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Abstract- This article examines the British political legacy on the development of politics in
Malaya. It argues that British legacy had shaped political development in Malaya especially after
Second World War. The British viewed security threats from sources such as rivalries between
states in Malaya, the Japanese occupation and later on the Communist insurgencies as reasons
to justify the policy of intervention and colonial rule in Malaya. The British colonial influence was
profound because it established the institutions and policies on which the later ruling regime was
based. This is important to understand the earlier political development in Malaya (now known as
Malaysia). The post colonial Malaya inherited the colonial legacy in terms of a multi-ethnic
society, the federal type of political system, and the government. All these are important factors
that have shaped Malaya. Accordingly, this article will explore the British existence in Malaya and
the reaction of early local political movements toward the British administration. This is followed
by an assessment of the society, in which the British implemented a political party system and
reinforced the principle of political accommodation between ethnic groups. This article utilized
primary data from documents in British National Archive and secondary data such as books,
journals and newspaper.
TheBritishLegacyandtheDevelopmentofPoliticsinMalaya
2014. Rizal Yaakop. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNoncommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
I.
Introduction
Ibid. p.115
Allen, R.,, Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect: The impact and
aftermath of colonial rule (London: Oxford University Press, 1968),
p.30; Tarling, N., Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) ch.5
4
Turnbull, C .M., The Straits Settlements, 1826-67: Indian Presidency
to Crown Colony (London, The Athlone Press, 1972, chs.9 and 10;
Tarling, N., British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago,
1824-1871, (Kuala Lumpur, 1969).
5
Tarling, N., Imperialism in Southeast Asia A fleeting, passing phase
(London: Routledge, 2001), pp.48-49.
6
Jackson, R., The Malayan Emergency, (London: Routledge, 1991),
pp. 3-4.
3
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was that Britain would provide military aid for the Sultan
if Kedah should be invaded by her powerful neighbour,
Siam. Harry Ord, the first governor of the Straits
Settlement reported that it would be greatly to the
advantage of the Settlements if our influence could be
extended over the Peninsular. 7 The British perception
on security issues in the region led them to intervene in
local affairs, which started a long lasting rule in Malaya
and Singapore. The British strategy of intervention was
due to two main factors. First, the chaotic situation in the
region led the British to provide security measures in
order to protect their economic interests. Secondly,
British military protection was needed by the local
people.
It is important to note here that the British
justified their intervention based on the argument that
the whole economy of Malaya was threatened by interstate division and rivalry among the Malay rulers. In
some states, anarchy prevailed. In addition to being
threatened by domestic rivalries, the British also claimed
that their trade, especially with China, was threatened by
sea pirates and state rivalries in the region. 8 A policy of
protecting trade and commerce at the cost of direct
political and military intervention was practised. This
officially marked a change of policy from non
intervention to intervention, which was also stressed by
Lord Kimberly, the Colonial Secretary who commented
that due to insecurity, the British viewed some sort of
action in Malaya was necessary. 9 According to
MacIntyre, the interests of the British Settlements
required that the British should exert their influence to
put an end to the state anarchy and disorder which
prevailed in several states. 10 Robert Heussler has
argued that the Governor of the Straits Settlements was
directed to implement the policy of intervention but he
was not to let matters go so far that the home
government might be called on to sanction political
moves that would involve military expenses and trouble
with other European powers or native authorities
nearby. 11 Furthermore, the intervention policy was
formalized with the signing of the Pangkor Treaty in
1874.
In addition, a British security role was welcomed
by some of the Malay rulers and the Chinese business
Power
British intervention in Malaya transformed the
demography and political geography of Malaya. The
earliest occupant of Malaya was the Malays. Perhaps
the most important aspect of the colonial legacy was on
the way the Malay power was consolidated. Malay
identity was becoming more synchronised after the
Second World War and especially in the aftermath of the
Malayan Union proposal of 1946. 15 Political expediency
arising from the aforementioned developments further
reinforced a sense of identity when the term Malay was
constitutionally defined. The 1957 constitution defined a
Malay as one who professes the Muslim religion;
habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms
to Malay custom. 16 The official definition of Malay
identity was inherited from colonialism: The modern
Malaysian constitutions definition of Malay is derived
from a 1913 colonial enactment in which a Malay was a
person belonging to any Malay race who habitually
speaks the Malay language . . . and professes the
Muslim religion. 17 This statement made the Malays
believe that Malaya is a Malay country and that it
should be ruled by Malays.
The British brought in the immigrant Chinese
and Indians to provide labour for the burgeoning tin and
Emerson, R., Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (Kuala
Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964), pp. 112-118.
13
Chowdhury, A., Malaysia in Transition. In: Walid, A. (ed.) The
ASEAN Region in Transition, (Singapore: Ashgate 1997), p. 44.
14
CO 273/42. Minute by Kimberly 21, p. vii.
15
A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan
Union Experiment, 19421948, Monograph 8 (Kuala Lumpur:
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979).
16
Malayan Constitutional Documents (Kuala Lumpur: Government
Press, 1962), p. 124.
17
Sheridan, L.A. Federation of Malaya Constitution (Singapore: Univ.
of Malaya Law Review, 1961); Ong, A., State versus Islam: Malay
Families, Womens Bodies, and the Body Politic in Malaysia,
American Ethnologist 17, no. 2 (1990): p.259; Rogers, M.L.,
Politicization and Political Development in a Rural Malay Community,
Asian Survey, 9/12 (1969), p.931.
12
7
CO 273/18, Ord to Buckingham. 8. iv. 1868. Cited in MacIntyre,
David Britains Intervention in Malaya. The Origin of Lord Kimberleys
Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873, Journal of South East Asian
History, Vol.II, No.3, 1961, pp.47-69.
8
Purcell, V., The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press,
1948), pp.104-110
9
CO 273/67. Kimberly to Clarke. 20. p. ix. 1873. Cited in MacIntyre,
David Britains Intervention in Malaya. The Origin of Lord Kimberleys
Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873, Journal of South East Asian
History, Vol.II, No.3, 1961, pp.47-69.
10
Ibid. p.50
11
Heussler, R., British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and
Its Predecessors, 1867-1942, (Oxford: Ohio Press, 1982), p.6
18
CAB 98/41, CMB (44)3 Future constitutional policy for British
colonial territories in South-East Asia: memorandum by Mr Stanly for
War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 14 Jan 1944.
19
Koon, H. P., Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian
Chinese Association (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 15.
20
CAB 129/28, CP(48)171 The Situation in Malaya: Cabinet
memorandum by Mr Creech Jones. See also Vaughan, J. D. The
Mannerisms and Customs of the Straits Chinese (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1879); Fong, M.L., The Sociology of Secret
1980), p.18
22
CAB 129/28, CP(48)171 The Situation in Malaya: Cabinet
memorandum by Mr Creech Jones.
23
CO 537/3746, no.9, a note by Linehan on the Malay dimension, 2
March 1948.
24
Andaya, B. W. and Andaya.. L.Y., A History of Malaysia, (Hampshire:
Palgrave, 2001), p. 248.
25
Lopez, C. The British Presence in the Malay World: A Meeting of
Civilizational
Traditions.
Online
article.
(Available
Online)
www.penerbit.ukm.my/jsari19-01.pdf. (Accesses 24/10/2005)
26
CO 825/354, no.52, A post-war settlement in the Far East: need for
a definite policy: joint CO-FO memorandum, August 1942. Cited in
Stockwell, A.J. (ed.), Malaya: Part 1, The Malayan Union Experiment,
1942-1948 (London: HMSO, 1995) , p.23
27
Ibid, p.23
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34
37
Mintz, J.S., Marxism in Indonesia. In: Trager, F.N. (ed.) Marxism in
Southeast Asia. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959),
pp.171-239; See also Benda, H.J. and McVey, R.T. (eds.), The
communist uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia : key documents
Year
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Malaya was left out. KRIS was then disbanded and the
unfinished task was passed on to its successor, The
Malay Nationalist Party (MNP). To the KMM, the
Japanese occupation seemed to be an opportunity to
strengthen their weak pre-war position. As the only antiBritish Malay nationalist group, they hoped that the
Japanese would treat their movement well. Indeed,
through tactical collaboration with the Japanese, the
KMM leaders intended to strengthen the Malays to the
point where they could demand the independence of
Malaya within Indonesia. Ibrahim Yaacob had promised
KMMs cooperation to the Japanese. Many other KMM
leaders such as Ahmad Boestamam, Pak Sako, Idris
Hakim and M.N. Othman did not know about a secret
pact between Ibrahim Yaacob and the Japanese. 34
However, the KMM attempts failed due to a few
main reasons. In the first place, the KMM did not have
inherent support among the elite Malays. Most of the
supporters
were
non-aristocrats
and
peasant
background. Secondly, the Japanese policies toward
the KMM greatly hampered its cause and at the same
time, they were distrusted by the MCP. Finally, the KMM
did not have enough military force for Malay nationalists
to achieve their aims. They were weak and lacked a
strong power base. Most of the intelligence activities
were done by untrained amateurs. They even relied on
information from prostitutes in certain cabarets in the
major towns, especially Kuala Lumpur. These led to the
KMMs failure to extend its organizational roots further in
the Malay community and to upgrade its actual strength
as a nationalist force during the war period. Ibrahim
Yaacob failed to establish a strong nationalist force
before the Japanese regime collapsed. The movement
failed and Ibrahim Yaacob fled to Indonesia. 35
However, the inability of Malay leaders to amass
support and to confront both the British and the
Japanese would be significant for the post-war course
of Malay politics. Stockwell notes that The war time
dislocation of society contributed, on the one hand, to a
general consciousness amongst Malays of their
precarious economic and political position in relation to
the non-Malay world, and, on the other hand, to a
greater instability within their own community, with the
result that, at the end of Japanese rule, tension was
released not in the triumph of a pan-peninsular
movement but also in sporadic communalism. 36
The other local political movement was MCP. It
was created due to an early Communist movement in
Malaya as a reaction to the emergence of the ideology
and its movement in Indonesia. Mintz noted that
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Union
The British proposed a Malayan Union in which
all eleven states on the peninsula were to be unified
under a central government administered by the British.
Included with the proposed plan was the granting of
citizenship to all who were born in Malaya or who had
lived there for at least ten years. 58 The unification of the
54
(Singapore : Singapore University Press , 1983); Kheng, C.B., SinoMalay conflicts in Malaya, 1945-1946 : communist vendetta and
Islamic resistance in Journal of Southeast Asian studies, v.12, (1981),
pp. 108-117
57
Kheng, C.B., The masked comrades : a study of the communist
united front in Malaya, 1945-48 (Singapore : Times Books
International, 1979), p.19
58
Lau, A., Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and
Controversy in Malaya 194248, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
20, no. 2 (1989): pp. 216243; Sopiee, M.N., From Malayan Union to
Year
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Press, 1974).
70
Rahmat, M., Barisan Nasional: Balancing Communal Rights (Kuala
Lumpur, Dasar Cetak Sdn. Bhd, 1998)
71
CO 537/1581, HQ Malaya Command weekly intelligence review,
no.17, 23 February, 1946
VII.
76
72
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82
Chee, S., Consociational political leadership and conflict regulation in
Malaysia. In: Chee, S. (ed.) Leadership and security in south east
Asia: Institutional aspect (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1991), pp. 53-86.
83
Vorys, K.V., Democracy without consensus: Communalism and
political stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton university press, 1975)
84
Milne, R.S., Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore:
Federal publications, 1978), pp.130-131.
85
Ibid. pp.130-131.
86
Chee, S., Consociational political leadership and conflict regulation
in Malaysia. In: Chee, S. (ed.) Leadership and security in south east
Asia: Institutional aspects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1991), pp. 53-83.
87
Vorys, K.V., Democracy Without Consensus, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975), pp. 14-15
88
Vorys, K.V., . p.151
89
Loh, F.K.W., The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia (Singapore:
Maruzen Asia, 1982), p.7
90
Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, ( Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1970) p.142.
91
Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in the
Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1979)
92
Baharudin, S.A., The Construction and Transformation of a Social
Identity: Malayness and Bumiputraness Re-examined. Journal of
Asian and African Studies 52, (1996), pp. 15-33.
93
Cmd. 9714, Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional
Conference, February 1956, p.10.
94
CO/1030/72, Memorandum by Col. H.S. Lee, a member of the
Malayan delegation to secretary of state for Colonial, 31 Jan 1956.
95
PREM 8/1406/2, MAL C (50) 12. Report on Malaysia
96
Tregonning, K., Malaya: 1955, Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, No.
2, (June 1956), p.25
97
Thompson, R., Defeating Communist Insurgency ( Praeger: New
York, 1966), pp. 50-57.
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Conclusion