, it need not always
be the case. Taking may include trespass
without actual eviction of the owner,
material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary
uses for which the property was intended
such as the establishment of an
easement.
As such, an imposition of burden over a
private property through easement (by
the government) is considered taking;
hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The determination of just
compensation, however, is a judicial
function (EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305)
and
initial
determinations
on
just
compensation
by
the
executive
department and Congress cannot prevail
over the courts findings.
Finally, service contracts with foreign
corporations is not prohibited under the
1987 Philippine Constitution with foreign
corporations or contractors would invest in
and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in
place to prevent abuses of the past
regime.
3. Limitations in the exercise of said
powers
4. Tests for a valid exercise of police
power
a.
the interests of the
public, not mere particular class, require
the exercise of police power; (LAWFUL
SUBJECT)
b.
the means employed is
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly
oppressive
to
individuals.
(LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the end
does not justify the means.
5. Read:
a.
JMM Promotions vs. CA, 260
SCRA 319
b.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS.
MAYOR OF MANILA, July 31, 1967;

c.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101
Phil. 1155
d.
CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY, 32
Phil. 580
e.
PEOPLE VS. POMAR, 46 Phil.
447
f.
US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
g.
VELASCO
VS.
VILLEGAS,
February 13, 1983
h.
ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE
VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, 24 Phil. 471
i.
AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA
195
j.
YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
RESTITUTO YNOT VS. THE
ITERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. No. 74457,March 20, 1987
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1.
On January, 13, 1984, Ynot
transported six carabaos by using a
pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. The six
carabaos, were, however, confiscated by
the Police Station Commander of Baratoc
Nuevo, Iloilo for alleged violation of
Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits
the
inter-provincial
transporting
of
carabaos and carabeefs which does not
comply with the provisions of Executive
No.626;
2.
That Section 1 of the said law
provides that "henceforth, no carabaos
regardless of age, sex physical condition
or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another.
The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of the said law shall be subjected
to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed to charitable
institution and similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National meat inspection
Commission may see fit in the case of the
carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through the dispersal of the Director of
Animal Industry, in the case of carabaos;
3. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and
carabao were returned to him upon
issuance of a writ of replevin upon
filing of a supersede as bond in
amount of P12,000.00;
the
the
his
the
4.
After trial of the case, the Judge
upheld the validity of the act of the Police
Station Commander in confiscating the
carabaos. Ynot was ordered to returned
the carabaos but since he could not do so,
the court ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court refused to rule on the
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constitutionality of the said Executive

Order on the ground of lack of authority to
do so and also because of its presumed
validity;
5. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but
the said court upheld the decision of the
Trial Court. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court
where YNOT claimed that the penalty of
confiscation is INVALID the same was
imposed without according the owner the
right to be heard before a competent and
impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due
process.
Issues:
1. May a lower court (like the MTC, RTC,
of the Court of Appeals) declare a law
unconstitutional?
2.
Is Executive
constitutional?
Order
No.
626-A
Sub-issues under this are:

a. Was it a valid police power
measure?
b. Was there an undue delegation
of legislative power?
Held:
1. While the lower courts should observe
a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional question, THEY ARE NOT
PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE SAME
WHENEVER WARRANTED, subject only to
review by the supreme court. This is so
because under Section 5,[2(a)], Art. VIII,
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court has the power to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal" or certiorari as the rules of court
may provide, final judgements and orders
of the lower courts in all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures.
This simply means that lower courts may
declare whether or not a law is
constitutional.
2.
In order that a measure or law
may be justified under the police
power of the state, it must meet two
tests:
a. the subject must be lawful; and
b. the means employed is lawful.
Since the prohibition of the
slaughtering of carabaos except where
they are at least 7 years old when male
and at least 11 years old when female is
in furtherance of the public interest since

said carabaos are very useful to the work
at the farm, it is conceded
that the Executive Order meets the first
test---- it has lawful subject.
But does the law meets the second
requisite or test which is lawful method?
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes
an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of
carabaos BUT ON THIER MOVEMENT,
providing that "no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another." The reasonable
connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the question measure is missing. We do
not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter considering that
they can be killed any where, with no less
difficulty in one province than in the other.
Obviously, retaining a carabao in one
province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill
them there.
The law is unconstitutional because
it struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him the centuriesold guarantee of elementary fair play.
Since
the Executive Order in
question is a penal law, then violation
thereof should be pronounce not by the
police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE,
WHICH ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE PRESCRIBED
PENALTY, AND ONLY AFTER TRIAL AND
CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED.
Also, there is no reasonable
guidelines or bases of the Director of
Animal Industry or the Chairman of the
NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in
the disposition of the carabaos or carabeef
other than what "they may see fit" which
is very dangerous and could result to
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even graft and corruption.
The Executive Order is, therefore,
invalid and unconstitutional and not a
valid police power measure because the
METHOD
EMPLOYED
TO
CONSERVE
CARABAOS
IS
NOT
REASONABLY
NECESSARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE
LAW
AND,
WORSE
IS
UNDULY
OPPRESSIVE. DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED
BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
CONFISCATED IS DENIED THE RIGHT TO
BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS
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IMMEDIATELY
CONDEMNED
AND
PUNISHED. THE CONFERMENT ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (like the
police) OF THE POWER TO ADJUDGE THE
GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED OFFENDER IS A
CLEAR ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS AND MILITATES AGAINST THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATIION OF POWERS.
Also, there is undue delegation of
legislative power to the officers mentioned
therein (Director of Animal Industry and
Head of the National Meat Commission)
because they were given unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the
property confiscated.
k.
TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT,
119 SCRA 597
l.
BAUTISTA VS. JUINIO, 127
SCRA 329
MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS.
ALFREDO JUINIO, ET AL, 127 SCRA
329
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
1. On May 31, 1979, President Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction No. 869
prohibiting
the use of private motor
vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH
(Extra Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and
holidays from 12:00 a.m. Saturday
morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or
1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of
the day after the holiday. Motor vehicles of
the following classifications are however,
exempted:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
S----service;
T----Truck;
DPL--Diplomatic;
CC---Consular Corps; and
TC---Tourist Cars
2. On June 11, 1979, the then

Commissioner of Land Transportation,
ROMEO EDU issued Circular No. 39
imposing
"the
penalties
of
fine,
confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of
registration on owners of the abovespecified found violating such letter of
Instructions";
3.
Bautista
is
questioning
the
constitutionality of the LOI and the
Implementing Circular on the grounds
that:
a. The banning of H and EH vehicles is
unfair, discriminatory, and arbitrary and

thus contravenes the EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE; and
b. The LOI denies the owners of H
and EH vehicles of due process, more
specifically of their right to use and enjoy
their private property and of their freedom
to travel and hold family gatherings,
reunions, outings on week-ends and
holidays, while those not included in the
prohibition are enjoying unrestricted
freedom;
c. The Circular violates the
prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power because the LOI does
not impose the penalty of confiscation.
HELD:
1. It must be pointed out that the
LOI was promulgated to solve the oil crisis
which was besetting the country at that
time. It was therefore a valid police power
measure
to
ensures
the
country's
economy as a result of spiralling fuel
prices. In the interplay of Bautista's right
to due process and the exercise of police
power by the State, the latter must be
given leeway. The police power is intended
to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and general welfare.
2. The petitioners' claim that their
right to equal protection was violated is
without basis. This is so because there is a
valid classification in this case. Definitely,
Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles consume
more gasoline that the other kinds of
vehicles and it is but proper to regulate
the use of those which consumes more
gasoline. If all the owner of H and EH
vehicles are treated in the same fashion,
or whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group is held equally binding on the
rest, there is no violation of the equal
protection clause.
3. The penalty of "impounding"
the vehicle as embodied in Circular No. 39
has no statutory basis. Therefore, it is not
valid being an "ultra vires".
m.
ASSOCIATION
OF
SMALL
LANDOWNERS
VS.
SECRETARY
OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 343
n.
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180
SCRA 533
o.
VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA,
September 21, 1987
5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON
CITY VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759
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CHAPTER IIDUE PROCESS

Section 1---NO PERSON SHALL BE
DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW, NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE
DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
Kinds of Due Process:
a. substantive due process---requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to life, liberty
or property. In short, it is to determine
whether it has a valid governmental
objective like for the interest of the public
as against mere particular class.
b. Procedural due process---one which
hears before it condemns as pointed out
by Daniel Webster.
Due process is a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial (Per
Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE CASE)
1.
Requisites of judicial due process.
a.
BANCO
ESPANOL
PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921
VS.
Requisites:
1.
There must be an impartial
court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and decide the matter
before it;
2.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant
or over the property subject of the
proceedings;
3.
The defendant must be given
the opportunity to be heard;
4.
Judgment must be rendered
only after lawful hearing.
a. GALMAN VS. PAMARAN (the 1st case)
b.
IMELDA
MARCOS
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998
IMELDA R. MARCOS VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 126995,
October 6, 1998
Purisima, J.
Facts:
1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS
and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Light Railway Transit
Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease

Contract with the Philippine General
Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an
LRTA property
in Pasay City for
P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;
2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased
the said property for P734,000.00 per
month to the Transnational Construction
Corporation represented by one Ignacio
Jumenez;
3. After
petitioners husband was
deposed as President of the Philippines,
she and Dans were charged of alleged
violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt
Practices
Act
before
the
Sandiganbayan;
4. After trial , the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the
legal requirement that all the 3 justices
must be unanimous in its Decision
because Justice Garchitorena and Justice
Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of
both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza
voted to acquit them;
5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as
Presiding Justice issued Administrative
Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special
Division of five and designating Justices
Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;
6. On September 21, 1993, Justice
Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he
be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the
same date, however, Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the division of 5 allegedly
because he and Justice Balajadia had
agreed to the opinion of Justice del
Rosario;
7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision
was rendered convicting the petitioner
and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA
3019;
8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division
of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
but acquitted DANS;
9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and at the same time
prayed that her Motion be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc claiming that her
right to
due process of law, both
substantive and procedural, was violated:
a.
as a result of the fact that she
was convicted as a result of the alleged
disparity of the rentals agreed upon with
PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease
contract between PGHFI and Transnational
Construction Corporation; and
b.
the First Division convicted her
after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a
Quezon City restaurant where they agreed
to convict her in one case and acquit her
in her other cases. The said meeting was
attended by another justice who is not a
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member of the First Division or the Special

Division in violation of the Rules of the
Sandiganbayan
which
requires
that
sessions of the court shall be done only in
its principal office in Manila and that only
justices belonging to the division should
join the deliberations.
Held:
The petitioner is hereby acquitted.
1. The great disparity between the rental
price of the lease agreement signed by
the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month)
and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per
month) does not necessarily render the
monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the
government in the absence of any
evidence using rentals of adjacent
properties showing that the rentals in the
property subject of the lease agreement
is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE
WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL
RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As
such, the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.
2. The court notes likewise the bias and
prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena
against the petitioner as shown by his
leading,
misleading
and
baseless
hypothetical questions of said justice to
RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the
petitioner. Said
justice
asked
179
questions to the witness as against the
prosecutor
who
cross-examined
the
witness which was 73. Said number of
questions could no longer be described as
clarificatory questions. Another ground
therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner
is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL
before the Sandiganbayan. This is one
reason why the case could no longer be
remanded
to
the
Sandiganbayan
especially
so
that
the
other
Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special
Division of 5 have retired. There is
therefore no compelling reason why the
case should still be remanded to the lower
court when all the evidence are already
with the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ
Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, and Panganiban voted for
conviction while Justice Vitug was the only
Justice who voted for the return of the
case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the
corrections of the perceived irregularities
in the proceedings below.)

c.
DBP VS. CA, January 29,
1999
d.
MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263
SCRA 490
e.
PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA
452
f.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144
SCRA 194
JAVIER VS. COMELEC

G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September
22, 1986
FACTS:
1.
The petitioner Evelio Javier and the
private respondent Arturo Pacificador were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa election in May 1984;
2. Alleging serious anomalies in the
conduct of the elections and the
canvass of the election returns, Javier
went to the COMELEC to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival;
3. On May 18, 1984, the Second Division
of the COMELEC directed the provincial
board of canvassers to proceed with the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation
of the winning candidate until further
orders;
4.
On June 7, 1984, the same Second
Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the
petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC;
5.
On certiorari with the S.C. the
proclamation made by the Board of
Canvasser was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the
5 - day period of appeal, which the
petitioner seasonably made;
6. On July 23, 1984 the Second Division
itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of Antique.
ISSUE:
Was the Second Division of the
COMELEC, authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984 proclaiming
Pacificador the winner in the election ?
APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS
CONSITUTION:
OF
THE
The applicable provisions of the 1973

Constitution are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3,
which provide:
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"Section 2. Be the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of all members of the
Batasang
Pambansa
and
elective
provincial and city officials."
"Section 3. The Commission on
Elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election casesa may be heard
and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be
decided within ninety days from the date
of their submission for decision."
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Petitioner:
The proclamation made by the Second
Division is invalid because all contests
involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections en banc.
Respondents:
Only "contests" need to be heard and
decided en banc, all other cases can be
- in fact, should be - filed with and
decided only by any of the three
divisions.
There is a difference between
"contests" and "cases" and also a
difference
between
"pre-proclamation
controversies" and "election protests". The
pre-proclamation controversy between the
petitioner and the private respondent was
not yet a contest at the time and
therefore could be validly heard by a mere
division of the Commission on elections,
consonant with Sec. 3. The issue at that
stage was still administrative and could be
resolved by a division.
HELD:
a. The S.C. decided to resolve the case
even if the Batasang Pambansa had
already been abolished by the Aquino
government, and even if Javier had
already died in the meantime. This was
because of its desire for this case to serve
as a guidance for the future. Thus it said:
"The Supreme Court is not only the
highest arbiter of legal questions but also
the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we
must also give him justice. The two are
not always the same. There are times
when we cannot grant the latter because

the issue has been settled and decision is
no longer possible according to law. But
there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act, then, not
only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the
future."
b. The S.C. held on the main issue that
in making the COMELEC the sole judge of
all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the
Batasang
Pambansa
and
elective
provincial
and
city
officials,
the
Constitution intended to give it full
authority to hear and decide these cases
from beginning to end and on all matter
related thereto, including those arising
before the proclamation of the winners.
The decision rendered by the Second
Division alone was therefore set aside as
violative of the Constitution. The case
should have been decided en banc.
c.
Pre-proclamation controversies
became known and designated as such
only because of Sec. 175 of the 1978
Election Code. The 1973 Constitution
could not have therefore been intended to
have divided contests between pre and
post proclamation when that Constitution
was written in 1973.
d.
The word "contests" should not be
given a restrictive meaning; on the
contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the rule
that the words used in the Constitution
should
be
interpreted
liberally. As
employed in the 1973 Constitution, the
term should be understood as referring to
any matter involving the title or claim of
title to an elective office, made before or
after the proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is claiming
the office in dispute.
e.
There was also a denial of due
process. One of the members of the
Second Division, Commissioner Jose
Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador.
He denied the motion to disqualify him
from hearing the case. The Court has
repeatedly and consistently demanded
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement we
have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just.
FELICIANO
and
concurring:
2008
MELENCIO-HERRERA,
All election contests involving

members of the Batasang Pambansa must
be decided by the Commission on
Elections en banc under Secs. 2 and 3 of
Art. XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These
sections do not distinguish between "preproclamation" and "post-proclamation"
contests nor between "cases" and
"contests".
g.
AZUL VS. CASTRO, 133 SCRA
271
h.
PADERANGA
VS.
AZURA,
136 SCRA 266
i.
DAVID VS. AQUILIZAN, 94
SCRA 707
j.
LORENZANA VS. CAYETANO,
78 SCRA 485 (respondent was not a
party to the ejectment case) so to
enforce the decision on her violates
her right to due process of law
k.
ZAMBALES
CHROMITE
MINING VS. CA, 94 SCRA 261
l.
ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119
SCRA 353
m.
SINGSON VS. NLRC, 273
SCRA 258
n.
ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119
SCRA 353
o.
MAYOR ALONTE VS. JUDGE
SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245
MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. JUDGE

SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245
Vitug, J.
Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was
charged of rape before Branch 25, RTC of
Laguna. However, as a result of a petition
for a transfer of venue filed by the
prosecution and granted by the SC, his
case was transferred to RTC Branch 53,
Manila, presided over by the respondent
judge.
After the petitioners arraignment, the
prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE signed by the private
complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN
where she prayed for the withdrawal of
the case because she is no longer
interested in pursuing the same with no
intention of re-filing the said case in the
future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to
withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for

bail. The same was not resolved despite
several motions filed by the petitioner to
resolve the same.
On December 17, 1997, counsel for the
petitioner, ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN,
received a notice from the respondent
judge notifying him of the promulgation of
the decision in this case despite the fact
that the prosecution and the defense have
not presented their evidence in court.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent
judge issued a Decision convicting the
petitioner of rape and sentenced to suffer
a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied
his right to due process of law.
Held:
In order that an accused in a criminal
proceedings is deemed to have been given
the right to due process of law, the
following requisites must be complied with
before a decision is rendered:
1.
the court or tribunal trying the
case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the matter before it;
2.
that jurisdiction was lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the
accused;
3.
that the accused is given the
opportunity to be heard; and
4.
that judgment is rendered only
upon
lawful
hearing
(PEOPLE
VS.
DAPITAN, 197 SCRA 378)
The act of the respondent judge in
rendering a decision without even giving
the petitioner the right to adduce evidence
in his behalf is a gross violation of his
right to due process of law. The Decision
rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of
due process.
p.
DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999
2.
Procedural due
administrative bodies
a.
process
before
TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635

Requisites:
a.
the right to a hearing which
includes
the
right
to
present
evidence;
b.
the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented;
2008
c.
the decision must have
something to support itself;
d.
the
evidence
must
be
substantial;
e.
the decision must be based
on the evidence presented during the
hearing;
f.
the tribunal or body must
act
on
its
own
independent
consideration of the law or facts;
g.
the board or body shall in all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceedings can know
the various issues involved.
b.
AMERICAN
TOBACCO
VS.
DIRECTOR, 67 SCRA 287
c.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531
d.
DELGADO VS. CA, November
10, 1986
If an accused was represented
by a non-lawyer during the trial
(though he thought that he was a
lawyer), his right to due process was
violated and therefore entitled to a
new trial.
3.
Procedural
due
process
disciplinary actions against students
in
Academic freedom; due process

disciplinary actions involving students
in
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT

OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER
EDUCATION,
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION
CULTURE
AND
SPORTS,
ALVIN
AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO
VALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980,
December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar,
James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were
expelled by the De La Salle University
(DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB)1[1] Joint Discipline Board because of
1[1]
College of Saint Benilde is an

educational institution which is part of the
De La Salle System.
2008
their involvement in an offensive action

causing injuries to petitioner James Yap
and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity.
respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul

Bungubung,
Richard
Reverente
and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap

was eating his dinner alone in Manangs
Restaurant near La Salle, when he
overheard two men bad-mouthing and
apparently angry at Domino Lux.
He
ignored the comments of the two. When
he arrived at his boarding house, he
mentioned the remarks to his two other
brods while watching television. These two
brods had earlier finished eating their
dinner at Manangs. Then, the three,
together with four other persons went
back to Manangs and confronted the two
who were still in the restaurant.
By
admission of respondent Bungubung in his
testimony, one of the two was a member
of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There
was no rumble or physical violence then.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner

Yap lodged a complaint2[7] with the
Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with direct assault. Similar
complaints3[8] were also filed by Dennis
Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin
Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled De La
Salle University and College of St. Benilde
v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105),
James
Paul
Bungubung
(ABPSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BSBS-APM/9235086),
Alvin
Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (ABMGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (ABMGT/9251227)
were
docketed
as
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
After this incident, a meeting was

conducted between the two heads of the
fraternity through the intercession of the
Student Council.
The Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity was asking for an apology.
Kailangan ng apology in the words of
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was
made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before
his next class at 6:00 p.m.,
James Yap
went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across
Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross
Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at
his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not
know what to do.
Then, respondent
Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands parang
knuckles.
Respondents Reverente and
Lee were behind Yap, punching him.
Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who
were in front of him, were also punching
him.
As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People
shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers left. Yap could not recognize the
other members of the group who attacked
him. With respect to respondent Papio,
Mr. Yap said hindi ko nakita ang mukha
niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.
What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy
also running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a
fraternity war.
The victims, namely:
petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual,
Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are
members of the Domino Lux Fraternity,
while the alleged assailants, private
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office

sent
separate
notices
to
private
respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and
Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them
of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their
respective answers.4[9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle
Discipline Board uniformly stated as
follows:
Please be informed that a joint and
expanded Discipline Board had been
constituted to hear and deliberate the
charge against you for violation of CHED
Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing
of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995
at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for
you and your witnesses to give testimony
and present evidence in your behalf. You
may be assisted by a lawyer when you
give your testimony or those of your
witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are
further directed to provide the Board,
through the Discipline Office, with a list of
your witnesses as well as the sworn
statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled
hearing or your failure to submit the list
of witnesses and the sworn statement of
2[7]
3[8]
4[9]
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128-129.
Id. at 130-133.
10

their
proposed
testimony
will
be
considered a waiver on your part to
present evidence and as an admission of
the principal act complained of.
During the proceedings before the Board
on April 19 and 28, 1995, private
respondents interposed the common
defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was
conducted nor the students allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against
them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board issued a Resolution5[18]
finding private respondents guilty. They
were meted the supreme penalty of
automatic expulsion,6[19] pursuant to CHED
Order No. 4.7[20] The dispositive part of
the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
considering
all
the
foregoing, the Board finds respondents
ALVIN
AGUILAR
(AB-BSM/9152105),
JAMES
PAUL
BUNGUBUNG
(ABPSM/9234403),
ALVIN
LEE
(EDD/94623250)
and
RICHARD
V.
REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
having violated CHED Order No. 4 and
thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A.
PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board
acquits him of the charge.
5[18]
Id. at 139-150.
Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that
expulsion is an extreme penalty of an
erring pupil or student consisting of his
exclusion from admission to any public or
private school in the Philippines and which
requires the prior approval of the
Secretary. The penalty may be imposed
for acts or offenses constituting gross
misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying
deadly
weapons,
immorality,
selling
and/or possession of prohibited drugs
such as marijuana, drug dependency,
drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and
other serious school offenses such as
assaulting a pupil or student or school
personnel, instigating or leading illegal
strikes or similar concerned activities
resulting in the stoppage of classes,
preventing or threatening any pupil or
student or school personnel from entering
the school premises or attending classes
or discharging their duties, forging or
tampering with school records or school
forms, and securing or using forged school
records, forms and documents.
7[20]
Rollo, pp. 151-153.
6[19]
2008
I SSUE
Were private respondents accorded due
process of law because there was no fullblown hearing nor were they allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against
them?
H E L D:
Private respondents right to
process of law was not violated.
due
In
administrative
cases,
such
as
investigations of students found violating
school discipline, [t]here are withal
minimum standards which must be met
before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are:
that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating
committee
or
official
designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.8[66]
Where
a
party
was
afforded
an
opportunity
to
participate
in
the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process. 9[67]
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that
must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.10[68]
The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.11[69] So long as the party is
given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due
course, it cannot be said that there was
denial of due process.12[70]
8[66]
Guzman v. National University, G.R.

No. L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA
699, 706-707.
9[67]
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157219, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
10[68]
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission, G.R.
No. 143964, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA
110.
11[69]
Valiao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
146621, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 543.
11

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all
times and in all instances, essential to due
process it is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.13[71] To be heard does not only
mean presentation of testimonial evidence
in court one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be
heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.14[72]
Private respondents were duly informed in
writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales.
They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against
them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers.
They were also
informed of the evidence presented
against them as they attended all the
hearings before the Board.
Moreover,
private respondents were given the right
to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did.
Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence
submitted to it by all the parties before
rendering its resolution in Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that
they were denied due process when they
were not allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against them. This argument
was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University15[73] where this Court
held that x x x the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions requires observance
of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice.
The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary;
and cross examination is not, x x x an
essential part thereof.
GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706
GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL

UNIVERSITY
Barza v. Dinglasan, Jr., G.R. No.
136350, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA
277.
13[71]
Seastar Marine Services, Inc. v. Bulan, Jr., G.R. No. 142609, November 25,
2004, 444 SCRA 140.
14[72]
Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687 &
158959, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 26.
15[73]
Supra note 66, at 706.
12[70]
2008
G.R. No. L-68288, July 11,

1986
FACTS:
Petitioners who are students of the
National University were barred from
enrolment. The school claims that their
scholastic standing is poor and that they
have been involved in activities that have
disrupted classes and had conducted mass
actions without the required permits.
HELD:
a.
It is apparent that despite the
accusations of alleged violations hurled by
the school against the petitioners, the fact
is that it had never conducted proceedings
of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or
participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein".
Also apparent is the omission of
respondents to cite any duly published
rule of theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
scholastic standing.
b.
Under the Education Act of 1982,
students have the right "to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, EXCEPT in case
of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations."
The petitioner were denied of this
right, and were being disciplined without
due process, in violation of the admonition
in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed
upon any student except for cause as
defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the
school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated
and
only
after
due
investigation
shall
have
been
conducted. It has already been held in
Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute,
117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school
to impose sanctions on students without
conducting due investigation.
c. Of course, all schools have the power
to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact the
maintenance of good school discipline is a
duty specifically enjoined on every private
school. The Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools provides that:
12
2008
"* * The school rules governing

discipline and the corresponding sanctions
therefor must be clearly specified and
defined in writing and made known to the
students
and/or
their
parents
or
guardians.
Schools
shall
have
the
authority and prerogative to promulgate
such rules and regulations as they may
deem necessary from time to time
effective as of the date
of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified."
b.
Philippine Savings Bank vs.
NLRC, 261 SCRA 409
c.
RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS.
NLRC, 261 SCRA 589
d.
WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES
VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174
e.
SAMILLANO VS. NLRC, 265
SCRA 788
f.
STOLT-NIELSEN VS. NLRC, 264
SCRA 307
g.
GARCIA VS. NLRC, 264 SCRA
261
d.
The imposition of disciplinary
sanctions
requires
observance
of
procedural due process. Due process in
disciplinary cases involving students :
4.
Effect
of
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration to violation of the right to
due process
a. need not entail proceedings and

hearing similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in court of
justice;
b. the proceedings may be summary;
c. cross-examination is not an
essential part thereof.
But the S.C. said that the following
minimum standards must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due
process:
1. the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel;
3.
they shall be informed of the
evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf;
5.
the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
a.
BERINA VS. PMI, September
30, 1982
Due process in the dismissal of
employees
Requisites of Due Process before
the NLRC
1.
2.
Notice; and
Hearing
a.
MGG
Marine
NLRC, 259 SCRA 664
Services
vs.
a.
CASUELA VS. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, 276 SCRA 635
b.
CORDENILLO VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, 276 SCRA 652
5.
In
administrative
proceedings,
does due process require that a party be
assisted by counsel and be able to crossexamine the witnesses?
LUMIQUED
SCRA 125
VS.
EXENEA,
282
There is no law, whether the Civil

Service Act or the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides that a respondent in
an administrative case should be assisted
by counsel in order that the proceedings
therein is considered valid. Not only, that,
petitioner
herein
was
given
the
opportunity several times to engage the
services of a lawyer to assist him but he
confidently informed the investigators that
he could protect himself.
Administrative Due Process
ATTY.
ROMEO
ERECE
MACALINGAY, ET AL.,
166809, April 22, 2008
VS.
G.R.
LYN
No.
THE FACTS:
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
Region I, whose office is located in San
Fernando City, La Union.
Respondent
employees of the CHR Region I filed an
Affidavit-Complaint dated October 2, 1998
against petitioner alleging that he denied
them the use of the office vehicle assigned
to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed
transportation allowance even if he was
using the said vehicle, and that he
certified that he did not use any
government vehicle, when in fact he did,
13

in
order
allowance.
to
collect
transportation
Respondent filed his answer denying

allegations against him.
the
After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC

Proper in CSC Resolution No. 99-1360
dated July 1, 1999 charged petitioner with
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for
using a government vehicle in spite of his
receipt of the monthly transportation
allowance and for certifying that he did
not use any government vehicle, when in
fact, he did, in order to receive the
transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal charge
read:
1.
That despite the regular receipt of
Erece of his monthly Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the
amount of P4,000.00, he still prioritizes
himself in the use of the office vehicle
(Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive
from the Central Office that he cannot use
the service vehicle for official purposes
and at the same time receive his
transportation allowance;
2.
That Erece did not comply with the
directive of the Central Office addressed to
all Regional Human Rights Directors, as
follows: to regularize your receipt of the
transportation allowance component of the
RATA to which you are entitled monthly,
you are hereby directed to immediately
transfer to any of your staff, preferably
one of your lawyers, the memorandum
receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your
name;
3.
That he certified in his monthly
liquidation of his RATA that he did not use
any
government
vehicle
for
the
corresponding month, which is not true
because he is the regular user of the
government vehicle issued to CHR-Region
I.
The foregoing facts and circumstances
indicate that government service has been
prejudiced by the acts of Erece.
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby
formally charged with Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, he is
given five (5) days from receipt hereof to
submit his Answer under oath and
affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the
Civil
Service
Commission-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his
Answer, he should indicate whether he
elects a formal investigation or waives his
2008
right thereto.
Any Motion to Dismiss,
request for clarification or Bills of
Particulars shall not be entertained by the
Commission.
Any of these pleadings
interposed by the respondent shall be
considered as an Answer and shall be
evaluated as such. Likewise, he is advised
of his right to the assistance of counsel of
his choice.16[4]
After a formal investigation of the case,
the CSC issued Resolution No. 020124,
dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner
guilty
of
dishonesty
and
conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and penalizing him with dismissal
from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the
CSC Resolution with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on January 7,
2005, the CA upheld the CSC Resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Resolutions
of
the
Civil
Service
Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.17[5]
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Petitioner raised the issue of violation of
his right to due process because he was
denied the right to cross-examine the
respondents on their affidavit-complaint.
H E L D:
Petitioner contends that he was denied
due process as he was not afforded the
right to cross-examine his accusers and
their witnesses. He stated that at his
instance, in order to prevent delay in the
disposition of the case, he was allowed to
present evidence first to support the
allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After
he rested his case, respondents did not
present their evidence, but moved to
submit their position paper and formal
offer of evidence, which motion was
granted by the CSC over his (petitioners)
objection.
Respondents then submitted
their Position Paper and Formal Offer of
Exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he was
allowed to present evidence first, it should
16[4]
17[5]
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 34.
14

not be construed as a waiver of his right
to
cross-examine
the
complainants.
Although the order of presentation of
evidence was not in conformity with the
procedure, still petitioner should not be
deemed to have lost his right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses.
This may be allowed only if he expressly
waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that
petitioner was not denied due process
when he failed to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses since he
was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain ones
side.18[6]
Velez v. De Vera19[7]
held:
Due process of law in administrative cases

is not identical with judicial process for a
trial in court is not always essential to due
process. While a day in court is a matter
of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings
since they rest upon different principles.
The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in
certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing
are not essential to due process of law.
The constitutional requirement of due
process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly
established
administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that
hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is
available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of
such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all
that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process.
Nor is an actual hearing always essential. .
. . 20[8]
The dismissal of the petitioner from the
government is valid.
CHAPTER III - THE EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE
Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697,

July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345.
19[7]
Id. at 387-388.
20[8]
Emphasis supplied.
2008
nor shall any person be denied the

equal protection of the laws.
1. The scope of the equal protection
clause, 95 SCRA
420
2. Equal protection of the law, 13 SCRA
266
3. Requisites for a valid classificationRead:
1.
People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
a.
There must be real and
substantial distinctions;
b.
It must be germane tot he
purposes of the law;
c.
It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and
d.
It must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
2. Read again, Association of Small
Landowners vs. Sec. of Agrarian reform,
July 14, 1989
4. Equal protection in generalRead:
1.
P. vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
2.
TIU VS. CA, 301 SCRA 278 (There
is real and substantial distinction between
business inside
the Subic Special
Economic Zone and outside wherein those
inside are exempt from other taxes as a
result of the policy of the government to
accelerate the development of the portion
of Subic left by the Americans)
3.
MELDA MARCOS VS. CA, 278 SCRA
843
4.
HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7,
1994
The fact that policemen charged
with a criminal offense punishable by
more than 6 years are to be suspended
during the entire duration of the case
unlike other government employees is
valid since it rests on valid classification
because policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against
them.
2-A Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37
SCRA 420
2-b.
PANFILO
LACSON
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
2-b-1. BASCO VS. PAGCOR, May 14, 1991
18[6]
No violation of the equal protection

clause if Congress would legalize cock-
15

fighting and horse racing since police
power could regulate gambling.
3.
PHILIPPINE
JUDGES
ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO, November 11,
1993
There is no valid distinction for a
law removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary while leaving the same to the
Executive and Legislative despite the fact
that there is considerable volume of mails
from the courts. Loss of revenue is not a
valid ground unless it would be withdrawn
to all government offices.
FRANCISCO TATAD vs. THE SECRETARY
OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, G. R. No.
124360, November 5, 1997
EDCEL LAGMAN, JOKER ARROYO,
ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA,
FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, HON. FRANCISCO
VIRAY, PETRON, FILIPINAS SHELL and
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 127867,
November 5, 1997.
PUNO, J.
These
petitions
challenge
the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled
An
Act
Deregulating
the
Downstream Oil Industry and for Other
Purposes. RA
8180 seeks to end 26
years of government regulation of the
downstream oil industry.
The facts:
1.
Prior to 1971, no government
agency was regulating the oil industry.
New players were free to enter the oil
market
without
any
government
interference. There were four (4) refining
companies at that time. SHELL, CALTEX,
BATAAN REFINING COMPANY and FILOIL
MARKETING and six (6) petroleum
marketing companies: ESSO, FILOIL,
CALTEX, GETTY, MOBIL and SHELL;
2.
In 1971, the country was
driven to its knees by the crippling oil
crisis and in order to remedy the same,
the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was
enacted REGULATING the oil industry ;
3.
On November 9, 1973, then
President Marcos created the Philippine
national Oil Corporation (PNOC) t break
the control of the foreigners to the oil
industry. It acquired ownership of ESSO
Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought
controlling shares of the Bataan Refining
Corporation. PNOC then operated under
2008
the
business
name
PETRON
CORPORATION and for the first time,
there was a Filipino presence in the
Philippine oil market;
4.
In 1984, Pres. Marcos through
section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL
PRICE STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to
cushion the effects of frequent changes in
the price of oil caused by the exchange
rate adjustments or increase of the world
market prices crude oil and imported
petroleum products;
5.
By 1985, only three (3) oil
companies were left operating in the
country. These are: CALTEX, FILIPINAS
SHELL and PNOC;
6.
In May, 1987, Pres. Corazon
Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172
creating the ENERGY REULATORY BOARD
to regulate the business of importing,
exporting,
shipping,
transporting,
processing,
refining,
marketing
and
distributing energy resources WHEN
WARRANTED AND ONLY WHEN PUBLIC
NECESSITY REQUIRES. The Board was
empowered to fix and regulate the prices
of petroleum products and other related
merchandise;
7.
In March, 1996, Congress
enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil
Industry not later than March, 1997. The
law requires that the implementation of
the regulation, shall as far as practicable
be made at a time WHEN THE PRICES OF
CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
IN THE WORLD ARE DECLINING AND
WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO
IN RELATION TO THE US DOLLAR; IS
STABLE;
8.
On February 8, 1997, Executive
Order No. 372 was issued by President
Fidel
Ramos
implementing
full
deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE
OPSF FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED;
9.
The petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of RA 8180 on the
following grounds:
a.
Section 5 of RA
8180 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution;
b.
The imposition of
different tariff rates does not deregulate
the oil industry and even bars the entry of
other players in the oil industry but
instead effectively protects the interest of
the oil companies with existing refineries.
Thus, it runs counter to the objective of
the law to foster a truly competitive
market; The inclusion of
Sec. 5 [b]
providing for tariff differential violates
Section 26 [1] of Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution which requires every law to
have only one subject which should be
expressed in the title thereof;
16

c.
Section 15 of RA
8180 and EO No. 392 are unconstitutional
for undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Secretary of
Energy;
d.
EO
392
implementing the full deregulation of the
oil industry is unconstitutional since it is
arbitrary and unreasonable since it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of
the OPSF fund, a condition which is not
found in RA No. 8180;
e.
Section 15 of RA
8180 is unconstitutional for it allows the
formation of a de facto cartel among three
existing oil companies in violation of the
Constitution
prohibiting
against
monopolies, combination in restraint of
trade and unfair competition.
The provisions of the law being questioned
as unconstitutional are Section 5 [b] and
Section 15 which provide:
Section 5 [b] Any law to the contrary
notwithstanding and starting with the
effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude
oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven
(7%) percent, except fuel oil and LPG, the
rate for which shall be the same;
Provided, that beginning on January 1,
2004, the tariff rate on imported crude oil
and refined petroleum products shall be
the same; Provided, further, that this
provision may be amended only by an
Act of Congress.
xxx
Section 15. Implementation of
full
deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5 [e] of
RA 7638, the DOE, upon approval of the
President, implement full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry not later than
March, 1997. As far as practicable, the
DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable.
The issues are:
Procedural Issues:
a.
Whether or not the petitions
raise justiciable controversy; and
b.
Whether or not the petitioners
have the standing to question the validity
of the subject law and executive order.
Substantive Issues:
2008
a.
Whether or not Section 5 of RA
8180 violates the one titleone subject
requirement of the Constitution;
b.
Whether or not Section 5 of RA
8180 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution;
c.
Whether section 15 violates the
constitutional
prohibition
on
undue
delegation of legislative power;
d.
Whether or not EO 392 is
arbitrary and unreasonable; and
e.
Whether or not RA 8180
violates the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
HELD:
1.
Judicial power includes not only
the duty of the courts to settle
controversies involving rights but also the
duty to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any agency or branch of the
government. The courts, as guardians of
the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the
limit imposed by the fundamental law.
When
the
statute
violates
the
Constitution, it is not only the right of the
judiciary
to
declare
such
act
as
unconstitutional and void.
2.
The question of locus standi
must likewise fall . As held in KAPATIRAN
NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN
NG PILIPINAS, INC. VS. TAN, it was held
that:
Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of
sufficient personality, standing, or interest
are , however, in the main procedural
matters. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE CASES TO THE PUBLIC, AND IN
KEEPING WITH THE COURTS DUTY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE
OTHER BRANCHEDS OF GOVERNMENT
HAVE KEPT THEMSELVES WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAWS AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT ABUSE
THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO THEM, THE
COURT
HAS
BRUSHED
ASIDE
TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE AND
HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THESE
PETITIONS.
There is no disagreement on the part
of the parties as to the far-reaching
importance of the validity of RA 8180.
Thus, there is no good sense in being
hyper-technical on the standing of the
petitioners for they pose issues which
are significant to our people and
17

which
deserve
resolution.
our
2008
forthright
bounds of these tests in EASTERM

SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA, thus:
3.
It is contended that Section
5[b[ of RA 8180 on tariff differentials
violates the Constitutional prohibition
requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its
title. We do not concur with this
contention. As a policy, the Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one
title---one
subject
rule.
We
have
consistently ruled that the title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A
law having a single general subject
indicated in the title may contain a
number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject. We hold that Section
5 providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of RA 8180 which
is the deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
There are two accepted tests to determine

whether or not there is a valid delegation
of
legislative
power
,
viz:
the
completeness test and the sufficiency of
standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative
such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will do is enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. BOTH TESTS
ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL
TRANSFERENCE
OF
LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE, WHO IS
NOT ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE SHOES
OF THE LEGISLATURE AND EXERCISE A
POWER ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE.
4.
The contention that there is
undue delegation of legislative power
when it authorized the President to
determine when deregulation starts is
without merit. The petitioners claim that
the phrases as far as practicable,
decline of crude oil prices in the world
market and stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar are
ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in
meaning and could not therefore provide
the
determinate
or
determinable
standards which can guide the President
in his decision to fully deregulate the oil
industry. The power of Congress to
delegate the execution of laws has long
been settled by this Court in 1916 in the
case of COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS
DE FILIPINA VS. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT WAS
HELD THAT:
The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law ,
which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be made.
Two tests have been
developed to
determine whether the delegation of the
power to execute laws does not involve
the abdication of the power to make law
itself. We delineated the metes and
The validity of delegating legislative

power is now a quiet area in our
constitutional
landscape
because
such has become an inevitability in
light of the increasing complexity of
the task of government. In fact, in
HIRABAYASHI VS. UNITED STATES,
the Supreme Court through Justice
ISAGANI CRUZ held that even if the
law does not expressly pinpoint the
standard, THE COURTS WILL BEND
BACKWARD TO LOCATE THE SAME
ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE
STATUTE;
IF
IT
CAN,
FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY.
5.
EO No. 392 failed to follow
faithfully the standards set by RA 8180
when it considered the extraneous factor
of depletion of the OPSF Fund. The
misapplication of this extra factor cannot
be justified. The executive is bereft of any
right to alter either by addition or
subtraction the standards set by RA 8180
for it has no power to make laws. To cede
to the executive the power to make laws
would invite tyranny and to transgress the
separation of powers. The exercise of
delegated power is given a strict scrutiny
by courts for the delegate is a mere agent
whose action cannot infringe the terms of
the agency.
6.
Section 19 of Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
The state shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interests so
requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
18

A monopoly
is a privilege or peculiar
advantage vested in one or more persons
or companies, consisting of the exclusive
right or power to carry on a particular
business
or
trade,
manufacture
a
particular article or control the sale or the
whole market structure in which one or
only a few firms dominate the total sales
of a product or service. On the other
hand, a combination in restraint of trade is
an agreement or understanding between
two or more persons, in the form of
contract, trust, pool, holding company, for
the
purpose
of
unduly
restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in
a certain commodity,
controlling its production, distribution and
price or otherwise interfering with
freedom of trade without statutory
authority. Combination in restraint of
trade refers to means while monopoly
refers to the end.
Respondents
aver that the 4% tariff
differential is designed to encourage new
entrants to invest in refineries. They
stress that the inventory requirement is
meant to guaranty continuous domestic
supply of petroleum and to discourage
fly-by-night operators. They also claim
that the prohibition against predatory
pricing is intended to protect prospective
entrants.
The validity of the assailed provisions of
RA 8180 has to be decided in the light of
the letter and spirit of Section 19, Art. XII
of the Constitution. While the Constitution
embraced free enterprise as an economic
creed, it did not prohibit per se the
operation of monopolies which can,
however,
be regulated in the public
interest. This distinct free enterprise
system is dictated by the need to achieve
the goals of our national economy as
defined under Section 1, Art. XII of the
Constitution which are: more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced
by the nation for all, especially the
underprivileged . It also calls for the State
to protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair and trades practices.
The provisions on 4% tariff differential,
predatory
pricing
and
inventory
requirement blocks the entry of other
players and give undue advantage to the
3 oil companies resulting to monopolies or
unfair competition. This is so because it
would take billions for new players to
construct refineries,
and to have big
2008
inventories. This would

prevent new players.
effectively
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied

that our oil industry is operated and
controlled by an oligopoly (dominated by a
handful of players) and a foreign
oligopoly at that. As the dominant players,
SHELL, CALTEX & PETRON boast of
existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% works to their
immense advantage. Yet, this is only one
edge on tariff differential. THE OTHER
EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE
HEART OF THEIR COMPETITORS. IT
ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE PLAYERS.
New players in order to equalize must
build their refineries worth billions of
pesos. Those without refineries had to
compete with a higher cost of 4%.They
will be competing on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the
advantage of PETRON, SHELL AND CALTEX
against prospective new players. The
three (3) could easily comply with the
inventory requirement in view of their
numerous storage facilities. Prospective
competitors again find compliance oft his
requirement
difficult
because
of
prohibitive cost in constructing new
storage facilities. The net effect would be
to effectively prohibit the entrance of new
players.
Now comes the prohibition on predatory
pricing or selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract
customers to the detriment of the
competitors. According to HOVENKAMP:
The rationale for predatory pricing
is the sustaining of losses today that will
give a firm monopoly profits in the future.
The
monopoly
profits
will
never
materialize, however, if the market is
flooded with new entrants as soon as the
successful predator attempts to raise its
price. Predatory pricing will be profitable
only if the market contains significant
barriers to new entry.
Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and
the inventory requirement, the predatory
pricing is a significant barrier which
discourage new players to enter the oil
market
thereby
promoting
unfair
competition, monopoly and restraint of
trade which are prohibited by the
Constitution.
2-d.LACSON
VS.
January 20, 1999
SANDIGANBAYAN,
19

3. Taxicab Operators vs. BOT,
September 30,l982
4. Bautista vs. Juinio,127 SCRA 329
5. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
6. Villegas vs. Hiu, 86 SCRA 270
7. Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
8. UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 38
9. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111
SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Makasiar
10. Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
11. Citizens Surety vs. Puno, 119 SCRA
216
12. Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30
13. Hawaiian-Phil. Co. vs. Asociacion,
151 SCRA 306
14. Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Ormoc City,
22 SCRA 603
15. Flores vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484
CHAPTER IV - THE SEARCH

AND SEIZURE PROVISION
Section 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human

Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic
Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007
and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law
shall be automatically suspended one (1)
month before and two (2) months after
the holding of any election)
Sec. 18. Period of detention without
judicial warrant of arrest.- The provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism
Council
has
taken
custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall,
WITHOUT
INCURRING
ANY
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVER
SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON
2008
TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS
counted from the moment said charged or
suspected person has been apprehended
or arrested, detained, and taken into
custody by the said
police, or law
enforcement personnel: Provided, That
the arrest of those suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism
must
result
from
the
surveillance
under
Section
7
and
examination of bank deposits under
Section 27 pf this Act.
The police or law enforcement
personnel
concerned
shall,
before
detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her
before any judge at the latters residence
or office nearest the place where the
arrest took place at any time of the day or
night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they
have arrested and presented before him
or her, to inquire of them the reasons why
they have arrested the person and
determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the subject
has been subjected to any physical, moral
or psychological torture by whom and
why. The judge shall then submit a written
report of what he/she had observed when
the subject was brought before him to the
proper court that has jurisdiction over the
case of the person thus arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit
his report within 3 calendar days from the
time the suspect was brought to his/her
residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody
of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the police or law
enforcement personnel shall notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest the
place of apprehension or arrest; provided,
That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after
office hours, the written notice shall be
served at the residence of the judge
nearest the place where the accused was
arrested. The penalty of 10 years and 1
day to 12 years imprisonment shall be
imposed
upon
the
police
or
law
enforcement personnel who fails to notify
any judge as provided in the preceding
paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in
the event of an actual or imminent
terrorist attack.- In the vent of an actual
20

or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects
may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a
municipal, city, provincial or regional
official of a Human Rights Commission, or
judge of the municipal, regional trial
court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of
the Court of Appeals nearest the place of
arrest. If the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, or after
office hours, the arresting police of law
enforcement personnel shall bring the
person thus arrested to the residence of
any of the officials mentioned above that
is nearest the place where the accused
was arrested. The approval in writing of
any of the said officials shall be secured
by the police or law enforcement
personnel concerned within five days after
the date of the detention of the persons
concerned; Provided, however, That within
three days after the detention the
suspects whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be
released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons
who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if
they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detain
ed under house arrest;
Restric
ted from traveling; and/or
Prohibi
ted from using any cellular phones,
computers,
or
other
means
of
communications with people outside their
residence.
Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.The deposits and their outstanding
balances, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records in any bank or
financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation
and
communication
equipment,
supplies
and
other
implements, and property of whatever
kind and nature belonging:
To any person charged with

or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism;
to a judicially declared and

outlawed terrorist organization or group of
persons;
to a member of such
judicially
declared
and
outlawed
organization, association or group of
persons,
-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen
in order to prevent their use, transfer or
2008
conveyance for purposes that are inimical

to the safety and security of the people or
injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or suspect may withdraw
such sums as are reasonably needed by
his family including the services of his
counsel and his familys medical needs
upon approval of the court. He or she may
also use any of his property that is under
seizure or sequestration or frozen because
of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon
permission of the court for any legitimate
reason.
Section 40. The seized, sequestered and
frozen bank depositsshall be deemed
property held in trust by the bank or
financial institution and that their use or
disposition while the case is pending shall
be subject to the approval of the court
before which the case or cases are
pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as
terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or
his case dismissed before his arraignment
by a competent court, the seizureshall
be lifted by the investigating body or the
competent court and restored to him
without delay. The filing of an appeal or
motion for reconsideration shall not stay
the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.
If
convicted,
said
seized,
sequestered and frozen assets shall
automatically forfeited in favor of the
government.
Requisites of a valid search warrant
Read:
a. Essentials of a valid search
warrant,145 SCRA
739
b. Validity of a search warrant and the
admissibility
of
evidence obtained in
violation thereof.
c. The place to be searched as
indicated in the warrant is controlling
PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA
400
Narvasa, CJ
In applying for a search warrant, the
police officers had in their mind the first
four (4) separate apartment units at the
rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in
21

Quezon City to be the subject of their
search. The same was not, however, what
the Judge who issued the warrant had in
mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS
ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH
WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained
from the place searched which is different
from that indicated in the search warrant
is inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose and in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair
to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually
searched---although not that specified in
the search warrant---is exactly what they
had in view when they applied for the
warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL
IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A
SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE
WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE
APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS,
OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS
THEY
SUBMITTED
TO
THE
COURT
ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was
not just a case of obvious typographical
error, but a clear case of a search of a
place different from that clearly and
without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search
warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action base don the results of the
search is afterwards commenced in
another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT
A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or
to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE
FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT--SUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING
COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING IS PENDING.
d. Validity of a warrantless search and
seizure as a result of an informers tip.
Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of
the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the
Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an
informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving
from Baguio City the following day with a
large volume of marijuana. As a result of
the tip, the policemen waited for a Victory
Bus from Baguio City near the PNB
Olongapo, near Rizal Ave. When the
accused got off, she was pointed to by the
informer. She was carrying a traveling bag
at that time. She was not acting
2008
suspiciously. She was arrested without a

warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of
marijuana. After trial, she was convicted
and
imposed
a
penalty
of
life
imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly
taken from the accused is admissible in
evidence.
Held:
Warrantless search is allowed in
the following instances:
1.
customs searches;
2.
searches of moving vehicle;
3.
seizure of evidence in plain
view;
4.
consented searches;
5.
search incidental to a lawful
arrest; and
6.
stop and frisk measures.
The above exceptions to the requirement
of a search warrant, however, should not
become unbridled
licenses for
law
enforcement officers to trample upon the
conditionally
guaranteed
and
more
fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The
essential requisite of probable cause must
still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. In order that the information
received by the police officers may be
sufficient to be the basis of probable
cause, it must be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief a crime has
been committed or is about to be
committed.
The marijuana obtained as a result of a
warrantless search is inadmissible as
evidence for the following reasons:
a.
the policemen had sufficient
time to apply for a search warrant but
they failed to do so;
b.
the accused was not acting
suspiciously;
c.
the accuseds identity was
previously ascertained so applying for a
warrant should have been easy;
d.
the accused in this case was
searched while innocently crossing a
street
Consequently, there was no legal basis for
the police to effect a warrantless search of
the accuseds bag, there being no
22

probable cause and the accuseds not
having been legally arrested. The arrest
was made only after the accused was
pointed to by the informant at a time
when she was not doing anything
suspicious. The arresting officers do not
have personal knowledge that the accused
was committing a crime at that time.
Since
there
was
no
valid
warrantless arrest, it logically follows that
the subsequent search is similarly illegal,
it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
This is so because if a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based
on the evidence produced by the search,
both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE
VS. AMINNUDIN,
and PEOPLE VS.
ENCINADA.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m.,
SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the
Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed by
an INFORMER that a drug courier would
be
arriving
in
Barangay
Salitran,
Dasmarinas, Cavite, from Baguio City,
with
an
undetermined
amount
of
marijuana. The informer likewise informed
them that he could recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June
20, 1994, the appellant was arrested by
the above-named police officers while
alighting from a passenger jeepney near
a waiting shed in Salitran, Dasmarinas,
Cavite, upon being pointed to by the
informer. The policemen recovered 28
kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The arrest
was without warrant.
The trial court convicted the
appellant for transporting marijuana based
on the testimonies of the Above-named
police officers without presenting the
alleged informer.
Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the
warrantless search and seizure is illegal
because the alleged information was
received by the police on June 19, 1994
and therefore, they could have applied for
a search warrant. The said contention is
without merit considering that the
2008
information given by the informer is too

sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is indication
that the informer knows the courier, the
records do not show that he knew his
name. On bare information, the police
could not have secured a warrant from a
judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is
allowed in the following instances:
1.
customs
searches;
2.
searches
of
moving vehicle;
3.
seizure
of
evidence in plain view;
4.
consented
searches;
5.
search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6.
stop and frisk
measures.
Since the accused was arrested for
transporting marijuana, the subsequent
search on his person is justified. An
arresting officer has the right to validly
search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons; and (2) those that
may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to
by the informer as the drug courier, the
policemen requested the accused to open
and show them the contents of his bag
and the cartoon he was carrying and he
voluntarily opened the same and upon
cursory inspection, it was found out that it
contains marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a
person traveling with a bag and cartoon
which should not elicit the slightest
suspicion that he was committing a crime.
In short, there was no probable cause for
this policemen to think that he was
committing a crime.
The said contention was considered
without merit by the Supreme Court
considering the fact that he consented to
the search as well as the fact that the
informer was a reliable one who had
supplied similar information to the police
in the past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the nonpresentation of the informer does not
affect the case for the prosecution
because he is not even the best witness.
23

He is merely a corroborative witness to
the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers
constitute
probable
cause
for
a
warrantless arrest or search IS A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN
GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID
DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS MADE BY
THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144
SCRA 1; PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, 163
SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA,
October 2, 1997; PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE,
220 SCRA).
The case is similar to the case of People
vs. Encimada where the appellant was
searched
without
a
warrant
while
disembarking from a ship on the strength
of a tip from an informer received by the
police the previous afternoon that the
appellant would be transporting prohibited
drugs. The search yielded a plastic
package containing marijuana. On Appeal,
the SC reversed the decision of conviction
and held that Encinada did not manifest
any suspicious behavior that would
necessarily and reasonably invite the
attention of the police.
ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May
27, 2004
Right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; Mission Order does not authorize
an illegal search. Waiver of the right
against an unreasonable search and
seizure.
In search of the allegedly missing
amount of P45,000.00 owned by the
employer, the residence of a relative of
the suspect was forcibly open by the
authorities by kicking the kitchen door to
gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they
confiscated different personal properties
therein which were allegedly part of those
stolen from the employer. They were in
possession of a mission order but later on
claimed that the owner of the house gave
his consent to the warrantless search. Are
the things admissible in evidence? Can
they be sued for damages as a result of
the said warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
The right
against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived expressly or
impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION
CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be
2008
clear and convincing evidence of an actual

intention to relinquish the right. There
must be proof of the following:
a.
that the right exists;
b.
that the person involved
had knowledge, either constructive or
actual, of the existence of said right;
c.
that the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.
Finally, the waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in
order that the said is to be valid.
The search was therefore held
illegal and the members of the searching
party held liable for damages in
accordance with the doctrine laid down in
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments
vs. CA.
e. General or roving warrants
Read:
1.
19,1967
Stonehill
vs.
Diokno,June
Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the
validity of a total of 42 search warrants
issued on different dates against them and
the corporations in which they are officers,
directing the peace officer to search the
persons
above-named
and/or
the
premises of their offices, warehouses and
to seize and take possession of the
following personal property, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers,
correspondence,
receipts,
ledgers, journals, typewriters and other
documents or papers showing all business
transactions
including
disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements"
since they are the subject of the
offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK
LAWS, TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS,
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the
search warrants are void being violative of
the Constitutional provision on search and
seizure on the ground that:
a. The search warrants did not particularly
describe the documents, books and things
to be seized;
24

b. cash money not mentioned in the
warrant were actually seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish
evidence in the deportation cases against
them;
d. the searches and seizures were made in
an illegal manner;
e. the things seized were not delivered to
the court to be disposed of in a manner
provided for by law.
Issue:
Were the searches and seizures
made in the offices and residences of the
petitioners valid?
OTHER WORDS, NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE

HAD
BEEN
ALLEGED
IN
SAID
APPLICATIONS.
THE
AVERMENTS
THEREOF
WITH
RESPECT
TO
THE
OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT.
AS
A
CONSEQUENCE,
IT
WAS
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO
ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO HAVE
FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE, FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES
THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT
PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST
WHOM
IT
IS
SOUGHT
HAS
PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS, OR
COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS,
VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF
OUR CRIMINAL LAWS.
2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
3. Secretary vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA
a. As to the searches made on

their offices, they could not question the
same in their personal capacities because
the corporations have a personality
separate and distinct with its officers. An
objection to an unlawful search and
seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND
CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD
PARTIES.
CONSEQUENTLY,
THE
PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT
TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM
OF THE DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND
THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND
PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS, TO
WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG,
AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE
CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY.
301
b. As to the documents seized in

the residences of the petitioners, the
same may not be used in evidence against
them because the warrants issued were in
the nature of a general warrant for failure
to
comply
with
the
constitutional
requirement that:
f. Define probable
determines probable cause?
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon

probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
2. that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has
been complied with in the contested
warrants.
They
were
issued
upon
applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had
committed a violation of Central bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. IN
2008
4. Castro vs. Pabalan, April 30,l976

5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54
SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa,
falsification, tax evasion and insurance
fraud is a general warrant and therefore
not valid)
6. Collector vs. Villaluz, June
18,1976
7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 SCRA
553
8. Dizon vs. Castro, April 12, 1985
9. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169
10.
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July
14, 1995; PEOPLE VS. CA, 216 SCRA 101.
A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a
search warrant issued for more than one
specific offense like one for estafa,
robbery, theft and qualified theft)
cause. Who
a.
ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307
b.
DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA,
247 SCRA 85
VICENTE LIM,SR. AND MAYOR
SUSANA LIM
VS.HON. N. FELIX (G.R. NO. 9905457)
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:
-------Petitioners are suspects of the
slaying of congressman Moises Espinosa,
Sr. and three of his security escorts and
the wounding of another. They were
initially charged, with three others, with
25

the crime of multiple murder with
frustrated murder. After conducting a
preliminary investigation, a warrant of
arrest was issued on July 31, 1989. Bail
was fixed at P200,000.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal
Alfane, designated to review the case,
issued a Resolution affirming the finding of
a prima facie case against the petitioners
but ruled that a case of Murder for each of
the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot
wound on the survivor be filled instead
against the suspects. Thereafter, four
separate informations to that effect were
filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail
recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion
for change of venue, filed by the
petitioners was granted by the SC. It
ordered that the case may be transferred
from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of
Makati.
Petitioners
then
moved
that
another
hearing
ba
conducted
to
determine if there really exists a prima
facie case against them in the light of
documents showing recantations of some
witnesses in the preliminary investigation.
They likewise filed a motion to order the
transmittal of initial records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate.
These motions were however denied by
the court because the prosecution had
declared the existence of probable cause,
informations were complete in form in
substance , and there was no defect on its
face. Hence it found it just and proper to
rely on the prosecutors certification in
each information.
ISSUE:
---------Whether or not a judge may issue
a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecutions certification
and recommendation that
a probable
cause exists?
Held:
----1. The judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva,
the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon
the fiscal's certification of the existence of
a probable cause and on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest. However, the
2008
certification does not bind the judge to

come out with the warrant of arrest. This
decision interpreted the "search and
seizure"
provision
of
the
1973
Constitution. Under this provision, the
judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing
a warrant of order of arrest. If on the face
of information, the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witness to
aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of a probable cause. This
has been the rule since U.S vs. Ocampo
and Amarga vs. Abbas.
2.
In the case of Soliven vs.
Makasiar, decided under
the
1987
Constitution, the Court noted that the
addition of the word personally after the
word determined and the deletion of the
grant
of
authority
by
the
1973
Constitution to issue warrants to other
respondent officers as to may be
authorized by law does not require the
judge
to
personally
examine
the
complainant and his witness in his
determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. Following established
doctrine and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the
reports and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
3.
The case of People vs.
Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the
following doctrines:
(1) The determination of
probable cause is a function of the judge.
It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor
to ascertain. Only the judge alone makes
this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry
made by the prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It merely assist him to make the
determination of probable cause. The
26

judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutor's present to him. By itself, the
prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes, and all other supporting documents
behind the prosecutor's certification which
are material in assisting the judge to
make his determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should
be distinguished from the preliminary
investigation proper. While the former
seeks to determine probable cause for the
issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter
ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or be released.
4.
4. In the case of Castillo vs.
Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC
no longer have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations: This authority
was removed from them by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985.
5.
In the present case, the
respondent judge relies solely on the
certification of the prosecutor. Considering
that all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he has not personally
determined the existence of probable
cause. The determination was made by
the
provincial
prosecutor.
The
constitutional requirement had not been
satisfied.
The records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal
Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate
when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrant of arrest against the petitioners.
There was no basis for the respondent
judge to make his personal determination
regarding the existence of probable cause
from the issuance of warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could
not have possibly known what has
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing
but a certification. Although the judge
does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses (for the
prosecutor
can
perform
the
same
functions as commissioner for taking of
evidence) there should be a report and
necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these
should be before the judge.
1. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739
1-a. 20th Century Fox vs. CA, 164
SCRA 655
1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA
467
2008
1-c. The Presidential Anti-Dollar

Salting Task Force vs. CA, GR No. 83578,
March 16, 1989
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA
393
The word personally after the
word determined does not necessarily
mean that the judge should examine the
complainant and his witnesses personally
before issuing the search warrant or
warrant of arrest but the exclusive
responsibility on the part of said judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. As such, there is no need
to examine the complainant and his
witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the
judge is convinced of the existence of
probable cause upon reading the affidavits
or deposition of the complainant and his
witnesses.
1-e. Pendon vs. CA, Nov.
16, 1990
1-f. P. vs. Inting, July 25,
1990
1-g. Umil vs. Ramos, et al.,

July 9, 1990 with the Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration in November,
1991
1-h. Paderanga vs. Drilon,
April 19, 1991
2. Department of Health vs. Sy Chi
Siong,
Inc., GR No. 85289,
February 20, 1989
2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA
465
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126
SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to
determine probable
insofar as the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is
concerned)
3. Tolentino vs. Villaluz,July
27,1987
4. Cruz vs. Gatan, 74 SCRA 226
5. Olaes vs. P., 155 SCRA 486
7.
Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA
435
7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE
JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO.
92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of
arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your
Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by NBI Director
27

Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant
of arrest issued by the respondent judge,
HON. JAIME SALAZAR, Regional trial
Court, Branch 103, Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. 90-10941. The warrant
was issued on an information signed and
filed earlier in the day by Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was
taken to and held overnight at the NBI
Headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila,
WITHOUT BAIL, NONE HAVING BEEN
RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION
AND NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF
ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner
through counsel filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus alleging that he was deprived of
his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:
a. held to answer for a criminal
offense which does not exist in the statute
books;
b. charged with a criminal offense
in an information for which no complaint
was
initially
filed
or
preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence, he
was denied due process;
2008
3. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as

applying to make rebellion absorb all other
offenses committed in its course, whether
or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
1. On the first option, 11 justices voted
AGAINST abandoning Hernandez. Two
members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. In view of the majority, THE
RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW, ITS
SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE
WITHSTOOD
ALL
SUBSEQUENT
CHALLENGES AND NO NEW ONES ARE
PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH
TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL.
This is so because of the fact that the
incumbent President (exercising legislative
powers
under
the
1986
Freedom
Constitution) repealed PD No. 942 which
added a new provision of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly Art. 142-A which
sought to nullify if not repealed the
Hernandez Doctrine. In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative fiat
reinstated the Hernandez as a binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court
can do no less than accord it the same
recognition,
absent
any
sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
2. On the second option, the Supreme
Court was unanimous in voting to reject
the same though four justices believe that
the arguments in support thereof is not
entirely devoid of merit.
d. arrested or detained on the

strength of warrant issued without the
judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable
cause.
3. With the rejection of the first two

options, the Hernandez Doctrine remains
a binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.
HELD:
On the issues raised by the petitioner:
The parties' oral and written arguments

presented the following options:
a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that

the information filed against the petitioner
does in fact charge an offense despite the
objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, that indictment is to be
read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The
petitioner's contention that he was
charged with a crime that does not exist
in the statute books, WHILE TECHNICALLY
CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED
THAT
REBELLION
MAY
NOT
BE
COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES
COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF,
MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS A
MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. Read in the
context of Hernandez, the information
c. denied the right to bail; and
1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine

and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice
Montemayor that "rebellion cannot absorb
more serious crimes";
2. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable
only to offenses committed in furtherance,
or
as
necessary
means
for
the
commission, of rebellion, BUT NOT TO
ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A
REBELLION WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE
COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS
GRAVE CHARACTER;
28
2008
does indeed charge the petitioner with a

crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION.
crime of simple rebellion which is bailable

before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE
ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION.
b. Was the petitioner charged without a

complaint having been initially filed and/or
preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows that a complaint for simple
rebellion against petitioner was filed by
the NBI Director and that based on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the
respondent prosecutors culminating in the
filing of the questioned information.
THERE
IS
NOTHING
INHERENTLY
IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN
FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN
INDUCTMENT
FOR
AN
OFFENSE
DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED IN
THE
INITIATORY
COMPLAINT,
IF
WARRANTED
BY
THE
EVIDENCE
DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.
NOTES:
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant

issued is void because it was issued barely
one hour and twenty minutes after the
case was raffled to the respondent judge
which could hardly gave him sufficient
time to personally go over the voluminous
records of the preliminary investigation.
Also, the petitioner claims that the
respondent judge issued the warrant for
his
arrest
without
first
personally
determining the existence of
probable
cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his
witnesses, in violation of Art. III, Section
2, of the Constitution. This Court has
already ruled that it is not unavoidable
duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he
follows
established
procedure
by
PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT
AND THE SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT
SUBMITTED
BY
THE
PROSECUTOR.
MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT
JUDGE
HAD
WHAT
SOME
MIGHT
CONSIDER ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF
PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH
THAT DUTY , GIVES NO REASON TO
ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD
NOT HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES
THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE
TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION
THAT
OFFICIAL
DUTY
HAS
BEEN
REGULARLY PERFORMED.
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied
of his constitutional right to bail. In the
light of the Court's affirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him
should be considered as charging only the
This might be useful also in your

Remedial Law.
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Supreme Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the
criminal case before the respondent judge
is the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The
correct course was for the petitioner to
invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition
to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se or by reason of the weakness
of the evidence against him. ONLY AFTER
THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL
COURT
SHOULD
THE
REVIEW
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
BE INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT
WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT
OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS
ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioner's
premise that the information charges a
non-existent crime would not excuse or
justify his improper choice of remedies.
Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to
quash brought in the criminal action
before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizures-when valid
or not. Is "Operation Kapkap"
valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No.
87059, June, 1992, 210 SCRA 174
Warrantless search and
seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts|
-----1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police
District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspiciouslooking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
29

2. When the surveilance team arrived
therein, they saw the accused "looking
from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen". They approched these persons
and identified themselves as policement
that is why they tried to ran away because
of the other lawmen, they were unable to
escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and
Wessor revolver was confiscated from the
accused and several days later, an
information for violation of PD 1866 was
filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of
having violated PD 1866 and was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua
based on the alleged gun as the principal
evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
-----Was there a
search and seizure?
valid
warrantless
Held:
----There is no question that evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search or
seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose. That is the absolute
prohibition of Article III, Section 3 [2], of
the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification
given by Justice Learned Hand that "only
in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit
by their wrong will the
wrong be repressed."
Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful.- A peace officer or private
person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just
been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a
2008
penal establishment or place where he is

serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x
We have carefully examined the
wording of this Rule and cannot see how
we we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously
inapplicable as Mengote was not an
escapee from a penal institution when he
was arrested. We therefore confine
ourselves to determining the lawfulness
of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par.
(b) of this Section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be
arrested (1) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (2)
in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been
established in the case at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was merely "looking from side to
side"
and "holding his abdomen,"
according
to
the
arresting
officers
themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or
was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by
Mengote in thie
presence.
The Solicitor General submits that
the actual existence of an offense was
not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
created a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the arresting officers and induced
in them the belief that an offense had
been committed and that accusedappellant had committed it". The question
is, What offense? What offense
could
possibly have been suggested by a person
"looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen" and in aplace not exactly
forsaken.
These are certainly not sinister
acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. It might have been
different
if
Mengote
had
been
apprehended at an unholy hour and in a
place where he had no reason to be, like
a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the
morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in
the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger
jeep
with his companion.He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the
clear light of day. There was nothing
30

clandestine about his being on that street
at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could
have been a number of reasons, all of
them innoent, why hiseyes were darting
from side to sideand he was holding his
abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the
minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless
not been shown what their suspicion was
all about.
xxx
The case before us is different
because there was nothing to support the
arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on
his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred
from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs.
AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the
Court held that a warrantless arrest of
the accused was unconstitutional. This
was effected while he was coming down
the vessel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other disembarking
passengers. He had not committed nor
was actually committing or attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting
suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable
because
its
no
less
stringent
requirements have also not been satisfied.
Theprosecution has not shown that at the
time of Mengote's arrest an offense had
in fact been committed and that the
arresting officers had personal knowldge
of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to
bem
committed.
xxx
In the landmark case of People
vs. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1, this
Court
declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113,
the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to
2008
commit
an
offense
must
have
personalknowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (SAYO vs.
CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
xxx
In arrests without a warrant under
Section 6(b), however, it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed
is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih
vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed,
or just
committed, what was that crime? There is
no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it
may be
observed that under the Revised Rule
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge of
the ground therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People vs. Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if
any person could be summarily arrested
and searched just because he is holding
his abdomen,
even if it be possibly
because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace
officer could clamp handcuffs on any
person with a shifty look on suspicion that
he may have committed a criminal act is
actually committing or
attempting it.
This simply cannot be done in a free
society. This is not a police state where
order
is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part ofthe
arresting officer may be justified in the
name of security.
xxx
The court feels that if the peace
officers had been more mindful of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant
might have succeeded. As it happened,
they allowed their over zealousness to
get the better of them, resulting in their
disregard
of the requirements of a valid
31
2008
search and seizure

that rendered
inadmissible the evidence they had
invalidly seized.
since the constitutional provision is not

applicable to him; when it is not valid)
This should be a lesson to other

peace officers. Their impulsiveness may
be the very cause
of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of
the law,
because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those
who are
supposed to enforce it.
VS.
When illegal arrest is deemed waived.
Read:
1.
PEOPLE
MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66
Warrantless searches and seizures by

private individuals
2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.
VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL., 482 SCRA
660
Carpio-Morales, J.
Warrantless arrest; no personal

knowledge of the arresting officer
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman
arrested the
accused-appellant on the basis solely
of what Reynaldo Castro had told him
and not because he saw the accusedappellant commit the crime charged
against him. Indeed, the prosecution
admitted that there was no warrant
of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken
into custody. Considering that the
accused-appellant
was
not
committing a crime at the time he
was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge
of facts indicating that accusedappellant committed a crime, his
arrest without a warrant cannot be
justified.
However, by entering a plea of not
guilty during the arraignment, the
accused-appellant waived his right to raise
the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS
NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A
WARRANT
OF
ARREST
OR
THE
PROCEDURE
BY
WHICH
A
COURT
ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE
BEFORE
HE
ENTERS
HIS
PLEA,
OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED
WAIVED. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST
WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND
DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO
CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE
FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED.
g-1. Warrantless Search and
seizure by a private person. (Valid
The petitioner suspects that the

respondents who are officers of the Silahis
International Hotel Union were using the
Union Office located inside the hotel in the
sale
or
use
of
marijuana,
dollar
smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived
at
the
said
conclusion
through
surveillance.
In the morning of January 11,
1988, while the respondent union officer
was opening the Union Office, security
officers of the plaintiff entered the union
office despite objections thereto by
forcibly opening the same. Once inside
the union office they started to make
searches which resulted in the confiscation
of
a plastic bag of marijuana. An
information for violation of the dangerous
drugs act was filed against the respondent
before the RTC of Manila which acquitted
them on the ground that the search
conducted was illegal since it was
warrantless and without consent by the
respondents.
After
their
acquittal,
the
respondents filed a case for Malicious
Prosecution against the petitioner for
violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court held that
petitioners are liable for damages as a
result of an illegal search. The same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search
conducted by the petitioners (private
individual and corporation) on the union
office of the private respondents is valid.
Held:
The search is not valid and they
are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil
Code. The fact that the union office is part
of the hotel owned by the petitioners does
32

not justify the warrantless search. The
alleged reports that the said union office is
being used by the union officers for illegal
activities does not justify their acts of
barging into the said office without the
consent of the union officers and without a
search warrant. If indeed there was
surveillance made, then they should have
applied for a search warrant.
The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti
is not applicable here because in Marti, a
criminal case, the issue was whether an
act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of ones constitutional rights may
be invoked against the State. In other
words, the issue in Marti is whether the
evidence obtained by a private person
acting in his private capacity without the
participation of the State, is admissible.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
ANDRE MARTI
G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991
Warrantless Search and seizure
by a private person
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send
four (4) packages to Zurich, Switzerland.
Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no
relation to Shirley), received said goods
and asked if she could examine and
inspect it. Marti refused. However later,
following standard operating procedure,
Job Reyes, co-owner and husband of Anita
opened the boxes for final inspection,
before delivering it to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor
emanated from the box that was
supposed to contain gloves. Upon further
perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves
inside the box. Job Reyes then brought
samples to the NBI, he told them that the
boxes to be shipped were still in his office.
In the presence of the NBI agents, Reyes
opened the box and discovered that the
odor came from the fact that the dried
leaves were actually those of the
marijuana flowering tops.
Two
other
boxes,marked
as
containing books and tabacalera cigars;
also revealed bricks or case-like marijuana
leaves and dried marijuana leaves
respectively.
2008
Marti was later invited by the NBI

to shed light on the attempted shipment
of the dried leaves. Thereafter an
information was filed against the appellant
for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of
Manila convicted accused Marti of violating
sec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
-----------1. Did the search conducted by a
private person, violate accused's right
against unreasonable searches seizures
and invocable against the state?
2.
Was the evidence procured
from the search admissible?
Held:
-------1. No, constitutional protection on search
and seizure is imposable only against the
state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987
constitution is almost verbatim from the
United States constitution, the SC may
consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise
doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US
cases, the constitutional provision against
unreasomable searches and seizure was
intended as a restraint upon the activities
of the sovereign authority and NOT
intended against private persons. If a
search was initiated by a private person
the provision does not apply since it only
proscribes government action. This view is
supported by the deliberations by the
1986 Constitutional Commission.
In short, the protection against
unreasonable
searches and
seizures
cannot be extended to acts comitted by
private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was
Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the
search. He opened the packages and took
the samples to NBI. All the NBI agents did
was to observe and look in plain sight.
This did not convert it to a search as
contemplated by the constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the
evidence from therein is admissible
evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of
evidence in violation of the right against
33

unreasonable searches and seizures,
likewise applies only to the government
and its agencies and not to private
persons.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau
McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state
Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker
state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes
us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick
state (329 sw 2d 135).
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND

SEIZURE:
1.
Search made incidental to a
valid arrest
a.
Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12
Phil. 439
b.
PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN
KIT, 251 SCRA 660
c.
PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256
SCRA 539
d.
PEOPLE VS. Figueroa,
248 SCRA 679
e.
NOLASCO VS. PANO,
139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a
valid arrest must be done at the place
where the accused is arrested. As such, if
accused was arrested while inside a
jeepney, there is no valid search incidental
to a valid arrest if she will be brought to
her residence and thereafter search the
said place)
f.
ESPANO VS. CA, 288
SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in
the street during a buy-bust operation,
the search of his house nearby is not a
valid search incidental to a valid arrest)
PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338
Where the gun tucked in a persons
waist is plainly visible to the police, no
search warrant is necessary and in the
absence of any license for said firearm, he
may be arrested at once as he is in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. No warrant is necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of the accuseds
valid warrantless
arrest inside
the
nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126.
This is a valid search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
2008
In fact, the subsequent discovery

in his car which was parked in a distant
place from where the illegal possession of
firearm
was
committed
[after
he
requested that he will bring his car to the
Police Station after his warrantless
arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and
shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN
MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As
such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed
firearms, drug paraphernalia and the
shabu, can be used as evidence against
the accused.
2.
Search of moving vehicles
a.
Carrol vs. US, 267 US
132
b.
PEOPLE VS. LO HO
WING, et al.
(G. R. No. 88017) January 21, 1991
c.
MUSTANG LUMBER VS.
CA, 257 SCRA 430
d.
PEOPLE VS. CFI, 101
SCRA 86
e.
PEOPLE
VS.
MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401
f.
PEOPLE VS. LO HO
WING, 193 SCRA 122
FACTS:
----------In
July
1987,
the
Special
Operations Group of the CIS received a tip
from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in importation of
illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband
items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate,
they recruited confidential men and "deep
penetration
agents"
under
OPLAN
SHARON 887. One such agent was
Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As
an agent, he submitted regular reports of
undercover
activities
of
suspected
syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of
oplan sharon 887, in turned informed the
Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
Tia was introduced to his coaccused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent
named George. Lim wanted a male
travelling companion for his business trips
abroad. Tia offered his services and was
hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to
Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho
Wing), the later turning out to be Tia's
intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left
for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia
34

telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would
return to the Philippines on October 6.
From Hongkong, the two proceeded to
Guangzhou in mainland China. There,
appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans
of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they
were opened for examination. That
evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing's room
and he saw two other men with him. One
was fixing the tea bags, while the other
was burning a substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo
Ho Wing joined the second man and
sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning
substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing
what cargo they would bring to Manila,
the latter replied that they would be
bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila,
customs examiners inspected the bags
containing the tin cans of tea. Since the
bags were not closely examined, appellant
Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In
Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng
Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia
boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded
their luggage in the taxi's compartment.
Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another
taxi.
2008
and to pay a fine of P25,000 each.

Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state
witness. The trial court gave full credence
to the testimonies of government agents
since the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties were in their
favor.
ISSUES:
---------1.
valid?
Was the warrantless search
2. Are the effects taken admissible

as evidence?
HELD:
----1. This is a case of search on a
moving vehicle which is one of the wellknown exceptions to the valid warrantless
search and seizure. To stilol get a search
warrant from a judge would allow the
accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are
valid, the evidence obtained is admissible
as evidence in any proceeding.
Meamwhile, a team composed by

Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in
strategic areas around the airport. The
CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia
followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the
CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho
Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to
stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the
taxi driver to open the baggage
compartment. The CIS team asked
permission to search their luggage.
3.
Seizure of goods concealed to
avoid duties/taxes (Valid)
A tin can of tea was taken out of

the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the
CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in
the middle to pull out the contents.
Crystalline
white
powder
resmbling
crushed alum came out. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous
drug, he had the three travelling bags
opened for inspection. All the bags
threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia
and appellant were taken to the CIS
headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile,
the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat
sped in attempt to escape. However, they
were later captured.
4.
Samples from the bag tested

positive for metamphetamine. The three
suspects were indicted for violating Art.
III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat
were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment
a.
857
b.
SCRA 16
c.
SCRA 517
d.
SCRA 721
Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA

Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56
HIZON
VS.
CA,
265
PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265

Seize of evidence in plain view
a.
Harris vs. US, 390 US 234
b.
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA
547
c.
PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA
135
d.
PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252
SCRA 213
5.
When there is waiver of right or
gives his consent;
a.
De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil.
689
b.
Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65
SCRA 336
c.
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212
SCRA (In order that there is a valid
waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver
or consent should be given by the person
affected, not just anybody. Example: The
35

landlady could not give a valid consent to
the search of a room occupied by a
tenant. Said tenant himself should give
the consent in order to be valid. The
doctrine in Lopez vs. Commissioner to the
effect that it could be given by any
occupant of a hotel room being rented by
the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210
SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house
allowed the policemen to enter his house
because they are searching for rebel
soldiers but when inside the house, they
instead seized an unlicensed firearm,
there is no consent to a warrantless
search)
6.
STOP AND FRISK.
a.
People
vs.
Mengote,
June, 1992
b.
PEOPLE VS. POSADAS,
188 SCRA 288
c.
MANALILI VS. PEOPLE,
October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn
who ran when they went near them. As
the policemen ran after them, an
unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The
search is valid)
d.
MALACAT VS. CA, 283
SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient
to validate warrantless arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR
NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
"zonings" and "saturation drives"
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
2008
cards; that the raiders rudely rouse

residents from their sleep by banging
on the walls and windows of their
homes, shouting, kicking their doors
open (destroying some) and ordering
the residents to come out; the
residents are herded like cows at the
point of high powered guns, ordered
to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks; that while
examination of the bodies of the men
are being conducted, the other
military men conduct search and
seizures to each and every house
without civilian witnesses from the
neighbors; some victims complained
that their money and other valuables
were lost as a result of these illegal
operations.
The respondents claim that they have
legal authority to conduct saturation
drives under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
The respondents would want to justify
said military operation on the following
constitutional provisions:
The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion x x
x
xxxx
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
The President shall have control of all the

executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Facts:
Held:
This is a petition for Prohibition

with preliminary injunction to prohibit
military and police officers from
conducting "Areal target zonings" or
"saturation drive" in Metro Manila
particularly in places where they
suspect that the subversives are
hiding. The 41 petitioners claim that
the saturation drives conducted by
the military is in violation of their
human rights because with no specific
target house in mind, in the dead of
the night or early morning hours,
police and military officers without
any search warrant cordon an area of
more
than
one
residence
and
sometimes the whole barangay. Most
of them are in civilian clothes and
w/o nameplates or identification
There can be no question that under

ordinary circumstances, the police action
of the nature described by the petitioners
would be illegal and blatantly violative of
the Bill of Rights. If the military wants to
flush
out
subversive
and
criminal
elements, the same must be consistent
with the constitutional and statutory rights
of the people. However, nowhere in the
Constitution can we see a provision which
prohibits the Chief Executive from
ordering the military to stop unabated
criminality,
rising
lawlessness
and
alarming communist activities. However,
all police actions are governed by the
limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
government cannot adopt the same
reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left.
This is so because Art. III, Section 3 of
36

the Constitution is very clear as explained
in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and
Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals, 164
SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out
that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend
one's sense of justice (Rochin vs.
California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable
that some violations were actually
committed. But the remedy is not to stop
all police actions, including the essential
and legitimate ones. A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as
the
rights of people are protected and not
violated. However, the remedy of the
petitioners is not an original action for
prohibition since not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged.
It
is
basically
for
the
executive
department and the trial courts. The
problem is appropriate for the Commission
of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded
to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon and Pasay City where the
petitioners
may
present
evidence
supporting their allegations so that the
erring parties may be pinpointed and
prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts
violative of human rights alleged by the
petitioners as committed during the police
actions are ENJOINED until such time as
permanent rules to govern such actions
are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla
Dissenting
and
Sarmiento,
2008
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is

very clear: Unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for
whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE
ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH
OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A
WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER THE
CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS
STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X
X X I submit that this court should instead
categorically and emphatically that these
saturation drives are violative of human
rights and individual liberty and should be
stopped immediately. While they may be
allowed in the actual theater of military
operations against the insurgents, the
Court should also make it clear that Metro
Manila is not such a battleground.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO
DURAL
and
RENATO
VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA
UMIL
and
NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS.
FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL. and companion
cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An
NPA may be arrested without warrant
while sleeping or being treated in a
hospital because his being a communist
rebel is a continuing crime)
h. If the judge finds that there's probable
cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest
as a matter of course? See the
distinctions.
Read:
JJ.
The ruling of the majority that the

petitioners are not proper parties is a
specious pretext for inaction. We have
held that technical objections may be
brushed
aside
where
there
are
constitutional questions that must be met
(RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603;
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702;
PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479;
EDU VS. ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481;
GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835;
LAGUNZAD VS. CA, 154 SCRA 199;
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148 SCRA 208).
Lozada was in fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person
is a proper party even if he may not be
directly injured. Each of us has a duty to
protect liberty and that alone makes him a
proper party. It is not only the owner of a
burning house who has the right to call
the firemen.
1.
SAMULDE VS. SALVANI,
SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 (No because a
warrant is issued in order to have
jurisdiction of the court over the person of
an accused and to assure the court of his
presence whenever his case is called in
court. As such, if the court believes that
the presence of the accused could be had
even without a warrant of arrest, then he
may not issue said warrant. Note: This
case involves a minor offense)
2.
GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300
SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a
serious one like that obtaining in this case
for murder, the
Judge must issue a
warrant of arrest after determining the
existence of probable cause)
i. Searching questions
Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT,
37

RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines,
GR No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (En
Banc)
Search
and
seizure;
requirements/requisites of a valid search
warrant; searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside
the Order of respondent Judge DENYING
the motion of the petitioner to quash
Search Warrant No. 87-14 as well as its
Order denying the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence
Special Action Division (ISAD) of the
Western Police District (WPD) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33, presided by the respondent Judge, an
application for the issuance of a Search
Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against
the petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant,
P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that:
"1. That he has been informed and has
good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at
the
Polytechnic
University
of
the
Philippines x x x has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives, hand
grenades and ammunition intended to be
used as the means of committing an
offense x x x;
"2. That the undersigned has verified the
report and found it to be a fact x x x ".
In support of said application, P/Lt.
Florencio Angeles executed a "Deposition
of Witness dated October 31, 1987 .
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and
All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led
by Col. Edgar Dula Torre and Major
Maganto;
4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando,
a member of the searching team executed
an affidavit alleging that he found in the
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room
of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown
envelope with three live fragmentation
hand grenades separately with old
newspapers;
2008
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner

moved to quash the search warrant on the
grounds that:
a. the complainant's lone witness, Lt.
Angeles had no personal knowledge of the
facts which formed the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant;
b. the examination of said witness was not
in the form of searching questions and
answers;
c. the search warrant was a general
warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be
searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in
that the complainant failed to allege that
the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent
judge denied the motion to quash and on
April 20, 1988, the same judge denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the
respondent judge valid? Was there
probable cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue,
there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The probable cause
must be in connection with one specific
offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
The "probable cause" for a valid search
warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the
38

place sought to be searched". (Quintero
vs. NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable
cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO,
64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL.
33; US VS. ADDISON, 28 PHIL. 566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw
declared that "he has been informed" that
Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosivees
described therein, and that he "has
verified the report and found it to be a
fact." On the other hand, Lt. Angeles
declared that as a result of continuous
surveillance for several days, they
"gathered informations from verified
sources" that the holders of said firearms
and explosives are not licensed t possess
them. It is clear from the foregoing that
the applicant and his witness HAD NO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES which became the
basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof
only through information from other
sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major
Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that "he
verified the information he had earlier
received and found it to be a fact, YET
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO
SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN
SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER
INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO
JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might have
clarified this point if there had been
searching questions and answers, but
there were none. In fact, the records yield
no questions and answers, whether
searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant.
In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it
was held that the following test must be
complied with in an application for search
warrant or in a supporting deposition
based on personal knowledge or not"The true test of sufficiency of a
deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it was
drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant of a search warrant and/or his
witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers
to be reliable."
2008
Tested by the above standards, the

allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do
not come up to the level of facts based on
his personal knowledge so much so that
he cannot be held liable for perjury for
such allegations in causing the issuance of
the questioned search warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take
the deposition of the applicant as required
by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan vs.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694, "mere affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus insufficient. The examining judge has
to take the depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and attach them to the record."
b. There was also no searching questions
asked by the respondent judge because as
shown by the record, his questions were
too brief and short and did not examine
the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers.
On the contrary, the questions asked were
leading as they called for a simple "yes" or
"no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI,
June 23, 1988, "the questions propounded
are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable
cause.
Asking
of
leading
questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant and
conducting of examination in a general
manner
would
not
satisfy
the
requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant."
The Court avails of this decision to
reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of probable cause in the
valid issuance of a search warrant as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, this
requirements are stringent but the
purpose
is
to
assure
that
the
constitutional right of the individual
against unreasonable search and seizure
shall
remain
both
meaningful
and
effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place
to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place
intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180).
In the case at bar, the warrant described
the place to be searched as the premises
of the PUP, more particularly the offices of
the Department of Science and Tactics as
well as the Office of the President,
Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the "one
specific offense" requirement considering
that the application for a search warrant
39

explicitly described the offense: illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions
under PD 1866.
validity of checkpoints
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME

COURT merely provides for a guideline,
departure
from
which
would
not
necessarily affect the validity of the search
warrant
provided
the
constitutional
requirements are complied with.
Facts:
a.
HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON,
247 SCRA 650
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33
(When the applicant is basing his
knowledge from an informant, the same is
not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313
3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA
210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA
423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388
(Depositions of the applicants and
witnesses should be attached to the
record of the case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133
SCRA 800
10. P. vs. Burgos, September
14,1986
11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July
6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July
31,1987 (When the statements in the
affidavits
of
witnesses
are
mere
generalities, mere conclusions of law, and
not positive statements of particular acts,
the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2.
Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA
599
3.
PENDON VS. CA, November 16,
1990. (When the questions asked to the
applicant for a search warrant was pretyped, the same is not valid since there
could have been no searching questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizures-when valid
or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN
RENATO DE VILLA,
GR No.
83988, September 29, 1989
Warrantless searches and seizures;
2008
Padilla, J.
1. On January 20, 1987, the National

Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
was activated with the mission of
conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility for the purpose of
maintaining peace and order. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela,
MM are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military
authorities
manning
the
checkpoints considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to
regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order.
2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the
apprehensions
of
the
residents
of
Valenzuela increased because Benjamin
Parpon, the supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned
down in cold blood by the military men
manning the checkpoints for ignoring or
refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspite of several warning shots fired in
the air.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of said
checkpoints as well as the periodic
searches and seizures made by the
military authorities without search warrant
valid?
Held:
Petitioners' concern for their safety
and apprehension at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts
of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
40

which is parked on a public fair grounds
(People vs. Case, 190 MW 289), or simply
looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97
SE 62), or flashes a light therein (Rowland
vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do
not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of checkpoints in
Valenzuela,
Metro
Manila
may
be
considered as security measure to
effectively maintain peace and order and
to thwart plots to destabilize the
government. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected
in the increased killings in cities of police
and military men by NPA's "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE
AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN
INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT
AGAINST
A
WARRANTLESS
SEARCH
WHICH
IS
HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED,
THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.
True, the manning of these
checkpoints by the military is susceptible
of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE
COST OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE,
DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO
THE CITIZEN, THE CHECKPOINTS DURING
THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF
THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY
SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on
July 17, 1988, the military checkpoints in
Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a
review and refinement of the rules in the
conduct of the police and military manning
the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC
Chief.
Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:
The bland declaration by the majority
that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the
fact that the Bill of Rights was intended
precisely to limit the authority of the State
even if asserted on the ground of national
security.
RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION
RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15, 1990
Very Important:
FOR
2008
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of

the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15
June, 1990, held that military and police
checkpoints are not illegal as these
measures to protect the government and
safeguards the lives of the people. The
checkpoints are legal as where the
survival of the organized government is on
the balance, or where the lives and safety
of the people are in grave peril. However,
the Supreme Court held further that the
military officers manning the checkpoints
may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT
BODILY SEARCH.
Read also the RESOLUTION
ON THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990,
185 SCRA 665
Read also:
1-a. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro,
June 23,1987
1-b. P s. Cendana, October
17, 1990
1-c. P. vs. Castiller, August
6, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Olaes, July 30,
1990
2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
4. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA
336
7. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135
8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509
& 139 SCRA
152
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646
(There is a valid warrantless search if a
NARCOM officer arrests the person who
owns a bag which contains marijuana
which he found out when he smelled the
same. Here , there is a probable cause
since he was personal knowledge due to
his expertise on drugs)
11.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July
10, 1994. (After the informant was given
by the police the amount of P100.00, he
went to buy marijuana from the accused
then return to the police headquarters
with said article. Thereafter, the policemen
went to arrest the accused without
warrant. The arrest is not valid since it
does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search
warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu
and its paraphernalia and instead, an
unlicensed firearm was seized instead,
said gun is inadmissible in evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a
warrant of arrest? (NO)
41

Read:
1.
Harvey
vs.
Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, June 26,1988
2.
Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA
562
3.
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66
SCRA 299
4.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS.
HON TOMAS ACHACOSO, G.R. NO. 81510,
March 14, 1990 (En banc)
5.
Presidential
Anti_Dollar
Salting Task Force vs.
CA, March 16,
1989
l. Properties subject to seizure
Read:
1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules

on Crimial Procedure, as amended
2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA
558
m. Warrantless searches and arrests
Read:
1. P. vs. Bati, August 27, 1990
1-a. Manuel et al., vs. Judge Tirso
Velasco, GR No. 84666, February 9, 1989
1-b. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,121
SCRA 47 &
137 SCRA 647
1-c. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20,
1990 (Compare with P. vs. Aminnudin,
July 6, 1988, supra)
1-d. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990
1-e. P. vs. De la Cruz
1-f. P. vs. ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990
1-g. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11,
1992
1-h. People vs. Mati, January 18,
1991
2. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121
SCRA 538
2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
2-b. People vs. de la Cruz, 184
SCRA 416
2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31,
1991
2-d. People vs. Sucro, March 18,
1991
2-e. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO, 262
SCRA 255
2-f. PEOPLE VS. CUISON, 256
SCRA 325
2-g. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212
SCRA 547
2-h. OPOSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA
188
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA
532 (Buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on
Criminal
Procedure, as amended
2008
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea

during the arraignment, if the arrest was
illegal. (The alleged illegality of the arrest
is deemed waived upon posting of the
bond by the accused)
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246

Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested
the accused-appellant on the basis
solely of what Reynaldo Castro had
told him and not because he saw the
accused-appellant commit the crime
charged against him. Indeed, the
prosecution admitted that there was
no warrant of arrest issued against
accused-appellant when the latter
was taken into custody. Considering
that the accused-appellant was not
committing a crime at the time he
was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge
of facts indicating that accusedappellant committed a crime, his
arrest without a warrant cannot be
justified.
However, by entering a plea of not
guilty during the arraignment, the
accused-appellant waived his right to raise
the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS
NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A
WARRANT
OF
ARREST
OR
THE
PROCEDURE
BY
WHICH
A
COURT
ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE
BEFORE
HE
ENTERS
HIS
PLEA,
OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED
WAIVED. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST
WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND
DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO
CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE
FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED.
Read:
1.
Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA
377
2.
PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260
SCRA 256
3.
FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
263 SCRA 222
4.
PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260
SCRA 256
5.
PEOPLE VS. LAPURA, 255 SCRA
85
6.
PEOPLE VS. SILAN, 254 SCRA
491
42

o . Penalty for illegal arrest
Read:
1989
Palon vs. NAPOLCOM, May 28,
p. Judicial pronouncements on illegally

seized
evidence, 106 SCRA 336
particularity, especially since the witness

had furnished the judge photocopies of
the documents sought to be seized. THE
SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE,
AND
THOSE
ITEMS
NOT
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE
CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE
WHOLE WARRANT.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA
25
q. The exclusionary rule,155 SCRA 494

n. What is the status of
document obtained through subpoena?
2008
Read:
Dianalan vs. Pros., Office of the
Tanodbayan, Nov. 27, 1990
r. Search warrant for pirated video tapes
1.
Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA
655 (The master copy of the allegedly
pirated tape should be presented before
the judge in order to convince him of the
existence of probable cause)
2.
COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA,
261 SCRA 144
LATEST
CASES ON
SEARCH
AND
SEIZURES
UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
The following are the requisites of
a valid search warrant:
1.
The warrant must be issued
upon probable cause;
2.
The probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not
by applicant or any other person;
3.
In determining probable cause,
the judge must examine under oath and
affirmation the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4.
The
warrant
issued
must
particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be
seized.
A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Search warrants are not
issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of
fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In
this case, most of the items listed in the
warrants fail to meet the test of
The protection against

unreasonable search and seizure
covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of highhandedness
of law enforces.
The plain view doctrine,
which may justify a search without
warrant, APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE
POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR
EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED, BUT
INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN
INCRIMINATING OBJECT.
Just
because
the
marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot does nor prevent the
appellant
from
invoking
the
protection
afforded
by
the
Constitution.
The
right
against
unreasonable search and seizure is
the immunity of ones person, which
includes his residence, papers and
other possessions. For a person to be
immune
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, he need not be
in his home or office, within a fenced
yard or private place.
PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663
In case of consented
searches
or
waiver
of
the
constitutional
guarantee
against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental
that to constitute waiver, IT MUST APPEAR
THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS; THE PERSONS
INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE, EITHER
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of the
existence of such right. The third
condition did not exist in the instant
case.
Neither
was
the
search
incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July 6,
2000) An alleged consent to a
warrantless
search
and
seizure
cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. THE
PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF, CANNOT
PREVAIL
AGAINST
THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
43

RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, AND
ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS
CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF
ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE
CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.
CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 3. The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Read:
Read:
Please observe the procedure in obtaining
the The Warrant [or Order] of
Surveillance, not found in the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
SURVEILLANCE
OF
SUSPECTS
AND
INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTS OR
CHARGED OF TERRORISM
Section
7.
Surveillance
of
suspects and interception and recording of
communications. The provisions of RA
4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of
his team may, upon a written order of the
Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and
record, with the use of any mode, form or
kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any
other suitable ways or means for that
purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words between members of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
2008
Provided,
That
surveillance,
interception
and
recording
of
communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists
and their sources and confidential
business correspondence shall not be
authorized.
Section 8. Formal Application for
Judicial Authorization.- The written order
of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals to track down, tap, listen,
intercept, and record communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words of any person
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism,
shall only be granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals UPON AN
EX-PARTE written application of a police or
law enforcement official who has been
duly authorized in writing by the AntiTerrorism Council created in Section 53 of
this Act to file such ex-parte application,
and upon examination under oath and
affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses who may produce to establish:
That there is probable cause to

believe based on personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that the said
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism has been committed, or is being
committed, or is about to be committed;
That there is probable cause to

believe based on personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that evidence
which is essential to the conviction of any
charged or suspected person for, or to the
solution or prevention of any such crimes,
will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective

means readily available for acquiring such
evidence.
Sec. 9. Classification and Contents
of the Order of the Court. The written
order granted by the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals as well as its
order, if any, to extend or renew the
same, the original application of the
applicant, including his application to
extend or renew, if any, and the written
authorizations
of
the
Anti-Terrorism
Council shall be deemed and are hereby
declared
as
classified
information:
Provided, That the person being surveilled
or whose communications, letters, papers,
messages,
conversations,
discussions,
spoken or written words and effects have
been monitored, listened to, bugged or
recorded by law enforcement authorities
has the right to be informed of the acts
done by the law enforcement authorities
44

in the premises or to challenge, if he or
she intends to do so, the legality of the
interference before the Court of Appeals
which issued said written order. The
written order of the authorizing division of
the court of Appeals shall specify the
following:
The identity, such as name

and address, if known, of the charged of
suspected
persons
whose
communications,
messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words are to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted or
recorded and, in case of radio, electronic,
or
telephone
(whether
wireless or
otherwise) communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, the electronic transmission
systems or the telephone numbers to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and their
locations if the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism is not fully known, such person
shall be subject to continuous surveillance
provided there is reasonable ground to do
so;
The identity (name and

address,
and
the
police
or
law
enforcement
organization)
of
the
members of his team judicially authorized
to track down, tap, listen to, intercept,
and
record
the
communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses

committed, or being committed, or sought
to be prevented; and
The length of time which

the authorization shall be used or carried
out.
Section. 10. Effective Period of
Judicial Authorization. Any authorization
granted by the authorizing division of the
court of Appealsshall only be effective
for the length of time specified in the
written order of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of
the written order of the authorizing
division of the court of Appeals by the
applicant police or law enforcement
official.
The CA may extend or renew the
said authorization for another nonextendible period, which shall not exceed
30 days from the expiration of the original
periodThe
ex-parte
application
for
renewal has been duly authorized by the
Anti-terrorism Council in writing.
2008
If no case is filed within the 30-day

period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately
notify the person subject
of the
surveillance, interception, and recording of
the termination of the said surveillance,
interception and recording. [Penalty to be
imposed on the police official who fails to
inform the person subject of surveillance
of the termination of the surveillance,
monitoring, interception and recording
shall be penalized to 10 years and 1 day
to 12 years.
Section 15. Evidentiary Value of
Deposited Materials. Any listened to,
intercepted,
and
recorded
communications,
messages,
conversationsWHICH
HAVE
BEEN
SECURED
IN
VIOLATION
OF
THE
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT,
SHALL ABSOLUTELY NOT BE ADMISSIBLE
AND USABLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
ANYBODY IN ANY JUDICIAL, QUASIJUDICIAL,
LEGISLATIVE,
OR
ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION,
INQUIRY, PROCEEDING, OR HEARING.
JUDICIAL
AUTHORIZATION
TO
EXAMINE
BANK
DEPOSITS,
ACCOUNTS,
AND RECORDS OF
SUSPECTED
OR
CHARGED
TERRORISTS
Section 27. judicial authorization
required to examine bank deposits,
accounts and records.
The justices of CA designated as
special court to handle anti-terrorism
cases after satisfying themselves of the
existence of probable cause in a hearing
called for that purpose that:
A person charged with or

Of a judicially declared and

persons;
Of a member of such
judicially
declared
and
outlawed
persons, may authorize in writing any
police or law enforcement officer and the
members of his team duly authorized in
writing by the anti-terrorism council to:
1.
examine or cause
the
examination
of,
the
deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records in a bank or financial institution;
and
45

2.
gather or cause the
gathering of any relevant information
about such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records from a bank
or financial institution. The bank or
financial institution shall not refuse to
allow such examination or to provide the
desired information, when so ordered by
and served with the written order of the
Court of Appeals.
Sec. 28. Application to examine
deposits, accounts and records.
The written order of the CA
authorizing the examination of bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records:


persons;
Of a member of such
judicially
declared
and
outlawed
persons, in a bank or financial institution-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE
AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA
UPON AN EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO
THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who has been
duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file such ex-parte application
and upon examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses he may produce to establish the
facts that will justify the need and urgency
of examining and freezing the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records:
Of A person charged with or


persons;
Of a member of such
judicially
declared
and
outlawed
persons.
Section 35. Evidentiary value of
deposited
bank
materials.Any
information, data, excerpts, summaries,
notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports
or
documents
acquired
from
the
examination of the bank deposits,
2008
placements, trust accounts, assets and

records of:


persons;
Of a member of such
judicially
declared
and
outlawed
persons,
-which have been secured in
violation of the provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as
evidence against anybody in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
investigation,
inquiry, proceeding
or
hearing.
1. PEOPLE VS. CABALQUINTO,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419
2. ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996
The wife forcibly opened the
drawers at the clinic of her doctorhusband and took diaries, checks and
greeting cards of his alleged paramours.
Thereafter, she used the same in their
legal separation case. Said documents are
inadmissible in evidence. This is so
because the intimacies of husband and
wife does not justify the breaking of
cabinets to determine marital infidelity.
3. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998
Puno, J.
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then
President
FIDEL
V. RAMOS
issued
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
ADOPTION
OF
A
NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino
citizens and foreign residents to have a
Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the National Statistics Office
(NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY .
The AO was questioned by Senator
Ople on the following grounds:
1.
The establishment of the PRN
without any law is an unconstitutional
46

usurpation of the legislative powers of the
Congress of the Philippines;
2.
The appropriation of public
funds for the implementation of the said
AO is unconstitutional since Congress has
the exclusive authority to appropriate
funds for such expenditure; and
3.
The AO violates the citizens
right to privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.
Held:
1. The AO establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every
Filipino citizens and foreign residents and
therefore, it is supposed to be a law
passed by Congress that implements it,
not by an Administrative Order issued by
the
President.
Administrative
Power,
which is supposed to be exercised by the
President, is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by
proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform
standard
of
administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of
his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing
precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that
is not appropriate to be covered by an
Administrative Order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of the
government. It must be in harmony with
the law and should be for the sole purpose
of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy. The subject of AO
308 therefore is beyond the power of the
President to issue and it is a usurpation of
legislative power.
2. The AO likewise violates the right to
privacy since its main purpose is to
provide a common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned
agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of
the application of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis
of a biological data. It is the confirmation
of an individuals identity through a
fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or
facial features. Through the PRN, the
government offices has the chance of
building
a
huge
and
formidable
information base through the electronic
linkage of the files of every citizen. The
data, however, may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that
may be too great

authorities to resist.
2008
for
some
of
our
Further, the AO does not even tells us in

clear and unequivocal terms how these
informations gathered shall be handled. It
does not provide who shall control and
access the data and under what
circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard
the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
the information. The computer linkage
gives other government agencies access
to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO
CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE
OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS
CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF
THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS
BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR
OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE
USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER
PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE
DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
AO No. 308 is unconstitutional
since it falls short of assuring that
personal information gathered about our
people will be used only for specified
purposes thereby violating the citizens
right to privacy.
KILUSANG
MAYO
UNO
VS.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
EDUARDO
ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20,
2006
BAYAN
MUNA
VS.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET
AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 420 that
mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multipurpose Identification System by all
Government Agencies in the Executive
Department. This is so despite the fact
that the Supreme Court held in an En
Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES
Administrative Order No. 308[National
computerized
Identification
Reference
System] issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos that the same is unconstitutional
because a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a
new national data collection and
card
issuance system, where none existed
before. The Supreme Court likewise held
that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it
violates the citizens right to privacy.
47

Based on the Ople ruling, the
petitioners claimed that Proclamation No.
420 is unconstitutional on two (2)
grounds:
a.
usurpation
of
legislative
powers; and
b.
it infringes on the citizens right
to privacy
Held:
The said Executive Order No. 420 does not
violate the citizens right to privacy since it
does not require all the citizens to be
issued a national ID as what happened in
AO 308. Only those dealing or employed
with the said government entities who are
required
to
provide
the
required
information for the issuance of the said
ID.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R.
No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
2008
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and

other commissioners of the PCGG declined
the
invitation
because
of
prior
commitment.23[7] At the same time, they
invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No.
1 earlier quoted.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45

a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested
Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC
Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City
and brought him to the Senate premises
where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the

Supreme Court a petition for habeas
corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services,
their
Chairmen,
Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and
Members.
I S S U E S:
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam

Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine
Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res.
No. 455),21[4] directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine
Communications
Satellite
Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT),
and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of
Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C.

Inocencio, under the authority of Senator
Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo
L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein
petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on
Services.
The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455.22[6]
Annex E of the Petition in G.R.
No. 174318.
22[6]
Annex F of the Petition in G.R.
21[4]
No. 174318.
Is the investigation conducted on

the petitioners violative of their right to
privacy?
H E L D:
The claim of immunity is without merit.
Zones of privacy are recognized and

protected in our laws.24[46] Within these
zones,
any
form
of
intrusion
is
impermissible unless excused by law and
in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord
to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a
constitutional right and the right most
valued by civilized men,25[47] but also
from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which
23[7]
Annex G of the Petition in G.R.
No. 174318.
24[46]
Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No.
135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.

25[47]
See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-
20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
48

mandates that, no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy
and everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.26[48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III
of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of
privacy. It highlights a persons right to
be let alone or the right to determine
what, how much, to whom and when
information about himself shall be
disclosed.27[49]
Section 2 guarantees
the right of the people to be
secure in their persons,
houses,
papers
and
effects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any
purpose. Section 3 renders inviolable
the privacy of communication and
correspondence and further cautions
that
any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the

right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if
so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.28[50]
Applying
this
determination
to
these
cases,
the
important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat
Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See
also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
26
[48]
27
[49]
28
[50]
Constitutional and Legal

Systems of ASEAN Countries,
Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law and
Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing
I.R. Cortes, The Constitutional
Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
Burrows v. Superior Court
of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.
3d 238, 529 P 2d 590 (1974).
See Katz v. United states (1967),
389 U.S. 347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct.
507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v.
Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364,
96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262; 8
Cal. 3d 623-624,105 Cal. Rptr.
521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT
Herreras Handbook on Arrest,
Search and Seizure.
2008
Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable

expectation of privacy?; and second, did
the
government
violate
such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative.

Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455, particularly
on the
anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC)
due
to
the
alleged
improprieties in the operations by
their respective board of directors.
Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners
acts committed in the discharge of their
duties as officers and directors of the said
corporations,
particularly
Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation.
Consequently,
they have no reasonable expectation
of privacy over matters involving
their offices in a corporation where
the
government
has
interest.
Certainly, such matters are of public
concern and over which the people
have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy

is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,29[51] the Court, in line
with Whalen v. Roe,30[52] employed the
rational basis relationship test when it
held that there was no infringement of the
individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is
for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official
corruption, maintain a standard of honesty
in public service, and promote morality in
public administration.31[53] In Valmonte v.
Belmonte,32[54] the Court remarked that as
public figures, the Members of the former
Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited
right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, and their actions are subject
to closer scrutiny.
Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the
right of the people to access information
on matters of public concern prevails over
29[51]
Supra.
30[52]
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
31[53]
Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative
Inquiry and Right to Privacy, p. 60.

32[54]
170 SCRA 256 (1989)
49

the
right
to
transactions.
privacy
of
financial
Under the present circumstances, the

alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT,
PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of
pesos, and the conspiratorial participation
of the PCGG and its officials are
compelling reasons for the Senate to
exact vital information from the directors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in
crafting the necessary legislation to
prevent corruption and formulate remedial
measures
and
policy
determination
regarding PCGGs efficacy. There being no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the
part of those directors and officers over
the subject covered by Senate Res. No.
455, it follows that their right to privacy
has not been violated by respondent
Senate Committees.
Let it be stressed at this point that so

long as the constitutional rights of
witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners,
will be respected by
respondent Senate Committees, it their
duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for
intelligent
legislative
action.
The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is
to respond to subpoenae, to respect the
dignity
of
the
Congress
and
its
Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo
Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso
Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio
Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, as well as its
directors and officers, must comply with
the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum
issued
by
respondent
Senate
Committees directing them to appear
and testify in public hearings relative
to Senate Resolution No. 455.
CHAPTER V - FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

PRESS, EXPRESSION, etc.
2008
right of the people peaceably to

assemble
and
petition
the
government for the redress of their
grievances.
Detain
Restric
Prohibi
computers,
or
other
means
of
residence.
1. Rule on criticisms against acts of public
officers
Read:
1. Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524
2. US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (A
public official should not be onionskinned with reference to comments
upon his official acts. The interest of
the government and the society
demands full discussion of public
affairs)
3. P. vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599
4. Mercado vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93
2. Freedom of the press, in general
Read:
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER &
CECILLE AFABLE VS. COURT OF
APPEALS & RAMON LABO, JR., 444
SCRA 28 [November 25, 2004]
Freedom of Expression; the public has
the right to be informed on the
mental, moral and physical fitness of
candidates for public office.
FACTS:
Section 4. No law shall be passed

abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the
1.
In the January 3, 1988 issue of the
Baguio Midland Courier (BMC),
Cecille
Afable, the Editor-in-Chief, in her column
50

In and Out of Baguio
following comments:
made
the
Of all the candidates for Mayor of

Baguio City), Labo has the most
imponderables about him. People would
ask: can he read and write? Why is he
always talking about his Japanese fatherin-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator or a
barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send
P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to
put an advertisement of Labo in the
Midland Courier but was refused because
he has not yet paid his account of the last
time he was a candidate for Congress. We
will accept all advertisements for him if he
pays his old account first.
2.
In the same column, Cecille Afable
wrote the following comments in her
January 10, 1988 column at the Courier:
I heard that the Dumpty in the
Egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair.
Some real doctors are also busy
campaigning against Labo because he has
not also paid their medical services with
them. Since he is donating millions he
should also settle his small debts like the
reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000
only. If he wins, several teachers were
signifying to resign and leave Baguio
forever, and Pangasinan will be the francaliqua of Baguio.
3.
As a result of the above articles,
Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for
Damages before the regional trial Court
of Baguio City as he claimed said articles
were libelous. He likewise filed a separate
criminal complaint before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Baguio but was
dismissed;
4.
Labo claimed that the said articles
were tainted with malice because he was
allegedly described as Dumpty in the
Egg
or one who is a failure in his
business which is false because he is a
very successful businessman or to mean
zero or a big lie;
that he is a
balasubas due to his alleged failure to
pay his medical expenses;
The petitioners, however, were able to

prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation
to the Courier in the amount of
P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his
campaigners for the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa elections;
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio
City, in its Decision dated June 14, 1990
2008
dismissed Labos complaint for damages

on the ground that the article of petitioner
Afable was privileged and constituted fair
comment on matters of public interest as
it dealt with the integrity, reputation and
honesty of private respondent Labo who
was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;
On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC Decision and ordered
the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr.
damages in the total amount of
P350,000.00 after concluding that the
Dumpty in the Egg refers to no one but
Labo himself.
Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
2.
Was Labo the Dumpty in the Egg
described in the questioned article/
3.
Were the articles subject of the
case libelous or privileged/
HELD:
1.
The Court
of Appeals is wrong
when it held that Labo is the Dumpty in
the Egg in the questioned article. This is
so because the article stated that The
Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for
Cortes, another candidate for mayor and
opponent
of
Labo
himself.
It
is
unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his
opponent and against himself. Although
such gracious attitude on the part of Labo
would have been commendable, it is
contrary to common human experience.
As pointed out by the petitioners, had he
done that, it is doubtful whether he could
have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the
1988 elections, which he actually did. In
line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA,
310 SCRA 1, that it is also not sufficient
that the offended party recognized himself
as the person attacked or defamed, but it
must be shown that at least a 3 rd person
could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication, the case should be
dismissed since Labo utterly failed to
dispose of this responsibility.
2.
Labo claims that the petitioners
could not invoke public interest to justify
the publication since he was not yet a
public official at that time. This argument
is without merit since he was already a
candidate for City mayor of Baguio. As
such, the article is still within the mantle
of protection guaranteed by the freedom
of expression provided in the Constitution
since it is the publics right to be informed
of the mental, moral and physical fitness
51

of candidates for public office. This was
recognized as early as the case of US VS.
SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the
case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN,
376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme
Court held:
it is of the utmost consequence
that the people should discuss the
character and qualifications of candidates
for their suffrages. The importance to the
State and to society of such discussions is
so vast, and the advantages derived so
great, that they more than counterbalance
the inconvenience of private persons
whose conduct may be involved, and
occasional injury to the reputations of
individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury
may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of
injury to private character so small, that
such discussion must be privileged.
Clearly, the questioned articles
constitute fair comment on a matter of
public interest as it dealt with the
character of the private respondent who
was running for the top elective post in
Baguio City at that time.
2. PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS.
COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 90878, January
29, 1990
Freedom of expression and of the press
(Note: Unanimous en banc decision)
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
1. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION" was enacted into law;
2. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio
and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt.
Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all
comprising the autonomous region shall
take part in a plebiscite originally
scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was
reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for
the ratification or rejection of the said act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the
Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No.
2167, Section 19 of which provides:
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnist,
commentators or announcers.- During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day
2008
before and on plebiscite day, no mass

media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues."
4. On November 20, 1989, petitioner
PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist
("OVERVIEW") for the Baguio Midland
Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Comelec to enjoin the latter
from enforcing Section 19 of resolution
No. 2167. Petitioner claims that the said
provision is violative of his constitutional
freedom of expression and of the press
and it also constitutes a prior restraint
because
it
imposes
subsequent
punishment for those who violate the
same;
5. On November 28, 1989, the Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent from enforcing
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through
the Solicitor General filed its Comment
and moved for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground that Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely
bar the petitioner from expressing his
views because under Section 90 and 92 of
BP 881, he may still express his views or
campaign for or against the act through
the Comelec space and airtime.
Held:
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the
Constitution to the Comelec is the power
to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities to
the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates are insured. The evil sought to
be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may
favor or give undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising time and
space. This is also the reason why a
columnist, commentator or announcer is
required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period if he
is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF
THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B),
52

2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE
CONSTRUED
TO
MEAN
THAT
THE
COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE
RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE
THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS
THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO
EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE
PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during the
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there
are no candidates in a plebiscite.
While it is true that the petitioner is
not absolutely barred from campaigning
for or against the Organic Act, said fact
does not cure the constitutional infirmity
of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No.
2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A
RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE
FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS
VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues,
INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people
affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened
by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.
Read:
1.
RANDY DAVID VS. ARROYO,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160;
2.
Adiong vs. Comelec, March
31, 1992 (putting of decals and
stickers in ones car is within the
protected freedom of expression)
3.
National Press Club vs.
Comelec, March 5, 1992. Real also the
dissenting and separate opinions of the
justices.
(Preventing
campaigns
through radio, TV and newspapers is
valid in order to even the playing field
between rich and poor candidates)
4.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 7960-707 &
Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales, GR No. 80578, February
1, 1989
5.
Eastern Broadcasting vs.
Dans,137 SCRA 628
6.
Newsweek vs. IAC, 142
SCRA 171
7.
Kapisanan vs. Camara
Shoes, 11 SCRA 477
8.
IN RE: Atty. Tipon, 79 SCRA
372
9.
Lacsa vs. IAC, May 23,1988
10.
Kapunan
vs.
De
Villa,
December 6, 1988
4. Not within the protection of the
freedom of
expression clause of the
Constitution
1. Obscenity; test of
ACCORDINGLY, Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Read:
Read also:
b.
1. In re: Ramon Tulfo,March 19, 199

2. In re: Atty. Emil Jurado, July 12, 1990
3. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA
800
4. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 448
5. Babst vs. NIB, 132 SCRA 316
6. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448 (In
order that any news item relating to a
judicial
proceeding
will
not
be
actionable, the same must be [a] a
true and fair report of the actual
proceedings; [b] must be done in
good faith; and [c] no comments nor
remarks shall be made by the writer}
7. Policarpio vs. Manila Times, 5 SCRA
148
8. Lopez vs. CA, 34 SCRA 116
9. New York Times vs. Sullivan,376
U.S.254
10. Liwayway Publishing vs. PCGG, April
15,l988
Tests:
3. Freedom of expression in general
2008
a. P. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352

P vs. GO PIN, August 8, 1955
a.
Whether the average person
applying to contemporary community
standards would find the
work
appeals to prurient interest;
b.
Whether the work depicts or
describes a patently offensive sexual
conduct;
c.
Whether the work as a
whole lacks serious literary , artistic,
political or scientific value.
c. Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d
419
d. Ginsberg vs. New York,390 U.S.
629
e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (A
City Mayor may not order the warrantless
seizure of magazines which he believes to
be obscene; otherwise, he will become the
complainant, prosecutor and judge at the
same time. He should obtain a search
warrant from a judge)
53

2. Libel or slander; test ofRead:
supra
510
a. Lopez and Manila Times cases,

b. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil.
3. Cases undersub-judice
Read:
a. P. vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265
5. Freedom of assembly and to petition
the government
for redress of
grievances
GESITE et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
444 SCRA 51
Freedom of public school teachers to
peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances;
right of public school teachers to form
union.
The petitioners admitted that they
participated in concerted mass actions in
Metro Manila from September to the first
half of October, 1990 which temporarily
disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they
claimed that they were not on strike. They
claimed that they were merely exercising
their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for
redress of their grievances. Thus, they
may not be penalized administratively.
HELD:
The issue of whether or not the
mass action launched by the public school
teachers
during
the
period
from
September up to the 1st half of October,
1990 was a strike or not has been decided
in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. LAGUIO,
200 SCRA 323 where it was held that
these mass actions were to all intents
and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of,
or absence from, work which it was the
teachers duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons.
It is undisputed fact that there was
a work stoppage and that petitioners
purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that
the conventional term strike was not
used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is
2008
inconsequential, SINCE THE SUBSTANCE

OF THE SITUATION, AND NOT ITS
APPEARANCE,
WILL
BE
DEEMED
CONTROLLING.
Despite the constitutional right to
form associations under the Constitution,
employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts
and other forms of mass actions that will
lead to temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service. The right of government
employees to organize IS LIMITED TO
THE FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS
ONLY,
WITHOUT
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE.
(Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore
entitled to their salaries during their
suspension
because
the
general
proposition is that a public official is not
entitled to any compensation if he had not
rendered any service.
BAYAN,
KARAPATAN,
KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
and GABRIELA vs. EDUARDO ERMITA,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief
of the Philippine National Police, Gen.
ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief
Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western
Police
District
Chief
Gen.
PEDRO
BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
The Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al.,
in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No.
880.
The second group consists of 26
individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et
al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that
they were injured, arrested and detained
when a peaceful mass action they held on
September 26, 2005 was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. They
further assert that on October 5, 2005, a
group they participated in marched to
Malacaang to protest issuances of the
Palace which, they claim, put the country
54

under an undeclared martial rule, and
the protest was likewise dispersed
violently and many among them were
arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No.
169881, allege that they conduct peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual
members as citizens, specifically the right
to peaceful assembly, are affected by
Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR)
being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October
4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to
be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but
police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed
them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on
October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along Espaa
Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge.
Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street
and
prevented
them
from
proceeding further.
They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one
of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All
petitioners
assail
Batas
Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto
and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of
CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals
of rallies under the no permit, no rally
policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.
B.P. No. 880, The Public Assembly
Act of 1985, provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise
By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To
Assemble And Petition The Government
[And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa
in session assembled:
SECTION 1. Title . This Act shall
be known as The Public Assembly Act of
1985.
SEC. 2. Declaration of policy.
The constitutional right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is
2008
essential and vital to the strength and

stability of the State. To this end, the
State shall ensure the free exercise of
such right without prejudice to the rights
of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. For
purposes of this Act:
(b)
Public place shall include
any highway, boulevard, avenue, road,
street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza square, and/or any open space of
public ownership where the people are
allowed access.
(c)
Maximum
tolerance
means the highest degree of restraint that
the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same.
SEC. 4. Permit when required and
when not required.-- A written permit
shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a
government-owned
and
operated
educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings
or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law
are not covered by this Act.
SEC.
5.
Application
requirements.-All applications for a
permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
1.
The applications shall be in writing
and shall include the names of the leaders
or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used
for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems
to be used.
2.
The application shall incorporate
the duty and responsibility of applicant
under Section 8 hereof.
3.
The application shall be filed with
the office of the mayor of the city or
55

municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five
(5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
4.
Upon receipt of the application,
which must be duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor
shall
cause
the
same
to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous
place in the city or municipal building.
SEC. 6.
Action to be taken on the
application.
1.
It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public
health.
2.
The mayor or any official acting in
his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date
the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.
3.
If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who
must be heard on the matter.
4.
The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the applica[nt]
within twenty-four hours.
5.
If the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit,
the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.
6.
In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions
may be appealed to the appropriate court
within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record
on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying if in
terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
2008
7.
All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed
to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
8.
In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
CPR, on the
set forth in a press
dated September
Annex A to the
169848, thus:
other hand, is a policy

release by Malacaang
21, 2005, shown in
Petition in G.R. No.
Malacaang
Manila, Philippines
Official
NEWS
Release No. 2
September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports
pointing to credible plans of antigovernment groups to inflame the political
situation, sow disorder and incite people
against the duty constituted authorities,
we have instructed the PNP as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce
a no permit, no rally policy, disperse
groups that run afoul of this standard and
arrest all persons violating the laws of the
land as well as ordinances on the proper
conduct
of
mass
actions
and
demonstrations.
The
rule
of
calibrated
preemptive response is now in force,
in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while
those with ill intent are herding a
witting or unwitting mass of people
and inciting them into actions that are
inimical to public order, and the peace
of mind of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be
dispersed. The majority of law-abiding
citizens have the right to be protected by
a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the
government to engage in lawful and
peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic
society.
56

The Presidents call for unity and
reconciliation stands, based on the rule of
law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend
that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880
requires a permit before one can stage a
public
assembly
regardless
of
the
presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part
of the message for which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not contentneutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The
words
lawful
cause,
opinion,
protesting or influencing suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government.
Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law
applies
to
assemblies
against
the
government because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation,
it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Furthermore, the law delegates
powers
to
the
Mayor
without
providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear
and present danger and imminent and
grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for
being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth
in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al.,
argue that the Constitution sets no limits
on the right to assembly and therefore
B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior
requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set
limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor
to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present
danger is too comprehensive.
Second,
the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events
require instant public assembly, otherwise
interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue
that it is preemptive, that the government
2008
takes action even before the rallyists can

perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the
maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880
and violates the Constitution as it causes
a chilling effect on the exercise by the
people of the right to peaceably assemble.
I s s u e s:
4.
On the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4,
5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and
Republic Act No. 7160:
1.
Are these content-neutral or
content-based regulations?
2.
Are they void on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness?
3.
Do they constitute prior
restraint?
4.
Are they undue delegations
of powers to Mayors?
5.
Do they violate international
human rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
5.
On the constitutionality and legality
of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR):
1.
Is the policy void on its face
or due to vagueness?
2.
Is it void for lack of
publication?
3.
Is the policy of CPR void as
applied to the rallies of September 26 and
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
H e l d:
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously
challenged.
Their right as citizens to
engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.
No. 880 which requires a permit for all
who would publicly assemble in the
nations streets and parks. They have, in
fact,
purposely
engaged
in
public
assemblies without the required permits
to press their claim that no such permit
can be validly required without violating
the
Constitutional
guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law
and dispersed the public assemblies held
without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or
57

of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of
the press, a right that enjoys primacy in
the realm of constitutional protection. For
these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which
all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v.
CA, the Court, as early as the onset of this
century, in U.S. v. Apurado
already
upheld the right to assembly and petition,
as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners
rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances
and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to
law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities.
These rights are
guaranteed
by
no
less
than
the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8
of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII.
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting
the peoples exercise of these rights. As
early as the onset of this century, this
Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld
the right to assembly and petition and
even went as far as to acknowledge:
It is rather to be expected that more or
less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater, the grievance
and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary
control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers.
But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon
every instance of such disorderly conduct
by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against
the authorities, then the right to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances
would expose all those who took part
therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the purposes
which they sought to attain did not
happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities.
If instances of disorderly
conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out
and punished therefor, but the utmost
2008
discretion must be exercised in drawing

the line between disorderly and seditious
conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising.
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court
likewise sustained the primacy of freedom
of speech and to assembly and petition
over comfort and convenience in the use
of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered
that the right, while sacrosanct, is not
absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But
it is a settled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that
the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign police power, which is the
power
to
prescribe
regulations,
to
promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
This
sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch
by the enactment of laws regulating those
and other constitutional and civil rights,
and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities
and cities by authorizing their legislative
bodies called municipal and city councils
enact ordinances for purpose
Reyes v. Bagatsing further expounded on
the right and its limits, as follows:
1.
It is thus clear that the Court is
called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly, arising from the denial of a
permit. The Constitution is quite explicit:
No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress
of grievances.
Free speech, like free
press, may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without censorship or
punishment.
There is to be then no
previous restraint on the communication
of views or subsequent liability whether in
58

libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action
for
damages,
or
contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that
[the State] has a right to prevent.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right
of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern.
It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the
case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our
republican institutions and complements
the right of free speech. To paraphrase
the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking
for the majority of the American Supreme
Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to
freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the
right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition the government for redress
of grievances. All these rights, while not
identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the
effects of the challenged governmental
actuation.
The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.
2.
Nowhere is the rationale
that underlies the freedom of expression
and peaceable assembly better expressed
than in this excerpt from an opinion of
Justice Frankfurter: It must never be
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights
was the child of the Enlightenment. Back
of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in
the power of an appeal to reason by all
the peaceful means for gaining access to
the mind. It was in order to avert force
and explosions due to restrictions upon
rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a
generous scope.
But utterance in a
context
of
violence
can
lose
its
significance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force.
Such utterance was not meant to be
sheltered by the Constitution. What was
rightfully stressed is the abandonment of
reason, the utterance, whether verbal or
2008
printed, being in a context of violence. It

must always be remembered that this
right likewise provides for a safety valve,
allowing parties the opportunity to give
vent to their views, even if contrary to the
prevailing climate of opinion. For if the
peaceful means of communication cannot
be availed of, resort to non-peaceful
means may be the only alternative. Nor is
this the sole reason for the expression of
dissent. It means more than just the right
to be heard of the person who feels
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. Its value may lie in
the fact that there may be something
worth hearing from the dissenter. That is
to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There
are, of course, well-defined limits. What
is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One
may not advocate disorder in the name of
protest, much less preach rebellion under
the cloak of dissent.
The Constitution
frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled
out and outbreaks of violence to be
avoided. The utmost calm though is not
required.
As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be
precise, United States v. Apurado: It is
rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought
to a high pitch of excitement, and the
greater the grievance and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers.
It
bears
repeating
that
for
the
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous
conduct, injury to property, and acts of
vandalism must be avoided. To give free
rein to ones destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of
the high estate occupied by intellectual
liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection,
absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where
the peace rally would start.
The
Philippines is committed to the view
expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939
vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v.
CIO: Whenever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities,
59

rights and liberties of citizens.
The
privilege of a citizen of the United States
to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order;
but must not, in the guise of respondents,
be abridged or denied.
The above
excerpt was quoted with approval in
Primicias v. Fugoso.
Primicias made
explicit what was implicit in Municipality of
Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where
this Court categorically affirmed that
plazas or parks and streets are outside the
commerce of man and thus nullified a
contract that leased Plaza Soledad of
plaintiff-municipality.
Reference was
made to such plaza being a promenade
for public use, which certainly is not the
only purpose that it could serve.
To
repeat, there can be no valid reason why
a permit should not be granted for the
proposed march and rally starting from a
public park that is the Luneta.
4.
Neither can there be any valid
objection to the use of the streets to the
gates of the US embassy, hardly two
blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard.
Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any
lurking doubt on the matter. In holding
that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of
Manila should grant a permit for a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this
Court categorically declared:
Our
conclusion finds support in the decision in
the case of Willis Cox v. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case,
the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap.
145, section 2, providing that no parade
or procession upon any ground abutting
thereon, shall be permitted unless a
special license therefor shall first be
obtained from the selectmen of the town
or
from
licensing
committee, was
construed by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfettered discretion to
refuse to grant the license, and held valid.
And the Supreme Court of the United
States, in its decision (1941) penned by
Chief Justice Hughes affirming the
judgment of the State Supreme Court,
held that a statute requiring persons
using the public streets for a parade or
procession to procure a special license
therefor from the local authorities is not
an unconstitutional abridgment of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech
and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in
2008
the issuance of licenses, to a consideration

of the time, place, and manner of the
parade or procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of
affording an opportunity to provide proper
policing, and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license, * * *. Nor should the point
made by Chief Justice Hughes in a
subsequent portion of the opinion be
ignored: Civil liberties, as guaranteed by
the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in
the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The
authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety
and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties
but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which
they ultimately depend. The control of
travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of
social need. Where a restriction of the
use of highways in that relation is
designed
to
promote
the
public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot
be disregarded by the attempted exercise
of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to
protection.
xxx
6.
x x x The principle under
American doctrines was given utterance
by Chief Justice Hughes in these words:
The question, if the rights of free speech
and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under
which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of
speech which the Constitution protects.
There could be danger to public peace and
safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its
peaceful character. It is true that the
licensing official, here respondent Mayor,
is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted.
It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably
occur,
given
all
the
relevant
circumstances, still the assumption
especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is
that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. The exercise of such a
right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American Supreme Court,
60

is not to be abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place.
xxx
8.
By way of a summary. The
applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in
time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable
or adverse, must be transmitted to them
at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority. Free speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other
intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in
our scheme of constitutional values. It
cannot be too strongly stressed that on
the judiciary, -- even more so than on the
other departments rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights.
No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has
been so felicitiously termed by Justice
Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption
must be to incline the weight of the scales
of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this
Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880
practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private
2008
place, only the consent of the owner or

the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant
of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place.
It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If
he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be
heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
B.P. No. 880
SEC. 4. Permit when required and when
not required.-- A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in
private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided
for by law are not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All
applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and
shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used
for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems
to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five
(5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which
must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
61

office of the city or municipal mayor shall
cause the same to immediately be posted
at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
SEC. 6.
Action to be taken on the
application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within
two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there
is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who
must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the applica[nt]
within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit,
the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions
may be appealed to the appropriate court
within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record
on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in
terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed
to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P.
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
2008
public assemblies but a restriction

that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. This
was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,33
where the Court referred to it as a
content-neutral regulation of the time,
place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.34
A fair and impartial reading of B.P.
No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies35 that
would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be peaceable and entitled to
protection.
Neither are the words
opinion, protesting and influencing in
the definition of public assembly content
based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words petitioning the government for
redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit
of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be
denied on the ground of clear and present
health. This is a recognized exception to
the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Neither is the law overbroad. It
regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the
extent needed to avoid a clear and
33
34
35
G.R. No. 132231, March 31,

1998, 288 SCRA 447.
Ibid, p. 478.
Except picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by
workers and employees resulting
from a labor dispute, which are
governed by the Labor Code and
other labor laws; political meeting
or rallies held during any election
campaign
period,
which
are
governed by the Election Code and
other election related laws; and
public assemblies in the campus of
a government-owned and operated
educational institution, which shall
be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational
institution. (Sec. 3[a] and Sec. 4 of
B.P. No. 880).
62

present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint,
since the content of the speech is not
relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers
to the mayor, the law provides a precise
and sufficient standard the clear and
present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a).
The reference to imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard.
As to
whether respondent Mayor has the same
power independently under Republic Act
No. 716036 is thus not necessary to
resolve in these proceedings, and was not
pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section
15 of the law provides for an alternative
forum through the creation of freedom
parks where no prior permit is needed for
peaceful assembly and petition at any
time:
SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act
36
The
Local
Government
Code.
Specifically, Section 16
stating the general welfare clause,
thus:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.
Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers
necessary,
appropriate,
or
incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those
which
are
essential
to
the
promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions,
local
government
units shall ensure and support
among
other
things,
the
preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and
support
the
development
of
appropriate
and
self-reliant
scientific
and
technological
capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and
social
justice,
promote
full
employment
among
their
residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort
and
convenience
of
their
inhabitants.
2008
establish or designate at least one suitable

freedom park or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable,
shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and
meetings may be held at any time without
the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan
Manila,
the
respective
mayors shall establish the freedom parks
within the period of six months from the
effectivity this Act.
2
The Court now comes to the matter of the
CPR.
As stated earlier, the Solicitor
General has conceded that the use of the
term should now be discontinued, since it
does not mean anything other than the
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P.
No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General,
thus:
The truth of the matter is the policy of
calibrated preemptive response is in
consonance with the legal definition of
maximum tolerance under Section 3 (c)
of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the highest
degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peacekeeping authorities shall
observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
Unfortunately,
however, the phrase maximum tolerance
has acquired a different meaning over the
years.
Many have taken it to mean
inaction on the part of law enforcers even
in the face of mayhem and serious threats
to public order. More so, other felt that
they need not bother secure a permit
when holding rallies thinking this would be
tolerated.
Clearly,
the
popular
connotation of maximum tolerance has
departed from its real essence under B.P.
Blg. 880.
It should be emphasized that the policy of
maximum tolerance is provided under the
same law which requires all pubic
assemblies to have a permit, which allows
the dispersal of rallies without a permit,
and which recognizes certain instances
when water cannons may be used. This
could
only
mean
that
maximum
tolerance is not in conflict with a no
permit, no rally policy or with the
dispersal and use of water cannons under
certain circumstances for indeed, the
maximum amount of tolerance required is
dependent on how peaceful or unruly a
mass action is. Our law enforcers should
calibrate their response based on the
63

circumstances on the ground with the
view to preempting the outbreak of
violence.
Thus, when I stated that calibrated
preemptive response is being enforced in
lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was
not referring to its legal definition but to
the distorted and much abused definition
that it has now acquired. I only wanted to
disabuse the minds of the public from the
notion that law enforcers would shirk their
responsibility of keeping the peace even
when
confronted
with
dangerously
threatening behavior. I wanted to send a
message that we would no longer be lax
in enforcing the law but would henceforth
follow it to the letter. Thus I said, we
have instructed the PNP as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce
a no permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all
persons violating the laws of the land . . .
unlawful mass actions will be dispersed.
None of these is at loggerheads with the
letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg.
880. It is thus absurd for complainants to
even claim that I ordered my corespondents to violate any law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic
policy of upholding the fundamental rights
of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. For
this reason, the so-called calibrated
preemptive response policy has no place
in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom.
It merely confuses our people and is used
by some police agents to justify abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does
not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies.
Far from being insidious,
maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government.
The
delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally permits is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound
clear and present danger standard.
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
are
GRANTED in part,
and Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu
of maximum tolerance, is NULL and
VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to
REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance.
Read:
2008
1. Right of assembly..31 SCRA 734 and

742
2. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil
255
3. Primicias vs. Fuguso, 80 Phil. 71
4. De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346
5. Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731
6. Philippine Blooming Mills Case,51
SCRA 189
7. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553;see
guidelines
8. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233
9. Villar vs. TIP, 135 SCRA 705
10. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA
359
11. Carpio vs. Guevara, 106 SCRA 685
12. Nestle' Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154
SCRA 542
13. Arreza vs. Araneta University
Foundation, 137
SCRA 94
6. Freedom from prior restraint
Read:
1. Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137
SCRA 717
2. New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S.
713 (Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its validity)
3. Near vs. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
4. Times Film vs. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43
5. Freedman vs. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51
5.
Clear and present danger and
dangerous tendency rule (whether
the words used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils
that the State has the right to
prevent)
7-a. Dangerous tendency rule (If the
words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the State has the
right to prevent, then such words are
punishable)
Read:
1. Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil.
152
2. Read again the Reyes and Ruiz

cases, supra
3. Read again Zaldivar vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR No.
7960-707&
Zaldivar
vs.
Gonzales,
GR
No.
80578, February 1, 1989
8. The balancing-of-interest
test
(When
a
particular
conduct
is
regulated in the interest of the public
64

order, and the regulation results in an
indirect,
conditional,
partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the
courts is to determine which of the 2
conflicting interests demand greater
protection under the circumstances
presented.)
Read:
AYER
PRODUCTION
VS.
JUDGE
CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ET AL.,
160 SCRA 861
Read also:
476
1. Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA
2. Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652,

including
the criticism on this test
by Justice Holmes
3. See also Zaldivar case above
CHAPTER VI - THE NONESTABLISHMENT

OF RELIGION CLAUSE
Section 5.
No law shall be made
respecting
the
establishment
of
religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination
or
preference
shall
forever
be
allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR,
492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration), 408 SCRA 1
Puno, J.
Respondent is the Court interpreter
of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City.
Complainant
requested
for
an
investigation of respondent for living with
a man not her husband while she was still
legally married and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada
believes
that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the
image of the judiciary, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein as
it might appear that the court condones
her act.
Respondent admitted she started
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than
20 years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She
likewise admitted having a son with
2008
Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged

grossly immoral conduct because:
She is a member of the

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
Society;
That the conjugal arrangement

was in conformity with their religious
beliefs;
That the conjugal arrangement

with Quilapio has the approval of her
congregation.
Escritor likewise claimed that she had
executed a DECLARATION OF PLEDGING
FAITHFULNESS in accordance with her
religion which allows members of the
Jehovahs witnesses who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and
binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed.
HELD:
Escritors conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out
a case for exemption from the law based
on her fundamental right to religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must
be upheld in order that freedoms--including religious freedom---may be
enjoyed. IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM,
HOWEVER, MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE
TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE
STATE, and so the stateinterest sought to
be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the
state that will also protect the freedom. In
the absence of a showing that the state
interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Escritor was therefore held not
administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
any specific system of belief,
worship or conduct, often involving a code
of ethics and philosophy.
A profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man
to his Creator.
The existence of a Divine being is not
necessarily inherent in religion; the
Buddhists espouses a way of life without
reference to an omnipotent God.
65

Strong fences make good
neighbors. The idea is to delineate the
boundaries between two institutions and
prevent encroachments by one against the
other.
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is
not only the State that is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs;
the Church is likewise barred from
meddling in purely secular matters.
NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
It simply means that the State
cannot set up a church; nor pass laws
which aids one religion; aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force
nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will; or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief; that
the State cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa
(EVERSON
VS.
BOARD
OF
EDUCATION, 330 US 1)
This clause seeks to protect:
Voluntarism---must
come
into
existence through the voluntary support of
its members;
Insulation from political process
growth through voluntary support of its
members will not take place if there is
intervention from the State.
There will be no violation of the
non-establishment clause if:
the statute has a secular legislative
purpose;
its principal or primary effect is one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and
it does not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.
(LEMON VS. KURTZMAN, 403 US 602)
The government is neutral
and
while protecting all, it prefers none and
disparages none. All here applies both to
the
believer
and
the
non-believer.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES
FREEDOM
FROM
RELIGION;
THE
RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE
RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP.
SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS.
VITALE, 370 US 421)
It is unconstitutional for a school
to require the students to recite a prayer
composed by the Board of Regents at the
starts of the days class. It is no part of
2008
the business of government to compose

official prayers for any group of the
American People.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS.
SCHEMPP, 374 US 203
It is unconstitutional for a law to
require that at least 10 verses from the
Holy Bible be read daily without comment
because the same constitute a religious
exercise
which
violates
the
nonestablishment clause.
BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. ALLEN,
392 US 236
A law requiring the Board of
Education to lend textbooks free of charge
to all students from grades 7-12 of
parochial school. This is constitutional
since it is not the parochial school which
gets the benefits but the parents.
EVERSON VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION,
330 US 1
The law authorizing reimbursement
of transportation expenses of school
children going to and from parochial
schools is not violative of the nonestablishment clause because it will be the
parents who get benefits, not the
parochial school.
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION
AND WORSHIP HAS TWO ASPECTS:
a.
b.
Freedom to believe; and

Freedom to act.
IN the first, such freedom is absolute. He

may indulge in his own theories about life
and death; worship any god he chooses,
or none at all. He may not be punished
even if he cannot prove what he believes.
In
the
second,
if
the
individual
externalizes what he believes, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority
of the State. This is so because religious
freedom can be exercised only with due
regard to the rights of others. Example:
Go forth and multiply---cannot marry
several times just to comply.
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & ZOSA, 38 O.G.
1676
Avoiding military duties based on
religious grounds is not allowed in the
Philippines because of Section 4, Article II
The state is the protector of the people
and it is the prime duty of the people to
66

defend the State and in the fulfillment of
this duty, the State may call all citizens to
render military or civil service.
IN RE SUMMERS, 325 US 561
No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS

making the flag ceremony compulsory in
all educational institutions, they were
expelled by the respondent school
authorities.
The act of the Illinois Supreme

Court
denying admission to the bar
because of his refusal to take in good faith
an oath to support the Constitution of the
State of Illinois which requires mandatory
service in the military in times of war was
reversed by the US Supreme Court stating
that this constitutes a violation of the 1st
Amendment which guarantees religious
freedom.
Hence this petition.
1.
Religious
freedom in relation to
impairment of
contracts and the
right to join associations,36
SCRA
445
Held:
2. Read:
1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
2. Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
3. INK vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1
4. American Bible Society vs. City of
Manila, 101
Phil. 398
5. Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106
Phil. 11
6. Pamil vs. Teleron, November 20,
1978
7. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope, 59
SCRA 54
7.
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA
514
ROEL EBRALINAG, ET AL VS. THE
DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU, March 1, 1993
Grino--Aquino, J.
Facts:
-----1. The petitioners are high school and
grade schools students enrolled in the
different public schools of the Province of
Cebu and who belong to the religious
group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses;
2. That they rrefused to take part in the
flag ceremony which includes playing by a
band or singing the Philippine National
Anthem, saluting the Philippine Flag and
reciting the patriotic pledge because they
considered the flag as an image and they
should not worship it except GOD;
3. That because of their refusal to perform
the foregoing acts as required by RA 1265
of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order
2008
Issue:
-----May the petitioners be expelled for
refusing to salute the flag, recite the
patriotic pledge or sing the national
anthem in order to follow their religious
beliefs?
The same issue was raised in

Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106
Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna vs. Secretary
of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960) where
the SC held that:
The flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Under
a system of complete separation of church
and state in the government, the flag is
utterly devoid of any religious significance.
The law, RA 1265 was likewise
incorporated in Executive Order No. 297,
September 21, 1988.
Our task is extremely difficult for
the 30-year old decision of this Court in
GERONA upholding the salute law and
approving the expulsion of students who
refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled
with.
The idea that one may be
compelled to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or be
expelled in school, IS ALIEN TO THE
CONSCIENCE
OF
THE
PRESENT
GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT
THEIR TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS
WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO
FREE SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE
OF
RELIGIOUS
PROFESSION
AND
WORSHIP (Section 5, Art. III, 1987
Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental
right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the
67

relationship of man and his Creator (Chief
Justice Fernando's separate opinion in
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 530).
The right to religious profession
has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of the thought.
The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom (according the Former
Chief justice Teehankee in his dissenting
opinion in German vs. Baranagan) is the
existence of a grave and present danger
of a character both grave and imminent,
of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State
has the right and duty to presvent. Absent
such a threat to public safety, the
expulsion of the petitioners from the
schools is not justified since they are not
doing anything that could warrant their
expulsion since during flag ceremonies,
they just quietly stand at attention to
show their respect for the rights of others
who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, we upheld
the exemption of the members of the
Iglesia ni Kristo from the coverage of the
closed-shop agreement between the labor
union and the company because it would
violate the teaching of their church not to
join any labor group.
We hold that a similar exemption
may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance
of the flag ceremony out of respect to
their religious beliefs, however "bizarre"
those beliefs may seem to others
CHAPTER VII - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
2008
NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF

THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Detain
Restric
Prohibi
computers,
or
other
means
of
residence.
Upon application of the prosecutor, the
suspects right to travel shall be limited to
the municipality or city where he resides
or where the case is pending, in the
interest of national security and public
safety. Travel outside of said municipality
or city, without the authorization of the
court, shall be deemed a violation of the
terms and conditions of the bail which
shall then be forfeited as provided in the
Rules of Court.
These
restrictions
shall
be
terminated upon acquittal of the accused;
or the dismissal of the case filed against
him; or earlier upon the discretion of the
court or upon motion of the prosecutor.
1. The constitutional as well as human
right to travel, 129 SCRA
2. Read:
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON.
RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
88211, September 15, 1989 and the
Resolution
of
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration dated
October 27,
1989
right to travel; liberty of abode
and "right to return"
En banc
Cortes, J.
This is a petition for mandamus and
prohibition asking the Supreme Court to
Order the respondents to issue travel
documents to the petitioners and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
68

The case for the petitioners is founded
on the assertion that their right to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed by the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived
of life liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the
President has no power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only the Courts may do so "within the
limits prescribed by law". Nor may the
President impair the right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do
so.
Also, the petitioners claim that under
international
law,
particularly
the
Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights
guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, AND TO
RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY.
Likewise, under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Art. 12
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
the right to enter his own country.
The respondents argue that the issue
in this case involves a political question
which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction
of the Court. Furthermore, they argue that
the right of the state to national security
prevails over individual rights, citing
Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted in the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
2008
The sub-issues, which could help in the

determination of the main issue, are:
1. Does the President have the
power to bar the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has
the power to bar former Pres. Marcos and
his family
from returning
to
the
Philippines, in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, has
the President made a finding that the
return of the petitioners to the Philippines
is a clear and present danger to national
security, public welfare or public health.
And if she has made that finding, have the
requirements of due process been
complied with in making such finding? Has
there been prior notice to the petitioners?
Held:
It must be emphasized that the
individual right involved in this case is not
the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel
connote. Essentially, the right to return to
one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent
from,
though related to the right to travel. Thus,
even the Universal declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within
the territory of the state, the right to
leave a country and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct
rights.
THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S
COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS
SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL,
BUT
IT
IS
OUR
WELLCONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO
RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
UNDER
OUR
CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF
THE LAND.
To the President, the problem is
one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the
exercise
of
rights
of
certain
individuals. The power involved is the
President's RESIDUAL POWER to
protect the general welfare of the
people.
69

The court cannot close its eyes to
present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged by the insurgency,
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, etc. With
these before her, the President cannot be
said to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously
and whimsically.
2008
recollection of the impressions of the

Court after the hearing.
2. Silverio vs. CA, April 8, 1991
Read also:
1. Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851
2. Kwong vs. PCGG, December 7,l987
3. Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149
Lastly, the issue involved in the case at

bar is not political in nature since under
Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution,
judicial power now includes the duty to
"determine whether or not
there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government."
1.
Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6
criminal cases for estafa pending against
him. In said cases he was admitted to bail
with the FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety.
NOTE:
2. The SEC requested the Commissioner

on Immigration not to clear petitioner for
departure pending disposition of the case
involving him. The same was granted by
the Commissioner.
The main opinion was concurred in by

7 justices (CJ Fernan, Narvasa, MelencioHerrera,
Gancayco,
Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8
justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING
the petition. Seven justices filed separate
dissenting opinions (Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and
Sarmiento).
***********************
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting.
With all due respect for the majority in
the Court that the main issue in this case
is not one of power but one on RIGHTS. If
he comes home, the government has the
power to arrest and punish him but does it
have the power to deny him his right to
come home and die among familiar
surroundings? x x x The government has
more than ample powers under existing
laws to deal with a person who
transgresses the peace and imperils public
safety. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL
PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS
BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO.
THERE IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN
FOREIGN LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR
HURTING THE NATION.
.
The
fears
expressed
by
its
representatives were based on mere
conjectures of political and economic
destabilization without any single piece of
concrete evidence to back up their
apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has
come to the conclusion that there exist
"factual bases for the President's decision"
to bar Marcos's return. That is not my
He is also involved in a case pending

before the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
3.
Petitioner subsequently filed before
the trial courts a motion entitled "motion
for permission to leave the country"
stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities".
4. The motion was denied by the lower
courts and the matter was elevated to the
Court of Appeals which also denied the
same. Petitioner brings the matter to the
S.C. claiming his constitutional right to
travel and also contending that having
been admitted to bail as a matter of right,
neither the courts which granted him bail
nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over
his liberty.
HELD:
Petition denied.
a.
A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.
This
is
a
necessary
consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel.
b.
"x x x the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit the accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will
70

be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding
force outside of said jurisdiction."(People
vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (l935)
c.
To allow the petitioner to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason would
place him beyond the reach of the courts.
d.
Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals
case of People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R.
No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980) as authority
for his claim that he could travel. The S.C.
held however that said case is not
squarely on all fours with the case at bar.
Unlike the Shepherd case, petitioner has
failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well
as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel.
e. It may thus be inferred that the fact
that a criminal case is pending against an
accused does not automatically bar him
from
travelling
abroad.
He
must
however convince the courts of the
urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, and that his sureties are
willing to undertake the responsibility
of allowing him to travel.
4. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil.
778
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, supra.
6. Salonga vs. Hermoso, 97 SCRA 121
7. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos
Cases of August
& October, 1989
CHAPTER VIII - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Section 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access
to official recordsshall be afforded
the citizen subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
1. Read:
Right to Privacy; right to information on
matters of public concern;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R.
No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
2008
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam

Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine
Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res.
No. 455),37[4] directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine
Communications
Satellite
Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT),
and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of
Directors.
The pertinent portions of the
Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005,

the representation and entertainment
expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3
million, as compared to the previous
years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS,
some
board
members
established wholly owned PHC subsidiary
called Telecommunications Center, Inc.
(TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly
siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million
had been allegedly advanced to TCI
without any accountability report given to
PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12
February 2002 issue reported that the
executive committee of Philcomsat has
precipitately released P265 million and
granted P125 million loan to a relative of
an executive committee member; to date
there have been no payments given,
subjecting the company to an estimated
interest income loss of P11.25 million in
2004;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the
proper
Senate
Committee
shall
conduct
an
inquiry
in
aid
of
legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC)
due
to
the
alleged
improprieties in the operations by
their respective board of directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C.
Inocencio, under the authority of Senator
Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo
L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein
Annex E of the Petition in G.R.
No. 174318.
37[4]
71

petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on
Services.
The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455.38[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined

the
invitation
because
of
prior
commitment.39[7] At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No.
1 earlier quoted.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45

a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested
Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC
Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City
and brought him to the Senate premises
where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the

Supreme Court a petition for habeas
corpus against the Senate Committee on
Services,
their
Chairmen,
Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and
Members. The case was docketed as G.R.
No. 174340.
I S S U E S:
Is the refusal of the petitioners to

testify in Congress by virtue of EO No. 1,
Section 4 [b] violates the constitutional
provision on information on matters of
public concern?
2008
the
power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff
from testifying in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding, thus:
No
member
or
staff
of
the
Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance.
Such
provision
of
EO
No.
1
is
unconstitutional because
it violates the
constitutional provision ensuring the
peoples access to information on matters
of public
1-A. BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT

VS.
COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1
The
petitioner
requested
the
COMELEC to publish the individual
nominees of all the party-list groups in
order that they will be guided on what
party-list group shall be supported by
them. The COMELEC held that under the
Party-list Act, such list of nominees is
confidential and should not be published.
Held:
The COMELEC should publish the
list of nominees of all the party-list
groups. This is in accordance with the
right to information on matters of public
concern which shall be accorded to every
citizen.
2. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, GR No.
74930, February 13, 1989 in relation
to the Right to Privacy
Cortes, J.
H E L D:
Yes.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 which was

invoked by the petitioners in support of
their refusal to testify in the Senate limits
38[6]
Annex F of the Petition in G.R.
No. 174318.
39[7]
Annex G of the Petition in G.R.
No. 174318.
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1986, petitioner Valmonte
wrote the respondent asking the latter to
furnish him copies of former members of
the Batasang Pambansa who were able to
secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior
to the February 7, 1986 elections;
2. On June 17, 1986, respondent through
counsel refused to give the petitioner a list
of said lawmakers who obtained "clean
loans" from the GSIS on the ground that
there is a confidential relationship
between the GSIS and its borrowers and it
72
2008
would be proper for them to preserve the

same;
denied except under limitations prescribed

by law.
3. On July 19, 1986, the petitioners filed

this instant petition.
Petitioners are members of the media.

As such, they have both the right to
gather and the obligation to check the
accuracy
of
the
information
they
disseminate x x x
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case should be
dismissed
for
failure
to
exhaust
administrative remedies?
2. Whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the documents sought in
accordance with their constitutional right
to information?
Held:
1. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that
before a party can be allowed to resort to
the courts, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative
redress available under the law.
In the case at bar, the decision of the
General Manager
of the GSIS is
appealable/reviewable by the GSIS Board
of Trustees. Petitioners did not ask the
Board of Trustees to review the decision of
the respondent.
However, the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable
when only questions of law is involved.
(Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466; Aguilar vs. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359.
This is not the first time that the court
is confronted with a case involving the
right to information. In Tanada vs. Tuvera,
136 SCRA 27, we upheld the citizen's right
to information as well as in Legaspi vs.
CSC, 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the
government officers involved to act as
prayed for by the petitioners. The
pertinent provision of the Constitution is
Section 7, Art. III which provides:
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions x x x shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided for by law.
The postulate of public office is a
public trust as institutionalized in the
Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. XI) to protect
the people from abuse of governmental
power, would certainly be empty words if
access to information of public concern is
The right to information is an essential

premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that
the right to information is merely an
adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedom
of speech and of the press. Far from it.
The right to information goes hand in
hand with the constitutional policies of
"full public disclosure" and "honesty in the
public service".
Yet, like all the constitutional
guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. It is subject to limitations
provided for by law and the people's right
to information is limited to "matters of
public concern". Similarly, the State's
policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest" and
subject
to
"reasonable
conditions
prescribed by law."
The information sought to be obtained
by the petitioners affect public interest
since the GSIS is
the trustee of
contributions from the government and its
employees. The funds of the GSIS assume
a public character and that its obligations
are guaranteed by the government.
The petitioners are entitled to access
to
documents
sought
subject
to
reasonable
regulations
that
the
respondent may impose relating to
manner and hours of examination, to the
end that damage or loss of the records
may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the
right of other persons entitled to inspect
the records may be insured [Legaspi vs.
CSC, supra; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.
383]
he petitioners, however, are not
entitled to be furnished copies of list of
alleged
members
of
the
Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure clean
loans through the intercessions of Pres.
Marcos and the First Lady. This is so
because access to public records does not
include the right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to
73

acquire information on matters of public
concern.
The respondent is therefore ordered to
allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to
members of the Batasang Pambansa, as
petitioners may specify, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations as the
GSIS may deem necessary.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by
SENATE
PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN
DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No.
16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative
power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid
of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in
Government
Owned
and
Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the
Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear
on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National
Machinery
and
Equipment
Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project).
The
public hearing was sparked by a privilege
speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President of
the
Philippines
issued
E.O.
464,
ENSURING
OBSERVANCE
OF
THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS,
ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS
OF
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION,
AND
FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES, which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately.
The
2008
salient provisions of the Order are as

follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of

Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation
of powers between co-equal branches of
the
government,
all
heads
of
departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage
of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of
confidentiality
based
on
executive
privilege is fundamental to the operation
of government and rooted in the
separation
of
powers
under
the
Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further,
Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides that
Public Officials and Employees shall not
use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made
available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.
(b) Who are covered. The following
are covered by this executive order:
1.
Senior officials of
executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege;
2.
Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege;
3.
Philippine
National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief
of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
4.
Senior
national
security officials who in the judgment of
74

the National Security Adviser are covered
by the executive privilege; and
5.
Such other officers
as may be determined by the President.
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the
right of the people to information on
matters of public concern; and
H E L D:
E.O
464
likewise
violates
the
constitutional provision on the right to
information on matters of public concern.
There are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the
right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does
the right to information grant a citizen the
power
to
exact
testimony
from
government officials.
These powers
belong only to Congress and not to an
individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in
aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, however, any executive issuance
tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information
in
such
investigations
necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. The citizens are
thereby denied access to information
which they can use in formulating their
own opinions on the matter before
Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and
other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression.
Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be
responsive to the peoples will. Yet,
this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate
its will intelligently.
Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of
the issues and have access to information
2008
relating thereto can such bear fruit.40

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people
to information as a consequence of E.O.
464 is, therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its violation of the
legislatures power of inquiry.
1-a. Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530
1-b. Brilliantes vs. Chang, Aug. 14,
1990
1-c. Canlas vs. Vazquez, July 3,
1990
1-d. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Manuel
Morato, November 13, 1991
2. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 44
3. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14
4. Lantaco vs. Lllamas, 108 SCRA 502
5. Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383
CHAPTER IX - THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN
ASSOCIATIONS
Section 8. The right of the people,
including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
1. Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100
2. The fundamental
organization,108 SCRA
right
390
of
self-
3. The right
of self-organization
managerial employees,47 SCRA 434
of
4. Read:
1. In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554
2. Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93
3. Samahan ng Manggagawa vs.
Noriel, 108 SCRA 381
4. Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983
5. P. vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
6. P. vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read
the dissenting
opinion of Justice
FERNANDO in both cases)
CHAPTER X - THE POWER

OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Section 9. Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just
compensation
1. The inherent power
domain,93 SCRA 663
of
eminent
G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989,

170 SCRA 256.
40
75

2. Who may exercise it? How about a
barangay? Yes provided there is an
approval of the President.
Read:
1. Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias,
148 SCRA 83
2.
Procedure for the exercise of said
power; Extent of payment to be made
before writ of possession shall be issued in
favor of the government.
Value of property expropriated for
national projects; Writ of possession when
it shall be issued by the court; when Rule
67 of the Rules of Court and when RA
8974 shall apply; full payment of just
compensation before government takes
over.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474
Tinga, J.
Facts:
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN
VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612 that the
CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE
BUILD
OPERATE
TRANSFER
ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER
TERMINAL II between the Philippine
Government
and
the
Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) as well as the amendments
thereto is void for being contrary to law
and
public
policy. On Motion for
Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420), the
Supreme Court held that:
This Court, however, is not
unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are
almost complete and that funds have been
spent by PIATCO in their construction. For
the government to take over the said
facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE
RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF
THE
SAID
STRUCTURES.
THE
COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN
NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT
THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS
INVESTORS.
On December 21, 2004, the
Government
filed
a
complaint
for
expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City
2008
seeking a writ of possession authorizing to

take immediate possession and control
over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the
amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank
of the Philippines representing the
assessed value of the terminals assessed
value for taxation purposes.
On the same day, Judge Gingoyon
issued an Order directing the issuance of a
writ of possession to the government to
take or enter upon the possession of the
NAIA 3 facilities. It held that it is the
ministerial duty of the government to
issue writ of possession upon deposit of
the assessed value of the property subject
of expropriation.
However, on January 4, 2005,
Judge Gingoyon issued another Order
supplementing the December 21, 2004
Order. It pointed out that the earlier
orderas to the amount to be deposited by
the government was based on Section 2,
Rule 67 when what should be applicable is
RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the
amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released
to PIATCO instead of the amount in the
December 21, 2004 Order.
On January 7, 2005, Judge
Gingoyon issued another Order directing
the
appointment
of
three
(3)
Commissioners
to
determine
just
compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.
Both Orders were questioned by
the government as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
1. What law is applicable in this
expropriation case: Rule 67 of the
Rules
of
Court
or
RA
8974?
2. If RA 8974 will be used, may
the court used the provision of Rule
67 on the 3 commissioners to
determine just compensation.
HELD:
1.
Application of Rule 67 would violate the
AGAN Doctrine which provides that for
the government to take over the said
NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE
RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF
THE SAID STRUCTURES. If Section 2,
Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be
enjoined
from
receiving
the
just
compensation even if the government
takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is
sufficient that the government deposits
76

the amount equal to the assessed value of
the facilities. It would violate the
proscription in the AGAN Decision that the
government must pay first the
just
compensation before taking over the
facilities.
So when shall Rule 67 be used in
expropriation cases and when shall RA
8974 be used?
In all National government projects
or national infrastructure projects,
like those covered by the Build-OperateTransfer, RA 8974 shall be followed. The
rest, Rule 67 shall apply.
Differences between the two laws on
expropriation:
a.
Under Rule 67, the government
merely deposits the assessed value of
the property subject of expropriation and
can have a writ of possession over the
same while under RA 8974, the scheme of
immediate payment (100%)
shall be
followed.
b.
Under Rule 67, there can be writ of
possession even if the owner of the
property has not received a single centavo
while under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ
of Possession may not be issued in favor
of the government UNTIL ACTUAL
RECEIPT by PIATCO of the proferred value
of just compensation.
Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the
government, however, it could already
exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA
3 facilities.
The just compensation to be paid
by the government shall be determined
within 60 days from the finality of the
decision based on Section 4, RA 8974.
2
Rule 67 on the appointment of
three (3) commissioners to determine just
compensation may be used since RA 8974
does not provide for such procedure.
Just Compensation; Amount to be

deposited in court before a Writ of
Possession may be issued by the court in
favor of the government; When to apply
Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. 8974;
Who owns the interest of the initial
amount deposited for the purpose of
issuing writ of possession
2008

HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 172410,
April 14, 2008
THE FACTS:
On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC
a
Consolidated
Complaint
for
Expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion
of the North Luzon Expressway. The suit
was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos,
Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty
and Development Corporation (HTRDC)
was one of the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ
of
Possession,
manifesting
that
it
deposited a sufficient amount to cover the
payment of 100% of the zonal value of
the affected properties, in the total
amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
government depository. TRB maintained
that since it had already complied with the
provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
897441[5] in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial on
the part of the RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an
Order for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the
RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit,
praying that the respondent or its duly
authorized representative be allowed to
withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00,
out of TRBs
advance deposit of
P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor,
including the interest which accrued
thereon.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of
the principal amount together with the
interest to the respondent but on Motion
for Reconsideration of the TRB, it
disallowed the withdrawal of the interest
reasoning out that the said issue will be
included
in
the
second
stage
of
expropriation, that is, the determination of
just compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue
to the Court of Appeals which ruled that
41
77

the respondent is entitled to the interest
by way of accession.
Hence, this petition of the government
before the Supreme Court.
I S S U E:
Who has the right over the interest
of the amount deposited representing the
zonal value of the property sought to be
expropriated? The expropriator or the
landowner?
HELD:
2008
to make an initial deposit with an

authorized government depositary.
Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the
initial deposit be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No.
8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the
market value of the property as stated in
the tax declaration or the current relevant
zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and
the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost
method.
The petition is without merit.
xxxx
The TRB claims that there are two

stages42[11] in expropriation proceedings,
the determination of the authority to
exercise
eminent
domain
and
the
determination of just compensation. The
TRB argues that it is only during the
second stage when the court will appoint
commissioners and determine claims for
entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Wycoco43[12] and
National Power Corporation v. Angas.44[13]
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under

which eminent domain may be exercised
by the Government. Yet by no means does
it serve at present as the solitary guideline
through which the State may expropriate
private property. For example, Section 19
of the Local Government Code governs as
to the exercise by local government units
of the power of eminent domain through
an enabling ordinance. And then there is
Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers
expropriation proceedings intended for
national
government
infrastructure
projects.
The TRB further points out that the

expropriation account with LBP-South
Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but
of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation
account includes the compensation for the
other landowners named defendants in
Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not
exclusively belong to respondent.
The said argument is without merit
because it failed to distinguish between
the
expropriation
procedures
under
Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of
different procedures, with the former
specifically
governing
expropriation
proceedings for national government
infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic
v. Gingoyon,45[14] we held:
There are at least two crucial differences
between the respective procedures under
Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under
the statute, the Government is
required to make immediate payment
to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a
writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only
42
43
44
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a

procedure eminently more favorable to
the property owner than Rule 67,
inescapably applies in instances when the
national
government
expropriates
property
for
national
government
infrastructure
projects.
Thus,
if
expropriation is engaged in by the
national government for purposes other
than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit
mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to
apply.
There is no question that the proceedings
in this case deal with the expropriation of
properties
intended
for
a
national
government
infrastructure
project.
Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the
procedure laid out in Republic Act No.
8974, by requiring the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal
value of the properties sought to be
expropriated before the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of the Republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from
the amount of the deposit, but as to the
ownership of the interest that had since
accrued on the deposited amount.
45
78

Whether the Court of Appeals was correct
in holding that the interest earned by the
deposited amount in the expropriation
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue
of accession, hinges on the determination
of who actually owns the deposited
amount, since, under Article 440 of the
Civil Code, the right of accession is
conferred by ownership of the principal
property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives
the right by accession to everything which
is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is
part of the deposited amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH which
pertains particularly to HTRDC.
Such
amount,
determined
to
be
P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00
total deposit, was already ordered by the
RTC to be released to HTRDC or its
authorized representative. The Court of
Appeals further recognized that the
deposit of the amount was already
deemed a constructive delivery thereof to
HTRDC:
When
the
[herein
petitioner]
TRB
deposited the money as advance payment
for the expropriated property with an
authorized government depositary bank
for purposes of obtaining a writ of
possession, it is deemed to be a
constructive delivery of the amount
corresponding
to
the
100%
zonal
valuation of the expropriated property.
Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and
undisputably the owner of the principal
amount deposited by [herein petitioner]
TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as
accession, in a bank deposit should
likewise pertain to the owner of the
money deposited.46[15]
Since the Court of Appeals found that the
HTRDC is the owner of the deposited
amount, then the latter should also be
entitled to the interest which accrued
thereon.
The deposit was made in order to comply
with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974,
which requires nothing less than the
immediate payment of 100% of the value
of the property, based on the current
zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property
2008
owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in

Republic v. Gingoyon47[16]:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974
to supersede the system of deposit under
Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate
payment in cases involving national
government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of
effecting delivery which gives legal effect
to the act is the actual intention to deliver
on the part of the party making such
delivery.48[17] The intention of the TRB in
depositing such amount through DPWH
was
clearly
to
comply
with
the
requirement of immediate payment in
Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could
already secure a writ of possession over
the properties subject of the expropriation
and commence implementation of the
project. In fact, TRB did not object to
HTRDCs Motion to Withdraw Deposit with
the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1)
that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that respondent is
the absolute owner thereof.49[18]
A close scrutiny of TRBs arguments
would further reveal that it does not
directly challenge the Court of Appeals
determinative pronouncement that the
interest earned by the amount deposited
in the expropriation account accrues to
HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only
asserts that HTRDC is entitled only to an
amount equivalent to the zonal value of
the expropriated property, nothing more
and nothing less.
We agree in TRBs statement since it is
exactly how the amount of the immediate
payment
shall
be
determined
in
accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the
expropriated properties.
However, TRB
already complied therewith by depositing
the required amount in the expropriation
account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor.
By depositing the said amount, TRB is
already considered to have paid the same
to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner
thereof. The amount earned interest after
the deposit; hence, the interest should
pertain to the owner of the principal who
is already determined as HTRDC.
The
interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on
the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim
that it paid an amount more than what it
is required to do so by law.
47
48
46
49
79

Since the respondent is the owner of
P22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right of
accession to the interest that had accrued
to the said amount only.
We are not persuaded by TRBs citation of
National Power Corporation v. Angas and
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, in
support of its argument that the issue on
interest is merely part and parcel of the
determination of just compensation which
should be determined in the second stage
of the proceedings only. We find that
neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in
the computation of the legal rate of
interest
on
just
compensation
for
expropriated lands, the applicable law is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which
prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed
the legal rate at 12% per annum. We
ruled in Angas that since the kind of
interest involved therein is interest by way
of damages for delay in the payment
thereof, and not as earnings from loans or
forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the
Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest
shall apply.
In Wycoco, on the other
hand, we clarified that interests in the
form of damages cannot be applied where
there is prompt and valid payment of just
compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve
interest as damages for delay in payment
of just compensation. It concerns interest
earned by the amount deposited in the
expropriation account.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974,
the
implementing
agency
of
the
government pays just compensation
twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of
the complaint, where the amount to be
paid is 100% of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and
(2) when the decision of the court in the
determination
of
just
compensation
becomes final and executory, where the
implementing agency shall pay the owner
the difference between the amount
already paid and the just compensation as
determined by the court (final payment).50
[19]
As a final note, TRB does not object to

HTRDCs withdrawal of the amount of
P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation
account, provided that it is able to show
2008
(1) that the property is free from any lien

or encumbrance and (2) that it is the
absolute owner thereof.51[21]
The said
conditions do not put in abeyance the
constructive delivery of the said amount
to HTRDC pending the latters compliance
therewith. Article 118752[22] of the Civil
Code provides that the effects of a
conditional obligation to give, once the
condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact
to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied
with the given conditions, as determined
by the RTC in its Order53[23] dated 21 April
2003, the effects of the constructive
delivery retroacted to the actual date of
the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH.
BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE

BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2,
RULE 67 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
AND
THE
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE, THE
ONLY
REQUISITES
FOR
THE
IMMEDIATE
ENTRY
BY
THE
GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION
CASES ARE:
a.
the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and
substance; and
b.
the making of a deposit
equivalent to the ASSESSED VALUE OF
THE
PROPERTY
SUBJECT
TO
EXPROPRIATION.
The owners of the expropriated land are
entitled
to
legal
interest
on
the
compensation eventually adjudged from
the date the condemnor takes possession
of the land until the full compensation is
paid to them or deposited in court.
New
Requisites
before
immediate possession or writ of
possession
may
be
issued
in
expropriation cases:
1.
Complaint sufficient in form
and substance; and
2.
Payment of 15% of the Market
value as appearing in the latest Tax
Declaration.
51
52
50
53
80

THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE
LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444
SCRA 269
Requisites before the expropriator is
allowed immediate entry on the property
subject of expropriation if the expropriator
is a local government unit.
The
expropriator
may
immediately
enter
the
property
subject of expropriation proceedings
if the following requisites are present:
1.
the complaint for expropriation
filed in court is sufficient in form and
substance; and
2.
the
expropriator
must
deposit the amount equivalent to
15% of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on
its current tax declaration.
GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176
What is the basis of the just
compensation
for
expropriation
proceedings in connection with the
agrarian
reform
program
of
the
government.
Held:
The taking of private lands
under the agrarian reform program of
the government partakes of the
nature
of
an
expropriation
proceedings. As such, in computing the
just compensation, it is the value of the
land at the time of the taking, not at the
time of the rendition of the judgment,
which should be taken into consideration.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA
637
Just compensation in expropriation
cases; value of the property when?
Just compensation is defined as
the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the
takers gain, but the owners loss.
Market value is that sum of money
which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given
and received therefore.
2008
The
just
compensation
is
determined as of the date of taking
of the property or the filing of the
complaint
for
expropriation,
WHICHEVER COMES FIRST.
4. Basis of just compensation
Read:
1992
1990
1990
a. NPC vs. Jocson, February 25,

a-1. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3,
b. Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1,
c. Reublic vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 572

d. Mun. of Talisay vs. Ramirez, 183
SCRA 528
e. NPC vs. CA, 129 SCRA 665
f. Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA
281
Read also:
1. Meaning of just compensation in
eminent domain
proceedings, 29
SCRA 868
Basis of just compensation (Exceptional
case)
BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
December 14, 1992
Cruz, J.
Facts:
-----1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then
President of Apolinario Apacible School of
Fisheries, a government institution in
Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a
written offer to buy the property of the
latter with an area of 10,640 square
meters for its 5-year expansion program;
2.
That
the
petitioner
expressed
willingness to sell at P50.00 per square
meter in its reply;
3. Viray then requested the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of the Province of
Batangas to appraise the land and the
latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per
square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and
expressed willingness to buy the latter's
property at P32.00 per square meter. The
petitioner, however, stuck to its original
valuation. Later on, it said that its
81

property had in fact appreciated to as
much as P100.00 per square meter;
5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of
the Philippines filed a complaint for the
expropriation of the petitioner's property
and invoked the assessment made by the
Provincial Appraisal Committee of the
Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the
amount of P32.00. The government
likewise sought immediate possession of
the property upon deposit of 10% of the
total assessment in accordance with PD
48;
6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the
purpose of the expropriation but later
abandoned
this
objection
and
concentrated only on what it called the
"underappraisal" of the subject land;
7. The RTC then appointed a panel of
commissioners in accordance with Rule
67, ection 5, of the Rules of Court, to
determine the just compensation to be
paid for the land;
8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of
commissioners submitted its report
to
the trial court and pegged the market
value at P85.00 per square meter;
9. The
Republic of the Philippines
objected and
pointed to three (3)
contracts of sale executed
by the
petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three
(3) tracts of land similar in topography
and adjacent to the property in question
for the unit price of only P19.18 per
square meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners
to convene anew and to
receive
additional evidence. However, in its
second report dated April 1, 1987, the
panel
reiterated
its
original
recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a
total of P904,400.00 for the entire area
sought to be expropriated. The trial court
acting on this recommendation rendered
judgment requiring the Republic to pay
the petitioner the amount of P904,400.00
for the entire area sought to be
expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial
court's decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered a decision REVERSING
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and
declaring that the fair market value which
should be the basis in computing the
amount to be paid by the government to
the petitioner shall be P19.18, the market
value according set by the petitioner if
2008
we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it

executed in favor of three (3) different
individuals;
12. The petitioner
was therefore
constrained to file this instant petition
claiming that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that P19.18 per square meter
should be the basis of the computation
for the just compensation of its property
because:
a. Viray even offered the
amount of
P32.00 per
squaremeter as the fair
market value;
b. that P32.00 per square meter was
the appraised value made by the Office
of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas;
and
c. the complaint itself prays that the
market value be pegged at P32.00 per
square meter.
Issue:
-----WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS
IN THE
COMPUTATION OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION:
P32.00/SQ.
M.
IN
ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF
THE
PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR;
P100.00/SQ.M.
AS CLAIMED BY THE
OWNER;
P85.00/SQ.
M.
AS
RECOMMENDED BY
THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE
COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR
P19.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS
THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT
LOT
SOLD
BY THE PETITIONER TO
THREE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Held.
----The basis in the computation of
just compensation shall be P19.18 per
square meter
or the price which the
petitioner sold its other lots to other
individuals.
This is so because there is no
showing that the petitioner had any
special reason for granting each of the
individual vendees
the
extraordinary
discount amounting to as much as 75%
of its claimed real value of the land. To
all appearances,
they were ordinary
buyers who bought the land for their own
private purposes only and not for the
public purpose invoked by
the
government.
82

The petitioner's claim that the
value as appearing in the deeds of sale
in the three other parcels is not a
reliable index
of just compensation
"because owners usually undervalue the
selling price of the property to lower the
expenses they would have to pay for
capital gains tax and documentary stamps
tax" is practically an admission that it did
not indicate the actual consideration in
the three transactions where it was made
to appear that the price per square meter
was only P19.18. If this was the purpose
of the petitioner when it executed the 3
deeds of sale, then IT IS SURELY HOIST
NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY
SO, FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER
RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON
WITH THE BUYERS.
The Court is disappointed that the
petitioner should demand a higher price
from the republic, which needs the land
for a public purpose, when it was willing to
accept less from the three individual
buyers who had only their private
interests to serve.
2008
Among the factors

to be
considered in arriving at the fair market
value are:
1. cost of acquisition;
2. the current value of like
proerties;
uses;
location; and
thereon.
3. its actual or potential

4. particular case of lands;
5.
their
size, shape,
6.
the
tax
declarations
Finally, note that as held in the

case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA
30, the market value as recommended by
the board of commissioners appointed by
the court were at best only ADVISORY
AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS
FINAL OR BINDING.
2.
3.
4.
5.
use":
NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245

Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987
EPZA vs. Dulay, April 29,l987
Lagunzad vs. CA, 154 SCRA 199
When it is considered for "public
The fact that the petitioner sold the

3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per
square meter which are admittedly of the
same topography as that subject of this
case, it impliedly admitted that the price
for the latter should be the same as the
former. This rule of consistency is best
expressed in the familiar saying, surely
not unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT
IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO
SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.
6. Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 SCRA

461
7. Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 428
8.Cosculluela vs. CA, 164 SCRA 393
Just compensation is defined as the

full and fair equivalent of the proerty
sought to be expropriated (Association of
Small Landowners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The
measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. he compensation, to be just,
must be fair not only to the owner but
also to the taker.
Requisites of taking:
a.
the expropriator must enter the
property;
b.
the entrance must not be for
just a momentary period;
c.
the entry must be under
warrant of color or title;
d.
the property must be devoted
for public use; and
e.
the owner must be ousted from
beneficial use of his land.
2. Ignacio vs. Guererro, 150 SCRA 369
3. Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 597
To determine just compensation,

the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property, to which
should be added the
consequential
benefits which may arise from the
expropriation.
The market value of the property
is the price that may be agreed upon
by the parties willing but not compelled
to enter into a contract of sale.
5. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain

cases
Read:
1.
Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336
6. Not a valid exercise of eminent domain

Read:
1. City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community, 40
Phil. 349 ( A private
property which is devoted to public use
83

may not be expropriated for another
public purpose.)
2.
De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA
660
CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February
12, 1989
Expropriation
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the
Philippines initiated an expropriation
proceedings against the owners of the
houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets, among them Cristina de
Knecht
together
with
Concepcion
Cabarrus,
and
some
other
fifteen
defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P;
2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the
Philippines prayed for the issuance of a
writ of possession of the property to be
expropriated on the ground that it had
already deposited with the PNB 10% of
the amount of compensation stated in the
complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the
Lower Court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into the
properties condemned and created a
committee
to
determine
just
compensation;
3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to
the Supreme Court
on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition directed against
the June 14, 1979 order of the lower
court;
4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme
Court rendered its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and
directing that the Order of the respondent
Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE
and the respondent Judge is permanently
enjoined from taking any further action on
Civil Case No. 7001-P;
5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in
Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the
dismissal of said case since the decision of
the Supreme Court is already final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic
moved for the dismissal of the case due to
the encatment of BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. On
the same date, the Court dismissed the
case. The defendants moved for a
reconsideration which the Court denied;
2008
7. De Knecht appealed the Order

dismissing the case to the Court of
Appeals who on December 28, 1988
issued its decision setting aside the Order
appealed from and dismissing
the
expropriation proceedings before the
lower court on the ground that the choice
of the above-mentioned streets as the line
through which the EDSA should be
extended is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a
Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the legislature could
still pass a law expropriating the lots of
the private respondents despite the
existence of a final decision of the
Supreme Court which held that choice of
their lot to be used as an extension of
EDSA is arbitrary?
Held:
It is true that there is already a final
decision of the Supreme Court to the
effect that the choice of the Fernando
Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval.
However, it is equally true that the
Constitution
and
our
laws
may
expropriate private properties after the
payment of just compensation. When on
February
17,
1983,
the
Batasang
Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating
the same properties for the same purpose,
IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED
ON
SUPERVENING
EVENTS
THAT
OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in
De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social
impact factor which persuaded the Court
to consider this extension has disappeared
because of the fact that the residents of
the area have been relocated and duly
compensated and only DE KNECHT now is
left while her property is only about 5% of
the area to be expropriated. The Republic
could
continue
it
expropriation
proceedings considering the supervening
events after the decision was rendered.
BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE
EFFECTIVELY
SUPERSEDED
THE
AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. X x x
THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND
NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340. THUS
THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT
MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT
LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
84

************************
Cruz, J., concurring
Supervening events have changed the
factual basis of the SC's decision to justify
the subsequent enactment of the statute.
If we are sustaining the legislation, it is
not because we concede that the
lawmakers can nullify the findings of the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is
simply because we ourselves have found
that under the changed situation, the
present expropriation is no longer
arbitrary.
I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS
NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE
KNECHT CASE, WHICH WAS DECIDED
UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February
12, 1989
3-a. Limitations of the power of
expropriation, 3
SCRA 706
7. When shall we base the computation of
the value of the property expropriated: at
the time of taking or at the time of the
institution
of
the
expropriation
proceedings?
8. Eminent domain cases, in general
Read:
1. City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, 106
Phil. 144
2. Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 620
3. Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93
SCRA 503
4. Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734
5. Arce vs. Genito, Feb. 27, 1976
6. Guido vs. RPA, 84 Phil. 847
7. Rep. vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461
8. Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga, 130
SCRA 30
9. San Diego vs. Valdellon, 80 SCRA
305
10. Haguisan vs. Emilia, 131 SCRA 517
11. Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220
12. Commissioner vs. Burgos, March
31,1980
13. Republic vs. Juan, 92 SCRA 29
CHAPTER XI - THE NON-IMPAIRMENT
CLAUSE
2008
Section 10. No law impairing the

obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
1. Read:
1. Kabiling, et al., vs. NHA, December
18,l987
2. Clements vs. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702
3. Co vs. PNB, 114 SCRA 842
4. Lozano vs. Martinez,146 SCRA 323
5. Rutter vs. Esteban,93 Phil. 68
6. Ilusorio vs. CAR, 17 SCRA 25
7. Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533
8. Ganzon vs. Insierto, 123 SCRA 713
9. Del Rosario vs. De los Santos,
March 21, 1968
10. Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 140
11. PVBEU vs. PVB, 189 SCRA 14
CHAPTER XII - RIGHTS DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Rights of a person under custodial
detention for one suspected or arrested
as a terrorist.
Section 21. Rights of a person
under custodial detention.- The moment a
person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy
to
commit
terrorism
is
apprehended or arrested and detained, he
shall forthwith be informed by the
arresting police or law enforcement
officers to whose custody the person
concerned is brought, of his or her right:
1.
to be informed of the nature
and cause of his arrest, to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of
counsel of his or her choice, the police or
law enforcement officers concerned shall
immediately contact the free legal
assistance unit of the IBP or the Public
attorneys office (PAO). It shall be the
duty of the free legal assistance unit of
the IBP or the PAOs thus contacted to
immediately visit the person detained and
provide him with legal assistance. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of the counsel of
choice;
85

2.
informed of the cause or
causes of his detention in the presence of
his legal counsel;
3.
allowed to communicate
freely with his legal counsel and to confer
with them at any time without restriction;
4.
allowed to communicate
freely and privately without restrictions
with the members of his family or with his
nearest relatives and be visited by them;
and
5.
allowed freely to avail of the
services of a physician or physicians of
choice.
Section 23. Requirement for an
official custodial logbook and its contents.The police or other law enforcement
custodial unit in whose care and control
the person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terroriam or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism has been
placed
under
custodial
arrest
and
detention shall keep a securely and
orderly maintained official logbook, which
is hereby declared as public document and
opened and made available for inspection
and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of
the person under custody or any member
of his family or relative by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree or his
physician at any time of the day without
any form of restriction. The logbook shall
contain a clear and concise record of:
1.
name,
description,
and
address of the detained person;
2.
date and exact time of his
initial admission for custodial arrest and
detention;
3.
the name and address of
the physician/s who examined him
physically and medically;
4.
the state of his health and
his physical condition a the time of his
initial admission for custodial detention;
5.
the date and time of each
removal of the detained person from his
cell for interrogation or for any purpose;
6.
the date and time of his
return to his cell;
7.
name and address of the
physician who examined him physically
and medically;
8.
summary of the physical
and
medical
findings
after
each
interrogation;
9.
names and addresses of the
members of his family and relatives;
10.
names and addresses of the
persons who visited him;
11.
date and time of such visits;
12.
date and time when the
detained
person
requested
to
communicate or confer with his lawyer;
2008
13.
the date and time of visits
by his legal counsel and the date and time
of departure; and
14.
all other important events
bearing on all relevant details regarding
the treatment of the detained person
while under custodial arrest or detention.
Section 24. No torture or coercion
in Investigation and interrogation.
No
threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no
act which will inflict any form of physical
pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure on the detained
person which shall vitiate his free will shall
be employed in his investigation and
interrogation; otherwise, the evidence
obtained from said detained person shall
be in its entirety, absolutely not
admissible and usable as evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative
investigation,
inquiry,
proceeding or hearing.
1.
The summary of the rights of an
accused during custodial investigation
(from the time of arrest)
PEOPLE
February 1, 1999
VS.
MAHINAY,
Rights of the accused during custodial

investigation; obligations of the arresting
officers and investigators during and after
arrest; effect of non-compliance by the
investigators
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
MAHINAY, G.R. No. 122485, February 1,
1999
En Banc
Per Curiam:
Considering the heavy penalty
of death and in order to ensure that
evidence against an accused were
obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the
people, lays down the PROCEDURE,
GUIDELINES, AND DUTIES WHICH
THE
ARRESTING,
DETAINING,
INVITING
OR
INVESTIGATING
OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS MUST
OBSERVE AT THE TIME OF MAKING
THE ARREST AND AGAIN AT AND
DURING
THE
TIME
OF
THE
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
OR
INTERROGATION IN ACCORDANCE
with the Constitution, jurisprudence
and Republic Act No. 7438. It is high
time to educate our law enforcement
agencies who neglect either by
86

ignorance or indifference the
called Miranda rights which
become insufficient and which
court must update in the light of
legal developments.
sohad
the
new
1.
The person arrested, detained,
invited or under custodial investigation
must be informed in a language known to
and understood by him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown a copy
of the warrant of arrest, if any; Every
other
warnings,
information
or
communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2.
He must be warned that he has
the right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3.
He must be informed that he
has the right to be assisted at all times
and have the presence of an independent
and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4.
He must be informed that if he
has no lawyer or cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, one will be provided
for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5.
That whether or not the person
arrested has a lawyer, , he must be
informed that no custodial investigation in
any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6.
The person arrested must be
informed that, at any time, he has the
right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means---telephone, radio,
letter or messenger---with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any
member of his immediate family; or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen
by him or by any one from his immediate
family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national or
international
non-governmental
organization.
IT
SHALL
BE
THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO
ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED;
7.
He must be informed that he
has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
2008
8.
In addition, if the person
arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he
must be informed that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
9.
That the person arrested must
be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or state of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with the warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation has
begun;
10.
The person arrested must be
informed that his initial waiver of his right
to remain silent, the right to counsel or
any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any other time during the
process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some questions or
volunteered
some
information
or
statements;
11.
He must be informed that any
statement OR EVIDENCE, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing,
whether
inculpatory
or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, SHALL BE
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
(NOTE: Any violation of the foregoing
rights of the accused shall entitle him to
sue for damages against the arresting or
investigating officers in accordance with
RA7438, not to mention the possible
criminal liability of said persons under
existing laws).
LATEST CASES ON THE RIGHTS OF A
PERSON DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
Rights during custodial investigation;
when custodial investigation is deemed to
have started; right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against
him.

JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475
SCRA 248
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
87

For
allegedly
diverting
and
collecting funds of the National Power
Corporation intended for the purchase of
US Dollars from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), the accusedappellants were charged of Malversation
through
Falsification
of
Commercial
Documents as defined and penalized
under Arts. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After
trial, all accused were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.
While the Information charged the
accused
of willful and intentional
commission of the acts complained of
while the Decision found the accused
guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Accused Ochoa interposed an
appeal and claimed that his conviction was
based on his alleged sworn statement and
the transcript of stenographic notes of a
supposed interview with an NPC personnel
and the report of the NBI. He maintains
that he signed the sworn statement while
confined a the Philippine heart center and
upon assurance that it would not be used
against him. He was not assisted by
counsel nor he was apprised of his
constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit. He likewise claimed that his
constitutional rights to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against
and due process were violated.
2008
rights enumerated by the accused are not

available
BEFORE
GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE.
The protective mantle of section 12,
article III does not apply to administrative
investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson,
175 SCRA 216); confession to a private
individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53);
verbal admission made to a radio
announcer who was not a part of the
investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334
SCRA 673);
or even to a Mayor
approached as a personal confidante and
not in his official capacity (People vs.
Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In fact, even a
videotaped interview where the accused
willingly admit his guilt in the presence of
newsmen is not covered by the said
provision though the trial courts were
warned by the supreme Court to take
extreme caution in admitting similar
confessions because of the distinct
possibility that the police, with the
connivance
of
unscrupulous
media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule
by having an accused admit an offense on
television (People vs. Endino, 353
SCRA 307).
Clearly, the confession of the accused was
obtained
during
an
administrative
investigation by NPC and therefore, the
same was not covered by Section 12, Art.
III of the Constitution.
Held:
1.
Even if the information charges
willful
malversation,
conviction
for
malversation through negligence may still
be adjudged if the evidence ultimately
proves that mode of commission of the
offense. (Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302
SCRA 118). This was the doctrine laid
down in the case of Samson vs. Court of
appeals, 103 Phil. 277.
2.
The claim that his affidavit is
inadmissible in evidence in accordance
with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is
not tenable. The investigation under said
provision refers to custodial investigation
where a suspect has already been taken
into police custody and that the
investigating
officers
begin
to
ask
questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the
suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial
investigation refers to the critical pre-trial
stage when the investigation ceases to be
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has began to focus on a particular
person as a suspect (People vs. Duenas,
Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly, therefore, the
PEOPLE VS. FIGUEROA, 335

SCRA 349
Under Art. III, Section 12 [1] of
the Constitution, a suspect in custodial
investigation must be:
1.
informed of his right to
remain silent;
2.
warned that anything he
says can be and will be used against him;
3.
told that he has the
right to counsel, and that if he is indigent,
a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him.
In this case, accused-appellant was
given no more than a perfunctory
recitation of his rights, signifying nothing
more than a feigned compliance with the
constitutional requirements. (People vs.
Samolde, July 31, 2000)
It is always incumbent on the
prosecution to prove at the trial that, prior
to in-custody questioning, the confessant
was informed of his constitutional rights.
88

The presumption of regularity of official
acts
does
not
prevail
over
the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Hence, in the absence of proof that the
arresting officers complied with the above
constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial
statements,
whether
inculpatory
or
exculpatory, made during the custodial
investigation, are inadmissible not only
against the DECLARANT but with more so
against 3rd persons. THIS IS SO EVEN IF
SUCH STATEMENTS ARE GOSPEL TRUTH
AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.
Such
statements
are
useless
EXCEPT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
VERY POLICE AUTHORITIES WHO
VIOLATED THE SUSPECTS RIGHTS.
PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341
SCRA 600
When custodial investigation is
deemed to have started.
The protection under Section 12 ,
Art. III of the Constitution begins when a
person is taken into custody for
investigation of his possible participation
in the commission of a crime, or from the
time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime, although not yet
in custody.
Custodial
investigation
begins
when it is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the
police
investigator
starts
i9nterrogating or exacting confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense.
THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION
IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE
EXISTENCE
OR
ABSENCE
OF
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE
TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING
BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. Thus,
there was custodial investigation when the
police authorities, upon their arrest of
some of the accused, immediately asked
them regarding their participation in the
commission of the crime , even while they
were still walking along the highway on
their way to the police station. This is line
with the provisions of RA 7438 which
makes it applicable even when a person is
merely invited for questioning.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO.
117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1,
2000; PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO.
2008
135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER

29, 2000.
However, spontaneous statements
voluntarily given, as where appellant
orally admitted killing the victim before
the barangay captain (who is neither a
police officer nor a law enforcement
agent), do not fall under custodial
investigation.
Such
admission,
even
without the assistance of a lawyer, does
not violate appellants constitutional rights
AND
THEREFORE
ADMISSIBLE
IN
EVIDENCE.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO.

117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1,
2000; PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R. NO.
128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31,
2000.
To be admissible in evidence, an
extrajudicial confession
must be: (i)
voluntary; (ii) made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (iii)
express; and (iv) in writing.
A suspects confession, whether
verbal or non-verbal, when taken without
the assistance of counsel, without a valid
waiver of such assistance, regardless of
the absence of coercion or the fact that it
had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible
in evidence, even if appellants confession
were gospel truth.
2. Guidelines for police investigation
Read:
1.Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478
2. Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436
3. P. vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
2-a. Duties of the Police or Arresting
Officers
Read:
1. P. vs. Matos-Viduya, Sept. 11,
1990
1-a. P vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289
2. P vs. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100
3. P vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2
4. P vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312
3. To be informed of the Right to remain
silent; cases in particular
Read:
89

1. Constitutional right to remain
silent,104 SCRA
391
1-a. People vs. Marcos Jimenez,
Dec. 10, 1991
Extrajudicial confession; counsel of choice
Right
to
counsel
during
custodial
investigation;
while
making
an
extrajudicial confession
PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA
413
The accused was under coercive
and uncounselled custodial investigation
by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a
half days . Then, he was brought to the
IBP Office where a lawyer would assist
him in his extrajudicial confession.
We are inclined to believe that
when he was brought to the IBP
Office, his body and his will were in
no position to raise any objection
much less to complaint to the IBP
lawyer about what he has gone
through. In fact, the IBP lawyer was
working on an appeal in another case
while the extrajudicial confession was
being taken.
The mere presence of a lawyer is
not
sufficient
compliance
with
the
constitutional requirement of assistance of
counsel. Assistance of counsel must be
effective, vigilant and independent. A
lawyer
who
could
just
hear
the
investigation going on while working on
another case hardly satisfies the minimum
requirements of effective assistance of
counsel. Not only was the accused
subjected
to
custodial
investigation
without counsel, he was likewise denied
effective assistance of counsel during the
taking of his extra-judicial confession.
PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ
G.R.No. 82604. December 10, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
----------On August 13, 1985, police
authorities, acting upon a report, came
upon the corpse of Pelagio Jimenez below
a cliff near a balite tree. The police
investigators learned that Marcos, the son
of the deceased Pelagio Jimenez told his
mother that his father had not come home
the previous night: that the search for the
2008
deceased, who was living separately from

them, commmenced a day earlier but it
was not until the morning of the following
day, August 13, 1985, that deceased
Pelagio was finally found dead. They also
learned from the persons they interviewed
of circumstances that drew their suspicion
to the son, Marcos and Robert, such as;
the bathing at the artisian well "as if
washing away stains of blood";the
deceased's violent quarrels with his
children and occasions that he had been
boxed and hit by his children. The police
had invited the deceased's widow and her
sons for questioning about the killing.
Adraft of the confession was prepared by
the investigating officer but Marcos was
not able to sign the same due to the
absence of the judge before whom it is
suppoed to be sworn and signed. Marcos
agreed to come back and sign his
statement, but upon his return, he,
assisted by a former judge whose
presence was requested by the police
authorities, refused to sign his statement.
Subsequently, an information for parricide
was filed against the widow and her sons,
Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins. In an order
dated July 21, 1986, the trial court
absolved the widow and Wilkins of any
participation in the filling for lack of proof.
On December 12. 1986, the trial court
found Marcos and Robert guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide,
noting that the unsigned confession is
admissible in evidence inasmuch as
evidence
aliunde
corroborated
such
confession. Both accused contest such
ruling. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
---------Is the extrajudicial confession of
Marcos admissible in evidence?
HELD:
--------No. Decision reversed.
Section 12 (1), Article III OF THE
1987 Constitution declares that a person
being investigated by the police as
a
suspect in an offense has the right, among
others, (1) to have a competent
and
independent counsel of his own choice and
if he cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one; and that
(2) said right cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
The lawyer who assists the suspect
under custodial interrogation should be of
the latter's own choice, not one foisted on
90

him by the police investigators or other
parties. In this case, the former judge
whose assistance was requested by the
police was evidently not of Marcos
Jimenez' own choice; she was the police
officers' own choice; she did not ask
Marcos if was is willing to have her
represent him. This is not the mode of
solicitation
of
legal
assistance
contemplated by the constitution.
Furthermore, the former judge was
not present when Marcos was being
interrogated by the police. While she
asked him if he had voluntarily given the
statements contained in the typewritten
document, this is far from being
substantial
compliance
with
the
constitutional duty of police investigators
during custodial interrogation.
The typewritten confession is
unsigned and was in fact expressly
rejected by Marcos. Hence, the supposed
waiver made therein of his constitutional
right to counsel of his own choice.
Neither
can
the
confession
prejudice his co-accused, his brother
Robert, not only because it was obtained
in violation of the constitution but also
because of the principle of res inter alios
acta.
The
interrogation
of
Marcos
Jimenez having been conducted without
the assistance of counsel, and no valid
waiver of such right to counsel have been
made, not only the confession but also
any admissible obtained in the course
therof are inadmissible against him or his
co accused. In view of the inadmissibility
in evidence of the confession, the rest of
the evidence of the prosecution is
inadequate to overcome the presumption
of innocence raised by the fundamental
law in favor of both the accused.
Extrajudicial
confession
without
the
assistance of counsel, inadmissible as
evidence; exception
PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284
SCRA 199; PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286 SCRA
207
Melo, J.
Even if the confession of the
accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it was
voluntarily given.
2008
In order that a confession is

admissible, the following requisites must
be present:
a.
the
confession
must
be
voluntary;
b.
the confession must be made
with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel;
c.
the
confession
must
be
express; and
d.
the confession must be in
writing.
The above requirements, however,
are not applicable when the suspect
makes an spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning
by the
authorities, BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY
MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY
ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE
CRIME. This was the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS.
ANDAN, March 3, 1997 when the accused
made a voluntary and verbal confession to
the Municipal Mayor that he committed
the crime imputed to him. As such, his
uncounselled confession is admissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190
Mendoza, J.
There are two (2) kinds of
involuntary or coerced confessions under
Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
These are:
a.
confession
which
are
the
product of third degree methods such as
torture,
force,
violence,
threat,
intimidation; and
b.
those which are given without
the benefit of Miranda Warnings.
There
is
no
compliance
of
the
constitutional requirement of competent
and independent counsel to assist an
accused during custodial investigation
when the accused was assisted by the
Station Commander of the WPD, Atty. De
los Reyes, while being investigated by
other policemen of the same police station
because the interest of the police is
naturally adverse to the accused. In fact,
the SC in the case of PEOPLE VS.
JANUARIO, 267 SCRA 608 held that a
lawyer applying for a position in the NBI
could not validly assist an accused being
investigated then by the NBI.
1-b. P. vs. Aspili, November 21,
1990
91

1-c. People vs. Judge Ayson,
175 SCRA 216
1-d. P. vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675
1-e. People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA
47
1-f. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162
SCRA 675
2. P. vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
3. P vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109
4. Draculan vs. Donato, 85 SCRA 266
5. P. vs. Borromeo, June 29,l983
6. P vs. Camalog, GR No. 77116,
January 31, 1989
(Including the duty of Police Officers
in
connection with said right)
7. P vs. Cui, Jr., 162 SCRA 220
3-a. How about if the accused gives an
spontaneous statement before he could be
advised of his right to remain silent?
Read:
Aballe vs. People, 183 SCRA 196
3-b. When shall the constitutional rights of
the
accused as mentioned above
demandable? During police line-up?
Read:
1. P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261
2. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA
642
3. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA
196
4. PEOPLE VS. HATTON
The right to counsel;
PEOPLE VS. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393
A lawyer provided by the investigators to
the
accused
during
the
custodial
investigation is deemed engaged by the
accused where he never raised any
objection
against
the
formers
appointment during the course of the
investigation
AND
THE
ACCUSED
THEREAFTER
SUBSCRIBES
TO
THE
VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE
THE SWEARING OFFICER.
(NOTE: In the case of PEOPLE VS.
JUANERIO, February 7, 1997, the SC
held that a lawyer who was at the NBI
Office applying for a position therein and
who was appointed as counsel for a
suspect being then investigated by the
NBI
could not be considered as the
competent and independent counsel
referred to in the Constitution especially
so that later on, said lawyer was
appointed by the NBI as one of its
agents.)
2008
Read also:
1. The right to counsel, 57 SCRA 481
1-a. P vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623
1-b. P vs. Hernandez, 162 SCRA 422
1-c. P. vs. Ampo-an, July 4, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Saludar, July 31, 1990
1-e. P. vs. Kidagan, August 20,
1990
1-f. Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan,
183 SCRA 12
1-g. P. vs. Buenaflor, 181 SCRA
225
2. P vs. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624
3. P vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373
4. P vs. Tawat, 129 SCRA 431
5. P vs. Marcos, 147 SCRA 204 (Note
that this
decision is widely criticized by
constitutionalists)
6. P vs. Ladrera, 150 SCRA 113
7. P. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471
8. P vs. Marquez, 153 SCRA 700
9. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
10. P vs. Caguioa, January 17, 1980
ll. P vs. Pecardal, 145 SCRA 624
12. P vs. Lasac, 148 SCRA 624
13. P vs. Pena, 80 SCRA 589
14. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516
How about if the lawyer who
assisted him during custodial investigation
is a public attorney who was not chosen
by the accused himself but given to him
free of charge?
Read:
P. vs. Alegria, September
28, 1990
Could the Fiscal also represent the
accused during custodial investigation to
satisfy the requirement of the Constitution
that the accused is assisted by counsel?
Read:
P. vs. Matos-Viduaya, September
11, 1990
5. Right to remain silent and to counsel
and the right
to be informed of such
rights; cases in general/when does these
rights demandable? Effect of its nonobservance by the investigator
Read:
1. P vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123
1-a. P vs. Lasanas, 152 SCRA 27
1-b. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
1-c. P vs. Capitin, 165 SCRA 47
1-a. Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
1-b. P vs. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760
1-c. P vs. Velasco, 110 SCRA 319
92

2. Diokno vs. Enrile, 110 SCRA 140
3. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA
538
4. P vs. Rojas, January 8, l987
5. P vs. Santiago, January 7,1987
6. P vs. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496
5-a. Is the right to counsel indispensable
in non-criminal proceedings?
Read:
1
1. Nera vs. Auditor Genral, 164 SCRA
6.
Presumptions
on
confessions(that
official
regularly performed as
presumption
against
constitutional rights)
extrajudicial
acts
were
against the
waiver
of
Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
the
not apply
Duero, 104 SCRA 379

Jara, 144 SCRA 516
Abano, 145 SCRA 555
Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
Salig, 133 SCRA 59
Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651
Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when
presumption of regularity does
7. Who can object to the admissibility of

an
extrajudicial confession?
Read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 576
3. P. vs. loveria, July 2, 1990
8. Inadmissible as evidence
a. The doctrine of the "fruit of the
poisoned
tree"
PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y
CAMACHO
GR No. 125333, March 20, 2002
En Banc
Facts:
1.
In the morning of September
19, 1995, accused-appellant and his
cousin, RONNIE GARCIA were drinking gin
in a canteen in Urdaneta, Pangasinan;
2.
At around 10 a.m. of the same
day, Rosita Mangunay saw both persons
walking along Ambrosio St., in the
2008
poblacion and noticed that they smelled

liquor when they greeted her;
3.
In the early afternoon of the
same day, accused-appellant and his
cousin went to look for 6-year old Maria
Lourdes Galinato, also known as Tisay and
found her playing inside a jeepney and
took her;
4.
At around 2:45 p.m. of the
same day, Mangunay again saw the
accused-appellant walking along Ambrosio
St., carrying Tisay who was crying and
struggling. She claimed that she clearly
saw the accused-appellant since they were
walking towards each other coming from
opposite directions;
5.
Before 3 to 4 p.m., prosecution
witness Natividad Bernardo, saw accusedappellant pass their house carrying a child
who looked about 5-6 years old.
6.
At about the same time,
witness Leah Magno saw the accusedappellant carrying a child was seen
heading towards the wooded area in the
Macalong River;
7.
By 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. of that
same day, Magno saw accused-appellant
walking alone to town coming from the
direction of the Macalong River;
8.
Meanwhile, the parents of Tisay
were frantically searching for their child
and when their search proved futile, they
reported the matter to the Barangay
Captain and to the Police;
9.
Upon receipt of the information
that the child was last seen with the
accused-appellant, the police together
with the Barangay Captains of Camantiles
and Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
proceeded to the house of the accusedappellant;
10.
As they approached the house,
the accused-appellant jumped out of the
window carrying a black bag. The police
authorities gave chase and finally caught
him after twenty (20) exhausting hours;
11.
After
his
arrest,
accusedappellant was brought to the Urdaneta
Police Station where he admitted that he
raped, killed and buried Maria Lourdes
near the Macalong River in Barangay San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, while
UNDER INVESTIGATION WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. INDEED, THE
BODY OF TISAY WAS FOUND IN THE
93

PLACE WHICH HE DESCRIBED DURING
HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
12.
After trial, the trial court (RTC
45 presided over by JUDGE JOVEN
COSTALES) rendered a judgment of
conviction and imposing the penalty of
death to the accused-appellant. The court
admitted as evidence
the extrajudicial
confession of the accused-appellant and
used the same as one of the grounds in
support of the judgment of conviction.
ISSUES
1.
Is the extrajudicial
the accused appellant
evidence?
2.
Whether the lower
convicting in convicting
appellant?
confession of
admissible in
court erred in
the accused-
2008
the combination of all circumstances is

such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The evidence in this case
are more than sufficient to prove the
accused-appellants beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence is not a
weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct
evidence and cases have recognized that
circumstantial evidence in its weight and
probative force, may surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the Supreme
Court.
(NOTE: The indemnification for the death
of a person in a rape with Homicide cases
was increased from P50,000.00 to
P125,000.00. The said indemnity shall
also be applicable where the death penalty
is authorized by applicable amendatory
laws))
Held:
b. The exclusionary rule, 145 SCRA

1
The alleged extrajudicial confession

of the accused while under custodial
investigation and without the assistance of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence despite
the fact that he was allegedly appraised of
his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel.
This is so because under the 1987
Constitution, the said rights could not be
waived except in the presence of counsel.
As such, in accordance with the doctrine
of the fruit of the poisoned tree, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
Any information or admission given
by a person while in custody which may
appear harmless or innocuous at the time
without the competent assistance or an
independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible.
Though the extrajudicial confession
of the accused-appellant is inadmissible as
evidence, his conviction by the trial court
is correct. This is so because [1] the
compromising circumstances were duly
proven which were consistent with each
other and which lead with moral certainty
to the conclusion that he was guilty of the
crime charged; and [2] the totality of such
circumstances eliminated beyond doubt
the possibility of his innocence. In People
vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction
may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided the following requisites are
present: [a] there is more than one
circumstance; [b] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [c]
700
Read:
1. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 516
2. P vs. Alcaraz,136 SCRA 74
3. Does it also include the confession
of a
witness, not the accused?
Read:
1. P vs. Bombesa, 162 SCRA 402
2. p. vs. Yutuc, July 26, 1990
9. Sec. 12(2)
Read:
1. Dizon vs. Gen. Eduardo, May 3,1988
2. P vs. Eligino, August 11,1988
3. Contado vs. Tan, April 15, 1988
10.
Extrajudicial
confession;
admissible or
inadmissible
when
Read:
1. The admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession in a criminal prosecution,142
SCRA 110
2. Admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession,135
SCRA 419 and 10
SCRA 520
3. Inadmissibility of an admission
obtained by
force, 114 SCRA
234
4. Confession as evidence against the
accused, 96
SCRA 637
94

Read:
5. P vs. Camalog, January 31, 1989
5-a. P vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533
5-b. P vs. Lagahan, December 8, 1988
5-c. P vs. Dino, 160 SCRA 197
5-d. P vs. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150
5-e. P vs. Enciso, 160 SCRA 728
5-d. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 565
5-e. P vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362
5-f. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
5-g. P vs. Robles, 104 SCRA 450
5-h. P vs. Eligino, 164 SCRA 260
5-i. P vs. Abejero, May 17,l980
5-j. P. vs. Bagano, 181 SCRA 34
5-k. P. vs. Estevan, 186 SCRA 184
5-l. P. vs. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184
5-m. P. vs. Flores, 186 SCRA 303
5-n. P. vs. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714
5-o. P. vs. Arsenio, 184 SCRA 205
6. P vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488
7. P vs. Dejaresco, 129 SCRA 576
8. P vs. Tuvera, 130 SCRA 169
9. P vs. Maternal, 130 SCRA 625
10. P vs. Nilos, 127 SCRA 207
11. P vs. Sanchez, 132 SCRA 103
12. P vs. Pizarro, 131 SCRA 418
13. P vs. Sabilano, 132 SCRA 83
14. P vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60
15. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4
16. P vs. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178
17. P vs. Palo, 147 SCRA 178
18. P. vs. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521
19. P vs. Pia, 145 SCRA 581
20. P vs. Encipiado, 146 SCRA 478
21. P vs. Canumay, 130 SCRA 301
22. P vs. Marino, 130 SCRA 595
23. P vs. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483
24. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRa 426--when
confession is
valid
25. P. vs. De La Cruz, 183 SCRA 763--when confession is inadmissible but
accused is still liable
11. Evidence of lack of cvoluntariness
Read:
2. P vs. Abayon, 114 SCRA 197
12. Is the testimony of the arresting
officer on the
alleged oral confession of
the accused admissible?
Read:
1. P vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111
******************************
2008
CHAPTER XIII - THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL
******************************
1. The right to bail, 104 SCRA 372
2. Bail, 81 SCRA 188
Kinds of bail; when not applicable.
Recognizance/bail for a convict
ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE
VS. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS, RTC 2
BORONGAN, SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Manuel Bagaporo, Jr. was convicted
of frustrated murder and was sentenced
four years and two months to eight years
and one day of imprisonment. He started
serving his sentence and subsequently, he
filed an application for release on
recognizance.
In
support
of
his
application, the Provincial Jail Warden
issued a certification that Bagaoporo has
been confined at the Provincial Jail since
February 9, 1996 and is already entitled to
parole. Another certification was issued by
the Supervising Parole and Probation
Officer showing that Bagaporo applied for
parole in lieu of the DOJs Maagang
Paglaya Program.
By
virtue
of
the
above
certifications, respondent judge ordered
the
release
of
Bagaporo
upon
recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden
of Eastern Samar. He likewise justified the
same based on the rule that bail is
discretionary upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Held:
Respondent Judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for ordering the
release of Bagaporo pending the approval
of his application for parole and before the
completion of the minimum period of the
sentence imposed upon him.
It is patently erroneous to release
a convict on recognizance. Section 24,
Rule 114 provides that there shall no bail
for a convict after final judgment. The
only exception is when the convict applies
for Probation before he commences to
serve his sentence and that the offense
95

and the penalty for the offense is within
the purview of the Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court (on the different kinds
of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED
UNDERGOING
PREVENTIVE
IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR
ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO
A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL
JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING
SENTENCE.
Judge Bugtas was therefore fined
P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law
and sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
2008
A person facing extradition

proceedings is not entitled to bail
even if the crime he was charged of in
a foreign country is bailable. This is
so
because
the
constitutional
provision on the right to bail under
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
applies only to criminal cases, not in
extradition proceedings.
*********************************
Right to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest in
extradition case
EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. THE
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 17, MANILA, 483
SCRA 290
3. Read:
Quisumbing, J.
*********************************
*********************
Excessive bail:
In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS.

JUDGE LANTION, 322 SCRA 160 (The
Mark Jimenez Case) , the Supreme Court
on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is
entitled to notice and hearing even when a
request for extradition by another country
is still being evaluated. However, on
Motion for Reconsideration in the same
case, in a 9-6 decision, the Supreme
Court held that the prospective extraditee
is not entitled to notice and hearing while
his case is still under evaluation because
this would defeat the purpose of the arrest
warrant since it could give warning that
respondents would be arrested and even
encourage them to flee but entitled to
notice and hearing if the case is already
filed in court.
1. De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1

*********************************
********************
1-a. Pestano vs. Judge Velasco,
July 3, 1990
*********************************
*********************
Waiver of the right to bail:
1-b. P. vs. Donato, June 5, 1991
*********************************
********************
2. Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 Phil.
4. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312
5. P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147
SCRA 219
6. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986
7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
8. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
4. See Section 10, Rule 114, 1985 Rules
on Criminal
Procedure
a. Procedure when prosecutor does

not object to the petition for bail in capital
offenses:
It is a different matter if at first,

the extraditee was allowed bail. The
cancellation of his bail bond may be made
only after notice and hearing. Otherwise,
his right to due process of law will be
violated.
(NOTE: In the case of US vs. Judge
Purugganan,
389
SCRA
623),
the
Supreme Court held that the extraditee is
not entitled to post a bond even if the
crime he was charged of abroad is a
bailable offense. This is so because of the
possibility of flight.)
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA

315
Bail in Extradition cases.
UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE
PURUGGANAN & MARK JUMENEZ
November, 2002
******************************
CHAPTER XIV - DUE PROCESS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
******************************
1. In general:
96

1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321
3.
Presumption of innocence prevails
over the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties of the police
authorities and Presumption of innocence
resulting in acquittal as a result on
conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of
the prosecutions witnesses:
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ,
VS.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953 ,
April 30, 2008
THE FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of
search and seizure issued by the RTC of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five
police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon
City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos
(Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1
Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera
(Gallinera) as members.
The search
conducted in the presence of barangay
kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner
himself, his wife Sheila and his mother,
Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty
plastic sachets containing residual morsels
of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
That on or about the 4th day of February
2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay
Tugos,
Sorsogon
City,
Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and
control two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
[or]
shabu with an aggregate weight of
0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets
containing
shabu
residue,
without
having been previously authorized by law
to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the
ensuing trial, the prosecution presented
Bolanos,
Arroyo
and
Esternon
as
witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the
leader of the raiding team, testified on the
2008
circumstances surrounding the search as

follows: that he and his men were allowed
entry into the house by petitioner after
the latter was shown the search warrant;
that upon entering the premises, he
ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad
Licup, whose assistance had previously
been requested in executing the warrant,
to conduct the search; that the rest of the
police team positioned themselves outside
the house to make sure that nobody flees;
that he was observing the conduct of the
search from about a meter away; that the
search conducted inside the bedroom of
petitioner yielded five empty plastic
sachets with suspected shabu residue
contained in a denim bag and kept in one
of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of
the pillows searched by Esternona
discovery that was made in the presence
of petitioner.54[10] On cross examination,
Bolanos admitted that during the search,
he was explaining its progress to
petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the
same time his eyes were fixed on the
search being conducted by Esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag
containing the empty plastic sachets was
found behind the door of the bedroom
and not inside the cabinet; that he then
found the two filled sachets under a pillow
on the bed and forthwith called on
Gallinera to have the items recorded and
marked.55[12] On cross, he admitted that it
was he alone who conducted the search
because Bolanos was standing behind him
in the living room portion of the house
and that petitioner handed to him the
things to be searched, which included the
pillow in which the two sachets of shabu
were kept;56[13] that he brought the seized
items to the Balogo Police Station for a
true inventory, then to the trial court57[14]
and thereafter to the laboratory.58[15]
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic
chemist
who
administered
the
examination on the seized items, was
presented as an expert witness to identify
54
[10]
TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6-9.
[12]
TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6-7, 10.
55
56[13]
Id. at 16-17.
57[14]
TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.
58[15]
Id. at 9.
97
2008
the items submitted to the laboratory. She

revealed that the two filled sachets were
positive of shabu and that of the five
empty sachets, four were positive of
containing
residue
of
the
same
substance.59[16] She further admitted that
all seven sachets were delivered to the
laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of
the same day that the warrant was
executed except that it was not she but
rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who
received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory .]
petitioner was not in the house for the

entire duration of the search because at
one point he was sent by Esternon to the
store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was
being searched by the lady officer. Licup
for his part testified on the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five
empty sachets were found, he went out of
the bedroom and into the living room and
after about three minutes, Esternon, who
was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed
that he had just found two filled sachets.]
The evidence for the defense focused on

the irregularity of the search and seizure
conducted by the police operatives.
Petitioner testified that Esternon began
the search of the bedroom with Licup and
petitioner himself inside. However, it was
momentarily interrupted when one of the
police officers declared to Bolanos that
petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking
something
inside
her
underwear.
Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct
the search of Sheilas body inside the
same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of
the room. So, it was in his presence
that Sheila was searched by the lady
officer. Petitioner was then asked by a
police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store and when he returned from the
errand, he was told that nothing was
found on Sheilas body.60[18] Sheila was
ordered to transfer to the other bedroom
together with her children.
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered

its Decision declaring petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Petitioner was condemned to
prison for twelve years (12) and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine
of P300,000.00. The trial court reasoned
that the fact that shabu was found in the
house of petitioner was prima facie
evidence of petitioners animus possidendi
sufficient to convict him of the charge
inasmuch as things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts
of ownership are presumptively owned by
him. It also noted petitioners failure to
ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from

the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside,
the officer closed the door and asked him
to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he
was doing as told, Esternon stopped him
and ordered him to lift the portion of the
headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet of shabu which
according to him came from a pillow on
the bed.61[20] Petitioners account in its
entirety was corroborated in its material
respects by Norma, barangay kagawad
Licup and Sheila in their testimonies.
Norma and Sheila positively declared that
59
TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The

results of the chemical analysis are
embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-03703. See records, p. 18.
[16]
60
[18]
10.
TSN, 2 December 2003, pp. 6-
61[20]
Hence, this Appeal.

HELD:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt . Be
that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to
create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt.
More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt. The chain of
custody
requirement
performs
this
function
in
that
it
ensures
that
unnecessary
doubts
concerning
the
identity of the evidence are removed.
Id. at 11-12.
98

As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.
It would
include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of the same.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss
or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is
one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.62[41] Graham vs. State63[42] positively
acknowledged this danger. In that case
where a substance later analyzed as
heroinwas handled by two police officers
prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and
whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it
was in their possessionwas excluded
from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could
have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by
records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least
between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to
the laboratorys findings is inadmissible. 64
[43]
A unique characteristic of narcotic

substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot
62[41]
Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d
652, 655.
63[42]
652.
64

652, 655.
[43]
2008
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood,

or at least the possibility, that at any of
the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances
from
other
casesby
accident
or
otherwisein which similar evidence was
seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records
readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from petitioner. Of the people who
came into direct contact with the seized
objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified
for the specific purpose of establishing the
identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to
whom Esternon supposedly handed over
the confiscated sachets for recording and
marking, as well as Garcia, the person to
whom Esternon directly handed over the
seized items for chemical analysis at the
crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under
which they handled the subject items.
Any reasonable mind might then ask the
question: Are the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and
offered in court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete
to
provide
an
affirmative
answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his
testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the
place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The
same is true of Garcia who could have,
but nevertheless failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which she received
the items from Esternon, what she did
with them during the time they were in
her possession until before she delivered
the same to Arroyo for analysis.
Given the foregoing deviations of police
officer Esternon from the standard and
normal procedure in the implementation
of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
99

on the presumption of regularity in the
conduct of police duty is manifestly
misplaced. The presumption of regularity
is merely just thata mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by the evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth. 65[52] Suffice
it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 66[53] In
the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly
seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the
same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates
a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and
elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused
lies on the prosecution which must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. The rule
is invariable whatever may be the
reputation of the accused, for the law
presumes his innocence unless and until
the contrary is shown.67[54] In dubio pro
reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a
matter of right.
Presumption of innocence leads to the
accuseds acquittal due to inconsistent
testimonies of prosecutions witnesses
ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30,
2008
FACTS:
On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening,
armed men robbed the house of spouses
George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay
Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking
with them several valuables, including cash
amounting to P600,000.00.68[3] Forthwith, the
spouses reported the matter to the police,
who, in turn, immediately applied for a search
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No.
135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312,
318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419
(2002).
65[52]
2008
warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of

Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.69[4]
The MTC issued
Search Warrant No. 5-95,70[5] directing a
search of the items stolen from the victims, as
well as the firearms used by the perpetrators.
One of the target premises was the residence
of petitioner, named as one of the several
suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant,
policemen
searched
the
premises
of
petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual,
Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The
search resulted in the recovery of a firearm
and ammunitions which had no license nor
authority to possess such weapon, and,
consequently, the filing of a criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for
violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession
of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The
prosecution presented eight witnesses namely:
(1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino71[7] (P/Insp.
Baldovino), a police investigator and the
applicant for the search warrant; (2)
Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the victim of the
robbery and private complainant; (3) Ignacio
Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local Government
Operations Officer of the Department of
Interior and Local Government who was the
civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt.
Bonifacio Abian72[8] (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy
Provincial Director of the Philippine National
Police and part of the search team; (5) SPO4
Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1
Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1
James Jara (SPO1 Jara); and (8) SPO2
Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon).
The prosecution's case centered mainly
on evidence that during the enforcement of
the search warrant against petitioner, a .38
caliber revolver firearm was found in the
latter's house.73[9] In particular, SPO1 Cabaya
testified that while poking at a closed rattan
cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the
lower shelf.74[10] The gun is a .38 caliber
revolver75[11] with five live ammunitions,76[12]
which he immediately turned over to his
superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.77[13]
Petitioner anchored his defense on
denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his
wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own
69
70
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No.

135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312,
318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419
(2002).
66[53]
67
[54]
68
People v. Laxa, id.
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
100

a gun.78[14] Lorna testified that she saw a
military man planting the gun.79[15]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision 80[16]
dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner
which rendered
dated January
modification the
thus:
filed an appeal with the CA,

the
assailed Decision81[18]
22, 2003, affirming with
decision of the trial court,
WHEREFORE,
except
for
the
MODIFICATION reducing and changing the
maximum of the prison term imposed to Five
(5) Years Four (4) Months and Twenty (20)
Days, the appealed Decision is otherwise
AFFIRMED.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review,
on the principal ground that the CA gravely
erred in finding that the guilt of petitioner has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
more specifically, in giving weight and
credence to the testimonies of the police
officers who searched the house of the
petitioner which are replete with material and
irreconcilable contradictions and in giving SPO1
Cabaya the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty despite the claim of Lorna
that the .38 caliber revolver was planted.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and
the CA committed reversible error in giving
little credence to his defense that the firearm
found in his residence was planted by the
policemen.
He also alleges material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
policemen as witnesses for the prosecution,
which amounted to failure by the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The petition has merit.
The paramount issue in the present
case is whether the prosecution established
the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt; and in the determination thereof, a
factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found
in the house of petitioner, must necessarily be
resolved.
It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal
in criminal cases opens the whole case wide
open for review.82[20]
78
2008
In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied

heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who
testified that he discovered the subject firearm
in a closed cabinet inside the former's house.
The trial court brushed aside petitioner's
defense of denial and protestations of frameup. The RTC justified giving full credence to
Cabaya's testimony on the principles that the
latter is presumed to have performed his
official duties regularly; that he had no ill
motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his
affirmative testimony is stronger than
petitioner's negative testimony.83[21]
Weighing these findings of the lower
courts against the petitioner's claim that the
prosecution failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt due to the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of its
witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous
examination of the records that the lower
courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime he was charged with. The
RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts
and circumstances that would have interjected
serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to who actually
entered the house and conducted the search,
who discovered the gun, and who witnessed
the discovery are material matters because
they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the
present case, whether a gun has been found in
the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which,
by the process of logic, an inference may be
made as to the existence or non-existence of a
fact in issue.84[24] As held in United States v.
Estraa,85[25] a material matter is the main fact
which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that
fact or any fact or circumstance which
tends to corroborate or strengthen the
testimony relative to the subject of
inquiry or which legitimately affects the
credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely
weakened by several contradictions in the
testimonies of its witnesses.
Especially
damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya,
none of whose declarations on material points
jibes with those of the other prosecution
witnesses. In the face of the vehement and
consistent protestations of frame-up by
petitioner and his wife, the trial court and the
CA erred in overlooking or misappreciating
these inconsistencies. The inconsistencies are
material as they delve into the very bottom of
79
80
83
81
84
82
85
101

the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya
really found a firearm in the house of
petitioner.
SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered
the house with four other policemen, among
whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3
Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another
one whose name he does not remember.86[26]
While searching, he discovered the firearm in
the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the
door.87[27]
He said that SPO1 Jara was
standing right behind him, at a distance of just
one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the
firearm;88[28] and that he picked up the gun,
held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara.89[29] He
asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one of
those who went inside the house.90[30]
However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who
could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's
testimony, related a different story as to the
circumstances of the firearm's discovery.
SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted
perimeter security during the search and did
not enter or participate in searching the
house.91[32]
SPO1 Jara testified that he
remained outside the house throughout the
search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and
showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters
away from him.92[33] He could not see the
inside of the house and could see Cabaya only
from his chest up.93[34] He did not see the
firearm at the place where it was found, but
saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to
show the gun, which was a revolver.94[35] He
is certain that he was not with Cabaya at
the time the latter discovered the
firearm.95[36] He further testified that SPO3
Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was
one of those near him when he (Cabaya)
discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did
not enter or search the house.96[37]
P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2
Renon conducted the search and entered the
house together with SPO1 Cabaya,97[38] directly
contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that
he, together with SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra,
SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he
cannot recall, were inside the house when he
2008
discovered the gun98[39] and that SPO2 Renon

did not enter the house of petitioner.99[40]
The testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses further muddled the prosecution
evidence with more inconsistencies as to
matters material to the determination of
whether a gun had in fact been found in the
house of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified
that Yabes stayed outside of the during the
search;100[59] whereas SPO1 Jara testified that
Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter
saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised
it.101[60]
Although the Court has held that
frame-up is inherently one of the weakest
defenses,102[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove,103[62]
in the present case, the lower courts seriously erred in
ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the
guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule
equiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing
r
evidence104[63] was never intended to shift
to the accused
the burden of proof in a criminal case.
As the Court held in People
of the Philippines v. Ambih:105[64]
[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that
he was the victim of a frame-up is easily
fabricated, this claim assumes importance
when faced with the rather shaky nature of the
prosecution evidence. It is well to remember
that the prosecution must rely, not on the
weakness of the defense evidence, but rather
on its own proof which must be strong enough
to convince this Court that the prisoner in the
dock deserves to be punished. The
constitutional presumption is that the
accused is innocent even if his defense is
weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.106[65]
(Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v.
Gonzales,107[66] the Court held that where there
was material and unexplained inconsistency
between the testimonies of two principal
prosecution witnesses relating not to
inconsequential details but to the alleged
transaction itself which is subject of the case,
the inherent improbable character of the
testimony given by one of the two principal
prosecution witnesses had the effect of
vitiating the testimony given by the other
86
87
88
98
89
99
90
100
91
101
92
102
93
103
94
104
95
105
96
106
97
107
102

principal prosecution witness.108[67] The Court
ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable
testimony of one officer and adopt the
testimony of the other that is more
plausible.109[68]
In such a situation, both
testimonies lose their probative value. The
Court further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2)
contradictory descriptions of the same sale
transaction, which allegedly took place before
their very eyes, on the same physical location
and on the same occasion? We must conclude
that a reasonable doubt was generated as to
whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever
took place.110[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring
contradictory testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses generate serious doubt as to
whether a firearm was really found in the
house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly
failed to discharge its burden of proving that
petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of
firearms beyond reasonable doubt.
The
constitutional presumption of innocence of
petitioner has not been demolished and
therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the
crime he was with.
Read also:
P. vs. Bernardino, January 28,
1991
1-a. P vs. Flores, 165 SCRA 71
1-b. Aguirre vs. P., 155 SCRA 337
1-c. P. vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287
1-d. P. vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182
1-e. P. vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313
2. Alonso vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552
3. P vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205
4. P vs. Quiason, 78 SCRA 513
5. P vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
6. P vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA
392
3. Presumption of innocence in general
and in the order of trial
PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355
SCRA 415
PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578
What is the EQUIPOISE RULE?
A.
If the evidence in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence
tilts the scale of justice in favor of the
108
109
110
2008
accused and he should be acquitted from

the crime charged.
Where
the
inculpatory
facts
and
circumstances are capable of two or more
interpretations one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.
Read:
1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322
4.
Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July
10,l986
SACAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-66497-98,July 10, 1986
FACTS:
1. At the initial hearing, the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses was interrupted
when the accused, through counsel,
admitted that he shot the deceased but
claimed that it was done in self-defense
and fulfillment of duty. The prosecution
then moved that the reverse procedure be
adopted in view of the admission that the
accused shot the deceased. No objection
was interposed by the accused or his
counsel.
2. On appeal with the S.C. after he was
convicted the accused later claims that
there was a violation of the order of trial
provided for in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. He also cites the case of
Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322,
wherein the S.C. ruled that : "It behooved
the respondent Judge to have followed the
sequence of trial set forth x x x the form
of a trial is also a matter of public order
and interest; the orderly course of
procedure requires that the prosecution
should go forward and present all of its
proof in the first instance."
HELD:
The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not
applicable inasmuch as the accused in the
case at bar did not object to the
procedure followed. In fact in the said
Alejandro case, the Court also stated:
"It is true that in the case of U.S.
vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (l910), relied
upon by the prosecution and the trial
Court, the defense has produced its proofs
before the prosecution presented its case,
and it was held that no substantial rights
103
2008
of the accused were prejudiced. There is

one radical difference, however, since in
that case no objection was entered in the
Court below to the procedure followed in
the presentation of proof. In this case, the
change in the order of trial made by
respondent Judge was promptly and
timely objected to by the defense."
Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner,

assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty.
In fact it should be noted that under

the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule 119)the said
procedure is now expressly sanctioned.
Thus:
On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its

Decision112[4] finding petitioner and his coaccused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide and sentencing them
to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal in each count.
"However, when the accused

admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly."
3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 1985 Rules on
Criminal
Procedure , as amended.
4. Other cases Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
P
P
P
P
P
vs. Opida, June 13,1986

vs. Tempongko, October 2,1986
vs. Drammayo, 42 SCRA 59
vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151
vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
6. Castillo vs. Filtex, September
30,1983
7. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, supra
5. Right to counsel-during trial
1. Reason behind the requirement
2. Obligation of the judge to an
accused who
appears in court
without a lawyer to assist him
Read:
1. P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752
2. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357
3. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296
5-a. The right to be heard by himself and
counsel during trial
JOHN HILARIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161070, April 14,
2008
THE FACTS:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert
Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts111[3]
of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
111
Docketed as Criminal Case

Nos. Q-00-91647-48.
During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the

Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid,
took over representing petitioner in view of the
death of the latter's counsel.
On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time

unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a
Petition for Relief113[5] from the Decision dated
December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of
merit. In his petition, petitioner contended
that at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment, he was already confined at Quezon
City Jail and was directed to be committed to
the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that
he had no way of personally filing the notice of
appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on
his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose
his full trust and confidence to his lawyer; that
he had instructed his lawyer to file the
necessary motion for reconsideration or notice
of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was
already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City and learned from the
grapevine of his impending transfer to the
Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing
that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel
prevented the Decision dated December 5,
2001 from becoming final to warrant his
transfer, he instructed his representative to get
a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC;
that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer
in defiance of his clear instructions; and that
the RTC Decision showed that it was received
by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet
the counsel did not inform him of any action
taken thereon.
I S S U E:
Whether or not the delay in appealing
the instant case due to the defiance or failure
of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to
seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes
excusable
negligence
to
entitle
the
undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to
pursue his appeal?
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere
112
[3]
113
Penned by Judge Monina A.

Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 36-52.
[5]
Id. at 53-60.
[4]
104

invocation of justice warrants the review of a
final and executory judgment?
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the negligence
of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on
him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to
appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary
relationship between counsel-client and cannot
be against the client who was prejudiced; that
this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted
in this situation considering that it was a
counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who
broke the fiduciary relationship; that the
assailed CA Resolutions both harped on
technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the
RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance on
technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who
is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime
he did not commit is an affront to the policy
promulgated by this Court that dismissal
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
especially if it will result to unfairness; and that
it would have been for the best interest of
justice for the CA to have directed the
petitioner to complete the records instead of
dismissing the petition outright.
In his Comment, the OSG argues that
the mere invocation of justice does not warrant
the review of an appeal from a final and
executory judgment; that perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment sought to be reviewed
final and not appealable; and that petitioner's
appeal after the finality of judgment of
conviction is an exercise in futility, thus the RTC
properly dismissed petitioner's petition for
relief from judgment. The OSG further claims
that notice to counsel is notice to clients and
failure of counsel to notify his client of an
adverse judgment would not constitute
excusable negligence and therefore binding on
the client.
We grant the petition.
A litigant who is not a lawyer
is not expected to know the rules of procedure.
In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get
tangled in the web of procedure.114[12] We
have held in a civil case that to demand as
much from ordinary citizens whose only
compelle intrare is their sense of right would
turn the legal system into an intimidating
monstrosity where an individual may be
stripped of his property rights not because he
has no right to the property but because he
114
See Telan v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October
4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
[12]
2008
does not know how to establish such right. 115

[13]
This finds application specially if the liberty
of a person is at stake. As we held in Telan v.
Court of Appeals:
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as
forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so
when as a consequence, life, liberty, or
property is subjected to restraint or in danger
of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused
person to be assisted by a member of the
bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there
would be a grave denial of due process.
Thus, even if the judgment had become
final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
xxxx
Even the most experienced lawyers get
tangled in the web of procedure. The demand
as much from ordinary citizens whose only
compelle intrare is their sense of right would
turn the legal system into an intimidating
monstrosity where an individual may be
stripped of his property rights not because he
has no right to the property but because he
does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be
invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an
on-going litigation, it is a right that must be
exercised at every step of the way, with the
lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law
could be as absurd as the position that
the right to counsel exists only in the trial
courts and that thereafter, the right
ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.116[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
To repeat the ruling in Telan, no
arrangement or interpretation of law could be
as absurd as the position that the right to
counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the
appeal.117[15] It is even more important to note
that petitioner was not assisted by counsel
when he filed his petition for relief from
judgment with the RTC.
It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in
criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an
accused person to be assisted by a member of
the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would
be a grave denial of due process.
115
[13]
116[14]
117
[15]
Id.
Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 541.
105

Cases should be determined on the
merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather
than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be served better.118[16]
While as a general rule, the failure of
petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration
within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by
law rendered the resolution final and
executory, we have on some occasions relaxed
this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla119[17] we
held:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in
order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle.
The power to suspend or even disregard rules
can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court,
speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco, had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
That is precisely why courts in rendering
justice have always been, as they ought to be
guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the
appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the
situation.
118
119
Garcia v. Philippine Airlines,

Inc., supra note 11, at 781.
[17]
G.R.
No.
160753,
September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA
675.
[16]
2008
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of

this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.120[18]
Moreover, in Basco
Appeals,121[19] we also held:
v.
Court
of
Nonetheless, procedural rules were

conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application of the rules would hinder
rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter.
Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court specifically provides that:
SECTION 2.
Construction. These rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination
of
every
action
and
proceeding.122[20]
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of rules that would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.123[21]
Even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the
accused afforded the opportunity to be heard
by himself and counsel.124[22]
However,
instead of remanding the case to the CA for a
decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the
same so as not to further delay the final
disposition of this case.
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right to appeal in the
manner prescribed by law. The importance
and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has
been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals125[27] where we ruled that an appeal is
an essential part of our judicial system and
trial courts are advised to proceed with caution
Id. at 686-687.
392 Phil. 251 (2000).
Id. at 266.
[21]
Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses
Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
[22]
Telan v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 12, at 540-541; People
of the Philippines v. Holgado, 85
Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores
v. Judge Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355
(1979); Delgado v. Court of
Appeals, 229 Phil. 362, 366
(1986).
120
[18]
121
[19]
122[20]
123
124
106

so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal and instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just disposition of his cause,
freed from the constraints of technicalities.
While this right is statutory, once it is
granted by law, however, its suppression
would be a violation of due process, a
right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thus, the importance of finding out whether
petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due
to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all
attributed to petitioner.
PEOPLE VS. NADERA, JR., 324 SCRA

490
Mendoza, J.
The cavalier attitude of Atty. Manolo
Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed.
It is discernible in [a] his refusal to crossexamine Oleby Nadera (the complainant
for RAPE); [b] the manner in which he
conducted
Maricris
Naderas
crossexamination; and [c] his failure not only
to present evidence for the accused but to
inform the accused of his right to do so, if
he desires. Only the faithful performance
by counsel of his duty towards his client
can give meaning and substance to the
accuseds right to due process and to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Hence, a lawyers duty, especially that of a
defense counsel, must not be taken
lightly. It must be performed with all the
zeal and vigor at his command to protect
and safeguard the accuseds fundamental
rights.
It may be so that the defense
counsel really found Olebys testimony to
be believable. Nonetheless, he had the
bounden duty to scrutinize private
complainants testimony to ensure that
the accuseds constitutional right
to
confront and examine the
witnesses
against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it
is often the words of the complainant
against the accused, the two being the
only
persons
present
during
the
commission of the crime. This is so
because the complainants testimony
cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accuseds
constitutional right to be presumed
innocent. This is where cross-examination
becomes essential to test the credibility of
the witnesses, expose falsehoods or halftruths, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct
examination
testimonies
may
125
2008
successfully suppress, and demonstrate

inconsistencies in substantial matters
which create reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused and thus give
substance to the constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses
against him. For unless proven otherwise
to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is presumed innocent.
(NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics)
Atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio,
had the duty to defend his client and
protect his rights, no matter how guilty or
evil he perceives accused-appellant to be.
The performance of this duty was all the
more imperative because the life of the
accused-appellant hangs in the balance.
His duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio.
The Decision of the RTC convicting
the accused is SET ASIDE and the case is
remanded
for
further
proceedings
consistent with this decision.
Read:
2.
1. P vs. Dischoso, 96 SCRA 957

Read also:
PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, G.R. NO.

120350, 343 SCRA 20, OCT. 30, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO.
132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000.
Right to be Heard by himself and
counsel and to present evidence for his
defense.
In this case, the non-appearance of
counsel for the accused on the scheduled
hearing was not construed as waiver by
the accused of his right to present
evidence for his defense. Denial of due
process can be successfully invoked where
no valid waiver of rights had been made
as in this case.
In another case, the accusedappellant validly waived his right to
present evidence. This is in consonance
with the doctrine that everyone has a
right to waive the advantage of a law or
rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the
community at large.
6. The right to be present during trial
107

Read:
1. Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63
SCRA 546
2. P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269
3. Waiver of the defendant's presence
in a
criminal prosecution,77 SCRA
430
7. The right to a speedy trial
JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
May 20, 2004
Right to speedy disposition of case.
Facts:
1.
On August 14, 1991, the
petitioner and several others were
charged of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act;
2.
On August 23, 1994 after the
presentation of the parties evidence, the
case was deemed submitted for decision
before the 2nd Division;
3.
Thereafter,
the
case
was
unloaded to the newly created 5th Division,
particularly to Justice Godofredo Legaspi
and later re-assigned to Justice Ma.
Cristina
Cortez-Estrada
upon
her
assumption of office on November 3,
1998.
4.
In the early part of 2002 while
Justice Estrada was writing the decision of
the case, she found out that the
November
26,
1993
transcript
of
stenographic notes, which was the crossexamination of the petitioner, was missing
so she called the parties for a conference
on April 19, 2002 to discuss the matter.
5.
Instead
of
attending
the
conference, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the case based on the alleged
violation of his right to speedy trial. The
Court denied the same as well as the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Was
there
violation
of
the
petitioners right to a speedy disposition of
his case when the same was not decided
for almost 8 years from the time it was
deemed submitted for decision?
Held:
No. The right is violated only if the
proceedings were attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The
2008
determination of whether the delays are of

said nature is relative and cannot be
based on mere mathematical reckoning of
time. Particular regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case. As held in the
case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
certain factors shall be considered and
balanced to determine if there is delay, as
follows:
1.
Length of the delay;
2.
Reasons for the delay;
3.
Assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and
4.
Prejudiced caused by the
delay.
There is no violation of the right to speedy
disposition of his case because petitioner
failed to assert his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of his case. During the
8-year period prior to April 19, 2002,
petitioner did not complain about the long
delay in deciding his case.
a. Read Admin. Circular No. 4 of the
Supreme
Court dated September
22, 1988
b. Department of Justice Circular No.
27, dated
September 16, 1988
c. When shall this right starts
Read:
1. P vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226
d. To what proceedings is this right
available
Read:
153
1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, 153 SCRA
e. In general
Read:
1. The right to speedy trial, 28 SCRA
601
2. Conde vs. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650
3. Ventura vs. People, Nov. 6,1976
4. Martin vs. Ver, July 25, 1983
5. Bermisa vs. CA, 92 SCRa
6. Luneta vs. Mil. Com., 102 SCRA 56
7. P vs. Baladjay, 113 SCRA 284
8. P vs. Araula, 111 SCRA 598
9. Regaspi vs. Castillo, 69 SCRA 160
10. Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA
247
11. Nepumuceno vs. Secretary,108
SCRA 658
12. Tatad vs. SB, 159 SCRA 70
13. P vs. CFI of Rizal, 161 SCRA 249
108

14. P vs. Laya, 161 SCRA 327
15. Salcedovs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811
16. DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
289 SCRA 721
18. ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN,
269 SCRA 301
SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL,
G.R. NO. 140188, 337 SCRA 227, AUG. 3,
2000; BLANCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. NOS. 136757 58, 346 SCRA 108,
NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR TEAM
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. HON. HOW, G.R.
NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22,
2000.
Speedy Disposition of Cases.
(i) The determination of whether
an accused had been denied the right to
speedy trial depends on the surrounding
circumstances of each case. Although it
took about 8 years before the trial of this
case was resumed, such delay did not
amount to violation of petitioners right to
speedy trial considering that such delay
was not by attributable to the prosecution.
Factors to consider in determining
whether or not such right has been
violated:
1.
length of delay,
2.
reasons for such
delay, and
3.
assertion
or
failure to assert such rights by the
accused and the prejudice caused by the
delay.
(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The
authority of the Secretary of Justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates
even after an information has already
been filed in court does not present an
irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day
period prescribed in Sec. 7 of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998.
8. The right to an impartial trial
Read:
1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986
1-a. P vs. Tuazon, 159 SCRA 317
2. Olaguer vs. Chief of Staff, May 22,
1987
3. Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz,90 SCRA 16
4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117
SCRA 630
9. Right to a public trial
2008
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Domingo, July 25,1973
2. P vs. Tampus, March 28,1980
6.
The right to be informed of the
nature and cause of
accusation.
JERRY NAZARENO, G.R. No. 167756, April
8, 2008
THE FACTS:
On March 17, 1999, appellant Jerry
Nazareno was indicted for violation of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No. 2638 for the alleged
rape of BBB, his daughter.
The
information reads:
That sometime and between
January 1992 up to December 06,
1998,
in
Barangay
Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province
of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of
force, violence and intimidation did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and repeatedly made sexual intercourse
with his daughter BBB at the age of 7
through 14 years old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.126[17]
On May 3, 1999, another Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2650, for
the rape of AAA, another daughter, was
levelled
against
appellant.
The
Information is worded thus:
That from sometime in January
1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay
Codon, municipality of San Andres,
Catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused,
being the father of the complainant, did
then and there willfully, feloniously and
criminally
repeatedly
had
sexual
intercourse with her daughter AAA, then
five years old up to the time when she
was 15-years-old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.127[18]
After trial , the accused was found
guilty of qualified rape in both cases. He
appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the People vs.
Mateo Doctrine but the Court of Appeals
126[17]
127[18]
Rollo, p. 21.
Records, Vol. II, p. 18.
109

affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, this
Petition before the Supreme Court.
I S S U E:
Is the constitutional right of the
petitioner to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him
violated since the information failed to
specify with certainty
the approximate
date of the commission of the offenses for
rape which is a fatal defect.
H E L D:
The argument is specious.
An
information is intended to inform an
accused of the accusations against him in
order that he could adequately prepare his
defense. Verily, an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information.
Thus, to ensure that the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against
him
is
not
violated,
the
information should state the name of the
accused; the designation given to the
offense by the statute; a statement of the
acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time and
date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense has been
committed.128[27] Further, it must embody
the essential elements of the crime
charged by setting forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused, so
that he can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense.129[28]
However, it is not necessary for the
information to allege the date and time of
the commission of the crime with
exactitude unless time is an essential
ingredient of the offense.130[29] In People
128[27]
People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372,

388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal
Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Secs. 6 and
8.
129[28]
Id.
130[29]
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161
(2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure
(2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission
of the offense. It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the
offense was committed except when
it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged
to have been committed on a date
as near as possible to the actual
2008
v. Bugayong,131[30] the Court held that

when the time given in the information is
not the essence of the offense, the time
need not be proven as alleged; and that
the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at
any time within the period of the statute
of
limitations
and
before
the
commencement of the action.
In People v. Gianan,132[31] the Court ruled
that the time of the commission of rape is
not an element of the said crime as it is
defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. The gravamen of the crime is the
fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.:
(1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented. In accordance with Rule 110,
Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as long as it alleges that the
offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed, an information is
sufficient.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater
firmness in People v. Salalima133[32] and in
People v. Lizada.134[33]
In the case under review, the
information in Criminal Case No. 2638
alleged that the rape of BBB transpired
sometime and between January 1992 up
to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of
Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650,
the information averred that from
sometime in January 1990 up to
December 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Catanduanes,
AAA
was
raped
by
appellant. To the mind of the Court, the
recitals in the informations sufficiently
comply
with
the
constitutional
requirement that the accused be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
date of its commission.

G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998,
299 SCRA 528.
132[31]
G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15,
2000, 340 SCRA 477.
133[32]
G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15,
2001, 363 SCRA 192.
134[33]
G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24,
2003, 396 SCRA 62.
131[30]
110

In People v. Garcia,135[34] the Court
upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape
based on an Information which alleged
that the accused committed multiple rapes
from November 1990 up to July 21,
1994.
In People v. Espejon,136[35] the
Court found the appellant liable for rape
under an information charging that he
perpetrated the offense sometime in the
year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto
and sometime in the year 1995 and
subsequent thereto.
In the case under review, the
information in Criminal Case No. 2638
alleged that the rape of BBB transpired
sometime and between January 1992 up
to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650,
the information averred that from
sometime in January 1990 up to
December 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Catanduanes,
AAA
was
raped
by
appellant. To the mind of the Court, the
recitals in the informations sufficiently
comply
with
the
constitutional
requirement that the accused be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed
before and until October 15, 1994,137[36]
sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter,138[37] and on or about and
sometime
in
the
year
1988139[38]
constitute sufficient compliance with Rule
110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
More than that, the Court notes
that the matter of particularity of the
dates in the information is being raised for
the first time on appeal. The rule is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that
objections as to matter of form or
substance in the information cannot be
made for the first time on appeal. 140[39]
Appellant failed to raise the issue of
defective informations before the trial
G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997,
281 SCRA 463.
136[35]
G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002,
377 SCRA 412.
137[36]
People v. Bugayong, supra note 30.
138[37]
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No.
128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA
719.
139[38]
People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103
& 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655.
140[39]
People v. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771,
780 (2000).
135[34]
2008
court. He could have moved to quash the

informations or at least for a bill of
particulars.
He did not.
Clearly, he
slumbered on his rights and awakened too
late.
Too, appellant did not object to the
presentation of the evidence for the
People contending that the offenses were
committed
sometime
and
between
January 1992 up to December 6, 1998
for Criminal Case No. 2632 and sometime
in January 1990, up to December 1998 in
Criminal Case No. 2650. On the contrary,
appellant actively participated in the trial,
offering denial and alibi as his defenses.
Simply put, he cannot now be heard to
complain that he was unable to defend
himself in view of the vagueness of the
recitals in the informations.
Read:
1. Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA 717
1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653
1-b. P vs. Corral, 157 SCRA 678
1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426
1-d. Formilleza vs. SB, 159 SCRA
2. P vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 730
3. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573
4. P. vs. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140
5. People vs. Regala, April 27,
1982
11. The right to meet witnesses face to
face or the
right of confrontation
Read:
1. P. vs. Talingdan, Nov. 9, 1990
1-a. P vs. Villaluz, October 20, 1983
2. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661
3. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718
4. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, March
16,1987
5. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92
6. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA
610
7. Toledo vs. People, 20 SCRA 54
8. P vs. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388
9. P vs. Santos, 139 SCRA 383
10. Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145
SCRA 640
11. P vs. Lacuna, 87 SCRA 364
12. P vs. Clores, 100 SCRA 227
13. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA
273
14. Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81
12. Trial in absentia
Read:
1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420
111

2. Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 502
3. P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Note
the purpose
of this provision)
4. P vs. Judge Prieto, July 21,1978
5. Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1
6. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA
273
13. Right to secure witnesses
production of
evidence.
and
Read:
610
1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA

2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514
14. Duty of the judge to the accused

before trial
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315
******************************
CHAPTER XV - HABEAS CORPUS
******************************
Read:
1In the matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of
Ferdinand Marcos,
etc, GR No. 88079, May 18,
1989
and August & October, 1989.
1-a. Harvey vs. Santiago, supra
2. Cruz vs. Juan Ponce Enrile, April
15,1988
3. Abadilla vs. Fidel Ramos, December
1,1987
******************************
CHAPTER XVI - THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
******************************
1. Self-incrimination, 24 SCRA 692
2. Read
1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA
294, read
including the
concurring and dissenting opinions
3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570
5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA
906
6. BASECO vs. PCGG, supra
7. Isabela Sugar vs. Macadaeg, 98
Phil. 995
8. Fernando vs. Maglanoc, 95 Phil. 431
9. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145
10. P vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
11. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
2008
12. P vs. Boholst-Amadore, 152 SCRA

263
13. P vs. Rosas, 148 SCRA 464
14. P vs. Ruallo, 152 SCRA 635
15. P vs. Policarpio, 158 SCRA
85( Compare with
the Rosas &
Boholst cases)
16. P vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1
17.
Cabal
vs.
Kapunan,
Jr.
December 29, 1962
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO.
132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS.
100801- 02, 339 SCRA 1, AUG. 25,
2000.
The essence of this right against
self-incrimination
is
testimonial
compulsion or the giving of evidence
against oneself through a testimonial act.
Hence, an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and have a
substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was
suffering from a disease that was
contracted by his victim without violating
this right.
******************************
CHAPTER XVII - THE RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
******************************
1. Read:
1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA
131
2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra
******************************
CHAPTER XVIII - RIGHT AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
******************************
a. Is the Death Penalty already abolished
by the
1987 Constitution?
Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327

P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113
P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242
P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988
5. People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA
107
b. Is death as a penalty a cruel or
unuasual
punishment?
Read:
1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647
112

2. P vs. Villanueva,, 128 SCRA 488
3. Veniegas vs. People, 115 SCRA 79
4. P vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688
2. On the death penalty whether it was
abolished or not
Read:
a. P vs. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358
******************************
CHAPTER XIX - RIGHT AGAINST
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
******************************
1. Read:
1. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA
323
2. Ajeno vs. Incierto, 71 SCRA 166
******************************
CHAPTER XX - THE RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
******************************
1. Requisites present before this right can
be invoked
PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1
There is double jeopardy when
there is:
[1] valid indictment;
[2] before a competent court;
[3] after arraignment;
[4] when a valid plea has been
entered; and
[5] when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
If the dismissal is through the
instance of the accused or with his
express consent, there is no double
jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
(2) exceptions:
1)
the motion to dismiss is based
on insufficiency of evidence; and
2)
the motion to dismiss is based
on the denial of the accuseds right to
speedy trial.
It must be pointed out, however, that in
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202
and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA
238, the SC reversed the dismissal of the
criminal case by the trial court based on
speedy trial since the same was not
predicated on the clear right of the
2008
accused to speedy trial. It is only when

there is a clear violation of the accuseds
right to speedy trial that the dismissal
results in double jeopardy.
3.
Double jeopardy, 102 SCRA 44 and
12 SCRA 561
4.
When the act is punished by both a
law and an ordinance:
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292
If the accused was charged of
theft of electricity based on the City
Ordinance of Batangas and not based on
the Revised Penal Code and later on the
case is dismissed by the judge due to the
fact that the crime has prescribed, the
government can no longer charge the
accused of the same crime under the
Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy
has set in.
Read:
1.
2.
3.
P vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379

CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173
CUISON VS. CA, 289 SCRA 159
3. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 SCRA 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651
8 P vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when
the
presumption of regularity
does7, 1966
2. P vs. City Court,154 SCRA 175
3. Galman vs. Pamaran, 144 SCRA 43
4. P vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397
5. P vs. Quibate, 131 SCRA 81
6. P vs. Obania, June 29,1968
7. Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy, 108 SCRA
736
8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA
121
9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA
861
10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA
217
11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217
12. Buerano vs. CA, 115 SCRA 82
13. P vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910
14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 SCRA 672
15. Lazaro vs. P, 112 SCRA 430
16. Flores vs. Enrile, 115 SCRA 236
17. Bernarte vs. Sec. ,116 SCRA 43
18. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573
19. P vs. Duran, 1075 SCRA 979
20. P vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312
21. Jimenez vs. Military Commission,
102 SCRA 39
22. P vs. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473
23. P vs. Araula, January 30, 1982
24. P vs. Baladjay, March 30, 1982
113

25. P vs. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA
247
28. P vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81
29. P vs. Gloria, December 29, 1977
30. P vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193
31. Tacas vs. Cariasco, 72 SCRA 527
32. P vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77
33. P vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277
34. P vs. Inting, 70 SCRA 289
35. De Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA
619
36. P vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289
37. Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700
38. Tangan vs. P, 155 SCRA 435
39. P vs. Quezada, 160 SCRA 516
40. Canizano vs. P, 159 SCRA 599
41. Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA
144
There is no double jeopardy in this
case:
PEOPLE VS. MOLERO

G.R No. L-67842, September 24, 1986
FACTS:
1. Molero was charged for having raped
his daughter. The original complaint was
dated March 22, 1977, the complainant
charged Molero of having raped her on the
"13th day of February 1976".
2.
Molero was arraigned and pleaded
"Not Guilty";
3.
During the trial, the complainant
testified that she was raped by her father
on February 5, 1976 and not February 13,
1976 as alleged in the complaint;
4. The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint. The motion was
granted
but
was
subsequently
reconsidered. The lower court in its order
dismissed the original complaint, but
ordered the Fiscal to cause the filing of a
new complaint charging the proper
offense of rape committed on or before
February 5, 1976;
5.
A new complaint was therefore filed
dated March 30, 1978
6. Molero claims that the new complaint
places him in double jeopardy.
2008
jeopardy presupposes a definite and

unconditional dismissal which terminates
the case.(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452;
People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883;
People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) And
"for dismissal to be a bar under the
jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it
must have the effect of acquittal.
(People vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579);
b. It is quite clear that the order of the
trial court dismissal the original complaint
was without prejudice to the filing of a
new
complaint
and/or
information
charging Molero with the proper offense.
The said dismissal did not therefore
amount to an acquittal.
c. In fact there was no need for the trial
court to have adopted such a cumbersome
procedure. It could have merely ordered
an amendment of the complaint. Sec. 12,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
applies when there is a mistake in
charging the proper offense, but not when
an honest error of a few days is sought to
be corrected and the change does not
affect the rights of the accused.
d. The precise time of the commission of
the crime is not an essential element of
the offense of rape. The amendment of
the complaint changing the date of the
commission of the crime of rape from
February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976 , a
difference of 8 days was only a matter of
form under the facts of this case and did
not prejudice the rights of the accused.
e.
The reliance of the accused on the
case of People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil.
698 is not well-taken. In the said case
the proposed amendment was the
changing
of
the
date
of
the
commission of the crime from June
18, 1952 to July 1947, or a difference
of 5 years. The S.C. held that the
amendment that would change the
date of the commission of the offense
from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a
matter of form.
f. The dismissal of the first complaint did
not amount to the appellant's acquittal. In
effect, the order of dismissal does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy. (People vs. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166)
HELD:
There is no double jeopardy.
a.
Dismissal of the first case
contemplated by the rule against double
5. May the government appeal a judgment

of acquittal or
for the increase of the
penalty imposed?
114
PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO.

127444, 340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13,
2000.
Double Jeopardy. Evolution of
doctrine. Appeal by the Government from
verdicts of acquittal.
As mandated by the Constitution,
statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the
ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court of a judgment of
acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless
there is a finding of mistrial, as in
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan.
Read:
1. Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
CA, GR No.
41859, March 8, 1989
1-a. P vs. Montemayor, January 30,
1969, 26 SCRA
687
2. P vs. Ruiz,81 SCRA 455
3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67
4. P vs. Ang ho Kio, 95 Phil. 475
6. The "Supervening Fact Doctrine."
Read:
1. 76 SCRA 469
2. P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260
3. P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268
4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
5. P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712
5-a. P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462
5-b. P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601
6. P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA
637
7. Read also Sec. 7, Rule 117, 1985
Rules on
Criminal Procedure
******************************
CHAPTER XXI
RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW,
BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC.
******************************
Read:
1.
Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111
SCRA 433
2-LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January
20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON VS. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA,
JR., Petitioners-Intervenors
2008
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

The petitioner seeks to stop the
Sandiganbayan
from
trying
the
multiple murder case
against him
and 26 other police officers for the
death of 11 Kuratong Baleleng
members in the early morning of May
18, 1995 at Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City. The police officers
claimed that it was a shoot-out
between them and the Kuratong
Baleleng
Members
while
SPO2
Eduardo de los Reyes claimed it was a
summary execution or rub-out.
The
preliminary
investigation
conducted by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs resulted in the dismissal of
the cases after finding that the incident
was a legitimate police operation.
However, the Review Board led by Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa resulted in the
filing of multiple murder cases against the
petitioner and his companion where he
was indicted as a principal.
Upon motion by the petitioner and
his co-police officers with leave from the
Sandiganbayan,
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration was filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman who AMENDED the 11
informations on March 1, 1996 charging
the petitioner , ROMEO ACOP and
FRANCISCO
ZUBIA,
JR.,
as
mere
accessories.
On March 5-6,1996, the accused
questioned
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan over the 11 criminal cases
since under Republic Act No. 7975,
particularly Section 2, paragraphs [a] and
[c], the said court has jurisdiction only if
one or more of the principal accused has a
rank of Brigadier General
(Chief
Superintendent) or higher and since the
highest PNP officer charged as a principal
accused is merely Chief Inspector, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
jurisdiction to try and decide the same.
On
May
8,
1996,
the
Sandiganbayan
issued
a
Resolution
transferring the case to the RTC of Quezon
City which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases under RA 7975.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor moved for a Reconsideration
and insisted that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan which was
opposed by the petitioner and his coaccused.
115
2008
While
the
Motions
for
Reconsideration were pending before the
Sandiganbayan, Congress passed into law
Republic Act No. 8249 which was
approved by the President on February 5,
1997
entitled
AN
ACT
FURTHER
DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE PD 1606, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR which
deleted the word PRINCIPAL in Section
2, paragraphs [a] and [c] of RA 7975
thereby
giving
jurisdiction
to
the
Sandiganbayan criminal cases involving
police generals like the petitioners even
though they are not charged as principals
but merely accessories or accomplices.
The new law further provides that it shall
be applicable to all cases which are
pending in court before the passage of the
same provided trial has not begun at the
time of its approval.
provisions
in Sections 4 and 7 which
actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law thereby violating
the one title one subject requirement of
Section 26 [1] Article VI of the
Constitution.
On
March
5,
1997,
the
Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor and
ruled that it stands pat in its Resolution
dated May 8, 1996 ordering the transfer
of the 11 criminal cases to the RTC of
Quezon City. On the same day, however,
the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM
to its March 5, 1997 Resolution where it
that with the passage of RA 8249, the
court admitted the amended informations
in these cases and by the unanimous vote
of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and
decide the cases.
Held:
The petitioner questioned the said

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court on the following grounds:
1.
their right to due process of law
and equal protection of the law was
violated as a result of the application of
the new law by
which restored to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their
cases
especially
so
that
the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9
months the resolution of the pending
incident involving the transfer of these
cases to the RTC of Quezon City and
waited for the passage of the law to
overtake such resolution and thereby
rendering their vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law moot;
2.
the retroactive application of
the new law violates their constitutional
right against ex-post facto law;
3.
the title of the law is misleading
in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous
The petitioners-intervenors claimed that

while the law (Sections 4 and 7)
innocuously appears to have merely
expanded
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan, it is in fact a class
legislation and an ex-post facto law
statute intended specifically to apply to all
the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case
pending
before
the
Sandiganbayan.
Finally, if their case will be tried by the
Sandiganbayan, they will be deprived of
their
two-tiered
appeal
to
the
Sandiganbayan which they acquire under
RA 7975 before recourse to the Supreme
Court could be made.
1. The contention that the law violates

petitioners right to due process and equal
protection of the law is too shallow to
deserve merit. It is an established precept
in constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary when there
is concurrence of four elements, namely:
a.
it must rest on real and
substantial distinctions;
b.
it must be germane to
the purposes of the law;
c.
must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and
d.
must apply equally to all
members of the same classall of which are present in this case.
The classification between those
pending cases involving concerned public
officials
whose
trial
has
not
yet
commenced and whose cases could have
been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA
8249, as against those whose cases where
trial has already started as of the approval
of the law rests on substantial distinction
that makes real differences. In the 1st
instance, evidence against them were not
yet presented, whereas in the latter the
parties have already submitted their
respective proofs, examined witnesses
and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of the courts, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration
116

of that jurisdiction necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory
provision.
The
transitory
provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any
court. It just happened that the Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected
by the law. Moreover, those cases where
trial has already begun are not affected by
the transitory provision under Section 7 of
the new law (RA 8249).
2. The petitioners argument that the
retroactive application of the new law to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes
an ex post facto law for they are deprived
of their right to due process as they can
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal
which they had allegedly acquired under
RA 7975 is without merit.
In order that a law is an ex post
facto law, the same must be one
a.
which makes an act
done criminal before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action;
b.
which
aggravates
a
crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed;
c.
which
changes
the
punishment
and
inflicts
a
greater
punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed;
d.
which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required
a the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant;
e.
every law which, in
relation
to
the
offense
or
its
consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage;
f.
that which assumes to
regulate civil rights and remedies but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of
a right which when done was lawful;
g.
deprives
a
person
accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become
entitled, such as
the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS
KAMI, 35 SCRA 429; MEJIA VS.
PAMARAN, 160 SCRA 457; TAN VS.
BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686; PEOPLE VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 211 SCRA 241).
Ex
post
facto
law
prohibits
the
retrospectivity of penal laws. RA 8249 is
not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
2008
The other contention that their right to a

two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under RA 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of RA 8249 is incorrect. The
same contention had been rejected by the
court several times in the cases of
RODRIGUEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 205
Phil. 567; ALVIAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
137
SCRA
63;
NUNEZ
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433; DE
GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, December 15, 1982
considering that the right to appeal is not
a natural right but statutory in nature that
can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory
right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Moreover, the new law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
3. The
contention
that
the
new
Sandiganbayan law violates the one titleone subject provision of the Constitution is
without merit. The petitioners claim that
the new does not define the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan but expands the same.
But even assuming that that is true, the
expansion of the jurisdiction, does not
have to be expressly stated in the title of
the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have
one subject expressed in the title is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include
subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. The
Congress, in employing the word define
in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution
itself
empowers
the
legislative body to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts.
(NOTE: Though the Supreme Court
rejected all the above arguments raised
by the petitioner and the intervenors who
are against the trial of their cases with the
Sandiganbayan and prefer to have their
cases be tried and decided by the RTC of
Quezon City, they got what they want in
the end because it was held that the 11
criminal informations failed to alleged that
they committed the crimes in relation to
their public office which is a jurisdictional
requirement in order that the same be
tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, sometime in May, 1999, the
Quezon City RTC to whom the said cases
were raffled DISMISSED the 11 murder
cases as a result of the retraction made by
the eyewitnesses. The same was revived
by the DOJ in April, 2001. The same was
117

returned to the QC RTC to determine if the
2-year provisional rule under the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure is applicable)
2.a. Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429
3. Sevilleja vs. COMELEC, 107 SCRA
141
4. P vs. Ferrer, 46 & 56 SCRA
5. Tan vs. Barrios, October 18,
1990
******************************
CHAPTER XXII-CITIZENSHIP
******************************
1. Effect
country
of
naturalization
in
another
Read:
a. Ramon Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec,
July 3, 1992
a.-1 RAMON LABO JR. VS.
COMELEC, GR No. 86564,
August
1, 1989
RAMON LABO, JR. VS. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
LUIS LARDIZABAL, G.R. NO. 86564,
August 1, 1989
Citizenship; renunciation of; who takes
the place of a disqualified winner in an
election; res judicata
Unanimous en banc decision
(NOTE: This is also important in your
Remedial Law)
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. The petitioner was proclaimed mayorelect of the City of Baguio on January 20,
1988;
2. On January 26, 1988, the private
respondent filed a quo warranto case
against the petitioner but no filing fee was
paid;
3. On February 10, 1988 or 21 days after
the petitioner was proclaimed, the private
respondent paid the filing fee of P300.00;
4. Since the filing fee was paid beyond the
reglementary period, the petitioner claims
that the petition was late because the
payment of the filing fee is essential to the
timeliness of an appeal, citing Manchester
vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562;
2008
5. The private respondent claimed he filed

the petition on time because when he first
filed the same, it was treated by the
COMELEC
as
a
pre-proclamation
controversy which needs no filing fee.
When the COMELEC treated it as a quo
warranto case on February 8, 1988, he
immediately paid the filing fee on said
date. Hence, the filing fee was paid on
time.
Issues:
1. Was the petition for quo warranto filed
on time?
2. Since the case was merely for
determination on whether or not the
petition was filed on time or not, may the
Supreme
Court
determine
whether
petitioner Ramon Labor, Jr. is qualified for
the office of the City Mayor of Baguio or
not?
3. Since the petitioner won in the election
and turned out to be not qualified for said
position, who shall take his place as the
City Mayor?
Held:
1. The petition was filed on time since the
filing fee was paid immediately when the
COMELEC treated the same as a quo
warranto and not a pre-proclamation
controversy. However, even assuming that
the filing fee was paid late, the same was
not traceable to the private respondent's
fault or neglect. What is important is that
the filing fee was paid.
2. Normally, the case should end here as
the sole issue raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto
proceedings against him. HOWEVER, AS
HIS CITIZENSHIP IS THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING, AND
CONSIDERING THE NECESSITY FOR AN
EARLY RESOLUTION OF THAT MORE
IMPORTANT QUESTION CLEARLY AND
URGENTLY
AFFECTING
THE
PUBLIC
INTEREST, WE SHALL DIRECTLY ADDRESS
IT NOW IN THIS SAME ACTION AGAINST
HIM. (DEL CASTILLO VS. JAYMALIN, 112
SCRA 629; ALGER ELECTRIC VS. CA, 135
SCRA 37; BEAUTIFONT VS. CA, January
29, 1988; SOTTO VS. SAMSON, 5 SCRA
733; REPUBLIC VS. PAREDES, 108 PHIL.
57; LIANGA LUMBER CO. VS. LIANGA
TIMBER CO. , 76 SCRA 197; ERICO VS.
HEIRS OF CHIGAS, 98 SCRA 575;
FRANCISCO VS. CITY OF DAVAO, 12 SCRA
628; VALENCIA VS. MABILANGAN, 105
PHIL. 162; FERNANDEZ VS. GARCIA, 92
PHIL. 592; LI SHIU LIAT VS. REPUBLIC,
118

21 SCRA 1039; SAMAL VS. CA, 99 PHIL.
30; US VS. GIMINEZ, 34 PHIL. 74;
TEJONES VS. GIRONELLA, 159 SCRA 100
and LIANGA BAY LOGGING VS. CA, 157
SCRA 357).
In addition thereto, since the petitioner
claims that the respondent COMELEC has
prejudged the case against him because it
adopted
the
private
respondent's
COMMENT which repeatedly asserted that
he is not a Filipino citizen, with more
reason that the Supreme Court shall now
decide the case with finality instead of
returning the same to the COMELEC.
3. There are two administrative decisions
involving the citizenship of the petitioner.
On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC held that
he is a Filipino citizen while on September
13, 1988, the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation held that he is not a
citizen of the Philippines.
In a statement by the Australian
consul in the Philippines, it was found out
that RAMON LABO, JR. was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on July
28, 1976.
However, Labo claims that the petition
to disqualify him because of his citizenship
is already barred by res judicata because
of the earlier ruling of the COMELEC that
he is a Filipino citizen. It must be pointed
out that res judicata does not apply to
questions involving citizenship (SORIA
VS. COMMISSIONER, 37 SCRA 213;
LEE VS. COMMISSIONER, 42 SCRA
561; SIA REYES VS. DEPORTATION
BOARD, 122 SCRA 478).
Labo also claims that his
naturalization in Australia was annulled
since it was found out that his marriage to
an Australian was bigamous. This is
without merit since even assuming it to be
true, the same did not automatically vest
him Philippine Citizenship which could be
reacquired only by: a) a direct act of
Congress; b) by naturalization; and c) by
repatriation. Since none of these is
present to show that he was able to
reacquire Philippine citizenship, Labo is
not considered a Filipino citizen. As such,
he is not even qualified to be a voter
under the Constitution, much less as a
candidate for the position of Mayor in the
City of Baguio.
Labo claims
further that the
"futile" technicality should not frustrate
the will of the electorate in Baguio City
who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority. Again, this is without
2008
basis because to be more accurate, he

won by just over 2,100 votes. But even
assuming further that he was elected
unanimously, the same voters of Baguio
City could not change the requirements of
the
Constitution
and
the
Local
Government Code. The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at
the least a stateless person to preside
over them as the City Mayor of Baguio.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege. The probability that many of
those who voted for him may have done
so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results
of the elections cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by
him.
3. Who shall take the place of the
petitioner then as the City Mayor of
Baguio? Is the private respondent entitled
to it? HE CANNOT FOR THE SIMPLE
REASON THAT HE OBTAINED ONLY THE
SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN
THE ELECTION AND THEREFORE, HE WAS
OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CHOICE OF THE
PEOPLE OF BAGUIO CITY.
It is true that in SANTOS vs.
COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 , the Supreme
Court held that in cases like this, the
second placer shall take the place of the
disqualified candidate since the latter was
considered as non-candidate and all that
he received are considered stray votes.
The second placer, in effect, won by
default. Said decision was supported by 8
members of the Court, three dissented,
two reserved their votes and one on
leave. Re-examining said decision, the
same shall be REVERSED in favor of the
earlier case of Geronimo vs. COMELEC,
136 SCRA 435, which is the more logical
and democratic rule first announced in the
1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238, and was supported by ten (10)
members of the Court without any
dissent. The Vice Mayor of the City of
Baguio shall be entitled to become the
City Mayor instead of the private
respondent.
1989
b. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, June 23,
c. Board of Commissioners vs. De

la Rosa and William Gatchalian, May 31,
1991
d. Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA
703
1-a. Effect of naturalization of wife and
minor
children
119
2008
Read:
1. Burca vs. Republic,51 SCRA 248
2. Reyes vs. Deportation Board,May
30,1983
2. Effect on the citizenship of an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen
Read:
1. Moy Ya Lim vs. Comm. on
Immigration, 41 SCRA
292
3. Effect on the citizenship of a Filipino
woman on her marriage to an alien.
Read:
1. Rep. vs. Tandayag, 117 SCRA 637
4. Procedure for repatriation
Read:
1. P vs. Avengoza, 119 SCRA 1
5.
Cancellation
naturalization
of
certificate
of
Read:
1. Schneider vs. Rusk, 377 US 163
2. Republic vs. Cokeng, 23 SCRA 559
3. Republic vs. Cokeng, 34 SCRA 668
4. Chan Teck Lao vs. Republic, 55
SCRA 1
5. Rep. vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
****************************
120

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D.

On July 5, 1993, the respondentsexaminees filed a petition for mandamus

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

constitutionality of the said Executive

Sub-issues under this are:

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

2. On June 11, 1979, the then

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

CHAPTER IIDUE PROCESS

Requisites of judicial due process.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

member of the First Division or the Special

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

JAVIER VS. COMELEC

The applicable provisions of the 1973

"Section 2. Be the sole judge of all

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

All election contests involving

MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. JUDGE

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999

TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635

Academic freedom; due process

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT

College of Saint Benilde is an

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

their involvement in an offensive action

respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul

On March 29, 1995, James Yap

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner

After this incident, a meeting was

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Guzman v. National University, G.R.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL

G.R. No. L-68288, July 11,

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

"* * The school rules governing

a. need not entail proceedings and

There is no law, whether the Civil

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Respondent filed his answer denying

After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Due process of law in administrative cases

CHAPTER III - THE EQUAL

Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697,