Eusebius as Political Theologian: The

Legend Continues*
Devin Singh
Yale University

It was Franz Overbeck who, in his attack on Harnack, referred to Eusebiuss work
as [that] of a hairdresser for the emperors theological periwig, and the eminent
historian Jacob Burckhardt who declared Eusebius to be the most objectionable of
all eulogists and first thoroughly dishonest historian of antiquity.1 The summary
judgment of such luminaries has aided the tendency to write off the bishop of
Caesarea as a hopeless ideologue. In recent decades, a shift has been underway
to recalibrate the picture we have of Eusebius, with robust scholarship arguing in
support of his work as an historian and biblical scholar.2 The aim has been in part to
distance Eusebius from Constantine, a proximity that is the source of much of the
modern consternation with the bishop, given modernitys own genealogical unease
*
Thanks to Christopher Beeley, David DeVore, Michael Hollerich, and Kathryn Tanner for
comments on an earlier draft.
1
Eines Friseurs an der theologischen Perrcke des Kaisers. (Franz Overbeck, Kirchenlexicon.
Materialien. Christentum und Kultur [ed. Barbara von Reibnitz; bd. 6.1 of Werke und Nachla;
Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1996] 246); Jacob Burckhardt, The Age of Constantine the Great (trans. Moses
Hadas; New York: Pantheon, 1949) 260, 283. Of course, modern aspersion cast upon Eusebius does
not stem from these two alone, but their views are representative and frequently recur in secondary
literature. Such widespread judgment is recounted in Gerhard Ruhbachs Die politische Theologie
Eusebs von Caesarea, in Die Kirche angesichts der konstantinischen Wende (ed. Gerhard Ruhbach;
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976) 23658. The endurance of such tropes is
evinced in the recent use of Eusebius to characterize a presidential speechwriter. See Stephen H.
Webb, Providence and the President (or, The New Eusebius), Reviews in Religion and Theology
15 (2008) 62229.
2
See, e.g., Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981); Michael J. Hollerich, Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing the First
Court Theologian, CH 59 (1990) 30925; idem, Eusebius of Caesareas Commentary on Isaiah
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1999); Aaron P. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius Praeparatio
Evangelica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

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with the relation between religion and politics.3 Whatever Eusebiuss actual relations
with the emperor, however, his rhetoric of apparently unequivocal exaltation of
Constantine endures. Yet this, too, requires reassessment.
A prominent characterization of this rhetorical logic, which this article seeks
to contest, is the image of a simple correlation between God and Constantine in
Eusebiuss political-theological works. Particularly in his De laudibus Constantini
(Laud. Const.) and Vita Constantini (Vit. Const.), works devoted to portrayals of
the emperor, Eusebius is taken as providing straightforward imperial legitimation
through this one-to-one mapping between God and ruler.4 Such a legend stems
in part from, and in turn reinforces, the view that Eusebius uncritically appropriates
Hellenistic thought in his authorization of Constantine. Because Eusebius, upon
first glance, repeats predominant pagan or Judaic monotheistic models of Gods
relationship to the world, and since he simply takes over Hellenistic ideals of
kingship, he can apparently construe a parallelism between heavenly and earthly
monarchies. Such direct correlation between God and emperor serves as linchpin
for a system that erroneously, say the critics, employs a theological model to
support particular political arrangements. Eusebius therefore ostensibly manifests
an atheology, a perversion of proper dogmatic practices, and is reduced to an
ideologue.5
3
For a review and problematization of such attempts see Devin Singh, Disciplining Eusebius:
Discursive Power and Representation of the Court Theologian, StPatr LXII.10 (ed. Markus Vincent;
Louvain: Peeters, 2013) 89102.
4
I limit my in-depth examination to these two works. Admittedly, fixation on these texts to the
exclusion of his biblical and theological studies has in part contributed to the skewed view of Eusebius
as ideologue. While not wanting to contribute to this tendency, I focus on these works since here we
find Eusebiuss most direct articulation of the God-emperor relation. I also intend to show that, even
within such limited scope, more nuanced reading of these texts challenges prevailing assumptions.
I follow the translation of the Laud. Const and De Sepulchro Christi (Sep. Chr.) in H. A. Drake, In
Praise of Constantine: A Historical Study and New Translation of Eusebius Tricennial Orations
(University of California Publications: Classical Studies 15; Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976). For the Vit. Const. I follow Eusebius of Caesarea, Life of Constantine (ed. and trans.
Averil Cameron and Stuart George Hall; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
5
Portrayals of Eusebius figure prominently in ongoing discussions of political theology. The next
section discusses the work of Erik Peterson, who made Eusebius a central foil for his claim that true
Christian theology yields no possible political theology. See Erik Peterson, Der Monotheismus als
politisches Problem. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum
(Leipzig: Hegner, 1935). Reprinted in Erik Peterson, Theologische Traktate (Munich: Heinrich
Wild, 1950). Citations here refer to the English edition: Erik Peterson, Theological Tractates (ed.
and trans. Michael J. Hollerich; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). Petersons portrayal of
Eusebius was in turn critiqued by his former friend Carl Schmitt, who saw Petersons early treatise
as an assault on his own position. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure
of any Political Theology (trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward; Cambridge, U.K.: Polity,
2008). A closer look at Eusebian thought thus relates to such exchanges and to the contemporary
conversations that draw on them, such as, e.g., Paul Fletcher, Disciplining the Divine: Toward an
(Im)political Theology (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009); Political Theologies: Public Religions
in a Post-Secular World (ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan; New York: Fordham
University Press, 2006).

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In what follows I consider such critiques and the Hellenistic and Eusebian
material upon which they draw. As I argue, the textual evidence belies a swift
and simplistic correlation between God and Constantine by Eusebius. This calls
into question the thesis of a simple transmission of Hellenistic political thought
and challenges condemnation of Eusebius as a political theologian based on such
purported correspondences. My central task is thus to demonstrate the complexity
of the God-Emperor relation. The tension and ambiguity in such relations stem
in part from Eusebiuss Christology and, in particular, the place of the Logos in
his conception of God-world interactions. Rather than being due to a dimness of
vision,6 these are intricacies of which he was well aware, as he strove to articulate
and defend his understanding of christological orthodoxy in the face of excessive
Arian subordinationism and Marcellan modalism.7
As a result of the important unity and distinctions that Eusebius maintains
between God and the Logos, I demonstrate that for Eusebius, Constantine at
times images God the Father, and at other times the Logosalready complicating
(apparently) binary Hellenistic schemas. Furthermore, there are ways Constantine
legitimates and materializes the authority of the Logos, potentially subverting
typical top-down constructions. As we will see, the predominant construal of a
chain of representation and singular ladder of authority from God to Logos to
Emperor to World is not the only view that emerges in Eusebiuss writings on
Constantine. Eusebius is not merely relying on political thought from the broader
culture, but attempting to integrate his reading of biblical material as well as an
emerging orthodox consensus. The latter play as decisive a role in his political
vision. The theological legitimation that Eusebius does offer the political sphere thus
incorporates important novel claims about God, Logos, and emperor, and contributes
its own unique set of tensions and ambiguities that merit fuller consideration.
My attempt to recast Eusebius is not a search for further avenues of theopolitical
enforcement. Neither is it an effort to exonerate him from the claim of providing
theological legitimation to the political sphere. Rather, I seek to intervene into the
legend of Eusebius as political ideologue, complicating the picture by showing the
additional layers requiring analysis in any claim to Eusebiuss divine sanction of
imperial reign. In considering the proverbial whipping boy of political theology,
my wager is that his vision has been too simplistically assessed and dismissed,
suppressing potential analysis of its impact. Counterintuitively, it may also be
6
Contrary to the general muddle-headedness of which Shapland accuses Eusebius, I see at
present no need to revoke the view that Eusebius was the most learned, respected, and eminent
churchman of his day (Athanasius of Alexandria, The Letters of Saint Athanasius Concerning
the Holy Spirit [ed. and trans. C. R. B. Shapland; New York: Philosophical Library, 1951] 21), as
reported by Drake, In Praise of Constantine, ix, xi, xii. Withholding such swift dismissals, and
attempting a more attentive and sophisticated reading of the text, reveal a potential coherence to
Eusebiuss thought.
7
On Eusebian orthodoxy see now Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and
Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012) 49104.

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that his discourse contributes its own seeds of critique and management of the
political sphere.8

Hellenistic Political Thought and Eusebian Appropriation

The work of Norman Baynes bears some responsibility for introducing the
assumption of Eusebiuss uncritical transferral of Hellenistic material. Relying on
a groundbreaking article by Erwin Goodenough on the philosophy of Hellenistic
kingship, Baynes suggests that this context formed the backdrop to Eusebiuss
depiction of Constantine.9 I say suggests because Bayness five-page paper could
not develop a robust argument along such lines, and in fairness represents some
initial intuitions, which, to my knowledge, Baynes did not elsewhere develop in
greater detail. Nevertheless, his brief reflections have been taken as something
of an authoritative urtext in nearly all subsequent literature on Eusebian political
thought.10 After a brief review of the valuable material collected in Goodenoughs
study, Baynes makes the jump to Eusebius:
Enough has been said to suggest that in the Hellenistic philosophy of
kingship material lay ready to the hand of Eusebius when he sought to fashion a theory of State for the new Christian Empire. Diotogenes, as we have
seen, had written that the king had been transformed into a god among men;
Eusebius had only to drop the godhead of the king and to put in its place the
Vicegerent of God: Constantine rules oi|a megavlou basilevw~ u{parco~ [as a
prefect (or governor) of the great king]. The State in its order and harmony,
8
This inquiry also supplements much contemporary discourse about theology and the political
that draws almost entirely upon the Augustinian duality of civitas terrena and civitas dei. Such
has led either to varieties of oppositional thinking and sectarian (or communitarian) withdrawal or
measured, so-called realist engagement. I do not intend here to set forth a comprehensive alternative,
but offer potential changes in part facilitated by a more serious consideration of Eusebiuss vision
and legacy. It may be that the Eusebian blurring of spheres provides a better descriptive lens for
grasping the reality of a continuous intermeshing of the theological and political. In the least, it
offers a potentially fruitful additional approach to the oppositional model that dominates.
9
Erwin R. Goodenough, The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship, YCS 1 (1928)
55104; Norman Baynes, Eusebius and the Christian Empire, Annuaire de linstitut de philologie
et dhistoire orientales 2 (1933) 1318. Reprinted in Norman Baynes, Eusebius and the Christian
Empire, in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (ed. idem; London: Althone Press, University of
London, 1955) 16872. Citations here indicate the reprint.
10
A sampling of the many passing references that appear to take Baynes at his word includes F.
Edward Cranz, Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea, HTR 45 (1952) 4766, at 48; D. S.
Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1960) 17778; Steven Runciman,
The Byzantine Theocracy (The Weil Lectures; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1977) 22; Daniel Stringer, The Political Theology of Eusebius Pamphili, Bishop of Caesarea,
Patristic and Byzantine Review 1 (1982) 13751, at 13738. Dvorniks massive study takes Baynes
as a starting point but builds its own substantive case. It does, however, repeat the conclusions by
remarkably neglecting Eusebiuss use of biblical material. Francis Dvornik, Early Christian and
Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background (2 vols.; Dumbarton Oaks Studies 9;
Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, Trustees for Harvard University,
1966) esp. 61158.

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133

said Diotogenes again, is a mimesis of the divine creation, the kosmos: for
the divine creation Eusebius had but to substitute the kingdom of heaven.11

The problem, to my mind, is not the suggestion that such Hellenistic thought
exerted a profound influence upon Eusebius, and in this respect Bayness
observations in this short piece are incisive. As indicated by my added emphases,
my concern is the swiftness and simplicity with which Baynes moves from one
discourse to the next, a simplicity he projects upon Eusebius. The claim can certainly
be defended that Eusebius appropriated such material in his novel constructions of
Christian empire. It appears more difficult to claim that such transition involved
no substantive transformation. Either option requires a fuller argument. Yet, this
breezy take on Eusebius is a tone reproduced in much of the literature relying upon
Bayness very preliminary and inconclusive remarks.12
Baynes begins his short essay with a disconcerting question, asking in regard
to Eusebiuss theological legitimation of Constantine, is this theory the outcome
of the thought of Eusebius himself or is it derived from other sources?13 This is
truly an unacceptable dichotomy. One wonders what would satisfy Bayness quest
for originality here besides unmediated, divine revelation or mystical, hermetic
inspiration. For when does one originate ideas without interface with preceding
thought? This view colors his presentation such that the parallels between Eusebius
and Hellenistic thoughtwhich certainly do exist and are without a doubt
significantare interpreted as a type of reportage with minimal translation.14 It is
as if the terms and vocabulary are emended but the structuring principles remain
unchanged. Yet, given the lack of Christian precedent to Eusebian political writings,
the image of mere reportage is tenuous. Compilation and transference seem less
Baynes, Eusebius, 172 [italics added].
Such close reproduction of the tone of simplicity is striking: Eusebius simply adopted the
doctrines of Diotogenes, Ecphantus and Plutarch, with suitable modifications (Runciman, Byzantine
Theocracy, 22 [italics added]); In various kinds of ways therefore, prevailing Romano-Hellenistic
modes of political philosophy exerted an enormous influence on Eusebius thought about Constantine.
Particularly the idea of the emperors temporal reign as reflection down on earth of the heavenly
and eternal Logos, was originally a well-known pagan philosophical idea which Eusebius simply
took over (Glenn Chesnut, The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and
Late Stoic Political Philosophy, ANRW II.16.2 [1978] 131032, at 1332 [italics added]).
13
Baynes, Eusebius, 168. Note also Bayness curious juxtaposition in the claim that Eusebius
was primarily a scholar and not an original thinker (ibid.). Such a view, that Eusebius was a
compiler and reporter rather than conceptual innovator, is widespread. Even if granted, questions
about the shape and design, its inclusions and exclusions, and, hence, the original intentionality of
his reportage merit asking.
14
Again, my intent is not to argue against Eusebiuss use of Hellenistic sources in his theology
and political thought, which are everywhere apparent. See, e.g., Claudia Rapp, Imperial Ideology
in the Making: Eusebius of Caesarea on Constantine as Bishop, JTS 49 (1998) 68595; Jeremy
M. Schott, Founding Platonopolis: The Platonic in Eusebius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, JECS 11
(2003) 50131. I am resisting the notion that this was a straightforward process, or that Hellenistic
thought was his only or even governing influence.
11

12

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applicable in the case of novel creations, for, as even Baynes acknowledges, here
for the first time is clearly stated the political philosophy of the Christian Empire.15
This idea of a conveyance of preceding pagan thought was decisively radicalized
by Erik Peterson. Eusebius functions as Petersons Kronzeuge (chief witness) in a
broader argument about the impossibilities of Christian political theology.16 Peterson
(who admits the partial influence of Bayness essay)17 claims that Eusebius constructs
essentially a parallel and direct correlation between God and Constantine: The one
monarch on earthand for Eusebius that can only be Constantinecorresponds
to the one divine monarch in heaven.18 Peterson appropriates intuitions about
the influence of pagan political thought to use in conjunction with a denigration
of Eusebiuss theology, which is taken as insufficiently Trinitarian. These two
purported shortcomings in Eusebius combine in a potent synthesis that has forever
plagued Christendom. The close mapping of God and Constantine, buttressed by
monotheismitself deemed a piece of Reichspolitik (imperial policy)19evinces
the dangerous, divine legitimation of political rulers and regimes and is ultimately
unchristian. In fact, both monotheism and monarchy are false ideas appropriated
from Hellenism, stemming from both pagan and Jewish influence, and are at odds
with Christian orthodoxy.
Baynesian accounts of reportage on the political front thus coincide with a
persistent critique of Eusebius as an unoriginal theologian. As a kind of transition
point between more instrumental Logos-sarx Christologies and eventual Nicene
synthesis, the story goes, Eusebius is beholden to cosmological models of Godworld mediation. As such, he reproduces and christianizes primarily Middle Platonic

Baynes, Eusebius, 168.

In brief, Petersons main argument is that stricter monotheisms seen in pagan or Judaic traditions
permit a direct, one-to-one correspondence between God as monarch and the political ruler. The
political ruler functions as direct stand-in and immediate representative of God on earth. Orthodox
Trinitarianism renders impossible any such correlations and thus obviates any potential Christian
political theology. On Eusebius as Petersons Kronzeuge see Jan Badewien, Euseb von Csarea, in
Monotheismus als politisches Problem? Erik Peterson und die Kritik der politischen Theologie (ed.
Alfred Schindler; Gtersloh, Germany: Gtersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1978) 4348. Schmitt,
in his response, challenges what he calls the legend or myth of the end of political theology, as
perpetuated by Peterson, and questions his portrayal of Eusebius (Schmitt, Political Theology II, 21).
While Schmitts counterarguments are admittedly thin, I, through no initial intention on my part,
lend support to his response by showing the indeed legendary or mythological use to which Peterson
puts Eusebius. As we will see, Eusebius is an obvious example of neither pagan monotheism nor
simple one-to-one correspondence, attenuating his role as main witness for Peterson.
17
Peterson, Theological Tractates, 226 n. 135. Petersons initial formulations, however, precede
the publication of Bayness essay. Erik Peterson, Gttliche Monarchie, ThQ 112 (1931) 53764.
Cited in Gyrgy Gerby, Political Theology versus Theological Politics: Erik Peterson and Carl
Schmitt, New German Critique 105 (2008) 733, at 15.
18
Peterson, Theological Tractates, 96 [italics in original].
19
Ibid., 102.
15
16

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schemas, never developing a fully soteriological account.20 This view is being

challenged through more recent work taking into consideration Eusebiuss full
corpus. Christopher Beeley argues that Eusebius stands firmly within Alexandrian
Trinitarian and christological tradition, and both evinces and conveys all the
categories necessary for the eventual orthodox claims about the Godhead.21 An
additional important refrain in J. Rebecca Lymans study is that Eusebius is as
much wrestling with biblical material as he is with pagan cosmology, that his
Christology rests on a profound and original, if not always coherent, synthesis
of biblical and philosophical models of mediation.22 The parallel claim can be
made about his political thought, which is everywhere tied to such Christology.
Thus Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe has asserted recently that Eusebius idea of kingship
is not merely a Christianization of Hellenistic philosophy, but builds on powerful
scriptural language of God as king.23 There is much more going on in Eusebius
than simply repetition, with suitable modifications,24 of a Hellenistic theory
of the kings mimesis of God.
Hellenistic schemas, while speaking of the logos or law, assume a dualism when
it comes to mimesis: it is really only about God and the king.25 Particularly in the
literature engaged by Baynes and Peterson, the logos appears as an abstract principle
that can be reduced to God or cosmos. One prominent theme is that the Hellenistic
king enjoys a special relationship to the law, often represented as in close proximity
20
This narrative is recounted, albeit with nuance, in Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition
(trans. John Bowden; 2nd rev. ed.; 2 vols.; Atlanta: John Knox, 1975) 1:16780; with less nuance
in Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 11820.
21
See Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 49104. Beeley claims, e.g., that Eusebius recognizes
the paradox that Christian monotheism requires full Trinitarian subsistence. In so doing, he lays
important groundwork for the later Trinitarian doctrine of writers like Basil of Caesarea and Gregory
Nazianzen (Christopher A. Beeley, Eusebius Contra Marcellum. Anti-Modalist Doctrine and
Orthodox Christology, ZAC 12 [2008] 43352, at 449).
22
J. Rebecca Lyman, Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius,
and Athanasius (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 109. She
notes further, Rather than merely a philosophical intermediary, the cosmic agency of the Son in
Eusebius theology necessarily entails the obedient activity of the biblical Jesus; he is the one agent in
two lives (116). Strutwolf also complicates this narrative by incorporating biblical and neoplatonic
material that influences Eusebius (Holger Strutwolf, Die Trinittstheologie und Christologie des
Euseb von Caesarea: eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung seiner Platonismusrezeption und
Wirkungsgeschichte [Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte; Gttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1999] 12993, 25875).
23
Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe, Early Christian Political Philosophy, in The Oxford Handbook of
the History of Political Philosophy (ed. George Klosko; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
14255, at 145.
24
Runciman, Byzantine Theocracy, 22
25
On the following points see Goodenough, Hellenistic Kingship.; Peterson, Theological
Tractates, 69105; Chesnut, Ruler and the Logos; Arnold Ehrhardt, Politische Metaphysik von
Solon bis Augustin (3vols.; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1959); Dominic J. OMeara, Platonopolis:
Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Paul
Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 2009) 96130.

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to it. The relationship might be elaborated by the theory of divine comes, a force or
principle that accompanies, protects, and guides the leader.26 Equally as prominent
is the view that the king not only exhibits proximity to but actually embodies divine
or universal law. As such the king is animate law (ovmo~ e[myuco~). Because of
this, the king is in a superior position to positive or legislated law, such as the legal
codes of the city-state or empire. The king, in personifying the higher law, exerts
authority over and in a sense personally legislates such positive law.27
In Stoicism the logos is at times construed as a generative principle, working
upon inert matter to bring forth life and activity. In Platonized Stoicism such a force
arises from the first God and works as intermediary upon creation, ordering and
animating it. Significantly, this notion of the lovgo~ spermatikov~ is now transferred
to kings. From [the king] the logos goes forth, as the logos in eclectic Platonizing
Stoicism went forth from God, to work in men as the other works in matter, and
to infuse life into them.28 With this are combined Pythagorean sentiments of
mimesis and harmony, such that those who copy the king may have a share, until
they themselves become copies of his model, and are indeed made virtuous by his
virtuous logos.29
An emerging dynamic, emphasized by Peterson, is the correlation between
divine and earthly monarchy. In the writings of the Middle Platonists, the pseudoAristotelian De mundo (Mund.), as well as a variety of Philos works, the singularity
of the ruler is tied to the unity of God.30 Just as a single divine principle and ground
means harmony and stability in the cosmos, so the rule of one staves off chaos and
civil war in the political realm. The singular ruler (whether divine or earthly) can
either function as the origin of power and activity or be its ground and principle.
The distinction means a ruler will either directly engage in acts of creation and
governance or function as their basis and guarantee, the actual activity of which
is carried out by intermediaries. To the latter correlate ideas of a second God or
principle, a (craftsman creator), which undertakes the work of creation,
interacting directly with matter. So, for instance, Numenius can claim that the
First God is free from work of all kinds and is king.31 According to Peterson,
Mund., which draws on Aristotelian ideas of divine monarchy, takes up a dialog
with the Stoic worldview of impersonal deity permeating all things, and argues
that an objective God does exist but remains hidden and detached, governing from
Arthur Darby Nock, The Emperors Divine Comes, JRS 32 (1947) 10216.
The kings rationality and virtue provide for this proximity and serve as evidence of it. It
is here that nomos and logos coincide. In Plutarch, the late Platonist, then, this Animate Law
conception has been fully identified with the Logos. The true king is the incarnate representation
of the universal Nomos, and as such he is the incarnate representation of the Logos (Goodenough,
Hellenistic Kingship, 95).
28
Ibid., 90.
29
Ibid., 92.
30
Peterson, Theological Tractates, 7076.
31
Numenius De bono, frag. 12, in Eusebius Praep. ev. 11.18.8. Cited in ibid., 205 n. 15.
26
27

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the shadows through subordinates.32 In stricter versions of monotheism, such as

Philos, angels act as intermediaries and governing principles, while the actual act
of creation belongs directly to God.
In his exploration, Peterson introduces a phrase from nineteenth-century French
political thought to describe a dynamic in Middle Platonism, as adapted by Jewish
and later Christian thought: le Roi rgne, mais il ne gouverne pas (the king reigns
but does not govern).33 By this he means the separation between the supreme deity
and the administration of creation by intermediaries. This invokes a widespread
Hellenistic notion of regality and honor due to the sovereign, that the Great King
does not get his hands dirty in managing daily affairs, that grandeur is actually
augmented by layers of subordinate officials.34 A correlation is made between the
first or supreme God and the king, with the implication being that (semi-)divine
intermediaries correspond to earthly administrative apparatuses and secondary
governors.
Peterson observes in passing that from the thesis that God reigns as king but
does not actually rule may be drawn the Gnostic conclusion that the sovereignty of
God is truly good, but the regime of the Demiurge (or demiurgic Powers, usually
seen as officials) is bad: in other words the regime is always wrong.35 To anticipate
an ambiguity that will be evident in Eusebius, the Christian claim that the Logos
is a divine person of the same or similar being as the first God complicates such
a schema. The eventual orthodox response to gnostic denigrations of demiurgic
activity is to declare the unity of God who creates and redeems the world, and to
assert as coeval the secondary divine principle, understood eventually as a distinct
(person) within a unified Godhead. Rather than the demiurge there is
only the first God, now depicted as Father and Son, to which eventually the Spirit
would be added. Yet the Father retains the sense of origin and reign, as grounding
principle (the Father is a[arco~ [without origin], while being the Sons ajrchv
[origin]). To the Father is ascribed the monarchy. The Son manifests elements
of worldly engagement, most notably in the incarnation, as the generated divine
element or person that communicates the Father to creation. The Son is the site of
32
The Persian Great King serves as a master trope here, as it does for much Hellenistic political
thought. For discussion of monotheistic ideas in pagan thought see Pagan Monotheism in Late
Antiquity (ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede; Oxford: Clarendon, 1999); One God:
Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire (ed. Stephen Mitchell and Peter Van Nuffelen; Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
33
Peterson, Theological Tractates, 71, 83. Schmitt (Political Theology II, 68) singles out
Petersons use of this phrase, attributed to Adolphe Thiers (1829): The retrospective use of such a
formula, from a post-Christian, liberal epoch back to the antiquity of the first century, is astonishing.
Schmitt indirectly criticizes what he sees as anachronistic projection, while implying that, ironically,
Petersons use demonstrates the enduring interdependence of theology and the political.
34
Time and time again, it is the same idea: Le Roi rgne, mais il ne gouverne pas. The gods
are kings, satraps, viceroys, friends of the King, or officials; actual imperium belongs to the highest
God, who is compared to the Roman emperor or the Persian Great King (ibid., 83).
35
Ibid., 7172.

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divine administration and governance of redemption. Arguably, then, the Christian

innovation is to synthesize the distinction between reign and governance within a
single divine being, preserving the differentiation in the discourse of oijkoomiva
(economy).36 In other words, the difference is not at the level of being (oujs iva),
but is one among persons as revealed in the economy of redemption. From the
standpoint of imperial imitation, we must now ask whom, precisely, the king is
imaging. Is it the Father or the Logos-Son, or both? What implications does this
have for the regime, given the differentiation in reign and governance that remains
in Trinitarian economy?
If Eusebius merely transferred preceding Hellenistic thought, the binary
correlation between God and emperor will also turn up. That Peterson sees such
a one-to-one correspondence in Eusebius serves his argument that Eusebius is
beholden to such pagan and Jewish concepts. In this way Peterson seeks to discredit
Eusebius, since, for Peterson and his implied readers, an uncritical transfer of
Hellenistic thought renders his theology and politics suspect.37 Both his apparently
narrow, monistic monotheism and direct correspondence between such a solitary
God and the monarch are of non-Christian provenance.
Yet, as intimated, the Christian insertion of the Logos as divine person disrupts
this binary correlation.38 The Logos cannot recede as a generalized principle, but
is now an agentive center of will, judgment, decision, and activity.39 Neither can it
36
The transition to Trinitarian orthodoxy and implications for the distinction of reign and
governance have been explored recently in Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a
Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini;
Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

37
Peterson makes explicit this type of hermeneutic when he chides Tertullian for invoking
Roman monarchy as a conceptual device for grasping the Trinity: Perhaps the weight of the
Roman constitutional construction of the double principate, which posited a participatio imperii (a
sharing of command), kept [Tertullian] from seeing that it was impossible simply to transfer pagan
theologys secular monarchy concept to the Trinity which requires its own conceptual development
(Peterson, Theological Tractates, 84).
38
On Eusebiuss defense of the personhood and divine Sonship of the Logos see, e.g, Brian E.
Daley, One Thing and Another: The Persons in God and the Person of Christ in Patristic Theology,
ProEccl 15 (2006) 1746. Beeley argues that Eusebius has a robust Son theology and not simply
one of the Logos or Word (Eusebius Contra Marcellum). I retain the centrality of the term Logos
as the Laud. Const. remains the central text of my inquiry. Eusebius never refers to Christ in this
text, the most persuasive explanation for which being not that his theology is deficient but that his
words are contextualized, given the occasion and partially pagan audience. See the discussion in
Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 4660. Note too that Eusebius explicitly upholds the Trinity in
this panegyric, ensconcing talk of it in numerology, again appealing to his audience (Laud. Const.
6.13). This also challenges Petersons claims of Eusebiuss non-Trinitarian monotheism.
39
Baynes writes that the basis of [Byzantine] political philosophy is to be found in the conception
of the imperial government as a terrestrial copy of the rule of God in Heaven: there is one God and
one divine law, therefore there must be on earth but one ruler and a single law (Eusebius, 168).
While this preserves a Hellenistic notion of impersonal and abstract law, it does not do sufficient
justice to the person of the Logos, who, while called Law, cannot be reduced to a principle. The
binary correspondences between God and king, on one hand, and Logos-Son and civic law, on the

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now be incarnated in the king, since Christ is the Logos manifest in the flesh. The
Logos thus emerges as a distinct third element. Its presence in Eusebius may serve
as a clue both to his incorporation of Christian material and consequent original
innovations in Christian political thought.
Significantly, this tension is already present in Peterson but is glanced over. Of
Eusebiuss model he writes, To the one king on earth corresponds the one God,
the one King in heaven and the one royal Nomos and Logos.40 It is striking that in
an effort to critique Eusebius on the basis of a one-to-one correspondence theory,
no mention is made of the fact that we have here three principles elaborated: king,
God, and Logos. Ambiguity is therefore already present in Petersons critique. If
one responds to that here, for Peterson, the Logos is simply identical with God, this
would be incorrect, for to substantiate his claim that Eusebius exhibits a narrow
monotheism with Arian tendencies, God and Logos on Petersons reading must
denote two separate principles. They should then be accounted for separately. A
defensive rebuttal on Petersons behalf might claim that he sees a singular line of
authority from God to Logos to emperor such that the unity can be maintained and
we can still speak loosely, if imprecisely, of a one-to-one correspondence. The next
section troubles such assumptions.

Eusebius, Constantine, and Correspondence

The Eusebian structure of the relationship between God and emperor, implied in
both Baynes and Peterson, which has widespread acceptance, is summarized by
Daniel Stringer: Constantine is the third in a progression of royal figures, the first
being God the Father and the second being the Logos-Christ. This Logos-Christ
himself is the archetypal image of the Father while the emperor in the third position
is the image of the Logos-Christ.41 This reading of Eusebius is justified, but it is
not the only one. Stringer himself, while almost completely beholden to Baynes,
also remarks that Constantine was for Eusebius a kind of second savior.42 George
Hunston Williams, although following Peterson, notes that Christ and the Christian
emperor are in the thought of Eusebius almost coordinate in honor, each under the
Supreme God, each in his special way leading men to the knowledge and worship
of God, each complementing the other in bringing order and peace to mankind.43
Such parallelism and coordinate complementarity present difficulties for a single
chain of authority and representation.

other, are tenuous at best. As we will see in Eusebius, such a model will not stand, for the Logos at
times assumes authority over the emperor and cannot correspond structurally to subordinate civic law.
40
Peterson, Theological Tractates, 94 [italics in original].
41
Stringer, Political Theology of Eusebius, 142. See also Cranz, Kingdom and Polity, 53.
42
Stringer, Political Theology of Eusebius, 138.
43
George Huntston Williams, Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century,
CH 20 (1952) 333, at 18 [italics added].

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

This alternative is outlined in more detail by Harold Drake after his in-depth
study of Laud. Const. In both contemporaneous pagan panegyrics and Laud. Const.:
Constantine is conceded a special relationship to the supreme God. According to the pagan speakers, [this supreme God] leaves the care of others
to lesser gods but deigns to associate directly with Constantine; according to
the LC, [God] rules the world through His Logos, but uses no intermediary
when dealing with Constantine. Indeed, the hierarchy of the LC is not so
much God-Logos-Emperor as God working through two coordinate powers in
Heaven and on earth, each identified by the title of His Prefect (u{parco~).44

Thus, in Drakes view, we need to account for the special relationship the emperor
enjoys with God that is unparalleled in creation. While the Logos apparently
mediates the Father to the world, there are ways such mediation is bypassed in the
case of Constantine. Hans Eger noted this dynamic in an early article following
soon after Petersons treatise, observing that Christ is now and again skipped over
in this gradation of God(Logos=)ChristEmperor, and the Emperor is called
the unmediated likeness of God.45 Eger claims that we can understand this in two
ways: Eusebius either did not overcome the pagan conception of the king as image
of God (since the emperor directly images God), or he sees God and Logos as one,
such that any reference to God includes both.46 Eger favors the latter but admits
the tension is unresolved. Indeed, this take is insufficient, for Eusebius frequently
differentiates God and Logos in his political rhetoric and throughout his corpus.47
Aloys Grillmeier also recognizes the difficulty that this double relation poses
for the Hellenistic understanding of imitation: According to the Laus, ch. I, the
emperor is the image (eijkwv) of the ruler of the world. At the same time he imitates
the Logos-Christ. Thus we have a twofold mimesis: first between the emperor and
God, and second in the imitation of the mimesis which is to be found between
Father and Son.48 In this multifaceted schema, Constantine does not only imitate
God the Father; neither does he simply imitate the Logos-Son. Rather, he imitates
the Logoss very imitation of the supreme God, imaging a relation of image to

44
Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 57. Consider also: Although Eusebius theoretically establishes
a hierarchy of God-Logos-Emperor, in practice he treats Constantine and the Logos as relatively
equal coordinates (ibid., 75).
45
Christus wird in der Stufenfolge Gott(Logos=)ChristusKaiser doch hin und wieder
bersprungen und der Kaiser das unmittelbare Abbild Gottes genannt. Hans Eger, Kaiser und
Kirche in der Geschichtstheologie Eusebs von Csarea, ZNW 38 (1939) 97115, at 113.
46
Ibid., 114.
47
Eusebius explicitly criticizes those who confuse or elide the specific roles and identities of
the Supreme God and the Logos. See, e.g., Sep. Chr. 11.17.
48
Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 1:25354. He continues: By virtue of this twofold
mimesis, the emperor enters into a kind of triadic relationship with the Father and the Logos. He
occupies the position of a third person. It follows almost automatically that the emperor also
participates in the functions of the Logos before the Father (254).

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prototype.49 This complicates the place of authority and power in Constantine, who
imitates the supreme sovereign, the delegated heavenly governor, and, somehow,
the relation between them and what it conveys. How are we to understand the
imperial mimesis?
At this juncture it will be helpful to observe the differentiation in reign and
governance (as introduced by Peterson ) in Eusebius, which will help us grasp the
significance of the God-Logos distinction. Eusebius begins the Laud. Const. by
invoking the supreme sovereign who dwells in an inapproachable realm above
the highest heavens. Between this highest God and creation is drawn a darkness
shutting off those outside from those within the royal halls. And about this like
torchbearers at the palace doors circle the sun and moon and heavenly lamps,
glorifying the Sovereign who is above the universe and by His will and word hanging
out for those allotted the darkness beyond the land of heaven inextinguishable
lamps of light.50 Royal imagery establishes the boundaries between God as king
and all that is ruled. God is like an emperor hidden behind the walls of his castle.
Man is separate from God as a city rabble is separate from the inner chambers
of the king.51 Middle Platonic thought, as well as Philo and the sentiments of
Mund. here make themselves felt, as the highest God is explicitly demarcated and
hidden from all else, reigning supreme in complete transcendence. This God stands
the farthest apart as the Ungenerated and Highest Power.52 Nevertheless, in
disposition, the Ruler of All Himself is, like a good Father, delighted with His
good and reverent sons.53
Who has seen the Invisible Sovereign and beheld these powers in Him?54 The
only one, says Eusebius, is the Logos, who with regard to the universe is first rank,
but within the Fathers kingdom is second to rule.55 Enclosed within the darkness
of the royal palace, the King of all gushes forth a light that dwells with him, and
this light mediates and separates the eternal and ungenerated Form from created
existence.56 The Supreme God has created the world, and handed the reins over
to the Logos-Son, who received the estate as from a Good Father.57 The Logos
is compared to a pilot as well as charioteer, both common tropes of governance.
49
On Eusebiuss understanding of image in terms of his Christology see Mark DelCogliano,
Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of God before 341, JECS 14 (2006) 45984. See
also Jon M. Robertson, Christ as Mediator: A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea,
Marcellus of Ancyra, and Athanasius of Alexandria (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
50
Laud. Const. 1.2. See also Theophania (Theoph.) 1.37.
51
Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 184.
52
Sep. Chr. 11.17.
53
Laud. Const. 6.2.
54
Ibid., 4.1.
55
Ibid., 1.6.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid., 6.9.

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

And this selfsame one would be the Governor of this entire cosmos, the One who
is over all, through all, and in all, visible and invisible, the all-pervasive Logos of
God.58 To the Logos then falls the clear task of governance and administration.
The Father is first and supreme God, as ultimate creator and origin of all. The
Logos aids in creation, not as its source but as its ordering principle and the one
who superintends it.
The Son follows the pattern given to him so closely, and governs so faithfully in
the stead of the Great King, that they are completely one. There is one Sovereign,
and his Logos and royal law is one. . . the living and actual God the Logos, who
directs his Fathers kingdom for all those under and beneath him.59 Here it is
important to note that, in addition to being not merely a legal principle, the Logos has
agency and governs actively. While we might hypothetically posit in some limited,
figurative way that abstract law provides direction to a ruled territory, the image
here is of a conscious governor, overseeing and steeringas a wise pilota course
toward salvation. This delegated authority is protective and responsive, leading
a vast heavenly army as a kind of prefect (u{parco~) of the Supreme Sovereign
(megavlou basilevw~).60 A notion of divinity is also granted the Logos in this verse,
indicating its origins in and identity with the supreme God. The Logos is the light
that dwells around and proceeds from the highest God.
Yet the distinction between reign and governance is everywhere apparent. Such
political overtones lead Pierre Maraval, in his own recent study of the Laud. Const.,
to note that all of chapter 1 is dedicated to the universal kingship of this supreme
God, whom Eusebius also designates many times as the Father. But if the Father
reigns, he does not govern: his kingship is carried out by his son, the Logos.61
Apparently invoking the division perceived by Peterson, Maraval concludes that a
clear distinction generally exists in Eusebius between responsibilities of reigning as
supreme sovereign and governing as delegated authority. Such are transposed onto
God and the Logos, respectively. Incorporating his understanding of the salvific
58
Ibid., 1.6. Immediately after this Eusebius claims that the Only-Begotton Logos of God
endures with His Father as co-ruler from ages that have no beginning to ages that have no end
(2.1). Had he not clearly just stated that the Logos is second in rank, such language of co-ruling
might convey an equality of authority. Rather, the point here is an emphasis on the eternity of rule,
possibly to counteract Arian claims to (a time) when the Son was not. The Son as delegated governor
has always administered the Fathers kingdom.
59
Ibid., 3.6.
60
Ibid. The many titles ascribed here to the Logos include: Supreme Commander and Chief
High Priest, Prophet of the Father and Carrier of Great Counsel, Radiance of the Paternal Light
and Sole-Begotten.
61
Tout le chapitre 1 est consacr la royaut universelle de ce Dieu suprme, quEusbe dsigne
aussi plusieurs fois comme le Pre.Mais si le Pre rgne, il ne gouverne pas: sa royaut est exerce
par son fils, le Logos. Pierre Maraval, Eusbe de Csare. La thologie politique de lempire
chrtien: louanges de Constantin (Triakontatrikos) (Sagesses chrtiennes; Paris: Cerf, 2001) 53
[italics added]. See also Fabienne Jourdan, Le Logos et lempereur, nouveaux Orphe Postrit
dune image entre dans la littrature avec Clment dAlexandrie, VC 62 (2008) 31933, at 32223.

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acts of God through Christ, as attested to in scripture and his theological forbears,
Eusebius makes the Logos a distinct aspect of divine rule in a way departing from
preceding political thought. While the Father is also oriented toward the world,
the Logos signifies that elementindeed, personof the Godhead that is engaged
directly with it. How, then, does Constantine figure into this schema?
We begin with Eusebiuss own list of apparent parallels between Constantine
and the Logos.62 1) As the Logos co-rules eternally with the Father, Constantine has
been granted a reign for an extended period of time. It is not clear at this point with
whom Constantine in turn co-rules. Yet, he is called the friend of the Logos, and
thus we can assume that just as the Logos co-rules in subordinate fashion with the
Father, Constantine co-rules in subordinate fashion with the Logos.63 Constantine
assumes the position of a delegated governor, drawing legitimacy from those
above. 2) The Logos leads the world to, and prepares it for, the Fathers kingdom.
Constantine in turn leads and prepares all for the Logos and his kingdom. Again,
we have imitation in submission, with Constantine carrying out activities parallel
to the Logos, but done in a ladder of succession. 3) While the Logos combats
invisible demonic powers of unrighteousness, Constantine subdues enemies of
God in very real combat. Here activities are carried out in parallel and complement
one another. No clear subordination exists unless one inserts the supremacy of
the spiritual over the material. 4) The Logos provides all with rationality and the
capacity for divine knowledge, and it is Constantine who proclaims this to them,
leading them to the Logos. Here a complementarity is suggested, with Constantine
crucially completing a task begun by the Logos. 5) Finally, the Logos welcomes
the righteous into his Fathers kingdom, and Constantine invites pious subjects into
his royal chambers. Here Constantine is both Logos and Father, at once doing the
welcoming and signifying the one into whose presence such guests are brought.
Thus, even in this short introductory pericope, multiple representational dynamics
present themselves, requiring further clarification.
The first possible way to understand the correspondence between God and
Constantine, noted above as the most popular reading, might be diagrammed as
such:

God

Logos

Emperor

World

In this model Constantine is subordinate to the Logos who is subordinate to the

Father. Constantine is accordingly a representative of the Logos who represents
God. Whatever knowledge Constantine gleans about ruling and governingand
whatever legitimation he gains from the divine realmare mediated through
Laud. Const. 2.15.
To complicate this, Constantine is also called Gods friend in Laud. Const. 5.1 and Vit. Const.
1.3.4. He thus apparently enjoys friendship both with God and the Logos. Tracing the implications
of such friendship requires consideration of the emperors relation to both such subjects.
62
63

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

the Logos. This is evinced in Eusebiuss claim that it is from and through the
all-pervasive Logos of God . . . [that,] bearing the image of the higher kingdom
(th`~ ajwtavtw basileiva~ th; eijkova fevrw), the sovereign dear to God, in
imitation (kata; mivmhsi) of the Higher Power, directs the helm (diakuberw`)
and sets straight all things on earth.64 Here the emperor looks to the example of
the Logos. Just as the Logos pilots or governs the universe, so Constantine directs
his kingdom. Such a dynamic is repeated in what is taken as a central passage in
the oration: Constantine pilots affairs below with an upward gaze, to steer by the
archetypal form. We are told shortly thereafter that it is the Logos who directs
His Fathers kingdom for all those under and beneath Him.65 This presumably
indicates Constantine most centrally.
It is while discussing such dynamics that Eusebius (in)famously extols monarchy
as being the best form of government, the one legislated from above, paralleling
Gods monarchical rule. While the Logos is also here referred to as God, no
difficulty is presented in construing Gods sole reign.66 This could either indicate
a strong subordination in which the Logos as delegated governor is outside the
divine center of rule, or a unitive tendency in which the albeit distinct Logos is taken
as so close to the Father that the reign is one. Both possibilities can be extracted
from the Laud. Const. when taken on its own. In either case, however, a sense of
subordinate, delegated role is attributed to the Logos, whether or not we construe
this as decidedly ontological or mainly functional. A singular chain of command
appears to exist, in which Constantine is a key extension.
A second option for demarcating correspondence and authority might be
schematized as such:
Logos
God
World
Emperor

Here Logos and emperor undertake assigned roles in parallel manner, and each
draws authority and legitimation from the Father, while each carries out its own
mode of representation. As both are called prefects (u{parcoi) of God, each
secures victory and obedient righteousness in its respective realm, whether against
demons or barbarians. Each leads subjects into the heavenly kingdom. Both serve
as delegates and governors on behalf of God. Yet each can be called sovereign in
this derived sense, after the image and pattern of the first God.67 Thus Constantine
is christened aujtokravtwr (sole ruler), having modeled himself after the archetypal

Laud. Const. 1.6.

Ibid., 3.56.
66
Eusebius takes no pains, as Tertullian (Adversus Praxean [Prax.] 3) earlier did, to argue that
having and ruling with a Son in no way attenuates the monarchy of the Father.
67
The Logos is referred to as a father in Laud Const. 4.3.
64
65

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form of the Supreme Sovereign.68 The impression is of a direct imitation of the

first God, although elsewhere, as we have seen, it is the Logos that conveys this
form to the emperor. Constantine, like the Father, in turn delegates his reign and
shares his rule with his sons, empowered by God to do so with great relief from the
burden of sole rule.69 Just as God assigns authority to the Logos-Son, Constantine
enlarges his Imperial power by ungrudging association of his relatives.70
This immediate relation to the Father is also implied with talk of the direct
revelations and visions the emperor has received from God, as well as his role
in passing on godly knowledge to his subjects. Eusebius reports that Constantine
himselfincredible as it sounds[became] the teacher of rules of worship to his
army, and he transmitted pious prayers in accordance with divine ordinances.71
Here he serves as a priest and mediator between his military (and presumably other
subjects) and God, taking on and helping to fulfill a function of the Logos. Finally,
Eusebius also speaks of the Supreme Gods direct affirmation and legitimation
of Constantines reign. The tricentennial celebration marks Gods faithfulness to
Constantine, for the Ruler of All Himself ... like a good Father has rewarded the
leader and cause of this excellence with such long-lasting honors.72 In his reign,
Constantine is secure, for God himself, the Supreme Sovereign, stretches out his
right hand to him from above and confirms him victor over every pretender and
aggressor.73 In this sense a direct legitimation from the Father to Constantine
grounds the latters reign. Constantine needs no mediated blessing from the Logos,
although such certainly augments his rule.

Laud. Const. 5.4.

Ibid., 3.1. This could provide an answer to our question of with whom precisely Constantine
co-rules in parallel to the co-rule of Father and Logos seen in 2.1.
70
Ibid., 3.2. Here Drake (In Praise of Constantine, 159 n. 5) notes an ambiguity: The question
whether Eusebius subject at a given point is God or Constantine is frequently complicated by his
free use of pronouns. Here, the sense of ungrudging association indicates Constantine as subject,
but grammatically, the subject is God. This is a good illustration of the slippage between God the
Father and Constantine seen in Eusebius. While one might attempt to attribute this to sloppiness or
poor knowledge of Greek, it seems that, especially given the ceremonial gravitas of the situation, the
learned Eusebius, a master rhetorician, has chosen his words carefully, such that even his ambiguity
is calculated. Here there is an intentional mismatching of pronouns such that, while Constantine
is the subject, the shadow of divine rule looms constantly, further entrenching the parallels. Thus,
Constantine, like the Father, shares power and so augments rather than attenuates his grandeur.
Elsewhere Eusebius speaks of Constantines general fatherly concern for all . . . bestowing everything
on everyone with generosity of heart (Vit. Const. 4.1.1).
71
Laud. Const. 9.10. Drake notes that transmitted () seems intentionally chosen to
vest the prayers with divine authority and to convey, once again, Constantines own close connections
with divinity (In Praise of Constantine, 169 n. 13). See also Jean-Marie Sansterre, Eusbe de
Csare et la Naissance de la Thorie Csaropapiste, Byzantion 42 (1972) 13195, esp. 14244.
72
Laud. Const. 6.2.
73
Ibid., 10.7.
68
69

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Attempting to merge these two arrangements (tavxei~) of God-Emperor relations,

and capture a sense of the plurivocity in Eusebiuss presentation, we can depict
the structure as such:
Logos

God
Emperor

World

Here both a singular ladder of authority and a parallelism are accounted for in
a way that, albeit complex and ambiguous, need not be contradictory. In such a
schema, Constantine at once receives directly from the Supreme God as well as by
mediation of the Logos, and passes on dual aspects of this structure in his reign.
The Logos, in turn, mediates aspects of divine reign to Constantine, and carries out
elements of its governorship through the emperor, while also directly interfacing
with the rest of creation. In such a schema, Constantine receives from both Father
and Logos, and Constantine and Logos each have spheres of primary influence
and rule in the world. This preserves a sense of the parallelism between the two
agents, while also maintaining a notion of priority and authority to the Logos, to
whom Constantine submits.
This helps explain a potentially confusing dynamic seen, for instance, where
Constantine is first introduced and described as the beloved sovereign who
reigns by imitating the Logos, a delegated governor.74 In a curious juxtaposition,
Constantine is seen as a sovereign (like the Father) imitating a governor (the Son).
That this duality can coexist stems from the dual sourcing of Constantines authority.
He receives direct installment by and legitimation from the Supreme God, and yet
also receives guidance from the Logos, who is a superior governor, and who shows
him how to respond to the task he has been given by God.
This also accounts for ways in which Constantine seems to complement and not
simply parallel the work of the Logos, completing it, or bringing it to fruition in
the material realm. In such conceptualizations Constantine is vital and embodies
something like the ongoing incarnation of the Logos, with a decidedly theopolitical
edge. For instance, Eusebius describes the work of the Logos in a manner strikingly
reminiscent of his descriptions of Constantine: He has modeled the kingdom on
earth into a likeness of the one in heaven, toward which He urges all mankind to
strive, holding forth to them this fair hope.75 Whereas we might have relegated
the Logos to a parallel spiritual realm, seen for instance in his defeat of demons as
the emperor defeats flesh and blood opponents, here the Logos undertakes earthly,
historical tasks. We are reminded of the importance of the incarnation and historicity
in Eusebian thought. The Logos is incarnate in Christ and enacts Gods salvation in
history. Beyond simply a parallel, there is a sense in which here the overlap is one
74
Constantine is called sovereign (basileuv~), a term Eusebius frequently ascribes to the highest
God. Ibid., 1.6. Compare 8.4; 8.7. See Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 167 n. 6.
75
Laud. Const. 4.3.

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of roles, as Constantine is another Christ, carrying out the same task in the same
sphere, just later in time. It appears as a passing of the mantle.
This is confirmed immediately in the next lines: And in this [i.e., the acts of the
(incarnate) Logos,] Gods friend henceforth shall participate, having been furnished
by God with natural virtues and having received in his soul the emanations from
that place.76 Constantine is singled out from among the human race as having a
special connection to and calling from God, continuing the specific work of the
Logos. Eusebius describes Constantine here as receiving guidance and power from
God, for from sharing in the Highest Power he has courage, while at the same
time being taught wisdom and reason from the Logos.77 The duality of influence and
legitimation here comes through, as both supreme God and Logos work to forge in
Constantine the rationality and virtue necessary to continue the work of the Logos.78
Constantine is described as an invincible warrior and attendant of the
Supreme Sovereign. He is a victor over barbarians and is from One Sovereign,
the image of the One Ruler of All.79 Here there is no mention of the Logos, and
Constantine is described as imaging the One Sovereign, and hence the Father.80
This is complicated by the following verses, which show the emperor completing
Laud. Const. 5.1.
Constantines rational capacity is one given to the entire human race by the Logos, but Constantine
is singled out as having developed such gifts to an exceptional extent. This evinces his especially
elect status and unique proximity to God. Adding to this we learn later that to Constantine alone
of those who have yet been here since the start of time has the Universal All-Ruling God Himself
given power to purify human life, to whom he has revealed his own Saving Sign . . . (ibid., 6.21).
Echoing Hellenistic theory, the emperor here has unique power to sanctify his subjects. It is given
a Christian transformation by Eusebius by being a power bestowed by God, enabled by the Logos,
and undertaken in extension of the Logoss original mission.
78
A similar ambiguity emerges in 6.21. Eusebius extols Constantine, to whom [the Universal
All-Ruling God Himself] has revealed even His own Saving Sign, apparently indicating the
labarum. He proceeds: Setting this victorious trophy, apotropaic of demons, against the idols
of error, he has won victories over all the godless foes and barbarians, and now over the demons
themselves, which are but another type of barbarians. Drake indicates textual difficulties here and
divergent manuscript traditions that make either Constantine or God the subject, claiming that the
stronger tradition favors God (In Praise of Constantine, 165 n. 30). This harmonizes with the talk
of subduing demons, a task of the Logos as outlined earlier. Yet, in this context, Eusebius has been
describing Constantine, and both language of the saving trophy and barbarians supports this. Here,
then, the blurring of roles between Constantine and the Logos has even impacted transcription.
Eusebius plays between the two continually, such that, in this case, there is a sense that Constantine
is subduing demons as well, as a Christ figure, since demons are but another type of barbarians.
79
Laud. Const. 7.12.
80
Here Drake notes Bayness invocation of a Hellenistic mimesis theory of kingly imitation
of God (In Praise of Constantine, 166 n.13). While acknowledging such dynamics are at play, he
claims that this passage indicates a much more intimate and personal mivmhsi~, according not only
with the theory of the sovereign as likeness of God . . . but also with Constantiness own concept
of his relationship to his deity. The ambiguities of Constantines personal beliefs notwithstanding,
any theory of Eusebiuss supposed transmittal of a Hellenistic model of mimesis would also need
to account for the Christian articulation of a personal and proximate God with whom the emperor
might have a relationship.
76
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in the material realm what the Savior accomplished long ago spiritually and
invisibly: For while the Common Savior of the universe punished the invisible
beings invisibly, he as the prefect of the Supreme Sovereign proceeded against
those so vanquished, stripping their long and utterly dead corpses and distributing
the spoils freely among the soldiers of the victor.81 Constantine is required for
fuller manifestation of the Saviors victory. And while there may be an implicit
hierarchy of spiritual over material such that the Logoss victory is given priority
and greater importance, Eusebius does not invoke it here. Instead he follows the
emphasis he places on history and historical revelation throughout his works to give
Constantine pride of place as agent of the kingdom. Here Constantine is described
as prefect (u{parco~) of the Father, in juxtaposition to the Savior, also a prefect.82
Constantine exhibits direct relation to the Father, accomplishing a task parallel and
complementary to the Word. He picks up the baton, so to speak, in submissive
complementarity, being commissioned by both Logos and Father.
Finally, it is important to note that, if one extracts a particular couplet of levels
from any of the above schemas, additional sub-layers of role and authority emerge.
Just as we saw that the Logos with regard to the universe is first, while with regard
to the Father it is second, Constantine is first with regard to the world, and third
(or a second second) with regard to the divine hierarchy. From the Emperor
World relation, in which Constantine is first, can be extracted the mediatorial
role of governors and delegates, as in the case of Constantines sons. This sublayer might be depicted then as Emperor Governors/Administration World.
Eusebius illustrates this dynamic poignantly in Vit. Const., describing a scene where
Constantine admonishes and exhorts his administrators:
Striking them, and as if actually flogging them, with his argument, he
made some of his courtiers bow their heads as their conscience was smitten.
Testifying in plain words he announced to them that he would give an account
to God of their activities; for the God over all had given him sovereignty over
things on earth, and he in imitation of the Supreme had committed particular administrative regions of the Empire to them; all however would in due
course be subject to scrutiny of their actions by the Great King.83

Just as the Sovereign God has delegated to the Logos the governance of the universe,
as well as delegated to Constantine his particular royal duties, so Constantine passes
on responsibility. Such acts are defined in relation to God and given divine sanction,
effectively grounding in heaven the division between reign and governance in
Constantinian administration. Note that in such a schema implicit parallels emerge
between the delegated representatives and administrators, on one hand, and the
Laud. Const. 7.13. As becomes clear in the following section (8.3), the corpses refer to the
pagan idols that Constantine stripped of precious metal and jewels.
82
Laud. Const. 3.6.
83
Vit. Const. 4.29.4. Consider also Constantines delegation of the administration of his imperial
treasury to his mother Helena (Vit. Const. 3.47.3).
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divine Logos, on the other. They too are blessed and legitimated in this structure
of power, imitating, under father Constantine, the delegated governance of the
Logos. In this extended sense, then, it is not only Constantines imperial person
that receives divine legitimation, but his entire state administrative edifice.
Let me summarize the various dynamics of authority and legitimation glimpsed
in this third possible structure of representation. God delegates supreme reign to
Constantine, showing him how to reign as a sovereign (as the Father reigns). God
also demonstrates how to delegate as a sovereign (just as the Sovereign Father
delegates to the Logos and to him). The Logos models and delegates reign and
governance to Constantine, showing him how to receive the delegation from the
Father (as the Logos receives it in submission), showing him how to govern as
a delegate (as the delegated Logos governs), and how to delegate as a governor
(as the Logos delegates to him). This is how Constantine can both reign supreme
and accept the judgment from Eusebius that his reign is not much greater than
the rule exercised by goatherds or shepherds or cowherds and is in a sense
more troublesome.84 He can embody the highest authority in the world, indeed
almost transcendent to it, and exist in humble submission to God. In this way the
christological pattern of discipleship gets conveyed to the imperial realm, such that
Constantine is not merely an imitation of God, ruling in one-to-one correspondence
as an echo of divine authority, but himself models humility after the form of Christ.
Furthermore, Constantine mediates this divine rule to the world primarily in the
political realm, exhibiting to his subjects a reign like the Father and governance
like the Logos. He also delegates and empowers his administrators under the model
of delegation exercised by the Father. Such administration then enjoys correlation
to the Logos. Yet, Constantine mediates in the spiritual or religious realm as well,
teaching and modeling submission to God. He demonstrates submission to the Logos
and leads his kingdom back to the Logos, as they follow his pattern of submission.
He also works to support the church financially and through legislation. This is
all part of his complementary submission, as subjects look to him for guidance in
how to submit to God.
The Logos, on the other hand, primarily mediates to the world in the spiritual
realm, conveying knowledge of the Father to a humanity that has been preformed
with logocentric rationality so as to be able to receive such knowledge. The Logos
shows the world how to submit to the Father. Yet, the Logos also mediates implicitly
to the political realm, showing it how to submit to Constantine, for Christian
faithfulness includes submission to the Christian emperor. The controversial hidden
implication here, then, is that somehow the Logos is submissive to Constantine.
For, how else does the Logos model/mediate/convey submission to this authority?
There is a sense in which the Logos recognizes and honors the Fathers election of
Constantine. The Logos supports Constantines direct authorization by the Father
and his parallelism with and complementarity to the Logos. As we saw, Constantine
84

Laud. Const. 5.5.

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can model submission to the Logos because he himself is submissive. In a move of

mutual submission, then, the Logos submits to Constantine and models submission
to him. In this sense Constantine receives a double legitimation, being installed and
authorized by the Supreme God and enjoying a type of submission from the Logos.85
There certainly is everywhere in these Eusebian texts a correlation between
God and Constantine. But it is neither simply one-to-one nor direct; nor is it a
stable configuration. The place of the Logos continually disrupts such attempts.86
Whether or not he was fully aware of the scope of the issues involved, the
ambiguity and multiplicity in Eusebiuss schema stem, in part, from the perceived
need to correlate the dual emphases of reign and governance to the person of the
emperor. In the interplay of Supreme God and governing Logos, Eusebius discerns
elements necessary for the administration of empire.87 There must be unity and
This need not be as problematic as it might initially appear, or at least no more so than the
already controversial Christian scriptural injunctions to submit to governing authorities (Rom
13:18), as well as Christs own apparent passivity before political power in the passion accounts.
While explicit justification for Christian submission is that such powers are under Gods authority,
the implicit claim is that submission is what Christ would do. Christ being the model and standard
for discipleship, his acts are taken as paradigmatic. Here, then, submitting to Constantines authority
is justified because it is Christ-like behavior, i.e., following the pattern of the Logos incarnate.
Such dynamics are gestured to, e.g., in Laud. Const. 2.1, with the idea of the Logos preparing
and leading the world toward the Fathers kingdom. Such preparation involves submission and
conformity to Gods earthly kingdom ruled by Constantine, and thus the Logos as leader/model
sets out the example of submission for all of humanity. We also get a sense in Laud. Const. 3.6 of
the pervasive presence of the Logos in all peoples, providing the rational capacity for worship of
God and submission to Constantine. That the Logos can forge in humanity the model of submission
to this emperor implies the presence or capacity of such submission in the Logos. Furthermore, if,
as we have seen, Constantines governors and administration find as correlate the Logos at times
when Constantine is correlated to the Father, Constantines authority over his governors can undergo
conceptual elision and transferral to the Logos as their representative. Such subtle dynamics of a
Logos submissive to empire may explain why those protective of church authority and independence
vis--vis the state have been wary of Eusebiuss theology. An interesting thought experiment would
be to consider the Eusebian directions of submission if Christ were contemporaneously present in
the flesh during Constantines reign. Would Christ submit to Constantines political leadership, or
would the latter abdicate his throne in deference to the former?
86
Particularly worthy of further consideration is the specific relation of Constantine to the
bishops in light of the God-Logos structure. This might shed light on the perceived relation between
church and state in terms of lines of representation and legitimation from above. See, e.g., Sansterre,
Eusbe et la Thorie Csaropapiste; Francis Dvornik, Emperors, Popes, and General Councils,
DOP 6 (1951) 323; Johannes A. Straub, Constantine as : Tradition
and Innovation in the Representation of the First Christian Emperors Majesty, DOP 21 (1967)
3755; G.W. Bowersock, From Emperor to Bishop: The Self-Conscious Transformation of Political
Power in the Fourth Century A.D., CP 81 (1986) 298307; David Woods, Eusebius on Some
Constantinian Officials, ITQ 67 (2002) 195223; Rapp, Eusebius on Constantine as Bishop.
87
Arguably, the orthodox synthesis of both poles of supreme reign and delegated governance
into one divine being eases the transposition onto a singular leader, thereby supporting the person
of the emperor and his administration, which is a figurative extension of his body. This works
against the widespread, specious claim that Arianism inherently favors imperial ideology, seen in,
e.g., Peterson, Theological Tractates, 102; Runciman, Byzantine Theocracy, 24. Hardy, too, speaks
of Eusebiuss imperialist Christianity which came so easily to Arians and Semi-Arians (Edward
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agreement between these poles. The king cannot be disengaged or isolated in a

way that renders his auctoritas (authority) ineffectual.88 The supreme God is not
an idle god but the creator God, who cares about the state and destiny of creation.
If the reins of the kingdom are to be handed over, this delegated authority must be
consistently correlated to the pattern of rule established by the sovereign, whether
earthly or divine. Politically, the close connection could certainly engender a type
of rigid absolutism, as delegated administration is bound to the person of the ruler,
functioning as an arm and extension of his will. Yet it could just as well facilitate
the empowerment and proliferation of such governing mechanisms, here given
authority by their association with the Emperor, as well as by having as their
heavenly correlate the Logos, which provides a divine sanction. As such they
are forms of delegation undergirded with esteem and authority in their vicarious
representation of the ultimate sovereign, that is, God.89 History has borne out both
such possibilities, and many varieties in between, in the wake of Eusebius.90
In light of these complexities, introduced primarily because of the divine person
of the Logos, Baynesian-inspired accounts of a simple transmittal of Hellenistic
political theory into Christian language should be called into question. The LogosSon is not one among many possible senses of intermediary, as in Hellenistic
accounts.91 For Eusebius, the Logos is absolutely unique, divine, alone generated
R. Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers [The Library of Christian Classics; Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1954] 336). Yet, just as Constantine, the first Christian emperor, presided over the
orthodox formulation at Nicaea (whatever hermeneutic of suspicion we wish to cast upon his sincerity),
the majority of ensuing Christian emperors upheld what is taken as orthodox Trinitarianism, with
notable, intermittent lapses into Arianism or paganism. As many, if not more, historical examples
can be found of Christian rulers supporting orthodox faith while continuing to draw legitimation
for their authority from this triune God, as can be gathered from emperors relying on a monistic
God. This historical correlation alone should trouble the claim that Arianism is imperial theology
and orthodoxy is not.
88
I employ auctoritas here to signal the ways this discussion may tie into later debates about the
auctoritas and potestas of the sovereign in medieval political theology. See, e.g., James Muldoon,
Auctoritas, Potestas, and World Order, in Plentitude of Power: The Doctrine and Exercise of
Authority in the Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Robert Louis Benson (ed. Robert Figueira;
Church, Faith, and Culture in the Medieval West; Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006) 12540, and
Lester Field Jr. Christendom before Europe? A Historiographical Analysis of Political Theology
in Late Antiquity, in ibid., 14170.
89
For one take on how such divine legitimation of the administrative and bureaucratic elements
of government has resulted in their proliferation, see Agamben, Kingdom and the Glory.
90
One might explore how the dual imperial mimesis established by Eusebius influences the
medieval debates about investiture, for the Norman Anonymous declares the king as both God
and Christ. Such dualities may prefigure eventual construals of the kings two bodies. See Ernst
Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1957) 48.
91
While we can certainly claim that Hellenistic thought was more complex than Peterson
presented it, and subject to a multiplicity of positions beyond that which we can here review, it can
be maintained that such thought lacked a theory of the Logos as authoritative personal agent. On
the other hand, Middle Platonic ideas of a demiurge or other intermediary powers, while ascribed
personal agency, were set at remove from full divine status, and were not correlated to the king.

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(gevvhto~) directly and immediately from the Father, and so must always be
accounted for in the relation of God to emperor inherited from prevailing GrecoRoman models and the Scriptures. The Logos is not merely a go-between or
synapse connecting the two, nor is it an abstract principle or simply law. Rather,
the Logos as active divine person uniquely and distinctively shapes emerging
imperial dynamics of authority and governance. Eusebius simply does not offer a
model of clear-cut pagan or Judaic monotheism that inevitably leads to monarchy.
He contributes an original albeit ambiguous legacy to the developing discourse of
Christian political thought. Attending to such nuances and ambiguities, rather than
recoiling from his presentation because of its problematic implications, can only
aid in analysis of its enduring impact.

Conclusion

Peterson was therefore correct to highlight the distinction between reign and
governance in the Greco-Roman and patristic literature he examines, for such proves
critical to understanding the nuance operative in Eusebiuss model, a complexity
Peterson apparently missed. His critique falls on its own sword, for one cannot
maintain, as he does, both that Eusebius is a type of semi-Arian subordinationist
and that he presents a one-to-one correspondence between God and Constantine.
If Eusebius is such a subordinationist, the Logos is not identified with God, is
extracted from the God-Emperor relation as a third subject, and requires explication
for the ways it too is everywhere in Eusebius distinctively coordinated to both. A
binary theory of correspondence collapses. If Eusebius is not a subordinationist
and exhibits something verging upon an orthodox model of the Godhead, Peterson
needs to account for how Eusebius can present a correspondence between God and
emperor, something Peterson claims orthodox theology resists.
Given the developing conversation that appears to be vindicating Eusebian
theological orthodoxy, the burden for scholarship falls to the latter problematic, that
is, whether and how correlations between the Trinity and political rulers and regimes
are possible.92 The force of Petersons critique of Eusebius, then, is not toward his
There is something unprecedented emerging in the Christian articulation of multiple, fully divine
figures existing in a plural singularity, which are then correlated to the emperor. While scholarship
on Hellenistic thought has progressed since Peterson, my point in reviewing the material as he sets
it out is to show the problems within his own presentation, that his conclusions about Eusebius
and political theologywhich continue to bear out in contemporary scholarship, despite progress
in other areasdo not necessarily follow from his premises.
92
The ongoing contemporary debate about whether the Trinity can be used to fund certain ecclesiopolitical programs is genealogically related to Petersons claims. See, e.g., Fletcher, Disciplining
the Divine; Kathryn Tanner, Trinity, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (ed. Peter
Scott and William T. Cavanaugh; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004) 31932. A central figure in this
debate, Jrgen Moltmann, expresses great admiration for Peterson and acknowledges his debt to him,
calling Monotheismus a magnificent treatise. See Jrgen Moltmann, Political Theology, ThTo
28 (1971) 623. Interestingly, much of Moltmanns oeuvre is devoted precisely to showing how
the Trinity informs Christian politics, as if attempting to demonstrate how wrong Peterson was. In

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model of Godsince, apparently, both strict monotheisms and Trinitarian doctrine

can be and have been brought into a legitimating role for the political realm. Rather,
the issue is one of how to relate such an idea of a transcendent God to the immanent
sphere of creation, and thus invokes questions of the role of analogy, difference, and
apophasis in construing or rejecting potential parallelisms. Theologians analyzing
political theology, particularly in its more authoritarian and repressive forms, cannot
skirt the issue by assigning its provenance to false or unorthodox theology,
but must reckon with orthodoxys own primary contribution to such traditions.
If Eusebius does provide a strong legitimation of monarchy and subsequent
Christian empire, he does not appear to be led there ineluctably by his model of
God. The precise motivations for Eusebiuss exaltation of Constantine remain the
subject of debate. Needed are further analyses of his rhetoric, the offence of which
is its apparent lack of apophatic reserve, its seemingly bold and blatant movements
from the theological to the political.93 Eusebius appears too quickly to translate an
idea of God to emperor (or vice versa), although, as I have tried to show, this move
is not so swift and simple as many have claimed, given the necessity of accounting
for the Logos. And while he is generally written off as ideologue or propagandist, as
Peterson does, there may be more at work in his praise of the emperor. For example,
the Vit. Const. quite possibly functioned as a Frstenspiegel, a mirror for princes
for Constantines sons, training them in Christian principles of leadership.94 In such
case the ideal portrait of the emperor serves less as flattery than as a standard to
which his sons are called and displays understandable distance from reality.
As an avenue for future research, work must be done to determine whether a
similar dynamic might be discerned in the Laud. Const. In this case, Eusebius,
the savvy and well-trained rhetorician, seeks to make the most of this opportunity
to address the emperor. Commissioned to deliver a panegyric, he fulfills his task
in excess, mounting up praise for the emperors conformity to the reign and
governance of God and Logos. In repeatedly emphasizing a faithfulness that
emperor and hearers know to be overblown, Eusebius subtly holds Constantine to
account, enforcing, with his words, the need to live up to the values and virtues
expected. The correlations between God, Logos, and Constantine are continually
unmaking themselves, serving as the horizon of possibility toward which his rhetoric
gestures, a horizon that is ever receding. Such correspondences are thus implicitly
fairness, Moltmann does not seek a Christian political theology that supports governmental regimes,
but one that questions hierarchy and totalization. Yet this highlights the ambiguity that Petersons
essay bequeaths, for it remains unclear how one might use ideas of God to assess contemporary
politics, given the absolute disjunction inserted by Peterson.
93
One of the few studies devoted to his rhetoric is Gerald S. Vigna, The Influence of Epideictic
Rhetoric on Eusebius of Caesareas Political Theology (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern Univeristy, 1980).
See also Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian
Discourse (Sather Classical Lectures 55; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
94
See, e.g., Cameron and Hall, Introduction, in Life of Constantine, 13. See also Johnson,
Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius, 195.

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apophatic. The emperor perpetually falls short, and so must continually strive
to conform to the strictures established by this ecclesial leader. While certainly
providing a problematic type of imperial legitimation, it could be that Eusebius
also demonstrates an alternative way of speaking truth to power, that of praise as
immanent critique. Rather than openly condemning Constantines failures, Eusebius
works with the givenness of the situation and, in a display of rhetorical oijkonomiva,
choosing and arranging his words strategically, enforces the same standards through
the establishment of an ideal. This would take seriously the picture of Eusebius as a
bishop scholarly and retiring, apparently more willing to compromise with secular
authority than his more militant colleagues but possibly, just possibly, playing a
shrewder game than any of the rest of them.95

95

Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 11 [italics added].