TAYLOR VS MANILA ELECTRIC

FACTS:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son
of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who
and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground
These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small
pistolcartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which
it may be discharged by the use of electricity
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite,
and have in themselves a considerable explosive power
the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took
end, and carried them home
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old,
and they went to Manuel's home
The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
break the cap with a stone - failed
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the
cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the
neck
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal
by the surgeons
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE:
1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage - NO
HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and
illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.
in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
1. Damages to the plaintif
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person
for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

3. The connection of cause and efect between the negligence and the damage.
while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or
permission would not have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for
injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received
cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on
one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and
continued in that employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it
appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more
mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15
The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion,
as described by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of
the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced
the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature
of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the
minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been
the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that
while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for
the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its

premises, nevertheless plaintif's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire
just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through
his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
Ylarde vs. Aquino
GR No. L33722, July 29, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During
that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area
so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton
concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the
Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom
where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children not to touch the stone. After he left, the children playfully jumped into
the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito
Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a
consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein
petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.
HELD:
As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, this is the general rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception

to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts
of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be
held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he
did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the
children are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed
the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work
Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault
and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers
he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient
to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation
would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.

BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51
GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS
- In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market
placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of
P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but
Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the
day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller
wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on
September 24, 1981.
- Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled
Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process.
- On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the
pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio
"made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about
the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G.
Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling
Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's
account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for
pretermination.
- Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller
insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for
P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife.

Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by
office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following the processing route, passed through the position
analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks, nos. 021759 and
021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the
preterminated placement, were prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the papers consisting of the
money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be preterminated, were
sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, in
BPI's Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks that very
morning. Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery.
- Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks
being delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks, her
niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. This telephone conversation
ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who would pick up
the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of the new
delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing
thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up.
- It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt.
As it turned out, the same person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the
checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the
placement, the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the
placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the
pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks, both of which letters
were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with Eligia G.
Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a
"close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13, 1981, a woman who
represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening
of a current account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio
Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co,
a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in the application form, however, was that the new
client was introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the
application to the New Accounts Section for processing. As finally proceeds, the application form shows the
signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"),
tax account number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is indicated
on the application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy, Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her
initials on the application form after reviewing it.
- On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in
controversy with Current Account No. 126310-3. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with
the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then
stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day.
- Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account No. 26310-3: On October 16, 1981, by means of Check
No. 240005 dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman holding herself out as
Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter, and Check No. 240003 dated October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00,
payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on October 19, 1981, by means
of Check No. 240006 dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash," which the woman identifying
herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22, 1981, by means of Check No. 240007
dated the same day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter;
and on November 4, 1981, by means of Check No. 240001 dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to
"cash," which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. The last withdrawal on November 4, 1981 left

Current Account No. 26310-3 with a balance of only P571.61.

- On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI, the real
Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her
placement on October 12, 1981. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks
in controversy, she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks
was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No. 35623 with maturity value of
P2,462,243.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a new promissory note (No.
40314 with maturity date of December 23, 1981 and maturity value of P2,500.266.77) to evidence a roll-over of the
placement.
- On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit, BPI returned the two checks in controversy
to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for reason "Beyond
Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee.
- The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1,206,607.58
with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12, 1983.
- However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration
Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1,206,607.58.
- BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but
modified the award by including a provision for attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at
the back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim
reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were
cleared
HELD
1. NO
- BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
guaranteed" stamped at the back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements
in the checks are genuine. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank,
respondent CBC, had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were
forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become
totally irrelevant.
- In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the
validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, the drawee
bank would not have paid on the checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty.
As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the
falsity of its representation.
- Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last
endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements
considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making
the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the drawee-bank
discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder
thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. However, the point that comes uppermost is
whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.
- The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is

"wholly inoperative", and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the
instrument. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the
forgery or want of authority. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an
exception to the general rule.
- In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. Following the general rule, the checks are
"wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general
rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of
the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the
controversy in relation to the forged checks.
- The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank
were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks.
- The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in
the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and
delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere
telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president of Philamlife; b) The
officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination;
c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter
requesting the pre-termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in
BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring
before the two checks in controversy were delivered, the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money
market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled petitioner
BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the
loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
- The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that these withdrawals, without any further showing that the CBC
employees had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec. 56, Negotiable
Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the
same amounted to bad faith cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.
- Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of
ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
- In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the
evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of
respondent CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's
negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss,
we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many justifications both banks
present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
2. NO
- The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the
circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not
contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
- Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is
not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of
Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a
comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which respondent

CBC did, could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to discover
the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud
perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
- BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual
and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between
the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the
impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the
checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according to petitioner BPI, there
was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held
to the checks without negotiating them.
- Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between the
issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said
forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not
unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's
employees, the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is therefore,
greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the
negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must
solely bear the loss of P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two (2) forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC
could have prevented any loss.
- The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of
huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. The opening of the account
itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear
chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm
which befell both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank
employees would have sufficed to seize it.
- Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the
forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which
resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the
proximate cause of the loss, respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in
encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code
to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while
CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2,413,215.16

E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

28 Phil 122
MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident
FACTS
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric
street railway

- Plaintifs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants

tracks run. To enter his premises from the street, plaintif must cross defendants
tracks.
- One night, plaintif drove home in a calesa and, in crossing the tracks to enter
his premises, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the plaintif
from the vehicle and causing injuries
- At the point where plaintif crossed the tracks, the rails were above-gruond, and
the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more
above the level of the street.
- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but
defendant claims the plaintif was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated,
and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident
- Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintifs negligence
was not as great as defendants, awarded plaintif P1,000.
ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintif contributed to the principal occurrence or only
to his own injury. (If the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court
was correct in apportioning damages)
HELD
NO
Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.
Reasoning
- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts, other than the fact that
Wright was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintif
was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been
injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober
man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.
- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and
falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel,
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his
condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would
not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the
realm of speculation and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintif not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of
damages to plaintif.
US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142
TORRES; September 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910, whereby
he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the

heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in
the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of
the court.
FACTS
- About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the
defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for
the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian
custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly
attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head
from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted
various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini,
and on his own mother, named Dioalan.
- For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur,
dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because
of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately
from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was
sufering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment
cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court.
ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable
HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable
criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and
for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of
acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators
exempt from criminal liability.
Reasoning
- Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility
on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably
and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to sufer
for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his
unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during
his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation
and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his
decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to sufer the consequences of his
acts.
- Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable.
- Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article
8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject
to the following:

(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by
a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and
under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that
there was no blame or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or
power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law.
DISPOSITION
Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in
accordance with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMENS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
99 PHIL 48
BENGZON; June 30, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC
FACTS
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque, turned over and
hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other
laborers.
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased. He has paid nothing, however, to the latter.
- Deceaseds wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer.
ISSUE
1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque
2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the
employers prohibition to ride haulage trucks

HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person, thereby
having the efect of releasing the employer from liability.
- The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons
because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the
indemnity ordered by the court.
- At any rate, even if the case was against a third person, the court already

decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does
not afect the liability of the employer.
- Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's
widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she
has already elected one of the remedies.
- This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the
ofender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages.
2. NO
- Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence,
ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se.
- Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its
violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of
negligence.
- Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the
proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders.
- Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies
"conscious indiferenece to consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct which
would naturally and probably result in injury".
Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed