DUE PROCESS

(Note: Ichong - Romualdez cases refer to

Consti notes)
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION
SATELLITE V. ALCUAZ
FACTS:
PHILCOMSTAT seeks to annul Order by
Commissioner Jose Alcuaz of NTC (which
directs provisional reduction of the rates
which may be charged by petitioner for
certain lines by 15% with reservation to
make further reductions later), for being
violative against undue delegation of
leg power and denial of procedural
and substantive due process of law.
PHILCOMSTAT granted a franchise for
establishing station for international
satellite communications; also w/ authority
to construct and operate ground facilities
as needed to deliver telecomm satellite
system. Also the sole signatory of the
Phis.in INTELSTAT and INMARSTAT.
EO 196 placed PHILCOMSTAT under
control of NTC re regulation of facilities
and services as well as fixing the rates.
NTC then filed app to continue operating
and maintaining facilities s.t the law.
NTC was given provisional authority to
continue operating for 6 months and was
extended to another 6 months but NTC
directed the petitioner to reduce
rates to 15%, HENCE the ISSUE.
HELD:
I. Petitioner contends that the EO 546 and
196 do not contain rate-fixing power
placing petitioner under jurisdiction of NTC
and thus constitutes undue delegation of
leg power.
Court said no. In delegation of ratefixing power, only the standard which
the legislature is required to prescribe for
the guidance of the admn authority is the
rate be REASONBALE AND JUST.
Based on the said Eos , NTC is
empowered, among other, to determine
and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation
of
public
service
communications.

II. Contention on violation of procedural

due process because it was issued motu
proprio, W/O NOTICE to petitioner and
W/O BENEFIT OF HEARING.
Respondents admit that the app of policy
like fixing of rates is quasi-judicial than
quas-leg. Hence notice is not reqd.
Accdg to SC, contention of PHILCOMSTAT
meritorious.
NOTE: Where the function of admin body
is legislative, no need for notice and
hearing as a GENERAL RULE. But where a
public admin body acts in a judicial or
quasi-judicial matter, the persons whose
rights and ppty may be affected is entitled
NOTICE and HEARING.
HOW IS IT CONSIDERED QUAS-JUDICIAL?
Said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and no other
Initital eval on rates reduction
made without affording petitioner
benefit of explanation
No rationalization offered which
prompted as much as 15%
reduction
The Court favors petitioner that immediate
reduction would adversely affect its
operations
and quality of its service.
Notably, the petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the inspector who issued the
report on which NTC based its report.
NOTE: Rate-fixing power may not be
exercised UNREASONABLY and in a
CONFISCATORY MANNER. It is thus clear
that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent
has NO AUTHORITY to make such order
WITHOUT first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be TEMPORARY or
PERMANENT and IMMATERIAL whether
made
upon
complaint,
summary
investigation, etc.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate
reduction is CONSFISCATORY in that its
implementation would virtually result in a
cessation of its operations and eventual
closure of business.
CONTENTION by respondent: Franchise
confers NO vested right; what it has is
only privilege or license which may be
revoked at wil..

But such grant CANNOT be revoked

unilaterally absent showing that it is for
common good must be FAIR and
REASONABLE (tests of substantive due
process).
Power to regulate is NOT the power to
destroy. Therefore, any regulation which
operates as an effective confiscation of
ppty is VOID being REPUGNANT to
constitutional GUARANTIES of due process
and equal protection of laws.
TEST OF REASONABLENESS: Rates
must not be so low as too confiscatory or
too high as to be oppressive.
METHOD EMPLOYED IN DETERMINING
REASONABLENESS:
1. FAIR return upon the value of the
ppty to the public utility.
2. Competition
ORDER VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
NULL AND VOID. Proceed w the hearing

ANG TIBAY v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS
FACTS:
- Toribio Teodoros claim, that a shortage
of leather soles in Ang Tibay made him
temporarily lay off members of the
National Labor Union Inc, was FALSE.
- Supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., form work
- That Torinio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly
unfavoring National Workers Brotherhood.
Ang Tibay filed an opposition both to the
motion for recon of CIR and the motion for
new trial of National Labor Union.
HELD:
Motion for New Trial
CIR a special court which is more of an
admin board than part of the judicial
system. It has jurisdiction over the Phils.,

to consider, investigate, decide, and settle

controversies between employers and
employees or labourers, and regulate
relations between them.
In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes.
CIR may be free from rigidity in procedural
reqts but does NOT mean that it can
entirely
ignore
or
disregard
the
fundamental and essential reqts of DUE
PROCESS in trials and investigations ofa
admin character.
CARDIINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS:
1. The right to a hearing presentation
of case and submission of evidence in
support thereof.
2.
Tribunal
must
consider
the
evidence presented. WHY? Because the
right to adduce evidence without the court
considering it is VAIN.
3. Support/basis of decision a
decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached. Principle emanates that the
genius of the government is contrary to
the unlimited power. LAW is both a GRANT
and LIMITATION upon power.
4. Evidence must be SUBSTANTIAL
substantial evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support
conclusion.
5. The decision must be rendered
based on the evid. presented at the
hearing CIR may refer any industrial or
agril dispute to a local board of inquiry,
provincial fiscal, justice of the peace and
may DELEGATE powers as may deem
necessary.
6. CIR must act on its independent
consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy should not just accept
deicison or view of a subordinate.
RULING: It would be better served if the
movant present at the hearing referred to
in his motion . MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS
GRANTED. REMANDED TO CIR.

ATENEO v. CAPULONG
FACTS:
Students who are being refused admission
to Ateneo have been found guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. This
attracted much publicity due to death of
one of the neophyte (Leonardo Villa) and
serious physical injuries inflicted on
another (Bienvenido Marquez) during the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Dean Cynthia del Castillo then created a
Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee to investigate the
death of Villa. It was clear from their
reports that there was a violation of the
said Rule.
The Board found the respondents guilty of
hazing. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, the Pres.of the
said university, imposed a penalty of
dismissal to the students.
The respondent-students filed with RTC a
petition for certiorari alleging that they
were currently enrolled as students and
theres lack of due process.
The students were not allowed to take
exams but respondent Judge ordered
petitioners to reinstate students and
conduct special exams. Hence, this civil
action questioning the order of respondent
judge.
HELD:
The Court granted the petition and
reversed the order of respondent judge
ordering readmission of the students.
Respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when e ruled that
respondent students have been denied
procedural due process.
De Guzman case is apropos to the instant
case stating standards to be satisfied
in the imposition of a disciplinary
sanctions:
1. Students must b informed in
writing of the nature of accusation
against them
2. That they have the right to answer
the charges against them w/
assistance of a counsel, if desired

3. They shall be informed of evidence

against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce
evidence
5. The evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating
committee or official to hear and
decide case
The above reqts were met by the school.
NOTE:
Disciplinary
cases
involving
students need not necessarily include the
RIGHT
TO
CROSS
EXAMINATION.
Administrative proceedings to investigate
the hazing incident need not be clothed
with judicial proceeding. It is enough that
there was NOTICE.
Respondent-students contention that the
investigating committee failed to consider
their evidence is FAR from truth because
the Order on Feb 14, 1992 clearly states
that it was reached after receiving
written
statements
and
hearing
testimonies of several witnesses.
EXCEPTION
TO
THE DOCTRINE OF
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES: happens
when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, the issue is W/N
RESPONDENT
STUDENT
HAVE
BEEN
AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PRIOR TO DISMISSAL FROM PETITIONER
UNVIERSITY
Essential elements of freedoms by J.
Felix Frankfurter: (1) Who may teach;
(2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; (4) who may be admitted to
study.
Academic freedom freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the
press; in other words, with the right of
individuals in university communities,
such as professors, researchers, etc.
Socrates: To follow
wherever it may lead

the

argument

FRANKFURTER FORMULATION:
1. What shall be taught, e.g.,
curriculum
2. Who may be admitted to study
Note: Academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning. (Art.
XIV, Sec. 5 [2]) since it is a dynamic

concept, let the court alone

further parameter of such.

develop

Note: Admission to an institution of higher

learning is discretionary upon the school,
the same being a privilege on the part
of the student and NOT a right.
Hohfeldia
terms:
students
have
a
concomitant duty, and that is, their duty
to learn under the rules laid down by the
school.
Religious education an education
which inculcates duty and reverence.

Petitioners assail that the definition of the

crime of terrorism is intrinsically vague
and
impermissibly
broad
like
widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace and coerce
the govt to give in to an unlawful
demand are nebulous.
OSG: void-for-vagueness or overbreadth
find no app in the present case since these
doctrines apply onlky to free speech
cases; RA 9372 regulates conduct, NOT
speech.
The Court clarifies OSG answer.

RULING: DISMISSAL AFFIRMED.

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan:

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE
TERRORISM COUNCIL

ANTI-

The word intervene in Sec.5 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act was
intrinsically vague. SC said that the
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness have
special app only for free-speech cases.

Before the Court are 6 petitions

challenging the constitutionality of R.A
9372 (or Human Security Act of 2007).

Romualdez v. COMELEC: Facial invalidation

of a criminal statute is not appropiiate.
Subject election offense is couched in a
precise language.

v.

FACTS:

Following the effectivity of such law,

petitioner and others filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Certiorari does not lie against respondents

who do not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. (Sec. 1, Rule 65 RC)

Estrada case (J. Mendoza): A facial

challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of the possibility of
chilling effect upon protected speech.
History in U.S First Amendment cases
(doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases)

In the present case, the dismal absence of

the first 2 requisites, which are the most
essential (in judicial review) renders the
discussion of the last 2 superfluous.
Petitioners have not presented any
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.

Note: The above rationale does not apply

to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct.

Note: Petitioners obscure allegations of

sporadic surveillance and supposedly
being tagged as communist fronts in no
way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution.

WHEN IS STATUTE VAGUE? when it

lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.

A FACIAL INVALIDATION OF A STATUE IS

ALLOWED ONLY IN FREE SPEECH CASES WHEREIN CERTAIN RULES OF CONSTIL
LITIGATION ARE RIGHTLY EXCEPTED.

REPUGNANT TO CONSTI IN 2 RESPECTS:

HELD:
The petitions fail.

1. It violates due process for failure

to accord persons fair notice of the
conduct to avoid

2. It leaves enforcers unbridled

discretion in carrying to its
provisions and becomes arbitrary
flexing of govt muscle.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
-

Decrees that the Govtl purpose to

control
or
prevent
activities
constitutionally
s.t
state
regulations may not be achieved
by means w/c sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the
areas of protected freedoms.
Assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits
and will accordingly refrain from
that behavior, even though some
of it is protected.

As-applied
challenge
Challenge
considers
extant
affecting
litigants

which
only
facts
real

Facial
invalidation
An examination of
the
entire
law
pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not
only on the basis of
its actual operation,
but also on the
assumption
or
prediction that its
very existence to
refrain
from
constitutionally
protected speech or
activities.

*If a facial challenge to a penal statue is

permitted, the prosecution of crimes may
be hampered. NO PROSECUTION WOULD
BE POSSIBLE.
The Court emphasized that the word
unlawful demand in said law seeks to
penalize conduct and NOT speech.
NOTE: Utterances not elemental but
inevitably INCIDENTAL to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of
the law to punish socially harmful
CONDUCT nor the essence of the whole
conduct NOT speech.
RULING: NEITHER ACTUAL CHARGE NOR
CREDIBLE THREAT OF PROSECUTION.
PETITIONS DISMISSED.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

- simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated (denotes classification)
should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
EQUALITY AMONG EQUALS
REQUIREMENTS (classification must not be
arbitrary):
1. It must be based upon substantial
distinctions.
2. It must be germane to the
purposes of the law.
3. It must not be limited to existing
conditions only.
4. It must apply equally to all
members of the class.

PEOPLE v. VERA
FACTS:
Petitioners
herein
and
HSBC
are
respectively the plaintiff and offended
party, and respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng,
one of the defendants, convicted of a
crime and whose motion for new trial was
denied by Judge Vera and CA.
The instant proceedings have to do with
the application for probation. Fiscal of
Manila and private prosecution opposed to
the granting of probation against accused,
alleging, among others, that Act No. 4221
(Old Probation law: endows provincial
boards with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their provinces
undue delegation of leg power) is
violative of Sec. 1, Art. III, guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws for the reason
that its applicability is NOT uniform thru
out the Islands.
Counsel for the defendant filed an
exception to the resolution denying
probation and notice to file a motion for
recon. However, due to numerous
postponements of the hearing, petitioners
came to court to put an end to what they
alleged as an indeterminable proceeding.

Petitioners alleged that respondent

judge acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of his jurisdiction.

SC: We see no difference between a law

which denies equal protection and a law
which permits of such denial.

CONTENTION: Even if Manila were

considered as province, ACT 4221 would
not be applicable to it because it does not
provide for the salary of a probation officer
as reqd by Sec. 11 thereof.

RULING: ACT 4221 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

AND VOID.

ACT 4221, a law providing a system of

probation for persons 18 and ab
ove, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of
Sec. 1, Art. III, guaranteeing equal
protection of laws because it confers upon
the provincial board of each province the
ABSOLUTE DISCRETION to make said law
operative. It constitutes an unlawful and
improper delegation of powers and that it
enlarges the powers of CFI without
uniformity.
HELD:
The discretion vested to provincial board is
arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. It is bound by no rule. It need
not give any reason whatsoever for
refusing or failing to appropriate any funds
for the salary of the probation officer.
The various provincial boards are, in
effect, endowed with the power of
suspending the operation of the
Probation Law.
Thus, Sec. 11 of said law has an improper
and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
Does it violate equal protection?
Equal protection pledge
protection of equal laws.

of

the

In the case at bar, one province may

appropriate the necessary fund to defray
the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do.
In such a case, the Probation Act would be
in operation in the former province but
NOT in the latter.
Ergo, persons similarly situated, in another
province would be denied those same
benefits.
This
is
OBNOXIOUS
DISCRIMINATION.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
Pertinent ruling:
DOES THE LAW DENY THE
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS?

EQUAL

Court: The aliens interest in this country

being merely transient and temporary, it
would indeed be ill-advised to continue
entrusting the very important function of
retail distribution in his hands. (ex. Utter
disregard of the welfare of the consumer,
manipulations, lacks loyalty, etc.) VALID
REASON for the state to prefer national
over alien.
What is the sufficient basis or distinction?
Classification is ACTUAL, REAL, AND
REASONABLE, and all persons of one class
are treated alike thus, the legislature
ACTED WITHIN ITS PREROGATIVE and
cannot declare that it transcends the limit
of equal protection. (NOTE: Legislative has
wide scope of discretion; with reasonable
basis not purely arbitrary; existence of
fact must be assumed; one who assails
has the burden to prove- Lindsley v.
National Carbonic Gas
Is Citizenship
classification?

valid

ground

for

YES. In Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, the

validity of Act. No. 2761 was in issue,
ownership
of
vessels
engaged
in
coastwide trade limited to Filipinos and
Americans only because of the existing
conditions DID NOT VIOLATE the equal
protection clause. The purpose of which
was to encourage Phil. Shipbuilding and
safety for these Islands from foreign
interlopers (illegal traders). Thus a valid
police power.

Gibbons v. Ogden: Aliens are under no

special constitutional
protection which
forbids classification for such would
require a higher degree of protection for
them as a class. issue on LICENSING
Commonwealth v. Hana: statute on the
licensing of hawkers and peddlers
provided no one can obtain a license
UNLESS he is a U.S citizen- why? To limit
the business for those who are supposed
to have regard for the welfare, good order,
and happiness of the community.

The Contention of petitioner that said

ordinance is NOT a purely tax or revenue
measure but a police power due to its
regulatory in nature is UNTENABLE.
First part of Ordinance which is the permit
process is VALID but the payment
requirement
of
P50.00
is
NOT
REGULATORY but a revenue measure.
There is no logic or justification in exacting
the said amount for aliens. purpose is
to raise money in the GUISE of
regulation.
P50.00 IS unreasonable
I. It fails substantial diff.in situation among
individual aliens reqd to pay it.

VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari to review decision of
respondent Judge Francisco Arca declaring
NULL AND VOID the Ordinance No. 6537
of the City of Manila.
THE ORDINANCE:
*Prohibits an ALIEN:
To be employed in any place of
employment OR to be engaged in
any kind of trade, business or
occupation (whether permanent,
temporary or casual) within the
City of Manila WITHOUT first
securing an employment permit
from the mayor of Manila which
costs P 50.00
W/ exception to persons employed
in the diplomatic/consular missions,
technical assistance programs of
the
govt,
working
in
hteir
respective
households,
and
members of religious orders or
congregations,
sect
or
denomination,
NOT
PAID
monetarily or in kind.
Private respondent, then employed in
Manila filed a petition for preliminary
injunction and to declare such ordinance
null and void. Judge issued injuction.

Again, although the equal protection

clause does not prohibit classification, it is
imperative that the same must be REAL
and
SUBSTANTIAL
having
a
REASONABLE RELATION to the subject
of the said legislation.
II. No standards set for the exercise of the
Mayor are laid down in the ordinance. NO
POLICY to set up standard to guide or
limit the mayors action = NO PURPOSE
to be attained by requiring a permit (i.e.,
no
purpose
to
be
attained,
enumerates no conditions for its
grant,
etc.)

ARBITRARY
AND
UNRESTRICTED POWER to GRANT or DENY.
Therefore, Ordinance is VOID for failure to
contain or suggest any standard or
criterion that will guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power granted him.
VIOLATION OF DUE
EQUAL PROTECTION

PROCESS

AND

Requiring a person a permit before he

can be employed by a Mayor who can
refuse or withhold at will such permit is
tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people to engage in a
means of livelihood.

Petitioner Mayor Villegas filed a petition.

Once an alien is admitted, he CANNOT be

deprive of life w.o due process. The
shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause
is GIVEN TO ALL PERSONS.

HELD:

RULING: Petition denied.

PEOPLE v. CAYAT
FACTS:
The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio,
was sentenced by the justice of the peace
of P5 (subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency)
Crime: possession of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, other than the socalled native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to
the passage of Act No. 1639.
SEC. 2: it is unlawful for any native citizen
to buy, receive, possess, or drink ardent
spirits. Ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors, other than those nave wines they
are accustomed to. Duty of any police
officer or other duly authorized agent of
the Insular, etc. to seize and destroy
liquors found in possession of any
member of a non-Christian tiribe.
SEC.3: FINES AND PENALTIES
HELD:
The guaranty of equal protection is not
violated by a leg based on reasonable
classification
which
consists
of
4
requirements:
1. Real or substantial classifications
the term non-Christian tribes
refers, not to religious belief, but to
the geographical area, and more
directly to the natives of the
Phils. of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from
settled communities.
RATIONALE: To meet the peculiar existing
conditions in the non-Christian tribes.
2. Germane to the purposes of law cannot
be doubted. The prohibition to buy,
receive, receive, possess, or drink such
liquors is designed to insure peace and
order in and among the non-Christian
tribes.
BACKDROP: the free use of
highly intoxicated liquors by the nonChristian tribes have resulted in
lawlessness and crimes hampering
the govt to raise the standard of life
and civilization.

3. The law is not limited to its app to

conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions
exist. Civilization of people is a slow
process and that had in hand with it must
go measures of protection and security
4. Equal application to all its members. Unfairness in its operation against a
certain number of non-Christians by
reason of of their degree of culture is not
an argument.
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
Destroying liquors NOT a violation of due
process. To constitute due process, notice
and hearing are not always necessary. This
is true when much must be left to the
discretion of administrative officials.
DUE PROCESS:
1. That there shall be law prescribed
in harmony w the general powers
of the leg dept of the govt
2. That it shall be reasonable in its
operation
3. That it shall be enforced accdg to
the regular methods of procedure
prescribed
4. That it shall be applicable alike to
all citizens of the state or to all of a
class
PURPOSE OF ACT 1639: to promote peace
and order in the non-Christian tribes so as
to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and eventually hasten
their equalization and unification with the
rest of their Christian brothers.
RULING: Petition denied.

DUMLAO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petition seeking to enjoin COMELEC from
implementing BP 51, 52, and 53 for
being unconstitutional.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions
the constitutionality of sec. 4 of BP 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to equal
protection
and
due
process
guarantees of the Constitution.

SEC. 4 - any retired provincial, city or

municipality who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled and shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected ,
shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective office form which he has
retired.
CONTENTION: Classification is purely
arbitrary and therefore a class legislation.
Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity
of BP 52 and 53.
HELD:
I. Contention of Dumlao is belied by the
fact that equal protection of the laws is s.t
rational classification. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are s.t compulsory
retirement.
To require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time
they assume office may or may not be a
reasonable classification
SC held that there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office
from which he had retired. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for govt work is
present
and
what
is
emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and
unavailable.
II. In the constitutional provision, in all
criminal prosecution, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until contrary is
proved., ad shall enjoy right to be heard
by himself and counsel.
The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence,
as
a
candidate
is
disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him.
Filing of charges is considered as prima
facie evidence and therefore REBUTTABLE.
RULING: Sec. 4, BP 22 is valid. Sec. 4, BP
52 is null and void.

HIMAGAN v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in
the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
the attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. Petitioner filed a motion to lift
the order for his suspension, relying on
Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be
limited to 90 days.
Respondent judge denied the motion
pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended
from
office
until
his
case
is
terminated.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the
Philippine National Police, he is covered
by the Civil Service Law, particularly
Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, which limits the maximum
period of suspension to ninety (90)
days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional
right to equal protection of laws.
HELD:
The language of the law is clear that
suspension from office of the member of
the PNP charged with grave offense where
the penalty is 6 years shall last until
termination of the case.
Also, there is nothing in RA 6975 (DILG
Act of 1990) that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will
be lifted if the 90 day period not
terminated. Shall not construed as
mandatory.
RATIONALE OF CLASSIFICATION:
Policemen carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally
charged with a serious offense is

reinstated to his post while his case is

pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and
armed.
The equal protection clause exists to
prevent
undue
favor
or
privilege.
Recognizing
the
existence
of
real
differences among men, the equal
protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike,
under
like
circumstances
and
conditions both as to the privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case.

QUINTO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
In preparation for the 2010 elections, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 8678 the
Guidelines
on
the
Filing
of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered
Political
Parties
in
Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of
Resolution No. 8678 provides that
Any person holding a public appointive
office or position x x x shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(automatic
resignation)
however
it
exempts those elected officials saying that
Any person holding an elective office or
position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus
Election Code, reads: x x x Any person
holding a public appointive office or
position x x x shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners were appointive officers of the
government who were planning to run in
the 2010 elections sought the nullification

of Sec. 4(a) on the ground, among others,

that it is discriminatory and violates
the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in
their favor. This prompted the COMELEC to
file an MR
HELD:
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause

In Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et

al.
We held, however, that the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are
material
and
significant
distinctions
between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section
14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, infringed on the equal
protection clause of the Constitution,
failed muster. In said case, the Court
ruled that:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between
elective
officials
and
appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between
the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service,
are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take (sic)
part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly

allowed to take part in political and

electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the legislators deemed it proper to treat
these two classes of officials differently
with respect to the effect on their tenure
in the office of the filing of the certificates
of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon
or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Therefore,
insofar
as
government
employees are concerned, the correct
standard of review is an INTERESTBALANCING APPROACH, a means-end
scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit
between the governmental interests and
the prohibitions in question.

BIRAOGO
v.
COMMISSION

PHIL.

TRUTH