Disclosure

Case
A. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose tag lines and
citations along with the first and last three words of all
cards in their broken cases at least an hour before the
round in which a given case is read. Disclosure should be
on the NDCA Wiki or LD Leaks because those are the most
common and accessible case lists.
B. Violation: (S)he didnt disclose this case
OR
(S)he doesnt have a wiki page.
C. Net Benefits: Three reasons we should disclose
Bietz 10
Bietz, Mike (former President of the National Debate
Coaches Association; debate coach at Harvard-Westlake
School in Los Angeles.) The Case for Public Case
Disclosure. May 2010.
The Case for Disclosure

1. Friendlier Tournament Atmosphere

One of the most frustrating things for me to watch is one debater
being prepped out by a group of coaches or other debaters because they
happened to know someone or are friendly with someone who either previously watched,
judged, or debated against them, while the other debater just sits there
and waits, not having any idea what their opponent is arguing. I dont
find the prep- out to be intrinsically frustrating. In fact, I have no qualms with coaches who help their debaters prepare for
rounds. I even have less of a problem with teammates who help each other. My concern is for the debater who isnt as
connected, or doesnt have as many teammates.

We havent done our job to make the

activity kid-friendly when we maintain a system that isnt friendly
collegial and instead inherently favors those who are connected .
2. Democratization of Power

and

The common response I hear from those who are against open disclosure is that they think it will cause more work at
tournaments because everyone will know what is being run, so there will be pressure to prep. This concern, ironically,
comes from coaches who have large teams and, when it comes time to want to prep (say, before a big outround), at their
disposal are a large number of flows, friends who have judged or seen their opponents, or any number of ways to find out

the ability to exercise power at will is

something that is reserved for those who are politically connected,
have a large team, or have a number of judges in the pool. An open
case list democratizes this power so that everyone has the ability to
choose when s/he feels like prepping and when s/he doesnt.
3. Academic Integrity
what is being run. Whether it is always used or not,

peer review is something that is not only accepted but is also

expected in academia. Debate is a high-stakes activity. For many of our
The idea of

students, it is perhaps the primary extra-curricular activity they will do in high school. For some of our students, the
monetary and time costs associated are burdensome. Regardless of each individuals commitment to the activity,

academic integrity is not something we should take lightly.

If a student were

to come to you with a case that uses evidence entirely from an unnamed personal blog that cites no sources or provides
no qualification, would you accept it as a good case? Probably not. However, we do not treat what is said or presented in
rounds with the same rigor that we would expect from the evidence we want our students to use in their cases .

The
ability for everyone to see what everyone else is quoting or using as
evidence is important not only because it allows us to check to make
sure that everything is done in an ethical and fair way, but also
because it is academically proper to do so. We send the wrong message when we take
this academic portion out of the competitive activity. The reason why the high-stakes element of my argument is
important is because we need to have a side constraint placed on the competitiveness of debate .

We need to
encourage integrity. Peer review is important to maintaining this
integrity.

Drop the debater. Nobody is going to disclose unless there is a

punishment for not disclosing. Also, drop the argument means
you drop anything they didnt disclose, which is the entire
case, so theyll lose anyways.

Theory
A. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all theory and
topicality interpretations at least an hour before the
round in which they are run. Disclosure should be on the
NDCA Wiki or LD Leaks because those are the most
common and accessible case lists.
B. Violation: (S)he is running an interp that wasnt on her/his
wiki
OR
(S)he doesnt have a wiki page.
C. Net Benefits: Disclosure will solve all abuse in the round
because people can see what the interp is and then
modify their strategy to be consistent with the
interpretation. Theory is made to stop in-round abuse,
and the best way to do that is allow debaters to see what
they were doing wrong or what would be considered
wrong and then correct the abuse before it happens.
Waiting until the abuse happens to bring up the
interpretation means the entire round is wasted on
punishing a debater for being inconsistent with an
interpretation they didnt know was relevant.
D. Terminal Impact: Solving abuse means that there will be
more deterrence against unfair and uneducational
practices. Deterring debaters from bad practices by
making them consistent with their opponents
interpretations gets all the benefits from the
interpretation itself with the added benefit of the
integrity of the round being kept intact because debaters
dont have to waste time on theory in the round. That
means more time is spent on the topic and theres more
topical engagement, which is key to education. Theory
education is in no way meaningful once we leave debate,
only engaging in the topic has a lasting benefit because it
teaches us to argue about real issues.

Drop the debater. Its the best way to teach my opponent a

lesson and have them disclose their theory next time. Drop the
argument would just drop their theory meaning theres no
incentive to disclose because the argument is only ignored
once they are caught for abuse. Also, this interpretation was
disclosed so they could have known to disclose their theory.
Weigh this first because its meta-theory and keeps the theory
debate fair and educational.

Flash
A. Interpretation: For tournaments using the
January/February 2014 topic, debaters have to flash or
email anything they plan on reading in the round to their
opponent before it is read when prompted to by their
opponent.
B. Violation: I asked them to flash and they didnt, nor did
they email.
C. Net benefits:
1. Academic Integrity: If I cant see their case I have no way of
knowing if any of their cards are actually legit because I cant see
the citations. Also, flashing promotes transparency so I can
actually comprehend what they are saying and make real
responses to it rather than hoping I caught the correct words to
respond to.
2. Inclusion: Debaters on the circuit might be familiar with
arguments and be able to know what case they are up against by
hearing key words but small school debaters dont know those
cases and need to see the text to familiarize themselves with the
argument.
3. It doesnt lend itself to plagiarism because if people are
transparent then it will be obvious when someone steals a case
and the community will retaliate. Also, policy debaters flash all
the time and there is very little plagiarism and if there is any the
plagiarizers are easy to beat because they dont understand the
arguments they stole.
4. Argumentation: If people can actually see the text of arguments
they are debating against they will have higher quality responses
and the round ceases to be about who can understand spreading
better. Spreading has good qualities and Im not against it but
theres a trade-off when debaters cant hear their opponents
case. Education derives directly from learning how to argue which
is done best when debaters flash cases and can understand each
others arguments.
5. Strat skew: If I can see the text of my opponents arguments then
I can formulate a strategy and hold them to the text of their case.
Otherwise they can deny what they said and I have no way of
holding them to it. Formulating a strategy based on the text of
my opponents case is fundamental to fairness otherwise the
debate becomes about who can sidestep and deny better.

D. Drop the debater

1. Being shady destroys the integrity of the round and means that
you cant evaluate the round correctly.
2. It sends a message to promote flashing and attain all the benefits
I read.
3. Fairness and Education are upheld best when debaters flash.
4. There is no reason to avoid flashing except to be shady because
they dont think they could win otherwise.
5. Time skew I have to waste time clarifying in CX and my rebuttals
may not link because Im not positive what Im debating against.

Framing

No RVIs
RVIs deter negatives from running theory and give the aff
permission to be abusive and either get away with it or win on
theory.
Debaters shouldnt win by demonstrating consistency with the
rules of debate. Football teams dont automatically win
because they stay in-bounds.
They were abusive first so any time skew they suffer is their
fault.
Reciprocity means I dont get RVIs on their theory, not that
they get RVIs on mine.

Competing Interps
Competing interps stops judge intervention.
Reasonability is a double standard since you wont vote on
reasonable substance.
If they are reasonable then they should be able to win under
competing interps. Otherwise they obviously werent.

Theory

AEC
A. Interpretation: Debaters using affirmative ethics choice
on the January/February 2014 topic must select a
utilitarian standard that includes all ends-based offense.
B. Violation: The affirmative debater selects a framework
based on side-constraints
OR
The affirmative debater excludes ends-based offense with
their standard

C. Standards:
(1.) Ground. Even if AEC exists to rectify some sort of
skew, the framework still needs to give the negative
debater an ample chance to win the round. Allowing
debaters to use means based standards or standards that
exclude offense relevant to the topic means that the
negative debaters ground can be mooted. The only way to
ensure debaters dont select standards like protecting
the environment or environmental ethics with AEC is
to vote on my interp. Furthermore, if the affirmative
debater limits what impacts are relevant then the only
ground the negative debater has is link turns. Ground is
key to competition because if debaters cant make
arguments to access the ballot then the round has no
competitive value.
(2.) Topical literature. Most of the literature that the
negative debater can use justifies resource extraction in
an ends-based manner. With the exception of critical
literature that is non-topical to the converse of the
resolution, the only way the negative debater can have a
case that is grounded in academia is to run a util case.
Topical literature strengthens the link to ground because
arguments based off literature carry more weight so no
topical lit means no ground, and is also key to topical
education because we dont learn anything about the
topic if we dont have literature to base our arguments off
of.
(3.) Clash. A priori frameworks or frameworks that make
only a narrow array of impacts relevant kill clash because
they justify a single way of evaluating the round, rather
than including the possibility for weighing various
arguments against each other. The only way to have clash
is either to not have AEC or to select a utilitarian
framework to evaluate the round, because util
frameworks offer the most substantial clash, and AEC
stops framework clash. Clash is key to advocacy skills
because we only learn how to argue when arguments
clash with each other.

D. Drop the debater. You can vote on (1) a violation of

competition, which is a gateway issue because debate is
at its core a competitive activity and taking the value
away from that invalidates the round, (2) A violation of
topical education which is important because we only
have two months to discuss this topic and topical
education prepares us to understand similar political
situations in the real world or (3) a violation of advocacy
skills which are the most important benefit of the activity
because regardless of the individual facts we forget, the
one thing we will always remember from debate is how to
argue, meaning advocacy skills are the most relevant
takeaway from the activity.
And, dont let them talk about trade-offs with philosophy
education because they violate that in that they read AEC.
This isnt a voter, but they dont get that link.

Spec
A. Interpretation: Debaters should specify the scope of their
advocacy in the AC by providing a policy option that they
defend with a qualified solvency advocate.
B. Violation: The AC does not defend a policy option.
C. Net Benefits: Without specification as to what policies the
AC actually defends, debaters dont get any educational
benefits in terms of advocacy skills. Our best shot at
discussing policies to act as advisors. Academics
recognize that they should advise policy makers.
Mahnken 10
Thomas G. Mahnken (Visiting Scholar at the Merrill Center for
Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins Universitys Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies served as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning)
Winter 2010 Bridging the Gap Between the Worlds of Ideas
and Action Orbis Vol. 54 No. 1 Science Direct Pages 4-13
Some calls for greater collaboration between the government and the academy have emerged from professors.

among the most engaged of social

scientists, there is modest support for engagement in policy. A recent
survey of scholars found that 49 percent of respondents believed they
should contribute to the policymaking process as informal advisors but only 29
Among international relations scholars, arguably

percent believed they should be formal participants.8 Among those who choose to engage in policy-relevant research, one
frequently heard complaint is that practitioners do not use their theories. Michael C. Desch, for one, has lamented that
Policymakers need to be willing to really listen to us as they formulate policy, rather than just using us as intellectual window
dressing.

That means evaluating the pros and cons of policies in an academic

context.

AND roleplaying as a policy maker to discuss specifics of our

advocacies is key to political efficacy.
Schaap 05
Andrew Schaap, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1,
February 2005
Learning political theory is largely about acquiring a vocabulary that
enables one to reflect more critically and precisely about the terms on which human beings (do and should) cooperate for and compete over public goods, symbolic and material. As such, political theory is necessarily abstract and general. But,

competency in political theory requires an ability to move from the

general to the particular and back again, not simply by applying general principles to particular events
and experiences but by reflecting on and rearticulating concepts in the light of
the particular. Role play is an effective technique for teaching

political theory because it requires that students employ political

concepts in a particular context so that learning takes place as
students try out new vocabularies together with their peers and a lifelong learner in the subject: their teacher.

AND a qualified solvency advocate is necessary because it

limits the resolution to topical literature that is actually going
to educate rather than letting debate be a nebulous
speculation that isnt grounded in real world education.
Solvency advocates also assist advocacy skills because we
learn what professionals have to say about policy options.
D. Terminal Impact: Advocacy skills are important because
we need political advocates to occupy the public sphere
and mitigate the power of elites
Boggs 2k
(CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, 2000, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or
dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed,
rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who
preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided

minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space
to maneuver as possible. The flight from abstract principles rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo ( slavery
or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional
matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through,
then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of
conventional wisdom. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshotts view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that
totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are
necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshotts minimalism poses

the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that

corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military
institutions will magically disappear from peoples lives. Far from it: the public space
vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives
elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the
yet another, but still related, range of problems:

fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the
American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this
light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could
simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the
embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile
antirationalism of Oakeshotts Burkean muddling-through theories.

Drop the debater to encourage debaters to specify policy

options and achieve the advantages of my interp.

E-SPEC
A. Interpretation: When affirmative debaters run a plan on
the January/February 2014 topic that must be enforced,
they must specify an enforcement mechanism in their
plan text.
B. Violation: They dont specify their enforcement-the plan
may be civil or criminal with unknown deterrents and
actors. The aff has to present evidence about that to
make a prima facie case.
C. Standard: Ground
1. I lose ground, without enforcement specified we lose
specific links to DAs, Ks, and case which discuss how law
works since 90 percent of the plan is implementation.
Elmore 80
Richard F. Elmore (prof. of political science at UWashington)
Political Science Quarterly; 1980; p. 605
The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that

Analysis of policy choices matter very littler if the

mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In
answering the question, What percentage of the work achieving a
desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic
alternative has been identified? Allison estimated that , in the normal case, it was
about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of
implementation.
decisions are not self-executing.

2. Theyre effectively fiating the object. If they dont tell me

what happens in the case someone doesnt obey the plan
it gives us the same ground as if we simply assumed to
plan solves, which destroys the negative ground since we
cant make solvency arguments so my strategy has to be
based on impact turns and I lose all link ground. Link
ground is key to fairness because the aff can run impacts
that I might not be able to turn like racism or patriarchy
and I have no strat if I cant turn links.
3. Specifying in CX is not enough because (a) I have to waste
more time asking them than it would take them to specify
and (b) we cant remember CX questions and I can hold
you to text printed in the AC. Also this means theyll only
spec if theyre caught and the interpretation fails to be
enforced as a rule meaning abuse is allowed in other
rounds.
D. Drop the debater. Without ground, the round wont be an
effective clash because I have no room to make
arguments and we lose out on advocacy skills, which are
the only portable skill the activity has to offer. Well
forget fairness violations and specifics about what we
learned, but learning how to debate is something well
have with us forever. You can also vote neg because the
aff cant solve if there are no enforcement mechanisms.

One Country
A. Interpretation: On the Janurary/February 2014 topic, the
affirmative debater must advocate environmental
protection for developing countries as a general principle.
They may specify environmental protection policies but
must advocate implementation in developing countries in
general.
B. Violation: The plan text only defends (COUNTRY)

C. Standards:
(1) Research burdens. Most definitions of developing
countries include 150 or more countries. The IMFs World
Outlook Report for 2012 identifies 156 countries as
developing. That means that the negative debater has to
do 156 times as much research as the affirmative just to
have blocks for all the countries the affirmative could
defend. In addition to having to prep out policies and
their specific implementation in each country, the
negative debater ends up having an impossible research
burden and the aff can de-link all generic turns killing
fairness. Unequal research burdens also allow the
affirmative debater to kill education because they dont
have to clash with any of the on balance arguments I
make. Disclosure doesnt solve because even if its
predictable it still skews research burdens.
(2) Topical Literature. There are very few articles that
exist for the negative debater to use in terms of
explaining why environmentally noxious extraction is
good in a specific country. If any, the arguments in favor
of extraction in super specific areas are few enough that
the affirmative debater can prep them out and leave the
neg with no possible arguments to make that are
grounded in literature. This kills education because once
again, theres no clash of arguments and the debate is
entirely one-sided and it also kills fairness because I have
no way to make arguments except analytically, which
means I have to do way more work than the affirmative
and theres less of a chance youll buy it. Most of the
arguments on this topic are either critical, which the aff
can exclude with a debate the converse shell, or
empirical, meaning topical analytics are basically
impossible.

D. Voters: Fairness and education. These are the two most

important issues in the round because fairness is a
gateway to a productive debate and education is the only
benefit we get from the round, particularly education
about how to debate, because it stays with us forever.
Clash is fundamental to learning how to argue because
clash is where the arguing occurs in rounds. Drop the
debater, you cant judge an unfair round objectively and
theres no reason to reward an uneducational debater. If
you dont drop the debater, the alternative is to hold them
to proving the resolution true as a normative statement in
which case they fail because their advocacy is too narrow.

Tomasi Theory
Interpretation: Debaters must accept reptilian political
leaders.
Violation: Tomasi says the reptilians will kill us and challenges
their leadership.
Impacts: Reptilians are democratically elected that means
that they can be democratically replaced. The majority must
want reptilian leaders or they would vote them out of office.
The following is a narrative from Meta Filter:
http://www.metafilter.com/113034/Brief-Overview-of-our-Reptilian-Overlords
"It comes from a very ancient democracy, you see..."
"You mean, it comes from a world of lizards?"
"No," said Ford, who by this time was a little more rational and coherent
than he had been, having finally had the coffee forced down him, "nothing
so simple. Nothing anything like to straightforward. On its world, the
people are people. The leaders are lizards. The people hate the lizards and
the lizards rule the people."
"Odd," said Arthur, "I thought you said it was a democracy."
"I did," said Ford. "It is."
"So," said Arthur, hoping he wasn't sounding ridiculously obtuse, "why
don't the people get rid of the lizards?"
"It honestly doesn't occur to them," said Ford. "They've all got the vote, so
they all pretty much assume that the government they've voted in more or
less approximates to the government they want."
"You mean they actually vote for the lizards?"
"Oh yes," said Ford with a shrug, "of course."
"But," said Arthur, going for the big one again, "why?"
"Because if they didn't vote for a lizard," said Ford, "the wrong lizard
might get in. Got any gin?"

And, questioning the supremacy of reptilian leaders invites

judge bias because we dont know whether or not they are a
reptilian in a human body. Im trying to protect Adam from the
reptilians because if he keeps reading this case eventually a
reptilian will hear it, be offended, and eat him.

Dont Run Critical Affirmatives

A. Interpretation - The affirmative should be required to read a
topical policy proposal and defend its implementation. The
affirmative can only weigh advantages that stem from the
implementation of the plan.
B. Violation The affirmative didnt read a topical policy
proposal, or doesnt defend its implementation. They leverage
advantages based off of the endorsement of the discourse or
theoretical content of the 1AC, not the plan.
C. Impact - Framework should be a procedural voting issue for
reasons of fairness and topic specific education.
Policy debate is good for education, engagement, and
empathy. Clear rules, a stable topic, institutional role-playing
and simulation are integral to the process.
Lantis 8
[Jeffrey S., Professor in the Department of political science and Chair of the

International Relations Program at The College of Wooster,

The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature,
International Studies Association Compendium, February 2008,
http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactivete
achingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf]
Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active
teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include
deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of
interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to
bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or
imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall
1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000;
Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and
Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The
aim is to enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear
about, the constraints and motivations for action (or inaction)
experienced by real players (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about
what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has
dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, Remote theoretical
concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are
familiar. Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning
techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into
multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli.
Early
examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and
colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work

sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research

tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated
simulations of international politics, with names like Crisis, Grand
Strategy, ICONS, and SALT III. More recent literature on simulations
stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by
individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security
Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and
provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000;
Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling
international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union
simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky
2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting,
through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be
designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or
international competitions.
The scholarship on the use of games in
international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For
example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are structured systems of
competitive play with specific defined endpoints or solutions that
incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but
contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to win
the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to
make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on
the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner
dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes
(Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004;
Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play.
Like simulations, role-play places students within a structured
environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ
from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of
well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for
students to think about how they might act when placed in the position
of their slightly less well-defined personal (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows
students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-plays less
goal oriented focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for
the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the
challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can
be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such
as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of
the scenario and its proximity to a students personal experience is also
flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished
from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid
out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in
the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston
2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008).
Taken as a whole,
the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well
detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a
set of core considerations that should be taken into account when
designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis
1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These

include building the simulation design around specific educational

objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed,
establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and
instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background
material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in
advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published
and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted
for use) depending upon an instructors educational objectives (Beriker and
Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw
2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is
growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that
these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between
academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to
enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy,
and acquisition and retention of knowledge.

Refusal to engage in institutional reform reduces inquiry to

narcissism. There is a direct tradeoff with productive
discussion and research.
Chandler 9
[David, Professor of International Relations at the University of
Westminster, Questioning Global Political Activism, What is
Radical Politics Today? October 2009, pgs. 81-82]
Today more and more people are doing politics in their academic work. This is
the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of
other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of
IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise
global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a
rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and
the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this
rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with
Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realisms ontological focus . It
seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the
world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the
global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with what is as
with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community.
Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political
elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous
trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken
up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is
conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to
focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about
the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking
rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we
need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and

positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This

becomes me-search rather than research. We have moved a long way from
Hedley Bulls (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical,
we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might
lead. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we
are more concerned with our reflectivity the awareness of our own ethics
and values than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me
when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed
with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is
despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the
basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy . Their theoretical
preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as
ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand
and engage with the world . Conclusion I have attempted to argue that there
is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global
politics. Politics has become a religious activity , an activity which is no
longer socially mediated ; it is less and less an activity based on social
engagement and the testing of ideas in

public debate or in the

academy . Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policymaking or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with
global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship
with their God. Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look
for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external
consequences of our political acts. What matters is the conviction or
the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we
increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this
limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory
the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the
world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is
no way of knowing the consequences of our actions . The more we
engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship
between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage
instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our
peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and
organisation.

Only debates about engaging institutions can produce social

change. Disengagement from politics fractures coalitions and
reinforces conservatism.
Mouffe 9
[Chantal, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the
Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, The
Importance of Engaging the State, What is Radical Politics
Today? October 2009, pgs. 233-237]

In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon critique
as withdrawal. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere.
They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extraparliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative
politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to engage with
them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them

altogether. This

disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The
Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power.
Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors
claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they
think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class
struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by
the notion of the people. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of
the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising
agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present
globalisation of capital and workers struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the
Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore
argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed .

They advocate a withdrawal

from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of
radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state.
Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a
feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as
engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of
social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it
is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is
better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and
Negris view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven
by one single logic: the workers resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon
immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by

they deny the positive role of political struggle.

In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we
capital and by labour. To put it another way,

use the word hegemony to describe the way in which meaning is given
to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given
institution or practice is defined as oppressive to women, racist or
environmentally destructive. We also point out that every hegemonic
order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counterhegemonic practices feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for
example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which
presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation,
Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers struggles. In their
various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have
influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about
the political, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of
heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different
ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society it
need not only refer to the workers struggles. I submit that it is necessary to
introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition
from Fordism to post-Fordism . This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers struggles) is
at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this
we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism

capitalists manage to use the demands for

autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s,
(2005), bring to light the way in which

harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked

economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the
term artistic critique to refer to how the strategies of the counterculture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of self management and
the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions
required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework
characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important
dimension of the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways.
It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski
and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called hegemony through

demands which challenge the

hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system, which is
achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive
potential. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to postFordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic
move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its
challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marxs sense of
the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging
dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage social
reality in terms of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices,
radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing
institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with
hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise
we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with
and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape
the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of
systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and
not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest,
Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the
state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of
communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between
the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the
proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both
cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that
cannot be transformed. It has to wither away in order to leave room for a
reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as Ive already
noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach
neutralisation or passive revolution. This refers to a situation where

supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices has been called post-Marxist by many, it
is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever
present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be

As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage

it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects
attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters
of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions
and social practices and defines the common sense through which a
given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is
always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by
counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field
criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always
one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can
never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims
to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more
eliminated.

comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic

politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as
environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform
them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power
relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement,
rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that
exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they
need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation
of a collective will, a we . This, in turn, requires the determination of a them. This obvious and
simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude
possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see the People as
homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts.

Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences.

Rather, they are what could be called an ensemble of differences, all
coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary.
Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest
against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, antiracists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development
and progress. In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad
general terms like Empire, or for that matter Capitalism. It is instead
contingent upon the particular circumstances in question the specific
states, international institutions or governmental practices that are to be
challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is
dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted
and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is
clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not critique as withdrawal, but
critique as engagement. It is a war of position that needs to be
launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a
range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between
social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The
aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a
wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming
them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical
politics.

Conservative forces always exist; only policy discussions can

persuade them to support change.
Kerbel- no date
[Susan G., clinical psychologist and co-founder of Cognitive
Policy Works, From the Couch to the Culture: How
Psychological Analysis Can Strengthen the Progressive
Agenda, Cognitive Policy Works,
http://www.cognitivepolicyworks.com/trash/psychology-andpolitics/]
The psychology of change: This is one of the great hidden powers of
clinical psychological thinking that the progressive movement would do

well to understand. Clinical practice is all about creating change, in individuals,

couples, families, and groups of people; organizational change is sometimes a
part of the equation as well. In all these instances, there is a dynamic at work
that is essential to understanding the nature of changing the beliefs
and choices of other people. There are the forces that seek change, and
those that fear and resist it. Both elements are always present. There is
a constant interplay between those aspects of the individual, or group, or
society, that desire to do things differently, and those that do not. In
our political lives, we often act as if this is not the case, or wish that to be
so, but it never is. Both impulses are always at work, and both must be
addressed before forward motion can occur. Being able to recognize and
anticipate the presence of resistance to change is at the heart of the
psychological change process, and a tremendous strategic advantage if one can
understand it and work with it. This is part and parcel of the work of any
competent clinician. If you know where and how resistance will play out in
response to a given initiative for change, one can plan for it, address it,
and harness the power of resistance to eventually join the forces of
change, if addressed effectively enough. At the very least, resistant forces
can be minimized or neutralized so that forward motion is not impeded.
Progressives seem to have much to learn about this. As a political body,
we seem to be in a constant state of surprise when the forces of
resistance to change emerge, and often seem unprepared to respond to it.
There is a predictable arc to the process of creating change that is apparent once
one knows how to read the signs of resistance. For activists who are
interested in generating social change, or in persuading others to
consider a new viewpoint or policy proposal, understanding the
psychodynamics of creating change can and should be an essential tool.
Once one can understand the change process from a dynamic psychological
perspective, one can act to harness the inevitable drag of resistance, and
minimize its impact on moving the agenda forward.

Topicality

Resource
For the January/February 2014 topic, resource extraction is
limited to oil, natural gas, and minerals.
In the text of the Consumer Protection Act, drafted in 2010,
Senator Frank defined the term clearly
Barney Frank (Senator, sponsor of bill). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act. H. R. 4173. One Hundred Eleventh
Congress of the United States of America. 5 January 2010.
http://www.workingre.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/APPRAISALPROVISIONS-OF-BASE-TEXT.pdf

(1) DEFINITIONS.In this subsection (A) the term commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals includes exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity, as determined by
the Commission; (B) the term foreign government means a foreign government, a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a
company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the Commission; (C) the term payment (i) means a payment that is (I) made to
further the commercial develop- ment of oil, natural gas, or minerals; and (II) not de minimis; and (ii) includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license
fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the Commission, con- sistent with the guidelines of the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (to the extent practicable), determines are part of the commonly recognized rev- enue stream for the commercial development of

the term resource extraction issuer means an issuer

that (i) is required to file an annual report with the Commission; and (ii) engages in the commercial
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; (E) the term interactive data format means an elecoil, natural gas, or minerals; (D)

tronic data format in which pieces of information are identified using an interactive data standard; and (F) the term interactive data standard means
standardized list of electronic tags that mark information included in the annual report of a resource extraction issuer.

The World Trade Report elaborates on the difference between a

resource and another good.
World Trade Report. Natural resources: definitions, trade patterns and
globalization. 2010.
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2b_e.pdf
A useful definition should not only identify the nature of natural resources but also
distinguish what is and what is not a natural resource. Under the above criteria, it is clear that
manufactured goods such as automobiles and computers would not be considered
resources, since both are subject to more than a minimal amount of processing.
However, this should not be taken to imply that all primary products are
covered as natural resources in the report. For example, while most agricultural goods
including food are primary products, we do not classify them as
natural resources for a number of reasons. To begin with, their production requires other
natural resources as inputs, particularly land and water but also various types of fertilizer. More
importantly, agricultural products are cultivated rather than
extracted from the natural environment.
Two important exceptions in this report relate to fish and forestry products, which are normally classified
under agriculture in WTO trade statistics, but which are treated here as natural resources. Both
fish and forestry products can be cultivated, for example in aquaculture for fish or through forest
management for wood. However, traditionally they have simply been taken from existing natural stocks, and still are for the most part. Unfortunately it
is impossible to distinguish between cultivated and non-cultivated
varieties of these products in standard databases on international trade, but some effort
has been made to identify these in the case of fish.

Drop my opponent for debating outside the limits of the

resolution. (1) As the judge you can only vote on a case within
the limits of the resolution, anything else is outside of your
jurisdiction. (2) This is a voter for fairness, which is a
prerequisite to determining the winner of the round. (3) Limits
are necessary for education, to ensure that we focus on the
topic and learn about it in depth.

Conservation
Environmental protection is distinct from resource
conservation.
Professor Arruda from Pitt State University elaborates:
Arruda, Joe, Dr (Pitt State University). "Careers with an Environmental
Spin." Careers with an Environmental Spin. Pitt State

The two traditional areas of environmental jobs are environmental

protection and resource conservation. Environmental protection refers to
the administrative regulation and control of solid and hazardous waste,
toxic substances, air pollution, and water pollution. Resource
conservation, on the other hand, usually refers to the management of
soils, lands, forests, fish, and wildlife.

Prefer my definition because (1) it comes from an academic

who studies environmental biology (2) it allows for a clear
separation between the affirmative and negative advocacies
and (3) it prevents the affirmative debater from simply
advocating a curbing of resource extraction, and puts
emphasis on environmental protection policies.
Drop my opponent for debating outside of the scope of the
resolution. You cant vote on a non-topical case because the
role of the ballot is to endorse a side of the resolution
Net Benefits:

My interpretation creates the most clash by forcing the affirmative to have

an advocacy that directly conflicts with alternative negative advocacies,
rather than focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of a single
affirmative advocacy. By stopping affirmatives from advocating
conservation and forcing them to defend protection, the focus of the
round shifts from whether or not unchecked resource extraction is good to
whether or not it is better than environmental protection. Two impacts to
clash:
1. Reciprocity is only possible when there is a clash between two
advocacies because now either debater can win on offense or
defense rather than being forced to go all in on defending an
advocacy or tearing one down, meaning burdens are distributed
most equally when there is ample clash between advocacies.
2. Clash doubles the amount of education offered otherwise because
now there are two sides of the topic to be discussed, rather than
one. Topical education is cut in half when there is only one advocacy
to debate about.

Terminal Impacts:
Reciprocity incentivizes debaters to hone skills and do research because
now they have an equal chance to win a round going in, and what happens
inside the round is determined entirely by preparation and skill. Advocacy
skills are the only portable skills we get from debate. This particular topic
may never mean anything to me in the future but understanding how to
argue in favor or against advocacies is the whole reason people join
debate and the most common skill we will take away from debate.
Reciprocitys emphasis on offense and defense provides the best benefits
to advocacy skills because we understand how to defend our own ideas
and attack the ideas of others all in one round.

Drop the debater. (1) You cant vote on a non-topical case

because the role of the ballot is to endorse a side of the
resolution, (2) vote neg to punish the aff for violating
reciprocity.

Extraction
A. Interpretation: For the January/February 2014 topic,
affirmative debaters must only implement a plan that fiats
the prioritization of environmental protection over natural
resource extraction. The debater must only gain impacts
from the implementation of that plan.
B. Violation: The plan implements the prioritization of
environmental protection over industrial manufacturing.

C. Standards:
(1) Research burdens If the affirmative debater goes
outside of the limits of the resolution then I have to do
more research to answer those impacts. They advocate a
sector that has nothing to do with the topic and no other
debater is debating about so I have to cut blocks about
that sector or lose because I didnt engage with nontopical advantages. Unequal research burdens also allow
the affirmative debater to kill education because they
dont have to clash with any of the topical arguments I
make. Disclosure doesnt solve because even if its
predictable it still skews the round.
(2) DA ground Extratopicality limits neg DA ground
because they can add any nonresolutional plank to their
advocacy in order to take out DA advantages and solve for
uniqueness. Topical affs do not harm DA ground because
then people cannot add words to the resolution, enabling
the neg. to run competitive DAs. DA ground is key to
fairness because they are the only way the neg can
generate independent offense. It fosters education
because DAs provide the best clash with aff advantages,
creating discussion and therefore more educational
benefits.
(3) Impact ground Extratopical positions explode the
debaters impact ground because they get access to
literally every impact if they are allowed to not have to be
completely topical. I solve for this because I ensure that
the aff is held to the text of the resolution, so s/he can
only get the impacts defined by the resolution. Explosion
of impact ground is unfair because he will always be able
to outweigh the NC because he can just pick the best
impacts for the situation. This also harms education
because the round will devolve into whoever can pick the
worst harm instead of actually discussing the various
nuances of an issue.

D. Drop the debate. Ground arguments are all links to

fairness since the ensure equal access to the ballot, so
you can vote on (1) fairness, which is a gateway issue to
evaluating an objective round and ensures competitive
equity in the round that keeps kids involved and (2)
education, which is the lasting benefit of the activity.
Clash is the best link to education because learning about
argumentation is the one thing we learn that we will all
use regardless of what our careers are. Drop the debater
on extra-T to deter them from running it, rectify the time I
have to spend on theory, and because their plan violates T
and they cant implement only part of the plan. Severance
is bad because it shifts the round so we start over in the
1AR.

Conflict
A. Interpretation: The affirmative debater must defend a
reduction of resource extraction for the January/February
2014 topic.
B. Violation: The affirmative plan makes extraction clean, it
doesnt reduce it.
C. Standards:
1. Ground Clean extraction is neg ground, the affirmative
ground is to defend environmental protection policies that
would conflict with extraction. If the affirmative plan
eliminates the conflict between protection and extraction
by defending clean extraction then the negative debater
can only make no impact arguments, but has no ground to
turn links. This is because I cant say that clean extraction
doesnt cut down pollution, and I cant reasonably turn
pollution arguments. Also, this means the negative
debater has nothing to advocate because the affirmative
debater is (a) defending extraction and (b) eliminating the
conflict of the resolution. Ground is key to fairness
because if one debater cant make arguments to win the
ballot then the round is skewed from the start.
2. Clash Clean extraction eliminates the conflict of the
resolution. This means theres no clash because
arguments typically interact where there is conflict
between two advocacies, and if theres no conflict then
theres nowhere arguments clash except for the denial of
the affirmative advocacys effectiveness, but those
arguments are still consistent with environmental
protection. Clash is key to advocacy skills because we
learn how to formulate advocacies and defend them when
those advocacies clash in the round.

D. Drop the debater. You can vote on (1) fairness, which is a

gateway issue and ensures the competitive integrity of
the round that keeps kids involved and (2) advocacy
skills which are the most important skill we take away
from debate because knowing how to argue is the only
skill from debate that is guaranteed to benefit us
regardless of our career choices. Advocacy skills
outweighs education because everything else we learn in
the round is forgettable.

Misc

Dont debate the con

A. Interpretation: Affirmative debaters must allow negative
debaters to advocate actions outside the scope of the
converse of the resolution.
B. Violation: The affirmative debater reads a spike that says I
have to defend the converse.
C. Impacts:
First, to negate means to deny the truth of so the textual
burden of the negative debater is to reject the resolution as a
statement of truth. Prefer textual burdens because they are
the most predictable element of the round, and predictability
controls the link to fairness because its the way we know what
arguments to prep. Predictability is also a link to clash
because we prepare arguments so that the arguments clash.
Clash is key to education because argument interaction
teaches us the most important skill we get from debate, how
to argue. Giving me an unpredictable burden kills both fairness
and education. Fairness is a gateway issue to evaluating a
round in the most objective way possible and education is the
only lasting benefit we get from the activity, so you should do
what you can to preserve them.
Second, making me debate the converse of the resolution kills
critique ground because I cant question underlying
assumptions the affirmative makes when Im forced to make
those same assumptions. That limits the activity and means we
will never access the benefits of critical pedagogy
Questioning the underlying assumptions of the resolution
breaks the normalizing mold of the current educational
system.
Stables 02
Andrew Stables, Reader in Education at University of Bath, 2002
[Trumpeter 18.1]

Wordsworth is here describing a mood, but one to treasure, and from which he derives (as he makes clear in many
other poems) significant personal and ethical guidance.

When moods become habitual, as seems

certainly to have been the case with Wordsworth, they also tend to become dispositions. I would argue,
then, that education for sustainability should, in part, be concerned with enabling the kinds of experience that
promote the kind of mood Wordsworth describes. This is, of course, by no means easy; after all, Wordsworth
ascribed his own love of nature to an often solitary rural childhood coupled with a naturally sensitive disposition. I

a frame of mind is
refer to some more enduring organizational structure

shall return to the challenges for educators in providing appropriate experiences below. If
more than just a mood, then the term must

for thinking and feeling. Framing, thus understood, has many, vaguely related connotations in various
literatures, but all of them seem to relate to categorizations and definitions determined, to some degree, by human
agency. Thus, when I think of Frames, I am reminded of the Kantian definition of the Category, of Wittgensteinian
language games, of Erving Goffmans Frame Analysis, and, more broadly, of genres, disciplines, ways of
thinking, even communities of practice; also, of course, of art, photography, and film. Dispositions relate to

tendencies to respond

in certain ways

within

these

frames,

or to utilise certain frames rather than others, depending on the

definition used. Regarding educational processes, I am reminded of Bernsteins distinction between Weak and Strong Framing and Classification, and the need for teachers to frame
things more strongly for children from certain backgrounds than for others. Of course, determined by human agency does not imply conscious control. Paul Guyer 1 defines Kants
Categories broadly as those general concepts by means of which our intuitions are converted into representations of objects or judgments. Although our intuitions, thus conceived,
relate to an absolute reality, bound by time and space, the Categories function prior to our conscious judgments despite being essentially human constructs (and common to all
humanity, according to Kantthough not to all sentient life). What Kant does not give much consideration to is the degree of possible variation in how judgments can be made. Put
simply, how much might the same frame of mind allow for different arguments and approaches? A belief in cause and effect, for instance, can be enacted very differently in positivist and
post-positivist research paradigms in the social sciences. Some of this is also true in a sense of the Wittgensteinian language game: 2 truths are constructed from within language games,
even though there is no good reason to suppose that the games/frames exist anywhere other than in the human psyche. Millennial global politics, as recent events have all too starkly
reminded us, bear witness to the huge differences between perspectives and dispositions at the cultural and religious levels. We may all operate within the same Kantian Categories
even the same Wittgensteinian language gamesbut the worldviews we construct can still be radically different. Even within the Christian community (to take a currently relatively
uncontroversial example) there are stark differences between liberals who interpret the Bibleaccording to cultural context, evangelicals, who interpret the contemporary context
according to the Bible, and fundamentalists, who use the Bible to keep their distance from the modern world as entirely as possible. Looked at this way, language games can certainly be
played very differently, and we do not necessarily need a new frame of mind. Goffmans social-psychological account construes frames as indeed dependent on social and cultural
change.3 He sees frames as something like spectacles, or the selective focusing of a camera lens. To see life through rose-coloured spectacles implies the adoption of particularin this
case, overoptimisticassumptions about spatial and temporal context. Goffmans frames enable us to read events as appropriate or otherwise within their contexts (and to Goffman,
context is all important), thus allowing us, for example, to be unsurprised when a naked person enters the room and sits before us in a life-drawing class, though less composed in the
unlikely event that this should happen under other everyday circumstances. (My example, not Goffmans.) Goffmans frames are thus heavily culturally determined. Goffman also differs

In his discussion of breaking frames through

Goffman refers to the sense of absurdity that recalcitrant youths often
feel when their elders and betters ask them to undertake role plays designed to teach
them life skills. A simple example arises from the experience of many of us who have been involved in the
from Kant, and perhaps from Wittgenstein, in his view of the relative teachability of frames.

bursting into laughter,

upbringing of children: it seems ridiculous to say please and thank you if you have not been taught to do so
habitually. Goffmans frames, therefore, seem less fundamental than Kants Categories, or Wittgensteins language
games; nevertheless, this does not imply that new frames are created at will. However, Goffmans analysis does
seem to leave the educator with some room for manoeuvre, at least with respect to prioritization. Basil Bernstein 4

schooling at the
reproduce the cultural

has perhaps done most to highlight the pedagogical importance of framing, pointing out that
end of the twentieth century, at least in Britain and countries like it, tended to

norms and practices of the socially privileged, with well-meaning liberal teachers misguidedly tending to use
weak framing and classification in classrooms, whether or not their students shared their
preconceptions about how to play the game of schooling. Bernsteins account, taken all in all, is essentially sociological and
structural, and more deterministic than Goffmans, with cultural practices divided along social class lines in relation to Codes that embody both work and domestic practices and are
expressed via language and schooling. Thus, for a variety of reasons, working-class children tend to grow up in homes where questions are not invited and feelings are little articulated,
where lines of authority are rigid and hierarchical, and where rules are hard and fast, and are made explicit (i.e. strongly framed), whereas the children of the professional classes,
particularly in the Post-Fordist West, are invited to enter debate and open exploration of feelings, rules, and opinions, so are more at ease in weakly framed situations (such as when a
teacher simply tells pupils to find out about something). Bernsteins key insight in the context of the present debate is that children experience educational events differently according
to their backgrounds and prior experiencesand teachers should take this into account. To misquote Tony Blair on schools in England and Wales, in word if not in spirit: One size should
not fit all. This serves as a reminder to environmental educators, for example, that the same experience will not always be interpreted in the same way or produce the same result; the
teachers frames will not always match those of the taught. Taken together, what do these formulations imply about frames of mind? Perhaps: (i) they organize, and/or determine and
constrain thinking. We see the world from within them, not outside them; (ii) yet we do have some metacognitive, aesthetic, or deconstructive capacity to recognize frames, if not from
the outside, at least from other frames. Also, our frames can be at least shaken by experience (cf. Kants views on the Sublime in the Critique of Judgment). Also, either frames change,
or our uses of them or operations within them change; (iii)what we cannot do is ever fully articulate the relationship of our frames to the material conditions prior to their development.
My ways of seeing the world, which cannot be entirely separate from yours (as Wittgenstein argued at some length in the section ofPhilosophical Investigations devoted to the
impossibility of a private language), nevertheless retain an essentially arbitrary relationship to biophysical reality, in the sense that we cannot understand the degree to which our
cultural options are constrained by material reality any more than we can understand why a dog is called a dog or a hund or achien. This is true even of Kants use of the Category. (An
interesting corollary of this is that if intelligent life has developed on other planets, there seems little reason to believe that we should be able to communicate with it, as there is no
compelling argument that the same material conditions would produce identical frames of mind, let alone identical strategic and tactical judgments within them. Even if material reality
can be explained mathematically, there is no reason to suppose that mathematical languages would be replicated. Contexts for action never completely replicate.) I would argue that

we tend to see sustainability in terms of the basic Category of cause and effect: modern

industrial practices have been the cause; environmental and social degradation are the result; sustainability is the
answer. To put it differently, sustainability as a regulative ideal is a product of the dialogue that produced the
current sense of environmental and ecological crisis. Given a broad acceptance of this, however, sustainability
dialogue is riddled with assumptions that do not really add up. Harr, Brockmeier, and Muhlhausler 5 have shown
clearly in Greenspeak, for example, how environmentalist

rhetoric has

cleverly

combined palaeontological,

cultural, and personal timeframes to create a sense of imminent disaster. Given these
paradoxes, and conflicting views about both frames of mind and sustainability, where might we look to develop new
orientations to action, whether or not these amount to frames of mind according to the various definitions above?
These possibilities occur: (i) in the postmodern science advocated by Aran Gare and others, 6 influenced by JeanFrancois Lyotards rejection of scientific progress as anything more, or less, than a narrative, and not one that can
override all others,7 or (ii) in some kind of spiritual, deep ecological movement, involving perhaps a revival of

mystical and quasi-mystical discourses and

could be said to be common to each of these,
differentiating each from the mainstream of Western modernist thought: a sense of interrelationship; a love of
the intangible Other; a delight in the unknown and the unknowable (yet perceivable, under the right circumstances); a belief that the whole is
Hegelian idealism, thoroughgoing Romanticism, or religious,

practices of transcendence and renunciation. Certain features

greater than the part will ever apprehend (including the human reason part), so an acceptance of both our power to be at one with nature and the healthy limitation of our powers; and a
belief that there may be no ultimate technological answer, including no ultimate recipe for sustainability. I have argued elsewhere that scientific and critical realist readings of the
environmental crisis tend to lack one or more of these crucial ingredients. 8 The modernist obsession with control over both nature and society, though it has brought us many benefits,
has, for example, tended to blind us to the fact that many of our most fulfilling experiences are encounters with the non-human, often when we are alone. A few weeks ago, I sat on a
stile in a Wiltshire field and watched a fox as it approached me, stopped and looked at me while I looked at it, and we mutually failed to understand each other. A little later, I spent even

longer observing gorillas in a zoo. (The very existence of zoos raises questions about environmental learning, of course.) We remember such things, I would suggest, because they
disrupt, or make us question, or make us somehow aware of, our frames and remind us that there is always life beyond the narrow limits of our reason: life to which we are related in
some way, though we cannot understand it. We are reminded, as Shakespeare wrote, that there is more in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophies. Some experiences

can rattle our frames. So a sustainable world may be one that continues to contain more than we can understand To bring about sustainability, thus defined,

we have to

leave open the possibilities for surprise and wonder by reminding ourselves that the real riches of
living lie in the world beyond that which we control . Life can be perfect (cf. Kants idea of the Beautiful) and awe-inspiring (the

Sublime). Whether we can actually guarantee keeping a balance in what we cannot understand or control is a moot question, though we can certainly try to keep a balance within
ourselves. How can we pursue knowledge in pursuit of the unknowable? Only, I would suggest (and this makes no pretence at an original answer), by acknowledging some force, a mind,
greater than our own, individually, collectively, or historically. While scientific modernity, encouraged perhaps by Kant, may tend to see people as moral agents within a mechanical
universe, perhaps a healthy reversal is due. We might rather conceive of much of ourselves, much of the time, as mechanical agents within a mysteriously purposeful universe: little
technicians who have often lost sight of our significant insignificance in the greater scheme of things that will always, in its entirety, remain closed to us. Thus understood, we are
trapped within frames of mind, or patterns of judgment, dictated by a rather reductionist rationalism and impoverished empiricism, but by opening ourselves up to new experience we
can reawaken our sense of wonder and of place, if not ever fully know what were here for, or guarantee our sustainability. The path through the maize field to the stile where I saw the
fox is there for all to follow; like all footpaths, it was once the obvious way from A to B. Now there is no point in following it unless you have a dog to walk, or you want to experience that
sense of something more or different that comes from following the way less travelled. Both were true in my case. Although it was only a field, and therefore, a pretty strongly humanly
controlled environment, it was redolent of the mystery of growth and decay that, presumably, we all wish to sustain; I went there to be reminded of more than I had in my mind, and was
not disappointed. And what of the pedagogical implications? On the one hand, our students need to understand our ways of doing things as modernist technophiles as much as ever. To
function in the modern world requires an education in its ways, and formal education, via schooling, is inevitably largely a conservative process of induction into a culture and its frames.
Although frames, as cultural constructs, might change over time, we cannot fully control this process: we cannot simply replace our ways of knowing or our ways of getting to know,
either with some new sustainable model, or some pick-and-mix from the more attractive offerings of premodern cultures. The challenge, therefore, becomes to encourage more than
what we have been doing, not to pretend to do without it. And where can this added value (for this is real added value) come from? While religious experience has been cited, it is
important not to suppose that religious education generally provides this. Often, religious education is received by students as yet another package of facts, and not a very useful one at
that. In such cases our teaching is not misguided but is insufficient, not amounting to enough, in many cases, to enrich personal existence through exposing students to their limits and
to the mysteries of the world beyond them, even where that may be its espoused intention. However, we are far from incapable of such experience, even in the urban context. Fiction

poetry can do this,

and
as can music and the other arts; contact with animals can do it (particularly, but not solely, in their natural habitats); as can some
experiences at the edge of safety and security, including the kind of outdoor pursuit that has become increasingly rare in British schools in an increasingly regulated and litigious climate;
sometimes, even science and languages and history in the classroom can do it, perhaps most often for those students rendered susceptible to their mysteries through influences beyond
the school. Certain kinds of sense-making are both exploratory and enriching, and resist easy closure. In conclusion, therefore, education for sustainability as a frame of mind, or towards
sustainability as a condition of the planet, might take the view that it remains important to learn languages and sciences and historybut that these should be learnt as much as
possible as adventures towards encounters with the unknown, and that students might have some other adventures, too, whether in or out of school, so that, even in education, the
experience can exceed the expectations, whether or not the frames are changed (because the latter depends on how we conceive of frames of mind). Let the educational quest always
be for the unknowable. How else can coming generations learn to live in awe of life? The twentieth century has been characterised as the century of the attempted

extermination of the Other by the exploitation of frighteningly powerful technologies, and we continue to
suffer the aftershocks. Alain Finkielkraut,8 for example, cites both Stalinism and Nazism as the excesses
of a coldly instrumental rationality that demonized difference in the pursuit (quite sincere, in their
own terms) of Utopia. It would, I fear, be quite possible to demonize difference in pursuit of a sustainable society,
based on principles of scientific ecology. Perhaps almost as uncomfortably, Finkielkraut sees the Millennial
postmodern condition as also retreating from encounters with the Other, but this time through a failure to respect
any ties, ideologies, traditions, or arguments, so that all human

living

on Earth

is conducted from the

superficial perspective of the tourist . Recent events have reminded us just how paper-thin the veneer of
mutual tolerance can be. Finkielkraut concludes In The Name of Humanity by quoting Hannah Arendt, who
considered resentment the natural, and understandable, condition of post-Holocaust humanity, and gratitude as its
only feasible alternative. What price an education that makes us grateful for life on Earth?

D. Drop the debater. Vote on (1) the affirmatives violation

fairness (2) the affirmatives destruction of education or
(3) the affirmatives limitation of our ability to challenge
educational norms.

A/T: Reciprocity
Theres nothing inherently good about reciprocity if it trades
off with predictability because if both of us could each make
one argument that would be reciprocal but it still makes
debate considerably worse. This isnt weighing, this is a no link
arguments since they cant control fairness with reciprocity, no
chance to access fairness impacts.
And, turn reciprocity because running a plan shifts neg ground
to whatever isnt the plan. If the aff went for whole res then I
could defend the converse and ground would be reciprocal but
now the affirmative has chosen to limit what they defend so I
need compensation.

A/T: Neg side bias

Each debater at a tournament debates either side of the
resolution about the same amount of times so structural bias
is solved over the course of a tournament and better debaters
will still end up breaking and winning. If there is side bias, it
does not uniquely affect my opponent and they dont deserve
compensation for it.
Additionally, side bias is compensated by the fact that my
opponent gets to make the last comparisons.
Also, plans effectively solve all bias because they allow for aff
focus and make the negs burden to prove that the plan is bad.
I cant be held to advocating the converse and attacking the
plan because that destroys my ground and makes the round
biased towards the aff.

Presume Neg
1. To negate means to invalidate so my textual burden is
only prove the resolution false, not to uphold any
alternative advocacy, you always negate in the case that
that the aff is false even if the neg isnt necessarily true.
Textual burdens come first because they are key to
predictability. All debaters know what it means to affirm
and negate. Predictability guides debate norms because I
know to prepare an aff and a neg on the current topic
because I can predict that Ill debate those positions.
2. Presumption against a statement is the best reasoning
because it coheres with scientific logic. Scientists
presume that mermaids dont exist even though we cant
prove that they dont with certainty.
3. Negating doesnt preclude that any other statement is
true, just that the resolution is false, so you always
negate defensively because it doesnt require the truth
value of an alternative statement.

A/T: Presume Aff

1. Structural bias is balanced by the fact that each debater
advocates each side of the resolution the same amount of
times in prelims and has a 50/50 chance to advocate
either side in outrounds so theres always a balance
between affirming and negating and structural bias
doesnt affect debaters in the context of the entire
tournament. The impact of presuming aff for structural
reasons is non-unique to the way structural bias balances
out when we debate the other side of the resolution.
2. Even if structural bias was a reason to presume, you dont
vote aff because (s)he gets the first and last speech to set
the debate up and make the last argument applications,
and we both have 13 minutes to speak, so theres no time
skew but strat skew flows neg, I can never answer their
strat in the 2AR.

Skep NC
1. Prefer a truth-testing paradigm because its the only way
to test the validity of the resolution and minimizes your
bias from preference of one side. Additionally, it
maximizes philosophical education by allow debaters to
test multiple levels of philosophical truth. That means the
affirmative must prove the resolution true and if they do
not meet that burden you negate.
2. Presumption is triggered when the resolution or the round
becomes incomprehensible, which means the aff has
failed the textual burden of proving the resolution true.
The resolution is a normative statement so skep triggers
presumption in that the resolution cant be
comprehended or proven true if there is no normativity or
no epistemology to discover that normativity.
3. Skep outweighs theory by rendering the normative nature
of rules incomprehensible so you dont look to
presumption for theoretical reasons like structural bias,
you negate on the textual burdens.
4. History shows widespread moral disagreement and no
signs of moral progress.
Leiter 10 Leiter, Brian (Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Chicago Law School).
Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. On the Human, sponsored by
the National Humanities Center. March 25th, 2010. http://onthehuman.org/2010/03/moral-skepticism-and-moraldisagreement-developing-an-argument-from-nietzsche/
With respect to very particularized moral disagreements e.g., about questions of economic or social policy which often trade on obvious factual

for over two hundred

years, Kantians and utilitarians have been developing increasingly
systematic versions of their respective positions. The Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy
has an even longer history. Utilitarians have become particularly adept at explaining how they can accommodate
ignorance or disagreement about complicated empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But

Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about particular cases and issues, though in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to the
competing traditions and which, in any case, do nothing to dissolve the disagreement about the underlying moral criteria and categories. Philosophers in
each tradition increasingly talk only to each other, without even trying to convince those in the other traditions. And while there may well be progress
within traditions e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham

there does not appear to be

any progress in moral theory, in the sense of a consensus that particular fundamental theories of right action and the
good life are deemed better than their predecessors. What we find now are simply the competing
traditions Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist, perhaps now even Nietzschean who often view their competitors as
unintelligible or morally obtuse, but dont have any actual arguments against the foundational principles of their competitors. There is, in short, no sign

Are we really to
believe that hyper-rational and reflective moral philosophers, whose lives, in most
I can think of none that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement between these competing moral traditions.

cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material

whom, in the modern era, spend

careers refining their positions, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings

success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material self-interest, and most of
professional

have reached no substantial agreement on any

foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality?
for well over a century are we really supposed to believe that they

5. Moral anti-realism best explains moral disagreement. We

cant reach consensus because morality is just a
psychological bias, not an objective truth.
Leiter 2
Heres how the Nietzschean explanation might go. The existence of incompatible moral philosophies providing dialectical justifications for moral
propositions is best explained as follows: (1) there are no objective facts about fundamental moral propositions, such that (2) it is possible to construct

the best explanation for these

theories is not that their dialectical justifications are sound but that they answer to the
psychological needs of philosophers. And the reason it is possible to construct apparent
dialectical justification for differing moral propositions is because, given the
diversity of psychological needs of persons (including philosophers), it is always possible to find people for whom
the premises of these dialectical justifications are acceptable. The alternative, moral realist explanation for the
datathe data being the existence of incompatible philosophical theories about morality is both less simple and less
consilient. First, of course, it posits the existence of moral facts which, according to the more
apparent dialectical justifications for moral propositions, even though (3)

familiar best-explanation argument I have defended elsewhere (Moral Facts and Best Explanations in E.F. Paul et al. (eds.), Moral Knowledge [Oxford:

are not part of the best explanation of other phenomena.

Second, the moral realist must suppose that this class of explanatorily narrow moral facts are undetected
by large number of philosophers who are otherwise deemed to be rational and
epistemically informed. Third, the moral realist must explain why there is a failure of
convergence under what appear (and purport) to be epistemically ideal conditions of
sustained philosophical inquiry and reflective contemplation across millennia. We can agree
Blackwell, 2001]),

with Peter Railton that we lack canons of induction so powerful that experience would, in the limit, produce convergence on matters of fact among all
epistemic agents, no matter what their starting points (Moral Realism, Philosophical Review [1986]), and still note that there exists a remarkable crosscultural consensus among theorists about fundamental physical laws, principles of chemistry, and biological explanations, as well as mathematical truths,
while moral philosophers, to this very day, find no common ground on foundational principles even within the West, let alone cross-culturally.

Thus, the resolution cannot be confirmed as a normative

statement and you negate.

Parametrics Bad
1. Theres no brightline for ground compensation, and the
skew made by parametricizing outweighs the ground the
AC should be compensated for. Predictable ground
division is set by the resolution.
2. Whole res offers more depth because we focus on the
same issues every round until we actually understand
them instead of talking about Yasuni one round and
Elephants the next.
3. Stable advocacy is non-unique. The text of the resolution
is a stable advocacy too, the fact that they say the
resolution lets them side-step offense is just them
threatening to be abusive if they dont get their way.
Default to no parametrics and hold them accountable for
defending the entire resolution.