Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MEDINA
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President
of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of
Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,
HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M.
LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.
(G.R. No. 180050
Facts: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the
Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province
of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President
appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on
January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July
1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del
Norte, filed another petition for certiorari8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that
when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only
and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts
Issue: Whether or not the law creating Dinagat Province is valid.
Held: The Congress in recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
full-fledged province enacted R.A. No. 9355 following the exemption from the land
area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found
as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the
Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted
upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that
exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province
when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A.
No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income ofP82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat
is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in
the mind of the Court.
The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared
VALID.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The
petitions
raise
the
following
fundamental
issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001
while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA
9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly
exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption
clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section
450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of
the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to curtail
the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, RA 9009
increased the income requirement for the creation of cities.
Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to
convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to
go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an
exemption, the Court should not create one.