PHILIPPINE PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST:

Rebuilding the Philippine Political System

by
Ralfhee Blake Barrios

The simple logic in dealing with an ineffectual system is to dump and change it. Adapting a
structure that brings more harm than benefit will only exacerbate the already sorry state of the
society. There is no sense keeping a volatile scheme, one that is prone to explode on the head
of the persons who have engineered the scheme itself. A wrong system breeds poor results and
poor results are manifestations for the need to change.
Philippines has been groping in the dark for far too long, rummaging in drawers and boxes for
the match that would flicker the necessary light. This is apparent in the miserable political,
economic, and social crises that have badgered the nation. To put it succinctly, the Philippines
is a weak state. The Philippine state is a weak state because its apparatus has constantly been
under the control of a powerful family, clan, or prevailing group for the primary purpose of
personal aggrandizement (Banlaoi, n.d). Of the three (politics, economy, society), politics, of
course, is the ultimate cause for the mayhems of the other two--economy and society. It is the
root of the problems. This is true especially because politics is equivocal to power and he who
has power has the ability to control the government system from which all men and institutions
depend. Although the need seems mutual for a government without its people is nothing, still
the people exist at the mercy of the government primarily because power resides in the hands
of those in the government. All government machineries and resources are then open for their
disposal. State apparatus are available for the incumbents disposal. History speaks fairly. In
2004, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was alleged to have sabotaged election results
by ordering then Commission on Elections Commisioner Garcillano to pad and shave the results
and win over her rival by a million votes. The infamous Ferdinand Marcos is known for his wits
and cunning in manipulating the law and government machineries to work in his favour from the

dissolution of the Congress to the empowerment of the military forces and then to turning into
an absolute dictator. A premature and weak Philippine state has produced weak institutions of
governance; thus, it is unable to manage the ethnic, religious and socioeconomic diversities in
its society (Banlaoi, nd.). These historical events being proving facts, it is therefore only
reasonable to alter the political system in order to affect better changes to the Philippine
economy and the society as well. This is the need for a Philippine Perestroika.
The term perestroika is more familiar as a Russian economic policy that intended to increase
mechanization and labour efficiency. However, the etymology of the word perestroika is
reconstruction or reformation. This etymological definition is exactly what the Philippines
needsa reconstruction, a reformation, a renovation in its political arena. A Philippine
perestroika aims to ouster the existing and ineffective political system in order to construct a
new one that will guarantee effective governance and unsoiled political actions. These
reconstructions will provide better safeguards as well as eliminate those that are unnecessary
and prove only to be cumbersome in the performance of executive, legislative, and juridical
functions. Glasnost is a related concept of the Russian perestroika but deals more with
transparency, or its English translation, openness. Glasnosts were Russian policies that dealt
with preventing graft and corruption. Policies on this very premise are what the country needs to
inhibit graft and corrupt practices in the government.
In order to achieve this rebuilding and openness, a set of literature relating to the Philippine
political system and governance by different authors has been reviewed by this writer. It has
been found out that these authors have various opinions as to the ultimate cause of the
countrys impoverish state. Some relate the problem to political dynasties, some to questions of
legitimacy, most to corruption, while still a few others to the electoral system. Each cause will be
analyzed in order to determine the weight and substance that they bring into the problem. The
reviews have been organized in order of political system so that the article on election comes
first, then on good governance and the rule of law and so on. Furthermore, this paper will
identify the ultimate cause of the state's pandemonium through a comparative approach.

A study of the different apparatus of the Philippines shall increase state capacity and even
transform the predatory nature of the state into what can be legitimately classified as
developmental. State capacity was first used by Charles Tilly to refer to the states ability to

raise revenues but this paper uses this to mean the wider range of competencies that the state
acquires in the development process, which includes the power to enforce contracts and
support markets through regulation or otherwise as have been used by Bersley and Persson
(2009) in their paper entitled State Capacity, Conict and Development.
Contrary to popular prejudices regarding the cumbersome nature of third world states and the
presence of predatory governments therein, Peter Evans (1989) attributes the levels of state
developments to state structures and points out that third world states are not necessarily
predatory but may also be classified as developmental. The predatory classification of the state
has been easy with the emergence and popularity of an ideologue that is neoutilitarianism.
Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a rational entity and in being so
would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of power, security, and welfare so that
the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said maximization of utility, the more
likely would rational entities venture out to claim this utility. This then creates a system of
predation where, when the government is entrusted with a vast power, the easier it is for it to
prey its people and to gain for himself. Evans (1989) points out that the emergence of
neoutilitarianism makes it easier to condone predatory activities as the very barest essentials of
this precept assumes that it is the nature of rational entities such as the state is to maximize its
resources even at the expense of the lives of its people. This maximization may come in the
form of corruption or rent-seeking. Some states may extract such large amounts of otherwise
investable surplus and provide so little in the way of "collective goods" in return that they do
indeed impede economic transformation. It seems reasonable to call these states predatory"
(Evans, 1989).
On the other hand, developmental states are not exactly the opposite of predatory states for the
former is neither a paragon of virtue nor of honesty but the ends are different from those of
predatory states so that even with the existence of corruption and informal networks in the
former, their economic progress, unlike those of predatory states, graph positive slopes. In fact,
in some cases, developmental states may have historically been more predatory than
developmental.
Hutchcroft (1998) classifies the Philippines as a predatory state based primarily on its history of
crony capitalism and rampant corruption which are most manifested in the Marcos, Estrada, and
Arroyo regime. Some political scientists even argue that the Philippines is not only a predatory
state but a predatory regime because the whole state apparatus connive in order to maximize

their utility. It is then the burden of the government to shift the predatory nature of the state to
one that is developmental as have been the case with Japan, Korea (North Korea, and Taiwan).
This paper will operate on both rational and institutionalized approaches.
This paper, Philippine Perestroika and Glasnost, aims to attain the developmental shift by
renovating the political sphere on which all government institutions and the polity exist.
Unless and until the state recognizes the problems and applies curative measures upon the
pandemic hitches that go against development and progress, the nation will remain in the hollow
crater of poverty and discontent.
A study of these articles leads us to the building blocks of the new edifice of this nation, that with
glass facades and solid pillars. These literatures, when amalgamated, shall be the blueprint of
the new political destiny.
On INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE by S. HIX AND M. WHITING
Before this paper argues on the specifics towards the path of a Philippine Perestroika and
Glasnost, it is only proper that a short discussion on political science, on which this paper will
operate, be made.
Political science is not a school work, it is a field of study that involves all aspects of human life
and affects all life form. It is indispensable to reality life because politics itself is indispensable to
the real world. Politics is everywhere and to detach its systematic means to comprehension is
similar to detaching a body from a brain.
The birth of political science could be traced back from Ancient Greek as a brainchild of no less
than Aristotle himself. He was the first featherless biped to relate the different forms of
governments with different state status or political outcomes in a systematic way, hence the
science. Aristotle has then influenced great mind like Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Madison.
Political science as it is known today is a product of several theorizing and logical thinking by
the aforementioned people. In ones study of political science, one would notice how much

philosophy the discourse involves. This is primarily because of the empirical nature of politics.
That is, it tends to lean more on experiences rather than on futuristic circumstances. To put it
bluntly, political science is the mistress of history.
This paper will implore the following organization and identification schemes; political behavior,
political institutions and political outcomes. This literature review will work in the context of
identifying the key factor that has affected or that is affecting political actions; whether it is the
behavior, the institution or the culture. At the offset, this writer will also identify which among the
three has contributed greatly to the problems held at status quo.
According to Hix and Whiting (2012), political behavior refers to the beliefs and actions of
political actors, be they citizens, voters, party leaders, members of parliaments, government
ministers, judges, civil servants, or members of interest groups. These actors have political
preferences: their political interests, values and goals. Issues like what the people want
prioritized; education, armed forces, or labor, fall under political behavior. Political institutions
have been defined as the sphere or arena on which political behavior manifests. Later on, this
writer will identify whether a certain issue could be resolved by altering political institutions say
from a presidential government to a parliamentary government or from a bicameral legislature to
a unicameral legislature. Finally, political outcomes cover a broad range of issues, from specific
policy outcomes such as economic growth or higher public spending or better protection of the
environment, to broader political phenomena, such as political and economic equality, social
and ethnic harmony, or satisfaction with democracy and government (Hix and Whiting, 2012).
Succinctly, political outcomes are the results or the sum of behaviors, institutions, and actions.
Hix and Whiting (2012) also discussed several approaches in the study of politics, which the
writer deems pertinent to the analyses to be rendered. The first approach is the rational-choice
approach which considers men as rational beings who will decide in favor of the option that
gives them the highest satisfaction or utility, which is equivocal to saying that rational men
choose options that serve them best. Hence, the rational-choice approach does not mean that
men rationalize decisions through a conscious effort of introspection and deductions, rather this
means that rational being have innate preferences and will choose according to their
preference.
This approach will be utilized in this study as political actors act on the premise of deriving
satisfaction for themselves. The rational-theory approach in this paper will be furthered by

identifying state actions in the context of the re-emerging neoutilitarian paradigm.

Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a rational entity and in being so
would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of power, security, and welfare so that
the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said maximization of utility, the more
likely would rational entities venture out to claim this utility even at the expense of illicit actions.
A famous illustration of the rational choice approach is the prisoners dilemma.
Another approach is the institutional approach which deals with role of institutions in state
actions. According to Hix and Whiting (2012), there are two types of institutions; formal
institutions and informal institutions. Formal institutions include the various provisions in a
constitution, the rules of procedure in a parliament, an electoral system, campaign finance
regulations, rules governing how a party chooses its leader, and so on. Informal institutions,
meanwhile, encompass social structures (such as class), social norms and cultural practices,
metaphysical beliefs and ideological values, and so on. Both, however, restrict behavior of
political actors such as the guarantee of the laws to penalize corrupt officials restricts the
commission of graft and corrupt practices. To a certain degree, institutions are more important
than behavior in explaining political phenomena because the former could restrict political
behavior licitly so that behaviors may not be carried out.
DEMOCRACY
The Philippines prides itself as not only a Republican but a Democratic country while U.S.
parties contend on both ideologies.
Democracy is a very complex idea. Whether it is even an idea is debatable. Regardless,
democracy has had a bitter history in the hands of philosophers such as Aristotle. The
sentiment of Aristotle was valid. He argued that a democratic state would eventually cause
chaos because state affairs and the decision process are bestowed upon the less educated
gentry. This was the principal characterization given to democracy. That it was the direct rule of
the people, which was composed of the lesser mortals so to speak. He feared that giving
such a group of people power equal to that of the more educated and economically independent
citizens would most likely lead to chaos and populism (Hix and Whiting, 2012) but because
politics is dynamic and ever-changing. Democracy has had a new definition. The famous line
from Gettysburg Address in 1863 exemplifies what democracy is in its new form, a government
of the people, by the people, for the people. This shows that democracy has evolved into a new

form where the needs and aspirations of the people are represented in the government by
electing political actors in their stead. Democracy has become indirect hence avoiding the fear
of Aristotle to what is currently considered as a mobocracy.
Robert Dahl (1971) believes that democracy is about political equality and giving everyone an
equal voice in saying how a state should be governed. Thus the essence of democracy has
been synonymous with political equality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.53) and Clark et al. (2012, p.180), in a previous study, found
out that as the countrys wealth increases, it is more likely to become a democracy. Although
the line of correlation has not been established, the fact is that a states economy and its
democratic nature have a bilateral relationship. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) proposed a
modernization theory stating that as a state modernizes, it is bound to tread on only one path,
that is democracy, and he also believed that less modernized state who are automatically of low
level of education are more prone to be ruled by a dictator. These claims have been disproved,
however, by political phenomenon such as the economic development of non-democratic
countries especially those in the Middle East and the non-modernization of democratic countries
such as India.
POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
The most popular and widely accepted reason behind preferences is the economic determinist
perspective which argues that a persons political preference is determined that persons
economic class. According to this perspective, the way of understanding an individual and his
decisions is by identifying the class he belongs in. Up until this day and age, the primacy of
economic conditions stands to be undisputed.
There are other factors that determine political preferences though, such as gender, religion,
ethnicity, or nationality.

On PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL REFORM by

JOEL ROCAMORA
According to Rocamora (1998), the most important characteristic of Philippine political parties
is that they are parties of the elite1. They do not compose of elite men and women but of men
and women who are retainers or followers of the elite. They are not the elite themselves but
the people who support them and their causes are. In fact, men who run for office are usually
lay people or ordinary men who have been influenced and promised to be supported by wealthy
families. This is not an unusual practice. Wealthy families have been supporting political
candidates for the apparent reason that once seated in the office and vested with powers, these
officials will come in handy in whatsoever political actions the elite family wishes to undertake.
No need even to lobby, everything is an i-Phone away. Obviously, they wouldnt spend money,
time, and effort without meaning to do business. Electoral supports given by elite families are
more or less what one might consider as investments for a business venture.
According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society there is always a class that rules
and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who
are capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of
superior individuals. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is always the Iron Law of
Oligarchy in all forms of human organization be it a club, a council, or a political party.
However, Rocamora sees the iron law of oligarchy working behind politicians. Instead of them
controlling the government and performing political functions, they have politicos at work to do
that for them.
This posits a serious problem on the purity of intention and integrity of the politicos. Do they alot
land A to resettle 200 homeless families or do they allow the wealthy to build commercial
buildings? Do they give away the lands to the dying farmers or do they strategically place
delaying tactics on the plenary and mask them as laws or petitions or motions? Most of the time,
the presence of elite support does not even give room for dilemma. Unsurprisingly, why would

During the 17 century, the word elite refers to commodities of special excellence. Later, the word is
used to denote superior social groupslike crack military units. In the social sciences, the concept of elite
gained prominence through the writings of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaeteno Mosca who were both reacting to
Marxs concept of class (Magno, n.d).
1

th

politicians create policies that go against the will of the families that funded their campaign, that,
in effect, place them to office?
Furthermore, despite the elite classes towering political parties and candidates who then
become government official, Rocamora (1998) points out that, what has kept the Philippine
state weak is that no one class has been strong enough to bend the state to its will. That is,
despite strong hold of elite families to politicians, the elite class themselves do not have a power
strong enough to bend the state to their will. This is primarily because the elite class have
divided themselves each to their own fancy. Each of them has their own personal agenda. They
are not unified which makes it impossible for the government to create and implement a solid
and coherent economic development strategy or an institution capable of providing a reliable
regulatory agenda for the Philippine economy. However this argument of Rocamora could not
hold water, for even with a unified elite with their shared goals, there is no assurance or
guarantee that policies and legislations will be for the best of the majority if not the entirety of
the Filipinos. For one, the elite class may agree among themselves decisions that are gratuitous
to them but onerous to the working class and the proletariat. Centralizing power on one class
has been one of Marxs greatest struggles. Powerful elite does not automatically accelerate the
social positions of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat to a degree. In fact, direct benefits are
vested only to the elite themselves and everything will occur at elite Canutes behest. This point
of Rocamora also fails to take into account the ability of the masses to establish their own
political destiny via their conscious self-organization.
Anchored on the same premise of elite support, Rocamora identifies yet another problem with
political parties in the Philippines, the shifting character of membership and absence of
ideological or programmatic differences. This problem is actually a combination of two
problems. First is the shifting character of membership and second is the absence of ideological
or programmatic differences. Albeit, the two are related for the shifting character of membership
is usually brought about by the absence of ideological or programmatic differences. This says a
lot about our politicians for not only do they have high tendencies to of being unresisting and
susceptible; they are also without principle or word of honour. The persistence of political
butterflies in the Philippines is a manifestation of the shifting character of membership.
Politicians change from one political party to another every election primarily on the basis of the
partys reputation and popularity and not on the principles by which the party has been founded
or the ideology it advocates. These political butterflies are often considered guest candidates
that can belong to more than one party. In effect, they are playing safe. The more apt term for

this shifting character of membership is political prostitution. In fact, political prostitution has a lot
of similarities with prostitution itself. For one, prostitutes are euphemised as GROs or Guest
Relation Officers, close enough to be guest candidates. And secondly, in both prostitutions,
there is the want of ideologies or principles.
Political ideologies2 are essential in a political party. These are the sets of beliefs or principles
on which all party programs, policies, and decisions must be grounded on. These are the very
basic beliefs that lead politicos to their shared goals. Without ideologies, party policies,
programs, and decisions become arbitrary and personalistic. A party without an ideology or
program does not have a true objective; it runs about the globe aimlessly, pointlessly. It is lost
easily in a grey forest, it is weak and without purpose; a complete cipher, engineered only to
exist in the eyes of the public. Hence, it is a mere facade, a surface, and inside it is hollow.
Without ideological differences, parties do not clash about anything other than the personalities
that represent them. Election then turns into a popularity contest rather than a contest of
leadership, skills, abilities, programs. The purpose of election, which is to put into office
individuals capable of governance, is thus defeated. However, the question of the nature of
ideologies advocated and their role in political life is another question.
According to Grossholtz (1964, p.163), those who have power are expected to use it to
promote their own interest and that of their family. There is no moral contempt for those who
benefit from their power. It is as it should be, and a man would be a fool to ignore his
opportunities. Those who have power lead interesting and eventful lives. And those without
seek to establish close contact with those who do. This is what happens in the Philippine
electoral system, there happens a series of power perpetuity by those who have it and those
who do not struggle to have such by clinging on those who do. This is one of the weaknesses of
Philippine political parties as pointed out by Rocamora; the desperate effort of those who need
power to cling and ride along those that are powerful.
What Rocamora has not mentioned is the non-permanence of parties in the Philippines, which
is a manifestation of the weakness of political parties. They are created in a year and cease to
exist on the next elections unlike the established parties in the United States-the Republicans
and the Democrats. The birth and death of major political parties show that, indeed, parties

The word ideology was first used by French Philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) and originally referred to a
new science of ideas (literally an idea-ology). It was Tracys hope that ideology would eventually be at par in
popularity with established sciences as zoology and biology.

have no concrete foundations such as ideologies or programs, or strong membership. These

absences qualify the Philippines as a state that possesses a weak and poor electoral system
and then, of course, administration.
Another electoral problem cited by Hix and Whiting (2012) that Rocamora was not able to
identify is the following;
For example, some citizens would like the government to spend more money on education and
healthcare while others would like the government to reduce taxes. Then, how do these
preferences translate into actions? For example, when voting in elections, do most citizens vote
expressively, for the party whose policies most closely match their political preferences; or do
they vote strategically, for a party which they prefer less but which has a higher chance of
winning? And, how do parties respond to voters? Do they stick with their policies and try to
persuade the voters to support them or do they adapt their policies to try to win as many votes
as possible?
THE PHILIPPINE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
In the Philippine electoral system, nobody loses. Cheating is so rampant, its either you win or
youve been cheated. In 2012, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been (hospital)
arrested for allegedly committing Electoral Sabotage during the 2004 elections where she won
over famous movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. Allegations of padding and shaving directed to Mrs.
Arroyo have begun when some of her conversations with then Commissioner Garcillano were
wiretapped and recording thereof have been released. After 8 years, and now without
Presidential immunity, Mrs. Arroyo undergoes trial and denies allegations.
During the 1992 election, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago contested before the Commission of
Election and the courts the results of the Presidential election claiming that she has been
cheated by Fidel Ramos who has lagged behind her by a significant margin in the first four days
of the vote-counting. Until today, whether or not cheating did occur, nobody can tell. During the
snap-elections between Marcos and Aquino, the former was alleged to have manipulated the
results of the election in order to stay in the Palace.
During the 2013 midterm election, a display of poor electoral system persisted; from shifting
membership of parties to the lack of ideological differences. For one, the prevalence of guest

candidates such as Loren Legarda, Grace Poe, and Chiz Escudero manifested the shift of
membership in political parties. There may be nothing unconstitutional or immoral in guest
candidates but it allows the electoral system to be perceived as a battle of party colours and
jingles. Another manifestation of the electoral weakness was the existence of a group
organized for electoral ends but did not really exist as a political party but with the functions
thereofthe team Pnoy. Evidently, the team subscribed to what Grossholtz described as the
need of the inferior to cling to those who are in power. The undeniable popularity of President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III who has had impressive trust ratings (compared to his
predecessors) enabled politicians eying government seats to have earned significant numbers
of votes. Those who trust the President have surely chosen whosoever the latter deemed
deserving to the government. The problem that sits with this scenario is the weak party chain it
cuffs among its members who are united solely on the bass of patronage and popularity. They
belong to a team primarily because the team-leader is popular and can harvest them enough
votes to win regardless of their stands and differences during elections3. This incoherent
membership and lack of shared goals (except to win elections) aggravated by the lack of
ideological or programmatic differences nulls the very reason for the existence of political
parties.
A TWO PARTY SYSTEM?
One of the comparisons cited in this paper earlier was the Philippine electoral system vis-a-vis
the U.S. electoral system that follows a two party system. With the existing problems raised by
Rocamora in his paper, the next logical step is to identify a solution. That is, will a two party
system counter the flawed political tradition of shifts and lack of ideological differences?
Apparently, a two-party system regulates the roster of candidates who could run for office and a
clearer demarcation between parties and party platforms will be drawn. When there are only two
parties, the difference of one party from the other will be highlighted and it will allow the parties
to select their best contender for election rather than presenting before the pool of voters
different candidates who may prove to be liabilities rather than assets of the nation.
This writer proposes that the major difference between the parties in a two-party system should
be based on the extent of government functions. On one end of the pole, is the socialist
3

However, the point of the Presidents popularity and its ability to influence people was not mentioned by
Rocamora.

perspective that the government should provide for its people and that it must handle major
economic affairs and institutions. On the other hand is the neo-utilitarian perspective of minimal
state intervention where the state intervenes as less as possible leaving most of state and
economic affairs to private individuals or institutions. The former should be called the
Conservatives while the latter the Liberals.
The question then is whether or not a two party-system eliminates the elite power over
politicians or as Rocamora puts it, creates a more coherent goal among the elite. Logically, a
two-party system concentrates elite support so that if a division should occur, division occurs
only on two major parties rather than one that is distributed unequally. Should there be a clash
between elite goals; the clash exists only two-fold. But whether or not total elimination of elite
rule is achieved is a question of ideological preferences and party-platforms of the winning
candidates.
The existence of close ties between a President and a candidate or an appointee which is really
a patron-client relationship is hardly dispensable. This writer argues that choosing kin to run an
office is not so much a detrimental act as long as it is backed up by meritocracy. In fact, the
beauty of having closely bounded people in the government is that there becomes an internal
coherence and a corporate identity. Internal coherence in that the executive is more able to
dispense its duties with people who have parallel perspectives with that of the President, thus a
coherent government goal, and corporate identity in that the government becomes a single
unified entity.
What the country needs is a stronger Omnibus Election Code that will regulate all candidates in
party membership so that stern requirements based on beliefs and philosophies are imposed. It
should also be the directive of the Commission on Elections to prohibit the existence of political
parties without any clear mandate or advocacy and inhibit commercials that are personalistic
and particularistic as may be defined by law.
In a morsel of logic, what Rocamora shows is the importance of political parties in
reconstructing a new political landscape. Elections, afterall, are the outsets of good governance.

On GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW

The prime reason this country has not been able to flourish in the Post-Martial Law era
is because it lacks good governance. The administrations that have held the government after
the Marcos regime have attempted, but in vain, to put the countrys economy back where it had
been before, that was next to Japan. Even the economists and the great minds that have ruled
this nation have faltered what they have overseen although the key is to focus on the countrys
quality of governance. The quality of governance affects the participation of the people; their
reactions and responses, and the political, economical and administrative institutions and
services and so in order to effectively carry out the duties of the government, its shall be rooted
on the basic principles of good governance and the rule of law.
The article on good governance and the rule of law points out that in order to achieve national
development, an amalgamation of good governance and a stable and predictable rule of law
that shall exercise proper justice regardless of social status of political considerations shall
occur. To put it simply, national development equals good governance plus the rule of law. The
question then is how to determine good governance and the rule of law and how does one
achieve both.
The irony that embodies this article is that the Philippine Constitution explicitly states that the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As a democratic country, the people expect
good governance in return of the trust they have vested upon the elected candidates and as a
republican state, the rule of law should be strictly implemented without favour or prejudice. This
is apparently lacking in the current political state that the Philippines is in.
One of the beautiful features of the article is its honest assessment of the challenges that
badger this nation and thwarts its development. The first challenge identified was the question
of legitimacy. In a query of power residence, power lies where men believe it resides. That is to
say that in the outset of a legitimacy question, power slips from the hands of those who have
engineered the process of attaining it. During the 2004 elections, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo was accused of sabotaging election results by padding and shaving by a
million votes. This accusation has exacerbated when a wire-taped conversation of the former
President and a former commissioner was released to the public. Although the tape was
inadmissible to the court by the principle of the fruit of the poisonous tree, it has dispersed
enough poison on the pool of people from whom all government power emanates. Perhaps so,

the exacerbation of this legitimacy question is due to the very fact that we are a democratic
state and power comes from the people. It seems only logical that a person whose power
allegedly did not come from the people should be unloved and unpopular. As a point of
digression, a historical approach on the Gloria Chronicle will show the ill-effects of election
engineering, which are the weak support system of the government and the elusive recognition
of authority and legitimacy on the part of government. We can account the legitimacy question
to the downfall of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Another challenge that the country faces is the predatory nature of its government. As a third
world state, the presence of rent seekers becomes acceptable and yet it is primarily because of
rent-seeking that we are left in this lowly state. Corruption is so rampant in the Philippines, it has
become a standard operating procedure, an SOP, in a non-standardized form. Corruption is not
a standardized commodity, it comes in different sizes and shapes and so to think of corruption
as a purely monetary issue is a mistake. According to the World Bank (1997) and the UNDP
(1998), corruption is the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gain. It can come in
various forms and a wide array of illicit behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism,
graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, embezzlement, falsification of records, kickbacks, influence
peddling, and campaign contributions (Balboa and Medallon, 2006). Incidentally, Balboa and
Medallon (2006) identify political legitimacy for the state through democratic elections and
transfer of power and an effective political opposition and representative government as the
first requisite for good governance.
The Philippine Development Plan of 2011-2012 further identifies lack of accountability as a
major issue concerning good governance. Without the governments assurance that it will be
accountable and transparent in all its decisions and dealings, there will always be an easy
pocket to be thieved, an accessible cheque to be filled out, a poor and ignorant Filipino to be
preyed.
These challenges have brought about several other aftermaths especially on the investment
climate. Thus, these challenges have collectively created a political instability in the country.
Albeit, the main concern of the article is eliminating corruption in all its forms. The Global
Competitiveness Index Report for 2011-2012 listed corruption and inefficient government
bureaucracy as the top most problematic factors for doing business in the Philippines (Philippine
Development Plan, 2011-2006). The article has provided different statistical data that prove
that corruption is one of the major problems of the country such as the Corruption Perception

Index of 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Global Competitive Index, which
all indicate the need of the government to strengthen its anti-corruption campaign and formulate
a more substantial course of action for good governance. This writer believes that this course of
action should be able to eradicate corruption systematically and logically in order for it to attain a
long-term effect.
The effects that corruption has upon good governance are apparent in the gutters and streets of
Manila but there is more to corruption than meets the eye. First of all, corruption, along with
political instability and weak rule of law, has scurried investors away from the country. Because
of this, the country experiences low capital formation, lesser job opportunities, lower household
income, lower household spending, and thus a lower Gross Domestic Product. In an article I
have written in 2011, I pointed out that,
The 5.9 increase in GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2011 was attributed to several conditions
including remittances and employment. However, the ultimate condition (sufficient condition)
that has caused the increase is the increase in household spending. Without this, growth would
have contracted. In the study of economics, the most important determinant of an economic
condition is production and supply. An increase in household spending shows direct relationship
between production and supply such that the greater the demand, the greater the revenues and
incomes generated and a greater supply means maximization of resources and employment at
the elementary level. This ostensibly delivers direct positive results unto the values of goods
produced and services rendered that is the GDP of the country. GDP growth must happen when
household spending increases. This is so because household spending augmentation happens
only when economic stability is significantly increasing. One of the contributing factors for this
augmentation is the high employment rate. Because employment increased, individuals tend to
spend more. In economics, there is a direct relationship between income and normal goods.
This increase in employment then is caused by the increase in public investments. Public
investors create more job opportunities. However, these public investors are swayed into the
Philippines due to the increase in confidence.
This writer along with several other members of the government identifies confidence of public
investors to the government as the prime necessary conditions that brought about the increase
in GDP.

Moreover, public services are not carried out properly when corruption occurs; government
projects do not have the quality they ought to have because funds have been manipulated
amongst the implementing agencies, the suppliers, and the rest of the other who have connive
for a kickback or they have been diversified for other purpose. Poverty-reduction programs have
also been pockets thieved by predators or rent-seekers, hence, if minimal, decrease of poverty
rate of the country. Private investors are not except from the corruptive tendencies of the
government. Most of the private investors shudder to invest in the Philippines primarily because
of the uncertainty of investors whose legitimacy is questioned and secondly because of the
prospect and reality of biased rules and extortive practices4. These second-thoughts are
understandable considering the amount of money that may be lost when all these individuals
really aim to do is serious business. Or as President Benigno Simeon Aquino III puts it, Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap.
The ways of eliminating corruption provided in the article could be identified into two; one is
curative while the other one is preventive, which very well proves that indeed corruption may be
eliminated although it has been endemic in the country and that it may indeed cease to exist.
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
The first solution provided by the article is an effective delivery of public service. A morsel of
logic will show us that the harder the procedures to deliver a public service are, the harder it is
for that service to be delivered. This is one of the reconstructions a Philippine Perestroika must
consider. When in order to deliver service A, steps 1 to 50 must be followed, it is more likely that
service A will not be delivered at all. In fact, fifty steps only provided 50 avenues for corruption
on the part of the implementing agency and the receiver of the service. On the part of the
recipient of the service, in order to avoid the cumbersome process, he/she resorts to illicit
bureaucratic standard operating procedures of paying in money to hasten the delivery of service
without undergoing proper procedure or more commonly called as lagay5 by Filipinos to avoid
the bureaucratic red tape.
The first solution to avoid corruption in this form is to prohibit predators from coming near easy
preys and temptations from nearing victims. That is, government agencies are better off
4

Ibid.
The term lagay can be translated as placement or more appropriately as placement fees. Although this is
illegal as it is paid to a government official to skip and not consider proper procedures, this has become
permissible in different government institutions in the Philippines.
5

applying impersonal transactions. This way, corruption can easily be monitored and identified
and bribery is less likely to happen. Reasonably, these forms of corruption such as bribery and
extortion are easier done in a face-to-face transaction rather than impersonal transactions
where procedures are dealt and followed online or via Short Message Services (SMS). By using
online procedures, consideration of not following proper procedures and resorting to illicit
placement-fees or bribery is instantly extinguished. Not only will this prevent corruption, this
will also give ease and convenience to the people since they no longer have to wait for hours in
a file in the Land Transportation Service or Department of Foreign Affairs. The problem with this
system of online transactions is that it goes proportionately with computer literacy. Unless and
until everyone is literate, manual transactions cannot be totally removed and so then is
corruption. Hence, impersonal transactions should come hand in hand with a perestroika of
manual government procedures that shortens but efficiently delivers the process until finally
everyone is literate enough to access online services. Regardless, impersonal services
decrease modes of corruption significantly. The article strongly upholds the implementation of
an Anti-Read Tape Act (ARTA) in order to eliminate corruption in government agencies.
Another solution is the increase in compensation of civil servants, which aims to improve their
economic wellbeing and raise their morale6 but in real terms attempt only to make them
satisfied enough to avoid corrupt practices. In relation to corruption, salary increase may have
insignificant effects. This writer believes that corruption is pervasive and continuous as
opportunities to corrupt are pervasive and continuous. Regardless of the amount that a corrupt
official earns from his salary, as long as there are opportunities to corrupt, these opportunities
will not be allowed to slip off. So this writer believes that salary has little, if not zero, effect upon
corrupt acts. What wage increases does however is that it encourages qualified people to work
for the government thereby increasing the chances of achieving good governance and quality
public service. In this time where the Philippines is allegedly experiencing brain drain with the
migration of experienced and qualified workers to other countries, the need to attract workers to
work in government offices increases. To use salary or wage increase as an incentive to work
for in government offices for the Filipino people is an effective incentive. One of the factors why
the government cannot carry out its duties and obligations properly is because those that are
bound to carry them out are not qualified to do so. In executive services, for instance, 47
percent of the occupied positions are held by non-eligible individuals. This is partly due to the
vast appointive powers of the President who could appoint officials in his discretion even if he
bases his decisions on political accommodations rather than on merit and fitness and partly
6

Ibid.

because those who are qualified to work in government institutions choose to work for private
employers or international companies for the greener pasture. On the point of vast appointive
power of the President, the best regulation not to limit it but to hold the President accountable
for the misgivings of his appointee and to hold the appointee responsible, if not automatically
discharged from office should he be deemed incompetent, and with enough proof of nonperformance of duty.
As a take on Philippine perestroika and glasnost, this writer believes that one way of regulating
government agencies delivery of service thus guaranteeing efficient public service and
eliminating corruption is to hold heads of the offices accountable for the workings in their
departments by discharging the from office should there be a presence of corruption in any kind
and inefficient public service. This writer recommends that an annual human perception survey
on the performance of the different departments of the government be made and the three to be
considered most corrupt or the three least efficient be subjected to investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Should irregularities be found to have occurred in one of these offices (if not in
all), the department head will be immediately removed from his post in place of a new one who
knows his fate should he tolerate corruption and inefficacy under his nose. This writer also
believes that compensation increase should be made alongside a scrap and build policy for
those that are ineligible are in effect given incentives for their incompetence and will then grip
tighter on their seats lest they not enjoy the wage-increases. This has made the clearing and
qualifying process more complicated but a systematic policy of identifying the under-qualified
and encouraging the qualified must be executed.
Another factor is attributed to the poor public service delivery in the country; this is the inability
of Local Government Units (LGUs) to meet the expectations of the public regarding service
delivery. This is what this writer wishes to call the economics of politics where a service
shortage occurs when the service supplied does not meet the services demanded. In order to
achieve service equilibrium, local government units shall have both the ability and the
willingness to dispense public service. As to the question of willingness, this is usually an innate
characteristic that is quantifiable only through actions but ability is another question. One can be
willing and not have the ability or one can have the ability and not be willing. One of the
common impediments for public service delivery by LGUs is their failure to raise sufficient funds
for local developments. LGUs have become unduly dependent on Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) transfers from the national government and have failed to manage their financial
resources effectively and sustainably (Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2016). While the

Local Government Code has vested LGUs a semi-local autonomy and administrative powers for
local governance, the national government through its agencies still delivers services that
should have been the LGUs. This overlap and redundancy of functions confuses the system of
accountability for local services and encumbers the national government with more tasks
therefore making it spend more money that should have been allotted for national development
plans.
INTEGRITY
Seemingly, the problem with integrity is that it is non-quantifiable. There are no hard and fast
rules to quantify the degree by which an act or an actor has integrity. But what integrity is is that
it is pure. There are no other shades of integrity, it is monochromatic. The maintenance of the
purity of a persons or an institutions integrity is where the challenge lies and a stained integrity
must be treated with stiff penalties.
As clich as it is, the Constitution explicitly qualifies a public office as a public trust and,
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
the utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
In order to keep the integrity of a public office, the integrity of those run it must also be kept.
The law assigns the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a pivotal role in ensuring integrity and
deterring corruption in the public sector7. The sanction against corruption is the prosecution and
conviction of corrupt government official who although some may have shields of immunity may
be impeached. The problem with the Office of the Ombudsman is that the Ombudsman and the
deputies are appointed by the President. After the administration of President Arroyo, no
investigations were made by former Ombudsman Merceditas Guiterez regarding the anomalous
transactions the former President incurred during her incumbency, reason for the filing of
impeachment case against Guiterez and her resignation during the Aquino incumbency.
Nevertheless, the damage has been done and for several years, the unpopular President was
able to scram from the law. Even during the Aquino Administration, the same effect of
appointment is seen. During the offset of the impeachment trial against former Chief Justice
Renato Corona, opposition groups believed the Office of the Ombudsman was used as an
7

See page 210 of Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2012.

apparatus by the raging President in order to ascertain the oust of the Chief Justice. As long as
the Office of the Ombudsman exists at the appointing power of a political entity such as the
President, this writer believes that the office will never be always immune to bias and political
accommodations. But then again, the office exists as a constitutional commission that assists
the President in his performance of executive functions.
RULE OF LAW
There is a reason why the United States of America is a Republican state and nowhere in their
Constitution could one find their claim to democracy. The reason is simple; their history is a
victim of democracy. When one studies American History, it is seen that once upon a time,
when they followed the precepts of democracy and the liberality it entailed, they turned into a
mobocratic state and the people abused the privileges of democracy. There were times when
the people decided whether a man should be executed or not and how the execution was to be
performed. This has made a lot of people even the government, most specially the government,
unsafe and unsecured and so when the Constitution was drafted, its framers made sure that the
bitter history will not repeat itself by choosing to be a Republican rather than Democratic state.
To this day, US remains to be a Republican state, nothing more and nothing less, although
political parties are either Republicans or Democrats. Republicanism adheres to the rule of law
rather than the rule of majority. It is then on the premise that the rule of law should triumph over
the desires and the actions of the people that Republicanism has been founded.
Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution identified this nation as both a Democratic
and a Republican. Evidently, the political paradox is extinguished. The Philippines is a
Democratic state in that the key players in the government are elected by the people by a
popular vote and a Republican State in that in all aspects the rule of law should be upheld
regardless of political considerations or popular opinion. The rule of law is essential is
administering justice to the people.
Justice is thought of as the proper administration of law; the proper and perpetual disposition of
legal matters or disputes to render every man his due1. But before it has become what is now
known as a universal hope for victims and prosecutors, it has first been a victim to different
perspectives and a prosecutor to different scholars. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, and
Aquinas, among others, had something to say about justice, what is just and what is unjust.
Plato identified justice as the universal virtue, the single and greatest good, and injustice as the

universal vice, the single greatest evil2. Aristotles narrower valuation of justice is fair equality
which is to be remembered forever in legal philosophy.
However, one of those whose words truly marked is Glaucon who, although appeared only in
Platos masterpiece that is the Republic, has presented a unique perspective nevertheless.
What makes his idea of justice unique is that it is for him only a lesser evil and not an absolute
good nor a universal virtue as what other philosophers claim. Glaucon believed that to do
injustice is good but to suffer injustice is evil and that justice, being only in the middle, a
compromise, is neither good nor evil but only a lesser evil.
Glaucon presents this idea on an egoistic point of view that sees men as essentially selfish. This
is to say that men only do something from the motive of self-interest. For Glaucon, as for
everyone who adheres to this theory, when a person does something good, it is only because
he intends to benefit from that good. So that, when a person has an opportunity to benefit
unfairly and not be punished in the process, that person will seize the opportunity even at the
expense of violating moral dogmas. It is on this very principle that Glaucon directs his concept
of justice that he expounds with the legend of the Ring of Gyges.
Should Glaucon be right then all the more should a tough rule of law be implemented, that
which could resist the desperate efforts of egoistic individuals to gain incognito.
By upholding the rule of law, corrupt practices are prevented for would-be offenders would see
the consequences in stored for them should they act against the rule of law and should they
challenge the very barest essentials of etiquette and conduct. Corrupt officials act with
discernment. In the process of selecting the most appropriate methods of corruption, the wouldbe offender will also consider the penalties to be imposed upon him especially if he sees that
many others like him have been punished severely. He will also have lesser connivances
thereby making corruption degrees more difficult that it was when nobody seemed to care
whether or not corruption takes place.
CITIZENS PARTICIPATION
The active role that the citizens have played in the three People Power Revolutions that
occurred indicates a positive status of citizens participation. In fact, the country prides itself with
citizen participation. According to the Philippine Development Plan (2011:16), Citizens

participation has been one of the strengths of Philippine Governance. This may not be entirely
true as the existence of the other issues in the Philippines could only be attributed to the
citizens apathy such as those issues concerning political dynasties and/or patronage politics.
But the active participation of Civil Society Organizations in aid to the government is one of the
most remarkable political phenomena that the Philippines can be proud of.
In the simplest terms, CSOs, including NGOs, fill in the shortcomings of the government. It is
only apt that the government provide more incentives for CSOs in performance of what should
be an executive function of the government. These CSOs must also be protected from militant
forces that deters peoples participation
POLITICAL PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS
According to the article, the current state of the country can be attributed to the different
historical phenomena that have stormed this nation. These include; (a) the dominance of elite
interests both local and nationalin politics and political contests, this is very similar to what
Rocamora cited as a major problem in the Philippine Electoral System and had thus been
discussed in this paper; (b) the absence of political parties that exact accountability from
individual politicians based on principled party platforms, this too has been identified during the
previous article; (c) the weakness and subservience of the bureaucracy relative to political
class, this subservience can be attributed to the Philippiness culture of patronage and
clientelism which will be discussed further later; (d) the unprecedented power and discretion of
the executive branch that encourages both patronage politics and grand corruption, and finally
(e) the corruption of elections through patronage and money politics.
Of all the areas identified by the article to need mending, this writer believes that priority should
be given to the political process and system.
The dominance of elite interests both local and nationalin politics and political contests.
As have been discussed, the ability of the elite group to support political candidates and the
need of the candidates to be supported equates to the dominance of elite interests during and
even after elections. Unfortunately, these elite interests do not really serve well for the people.
In fact, the interests of the elite are usually contradictory to the interests of the proletariats for

the owners of lands cannot simply divine to doll out their lands to the peasants who have
worked hard for them.
This writer believes that in order to eradicate the dominance of elite interests in the government,
an electoral reform should take place.
The absence of political parties that exact accountability from individual politicians based on
principled party platforms.
From north to west, a platform-based political party is elusive. An average Filipino may not even
know the difference in platform of one political party from another. Usually, its just the difference
in colour, the difference in jingles, and the difference in names that parties highlight and a crosscut difference is not really apparent. This is bad already in a university election, what does that
make local and national elections?
This writer believes that the precedence of popularity, name-recall, or physique over ideologies,
platforms, and track-records has been an indispensable part of the Philippines political culture.
Political Culture is the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which
defines the situation in which political action takes place (Verba, 1965). This culture has been
born out of years of practice and custom. So much of the problems that this country faces are
brought about by the political culture we have. The choice, for example, of electing popular
government officials rather than deserving government officials has caused the government to
collapse and threatened this nation to an unredeemable fall.
In order to address this issue, this writer believes that an anti-political dynasty law should be
legislated and that political parties should not be allowed to exist unless clear platforms and
ideologies are in place. This writer does not see why this is hard as it does not even violate any
democratic principle. Furthermore, a two-party system must be adopted in the Philippines in
order to empower political parties and in order for them to not exist at the favour of popular
candidates.
The weakness and subservience of the bureaucracy relative to political class.
Political classes have crossed their borders. But doesnt anything political do? Apart from the
prior recommendations of this writer to establish a clear and stern political system, this writer

also recommends the organization of non-elite individuals into manageable and ordered groups.
The government should encourage the formation of labour unions and other organizations of
similar nature in order to empower and create a group that will ouster political elite.
Moscas (1964:9) elite theory states that, in every society there is always a class that rules and
a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who are
capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of
superior individuals.
The best counter then is to organize another group that will be ruled by individuals superior to
their class. The very basic principles of simple arithmetic show that an organized many could
easily ouster an organized few, ceteris paribus that is.
The unprecedented power and discretion of the executive branch that encourages both
patronage politics and grand corruption.
This writer agrees that the power and discretion of the executive branch have stretched to an
unreasonable parameter. This vast power has deeply contributed to the downfall of the nation
as different Presidents have abused the powers granted unto them by the constitution and have
even gone as far as making a constitution that is favourable to themselves. Because the
President can easily manipulate the apparatuses of the state, the Philippine has repeatedly
morphed into a Zairan state.
For one, there is the existence of what is seemingly a Philippine version of the Zairian
presidential cliques (especially during elections). Members of this clique usually seek the
favour and approval of the patron who is the President. This culture of patronage is prevalent in
the Philippines and is most likely due to the said vastness of executive power. According to
Kimura (1992), one of the most dominant political cultures is patron-client relationship where
the socio-economic status (patrons) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection
or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. Carl Lande
(1965) extends this idea to the Philippine context where he observes that patron-client
relationships exist from great and wealthy political leaders to leaders in each province down to

lesser gentry politicians in the towns, down further to petty leaders in each village, and down
finally to the clients of the latter: the ordinary peasantry According to Evans (1989), because
decisions are eminently up for sale to private elites, the state lacks autonomy.
The persistence of patronage politics has brought about several political phenomena that have
brought this country to shame such as the martial rule of an uber-powerful dictator, the electoral
fraud of then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and even the impeachment of former Chief
Justice Renato Corona who has been prey to the cosmic power of the President to use
government apparatuses in his favour.
Unfortunately, although the Constitution guarantees protection against grave abuse of
discretion, the persistence of patronage politics puts the provision to shame.
The corruption of elections through patronage and money politics.
Politics starts at the moment a political candidate appears on TV. to say Gusto ko happy ka. In
order to carry out good governance, a clean and honest election must take place. Campaigning
period is probably the filthiest time of the year; convoys and families are massacred, people are
paid for their vote, and worst of all, Loren Legarda starts to prostitute herself (if thats even a
valid verb).
On FAMILY AND POLITICS: DYNASTIC PERSISTENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES by Pablo
Querubin
From the age of consciousness, we have been taught that the family is the basic unit of the
society. It is essentially where society begins; even the most essential institution in a polity. This
same belief could not be understated in Political Science especially in the field of Political
Dynamics where the family is qualified as the starting point of influence and power. As Querubin
(2010) puts it, not only can families exercise their power outside formal institutions of
government, but they can also take over these institutions and capture the political system.
Even in the study of the Philippine electoral system, it is clear that candidates aim to affect
families instead of individuals for it is more common for families to have a single decision rather
than the arbitrary desires of individuals. However, this is not just the case in the most political
systems such as in the Philippines where more than 50 percent of the elected

Congressmen8 and governors have had a previous relative in office (Querubin, 2010) and two of
the Presidents are children of former Presidents, Macapagal and Aquino. Here, families play a
larger role and this role aims to centralize power among themselves and distribute it to their
heirs. Instead of candidates simply influencing families, families in the Philippines take on their
political destinies and pass them from one generation to another and sometimes even taking
on government positions simultaneously.
This is a system that has been going on in the Philippines. Politicians who win power seek to
maintain it for generations and even generations not certain. In a dynastic culture, power is
centralized only on one family. We have been born out of a history of political dynasties. In the
pre-colonial times, we were ruled by Datus and Rajas who hold power based on lineage rather
than meritocracy. Traditionally, the first sons of these Rajas or Datus are the direct heirs to the
thrones. During the Spanish colonization which lasted for almost 400 years, political power was
concentrated to a small mestizo elite commonly referred to as principalia[9]9. Instead of
establishing a strong centralized state, power at that time was disseminated among the various
elite families in the provinces. These families have the right to hold land, vote, and serve in
positions of local political power. The most important position at the local level was the
gobernadorcillo (petty governor), elected by the principalia class from its own ranks and put in
charge of collecting taxes and administering justice (Querubin, 2010).
The problem that arises with this system in a time of modernization, globalization, and
McDonalization is that it violates the constitutional provision of equal opportunity to public
service10 which veers away from the precepts of democracy and justice. The framers of the
Constitution have seen to it that the oligarchic feature of a dynastic system is prohibited in the
Philippines. However, despite this constitutional mandate for equal opportunity, the existence of
political dynasties is prevalent for this provision is considered a dead provision, a non-selfexecuting provision that is inactive until backed up by a sanctioning law. In fact, the law explicitly
states that the state shall... prohibit political dynasties as may be defined be law11. That means
that this provision of the constitution needs another law to define it and to set its penalties.
Without this law, the provision regarding political dynasties has no teeth and thus cannot
8

Compared to USs 7%.

Simbuhan (2005) and Cullinane (2003) claim that principalias were the maharlikas of the pre-colonial
Philippines. When the encomienda system was eliminated, the maharlikas became the principalias. It was a
hereditary status.
10
Section 26, Art. 2 of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
11
Ibid.
9

penalize its offenders. This is why political dynasties have been multiplying at a frequency that
is seemingly faster than the speed of light. There is a persistence of political dynasties in the
Philippines.
According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society there is always a class that rules
and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who
are capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of
superior individuals. Unfortunately, these minorities refer to the dynastic families in the
Philippines. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is always the Iron Law of Oligarchy in all
forms of human organization be it a club, a council, or a political party. According to Querubin
(2011) a more recent literature by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) emphasize the way by which
elite persistence may undermine attempts to reform institutions, leading to captured
democracies" wherein economic institutions and policies disproportionately benefit the elite12.
It is called a dynasty for its very nature; it entails power, it is driven to ruling, and it is
meticulously designed to stand the tests of time. Because of this and the toothless provision of
the law seeking to eradicate political dynasties is challenged. What makes things worse is that
legislators do not pass the law to back up the provision with its necessary dentures. If you think
about it, no person would annihilate themselves especially if it talks about power, wealth, and
fame. This is the very reason why no law has been stipulated regarding political dynasty since
1986.
According to Timberman (1991), the Philippines exists in a culture of tradition. The masses
prefer to follow the tradition that they have been accustomed to which accounts to why Filipinos
tend to vote based on the popularity of a personality rather than on the bases of ideologies,
beliefs, or philosophies, which is what modern political culture is. Because of this, we see a
problem with the credibility of choice by which Philippine politicians have been elected to office.
This aggravates the problem of political dynasty since the choice of the masses mostly favours
those that come from families that the people are already accustomed to govern them leaving
out those that are new to politics behind the line. In a study conducted by Querubin (2010) in his
thesis entitled Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippine, it has been found
that,
12

Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines by Pablo Querubin.

Non-dynastic candidates who win their first election by a small margin are 4 times more likely to
have a posterior relative in office than those who lost their first election by a small margin and
never serve... Moreover, in 40% of the 79 provinces, the Governor and the Congressmen are
related.
This data show that there is not only the existence but also the persistence of political dynasty in
the Philippines especially in the local levels. This persistence is continued as politicians
perpetuate their bloodline in politics. One of the major concerns of Querubin (2010) is the
tendency of families to use political power to further their own interests and appropriate rents at
the expense of the majority of the population. According to Bertelsmann Transformation Index
(2006), power brokers tend to have the upper hand in manipulating political as well as
economic resources to their advantage. This use of political and economic resources for private
gain is what Balboa and Medalla (2006) call corruption. This is to say that the concentration of
power on one family makes the system prone to corruption or John Dalberg-Acton says it best,
power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. In fact in Robert Klitgaards
Strategies Against Corruption (1998), he identified monopoly of power as a factor that results
to corruption along with discretion and absence of accountability thus the formula C=M+D-A,
where C is corruption, M is monopoly of power, D is discretion, and A is the absence of
accountability. In Alfred McCoys An Anarchy of Family, he shows that in fact it is really just a
few that accounts for this strength and power. Who have shaped its past, who are determining
its present, who are charting its future (De Quiros, 2012)13.
Furthermore, Querubin (2010) notes that the poorest provinces in Cavite are those that have
been ruled by dynastic clans. This literature shows that there is a relationship between the
persistence of political dynasties and the economic status of the province, which will be
measured in this study in terms of GDP and perception surveys. The same literature shows that
incumbents have higher advantages in winning government office, results of Querubins study
shows that incumbents vote share is 36 percentage points larger than that of non-incumbent
opponents.
The inclusion of the anti-dynasty provision itself has been subject to a formidable debate during
the drafting of the constitution. As constitutionalist Joaquin Bernas recalls in his article entitled
Political Dynasties published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2012);

13

Family Bonds by Conrado de Quiros, The Philippine Daily Inquirer

The political dynasty provision was authored by Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo. A similar
provision had already been rejected under the article on local governments, but Nolledo
entertained the hope that the Constitutional Commission might still approve one because, as he
said, It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision in the Constitution is very popular
outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity inside the Constitutional Commission.
He was also faintly hoping that Congress would do what the commission would not do. Hence
his impassioned plea: And so I plead with the members of the Commission to please approve
this provision. . . . [W]e leave it to Congress to determine the circumstances under which
political dynasty is prohibited. The commission will not determine hard and fast rules by which
political dynasty may be condemned. But I think this is a very progressive provision and, in
consulting the people, the people will like this provision. I hope the commission will hear the
plea of the people.
The thrust of the constitutional provision is to impose on the state the obligation of guaranteeing
equal access to public office. Although the provision speaks in terms of service, it is meant to be
a blow in the direction of democratizing political power. Nolledo had the support of
Commissioner (now Comelec Commissioner) Rene Sarmiento, who explained the rationale of
the provision thus:
By including this provision, we widen the opportunities of competent, young and promising poor
candidates to occupy important positions in the government. While it is true we have
government officials who have ascended to power despite accident of birth, they are exceptions
to the general rule. The economic standing of these officials would show that they come from
powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.
But strong contrary views were also expressed. Commissioner Christian Monsods was brief: I
just want to make the motion to delete Section 20 [now 26], first, because it has been argued
and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments and this body has already made a
decision on the same point; and, secondly, for the reasons I have stated, that I do not think we
should curtail the right of the people to a free choice on who their political leader should be.
Commissioner Blas Ople for his part argued that what were called dynasties were in fact not
the causes of social evils but the result of socio-economic imbalances. He concluded that the
commission should address these socioeconomic imbalances instead.

He also noted that even under present conditions, less privileged citizens have succeeded in
establishing themselves politically. He added: In my own province there are no longer any
dynasties. There are other provinces where you find the word dynasty probably misapplied to a
distinguished family, let us say, to the Cojuangco and Aquino family in Tarlac or the Padilla
family in Manila and Pangasinan, or the Rodrigo family in Bulacan, or the Laurel family in
Batangas, and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in Rizal, the Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya,
and Peps Bengzon has been calling my attention to the existence now of a Bengzon line of
political officeholders in Pangasinan. This is not to say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that the Philippine
society has been immobile. We see lots of evidence that, in fact, people disadvantaged by the
accident of birth have indeed risen through their own efforts to become successful competitors
of entrenched political dynasties in their provinces and cities. I can sympathize with
Commissioner Nolledos concern about dynasties because he comes from a province which
tends to be governed by political dynasties. Is that not right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
Indeed, the question of an anti-dynasty law or provision challenges the right of a citizen to vote
and be voted in the spirit of democracy, it essentially curtails the right of the people to a free
choice on who their political leader should be (Monsod, 1986). At a certain extent, the framers
of the constitution have posited a valid question. Does not an anti-dynasty law discriminate
politicians who are born of politician family or parents?
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago attempted to answer this question in the abstract portion of
the Anti-Dynasty Act which she has filed during the first regular session of the upper legislative
chamber in 2011.
The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26
The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit political dynasty
as may be defined by law.
To give force and effect to this provision, the playing field of the political arena should be
leveled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to aspire on even terms with those
from ruling politically dominant families.
Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system of extended families.
However, this extended family system, an beneficial concept when applied to the social aspects

of human behavior, finds its pemicious effects in the political arena where public office becomes
the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are well entrenched in Philippine
politics. The monopoly of political power and public resources by such families affects the
citizenry at the local and national levels.
The socio-economic and political inequities prevalent in Philippine society limit public office to
members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for convenience and out of cultural
mindset look up to these ruling families as dispensers of favors, and thus elect relatives of these
politically dominant families.
The same bill defines political dynasty as a situation when an incumbent official's spouse or his
or her second-degree relatives hold or seek office together, or when a spouse or relative
succeeds him or her. It also happens when spouses or relatives run for or hold public office
together even if they are not related to an incumbent official14. According to Defensor-Santiago
(2012), the parameter of the anti-political dynasty bill shall be to prohibit relatives from
occupying office in the same agency. Defensor-Santiago believes this to be a fair compromise
for the counter-arguments of those that see no reason to rule out dynastic individuals from
exercising the rights vested unto them by a democratic state.
This writer believes the compromise to still be defective and detrimental to the polity and,
although may decrease the existence of political dynasties, does not really eliminate its
persistence. The line between existence and persistence then becomes clean-cut.
This writer sees that in order to fully eliminate political dynasties without raising questions of
constitutionality, a regulating law should be implemented that would allow the two issues to
meet half-way such as by creating a law that would implement and incremental dynasty ban
from 1 term and so on. When a politician has been elected to office, no relative of his should run
in the same locality for the next term and this ban should be incremental by a term as time goes
by. This way, constitutionality questions will be easily answered and the effects of political
dynasties such as the use of government machineries for electoral purposes and the
permissiveness of patronage politics are avoided, even more, persistence of political dynasties
is thwarted.

14

Senate Bill 2649 or the Anti-Political Dynasty Act by Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago

The Filipino people should realize that political dynasties become detrimental only when they
reach a certain level of persistence. It is proper to conduct a study that would evaluate the level
of dynastic persistence that would be detrimental by studying the different municipalities and
provinces in the Philippines and the dynastic persistence therein. Should it be found out that the
tolerable number of dynastic individuals, for instance, is 2 relatives in one term, then 2
politicians occupying government office in one term should be permitted by the anti-political
dynasty law. Amalgamating this second proposal with the dynasty ban previously stated, a
dynasty ban based on the tolerable number of dynastic politicians should thus be implemented.
On ANTI-CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE by Jenny
Balboa an Erlinda M. Medalla
The greatest of all sins that a government could commit against its people is corruption. Yet
corruption has become endemic, almost indispensible with state existence, and as Balboa and
Medalla (2006) point out, corruption is a problem which all governments, at any level of
development, have to deal with. That it, regardless of whether the state has achieved full or
partial development, corruption is deemed to be present. The beauty of this article is that it
relates the magnitude of corruption with governance and development.
An earlier article has discussed the importance of good governance and its role in order to
maximize state capacity and achieve development. Balboa and Medalla (2006) point out that
good governance requires the highest standards of integrity, openness, and transparency
which are ostensibly absent in a corrupt government. The reason for the non-tangency of
corruption and governance is that the two serve different masters, the former elite families and
allies while the latter serve the people. Furthermore, while good governance means following
rules or the rule of law, corruption manipulates these laws to serve interests of the incumbents.
Corruption is a very popular activity but has acquired an identity that is more synonymous to
robbery than its raw meaning which is the misuse or abuse of public office for public gain
(WorldBank, 1997, UNDP, 1999) in whatever form that is not necessarily monetary such as
influence peddling, gift giving, or future benefits. Corruption may be as simple as not following
rules and obligations or it can be as large as amassing ill-gotten wealth during ones
incumbency and even manipulating government apparatus to work in ones favour. One must
also take note that corruption does not only exist in government agencies and institutions but

even in other aspects of governance, such as political parties, private business sector and
NGO (USAID, Anticorruption Strategy, 2005).
According to Robert Klitzgaard (1998), corruption takes place when monopoly of power is
combined with discretion and absence of accountability whereas UNDP adds that, as a
consequence of weak governance, the absence of integrity and transparency is a dimension
that is necessary for corruption to take place. Hutchcroft (1997) argues for a more general and
conclusive view. According to him corruption is the end result of the politics of privilege, rent
seeking, and clientelism. Balboa and Medalla also consider the principal-agent theory of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) stating that the agents (in this case the politicians and bureaucrats) are
able to abuse the advantages offered by such discretionary power in the wake of incoherent
interests in the principal (in this case, the electorate or the public at large).
The very definitions cited in the article show the detrimental characteristics of corruption
however, the more significant finding of Balboa and Medalla is the effect that corruption has on
development. According to studies, a corrupt state is more likely to achieve aggregate
investment levels of almost 5 per cent less than a relatively uncorrupt country. It has been found
out further that corrupt countries tend to lose about half a percentage point of gross domestic
product in a year. These data show that direct impact corruption has in a countrys economic
growth. Identified effects of corrupt regimes by Balboa and Medalla are the following:

Lower level of social services

Infrastructure projects biased against the poor, since public officials will design public
projects that will maximize bribery receipts and minimize the chance of detection

Higher tax burdens and fewer service

Lower opportunities to sell their produce and for SMEs to flourish, as their ability to
escape poverty using their livelihood will be severely restricted by corruption of the state
regulatory apparatus.

An example state that best shows the relationship between corruption and development was the
historical Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) with its incoherent absolutist
domination and its klepto-patrimonial nature. According to Evans (1989) Zaire is, in short,
a textbook case of the sort of predatory state we should expect to be pervasive if neoutilitarian
logic held. According to Evans (1989), during the reign of Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko in 1965,
Zaire had gradually moved towards the bottom of the world hierarchy of nations and lest its

population in misery as bad as or worse that they suffered under the Belgian colonial regime.
This impoverished state is attributed to the klepto-patrimonial culture of the state where
corruption and rent seeking is rampant and as a Zairian Archbishop puts describes it:
Why in our courts do people only obtain their rights by paying the judge liberally? Why
do the prisoners live forgotten in prisons? They do not have anyone who can pay the judge who
has their dossiers at hand. Why in our office of administration, like public services, are people
required to return day after day to obtain their due? If they do not pay the clerk, they will not be
served. President.
There is thus a prevalence of Zairian bargain where everything can be considered for sale
and state decisions are highly buyable exclusively for private elite.
This is no different from the Philippine experience where the brilliant Ferdinand Marcos
concentrated power in his hand with the declaration of martial law. His authoritarian rule could
be identified as similarly klepto-patrimonial as it resulted to crony capitalism that made his
family, allies, and conglomerates rich. When finally the Marcos regime has ended, the country
was a step beyond the point of no return and until today, no effort has been enough to resurrect
the Philippine economy from its collapse. Ousted Presidents Estrada and Arroyo had no
different fates; the short Estrada presidency had marked the resurgence of crony capitalism,
stock market manipulation, massive money laundering, plunder, and others whereas the long
Arroyo administration (the Philippines second longest term of Presidency next to Marcos) has
been subject to questions of legitimacy, election sabotage, malicious transactions at
partnerships, and ineffective public service.
There is also the presence of patrimonial tradition in which state apparatus is vested in a small
group of personalistically interconnected individuals in Zaire. Following the neoutilitarian logic,
this group, with their immense powers had greater tendencies to corrupt leaving those that are
powerless exploited of resources. Furthermore, the presence presidential cliques and
presidential brotherhoods whose members are selected on the bases of patronage,
clientelism, and personalism manifests a weak internal structure of the Zairian state, which
exists at the mercy of otherwise illegible individuals with the intention of maximizing their gains
whilst they seat in the government. Because of the predatory nature of the bureaucracy,
investors are also no longer willing to risk long-term investments lest they be preyed upon by

those that are in the government. This then creates a weak external structure between the state
and the business sector.
This is no different from the Philippines; from the Marcos regime where cronyism was at its peak
to the incumbent Aquino administration where the President has been appointing his KKK or
Kaibigan, Kaklase, at Kabarilan (Friend, Classmate, and Shooting mates). The presence of
patronage politics has been part of several administrations making it difficult to eliminate, at the
very least to counter, corruption. The problem with having appointees appointed on the bases of
close ties rather than meritocracy is that they are nothing more than ineligible friends who exist
at the behest of the President and, taking into account the neoutilitarian logic, would better
serve themselves than the people. This is what has accounted to the Philippines weak internal
structure just like that of the Zairian state, it lacked internal coherence. The different agencies
and institutions of the government shot aimlessly at different directions thereby confusing the
whole system. Just like Zaire, buying of governments policys and decisions and justice by the
elite had been alleged since most of the pro-poor and marginal-inclined programs of the
government are either not acted upon or have stopped operating. At a comparative scale, the
presence of KKKs in the Aquino Administration has so far proved to be gratuitous rather than
onerous. This writer relates the different effect on the fact that the informal network of KKKs
have been backed up and regulated by a meritocratic bureaucracy so that even when the stake
holders are related to the President, they have been selected from a pool of qualified individuals
such as the late DILG Secretary Jesse Robredo.
This writer therefore argues that although corruption is present in a bureaucracy regardless of
the level of development, corruption occurs because bureaucracies do not behave as they are
bound to behave. To a certain extent, patron-client relationships may exist in a bureaucratic
system but this relationship must be regulated by meritocratic advances. In fact, this paper
argues that patron-clientelism, which has been considered the cause of corruption, is important
in order to achieve internal coherence and corporate identity but only so long as both the patron
and the client are qualified and competent. Therefore, it is the opinion of this writer that
corruption cannot be eradicated from the top-most level of the government to the grassroots.
However, it can exist hand to hand with development as long as its magnitude is almost
insignificant and there is a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong sense of corporate identity
and a dense set of institutionalized links to private elites (Evans, 1989) just as the once
developmental state Japan.

The government has stretched its hands; it has probably exhausted all the programs capable of
countering corruption. This paper sees it time to foster a new form of government that will limit
the vast power of the President, thereby regulating personalism, and strengthening the
Philippine party system on the bases of programmatic politics, thereby electing no less than
principled statesman. This paper sees a Parliamentary government with a two-party system the
most appropriate form of government to ease the country from corruption thus increasing the
level of development.
On PHILIPPINES: A REPORT by BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX 2006
When the theory and the truth contradict, face the fact. The plain and simple fact that history
shows is that the Philippines is not a democratic state per se. Claims of freedom and choice are
easily refuted by the prevailing social and economic inequalities that are apparent even in most
civilized areas because the truth is that the Philippines is an elitist democracy. There is the
persistence of patronage politics in the Philippine political system that impedes efficient
management of national resources such that instead of a populist policy, government decisions
are more inclined to serve elitist interest.
The article by Bertelmann Transformation Index 2006 discusses the challenges that the country
has faced and how each administration has contributed to achieve the would-be market-based
democracy. The transformation has been considered modest, subtle in that each President has
contributed little to bolster economic change alongside maximizing democracy. The article
considers the restoration of the presidential system of government based on the precepts of the
separation of power and checks and balances as the most important aspect of the Philippine
political reform. Democratic transformation in the post-1986 period was further characterized by
1) the free election of legislators and local officials; 2) the strengthening of the legislature; 3) the
reestablishment of an independent and credible judiciary; 4) restoration of a free press; and 5)
institutionalization

of

decentralized

bureaucracy and

local

government

autonomy

(Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006). This writer begs to differ. Although a presidential
system seems to be the most appropriate form of government for a democratic country, this
writer believes that a presidential system is retaliated by the culture of patronage and clientelism
that is prevalent in the Philippine. Because the President enjoys vast personalistic-bent powers,
democracy is easily transformed into elite democracy. This writer believes that one of the major
perestroika to be undergone is a shift from presidential to parliamentary system in order to
eradicate personalism and patronage, which have been repeatedly identified as causal

problems in this paper. However the parliamentary form of government should be tailored to
maintain a meritocratic parliament.
While other countries who have suffered worse during the Second World War have already
recovered, the Philippines still struggles to alleviate its economic position despite brilliant
incumbents such as former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo whose administration was
incumbent when the study was taken. According to the article, Arroyos first term in office was
punctuated by serious challenges to the legitimacy of her government. It is the personal belief
of this writer that the Arroyo question to legitimacy is the mark and the genesis of the many
challenges that the President had faced. Arroyo resolved to address this issue by having sought
to be re-elected during the 2004 presidential election. But this has only exacerbated the problem
when allegations of massive fraud have been propped up by possible evidences that would
validate the accusations such as famous Hello Garci tape. Despite this, no impeachment
complaint or mutiny was able to ouster the infamous President. This is primarily because the
President was smart enough to device schemes to keep her in office. One thing the ousted
Estrada did not have. Evidently. These schemes went as far as exploiting the one-year
impeachment ban by allowing herself to be charged of incomplete charges to providing military
benefits for military capacity and loyalty.
The assessment section gauges the current state of different elements toward a market-based
democracy. The first is stateness under democracy which points out the innate desire of the
Filipinos to belong under this nation whilst guided by the Philippine Constitution. As the article
points out, possessing Filipino citizenship is among the important requisites for national
identity. The writer however contests this nationalistic claim. It should be noted that the
statehood of the Philippines is a birth child of a desperate colonial flight. The Filipinos have
united in order to overthrow the series of colonizers that have preyed on this nation rather than
unite on the basis of shared goals, ethnicity, tradition, or culture. Because of this, the
Philippines, up to this moment, suffers the lack of national identity and shared goals. Filipinos do
not have a concept of communal destiny and no perception survey could dispute this so that
although at the surface the Filipinos seem to have national identity, this writer believes that on
the depths of these people are unlit wickers ignited only when a quasi-colonial event occurs. It is
almost as if Filipinos have been programmed to manifest nationalism and patriotism only when
events seek to ouster a powerful but predatory incumbent and remain apathetic otherwise.

The scope of the state is extensive as manifested by its presence in 17 regions, 79 provinces,
117 cities, 1,500 municipalities, and 41,975 barangays (villages) (Bertelsmann Transformation
Index, 2006). This extensive territory logically validates the need to adopt a federal government.
But this will be discussed further later.
On the part of political participation, this writer believes that a squirrel patron-clientelism exists
alongside political participation. If politicians are in fact elite dummies then political participation
during elections are in effect political participation is favour of the elite supporters.
The other aspects have proved to be usually predictable. This writer believes that it is
sardonically impossible to achieve a market-based economy if the system remains prone to
corruption and to faltering policies. The urge to attain a market-based economy should not be
hasted.
On PHILIPPINE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ISSUES AND REFORMS by ERLINDA S.
ECHANIS
Corporate governance has been seemingly undermined into a minimal aspect in the
political sphere. However, the truth is that politics relate so much to corporate governance
primarily because governance is the very barest essentials of politics and secondly because it is
the states policy to actively promote corporate governance reforms aimed to raise investor
confidence, develop capital market and help achieve high sustained growth for the corporate
sector and the economy15.
In 2012, the Asian Corporate Governance Association reported that the Philippines is the
second worst in terms of corporate governance among 11 countries in Asia. This report is more
than enough proof of how corporate governance has been undermined in the country and even
in academic institutions. This writer believes that the reason for the exclusion is brought
primarily by the idea that corporations rarely affect the masses. An average reasonable mind
would know the truth to be otherwise. The paper by Dr. Echanis discusses the condition of
corporate governance at status quo and the problems that it faces in the Philippine environment.
According to Echanis (2006) corporate governance refers to both the structure and the process
by which the public corporations control agency problems. This is basically how the
15

Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series Of 2002 Code of Corporate Governance

management of a corporation deals with the finances, shares, and stocks of the owners and
assure that the investments of the latter are returned. This is the major problem of corporate
governance; there is a disparity between ownership and management which is equivocal to
disparity in interests. Tagging along the neoutilitarian notion of maximizing utility, the interests of
the managers are often self-serving and leading to the exploitation of opportunities to corrupt.
Another problem posited by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the non-vigilance of non-owners in
terms of the management of affairs and investments of the company. That is, since the money
are not the money of the managers, they could not be expected to treat the money with the
same anxious vigilance as an owner would or as they point it, negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a
company. This is basically the principal-agent problem.
Reforms on corporate governance must thus be undertaken and the Philippine government
must lead this reform from its macro-structure to internal corporate governance.
Several safeguards and mechanisms have already been set in place yet the Philippines still lags
behind other Asian countries. The weaknesses of corporate governance in the Philippines have
been attributed by the author to the following factors;
1. Decision processes
2. Violation of regulations
3. Weaknesses of regulatory agencies;
and
4. Financial reporting standards
This writer notices that the weaknesses are purely executive and discretionary. That is, the
flaws are not with the mechanisms or the policies but with how they are executed and acted
upon. Therefore the remedies have to cure the implementation and not the policies. This writer
believes that a sturdy wall must divide the auditors from the corporations so that unnecessary
relationships will not be fostered.
In order to address the issues on the separate interests of the owners and the managers, this
writer believes that executive incentives should be considered. These incentives could be
explicit or implicit and come in the form of bonuses, stock options, or increasing salaries. The

idea behind this is that incentives tend to align the interests of the managers with the interests of
the owners such that increasing profit of the company by managerial actions can mean bonuses
or stock options. The shareholders may also regulate managers by threats of firing the latter on
ground of incompetency and ineffectiveness.
Intrinsic motivations such as fairness, horizontal equity, morale, trust, corporate culture, social
responsibility & altruism, feelings of self-esteem, and interests in the job, among others, would
solve the non-vigilance issues of corporations.
This writer also believes that there must be a concentrated ownership and not one that is
diffused. The latter tends to be weak since there is weak monitoring and diverse interests.
Another possible solution that Echanis herself has identified is the strengthening of corporate
monitors such as accountants and auditors, banks and analysts, creditors and credit rating
agencies, shareholders and shareholder activism. This writer believes that the internal monitors
such as the Board of directors must also be strengthened. As the Code of Corporate
Governance provides, the Board is primarily accountable to the shareholders and Management
is primarily accountable to the Board.
The problem with corporate governance in the Philippines is the disparity it draws between
business ethics and ethics.
On FORGING SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN MINDANAO: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY by
STEVEN ROOD
The first law of politics as a science is that opposing forces will always rip a nation apart
and that only a third forces acting on an institution or an actor can emulsify the two forces.
The plain and simple fact is that the separatist problem in the Southern Philippines is a dispute
between the government and a number of Mindanawans. Hence, it is only rational to believe
that a third party could better solve the conflict than a reliance on two completely opposing
forces. Rood (2005) identifies this third party to be civil societies. His paper argues that civil
societies are the long term facilitators to mend the existing separatist conflict in Mindanao.
Civil society can be defined as a realm of collective public action between the private sphere
and the state in which a voluntary, self-generating, and politically active sector of society

independent of the state seeks benefits, policy changes, or accountability from the state
(Silliman and Noble 1998: 13). However Rood (2005) defines civil society as a wide range of
organizationsfrom development NGOs to church-based groups and business associations.
Regardless, the two definitions show how civil society is an essential element is public or state
affairs and development. The paper of Rood, however, uses this nature in the context of the
Mindanao conflict.
Before expounding on the role of civil societies in the resolution of the conflict, it is only apt that
a brief introduction on the so-called Bangsamoro struggle be recounted. Unlike other
revolutionary movements such as those by the New Peoples Army and the National Democratic
Front whose main objective are based on the imperatives of class struggle, the Muslim
revolution, from the Kamlun rebellion up until the present, has not had any sign of such struggle.
Instead the revolutionary movements in Mindanao operated mostly on their desire to be
independent with a facet of ideological resistance. This separatist struggle then extended only to
involve more heinous and morbid crimes such as kidnapping and murder and the deaths of
civilians and armed people in several encounters. The conflict has become worse and the
government is failing in its peace talks. The post-martial law Presidents have all been forging
peace drafts and setting up peace panels but all to no avail. Even former President Estradas
all out war has been in vain. To date, possibly 120,000 have died in the fighting, and millions
have been displaced (Rood, 2005). The question of granting Mindanao its independence
should be immediately dropped on the bases of sovereignty and the exhaustion principle.
In the context of the separatist conflict in Mindanao, civil societies have so far played modest
roles. According to Rood (2005), civil society has still not been able to attain the main objective
referred to by Gaspar et al.: to end the war and bring the GRPMILF Peace Panel back to the
negotiating table. In fact, some of the divisions in civil society have been impossible to paper
overas evidenced by two simultaneous peace conferences being held in different Mindanao
cities, Cagayan de Oro and Davao, in May 2003.
The government seems to have belittled role of civil societies, undermining them into mere
diminutive institutions rather than strengthening them.
For one, civil societies promote a wide area of concerns development and do not focus on a
single aspect as would the state. Because it is the nature of civil societies to point out and help
mend state problems, it is easier for them to make both parties identify the specific areas that

need to be worked on or improved. In effect, civil societies would act as representatives of the
people in peace talks. In that way, also, the talk will rotate around the objective and nothing
more and no accusations of inequity or biasness will be raised.
There is also greater legitimacy on the part of the stakeholders because the issues raised
during the peace panels have been derived, theoretically, from a non-bias entity who represent
the desire of the people and whose positions are basically relative to the issues they deem need
resolution.
Comparative studies also prove that conflicts similar to that of Mindanao are resolves with the
significant role and access of civil societies in peace talks and deliberations, one thing that civil
societies in the Philippines did not have. Rood (2005) explains that Niklas Hansson undertook
a study of peace agreements from 1989 (the end of the Cold War) and 1996 and then judged
whether the agreements were still being kept after five years. He found a strong relation
between civil societys success and access to the peace agreement process.
What civil societies need is strength and this strength could only be mustered if the state
recognizes the significant contributions that civil societies could voluntarily donate alongside the
limitations it innately has.
On REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: LESSONS FOR POLICY AND
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM by LEDIVINA V. CARIO
Cario showed how the Philippine government had resolved the conflict that has arisen
during the 1980s while the country was on the brink of an economic collapse. The panacea was
to liberate the economy to foreign investors, similar to Japans actions after the Second World
War, by making it conducive for investments, trade liberalization, privatization and restructuring
adjustment loans. However, economic liberation through the notion of neo-liberalism has made
the country prone to the ill-endemics of globalization. The solution then was to institutionalize
Filipino measures that would avert the onslaught of the emerging globalization and uphold
nationalistic philosophies as the nations shield.
State Policies of the Constitution of 1987 (Article II, Section 9):

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all.
Cario in another paper defined regulatory governance as a governance that encompasses the
whole system by which regulation and competition are managed to achieve societal goals. The
use of governance suggests a broad approach to the issue, indicating a multiplicity of actors,
rules and processes to ensure goal attainment.
The policy framework was to merge nationalism and liberalization and this is the essence of
regulatory governance. In effect, it seeks to regulate liberalization so as not to overshadow
nationalism.
Cario points out the following to be the problem of regulatory governance in the Philippines;
policy distortions in reforms, access to poor but at higher costs, too many controls and checks,
legalism over fairness, devolution not changing national government, lack of readiness of
Philippine capital market.
This writer sees that the best solution is to strengthen regulatory agencies as regulation can be
considered as a political process as well. It must understand public interests and public
sentiments. Hence, this writer believes that regulatory governance in the country lacks the spirit
of protecting public interest. In order to carry this out, the government should include in its
regulatory scheme an agency that will balance public interests and economic liberalization.
CONCLUSION
This writer has conceived several references to address the issues of the nation as they have
been covered and discussed in the articles studied. However, this writer believes that the true
impediment towards a Philippine Perestroika and Glasnost in the Philippine Political Behavior.
Much, if not all, of the internal conflicts of the state are brought about by the persistence of
patron-clientelism in the Philippine political sphere. The tolerant nature of Filipinos to be ruled by
this relationship has caused most of the national unrests from elections up until governance.
Kawanaka (1992) on The Robredo Style: Philippine Local Politics in Transition points out that
one of the most dominant relationships present in the Philippines is the patron-client

relationship. This poses as a serious threat, as it had been a serious malady, because in this
kind of relationship, the patron has no further bind to the client apart from his personality.
Furthermore, the patron-client persistence in the Philippines has made the political culture prone
to personalism, particularism, and skepticism as to the governments efficacy. Intensifying the
already sorry state of the nation is the fact that the Philippines is a parochial gentry which
means that there is low level of awareness, knowledge, and involvement (on the part of the
people to the government).
As this writer have noticed in the articles reviewed, the form of patron-clientelism in the
Philippines comes in different forms. The patron may sometimes be the government official or
the political actor and the people the client; the patron may be the President and the other
government officials, especially the appointees, the client, but mostly the patron are elite
individuals or families and the client is the government.
This is apparent in all the articles provided for review, the presence of elite individuals or
families in the government has morphed the government into a dummy that operates at the
behest of this rich and influential people. Whats worse is that the interests of these elite are
contradictory to the real public sentiments.
The Filipinos are fooled by the squirrel process by which elite individuals are empowered. Elite
individuals support and fund electoral candidates who are put to office on the basis of peoples
trust only to operate for the elite interests once they have seated well in their stead.
It seems that the elimination of elite groups in political affairs is impossible and the alteration of
tolerant clients into vigilant observers is a challenge that would take multiple hands to carry out.
Then maybe the submission to Moscas elite theory would be best and just accept things as
they are. At a rational approach, men are bound to act as they please anyway. At a neoutitarian
perspective, men are bound to succumb to the endless temptation of corruption anyway. The
problem seems to be without solution. We seem to have been destined to fall under the Iron
Law of Oligarchy. This is the common perspective of lay people who have not only entrusted
their votes to the state but their life and their destiny as well.
This writer begs to differ on this common notion. Although several recommendations have been
presented in this article review, the ultimate solution that this writer deems appropriate is to

regulate the role of elite in state affairs starting from election campaigning. This writer also
differs from Moscows belief that elite groups are tailored to be the ruling group because they
have the instinctive characteristic of organizing themselves as opposed to the arbitrary and
unorganized masses. The solution is simple, that is to organize the masses who at simple
arithmetic could balance the extensive power of the higher mortals.
This writer also believes that the policies and the laws are close to sufficient. It is often in the
implementation process that the government starts to pussy-foot until finally this nation is flat on
its back. This writer believes in a meritocratic bureaucracy. A bureaucracy of individuals close to
the President but are selected on the basis of their skills. This is done by limiting the pool of
choices to the kin of the President but selecting the best among them. This gives the
government a strong internal network and a corporate identity.
It is this articles belief that a state does not have to be virtuous in order to achieve development
and progress, but as a developmental state it must be able to behave as a bureaucracy. Patronclient relationship does not have to be totally eliminated if it could be altered to be gratuitous to
achieve political efficacy and advancement.
The government must act now before it crosses the point of no return otherwise this it will take
twice the effort to get it back on its feet. The Philippine Perestroika and Glasnost is not only a
total overhaul of the political system but an attempt to change the political behavior of the
Filipino people.

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