In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA.

DE
ENRIQUEZ,ET AL. v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954MONTEMAYOR,
J.
:FACTS:On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purporting to be his Last Will
andTestament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated atP8,000 in
value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for itsprobate in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estateof the deceased if
he left no will, filed opposition.During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote out the will in
longhand in Spanishwhich the testator spoke and understood, and that he signed on the left hand
margin of the front pageof each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and
numbered the same withArabic numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the
last page. All this was donein the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will.
The said threewitnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in
thepresence of each other.The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will. Although at the
time it was executedand at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law, still,
because at thetime of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force,
whichCode permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect inform, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will as the
Last Will andTestament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision, and
because onlyquestions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will executed before the New Civil Code maybe
considered for probate as such during the effectivity of the same
.RULING:No.At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted. The law at the
timeimposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page inletters and
signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses
requirements which were not complied with. The failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on theleft hand
margin of every page vitiates the testament.What is the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father
Abadia? May we apply the provisions of thenew Civil Code which not allows holographic wills? But article 795
of this same new Civil Code expresslyprovides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at thetime it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to theaffect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at
the time of the testator's deathor at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by thecourt but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is
that althoughthe will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator
about thedisposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn
expression at the timethe will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.Of
course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factorand that
all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out saidintention,
and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of thetestator
lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutesshould be
applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However,

we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves awill, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the dueprocess clause of the constitution against
a subsequent change in the statute adding new legalrequirements of execution of wills which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when oneexecutes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of itsexecution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and hisheirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent
law with more liberal requirements orwhich dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective willand thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general ruleis that the Legislature can not validate void wills.In view of the
foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.

Fleumer vs. Hix54 Phil 610

Facts:The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the
latters will wasexecuted in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction,and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the
petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia
Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 andas certified to by the Director of
National Library.The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the
grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West
Virginia as a prerequisiteto the allowance and recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts
of thePhilippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states
of theAmerican Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of
the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor wasthe extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under theseal of the State of West Virginia as provided in
Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that theextract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court therefore did not err
in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in WestVirginia must be proved.

Probate of the late William R. Giberson.LELA G. DALTON vs. SPRING GIBERSONG.R. No. L4113June 30, 1952

Facts: Lela Dalton presented an application in the CFI of Cebu asking for thelegalization of a
document, which was awarded in San Francisco, California,purporting to be the holographic will of
William Giberson, who was a citizen of theState of Illinois, USA, a resident of Cebu and died in
Manila.
Spring Giberson, son of the deceased, filed an opposition claiming that the will isapocryphal, that it
does not represent the true will of the deceased, and that it hasnot been in accordance with law.
The trial court dismissed the application statingthat under our existing rules only those wills that
have previously been proved tobe allowed in the United States, or any state or territory thereof, or
any foreigncountry, according to their laws, may be allowed to be filed or recorded in theproper
court of first instance in the Philippines. Hence, this petition
Issue: Whether the will of William Giberson can be authenticated in thePhilippines, although such
document
Held: No. A will awarded outside the Philippine can be legalized and registered inthe Philippines,
provided that it was awarded in accordance with the laws of theState or country where it was
awarded. This is supported by Article 637 of the CivilCode wherein it was stated that wills
authenticated and legalized in the UnitedStates, or any state or territory thereof in accordance
with the laws of that state,may be be legalized and recorded in the CFI of the province in which
the testatorhas a real property or estate.

Paula
DE
LA
CERNA,
Manuela
REBACA-POTOT,
et
COURT
OF
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

et
al.,
al.,
and
APPEALS,

petitioners,
vs.
the
HONORABLE
respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament
whereby they willed that their two parcels of land acquired during their marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece. Bernabe died and the will was
probated in 1939 after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition. Upon the death
of Gervasia Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned
was filed by Manuela but the court dismissed it for failure of Manuela to appear.
Paula de la Cerna questioned for the nullity of the joint will of Bernabe being prohibited in the
Philippine law. The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and
void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code but on appeal by the
testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an error of law affects the conclusive effect of its decision.
2. Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe.
RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last
will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil
Code). A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
The probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la
Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still
alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction,
precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil
Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It follows that the validity of the joint will,
in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de
novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Therefore, the undivided interest of
Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only
heir intestate of said Gervasia.
TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
VS.
HELEN
CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA,
oppositor-appellant
January
31,
1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California
law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends
that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California
law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed
by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain
undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and
the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to

follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled
outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back
to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD
A.
BELLIS,
ET.
AL.,
heir-appellees
G.R.
No.
L-23678
June
6,
1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife,
Violet
Kennedy
and
finally,
3
illegitimate
children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided
in
trust
in
the
following
order
and
manner:
a.
$240,000
to
his
1st
wife
Mary
Mallen;
b.
P120,000
to
his
3
illegitimate
children
at
P40,000
each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in
the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor
divided
the
residuary
estate
into
7
equal
portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The
ISSUE:
Whether

lower

court
Texan

denied

their

Law

of

respective
Philippine

motions
Law

for

reconsideration.
must

apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine
of
renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the

provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children
with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him)
and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition
claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the
Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens
successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased.

Validity of wills consists of 2 parts: extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic validity refers to the
forms and solemnities prescribed by law. Intrinsic validity refers to the legality of the will's
provisions.
Extrinsic Validity
1.) From the viewpoint of time: the laws in force at the time the will was made.
2.) From the viewpoint of place/country:

a.) If the testator is a Filipino, he can observe Philippine law or the law of the country where
he executes the will.
b.) If the testator is a foreigner living abroad, he can follow the law of his domicile (the
country he's permanently staying in,) the law of his home country or Philippine law.
c.) If the testator is a foreigner in the Philippines, he can either follow the law of hishome
country or Philippine law.
Intrinsic Validity
1.) From the viewpoint of time: the law in force at the time of the testator's death
governs succession rights.
2.) From the viewpoint of place/country: the national law of the testator governs, regardless
of the place the will was executed or where the testator died.
Art. 795 of the Civil Code says that the law in force at the time the will was made governs
its form.

Who are the compulsory heirs in the direct line?

a. Legitimate children and descendants with respect to their legitimate parents or ascendants;
b. Legitimate parents ot ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
c. Illegitimate children (Recognized)
d. The father or mother of illegitimate children
Note: The surviving spouse is not included.

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,vs.HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the

Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of FirstInstance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984GUTIERREZ, JR.,
J.:
FACTS:Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America
and a permanentresident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and Testament in the
county of Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while in
temporary sojourn in thePhilippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila, leaving
property both in the Philippines andin the United States of America. The Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos wasadmitted and granted probate by the Orphan's
Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, theprobate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the saidforeign country on

procedure and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, wasappointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
This was opposed by Adoracions father, Hermogenes Campos
, who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left
a will. He later died and was substituted by PollyCayetano as petitioner in the instant case.A
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes
Camposmerged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children andforced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.Cayetano alleged that
the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can bedivested by
a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir
incomplete disregard of Law of Succession.ISSUE:Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to
his legitime in case the testator was a citizen of anothercountry.RULING:No.Applying Article
16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will isthe law
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admitthat the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be
given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because itwould be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter
to the specificprovisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code, the national law of the decedentmust apply.
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court

EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita
Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory
heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit ofAdjudication, adjudicating unto himself the
entire
estate
of
Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others
that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion
died
in
Manila
while
temporarily
residing
in
Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano
as
the
executrix.
Hence,
this
case.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not the will was valid

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before
it
is
probated,the
court should meet
the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the
law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the
national
law
of
the
decedent
mustapply.
As

to

the

issue

of

jurisdiction

--

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila
where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her
death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania,USA and not a usual resident of
Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Cayetano vs. Leonidas

Cayetano vs. Leonidas
Facts:
The decedent at the time of her death was an american citizen. Her father, being the only compulsory heir
adjudicated the entire estate to himself. However, the sister of the decedent filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. The reprobated will was allowed.
Issue:

Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the father of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him and the same would work injustice and injury to him.
Held:
No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
The order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST
OF THE ROMANCATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,vs.BELINA
RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO,respondents-appellees.G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979FACTS:AQUINO,
J.:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed
onOctober 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of
December 5,1935. In addition to the devices contained therein, the will had a provision to the
effect that the testatorintended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would
become a priest. It was statedtherein that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one,during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of
the testator was studying for the priesthoodand two, in case the testator's nephew became a
priest and he was excommunicated.ISSUE:Whether or not a device in favour of a person who
se identity at the time of the testators death cannot
be ascertained, may be efficacious.RULING:No.The Supreme Court held that the said bequest
refers to the testator's nearest male relative
living at thetime of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter
.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, theheir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper"
(Art. 1025, Civil Code).The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed.
To construe them asreferring to the testator's nearest male relative at
anytime after his death
would render the provisionsdifficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been hisintention.The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of hisdeath, who would like to become a priest, was
still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in theseminary. In that case, the parish priest
of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephewentered the seminary. But the moment
the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would beentitled to enjoy and administer the
ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, thetrusteeship would be terminated

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died
in1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to
followthe ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest'spetitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged
therein that "not malerelative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood."Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest,
the unavoidableconclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administrationof the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt
was likewise inoperative.It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when thetestator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become
a priest, had not yet enteredthe seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies didnot arise, and could not have arisen in this case
because no nephew of the testator manifested anyintention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, nowarticle 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it
shall be mergedinto the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right
of accretion exists."This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960
(2), which provides thatlegal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator." Therebeing no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same
should be distributed among thetestator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.

PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR (CIVIL)

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any iterpretation must be in accord with the plain
and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his contention was
different from that literally expressed.
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills. It is the greatest rule in
giving effect to a will.
From the testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the
ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the
ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say masses for
the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only
in two situations: (a) during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for priesthood; and (b) in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria as envisaged in the will was
likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in his
favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee. The contention is untenable. A
reading of the testamentary provisions does not support the view that the parish priest was a
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who
became a priest.
The CA correctly rules that this case is covered by Article 956 of the Civil Code which provides
that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate,
except in cases of substitution and those in this the right of accretion exists."
This case is also covered by Article 960(2) which provides "legal succession takes place when the
will does not dispose of all the belongings to the testator." There being mo substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the legal heirs. The
effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. If a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy