Which Idea of Africa?

Herskovits's Cultural Relativism

Author(s): V. Y. Mudimbe
Source: October, Vol. 55 (Winter, 1990), pp. 93-104
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/778940 .
Accessed: 01/10/2014 14:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to October.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Which Idea of Africa?

Herskovits'sCultural Relativism

V. Y. MUDIMBE

Knowledge about Africa is now ordering itselfin accordance witha new

model. Despite the resiliencyof primitivistand evolutionistmyths,a new discourse, more exactly,a new typeof relationto the Africanobject is takingplace.
Anthropology,the mostcompromisedof disciplinesin the exploitationof Africa,
(duringthe colonial period)
began to rejuvenateitselffirstthroughfunctionalism
In
and then,towardthe end of the colonial era, in France,throughstructuralism.
so doing, anthropology,at least theoretically,reviseditsconnectionwithitsown
object of study.In any case, in the mid-1950s it merged withother disciplines
(economics, geography,history,literature,etc.) to constitutea new but rather
vague body of knowledgeabout Africaor "Africanism."Bound togetherin the
same epistemologicalspace but radicallydivided in theiraims and methods,these
disciplineswere caught between veryconcrete demands for the politicalliberation of Africa and the institutionaldemands to define their own scientificity,
theirown philosophicalfoundation.The figureof the Africanwas taken both as
an empiricalfactand as the sign of absolute otherness.Michel Foucault remarks
this point quite well in the followingpassage fromThe Orderof Things:
In thisfigure,whichis at once empiricaland yetforeignto (and in) all
that we can experience,our consciousnessno longer finds-as it did
in the sixteenthcentury- the trace of another world; it no longer
observes the wanderingof a strayingreason; it sees welling up that
which is, perilously,nearest to us-as if,suddenly,the veryhollowness of our existenceis outlinedin relief;the finitudeupon the basis of
which we are, and think,and know, is suddenlythere before us; an
existenceat once real and impossible,thoughtthat we cannot think,
an object for our knowledge that always eludes us.'

1.
Michel Foucault, TheOrderofThings:An Archaeology
oftheHuman Sciences(New York: Vintage
Books, 1973), p. 375.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OCTOBER

94

From thisquotation-a commentaryon the figureof madnessas the truthand

the alterityof modern Western experience-I would like, paradoxically, to
suggestthat,in general,truthhas been the aim of "Africanism."But is thisreally
a paradox when one considers the way these "exotic" figureshave, since the
fifteenth
century,served to testifyto a conjunctionof Africawithfolly?2Yet, as
as
and conversions
strange it may appear, methodical shifts,transformations,
withinthe technicaldiscoursesof Africananthropologyand historyhave been
guided by criteriadesigned to attainthe truthabout Africaand expressit in true
and "scientifically"credible discourses. It is this search which, for example,
accounts for the existingtension in anthropologybetween evolutionism,funcand structuralism.
tionalism,diffusionism,
It appears to me that the various methodsof Africanismhave also had to
confrontanother major issue. This issue concerns the way empiricaldiscourses
must witnessto the truthof theoreticaldiscoursesand vice versa. Indeed, this
problemlargelytransgressesthe modalitiesof Africanistmethodologicalschools.
In a paper on "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding,"
Albert Hirschmannotes that "a recentjournal articleargued forcefullyagainst
the collection of empirical materialsas an end in itselfand withoutsufficient
theoreticalanalysisto determineappropriatecriteriaof selection." Immediately
afterthis,Hirschmanspecifieshis own project: to evaluate "the tendencytoward
compulsiveand mindlesstheorizing- a disease at leastas prevalentand debilitating . . . as the spread of mindlessnumber work in social sciences."'
I would suggest that the real issue is not one of theoryversus empirical
observationand collection;it is, rather,the silentand a priorichoice of the truth
at whicha givendiscourseaims. In thiscontext,I understandtruthas a derivative
abstraction,as a sign and a tension.Simultaneouslyunitingand separatingconflictualobjectives of systemsconstitutedon the basis of differentaxioms and
paradigms,truthis neitherpure idea nor purelyobjective.
"Whatever may be the case in respect to [a] wish for unity,it is at the
beginningand at the end of truths.But as soon as the exigencyfora singletruth
entersinto historyas a goal of civilization,it is immediatelyaffectedwitha mark
of violence. For one alwayswishesto tie the knottoo early.The realizedunityof
the true is preciselythe initial lie."4 Thus, for example, the challenge of a
linkingitsfatein 313 to thatof the Roman Empire; the paradoxical
Christianity
of
a
expansion outside its borders which,almost exactly 500
European
power
See DorothyHammond and AltaJablow,TheMythofAfrica(New York: The Libraryof Social
2.
Science, 1977) and Bernard Mouralis,"L'Afrique comme figurede la folie," in L'Exotisme,ed. Alain
Buisine, et al. (Paris: Didier-Erudition,1988).
3.
Albert Hirschman,"The Search for Paradigmsas a Hindrance to Understanding,"in InterpretiveSocial Science:A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley: Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1979), p. 163.
Paul Ricoeur,Historyand Truth,trans.Charles A. Kelbley(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversity
4.
Press, 1965), p. 176.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Cultural Relativism
WhichIdea ofAfrica?Herskovits's

95

yearsago, inventedand organized the world in whichwe are livingtodayon the

basis of the concept of natural law; finally,the lie thatjustified slaveryand,
apropos of all non-European territories,the idea of "terra nullius" thanks to
whichAmerica,Australia,and South Africaare what theyare today. The representationsand signsthatgave the hidden and violatedmemoryof these countries
its rightand pertinenceas a beginningseem now to have disappeared.
This type of "paradoxical" sign might be less interesting.It unveils too
easily its own internalcontradictions.But could I anchor this statementabout
truthas faultin a reflectiondealing withthe tasksof Africanistsand, at the same
time,found it?
Let me elaborate myhypothesis.I thinkthatin the briefhistoryof Africanism it has become obvious that beyond the dichotomy entertained by
evolutionists- Levy-Bruhl and his disciples, including Evans-Pritchardbetween rudimentaryand scientificknowledge, illusion and truth,there is a
major problem concerningthe veryconditionsof knowledge. Most of us would
agree with Foucault that some distinctionsshould be made. On the one hand,
there are necessarydistinctionsto be made about truthitself.One: there is "a
truththatis of thesame orderas theobject-the truththatis graduallyoutlined,
formed,stabilized,and expressedthroughthebodyand the rudimentsof perceptions"; two: there is "thetruththatappears as illusion"; and three: concurrently
"theremustalso exista truththatis oftheorderofdiscourse-a truththatmakes it
possible to employ, when dealing with the nature or historyof knowledge,a
language thatwillbe true.5Such distinctionsshould have a universalapplication.
On the otherhand, thereis an importantquestion whichconcernsthe statusof a
true discourse.As noted by Foucault, "eitherthistrue discoursefindsitsfoundation and model in the empiricaltruthwhose genesis in nature and in historyit
retraces,so thatone has an analysisofthepositivist
type. . . or the true discourse
nature
and
it
the
truth
whose
anticipates
history defines . . . so that one has a
discourseof theeschatological
type."6
These methodological separations into types of truth,these attemptsto
definethe conditionsof possibilityof a true discourse and the tensionbetween
positivistand eschatological discourses, make sense. Is there really a way of
rigorouslyconceptualizingthe realityof Africa withoutdealing with them?In
order to clarifysome theoreticalconsequences of the precedingremarks,I would
like to focus seriouslyand at length on the notion of cultural relativismas
expounded by MelvilleHerskovits,the foundingfatherof AfricanStudies in the
United States.

5.
6.

Foucault, Orderof Things,p. 320 (emphasisadded).

Ibid. (emphasisadded).

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OCTOBER

96

Let us begin with a simple inquiry. Herskovits'squestions about ancient

civilizationswill speak to the most skeptical:how true is our knowledge about
them?
One may well ask, is not our knowledge of the civilizationsof the
palaeolithicat best too scanty?Do we know too littleof the actual life
of the people to judge it?In what sortof dwellingsdid these men live
fromthe earliesttimes?What sort of language did theyspeak? What
was their religion and their social organization?What clothing did
they wear? What foods other than the meat of the animals whose
bones we findin the refuseheaps did theyeat? These and numerous
other questionswill occur to one; it is unfortunatethat most of them
cannot be answeredwithanythingmore than guesses,shrewdthough
these be.7
The predicament,as well as the real significance,of the so-called crisisof
social sciencesin general and Africanstudiesin particularmightbe located here.
As Benoit Verhaegen saw it,8it residesin the tensionbetweenthe claim and will
to truth of empirical discourses (in which supposedly reality determinesthe
credibilityand objectivityof the discourse) and the claims of eschatological
discourses(in whichthe value of a hope and a promiseis supposed to actualize a
its being). Apropos thissame tension,Foucault
truthin the process of fulfilling
notes that Marxismcomes in contact with phenomenologyto posit the human
being as a disturbingobject of knowledge. More simply,one also discoversthat
Auguste Comte and Karl Marx witnessto an epistemologicalconfigurationin
which"eschatology(as the objectivetruthproceedingfromman's discourse)and
positivism(as the truthof discourse defined on the basis of the truthof the
object) are indissociable."'
This awareness should have imposed itselfas an epistemologicaldemand.
But in the 1960s, mostAfricanMarxistprojectsignored the complexityof their
epistemologicalroots and thus erased the paradoxes inherentin theirown discourse and practice.On the otherhand, non-Marxistworks,byignoringboththe
historicalframeworkof theirown discoursesand the conflictinghistoricitiesof
their "objects" of knowledge,tended to privilegeallegorical models of closed,
nonexistentsocietiesreduced to mythicalpasts; or, as in the case ofJohn Mbiti,
wroteand thoughtin a subjunctivemood accounted forbyan uncriticalleap out
of historyinto Christianeschatology.'0In all cases, it is the past-history, or
MelvilleHerskovits,"The Civilizationsof Prehistory,"in Man and His World,ed. B. Brownell
7.
(New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1929), p. 121.
A l'HistoireImmidiate(Gembloux: Duculot, 1974).
See Benoit Verhaegen, Introduction
8.
9.
Foucault, Orderof Things,pp. 320-21.
10. See John S. Mbiti, New TestamentEschatologyin an AfricanBackground(London: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1971).

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Cultural Relativism
WhichIdea ofAfrica?Herskovits's

97

more exactly,historiesof Africa- whichwas erased, thus reducing the idea of

Africato a potentialityin the future.Here we may recall Herskovits'sadvice:
Make no mistake,culturalrelativismis a "tough-minded"philosophy.
It requires those who hold to it to alter responses that arise out of
some of the strongestenculturativeconditioningto which theyhave
been exposed, the ethnocentrismsimplicitin the particularvalue-systemsof theirsociety.In the case of anthropologists,thismeans following the implicationsof data which,when opposed to our enculturated
systemof values, sets up conflictsnot always easy to resolve."

I question Marxist lessons on Africa. Yet, they seem somehow right in

insistingon the factthat there is a relationof necessitybetween the practiceof
social scienceand politics,and thusethics.One mightoppose the politicaldeductions of the Marxists,but, about the idea of Africa,there is no way of ignoring
theirsignificanceand the evidence theyunveil. In termsof the future,the cost
(or the price) of social mythologies(development,modernization,etc.) invented
applied anthropology,and colonialismis such that a redefiniby functionalism,
tionof the "Africanist"discourseand practiceshould be isomorphicwiththatof
our politicalexpectations.In termsof the past, the same holds true: what is the
price to be paid in order to bringback to lightwhathas been buried,blurred,or
simplyforgotten?
Perhaps it is now time to reread carefullyHerskovits'sEconomicLife of
Primitive
Peoples(1940) and reanalyzeitsbasic oppositionbetweenlifebeforeand
afterthe machine,between the "foreign" and the "familiar."

In his well-knownvolume on CulturalRelativism(1972), Herskovitsstresses

that culturalrelativism- that is, an anti-ethnocentric
approach to othernessshould be understoodas a method,a philosophy,and a practice:
As a method,relativismencompassesthe principleof our science (i.e.,
anthropology)thatin studyinga culture,one seeks to attainas greata
degree of objectivityas possible; thatone does notjudge the modes of
behaviorone is describing,or seek to change them. Rather,one seeks
to understandthe sanctionsof behavior in terms of the established
relationshipswithinthe cultureitself,and refrainsfrommakinginterpretationsthatarise froma preconceivedframeof reference.Relativism as philosophyconcernsthe nature of culturalvalues and, beyond
this,the implicationsof an epistemologythat derives froma recogniMelville Herskovits,CulturalRelativism,ed. Frances Herskovits(New York: Random House,
11.
1972), p. 37.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

98

OCTOBER

tion of the forceof enculturativeconditioningin shapingthoughtand

behavior. Its practicalaspects involve the application- the practice
-of the philosophical principlesderived from the method, to the
wider, cross-culturalworld scene.12
The project thus explicitlypromotes the necessityof making statements
whichfallwithinthe contextof the actor's perceived and understoodtermsand
experiences. Most clearlyit denounces the partialityof prejudice. The exigency
of such an orientationin Africanismactualizes a hermeneuticaltask, that of
interrogatingthe realityof "temporal distance" and "otherness" with a rigor
similar to that proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer apropos of historical
consciousness:
We mustraise to a consciouslevel the prejudiceswhichgovernunderstanding and in this way realize the possibilitythat "otheraims"
emerge in their own rightfrom tradition- which is nothing other
than realizingthe possibilitythat we can understandsomethingin its
otherness.. . . What demands our effortsat understandingis manifest
beforeand in itselfin its characterof otherness . . . we mustrealize
thateveryunderstandingbegins withthe factthatsomethingcalls out
to us. And since we know the precise meaningof thisaffirmation,
we
claim ipsofacto the bracketingof prejudices. Thus we arrive at our
firstconclusion: bracketingour judgments in general and, naturally
firstof all our own prejudices, will end by imposing upon us the
demands of a radical reflectionon the idea of questioningas such.'"
The identityof tasksthatI postulateby bringingGadamer's meditationon
the problem of historicalconsciousnessto bear on Herskovits'srelativismalso
reflectsitselfin the similaritiesthat exist between historyand anthropology.
Claude Levi-Strausshas argued thatthesetwo disciplinesare actuallytwo facesof
the same Janus: "the fundamentaldifferencebetween the two disciplinesis not
one of subject,of goal, or of method.They share the same subject,whichis social
life;the same goal whichis a betterunderstandingof man; and, in fact,the same
method,in whichonlythe proportionof researchtechniquesvaries.They differ,
principally,in theirchoice of complementaryperspectives:Historyorganizesits
data in relation to conscious expressionsof social life,while anthropologyproceeds by examiningits unconsciousfoundations."'4
whichstrictly
Herskovits'sculturalrelativismbears witnessto Einfiilhung,
means "sympathy."This remindsme of a remarkabletemptationfaced by the
12.
Ibid., pp. 38-39.
13.
Hans-Georg Gadmer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," in InterpretiveSocial
Science:A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley: Universityof California
Press, 1979), pp. 156-57.
14. Claude Levi-Strauss,StructuralAnthropology
(New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 18.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Cultural Relativism
WhichIdea ofAfrica?Herskovits's

99

Belgian missionaryPlacide Tempels in the 1940s- an era dominatedin anthropology by reductionistmodels. The temptationwas preciselyto fuse,to identify
withthe otherto the pointof becomingthe other,ifonlyfora moment,in order
to be able to speak sense about the other. Yet, such a project and its procedures
of Einfiilhung,undoubtedlylegitimate,at least in principle,are fundamentally
difficultto understand.They seem to presuppose at least two ambitioustheses.
The firstconcernsthe possibilityof a fusionof the I and the Other whichwould
suggest that,transcendingor negating its own indeterminationand unpredictability,the I can reallyknowthe Other. Sartre has indicated,in a powerfuland
of thisthesis.'5
convincingtext,some of the major and paradoxical difficulties
The second problem stems from the questionable transparencyof the
object of anthropology.For Herskovits,the human as object of knowledgeand
science seems an obvious and unproblematicgiven,accounted for by the history
and dynamicsof a culturalspace. Thus, for example, Schmidt'snotion of "cultural invariants"froma comparativeperspective,or Edel's theoryof "indeterwould appear to be no more
minacy" matterlittleto him, "since the difficulty
than a semanticone":
The problem would ratherseem to be analogous to thatof ascertaining themostadequate basis for derivinggeneral principlesof human
behavior,in termsof the relationbetweenformand process. Here the
issue is clear . . . withthe particularexperience of each society
giving
uniqueformalexpressionto underlying
historically
processes,which are
operative in shaping the destinyof all human groups.'6
In sum, Herskovitsprivilegesthe cultureas a totalityratherthan the individual
consciousness.As a consequence, a collectivesocietal dynamicappears to stand,
as a sort of consciousnessof a society.Herskodiachronicallyor synchronically,
vitsthusclearlyconfirmsanthropologyin itstraditionalconfiguration,thatis, in
its proximityto nineteenth-century
biology and physiology.Yet, he insiststhat
his "cross-culturalapproach" studies"Man in thelarge,in the lightof differences
and similaritiesbetween societies,and in the ways by which differentpeoples
mustachieve these ends thatall peoples mustachieve if theyare to surviveand
adjust to theirnatural and social environments.""17A question remains:what is
this "Man in the large"? How has he been conceived as a possible object for
knowledgeor for science, and fromwhich epistemologicaland culturalspace?

15. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness,trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1956), p. 353.
Heiskovits,CulturalRelativism,pp. 56-57.
16.
17.
Ibid., p. 108.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

100

OCTOBER

regardingthis "Man in thelarge,"

Focusingon the varioushypotheses
in interpretations
sees distortions
Herskovits
as dependentupon inappropriate
theparadoxofthehistory
ofanthropology.
and as exemplifying
attitudes
"Early
ofman,"he notes,"stressedtheconceptof'humannature,'butthiswas
students
essentiallyto allow them to bring observed divergences under a single head.

butagainthiswas to show
Later,moreemphasiswas laid on thesedifferences,
ofcommonhumantendencies
howdiversethemanifestations
mightbe."'" Or,as
in thecase of "Man" beforeand afterthe machine,he antagonizesand brings
togetherculturesin termsof thetypeof theirtechnologies.'9
Herskovits's
conceptof "Man in thelarge"does notseemto reston a clear
a language,a thought,
betweenthesubjectand theobjectofa culture,
distinction
discourse
on theone hand;and thesubjectand theobjectoftheanthropological
on theother.In fact,I wouldsaythattheconcept,mainlyin Herskovits's
earlier
of the period:in orderto
works,actualizesa truismof physicalanthropology
to knowthevarietiesofmen,their
knowMan (witha capitalm),itis imperative
A concreteillustration
can be seen in hiscontribuand similarities.
differences
of
tionto Man and His World(1929). In his essayentitled"The Civilizations
such as: "we cannotsay
Herskovits
ceaselesslymakesstatements
Prehistory,"
"Manof[the]pre-Chellean
whattype
epoch
ofmanlivedat thedawnofprehistory";
had littlein thewayof civilization,
yetit musthavetakenhundredsof generamanlivedin Africawe
tionsto havebroughthimto thisstage";"That paleolithic
man
of
neolithic
contribution
tohumancivilization
was
are certain";"thegreatest
thefactthathe learnedhowto tameplantsand animals";and so on.20
was awareof the problem(and of the complexity
of the
That Herskovits
to
back
Kant's
what
is
that
fundamental
man?)is
goes
anthropology:
question
to thedeclensionoftheconceptsofcivilization
obviouswhenone paysattention
and culturein theirsingularand pluralforms:thesingulargenerally
postulates
and culturalvariation.One
and thepluralitsdiversity
theunityof humankind,
art of double-talkin his brief1961
gets the clearestpictureof Herskovits's
E.
a
of
professorwho argued thatracial
critique Henry Garret, psychology
and inequalitiesare empiricalfactsthatwere beingopposedby a
differences
of apostlesof "the EqualitarianDogma." Garret'sarguments,
pubconspiracy
in Biology
and Medicine
lishedin an issueofPerspectives
(Autumn1961),furnish
himselfcallselsewhere"classicalimperialism."
an exampleof whatHerskovits
and complementary
ordersofreflecoutlinestwodifferent
Herskovits's
criticism
in thenameof
tion.On theone hand,an explicitethicalargumentcontending
"science"and "reason"thatthereis a historicity
properto each humangroup
Thishistoricity
can accountfordifferences
between
and evento eachindividual.
18.
Ibid., p. 57.
19.
MelvilleHerskovits,TheEconomicLifeofPrimitive
Peoples(New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1940),
p. 22.
20.
Herskovits,"Civilizationsof Prehistory,"pp. 108, 110, 127, 130 (emphasisadded).

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WhichIdea ofAfrica?Herskovits's
CulturalRelativism

101

valid evidence has ever

culturesand between individuals,but "no scientifically
been produced to show that these differences,either in general intelligenceor
particularaptitudes,are related to race."2' On the other hand, a more discreet
order, stronglypressed,yetimplicit,alludes to a major epistemologicalissue that
I can illustrateby referenceto one of Foucault's statements:"Western culture
has contributed,under the name of man, a being who, by one and the same
and cannot be an
interplayof reasons, must be a positivedomain of knowledge
of
science."22
object
Fundamentallya relationto values, culturalrelativism,whetherdiachronic
or synchronic,is, as Herskovitsaptlyput it, "an approach to the question of the
nature and role of values in culture."23 As such, it defines itselfas a vivid
interrogationof ethnocentrism:
The verycore of culturalrelativismis the social disciplinethatcomes
- of mutualrespect.Emphasison the worth
of respectfordifferences
of manyways of life,not one, is an affirmation
of the values in each
culture. Such emphasisseeks to understandand to harmonizegoals,
not to judge and destroythose that do not dovetail with our own.
Cultural historyteaches that,importantas it is to discern and study
the parallelismsin human civilizations,it is no less importantto discern and study the differentways man has devised to fulfillhis
needs.24
Following Kluckhon, Herskovitsbelieved that "the doctrine that science has
nothing to do with values . . . is a pernicious heritage from Kant and other
thinkers."25His Human Factor in ChangingAfrica(1967), particularlyits two
chapterson "Rediscoveryand Integration,"is probablythe most concreteillustrationof this belief.

Let us now turn the discussion toward structuralism,the other major

relativisttrend in anthropology. In a careful reading of structuralism,after
expoundingthe linguisticmodel and itstranspositionin LUvi-Strauss'sStructural
(1963) and The Savage Mind (1966), Paul Ricoeur turns to the
Anthropology
German theologian Gerhard Von Rad's Theologyof theHistoricalTraditionsof
Israel, and notes:

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Herskovits,CulturalRelativism,p. 115.
Foucault, Orderof Things,pp. 366-67.
Herskovits,CulturalRelativism,p. 14.
Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid., 42.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OCTOBER

102

Here we findourselves confrontinga theological conception exactly

the inverseof that of totemismand which,because it is the inverse,
suggests an inverse relationshipbetween diachrony and synchrony
and raises more urgentlythe problem of the relationshipbetween
structuralcomprehensionand hermeneuticcomprehension.26
and
This statementspringsfromboth a methodologicalcritiqueof structuralism
a philosophicalthesis.The critique,saysPaul Ricoeur,showsthat"the consciousness of the validityof a method . . . is inseparablefromthe consciousnessof its
limits."27These limitswould seem to be of two types:"on the one hand . . . the
passage to thesavage mind is made by favor of an example that is already too
favorable,one which is perhaps an exception rather than an example. On the
other hand, the passage froma structuralscience to a structuralistphilosophy
seems to me to be not very satisfyingand not even very coherent."28 If I
understandcorrectlyRicoeur's criticalreading of Levi-Strauss'sStructuralAn(1963) and The Savage Mind (1966), the example which permitsthe
thropology
firstpassage is LUvi-Strauss'sthesis about kinshipas a form of language, or,
marriagerulesas "words of the group."29As to the second passage,
symbolically,
be accounted for,accordingto Ricoeur, by the LUvi-Straussian
could
its fragility
of
concept bricolage.Here is Ricoeur's question:
Hasn't he [LUvi-Strauss]stacked the deck by relatingthe state of the
savage mind to a cultural area-specifically, that of the "totemic
illusion"-where the arrangementsare more importantthan the
contents,wherethoughtis actuallybricolage,workingwitha heterogeneous material,withodds and ends of meaning?Never in thisbook is
the question raised concerning the unityof mythicalthought. It is
taken forgrantedthatthe generalizationincludesall savage thought.
Now, I wonder whether the mythicalbase from which we [Westerners] branch- with its Semitic [Egyptian,Babylonian, Aramaic,
Hebrew], proto-Hellenic,and Indo-European cores-lends itselfso
easilyto the same operation;or rather,and I insiston thispoint,itsurely
lendsitselfto theoperation,but does it lend itselfentirely?30
The overall effectof thisline of questioningis important,forit impliestwo
main problems.First,the "unity" supposed by the concept of the "savage mind"
is not proven. Thus Melville and Frances Herskovits'sDahomeanNarrative,for
26.
p. 45.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict

(Evanston: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1974),
ofInterpretations
Ibid., p. 44.
Ibid., p. 45.
Levi-Strauss,StructuralAnthropology,
p. 36.
p. 61; Ricoeur, ConflictofInterpretations,
Ricoeur, ConflictofInterpretations,
pp. 40-41 (emphasisadded).

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WhichIdea ofAfrica?Herskovits's
Cultural Relativism

103

example, would simplywitnessto a well-localized"bricolage."Secondly, if the

"savage mind" is only a hypotheticalconstructwhose theoreticalunityis challenged by a tension between actual, well-spatialized,and contradictory"bricolages," how could it be used as a measure for comparison with the base from
which sprang the Westerntradition?
Let us pause one momentand reflecton the last phrase of my quotation
fromRicoeur. Does the mythicalbase fromwhichWesternersbranch lend itself
to the same typeof operationas does the mythicalthinkingof non-Westentirely
ern cultures?As hypothesis,we could retainHerskovits'sunderstandingof myth,
that is, a cultural narrative "deriving from human language skill, and man's
fascinationwithsymboliccontinuities.But as a culturalfact,it also findsdynamic
expressionin the play between outer stimulusreceived by a people, and innovation fromwithin.""'
Well, I thinkEdmund Leach has demonstrated,in his brilliantand controversialstudies,thatbiblical narrativescan lend themselvesto structuralist
analyand explicsis.32AlthoughGeorge Dum zil rejected the concept of structuralism
his worksconvincinglydemonstrate
itlystated that he was not a structuralist,33
thatIndo-European historicaland culturalexperiencessubmitto typologizations,
and patternssimilarto those produced by structural
systemsof transformations,
analysis in non-Westernsocieties. And, Luc de Heusch's The DrunkenKing
(1982), one of the foremostsystematicstructuralistanalyses applied to Bantu
myths,derives its methodologyfromboth LUvi-Strauss'sand Dumezil's lessons.
These factsseem, at least partially,to lay to rest Ricoeur's suspicions.
But in the case of Israel's historicaltradition,Ricoeur claims to find a
conjunctionof three historicitiesthat does not seem to exist in totemiccultures
and societies.34The firstof these is that of a hiddentimewhich expounds, in a
mythicalsaga, Yahweh's action as Israel's history.The second, thatof a tradition,
founds itselfon the authorityof the hidden time; in successive readings and
of thisauthority,it perceivesitspast and becoming,and reflectsit
interpretations
as a Heilgeschichte.
of hermeneutics,whichRicoeur
Finally,thereis the historicity
refersto, usingVon Rad's language,as "Entfaltung,
'unfolding'or 'development'
to designate the task of a theologyof the Old Testament which respects the
threefoldhistoricalcharacterof the HeiligeGeschichte
(the level of the founding
the
level
of
events),
(the
Uberlieferungen
constitutingtraditions),and finallythe
of
Israel
level
of
a
constituted
(the
identity
tradition).''3
Of course, thismakessense. Yet how can one jump fromthe foundingsagas
of Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob to the concept of a Heilgeschichte
unless one has
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Herskovits,CulturalRelativism,p. 240.
See George Dumiil, Camillus(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1980).
Ibid., p. 11, n. 17.
Ricoeur, ConflictofInterpretations,
pp. 45 - 56.
Ibid., p. 47.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

104

OCTOBER

already accepted that these foundingevents do indeed bear witnessto it? It is

faithin the confession,overextendedby the narrativesand subsequentlyby the
whichjustifiesand confirmsa hidpower of commentariesand interpretations,
den timeas sacred as it transmutesit firstinto signsof God's kerygma,theninto
both a historyand an eschatology.
Here thenis the paradox: Ricoeur's readingseems pertinentonlyinsofaras
it can be understoodwithinthe economyof the traditionthatit documentsand
explainson the basis of the whole significanceand role of a Christianthinkingin
the West. On the other hand, it is the very foundationof this tradition,and
particularlythe posited singularityand specificityof Israel's history,that gives
meaningto Ricoeur's hermeneuticsand itsambition.We are reallyfacingsomethinglike a firmlyclosed circle which expands by exaggeratingits own significance fromthe internallogic of a dialogue between its own differentlevels of
or, more exactly,fromthe
meaning. In effect,fromthe marginsof Christianity
how can one not
Christianity,
marginsof a Westernhistorythatinstitutionalized
think that what is going on here is a simple exegesis of a well-localizedand
tautologizedtraditionwhichseems incapable of imaginingthe verypossibilityof
its exteriority,namelythat,in its margins,other historicaltraditionscan also be
credible, meaningful,respectable and sustained by relativelywell-delineated
historicities?
It is in Herskovits'sphilosophicalstatementsthat I have found reasons to
believe in truthas a goal. Other traditionssituatedoutside the WesternspaceChristianityand its institutionalizedprocedures, and today's secularized
philosophies-speak also about theirown hidden times,and all of them,each in
its manner,bear witnessto their own historicities.Are these historicitiestwo,
three, or four? What really should matter is the challenge that this question
implies.As Herskovitsaptlyput it: "there remainsthe challenge to take concepts
and hypothesesinto the laboratoryof the cross-culturalfield, and test their
generalizingvalue, or arrive at new generalizations.Perhaps 'challenge' is too
austere a word forour implicitmeaning. In the traditionof humanisticscholarship, it is an invitationto discover for the world literatureand thought vast
resources which will informand delightus.""36
Precisely:taken seriously,this last invitationcannot but destroyclassical
Africanism,or, at any rate, conflictwithits conceptual framesand boundaries.

36.

Herskovits,Cultural Relativism,p. 241.

This content downloaded from 148.206.186.240 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:38:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions