Emilio Scragg Campos

Kbenhavn Universitet
January 4, 2015

Epistemology of Disagreement
Syllabus
Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of
Knowledge. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY.
(Standard Pages: 356)
Alston, W. (2014). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research. Vol. 47, No. 1. International
Phenomenological Society: 1-30.
(Standard Pages: 30)
Barnett, D. (2013). Whats the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?
Draft: 1-28.
(Standard Pages: 28)
Bergmann, M. (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. LXIX, No. 3: 709727.
(Standard Pages: 18)
Christensen, D. (2007). "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good
News." Philosophical Review 116(2): 187-217.
(Standard Pages: 40)
Christensen, D. (2013). Epistemic Modesty Defended. Disagreement
without Transparency. The Epistemology of Disagreement. D.
Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford.
(Standard Pages: )
Cohen, S. (2013). A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View. The
Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford,
Oxford.
(Standard Pages: )
Elga, A. (2007). How to disagree about how to disagree. Disagreement.
R. Feldman and T. Warfield. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
(Standard Pages: )

Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.

Epistemology Futures. S. Hetherington, Oxford Clarendon Press: 21636.
(Standard Pages: 20)
Feldman, R. & J. Lackey (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement:
New Essays. Oxford University Press; Oxford, UK.
(Standard Pages: 417)
Frances, B. (2013). Philosophical Renegades. The Epistemology of
Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
(Standard Pages: )
Goldberg, S. C. (2013). Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion. The
Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
(Standard Pages: )
Goldman, A. (2001). "Experts: Which Ones Should You trust?"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63.
(Standard Pages: )
Goldman, A. I. (2007). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable
Disagreement. Disagreement. R. F. a. T. Warfield. Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
(Standard Pages: )
Gowans CW. Moral Virtue and the Epistemology of Disagreement.
Philosophical Topics. 2010;38(2): 39-57.
(Standard Pages: 18)
Greco, J. (2001). Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1: 105-112.
(Standard Pages: 7)
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.
Disagreement. R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, Oxford University Press.
(Standard Pages: )
Lackey, J. (2010). A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic
Significance. Social Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D.
Pritchard, Oxford University Press.
(Standard Pages: )

Machuca, D. (ed.) (2013). Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge;

New York, NY.
(Standard Pages: 373)
Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World. Philosophical
Papers. Collier Books; New York, New York: 126-148.
(Standard Pages: 22)
Sosa, E. (2010). The Epistemology of Disagreement. Social
Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard, Oxford University
Press.
(Standard Pages: )
Wedgwood, R. (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. Disagreement. R.
Feldman and T. Warfield, Oxford University Press.
(Standard Pages: )