CASE STUDY

CASE STUDY ON DP OPERATIONS IN 500M ZONE

BREACH OF PLATFORM
RESTRICTED ZONE
An incident occurred at approximately 10:30 when
a vessel was approaching a platform for a fuel
transfer. Due to the restricted visibility at the time
of arrival (250m), the vessel went on standby
outside the 500m zone. The bridge team started the
pre-entry checklist at 12:00. but this was not
completed due to the restricted visibility
preventing alongside work.
It was decided to utilize the time on standby on DP
mode to gain some DP time for the bridge team.
The vessel set up on DP just over 1 mile from the
platform. After a period of just over two hours on
DP, the visibility had improved enough to meet the
minimum visibility criteria and thus allow the
decision to commence the operation.
Weather conditions on location at the time were
recorded as: wind direction: ENE; wind force: 2;
sea height: lm; visibility: poor; temperature: 21C;
tide direction 207 degrees true; tide rate: 0.7 knots.
Pre-entry checks were recorded in the deck
logbook. The pre-entry checks confirmed all
equipment was operating correctly, and the vessel
entered the 500m zone at 14:20.
At 14:38, the chief officer was driving the vessel
from the aft console and was going alongside the
north face whilst the crane was preparing to lower
the hose. This maneuver included thrusting to
starboard. As they approached the required station,
the chief officer moved the joystick to port to
'check' the starboard movement of the vessel and
ease into position. While moving the stick from
starboard to port, an unexpected clicking noise was
heard, and he immediately felt the tension on the
joystick slacken. He immediately deselected the
joystick control and operated the manual thruster
controls on the aft console whilst at the same time
asking the second officer to conlact the installation
and inform them there was a problem and they
would be pulling off to investigate.
The second officer informed the installation and
then immediately called the master to the bridge.

Once the chief officer had thrusted off to

approximately 40m, he decided to utilize the main
propulsion to take a clear escape route straight
ahead to exit the 500m safety zone.
Prior to entry to the 500m zone, the main engines
and rudders had been set up for split rudder
configuration, with the port rudder set to 30
degrees to starboard and zero pitch on both main
engines. The chief officer applied forward thrust on
both engines by moving the propeller pitch to 30
per cent ahead and then prepared to pass control to
the forward console where the second officer was
in a position to accept control.
Navigating from the forward console when going
ahead is normal navigational practice, and transfer
between the consoles was a routine task that was
carried out regularly by all navigational officers. In
order to hand over the control to the forward
console, both thruster and pitch controls were set
to zero, and control was then passed over from the
aft console to the forward one where the second
officer was stationed to accept control.
At this point, the chief officer stated that the vessel
began to veer to starboard. The second officer was
of the opinion that the vessel was veering to
starboard prior to this point. Both parties confirmed
that the second officer had commented, "You can't
go in there," which would suggest the vessel was
already veering to starboard before control was
passed.
The second officer, on taking control on the
forward console, noticed that the rudder indicator
was over to starboard, although he could not
confirm whether it was one rudder or both or
exactly how may degrees to starboard it was
showing. He realized that, if he applied ahead
propulsion before putting the rudders to port, it
would only aggravate the situation and increase the
rate of turn to starboard. He therefore activated the
forward thrusters to port to swing the vessel's head
out of the starboard turn, and the vessel exited the
restricted zone and, once well clear, recorded the
time of exit at 14:48.
The master arrived on the bridge and witnessed the
second officer applying the forward thrusters to

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CASE STUDY

correct the vessel's heading and counter the

starboard turn. When the vessel reached a safe
distance from the installation, the issue with the
joystick was investigated, and it was decided to
replace the aft joystick with one from the starboard
bridge wing and test it fully. The test proved
successful, and when the master was satisfied with
the operational integrity of the joystick, the vessel
went alongside to accept the fuel hose. Later
investigation identified a spring in the joystick had
broken.
The bridge team confirmed they were aware of the
restricted access zone, and they had an installation
data card posted on the bridge. They also stated that
they were aware that the zone was to protect the
risers, and they were aware of the location of the
risers. They did not intend to enter the restricted
access zone. The second officer confirmed at least
one of the forward rudder indicators was to
starboard. The rudders had been selected in the
joystick configuration. The vessel confirmed that
the aft console has been selected prior to the
joystick being selected, therefore the default on
disengaging the joystick was to return the control
to the aft panel. The failed joystick was only five
months old.
The chief officer and all the bridge crew were well
aware of the platform's restricted area. There was
never any deliberate intention to enter into it.
The above case raises following questions:
1. Are all officers and DPOs on our vessels
aware of the restricted zone on the rig they
are operating with?
2. If so, why this restricted zone specified and
did we ask the rig to share the installation
data card?
3. Is this installation card posted on the
bridge?
4. The chief officer thought that, when he
experienced the slackening of the joystick,
it had undermined its operational
effectiveness; this was later proven not to

be the case. He instinctively decided the

most suitable course of action was to pull
off the installation immediately and vacate
the 500m zone by the shortest route. On the
premise that he believed the joystick had
failed completely. Is this action by the
Chief Officer correct? Would you act in a
different way?
5. The decision was made to pass over control
from the aft console to the forward console
during the exit from the 500m safety zone.
Do you think this decision is correct? What
would you do in such a situation?
6. The chief officer has stated that, with
hindsight, he should have continued to
thrust to port and exit the 500m zone by that
means before attempting to pass control.
Do you agree with this given the status of
Joystick? If so why and if not why?
7. Please read the statement carefully The
second officer, on taking control on the
forward console, noticed that the rudder
indicator was over to starboard, although he
could not confirm whether it was one
rudder or both or exactly how may degrees
to starboard it was showing. He realized
that, if he applied ahead propulsion before
putting the rudders to port, it would only
aggravate the situation and increase the rate
of turn to starboard. Would the situation
be better served if the 2nd Officer had put
the rudders to port and then applied the
ahead propulsion? What maneuver would
you adopt if you were in that situation.
Please list your Recommendations:
Do we need any changes to our procedures in
light of the above.
Please check the operational modes (i.e rudder
angle and pitch) of the propellers, thrusters and
rudders upon changing over controls from DP
to aft console; aft console to forward console
and forward console to aft console. Do we need
this information displayed on the bridge.

Compiled using information from the Marine Safety Forum

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