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JURISDICTION Judicial Stability

Atty. Cabili vs. Judge Balindong


2011-09-06 | A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
FACTS:
Illigan RTC issued a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of a decision against MSU, holding the latter
liable for damages for a vehicular accident. The sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU's
depositary bank, the LBP. The OSG opposed the motion for execution but denied. The MSU responded
to the denial by filing a petition with the Marawi City RTC presided by the respondent judge, for
prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.
The respondent judge issued a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of
execution issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing from MSU's LBP-Marawi City Branch
account. Later on, respondent judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the judge violated the elementary rule on judicial stability or non-interference.
Held: YES.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by the injunction.The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a
court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as
still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide
the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings.
Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Court's deliberations,
finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other
than the judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a
claim with another court which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary
restraining order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU
itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the
enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for
relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court, or to elevate the
matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan
City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal
court presided
over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an
erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the
writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not
discretionary. The appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court
in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body.
SPOUSES ALFREDO vs CA
G.R. No. 118830 | 2003-02-24
Facts: This case involves three different cases filed in separate jurisdictions.

CFI Manila - Family Savings Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the CFI of Manila, for the collection of a
sum of money against its debtor Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc. and Alfredo Ching, who acted as a surety
for Cheng Ban. The Bank obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants.
Respondent Ferdinand J. Guerrero, the deputy sheriff of the CFI of Manila, proceeded to levy upon a
conjugal property belonging to the spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching.
CFI Rizal Spouses Ching filed a petition seeking to declare illegal the levy on attachment upon their
conjugal property. The trial court, however, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the
subject property was already under custodia legis of the CFI of Manila.
Meanwhile, CFI MNL favored the Bank and granted its motion for execution pending appeal (CA). As a
consequence, the attached conjugal property was levied upon and sold through public auction by the
deputy sheriff to the Bank.
RTC Makati - Spouses Ching filed a second annulment case to declare void the levy and sale on
execution of their conjugal property on the basis that the sheriff had no authority to levy upon a
property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
The decision in the collection case became final.
The RTC of Makati rendered judgment in favor of spouses Ching and declared void the levy and sale on
execution upon the conjugal property. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC of Makati and
declared that the Makati annulment case is barred by res judicata because of the prior Rizal annulment
case and Manila collection case.
ISSUE: WON RTC of Makati has jurisdiction.
Held: RTC Makati has no jurisdiction.
RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy and sale on execution that was ordered by
the CFI of Manila, a co-equal court. The determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property
in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of justice.
A separate and distinct case from that in which the execution has issued is proper if instituted by a
"stranger" to the latter suit. Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff
in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief
therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, the executing court. This is true even if a new
party has been impleaded in the suit.
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account
of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" NO. EXC: what were
executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party to the
case.
JURISDICTION OVER SM
HOME GUARANTY CORP. vs. R-II BUILDERS INC., and NHA
G.R. No. 192649 | 2011-03-09
Facts:
NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the
PNB (later replaced by PDB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which

provided the mechanics for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP).

The parties likewise executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by the trustee
and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to pay
the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.
However, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to
an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of
the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's
favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.
R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA before Branch 24 of the MNL RTC, a Special
Commercial Court (SCC); for HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining
possession of the Asset Pool. Branch 24 of the MNL RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought
by R-II Builders.
HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which
included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue.
R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted
the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. In lieu thereof, said
pleading introduced causes of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset
Pool.
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order to the effect, among other matters, that it did
not have the authority to hear the case. As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent
Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent RTC) which subsequently issued an order which, having
determined that the case is a real action, admitted the aforesaid Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, subject to R-II Builders' payment of the "correct and appropriate" docket fees.
However, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its
previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the nonpayment of the correct docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II
Builders' cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool.
Respondent RTC denied HGC's motion to dismiss; granted R-II Builders' motion to admit its Second
Amended Complaint;
HGC filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, w/c denied the petition and
affirmed the order of RTC.
ISSUES:
1) Whether a branch of the RTC which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to
remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction.
2) Whether the case is a real or personal action; and whether correct docket fees were paid.
HELD: Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a
case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law,the rule is settled that a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law
in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
1) RTC Br. 24 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case
to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 24 could take on
the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The directive for the re-raffle of the case is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it
had in the same breath declared it did not have. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the
impression that its previously issued preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from
which it issued was not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a
transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts
which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case
cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

2) R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both
interposed causes of action for conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entire
Asset Pool, for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or
estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. Despite the R-IIs
withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that
respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of the correct docket
fees.
The test in ascertaining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation is
by determining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand,
considered capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money,
the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a
consequence of, the principal relief sought. To our mind, the application of foregoing test does not,
however, preclude the further classification of actions into personal actions and real action, for which
appropriate docket fees are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, real actions
are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. While personal actions
should be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,the venue for real actions is the court of the
place where the real property is located.
In Gochan v. Gochan, this Court held that an action for specific performance would still be considered a
real action where it seeks the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of
deeds of conveyance of real property.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action.
(An action for declaration of nullity of share issue, receivership and corporate dissolution is one where
the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.)
Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed
fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,77 viz.:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the

court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on
the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders'
Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions
rendered by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case, said
decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the party to pay the correct docket fees
and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II
Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended
and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second
Amended Complaint.
DESPOSITION: REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the regular
courts'(RTC Branch 22, 24) orders. The complaint of R-II Builders first before Br. 24 and thereafter
before
Br.
22
both
of
the
RTC
of
Manila
is
hereby
DISMISSED.

JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES


CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, et. Al
G.R. No. 162416 | 2006-01-31
FACTS: Chester de Joya was among the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State
Resources Development Management Corporation charged as participants in the conspiracy to commit
the crime of syndicated estafa.
The respondent judge found the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him and his co-accused. De Joya filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks
the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 03-219952.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to seek relief from SC or from the trial court as he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
HELD: NO.
There is no exceptional reason (when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law
or to protect the orderly administration of justice) in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from
the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the
accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. It should be
remembered that he who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
(Justice Regalado)
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance
or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court
to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the
parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed
in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their
implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation).
This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing
it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the
court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a nonresident defendant.
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of a non-resident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action
involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims
an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is
merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any
action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
The documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
JUROSDICTION OVER THE RES
MELINA P. MACAHILIG vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT
G.R. No. 141423 | 2000-11-15
FACTS: Magalit filed with the then Philippine Fisheries Commission -- now BFAR-- Fishpond Application
for 11 hectares of land situated in the Municipality of Batan, Province of Aklan. Macahilig protested
Magalit's application contending that for a period of 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the
five-hectare area included in Magalit's application.
The Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict, Office of the President and IAC concluded that
Macahilig was merely Magalit's laborer and caretaker.
Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of
Execution. Then it filed a Motion for Correction of the Implementation for the court to properly
implement the IAC decision.
On September 17, 1992, Judge Maria Carillo-Zaldivar issued the following Order:
"Finding from the Ma[n]ifestation of counsel on record for the movant that the two (2) hectares of land
she desires to be executed thru an alias writ is outside the ten (10) hectares awarded to her by the
Fisheries, this Court has no jurisdiction over her claim.
Subsequently, Dr. Magalit filed a "Petition for Contempt Against Melina Macahilig," alleging that
Macahilig had refused to turn over Lot 4417 to her. The trial court and CA ruled in favor of Magalit.
ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res - Lot 4417.
2. WON September 17, 1992 Order constitute res adjudicata barring the June 18 and July 14, 1993
Orders of the trial court.
HELD:
1. YES. It is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. She clearly
submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517. We cannot allow her
to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation
in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction.
One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just
to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If, by deed or
conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the
former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss
or injury to the latter.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition,
the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual
custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the Petition for a
Writ of Execution filed by the respondents' predecessors in interest. Without taking actual physical
control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over
the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the
surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
2. NO. September 17, 1997 Order of the trial court is an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order
cannot give rise to res judicata. Only a final and unappealable judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction can effectively bar another action that has identical parties, subject
matter and cause of action as the prior one.
Petitioner insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two
accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the
period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal
involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as
distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a
judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention.
Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under
the second category.
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2)
the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one
on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. For example, an order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata that
will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments
until the rendition of the final judgment.
Strictly speaking, res judicata does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.
The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 is evident from the fact that the trial
court proceeded to hear and determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in the Fishpond Case.
PETITION DENIED.
CAUSE OF ACTION

SPOUSES HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES EMBUDo


G.R. No. 149554 | 2003-07-01
FACTS: Spouses Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Embudo a complaint for "Annulment
of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorney's
Fees," before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent
Teofredo Embudo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land
situated for a consideration of P15,000.00. However, the TCT was issued solely in Teofredo's name and
that despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the RTC is for the annulment of deed of sale and
partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that
the action is one for annulment of title and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the
complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction
HELD: NO. Designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the
50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents; it should be filed in
the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Pineda vs. CA and the Department of Education, etc.
G.R. No. 181643 | 2010-11-1
FACTS: Pineda entered into a MOA with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr.
Blas, for a 5-year lease of the school canteen. The faculty and personnel of LHS questioned the validity
of the MOA.
DepEd, through Usec. Gascon, declared the MOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled."
Pineda was also ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen.
Pineda filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC, which the latter granted.
DepEd, this time represented by Asec. Montesa, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to
set aside the orders of the RTC.
CA affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEd's motion to dismiss but reversed its order granting the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
ISSUES:
1. WON Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the petition
2. WON MR s/b filed before going to the CA on certiorari

3. WON CA erred in disolving the Writ of Injunction in favor of Pineda


HELD:
1. YES. Respondents were sued in their official capacities. What was actually being assailed by Pineda
in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd's existing guidelines with the
nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal of LHS.15 As Asec. Montesa
merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute the petition
before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies of his office - DepEd. Applying Rule 3,
Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will surely be affected,
favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case before the RTC.
2. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo
to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to
the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of
Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,17 it was written:
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent
nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
3. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to
be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated.20 The DepEd already prohibited Pineda
from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since
Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC's preliminary writ should
be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole
objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes
the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case.
Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status.
Petition DENIED.
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, et.al vs. SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIO RICAFORT
G.R. No. 150159 | 2003-07-25
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Pablo and Antonia Ricafort and spouses Renato and Teresita Villareal
entered into a compromise agreement approved by the court, to divide in half a portion of land under
the name of Spouses Renato and Teresita Villareal.
Not long thereafter, respondents filed a motion to cite Renato and Teresita in contempt of court for
refusing to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement. Before the motion was heard by the
trial court, the siblings of Renato and his co-heirs to the subject lot, filed a motion for intervention and
substitution of parties, alleging that Renato and Teresita have waived their interest in the disputed lot
in their favor.

Later, upon realizing that the compromise judgment was already final, the petitioners filed a petition
for annulment of judgment. They insist that the compromise judgment was a nullity because they were
not impleaded as parties-defendants despite the fact that they were co-heirs of Renato and
indispensable parties therein. They alleged that they only learned of the compromise judgment a year
after it was promulgated.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are indispensable parties?
HELD: NO.
This assertion has no merit given the fact that on its face, the certificate of title shows that the
property is solely owned by Renato Villareal, married to Teresita Villareal, and without any indication
whatsoever that petitioners have an interest in the disputed lot. It must be emphasized that
respondents cannot be expected to know details that are not reflected on the face of the certificate of
title. In other words, no one could have guessed that petitioners were claiming a right over the
property by virtue of succession or, assuming petitioners' allegations to be true, that Renato only held
the property in trust for his brothers and sisters.
Petitioners are also estopped from denying Renato's absolute title to the lot.Verily, since petitioners
themselves admitted that they donated and caused registration of the lot in Renato's name, they
cannot now be allowed to defeat respondents' claim by conveniently asserting that they are co-owners
of the lot.
Thus, for purposes of the action for annulment of TCT No. 199241, the only indispensable partydefendant was Renato and his wife. He is the registered owner of the lot and is conclusively presumed,
for all intents and purposes, to be its owner in fee simple. A certificate of registration accumulates in
one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner which,
in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title showing exactly the owner's real interest over the
property covered thereby.
VENUE
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, Petitioners, versus HON. JANE AURORA C. LANTION,
et.al
G.R. No. 160053 | 2006-08-28
FACTS:
Petitioners defaulted on the payments for peso and dollar loans to the respondent bank, so the latter
foreclosed the mortgaged lots.
Subsequently, petitioners filed against PDB and its officers a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or
Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent
Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. They alleged that only their peso loans
were covered by the mortgages and that these had already been fully paid, hence, the mortgages
should have been discharged.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since the loan
agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.
The respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for
improper venue.
HELD: NO. Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are
restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements.

Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions
shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude
parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely
an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
REAL ACTION
CABUTIHAN vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 146594 | 2002-06-10
A case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where
any of the parties reside.
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A suit for
such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate,
subject of the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees.
FACTS:
Respondent Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation entered into an Agreement with
Petitioner Cabutihan to execute the appropriate document assigning, conveying, transferring and
delivering particular lots (situated in the Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal) in favor of the
latter, as a compensation upon accomplishment of some undertakings. Cabutihan performed and
accomplished the undertakings in the agreement but the respondent failed to comply with its
obligations, as embodied in the agreement, despite petitioner's formal demand.
Cabutihan filed an action for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Pasig City.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismis alleging improper venue as one of the issues.They contended
that
the case is for recovery of respondent corporation's land or her interest therein. Thus, a real action or
an action in rem.
ISSUE: WON Venue was improperly laid.
HELD: YES.
The action is in personam. The petitioner ultimately sought the conveyance of real property, not
located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is an anticipated consequence and beyond the
cause for which the action was instituted.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the
parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for
rescission.
In Commodities Storage cited earlier, petitioner spouses obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over
their land and ice plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to pay the loan, the mortgage
was foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the RTC of Manila, they sued the bank for damages
and for the fixing of the redemption period. Since the spouses ultimately sought redemption of the
mortgaged property, the action affected the mortgage debtor's title to the foreclosed property; hence,
it was a real action.[18] Where the action affects title to the property, it should be instituted in the trial
court where the property is situated.[19]
In National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court held that "an action in which petitioner seeks
the execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor x x x has been held to be for the
recovery of the real property and not for specific performance since his primary objective is to regain
the ownership and possession of the parcel of land."

However, in La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada,[21] private respondents filed an action for specific
performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly reneged on their
contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City - - a piece of property which the latter sold
to petitioner while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim
ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants' ownership
thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the
property was situated in Bago.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals,[22] private respondent filed a case for specific performance with
damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they
sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained
the trial court's order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with
damages. Contrary to petitioners' position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the
case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the
original Complaint.
ACTION IN PERSONAM
GOMEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 127692 | 2004-03-10
FACTS:
Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr.
Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction
and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners
who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey
ownership of the properties to petitioners.
An action for specific performance and/or rescission was filed by herein petitioners.
Defendants filed for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the RTC-Cebu in favor of the
plaintiffs. They alleged that the trial court's decision is null and void on the ground that it did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and
the complaint.
ISSUE: W/N action is an action in personam
HELD: YES.
To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of the action filed
against them must first be determined. It will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.
In the present case, petitioners' cause of action is anchored on the claim that the spouses Jesus and
Caridad Trocino reneged on their obligation to convey ownership of the two parcels of land subject of
their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the
appropriate deed of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in the alternative,
that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their down
payment in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect the
parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
Contrary to petitioners' belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or rescission is not
an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or possession of the two parcels of
land, it does not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem.
The objective sought in petitioners' complaint was to establish a claim against respondents for their
alleged refusal to convey to them the title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their
father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners. Hence, this case is an

action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the basis
of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in
order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons.
PLEADINGS
NHA versus BASA
G.R. No. 149121 | 2010-04-20
FACTS:
NHA obtained a Writ of Possession from RTC, ordering spouses Basa to vacate the lots extrajudicially
foreclosed in favor of the former. Spouses Basa filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and assailed the
validity of the foreclosure proceedings and their right of redemption.
Issue:
W/N the petition complies with the requirements of Rules on verification of pleadings
Held:
3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the best of
my own personal knowledge."
A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that he
had read the allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his personal knowledge.
The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of my personal knowledge" did not violate
the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant declared that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his personal knowledge.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a
pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
faith.[37] To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn
statement confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of
the affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records.[38]
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A
strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be avoided.
CERT. AGAINST FS
HEIRS OF JUANA GAUDIANE et.al vs. CA
G.R. No. 119879 | 2004-03-11
FACTS:
Felix executed a document entitled Escritura whereby he sold to his sister Juana his one-half share in
Lot No. 4156 covered by TCT No. 3317-A. However, the Escritura stated that Lot No. 4156 was declared
under Tax Declaration No. 18321 and said tax declaration was for another parcel of land, Lot 4389 and
not Lot 4156.

Descendants of Juana, the Isos, claimed that the sale included not only Lot 4156 but also Lot 4389. So
they filed a pleading in the trial court seeking to direct the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City to
cancel OCT 2986-A covering Lot 4389 and to issue a new title in favor of the Isos. This was later
withdrawn after respondents' predecessors-in-interest, Gaudiane, opposed it on the ground that the
Isos falsified their copy of the Escritura by erasing "Lot 4156" and intercalating in its place "Lot 4389."
The Isos again tried their luck to acquire title in their name by filing in 1975 a case for quieting of title
of Lot 4389 but the same was dismissed without prejudice.
The Isos later filed another action for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 6817, but it was again
dismissed by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, due to the failure of the plaintiffs (the Isos) to
prosecute and to comply with the orders of the court. When the judgment became final, respondents
sent a letter to Ines Iso asking her to surrender the possession of the one-half portion of Lot No. 4389
comprising Felix' share. The Isos refused.
The respondents filed the present case for partition of Lot 4389, accounting of proceeds and damages
against herein petitioners.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Issue: WON the defense of ISOS in present case is barred by res judicata
Held: YES.
We cannot delve anymore into the legality and validity of the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 6817
because it has long become final and executory for failure of the petitioners to file an appeal. In
accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[8] said order had the effect of
judgment on the merits although no trial was conducted because it did not contain any statement that
the case was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a similar future action. As such, based on the
principle of res judicata, the petitioners are barred in another action (involving the same subject
matter, parties and issues) from raising a defense and from asking for a relief inconsistent with an
order dismissing an earlier case with prejudice.
Considering the similarity of petitioners' defense in this case with their main averment in the case for
quieting of title, petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership of Lot 4389.
In Medija vs. Patcho, et al. we ruled that a case for partition and an action for quieting of title have
identical causes of action and can therefore be the subject of res judicata.
For reasons of public policy, res judicata cannot be waived by a party because the time and energy of
the State and the taxpayers are wasted by the re-litigation of settled issues.
Genuiness of a Document
SPOUSES DONATO vs. CA
G.R. No. 102603 | 1993-01-18
Facts: In this case, the petitioners possessed a land which is not the same land they hold title to. The
land in dispute is Lot 5145. owned by the deceased mother of the respondents, but is still in
possession of the petitioners, who likewise owned Lot no. 5303 (foreclosed mortgage from Carolina,
original vendee) located near the land in question. The petitioners believed that Lot 5145 is the very
same Lot No. 5303 over which they hold the title of ownership; that it was a matter of oversight on the
part of the Bureau of Lands, that the identity of these two parcels was not reflected in their title.
According to the petitioners, Ochave's (original vendor) ownership over the same parcel finds support
in the Deed of Sale executed by Basilio Rarang, who allegedly derives his authority as petitioners
mother's agent from a Special Power of Attorney duly executed in his favor.
Issue:
1. WON the SPA executed by the mother of the respondents is null and void.
2. WON respondents deemed admitted the genuiness and execution of the SPA.

HELD: The SPA is null and void and all subsequent transactions involving Lot 5145 and springing from
the SPA are also null and void. Consequently, on this alone, petitioners' claim of ownership should be
rejected outright.
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the rule on implied admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document subject of an action or defense, the same is not without
exception. One such exception is when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument. Respondents Lolita and Ernesto were mere witnesses to the SPA in question and as such,
they cannot be considered as parties to the instrument. Moreover, the same document should not be
afforded a presumption of genuineness and due execution. In view of the various discrepancies found
by the trial court, it lacks the veracity to entitle it to any degree of credibility.
Negative Pregnant
PHILAMGEN and TPI vs. SLI, DVAPSI and CA
G.R. No. 87434 | 1992-08-05
Facts:
SLI is an interisland carrier used by a foreign common carrier to tranship to Davao two consignments of
cargoes covered by Bill of Ladings. The cargoes took on board at Baton City, LA for shipment to Manila
and later for transhipment to Davao. Both cargoes consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust
Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics. However, when the cargoes were discharged
from the interisland carrier into the custody of the consignee, it was found out that some bags were
either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled
or were fully/partially emptied, but, worse, the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and
therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose.
The petitioners filed for damages due to respondents negligence and the trial court ruled in their favor.
However, the CA reversed the lower court's decision, in effect dismissing the complaint of petitioners.
Issue:
WON respondent court erred in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-called prescriptive
period.
Held:
Although the bills of lading that contains the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a
court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on
such bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are
inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative
rights of the parties thereto.
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so
considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the
court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face
of relevant pleadings. In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised
by SLI in its answer, except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in
evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be maintained as
such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere references thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in
the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness and due
execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party.
The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said
documents
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of
the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by
the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to

have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when the
due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's
failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural
earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with
the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is
in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity
of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and said
stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.
WAIVER OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA and PASTOR
G.R. No. L-47847 | 1981-07-31
Facts:
Respondent Manuela Pastor applied for the registration under R.A. 496 of 13 parcels of land. The
respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, uninterrupted,
open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of ownership for more than
thirty (30) years.CFI granted the application. Upon appeal, the petitioners contend that some of the
lots are subject of a Cadastral case, which either way, whether the decision in such case had become
final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496 cannot prosper because of
the principles of res adjudicata and litis pendentia. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.
Issue: WON the defense of res judicata and/or litis pendencia were deemed waived by failure to set up
during the trial.
Held: YES. The oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set
up the defense of res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of
oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal.
Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:
"SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. - Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; . . ."
The defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed
waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner
herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of. The decision in
Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor;
because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree
contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter
complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as
said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).
SPECIFIC DENIAL
RP, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.DE NERI
G.R. No. 139588 | 2004-03-04
FACTS:
OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of Deeds of CDO City as compliance to Decree No. N-361749
issued by the CFI in its decision granting the heirs of Graciano their application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title for Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, which was also approved by the

Land registration Commission and certified by the Bureau of Forest Development as alienable and
disposable.
Subsequently, the OSG thru the Director of the Bureau of Lands sought for the annulment of the OCT
No. 0662 and the reversion of the property, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction over the person and on
the subject matter, as well as due to non-compliance with Comm. Act No. 141, which mandates that a
copy of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title should be duly served on the Director
of the Bureau of Lands; and non-compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which requires the
plan to be re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in this case, Plan (LRC)
SWO-150.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents and that
the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the same.
Held: YES.
As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the private respondents had the burden of complying with the
statutory requirement of serving the Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application
and amended application, and to show proof of their compliance thereon.
The question that comes to fore then is whether or not the petitioner was burdened to prove its
allegation that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had approved Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The answer to
the question is dependent on the resolution of the issue of whether or not the private respondents
admitted the same, impliedly or expressly, in their answer to the complaint and in their pleadings.
"As regards the Report required by the provisions of Section 3 of PD 239, the records show that a
Report has been made to the Director of Lands, Manila, by the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands
in Cagayan de Oro City. "
The private respondents failed to specifically deny the petitioner's averment in its complaint that LRC
Plan SWO-150 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The private respondents
thereby impliedly admitted that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan
as required by Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239.
In light of the private respondents' admission, the petitioner was relieved of its burden of still proving
that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan of Lot 2821 before the trial
court rendered its decision.
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of
Lands. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan
and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no value.
Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in
the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings,
not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is
to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts
averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party
would be successful if he offers no evidence.
However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the petitioner in the trial court to prove
the material allegations of its complaint. This is provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
Burden of proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a
general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:

(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.


(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been
sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as those
admitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
(5) Facts which are legally presumed.
(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail;
it does not shift the burden of proof.[36] In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration
Commission and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of serving
a copy of the application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner
to prove..
A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence
and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary
evidence.
On the first issue, the rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed in this Court on a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held that the finding
of facts of the appellate court may be questioned in this Court, where as in this case, the latter's
judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are contrary to the admissions
of the parties, or when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
COUNTERCLAIM
SPOUSES JAVIER vs. IAC
G.R. No. 75379 | 1989-03-31
FACTS: Private respondent has been charged with estafa under B.P. Blg. 22 in the RTC of Makati for
issuing a check subsequently dishonored. The civil case was not reserved. Subsequently, private
respondent filed a civil action - a complaint for damages - against the petitioners in the RTC of
Catarman, Northern Samar. In this complaint, the defendants were charged with having inveigled
Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the Makati court. The complaint in
effect explains why he issued the check for which he is now facing prosecution.
Issue: WON respondent can raise the reason for issuing the check in another court, in a separate civil
action for damages filed by him against the petitioners.
Held: NO. As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal case in the RTC of Makati.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other
cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party
without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court.
It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal charge of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil action based

on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court that he could offer
evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. This he should have done in the
form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the petitioners. In fact, the
counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent upon the implied
institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances
are present: (1) that it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 12
All these circumstances are present in the case before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
As Chief Justice Concepcion said in Aytona v. Castillo: 14
Good faith, morality and propriety form the basic foundation of claims to equitable reliefs . . . Needless
to say, there are instances wherein not only strict, legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness
should be taken into account.
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments for harassment and the circumvention
of the law through cunning manipulations of the procedural rules by counsel who may be too clever for
their own good. Rules of procedure are intended to expedite rather than complicate, and much less to
obstruct, the administration of justice. There is no excuse why the bench and the bar should not know
this principle by now.
The applicable provision is Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading in full as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
CALIBRE TRADERS, INC. vs. BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 161431 October 13, 2010
FACTS:
Calibre was one of Bayerphils distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the provinces of
Pangasinan and Tarlac. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to Calibre after the latter failed to
settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1,751,064.56.
As Bayerphils authorized dealer, Calibre then enjoyed discounts and rebates. Subsequently, however,
the parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations of these discounts. Calibre,
although aware of the deadline to pay its debts with Bayerphil, nevertheless withheld payment to
compel Bayerphil to reconcile its accounts.
Calibre then filed a suit for damages, accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship
agreement by manipulating Calibres accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging
unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it
out of business. Bayerphil counterclaimed the unpaid accounts of Calibre, but failed to pay docket fees
on the belief that their counterclaim is compulsory.
Issue: WON Bayerphil's counterclaim is permissive.
Held:
YES. Bayerphils counterclaim is permissive, but the trial court should have given it the opportunity to
pay the docket fees since it did not avoid paying said fees.

Court has already laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as
the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? The fourth test is the
compelling test of compulsoriness.
Bayerphils suit may independently proceed in a separate action. Although the rights and obligations
of the parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each other
are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. The counterclaim for collection of money is not
intertwined with or contingent on Calibres own claim for damages, which was based on the principle of
abuse of rights. Both actions involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence.
All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its
counterclaim was compulsory.
VERIFICATION
Attys. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs. Judge RALPH S. LEE and Sheriff DE
LA CRUZ JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518 | 2004-01-15
FACTS: Petitioners filed an administrative complaint against Judge Lee with manifest partiality,
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; and Sheriff de la Cruz Jr. with unjust, oppressive,
irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of attachment.
The complainants are counsels for the defendants in a civil case for Sum of Money with Prayer for
Preliminary Attachment. Properties of the defendants were attached bu later on discharged because of
the bond deposited by the defendants. Subsequently, respondent judge through an urgent ex-parte
motion to withdraw cash deposit, ordered the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and
released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered.
In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that the Complaint was fatally defective, because
complainants did not have legal personality to file it; neither did they present affidavits, verified
statements or any authority to represent their clients. Further, the Complaint did not contain a
certification of non-forum shopping, but instead had a handwritten verification not sworn to or
subscribed before an administering officer.
Issue: WON the complaint is fatally defective.
Held: NO.
Specious is the argument of respondent judge that complainants have no legal personality to file the
instant Administrative Complaint against him. His contention that the allegations contained therein are
hearsay also deserves scant consideration. Rule 140 allows the institution of disciplinary proceedings
against judges, not only upon a verified complaint -- supported by affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents substantiating the allegations -- but
even upon an anonymous one. Complainants herein have the requisite personal knowledge and have,
in fact, executed a joint Complaint-Affidavit and substantiated their allegations with pertinent
documents.
The verification in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after the jurat, is sufficient in form and
substance. Such verification is a clear affirmation that they are prepared to establish the truth of the
facts pleaded. In fact, the lack of it is "merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal."
This Court may order the correction of a pleading, "if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice." The jurat that
preceded the verification simply evidences the fact that the Affidavit was properly made and sworn to

before the officer certifying it. Furthermore, a certification against forum shopping is not needed in this
case; Rule 140 makes no such requirement.
However, With respect to the charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant of the
withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an Order he later reversed by ruling that the deposit be returned to
the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not an act revealing gross ignorance of the law or
procedure.
Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of a trial -- specifically, the
satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation.[12] Such order is enforced through a writ that may be issued at
the commencement of an action,[13] commanding the sheriff to attach property, rights, credits or
effects of a defendant to satisfy the plaintiff's demand.[14] Hence, the property of a defendant, when
taken, is put in custodia legis.[15]
In order to prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the defendant (also called the
adverse party) may make a deposit or give a counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in the
order of attachment. Such deposit or counter-bound is intended to secure the payment of any
judgment that the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to the writ) may recover in
the action.[16] After a writ has been enforced, however, the adverse party may still move for the
discharge of the attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a counter-bond to
secure the payment of any judgment[17] the attaching party may recover in the action.[18] The
property attached shall then be released and delivered to the adverse party; and the money deposited
shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
rendered in favor of the prevailing party.[19]
In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered[20] the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the
defendant and released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This action was
clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the discharge of an attachment, the money
deposited shall stand in place of the property released.[21] However, the inadvertence[22] of
respondent judge was not gross enough to merit sanction.
ESTEL vs. DIEGO
G.R. No. 174082 | 2012-01-16
FACTS:
Respondents and petitioners entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. After receiving the
amount of P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material
possession of the subject property to respondents; respondents had been in actual, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot. However the petitioner, together with her two sons and
five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed herein respondents thru
the use of force and violence.
The respondents then filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for
TRO.
In petitioners' Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, she denied the material
allegations in the Complaint. MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the RTC
and CA.
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner raised the issue that complaint states no cause of action because
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and,
as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading.
ISSUE:
WON the complaint should have been dismissed due to non-compliance with the requirement
regarding verification.
HELD: NO.
Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised
before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court

finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification.
A reading of respondents' verification reveals that they complied with the above quoted procedural
rule. Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and
correct based on their personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase
"of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being
sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct
based on their personal knowledge.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents'
Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any
similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other
action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact
to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the
part of respondents.
It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of.22 This is because the requirement of strict compliance with
the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.23 It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.
MEDADO vs HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING
G.R. No. 186720 | 2012-02-08
FACTS:
Spouses Medado) and the Estate of Consing, as represented by Soledad, executed Deeds of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage for the former's acquisition from the latter of the property in Cadiz City
identified as Hacienda Sol. Records indicate that the sale included certain parcels of land. As part of
the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with PNB.
Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government via
the DAR's Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program. The Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC,
Branch 44 of Bacolod City an action for rescission and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-11320
against Spouses Medado, PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the
spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement.
In the meantime that civil case for rescission was pending, LBP issued in favor of the Estate of Consing
a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered by the
VOS. It prompted Spouses Medado to institute an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO, with the RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City. They asked that the following be issued by the trial court:
(a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the VOS
proceeds of the lots offered by the Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from
receiving these proceeds; and (b) writ of mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the remaining
amount of the VOS to the spouses.
The RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order granting Spouses Medado's application for the issuance of writs
of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. However, this was nullified and set aside by the
CA upon appeal.
Issue:
WON CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it, notwithstanding alleged
deficiencies in its verification and certification against forum shopping.

Held:
The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition were
substantially complied with, following settled jurisprudence.
The petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and certification against forum shopping of
the petition filed with the CA was defective for being signed only by Soledad, instead of by all the
petitioners.
Records show that Soledad signed the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf
of her co-petitioners by virtue of a SPA attached to the petition filed with the CA, which provides that
their attorney-in-fact Soledad.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before
the CA, including the execution of a verification and certification against forum shopping therefor,
being acts necessary to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and
proper in relation to their rights over the subject properties.
In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common
interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the
verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a
case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus,
under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and
correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
LIM versus NAPOCOR
G.R. No. 178789 | 2012-11-14
FACTS:
This case is about the consequence of a party's failure to explain in his motion why he served a
copy of it on the adverse party by registered mail rather than by personal service.
Respondent NPC filed an expropriation suit against Lim before the RTC of Lingayen covering Lots
2373 and 2374 that the NPC needed for its SualCoal-Fired Thermal Power Project. Pending the case,
respondent spouses Arcinues filed a motion for leave to admit complaint in intervention, alleging that
they owned and were in possession of Lot 2374, one of the two lots subject of the expropriation. On
January 7, 1997 the RTC granted the Arcinues' motion and but Lim and the NPC failed to file their
answers to the complaint-in-intervention. The Arcinues filed a motion for judgment by default. Lim
sought to expunge the motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite explanation why the Arcinues
resorted to service by registered mail rather than to personal service. At the scheduled hearing of the
motion, Lim's counsel did not appear. Subsequently, RTC issued an order of default against both Lim
and the NPC. The RTC pointed out that the Arcinues' failure to explain their resort to service by

registered mail had already been cured by the manifestation of Lim's counsel that he received a copy
of the Arcinues' motion 10 days before its scheduled hearing.
Issue:
WON Motion to Declare in Default be expunged from the records since it lacked the requisite
explanation as to why they resorted to service by registered mail in place of personal service.
Held: NO.
There is no question that the Arcinues' motion failed to comply with the requirement of Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation, why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
But the above does not provide for automatic sanction should a party fail to submit the required
explanation. It merely provides for that possibility considering its use of the term "may." The question
is whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not going for the sanction of striking out the
erring motion.
The Court finds no such grave abuse of discretion here. The fact is that Lim's counsel expressly
admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment by default 10 days before its
scheduled hearing, this means that the Arcinues were diligent enough to file their motion by registered
mail long before the scheduled hearing.
DEFAULT
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY vs. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 176628 | 2012-03-19
FACTS:
PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism,
entered into a contract with AEI for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects.
The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course
aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized
domestic corporation, to build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also provides that
PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.
On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA. Despite the RTCs liberality of
granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the
RTC rendered a judgment of default.
In 2005, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead, filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment was premised
on the argument that the gross negligence of PTAs counsel prevented the presentation of evidence
before the RTC.
Issue:
1) WON negligence of the petitioner's counsel constitute an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment of
judgment
2) WON Annulment of judgment is the proper remedy
Held:
The petition unmeritorious.
The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an orderly
disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of

its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every
party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that a client is bound
by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts
involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it
had been the latters acts.
There was no extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent.Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTAs counsel to be
constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
The records reveal that the judgment of default[10] was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel.
However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[11] Since the failure
of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the
RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.
Annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy.
PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.
In this case, appeal was an available remedy.
Lastly, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for
appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the law.

COUNTERCLAIM
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION vs. THE REPARATIONS
COMMISSION and CA
1987-11-12 | G.R. No. L-29673
FACTS:
An agreement was entered into by the parties for a conditional purchase and sale of raparation goods,
involving a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and three (3) fishing boats sold to VISPAC, for
which it bound itself to pay the total price in 10 equal yearly installments with interest.
Prior to the due date of the first installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder thereof.
VISPAC's response was to file in the CFI of MLA two special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging
ambiguity in the contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the agreement's failure to clearly
state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment of the price would arise.
On the other hand, REPACOM instituted an ordinary civil action for collection when VISPAC failed to pay
despite several demand. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of REPACOM.
The declaratory relief actions had been earlier dismissed by CFI, holding that the clarity of the terms of
the contract eliminated all occasion for interpretation thereof.
Upon appeal by VISPAC of the appellate court's decision affirming the CFI's order in the collection suit,
it contends that it was error on to have affirmed the Trial Court's decision for the collection of the first
installment of the price due from it under its contract with REPACOM, because that money claim should
have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since REPACOM
had not done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby become barred.
Issue:
WON the compulsory counterclaim subject of the collection suit s/b barred.

Held:
A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in
the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. The omission is not
however irremediable or irreversibly fatal.
The Rules provide that when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence,
or excusable negligence, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim
or cross-claim by amendment before judgment. 7 Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a
separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia, 8 and/or
dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata. 9 Res adjudicata may be pleaded as a ground for dismissal
if the
opposing party's claim, involving the same transaction or occurrence as the counterclaim, has already
been adjudicated on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the judgment has become
final; this, on the theory that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters squarely raised
and litigated, but all such other matters as could have been raised but were not.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as
a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not
done. However, under the circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time
that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to pronounce
the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims.
[1/3] BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CO
1993-06-30 | G.R. No. 105751
FACTS:
Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action as plaintiff in the court below to recover a sum of
money arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted to
defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor by his codefendants.
After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the
case was set for Pre-Trial Conference. However, counsel for plaintiff, petitioner herein, failed to attend
the Pre-Trial Conference. The case was dismissed without prejudice by motion of the defendant. Private
respondents moved to set the reception of their evidence in support of their counterclaim. Petitioner
opposed the motion, but it was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of
defendants, carry with it the dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim?
HELD: YES.
The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely permissive but compulsory in nature and
consists of claims for alleged overpayments and damages. Clearly, the same evidence needed to
sustain the counterclaim of private respondents would also refute the cause of action in petitioner's
complaint. For, if private respondents could successfully show that they
actually made overpayments on the credit accommodations extended by petitioner, then the
complaint must fail.
The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication by
the court." This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit
and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.
Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main
action of the case, as when it dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to
the principal controversy, must likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the
grant of any relief under the counterclaim.

Indeed, as Justice Vicente Abad Santos succinctly puts it -- ". . . The petitioner does not object to the
dismissal of the civil case but nonetheless wants her counterclaim therein to subsist. Impossible. A
person cannot eat his cake and have it at the same time. If
the civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein."
More recently, this Court ruled that the dismissal of the complaint on defendant's own motion operated
likewise to dismiss the counterclaim questioning the complaint.
The Rules of Court provides a remedy to recover on defendant's counterclaim if plaintiff moves to
dismiss the case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise objection to the dismissal of the
complaint; in such case, the trial court may not dismiss the main action.
Henceforth, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17,
of the Rules of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he
should only move to have plaintiff declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no
longer present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on the
compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his counterclaim. This
will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his compulsory counterclaim, which is
intertwined with the complaint, because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the complaint and of
the whole case.
THIRD/FOURT PARTY COMPLAINT
GO vs. CA
1993-06-30 | G.R. No. 104609
FACTS:
Five deliveries of denim materials were made by Clover to Philip Go,president and GM of Specifique
Garments, at the latter's address. The delivery receipts and packing lists, indicated Go as the
"customer" and were duly acknowledged by his employees. Of the total purchase of P949,783.22, only
the price for the first delivery in the amount of P146,109.50 was paid to Clover. Demand for the
balance was made on Go and Specifique but to no avail.
Clover filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City against the petitioners for the said balance.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants denied ever having transacted with the plaintiff. Go
alleged that he had bought the denim materials from Lim, to whom he had made full payment, in cash
for the first delivery and by check subsequently encashed for the next four deliveries.
It is noteworthy that Lim was not impleaded in a third-party complaint. Instead, he testified for the
defendants to support their allegations.
ISSUE:
Whether it was Go or William Lim who directly purchased the denim materials from Clover.
HELD:
The denim materials were purchased by Go directly from Clover and not from William Lim.
The first thought that occurs to the Court is why, if Go had really paid Lim the full value of the five
deliveries, the latter was not impleaded by the plaintiffs in a third-party complaint under Rule 6,
Section 12, of the Rules of Court. This rule states: Sec. 12. Third-party complaint. -- A third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party
to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
The circumstance that Go and Lim might have been close friends (although this is not established in
the record) was no impediment to Go's filing the third-party complaint for the protection of his
interests. Even if there were such a friendship, the facts disclose that it was betrayed by Lim when he
did not remit Go's payment to Clover and thus exposed his friend to the complaint and the attachment
of his properties.

What Go should have done as a cautious businessman was to sue Lim in a third-party complaint and to
maintain the suit as long as Lim had not yet complied with his promise.
DE DIOS vs. BALAGOT
1967-08-10 | G.R. No. L-24103
FACTS:
An action for recovery of possession of land was filed by de Dios against Balagot, in the CFI of Rizal, QC
branch, alleging that she is the registered owner of 1,296 square meters of land situated in QC covered
by TCT No. 52577 issued in her name; that she had purchased the same from J.M. Tuason & Co., then
the registered owner of the land; that "prior to September 6, 1960 up to the present" defendant has
been in possession of a portion of about 600 square meters of said parcel of land, without the
knowledge and tolerance of J. M. Tuason & Co., and thaT despite demands, the former failed to vacate
the lot.
The defendant counterclaimed that the portion of land occupied by defendant was first owned by
Deudor; that from Deudor, successor-in-interest of Telesforo, he bought the portion of land in question;
that right after the sale, he took possession of the land, subsequently constructing thereon a house;
that pursuant to an agreement between J. M. Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs, defendant's right to
the land has preference over the sale in favor of plaintiff.
The defendant filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, attaching the same to the
motion, against J. M. Tuason & Co. and Pedro Deudor, for payment of the value of the house and lot in
case of eviction. Plaintiff opposed, stating that a third-party complaint to enforce the warranty of
eviction should have been filed before the time for filing the answer.
Said defendant's motion was denied for lack of merit". Defendant appealed to the CA, but was certified
to the SC for it involves purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
(1) Is the third-party complaint admissible or not?
(2) May the order denying the admission of the third-party complaint be appealed from at this stage of
the proceedings?
HELD:
As a rule the admission of a third-party complaint is left to the discretion of the trial court. The present
case, however, involves a third-party complaint seeking to enforce a vendor's warranty in case of
eviction. And pursuant to express provision of Article 1558 of the Civil Code, a defendant-vendee in a
suit for eviction must summon in said suit his vendor, otherwise the latter shall not be obliged to make
good his aforesaid warranty (Art. 1558). As stated, appellee's contention is that this summoning of the
vendor should take place before the answer is filed, under Art. 1559 of the Civil Code.
The act of summoning the vendor can be accomplished either under Article 1559 of the Civil Code, by
asking that said vendor be made a co-defendant, in which case the request should be made within the
time for answering the complaint; or thru the filing of a third-party complaint against said vendor,
under Sec. 1, Rule 12, now Sec. 12 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.
In the first case, the vendor is summoned by being made a co- defendant; in the second, by being
made a third-party defendant. From this it can be seen that a third-party complaint filed after the
answer but before trial is not late; Article 1559's time-limit does not apply thereto.
As adverted to above, in this case, the third-party complaint, as against Pedro Deudor, seeks
enforcement of the warranty against eviction. The same is thus required by law to be resorted to
instead of being left to be filed as a separate action. If not raised in the action for eviction, the same
will not prosper and the vendor will be released from his warranty. Not only does the admission of the
thirdparty complaint against Pedro Deudor, avoid multiplicity of suits: it is necessary for defendant to
enforce said warranty against his vendor. Denial of the lower court was therefore appealable.
As regards J. M. Tuason & Co., and defendant, however, no relationship of vendor and vendee obtains
and the third-party complaint does not partake of the nature of an enforcement of a warranty against

eviction; rather, it seeks to enforce the Tuason-Deudor agreement. As such, the trial court properly
disallowed the same.
AMMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
TRIBIANA vs TRIBIANA
2004-09-13 | G.R. No. 137359
FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together but the former later on left the
conjugal home with their daughter Khriza, who was then 1 yr and 4 mos.Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin's
mother,Rosalin.
Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC. Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes' petition on
the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its
filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON failure to allege that resort to compromise agreement was made before filing the petition
amounts to outright dismissal.
HELD: NO.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin's motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A
dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition
precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It would have been a different matter if Edwin
had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.
Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the court's power to resolve. If a party fails to raise
such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. Such defect is curable by
amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive
pleading. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging
compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of
action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the
failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of
the complaint. Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of
suits and to present the real controversies between the parties.
Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are
not required in petitions for habeas corpus.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. THE PRESIDING
JUDGE
1990-09-21 | G.R. No. 89909
FACTS:
Metropolitan in whose favor a deed of chattel mortgage was executed by GEE over certain air
conditioning units installed in the
GEE building, filed a complaint for replevin against Uniwide, for brevity) and BPI-Consortium, for the
recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the event they may not be recovered, for
the defendants which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be required, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the

Subsequently, Raycor Air Control Systems, Inc. filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging 'it has a
direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment' and attached the 'Intervention Complaint',
which was admitted by the lower court.
Upon joint motion of the erring parties, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice due to the
compromise agreement between Metrobank and defendants BPI-Consurtiom. Raycor filed a MR of the
order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, claiming it was not furnished with copy of the joint
motion for dismissal and that it received the order of dismissal belatedly. The respondent court granted
the motion.
Issue:
WON the order of the lower court has the effect of allowing the intervention suit to prosper despite the
dismissal of the main action.
HELD: NO.
There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court has the
effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of
dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the
intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the
case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the
respective claims of the said original parties inter se, but the same cannot in any way affect the claim
of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original
parties. A resum of pertinent rulings on the matter would be in order.
Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the
court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or
uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of
them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between
others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings,
by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by
him to be affected by such proceedings." Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in
litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in such
action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the court to dismiss the action, including
the intervention suit on the basis of an agreement between the original parties to the action. Any
settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a
party to it.
By the very definition of "intervention," the intervenor is a party to the action as the original parties
and to make his right effectual he must necessarily have the same power as the original parties,
subject to the authority of the court reasonably to control the proceedings in the case.
Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interests, an intervenor is
entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined. The
parties to the original suit have no power to waive or
otherwise annul the substantial rights of the intervenor. It has even been held that the simple fact that
the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs action does not require dismissal of the action of the
intervenor.
A person who has an interest in the subject matter of the action has the right, on his own motion, to
intervene and become a party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been dismissed, may
proceed to have any actual controversy established by the pleadings determined in such action.
Camacho vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al:
"There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was
previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary
action. The main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the
intervention may be based. In the case at bar, however, there was no such final or complete dismissal
but rather an approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied in what was specifically

designated as a 'Partial Decision' affecting only the interests of herein petitioner and the defendant in
said case but not those of her co-plaintiff municipality and the intervenor.
On the propriety of the order dated January 11, 1988, admitting private respondent's amended
complaint in intervention, we sustain respondent Court of Appeals in upholding the same. Incidentally,
it will be recalled that petitioner was granted the opportunity to file, as it did file, its answer to the
amended complaint in intervention and it even interposed a counterclaim in the process.
Now, the granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or that
it was made to delay the action. 18 Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal,
except in case of abuse thereof.
In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely
supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to
submit the real matter in dispute.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, it does not substantially change intervenor's cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, hence its allowance is in order.
In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint,
what is to be ascertained is whether the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal
obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not
be considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show
substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the
same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are
made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced
remains the same.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE
INFRASTRUCTURES, INC., et.al.,
2004-01-13 | G.R. No. 120384
FACTS:
The petitioner issued five separate Letters of Guarantee in favor of the PNB as security for various
credit accommodations extended by PNB to respondents. PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre executed a
Deed of Undertaking binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or reimburse petitioner upon
demand such amount of money or to repair the damages, losses or penalties which petitioner may pay
or suffer on account of its guarantees; as security for prompt payment by respondent PII, the latter
submitted to petitioner, surety and performance bonds issued by respondents PBAC and Solid. PNB
called on the guarantees of petitioner, and so, the latter demanded from respondent PII, BF Homes,
PDC and Aguirre but they refused to settle their obligation. Hence, petitioner filed an action for
collection of sum of money. PII moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action for not
alleging loss or actual payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees, but the motion was first
denied. Thereafter, hearing on the merits ensued. During the trial, petitioner offered the testimony of
its Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from the PNB (Exhibit "LL") proving its actual
payment to PNB pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent PII. Petitioner then filed a
Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence. However, acting on the motion to amend, the trial
court, at that time presided by another judge, dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground of
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing the Order dated June 10,
1987 issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier.
ISSUE:
A) WON the trial court was correct in ordering
complaint to conform to the evidence.

dismissal instead of granting a motion to amend

B) WON the case s/b dismissed for lack of cause of action.


HELD:
A) NO. The trial court issued an order of dismissal in stead of granting a motion to amend complaint to
conform to evidence, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It should be stressed that amendment was sought after petitioner had already presented evidence,
more specifically, the testimony of petitioner's Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from
the PNB (Exhibit "LL") proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the amount of P19,035,256.57
pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent PII.
Petitioner avers that respondents did not raise any objection when it presented evidence to prove
payment to PNB. Hence, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, when
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by
respondents reveal that none of them claimed that they raised any objections at the time when
petitioner presented its evidence to prove its payment to PNB. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted
the presentation of the said evidence.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that:
The presentation of the contrariant evidence for and against imputations undoubtedly cured, clarified
or expanded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in the issues there
might have been in the amended complaint. . . .
It is settled that even if the complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff,
without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it
intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet
the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been
previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings.
Thus, the contention of respondents that the amendment would introduce a subsequently acquired
cause of action as there was none at the time the original complaint was filed, is untenable.
B) NO. Respondents' obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless
from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and
there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action
against respondents. The mere inclusion in petitioner's original complaint of the allegation that the
PNB had already called on the guarantees of petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against respondents. Clearly therefore, the original complaint, by itself, stated a valid cause of action.
MACASAET, ALFIE LORENZO, et.al versus THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
2005-02-23 | G.R. No. 156747
FACTS:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger
Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper Abante
were charged before the RTC of QC, with the crime of libel.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged -- that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the
RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC.
According to the private respondent, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at
the time of publication of the articel. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit
which indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue
of Abante.
ISSUE:
WON the supplemental affidavit submitted during the PI of this libel suit cured the defect of the
information.

A) Whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court -- not the OSG.
HELD: NO.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented.
The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations
contained in the principal pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements;
rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental pleading is not
something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its admittance is
something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a
supplemental pleading should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the
date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he filed his
original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor
fails to persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the
Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even bother to explain the reason behind the
belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to file it
much earlier in the proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
A) Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the
Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section
9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties. When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not
cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.[50]
As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the
parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the
period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses
jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to
do so for all the parties.[51]
The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the
period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is
only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins
and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.
B) Marikina has Jurisdiction.
BARNES vs. REYES et. al.,
2003-09-23 | G.R. No. 144533
FACTS:
A complaint for ejectment was filed by siblings Reyes against petitioner Barnes. The MTC ruled in favor
of Teresita and her co-parties. On appeal to the RTC reversed. CA, dismissed the petition of the

respondents due to non-compliance with the rules on pleadings, but granted its MR after attaching an
SPA authorizing Teresita to sign the verificationa and certification page on behalf of her siblings.
ISSUE:
WON the case should be dismissed on the following grounds:
a) The verification and certification on non-forum shopping was signed only by one of the six
petitioners without any showing that the signatory was duly authorized to bind her fellow petitioners.
b) No written explanation was submitted why copies of the petition have to be furnished the
respondents by registered mail, instead of personal service
HELD:
A) With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of
substantial compliance applies. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with, in essence,
what it means is that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. But it does not thereby rule out substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances.
The rule against forum-shopping was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its ultimate objective - the goal of all rules of procedure - of achieving substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly reconsidered the dismissal of the respondents'
petition after being informed of and presented with the authority of Teresita to sign the verification and
certification of the petition, and file the same in the Court of Appeals. We note that Teresita
represented her co-parties, who are her siblings, in the commencement of the action in the
Metropolitan Trial Court and later in the Regional Trial Court, both in Quezon City. Her authority therein
was never questioned as she was, in fact, authorized by her co-parties to handle the case.The strict
application of the no forum-shopping rule will not serve the ends of justice.
B) Furthermore, the rule on priorities in modes of service and filing of pleadings (insofar as it refers to
the effects of non-compliance) is merely directory.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure suggests the preferential mode of
serving pleadings and other papers personally on the other party to ensure (and prove) the latter's
receipt thereof. The preference is apparent from the phrase "whenever practicable." It is then
incumbent upon the court to use its discretion in determining whether substantial justice will be served
(or rights unjustifiably prejudiced) if it resolves to dismiss a petition because of non-compliance with a
mere directory rule. We say "directory" because of the use of the word "may."
BALTAZAR vs. COMELEC et al
2001-01-29 | G.R. No. 140158
FACTS:
Petitioner Baltazar and private respondent Bagasina were both candidates for the position of municipal
mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga during the May 11, 1998 local elections. After the canvassing of votes,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality.
On June 29, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, an
election protest which was docketed as Election Case No. G-898. Summons was served on petitioner
on July 7, 1998. The court strike out petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest on the ground that the
same was filed out of time.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner's ANSWER is within the reglementary period provided by the COMELEC rules
HELD: NO.
A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training. In the case at bar, there is no cogent

reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the COMELEC conforms rather than
conflicts with the governing statute, implementing rules and controlling case law on the matter.
Rule 35, Section 7, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure state that:
SECTION 7. Answer, Reply, Counter-Protest and Intervention. (a) Within five (5) days after receipt of the
notice of the filing of the petition and a copy of the petition, the respondent shall file his answer
thereto....
A close scrutiny of the record shows that the envelope which contained petitioner's Answer with
Counter-Protest was filed postmarked July 15, 1998. It is, therefore, clear that the pleading was filed
three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period within which to file the same, considering that
summons was served on him on July 7, 1998.
BOISER versus JUDGE AGUIRRE et al
2005-05-16 | A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1924-RTJ)
FACTS:
The administrative complainant against respondent judge arose from the ejectement case filed by the
petitioner is a plaintiff. The MTC ruled in favor of the complainant and ordered the writ of injunction
issued by the court be dismissed.
The case was appealed to the RTC. The defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion to release
bond on the ground that the MTC in its decision had already resolved the writ of preliminary injunction
without mentioning the applicant's liability. Respondent judge granted the motion.
Complainant alleged that the issuance by respondent judge of the is indicative of his ignorance of the
law considering that the motion did not state that he was furnished a copy of the motion thereby
depriving him of his right to due process. He also averred that the motion was a mere scrap of paper
for failure to state the time and date of hearing. He further alleged that respondent manifested gross
ignorance when he resolved to grant the motion to release the injunction bond considering that the
same was meant to answer for damages that he may suffer due to defendant's continued illegal
possession of the land.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is liable in granting the motion which lack notice of hearing and proof of
service
HELD:
The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of
hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof
of service. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not have a proper notice of hearing.
The date and time of the hearing were not specified. Neither complainant nor his counsel was
furnished a copy thereof. These were never controverted by respondent judge.
A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which
the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court
will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in
order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.
Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality
deserving no judicial cognizance. The rule mandates that the same shall not be acted upon by the
court. Proof of service is mandatory.

As can be seen the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less.
Clearly, respondent judge had ignored a fundamental rule. He acted too precipitately in granting
defendant's motion despite the absence of the requirements as above prescribed. As a judge, Judge
Aguirre is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Unfamiliarity with the rules is
a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. A judge must be acquainted with
legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by
a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
Anent respondent's retirement on 01 November 2004, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted
of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official
ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.[11] This was expounded in the case of
Perez v. Abiera,[12] cited in the case of Judge Rolando G. How v. Teodora Ruiz, et. al.,[13] thus: [T]he
jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his
case.
The court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. x x x If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and
maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and
control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of
litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
TEH vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILS.
2005-01-11 | G.R. No. 141180
FACTS:
Petitioner Teh and certain Josalie Baguio were charged with estafa before the MTCC.
In finding petitioner guilty as charged, the MTCC ruled that inasmuch as she signed the trust receipt
agreement, she is bound by the terms stipulated therein. Her failure to remit the proceeds or to return
the goods to Rodson's Collection Center constitutes estafa under Article 315 of the RPC.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC Decision.
Petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA by way of a petition for review. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate original or
certified true copies of the documents and material parts of the record that would support the
allegations. Moreover, there was no written explanation why service of the petition was not done
personally.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the CA is correct
Held: YES.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:
"SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original
copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners
or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or
law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied
upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true

copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
We note that petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23482 were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC. There were no copies of
the pleadings filed below or other material portions of the record which would support the allegations
in the petition. Indeed, this is contrary to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She contends, however,
that no prejudice was caused to the parties by her non-compliance. Clearly, petitioner violated both
provisions quoted above which warrants the dismissal of her petition by the Court of Appeals.
LIM vs.VERA CRUZ
2001-04-04 | G.R. No. 143646
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit. Notice of lis pendens is filed for the
purpose of warning all persons that the title to certain property is in litigation and that if they purchase
the same, they are in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment. The notice is, therefore,
intended to be a warning to the whole world that one who buys the property does so at his own risk.
This is necessary in order to save innocent third persons from any involvement in any future litigation
concerning the property.
FACTS:
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by petitioner against private
respondents before the RTC of Malolos.
Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT T-16375.
A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by private respondents on the grounds that said
notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is not necessary to protect petitioner's rights.
Respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens upon the posting by private
respondents of an indemnity bond.
ISSUE: WON it was proper to cancel the notice of lis pendens.
HELD: NO
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof.
With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any
part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the
particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. Based on this principle as well as the express
provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the 200 square
meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of
such notice, respondent's aim is to protect his right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling
of the trial court that the notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and
restriction of petitioners' right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT
16375 in their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion.
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, earlier quoted,
courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice
is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party; or b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the
party who caused it to be recorded.

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of
which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This
purpose would be rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the
amount, in substitution of said notice. In Tan vs. Lantin[9], this Court held that the law does not
authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient
bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated.
This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal
effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or lien. It only means that a person purchases or
contracts on the property in dispute subject to the result of the pending litigation.
For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the
party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him.

SUMMONS
REBOLLIDO vs. CA
1989-02-28 | G.R. No. 81123
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for damages against Pepsi Pepsi Cola and Alberto Alva before the RTC of
Makati, due to a vehicular accident involving the parties.
The sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the defendants. It was received by
one Nenette Sison who represented herself to be the authorized person receiving court processes as
she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. The lower court heard the case exparte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages in a decision.
When the default judgment became final and executory, the petitioners filed a motion for execution, a
copy of which was received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private respondent PEPSICO,
Inc.who undertook to settle Pepsi Cola's obligations due to the latter's dissolution, which occurred one
day after the accident.
Respondent PEPSICO, Inc., opposed the motion for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of
summons to a mere clerk. It invoked Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the manner of service
upon a private domestic corporation and Section 14 of the same rule on service upon a private foreign
corporation.
ISSUE:
(1) WON there was valid service of summons through Nenette Sison, allegedly the secretary of the
legal department of Pepsi Cola.
(2) whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to whom summons
should be served in the civil case for damages; and
HELD:
1) YES. At the time of the issuance and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was already dissolved. The
Court is of the opinion that service is allowed in such a situation. In the American case of Crawford v.
Refiners Co-operative Association, Incorporation, it was held that a "defendant corporation is subject to
suit and service of process even though dissolved."
Nowhere in the Corporation Code is there any special provision on how process shall be served upon a
dissolved defendant corporation. The absence of any such provision, however, should not leave
petitioners without any remedy, unable to pursue recovery for wrongs committed by the corporation
before its dissolution. Since our law recognizes the liability of a dissolved corporation to an aggrieved
creditor, it is but logical for the law to allow service of process upon a dissolved corporation. Otherwise,
substantive rights would be lost by the mere lack explicit technical rules.

Section 13, Rule 14 mandates:


"Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
"When an action that might have been instituted against a foreign or domestic corporation while it was
a going concern is instituted after its dissolution, process in the action may be served upon the same
person upon whom the process could be served before the dissolution."- (Castle's Administrator v.
Acrogen Coal Co.)
Whomsoever Miss Sison was acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the notice
of
the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO with whom she is admittedly
connected. We rule, as in G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (supra), that there was
substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 because the purpose of notice was satisfied. Contrary
to the decision of the Court of Appeals, we therefore, hold that there was proper service of summons to
bind Pepsi Cola and that the decision of the lower court against Pepsi Cola rendered on June 24, 1985
is valid and enforceable against the private respondent.
2) YES. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interestdefendant in the
civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but
also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the
party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola.
The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still he made a party to suit.
Under paragraph 1, Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it
would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and
enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its
assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established."
LAZARO vs. RURAL BANK OF FRANCISCO BALAGTAS
(BULACAN), INC. & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY
2003-08-15 | G.R. No. 139895
FACTS:
Petitioner Lazaro obtained a loan from respondent bank, RFBI. Apparently, Lazaro failed to pay said
loan on March 12, 1984. RFBI sued him before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for collection of deficiency
in the payment of the loan.
In its complaint, RFBI gave Lazaro's address as No. 856 Esteban Street, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. On March 16, 1984, summons was accordingly served upon petitioner at said
address.Petitioner did not answer, hence, the trial court declared him in default. An ex-parte hearing
then proceeded.
In 1988, RFBI instituted another suit against petitioner docketed as Civil Case No. 2856-V-88 before the
RTC of Valenzuela City. The complaint again indicated same address of the petitioner. Summons was
again served accordingly. As in Civil Case No. 7355-M, Lazaro failed to file an answer or responsive
pleading and the trial court declared him in default.
On April 29, 1999, Lazaro filed a petition, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52504, for declaration of nullity
of judgments in Civil Case No. 7355-M and Civil Case No. 2856-V-88 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. Lazaro alleged that RFBI did not indicate in its complaints his
true address thereby depriving him the opportunity to participate in the hearing of said cases. He
contends that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over him because he was not properly served with

summons at his actual residence at Brgy. Katipunan, Quezon City, where he had been residing since
1983. Although he owned the property located at No. 856 Esteban Street, Dalandanan, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, he did not actually reside thereat.
ISSUE: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
HELD: YES.
In this case, despite petitioner's asseverations, we find sufficient basis to conclude that the respective
summons in both Civil Case No. 7355-M and Civil Case No. 2856-V-88 were properly served on him.
Section 6 of Rule 14, Rules of Court, lays the rule in this jurisdiction that summons must be served
personally on the defendant. Said provision requires that summons, whenever practicable, be served
personally to the defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.[18]
Service to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant's actual
residence. It is enough that defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone
authorized by law. This is distinct from substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court,[19] relied upon by petitioner. Substituted service which requires that summons be
served at the defendant's residence in the event personal service is not possible within a reasonable
time for justifiable reasons, finds no application in this case.
That petitioner was personally served with summons in Civil Cases No. 7355-M and 2856-V-88 is
attested to by the certified true copies of the process server's returns.The sheriffs' certificate of service
of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out. To overcome the presumption of
regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such sheriff's return, the evidence against it
must be clear and convincing. Unless petitioner could come forward with the requisite quantum of
proof to the contrary, the presumption of regularity on the part of said sheriffs' certificate stands. That
private respondent did not present said certificate before the Court of Appeals is of no moment, for it
was not private respondent RFBI but herein petitioner who raised the failure of personal service of
summons as an issue. The burden of proving lack of jurisdiction because of lack of valid service of
summons fell upon petitioner. That burden has not been satisfactorily discharged by him.
DOMAGAS versus JENSEN
2005-01-17 | G.R. No. 158407
FACTS:
Petitioner Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Jensen before the MTC of
Calasiao. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her brother, Oscar Layno, who was
then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who
received the same.
The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan
City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the
Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway; and the
substituted service was not valid since it was not served in her residence, the MTC
never acquired jurisdiction over her person. She contends that the forcible entry is an action in
personam, hence, jurisdiction over her person is required.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons; Whether FE is an action in personam or
quasi in rem.
HELD: NO valid service of summons since FE is an acion in personam.

An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff
seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil
Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to
the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of
the property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and
by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its
object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to
determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person.
As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs,[24] the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal
rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.[26] In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein
to the obligation or loan burdening the property.[27] Actions quasi in rem deal with the status,
ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined
the action.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section
7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily
out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service
set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.[32]
Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999,
the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
In Keister v. Narcereo,[38] the Court held that the term dwelling house or residence are generally
held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the formers
dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to
the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It
As gleaned from the process service return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house
where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein.
Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent
was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and
that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons
on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or
place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to
return.

DELOS SANTOS vs. HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA et al


1993-04-06 | G.R. No. 73531
FACTS:
Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns Lot 39, a portion of
which petitioners entered and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction.
Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to
submit the corresponding answer, judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary
procedure.
Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were
never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They
insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because petitioners actually
occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by Nicolas delos Santos under Original Certificate of Title No. F-10418.
ISSUE:
WON summons was validly served
HELD: Voluntary appearance equates to valid service of summons.
At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable response
from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not indicate
impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service. Even then,
and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have not been
strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were
nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed
a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution . Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to
voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner
was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant.
PALMA versus Judge GALVEZ
2010-03-10 | G.R. No. 165273
FACTS:
Petitioner Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the PHC, Dr.Giron and Dr.Cruz,
alleging that the defendants
committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her
will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the
specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as
the label therein pertained that of somebody else.
Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of
additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, including herein private respondent Agudo.
Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias
summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private
respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent
was out of the country.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid service of summons
HELD: YES.

In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and
"also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be
availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines.
Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.[18]
In Montalban v. Maximo,[19] we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court
over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted
service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him.
There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams
make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.
Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint
may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the
service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging
receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place
and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf,
without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed
two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had
already invoked the RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of
time to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

MOTIONS
PH CREDIT CORPORATION vs. CA
2001-11-22 | G.R. No. 109648
When there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a decision and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of
execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.
FACTS:
PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Farrales, Sebille and Lim, for a sum of money
before the RTC, Branch 51, Manila. After service of summons upon the defendants, they failed to file
their answer within the reglementary period, hence they were declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was
then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner and a
Writ of Execution was issued.Personal and real properties of defendant Ferrales were levied and sold at
public auction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA disregarded the basic policy of avoiding multiplicity of motions.
HELD:
Omnibus Motion Rule

Petitioner contends that because private respondent did not question the joint and solidary nature of
his liability in his (a) Motion to Quash Levy Execution[9] dated August 23, 1984, (b) Urgent Motion to
Order Sheriff to Suspend Sale on Execution[10]dated December 3, 1984, and (c) Motion to Declare
Certificate of Sale Null and Void[11]dated January 9, 1985, he cannot now raise it as an objection.
Petitioner argues that the "Omnibus Motion Rule" bars private respondent's belated objection. We do
not agree.
The Omnibus Motion Rule is found in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
"Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived. (8a)"
As an aid to the proper understanding of this case, we should at the outset point out that the
objections of private respondent contained in his Omnibus Motion[12]dated November 5, 1990 were
directed at the proceedings and the orders issued after the auction sale of his real property covered by
TCT No. 82531. In his Omnibus Motion, he asked for the recall and quashal of the Writ of Possession
issued on October 26, 1990; the annulment of the June 21, 1989 auction sale of the said real property
and the
recomputation of his liability to petitioner. However, the three (3) Motions that petitioner referred to
above were clearly directed against the execution of private respondent's personal properties. A
perusal of these Motions will show that at the time, his objections were directed at the acts of
execution against his personal properties.
After private respondent realized that he was being made to answer on the entire liability as a solidary
debtor, he filed his Omnibus Motion questioning the Writ of Possession and all incident orders and
proceedings relevant thereto. This realization dawned on him, because his real property was levied and
sold despite the previous sale of his personal property. Only at this point was he in a position to assert
his objections to the auction sale of his real property and to put up the defense of joint liability among
all the respondents.
The Rules of Court requires that all available objections to a judgment or proceeding must be set up in
an Omnibus Motion assailing it; otherwise, they are deemed waived. In the case at bar, the objection of
private respondent to his solidary liability became available to him, only after his real property was
sold at public auction. At the time his personal properties were levied and sold, it was not evident to
him that he was being held solely liable for the monetary judgment rendered against him and his corespondents. That was why his objections then did not include those he asserted when his solidary
liability became evident. Prior to his Omnibus Motion, he was not yet being made to pay for the entire
obligation. Thus, his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other respondents was not
yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to by petitioner. Not being available,
these objections could not have been deemed waived when he filed his three earlier Motions, which
pertained to matters different from those covered by his Omnibus Motion.
True, the Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a single
opportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections.[18] But to apply that statutory norm, the
objections must have been available to the party at the time the Motion was filed.
PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INCORPORATED, vs. CA, and MUNICIPALITY OF
PARA?AQUE MAYOR OLIVARES
1996-07-26 | G.R. No. 119328
FACTS:
PARANAQUE filed Civil Case No. 93-1412 with the RTC of Makati for the expropriation of certain parcels
of land. These lots belonged to PIRC and were to be used as the site for a new municipal building.
PARA'AQUE claimed that it offered to buy the property for P54,520,800.00 based on the fair market
value stated in the tax declarations, but PIRC refused to sell.
The RTC of Makati (Branch 61) dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, upon PIRC's motion, as the
lots to be expropriated were in custodia legis, being sequestered by the PCGG and involved in a case
pending before the SB.

Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati, per Judge Mendiola, issued and order 6 denying PARA'AQUE's MR
and directing its agents to vacate the lots and surrender possession to PIRC within five days from
notice.
On 27 October 1993, PARA'AQUE filed its Notice of Appeal from the orders.
On 29 October 1993, Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati issued andorder giving due course to
PARA'AQUE's appeal and ordering the transmittal of "the entire records" of Civil Case No. 93-1412 to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
On 4 November 1993, PIRC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate
and the appointment of a special sheriff. Forthwith, and on even date, the RTC of Makati (Branch 133)
gave PARA'AQUE a period of five days from receipt of the order within which to file its
Comment/Opposition to the motion.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court can validly act on the Motion for execution pending appeal after repondent filed its
Notice of Appeal.
HELD:
There can, however, be no question as to the trial court's authority to act upon PIRC's motion, filed
within the period to appeal, for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate issued on 22
October 1993. Such a motion cannot be characterized as anything but a motion for execution pending
appeal, and pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such may be filed before the
expiration of the period to appeal, i.e., fifteen days counted from notice of the 22 October 1993 order.
31
An appeal from such order of execution of 22 October 1993 would be deemed perfected not by the
filing of the notice to appeal by one party, but upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party.
It is settled that a court may take cognizance of a motion for execution pending appeal filed by a party
within its period to appeal, 36 as the filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest
the adverse party of the right to ask for execution pending appeal. 37 Thus, the trial court's 29 October
1993 order giving due course to PARA'AQUE's appeal and for the transmittal of the record of the case
to the Court of Appeals was inconsequential, 38 for, despite that, PIRC had the right to file a motion for
the execution of the order to vacate on or before 6 November 1993, and the trial court could validly
act thereon even after the expiration of the period to appeal or perfection of the appeal, but before the
transmittal of the record of the case to the appellate court.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2 Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party,
the court may in its discretion, order execution to issue before the expiration of the time to appeal,
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion
and the special order shall be included therein.
Obviously, the execution of judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule and must,
therefore, be strictly construed. While the grant thereof is discretionary, the aforesaid Section 2
prescribes the following requisites for the valid exercise of the discretion: (a) there must be a motion
by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution
pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
Notice of Appeal
A notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court, and not to the parties, is not notice at all.
Accordingly, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is nothing but a
mere scrap of paper. 43 The Clerk of Court did not even have the duty to accept it, much more to bring
it to the attention of the Presiding Judge. Yet, the former did. Worse, the latter not only gave it undue
attention, forthwith on the date the motion was filed he issued an order giving PARA'AQUE five days
from receipt of the order within which to file its comment/opposition to the motion, after which the
motion would be deemed submitted for resolution, with or without such comment/opposition.

By overlooking the mandatory rule on notice to the adverse party in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, a positive duty imposed upon the movant, and by according value to a mere scrap of paper by
"curing" its fatal defect by means of the order to serve as notice to PARA'AQUE, the trial court clearly
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Since the motion in question was a mere scrap of paper for want
of mandatory notice, it must be deemed, for all legal intents and purposes, as if it were not filed;
hence, it did not suspend the running of PIRC's period to appeal. As stated earlier, a motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed within the period to appeal. It follows that none was properly
filed by PIRC and the trial court had nothing to validly act upon. When it did through its order of 16
November 1993, it was nothing short of grave abuse of discretion.
OROSA et al vs. CA
1996-09-03 | G.R. No. 118696
A motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners before the RTC of Manila.
Accordingly, the trial court issued the corresponding summons to be served upon petitioners.
Per sheriff\'s return dated 8 February 1993 summons was served on 6 February 1993 upon petitioners.
On 24 February 1993 petitioners filed a motion for additional time to file answer. However, upon urgent
ex-parte motion by private respondents on 5 March 1993, the trial court issued its Order of 8 March
1993 declaring petitioners in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period. On 30 March
1993 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and at the same time filed their answer. On 22
March 1994 the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and expunged petitioners\' answer
from the records.
ISSUE:
WON the order of default is valid despite the motion for additional time to Answer
HELD:
Admittedly, the sheriff\'s return dated 8 February 1993 is bereft of any particulars on the impossibility
of personal service on petitioners within a reasonable time. However, they are deemed to have waived
any flaw in the court\'s jurisdiction arising from a defective service of summons. For, instead of
entering a special appearance questioning the propriety of the service of summons, hence, the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over petitioners, they filed a motion for additional time to file
answer on 24 February 1993, which was beyond the reglementary period. In effect, they voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
The certificate of service of summons by the sheriff is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in such
certificate. To overcome the presumption arising from the sheriff\'s return, the evidence must be clear
and convincing. 3 But petitioners failed to overcome this presumption. Hence, there is no question that
the motion for additional time to file answer was submitted beyond the period fixed by law. The
granting of a motion to file an answer after the prescriptive period had expired is a matter addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and once this discretion of the trial court, and once this
discretion is exercised by the denial of the motion this Court will not interfere therewith unless it can
be shown that the trial court has gravely abused its discretion, something which petitioners failed to do
in the instant case.
It is settled that parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the time they
pray for. 4 After all, a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to file their answer within the reglementary period, the order declaring them in default is
valid, and conforms fully with Sec. 1, Rule 18, of the Rules of Court.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Petitioner, versus HON. Judge JUNTILLA et al
2005-06-08 | G.R. No. 157801
FACTS:

PPGI was not able to deliver a condominium unit due to Aguilar so the latter demanded in writing the
rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of what she had paid. When PPGI refused,
she filed a complaint against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to sell and damages with the
HLURB.
HLURB ruled in favor of Aguilar. On motion of the Aguilar, the HLURB issued a writ of execution
ordering the ex-officio sheriff to execute its decision against PPGI with address at the Penthouse,
Century Citadel, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City.
The Sheriff proceeded with the sale at public auction and Aguilar was declared the highest bidder for
the condominium unit. She filed a motion with the HLURB for the issuance of a writ of possession. A
copy of the motion was served on PPGI at its principal office as alleged in the complaint at No. 21/F
Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City. It appears that Ramon Reyes, Jr.
received the said copy for PPGI. During the hearing of the said motion, no representative of the PPGI
appeared. The HLURB issued its Order granting Aguilar's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
PPGI filed its motion for reconsideration[22] of the order of the HLURB, contending that it was not
served with a copy of Aguilar's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because said motion
was served at its old principal office at No. 21/F Multinational
BanCorporation Centre, No. 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, and not at its new principal office address.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was deprived of due process because it was not informed or duly notified of the
hearing on the motion
HELD: NO.
First. The petitioner was mandated to notify the HLURB and the respondent herein of the transfer of its
principal office from the Multinational BanCorporation Centre to the Prime Citadel Condominium at No.
5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City. However, the petitioner failed to do so. That the petitioner retained
its principal office at the Multinational BanCorporation Centre is shown by the fact that its employee,
Ramon Reyes, Jr., received a copy of the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the
respondent on November 23, 2001. The petitioner has not disputed the authority of Reyes, Jr. to
receive such copy of the respondent's motion.
Second. The petitioner's reliance on Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, quoted, infra, is
misplaced:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. ;
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. ;
Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary.
This is so because the aforecited provisions apply only to a litigated motion and not to an ex parte
motion. The said rules The said rules do not apply to a motion which is merely a mode by which the
respondent herein informed the Court that the writ of execution had not been implemented, and that
she had not been placed in possession of the property. There is no need for a hearing of such motion
because it is not a litigated motion, and the court may act thereon without prejudice to the rights of
the petitioner as the adverse party. The writ of possession was but an implementation of the writ of
execution.
Third. The procedure in a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest.
VIRGINIA O. GOCHAN vs. YOUNG
2001-03-12 | G.R. No. 131889
A court or tribunal's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in
complaint. The fact that certain persons are not registered as stockholders in the books of
corporation will not bar them from filing a derivative suit, if it is evident from the allegations in
complaint that they are bona fide stockholders. In view of RA 8799, intra-corporate controversies
now within the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction, no longer of the SEC.

the
the
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are

FACTS:
Alice, mother of herein respondents, inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the her father,
one of the incorporators of Gochan Realty. She died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband,
John Young, Sr. At time all the children had reached the age of majority, John Sr., requested Gochan
Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and
issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of herein respondents. Gochan Realty
refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles
of Incorporation. On 21, 1990,John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the respondents.
Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the
rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust,
accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages against respondents.
Herein petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint. SEC, through its Hearing Officer, granted the
motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated upon the titles of
the corporate lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was justified considering that the suit did
not involve real properties owned by Gochan Realty.
HELD:
On the issue of the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the titles of the properties of the
corporation and the other respondents, we still find no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. Under the third, fourth and fifth causes of action of the Complaint, there are allegations of
breach of trust and confidence and usurpation of business opportunities in conflict with petitioners'
fiduciary duties to the corporation, resulting in damage to the Corporation. Under these causes of
action, respondents are asking for the delivery to the Corporation of possession of the parcels of land
and their corresponding certificates of title. Hence, the suit necessarily affects the title to or right of
possession of the real property sought to be reconveyed. The Rules of Court allows the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens in actions affecting the title or right of possession of real property. Thus, the Court
of Appeals was correct in reversing the SEC Order for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.

MOTION TO DISMISS
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA BALANCED FOOD et al vs. PINAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION
2004-01-16 | G.R. No. 139068
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well regulated system of jurisprudence and
is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public
policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litumi; and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause, memo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. This doctrine applies
squarely to the case at bar.
FACTS:
Respondent company filed with the LA a complaint for ULP and damages against the petitioners and
other union members.
LA rendered a Decision declaring the forfeiture or loss of employment status of the union officers.
Upon appeal, NLRC upholds the illegality of the strike or walk-out staged by petitioners, nevertheless,
ordered their reinstatement.
Both of parties filed a petition with the SC: Respondent company filed a petition for certiorari but was
dismissed for lack of a verified statement of
material dates required by the Rules. Petitioners also filed a petition for certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 123976, but was similarly dismissed on the ground that no grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to the NLRC. This Resolution became final and executory.

The Writ of Execution was ordered but the company filed with the Arbiter a motion to recall and
quash the alias writ of execution. In its motion, respondent company alleged that there
have been supervening events which rendered unjust the reinstatement of petitioners to
their former positions. The Arboiter granted the motion but set aside by the NLRC.
CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the final and executory Decision of the NLRC. While
the Court of Appeals upheld the illegality of the strike or walk-out staged by petitioners, however, it
modified the NLRC Decision reinstating them to the service by declaring that they have lost their
employment status.
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it modified the NLRC's final and executory
decision
HELD: YES.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, still passed upon the same issue already disposed of by
this Court in G.R. No. 123976 declaring that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
declared the strike illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners. Verily, the Appellate Court
modified what should otherwise have been an immutable and unalterable Decision. Indeed, the same
court disregarded the doctrine of res judicata. Applying the said doctrine, the issue of whether
petitioners should be reinstated to their former positions (despite the finding that they have directly
participated in an illegal strike or walkout) may no longer be relitigated.
ASIA UNITED BANK vs. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.,
2011-03-09 | G.R. No. 191388
The costly consequence of forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be mindful against
abusing court processes.
FACTS:
Respondent Goodland executed a Third Party REM over two parcels of land in favor of petitioner AUB.
The mortgage secured the obligation of RMNI, doing business as Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. The
REM was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
Goodland then filed a Complaint docketed as before the RTC of Bian, Laguna for the annulment of the
REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties' verbal
agreement (Annulment Case).
While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB,
prompting the latter to exercise its right under the REM to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.The
mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to AUB as the highest bidder.
Before AUB could consolidate its title, Goodland filed another Complaint against AUB and its officers.
This Complaint sought to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of
AUB (Injunction Case).
The trial court acted favorably on petitioners' motion and dismissed the Injunction Case with prejudice
on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia, which upon appeal, reversed by the CA. The CA
then concluded that Goodland was not guilty of forum shopping when it initiated the Annulment and
Injunction Cases. The CA held that the reliefs sought in the two cases were different.
Contemporaneously with the proceedings of the Injunction Case, the earlier Annulment Case was also
dismissed by the trial court on the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUE:
whether the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum shopping.
HELD: YES.

There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court."
Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases
filed. Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly
falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland's right to the mortgaged property.
It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the
same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for
the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title.
There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of
injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is already
the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that
the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings
will conflict with each other. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping.
The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or
legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The wellentrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method
of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK et al vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS et al
2004-03-15 | G.R. No. 143556
FACTS:
Sta. Rosa Mining filed before the RTC of QC, a complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioners Equitable-PCIB. Sta. Rosa alleged that it lost income opportunity from its joint venture with
Sa Amin.
Sta Rosa. has savings/current/time deposit account with petitioner and sought to obtain checkbooks
but bank refused to issue the checkbooks allegedly due to a restraining order issued by the SEC.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was guilty of forum shopping when
it filed a case for damages against petitioners for failure to release the funds in Savings Account No.
0453-52672-1 although the said funds were already subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 6014, where
petitioners were also involved in view of the order of garnishment of the Daet court. Thus, petitioners
argue that any claims for damages should have been pleaded in Civil Case No. 6014 but Sta. Rosa
failed to do so, hence, such claims are deemed waived, and Sta. Rosa cannot now file another case
involving the same parties, the same issues and the same object in another court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping
HELD: NO.
A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in,
or already resolved adversely, by some other court.[15] For a charge of forum shopping to prosper,
there must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before another court: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity

of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[16]
In the cited cases, we find there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6014, Sa
Amin, is not a party in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, although both Sta. Rosa and petitioners are
impleaded as parties in different capacities. In Civil Case No. 6014 petitioner PCIB (now Equitable-PCIB)
is an intervenor, while Sta. Rosa is the defendant. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073,
Sta. Rosa is the plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants. Apparently, the parties represented
different interests in these cases.
Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought.In Civil Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa is
defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where petitioners are the intervenors, while in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is asserting its right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the
defendant, now petitioner bank. Indeed, the two proceedings are far from identical.
Manalo et al vs CA et al
2001-04-20 | G.R. No. 124204
FACTS:
Then Secretary Quisumbing issued DECS Order No. 5, Series 1989, setting forth the guidelines and
procedures in the implementation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6655 - "Free Public Secondary Education Act
of 1988".
Subsequently, plaintiff Reyes filed with the RTC of Cebu City a complaint for temporary restraining
order enjoining defendants from enforcing or implementing DECS Order No. 5, and after hearing,
declaring DECS Order No. 5 ultra vires for being issued not in accordance with law.
In the meantime, DECS, represented by Regional Director Dioko, entered into a MOA with CSCST.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.
On October 31, 1990, Jesus Bonilla and other superintendents of CSCST filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cebu City, a petition for the issuance of preliminary injunction restraining the DECS
from continuing with the implementation of the rules and regulations separating the high schools from
CSCST. On January 28, 1991, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of no cause of action,
lack of jurisdiction over the case and failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to
court action. The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition.
On May 28, 1992, Bienvenido Abucay and other faculty members of the CSCST filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City, another petition for declaration of nullity of the memorandum of
agreement with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Petitioners alleged that the MOA had no
basis, legal or factual, and it had the definite effect of separating them from the service, which violated
their security of tenure. On December 9, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to
state a cause of action.
On February 4, 1993, petitioners Norma V. Manalo, and other faculty members, registrar, librarian,
janitor and other personnel of CSCST filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22, a
complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Preliminary Injunction."On the
same day, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set the hearing on the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent Marcelo M. Bacalso filed a motion to dismiss[11] the
case on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is barred by res judicata.
HELD: YES.
Petitioners allege that the order of dismissal in CEB-11735 did not constitute res judicata because the
order was not an adjudication on the merits as it dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action; failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and lack of jurisdiction.

The petition is without merit.


Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as
to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. Res
judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; (d) there
must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of
action.
All these requisites were present in this case. The parties in Civil Case No. CEB-11735 and in Civil Case
No. 13562 were faculty members and personnel of the CSCST. They represented the same interest in
both actions which referred to the nullity of the MOA. As observed by the appellate court, there is
substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought.
As to the contention that the order in Civil Case No. CEB-11735 was not a judgment on the merits, we
find such contention not enable. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections. It is not necessary, however, that there be a trial.
MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN vs. HON. CA, and JESUS M. GARCIA
1993-02-17 | G.R. No. 94733
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful detainer, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, against private respondent in the Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna alleging
that it was no longer amenable to the renewal of its 25-year lease contract with privaterespondent
over the premises involved because of its pressing need to use the same for national and provincial
offices therein.
On October 16, 1989, private respondent filed this time a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion
to Dismiss Has Been Filed" on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, reiterating its
argument that the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and
that, at any rate, under said contract he has the exclusive option to renew the same for another 25
years.
The municipal trial court rendered judgment ordering private respondent to vacate the premises
subject of the ejectment case.
Private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion" before said trial court praying that the issues raised
in the motion for preliminary hearing, apparently because it was in the nature of a motion to dismiss,
be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court is correct in not conducting a preliminary hearing before summarily rendering a
judgment on the merits of the case.
HELD: NO.
Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing, as prayed for in private respondent's
"Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been filed," before summarily rendering
judgment on the merits of the case. The said motion of private respondent is anchored on the ground
that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original term of 25 years stipulated in
the contract of lease had not yet expired and assuming that it had expired, private respondent had
made known to petitioner his exclusive option to renew it for another 25 years.

Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:


"Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in
this Rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed."
The aforequoted provision allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as affirmative
defenses in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed.
However, contrary to the claim of private respondent, the preliminary hearing permitted under the said
provision is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of
the trial court. The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a matter of
right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not
mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and
possibility.
Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of action is not
necessary.
VESAGAS vs. CA
2001-12-05 | G.R. No. 142924
FACTS:
The respondent spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members in good standing of the Luz Village
Tennis Club, Inc. (club). They alleged that petitioner Vesagas, who claims to be the club's duly elected
president, in conspiracy with petitioner Asis, who, in turn, claims to be its duly elected vice-president
and legal counsel, summarily stripped them of their lawful membership, without due process of law.
Thereafter, respondent spouses filed a Complaint with the SEC against the petitioners.
Before the hearing officer could start proceeding with the case, however, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The motion
was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the case s/b dismissed on lack of jurisdiction
HELD: SEC has jurisdicion.
Petitioners' attempt to impress upon this court that the club has never been a corporation is devoid of
merit. It must fail in the face of the Commission's explicit finding that the club was duly registered and
a certificate of incorporation was issued in its favor.
The necessary implication of all these is that petitioners recognized and acknowledged the corporate
personality of the club. Otherwise, there is no cogency in spearheading the move for its dissolution.
Petitioners were therefore well aware of the incorporation of the club and even agreed to get elected
and serve as its responsible officers before they reconsidered dissolving its corporate form.
We now resolve whether the dispute between the respondents and petitioners is a corporate matter
within the exclusive competence of the SEC to decide. In order that the commission can take
cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: a) between
the corporation, partnership or association and the public; b) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; c) between the corporation,
partnership, or association and the state as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.[13] The fact that the
parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties involved are the
stockholders and the corporation, does not necessarily place the dispute within the loop of jurisdiction
of the SEC.[14] Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of
the parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.[15]
We rule that the present dispute is intra-corporate in character. In the first place, the parties here
involved are officers and members of the club. Respondents claim to be members of good standing of
the club until they were purportedly stripped of their membership in illegal fashion. Petitioners, on the

other hand, are its President and Vice-President, respectively. More significantly, the present conflict
relates to, and in fact arose from, this relation between the parties. The subject of the complaint,
namely, the legality of the expulsion from membership of the respondents and the validity of the
amendments in the club's by-laws are, furthermore, within the Commission's jurisdiction.

DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
ROXAS vs. CA
2001-08-15 | G.R. No. 139337
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with the RTC of Paraaque City an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, Roxas, private
respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children.
But the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal, to dismiss
the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been served and no responsive pleading has
yet been filed.
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed. It was raffled in due course
to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque presided by Bautista-Ricafort. The latter issued
an Order granting the application for support
pendente lite.
On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite private
respondent in contempt of court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 61 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, after the latter failed to comply with the said Order of the trial court. The respondent was
declared in contempt.
Upon appeal, the appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the
reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of
Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice.
ISSUE:
If a case is dismissed without prejudice upon the filing by the plaintiff of a notice of
dismissal pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 17, before the service of the answer or responsive
pleading, would the subsequent re-filing of the case by the same party require that the
certificate of non-forum shopping state that a case involving the same issues and parties
was filed and dismissed without prejudice beforehand? Would the omission of such a
statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping render null and void the proceedings
and orders issued by the trial court in the re-filed case?
HELD: NO.
It is our considered view and we hold that the proceedings and orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort
in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the
re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the omission of a
statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without
prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties and issues.
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
The language of the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.[10] The most important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by
a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs."

In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523 which
was the first case filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The dismissal without
prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[15] considering that it was done before service
of answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res
judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn
by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge How's
order is one merely "confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by the plaintiff (herein petitioner).
Neither is there res judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits
but a dismissal "without prejudice".
Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute
res judicata and litis pendencia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum
shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to "secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., vs MILAN et al
2010-04-05 | G.R. No. 151215
FACTS:
A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner PCI Leasing against herein respondents Milan.
Summons was served but the defendant was not located.
PCI Leasing filed a Motion to Archive, asserting that it was then conducting an investigation in order to
ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents. PCI Leasing prayed that the case be archived, subject
to its reinstatement after the whereabouts of the respondents was determined. The RTC denied the
Motion to Archive the case.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order, directing PCI Leasing "to take the necessary steps to actively
prosecute the instant case within ten days from receipt" under pain of dismissal of the case "for lack of
interest." PCI Leasing then filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons. Said motion was, however,
denied by the RTC via an Order on the ground that the same was "a mere scrap of paper" for
apparently containing a defective notice of hearing.
PCI Leasing filed another Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, which the RTC scheduled for hearing.
When this case was called for hearing on the Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, there was no
appearance for [PCI Leasing]. It should be recalled that earlier PCI Leasing had been ordered to take
the necessary steps to actively prosecute this case, otherwise, the same shall be dismissed. In view of
the absence of the counsel for PCI Leasing, the case was DISMISSED.
On May 11, 2001, PCI Leasing filed a Notice of Appeal in an attempt to challenge the Order dated of
the RTC, as well as the Resolutions. But the RTC rendered a Resolution dismissing the Notice of Appeal,
given that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court, however,
dismissed outright the aforesaid petition.
Admittedly, the filing of the notice of appeal was late by one day. Moreover, [PCI Leasing] has not
disputed that as stated in the notice of appeal, it is appealing the assailed Orders and Resolutions of
respondent Judge to this Court on the ground that the same are contrary to the applicable law and
jurisprudence and, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction over the intended appeal as only questions
of law would be raised therein.
ISSUE:
WON case s/d dismissed.

HELD:
The Court of Appeals indeed committed a mistake in issuing the Resolutions which dismissed outright
the Petition for Certiorari filed by PCI Leasing and denied the latter's Motion for Reconsideration. To
recall, the Court of Appeals based the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari on the fact that (1) the
appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time and (2) the Notice of Appeal supposedly involved pure
questions of law.
CA concluded that the Notice of Appeal involved pure questions of law on the basis of the statement
therein that the Order dated October 13, 2000, the Resolution dated January 4, 2001 and the
Resolution dated April 6, 2001 of the RTC would be appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the same were "contrary to the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter." The Court of
Appeals was of the opinion that it would not have jurisdiction over the intended appeal since the same
should be raised to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Under Rule 41, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a notice of appeal is only required to indicate (a) the
parties to the appeal, (b) the final judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, (c) the court to
which the appeal is being taken, and (d) the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. In
usual court practice, a notice of appeal would consist of one or two pages.
Only after the specific issues and arguments of PCI Leasing are laid out in detail before the Court of
Appeals in the appropriate substantive pleading can it make a conclusion as to whether or not the
issues raised therein involved pure questions of law.
As regards the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time, the
same was in concurrence with the findings of the RTC that the Notice of Appeal was filed one day late.
On this matter, we hold that the conclusion of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its appeal was
correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken.
Applying the Neypes Rule, and contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the
Notice of Appeal should not be reckoned from May 3, 2001, the date of receipt of the RTC Resolution
dated April 6, 2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCI Leasing.
As PCI Leasing was not able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed
therefor, the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010, should be
deemed final and executory.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Notwithstanding the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds, after a through
review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this case, which clearly warrant the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
To our mind, it will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTC's dismissal of the case with
prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely
procedural grounds, unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad
faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes.
In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount of
P2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from
collecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
PCI Leasing.
FIDEL M. BANARES vs. ELIZABETH BALISING et al
2000-03-13 | G.R. No. 132624

FACTS:
Petitioners were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa in the MTC of Antipolo Rizal. After the
petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty, they filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo
conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The MTC denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the
non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that
such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the
right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases.
The petitioners filed a MR and the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal
cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary
Procedure.
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a Motion
to Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of
referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.
Petitioners filed a Comment and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and
executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
revive.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2) Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by
motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3) Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed
without prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has
become final and executory.
HELD:
A \"final order\" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an \"interlocutory
order\" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. In Olympia International vs. Court of
Appeals, we stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was
any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice,
nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final
disposition of the complaint. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and
executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or
revoke.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes
outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other
remedy but to file a new complaint.
Contrary to private respondents' claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal
cases as well.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal
trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code of 199151 [Section 412 in relation to Section 408 may be raised in a motion to
dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the
law52 [Ibid.] is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.
Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments
under the Revised Rules of Court40 [Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.] do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to
conciliation at the
barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government
Code.
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view. Section 18
merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed
without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the
dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion
even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has
lapsed.

DEFAULT
ACANCE vs CA
2005-03-16 | G.R. No. 159699
FACTS:
Respondents herein filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa an amended complaint against the petitioners.
The amended complaint sought to annul the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Jesus
P. Acance and Waiver of Rights, executed by Jesulito, Manuel and Nestor, all surnamed Acance, and
their mother Angela. The estate covered by the said extra-judicial settlement included two parcels of
land.
Upon motion of the respondents (the Quijano siblings and their spouses), as plaintiffs therein, the court
a quo issued an order declaring the petitioners (the Acance siblings and their spouses), as defendants
therein, in default for their failure to file an answer to the amended complaint.
The petitioners filed a motion to set aside th order of default. The affidavit of merit likewise alleged
that the petitioners have a valid and meritorious defense including that the subject real properties
were acquired by their parents, Jesus and Angela, with both their earnings during the period that they
lived together. They denied that these were paraphernal properties of Angela or conjugal properties of
Angela and Vernier. The petitioners further claimed that the extra-judicial settlement was duly
executed by them and Angela's waiver of her rights over the subject properties in their favor was
validly made. To prove that Angela really intended to transfer the properties to them, the petitioners
presented her Last Will and Testament executed in the United States on December 6, 1996 in which
she bequeathed to them all her properties, real and personal, wherever situated.
In its Order dated June 27, 2002, the court a quo denied the motion to lift the order of default.
Petitioners contended that, in denying their motion to lift the order of default, the court a quo adopted
a rigid, strict and technical stance. Further, petitioner Rosalino, as their counsel, was of the honest
belief that when the court a quo did not act on his motion to represent the petitioners, it was still
determining whether all the requirements for a valid extraterritorial service was made on them.
ISSUE:

WON the order of default must be set aside.


HELD: YES.
In this case, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default
without showing that there was full compliance with the requirements for extraterritorial service of
summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Under the circumstances, the setting aside of the order of default is in order. The petitioners should be
afforded the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf in order that substantial justice is
achieved. After all, court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of
the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
ferret out such truth. By conducting a full-blown trial, both parties will be able to present their
evidence, thus, affording them the opportunity to enforce and protect their respective rights.
The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. However, this rule admits of exceptions including:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed with the CA shows that the petitioners expressly stated
therein that they dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo because
they raised questions of jurisdiction in the motion to set aside the default order filed therewith. It was
further averred that there was an urgent necessity for relief as the court a quo seemed to act with
precipitate haste.
It appears that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for
failure of the petitioners to move for a reconsideration of the default order when it had been
sufficiently shown that the need for relief was extremely urgent.
Among other remedies, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is
available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.
TAN vs. CA
1997-07-17 | G.R. No. 108634
FACTS:
Petitioner Tan was the lessee of a piece of property when on respondent DPG acquired ownership
thereof by purchase from Gonzales. Subsequently, DPG filed with the MTC of Manila on April 13, 1989
an ejectment suit for nonpayment of rentals against Vermont Packaging, Inc. which was managed by
petitioner.
During the pendency of said suit, petitioner, on January 24, 1990, filed Civil Case No. 90-51767 against
the Register of Deeds of Manila and DPG for cancellation/annulment of TCT No. 169146 issued in the
name of DPG. In a nutshell, this complaint challenges the validity of TCT No. 169146 which, according
to petitioner, emanated from TCT No. 165501 that covered parcels of land outside of Manila.

DPG received summons and the copy of the complaint on but it failed to file an answer despite court's
granting several extentions to file the same. Upon motion, the trial court declared DPG in default.
Petitioner thereafter presented evidence and the trial court ruled in its favor.
DPG received a copy of the trial court's decision on October 25, 1990. Nine (9) days later or on
November 3, 1990, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso filed a notice of appearance as new counsel for DPG. On
the same day, said counsel filed a motion for new trial and to admit answer with counterclaim. The
court denied the motion for new trial. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of the motion for new trial did not interrupt the finality of the trial court's Decision
inasmuch as there was no valid substitution between DPG's previous counsel on record Atty. Bello and
new counsel Atty. Formoso who filed the said motion for new trial.
HELD:
This brings us to the second argument which touches on the heart of the matter. There is no question
that the remedy against a judgment by default is a motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court which should be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal, and that the timely filing thereof
interrupts the 15-day reglementary period. The CA is thus correct.
It is settled in Our jurisprudence that a motion for new trial is the appropriate remedy when the
defendant discovers that he has been declared in default and that a judgment has already been
rendered, which has not, however, become final and executory as yet. It is not required that the
defendant file first a motion to file the order of default "to regain his standing." The filing of a motion
for new trial suspends the reglementary period for the attainment by the decision of finality.
If a new trial be granted, . . . the judgment shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de
novo, .. . (Rule 37, Section5) There is also no dispute that a motion for new trial (and to admit answer
with counterclaim) was filed onbehalf of DPG within the 15-day appeal period, i.e., on November 3,
1990 or just nine (9) days from DPG's receipt (on October 25, 1990) of a copy of the trial court's
October 5, 1990 Decision.
Note that DPG was declared in default (and was thus denied opportunity to present evidence and
participate in the trial) by reason of Atty. Bello's negligence. Said counsel failed to file an answer
despite being given by the trial court two (2) extensions of time to file it. True, the general rule is that
the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel. But this is not a hard and fast rule.
On the first argument, as a rule, the special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors.
However, this rule admits of certain recognized exceptions; It is exceptive circumstance (b) that
justified DPG's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration, inasmuch as DPG's petition for certiorari
before the CA involved a similar issue or question passed upon by the trial court in its November 23,
1990 Order, i.e., the propriety of the motion for new trial filed by DPG's new counsel (Atty. Formoso).
It must also be stressed that what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies. 17 Thus, even when
appeal is available and is the proper remedy, a writ of certiorari has been allowed when the orders of
the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction.
HUTAMA-RSEA/SUPERMAX PHILS versus KCD BUILDERS
CORPORATION
2010-03-03 | G.R. No. 173181
FACTS:
KCD Builders Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money against appellants Hutama-RSEA/Super
Max, Philippines and/or Charles H.C. Yang before the RTC of Makati. Its cause of action arose from a
written contract which Hutama is the principal contractor and KCD as sub-contractor.The final billing
was submitted to appellant Charles H.C. Yang, and despite a joint evaluation by the parties through
their respective representatives and a letter of demand, appellant corporation [Hutama]
failed and refused to pay.

KCD filed a Motion to Declare Defendant/s [Hutama and Yang in Default for failure to file the responsive
pleading within the extended period, and set the same for hearing. On 23 April 2002, appellant Charles
H.C. Yang filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a case of action against him, as
he merely signed the sub-contract between the parties not for his personal benefit but only in behalf of
appellant HUTAMA. On the same date, appellant HUTAMA filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Attached
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, together with the said answer.
During the hearing on KCD's motion to declare defendant/s [Hutama and Yang] in default, the trial
court noted the filing of appellants' [Hutama and Yang's] respective motion to dismiss and answer with
counterclaim but noted that the filing thereof on 27 March 2002 was too late considering that they
were only given an extended period up [to] 16 March 2002 to do the same. Thus, the trial court
granted the motion to declare defendants [Hutama and Yang] in default and directed, upon appellee's
[KCD's] motion, the presentation of evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of court who was
appointed as commissioner to received evidence.
Appellants [Hutama and Yang] filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default.
The trial court then denied the said motion in the Order dated 19 September 2002.
ISSUE:
WON the order of default is valid
HELD:
Hutama avers that the CA committed a reversible error when it upheld the decision of the RTC, which
was based on the ex-parte evidence presented by KCD. Allegedly, its constitutional right to due
process was violated when the RTC issued an order of default which resulted in its failure to present
evidence.
However, we find that the RTC acted within the confines of its discretion when it issued the order of
default upon the motion of KCD when Hutama failed to file an answer within the extended period. The
RTC did not hastily issue the order of default. It gave Hutama the opportunity to explain its side. On
August 22, 2002, the motion to set aside the order of default was set for hearing, but neither Hutama's
counsel, nor any other representative of petitioner corporation, appeared. According to the counsel of
Hutama, in his Memorandum,[12] he failed to file an answer on time because he went to the province
for the Lenten season. He assigned the case to his associate, but the latter also went to the province.
This flimsy excuse deserves scant consideration.
BAYOG vs NATINO
1996-07-05 | G.R. No. 118691
FACTS:
BAYOG and hereinafter respondent MAGDATO entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract, with
BAYOG as the LANDOWNER LESSOR and MAGDATO as TENANT LESSEE.
BAYOG, executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of redemption within five years, in
favor of Pesayco.
Bayog and Pesayco asked MAGDATO to remove his house but the latter did not comply, so the former
filed with the Third MCTC for "Ejectment and/or
Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition,".
In its Order of 15 December 1992, the MCTC declared that the case fell under the Rule on Summary
Procedure and directed the issuance of summons which, together with complaint, was served on
MAGDATO on 11 January 1993.
MAGDATO had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22 January 1993) to file his Answer, but
he filed it only on 25 January 1993. In his Answer, MAGDATO admitted BAYOG's ownership of the lot,
but asserted that he was in actual possession thereof as BAYOG's agricultural lessee as evidenced by
the Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed on 17 June 1975. As defenses, MAGDATO alleged that the
court had no jurisdiction over the case, it being an agrarian dispute; and that he had not been able to
cultivate the land because plaintiff Jorge Pesayco, Jr. threatened to shoot anyone who would work on it.

On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order 13 holding that since MAGDATO's Answer was filed
outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction
under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. It then considered "needless" for the court to resolve all pleadings
subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority under Section 5 14 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs BAYOG and Pesayco.
MAGDATO alleged therein that the late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for
at the time he received summons, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis which restricted his
nobility and sound judgment. Further, his illiteracy limited his understanding of the English language,
hence, he was unaware of the "unextendible" 10-day period, and by the time he consulted a lawyer in
San Jose, Antique, said period had already lapsed. In fact, it was only when his house was demolished
in the latter part of January 1994, that he learned of the judgment rendered against him.
In his Comment, MAGDATO admits that his answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time; however,
he insists that the MCTC should not have disregarded it as it alleged the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties, thereby bringing the case beyond its jurisdiction, and within that of
the
DARAB.
ISSUE:
WON the order of default was proper due to late (2-day) filing of answer.
HELD:
While the MCTC Order of 20 September 1993 was received by MAGDATO's lawyer, Atty.Josue, on 11
October 1993, the latter, however, did not inform nor notify MAGDATO about it; worse, the said lawyer
took no action whatever after he received a copy of BAYOG's motion for execution.
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties,
and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application
to a given case, however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding
circumstances; otherwise, in the court's desire to make short cut of the proceedings, it might foster,
wittingly or uwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice.
The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a
strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section which bars the
MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its
predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged
from
the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to file
his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have
even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19
thereof.
In any event, the 60-day period in this case can, with equal force and effect, be reckoned from
MAGDATO's receipt of the Order of Execution of 24 January 1994 and the petition may then be treated
as a petition for relief from the said order.
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not
prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca 44 ruling.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief
is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no
fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment
which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular
appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993.

TRIAL

DE GUIA vs DE GUIA
2001-04-04 | G.R. No. 135384
Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately
on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly
direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial
conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment
rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
FACTS:
The record shows that plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia, Tomasa De Guia and Irene Manuel
filed with the court below a complaint for partition against defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and
Pablo De Guia.
"It is further shown that the Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial. Copies
of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned out that both
defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs' motion,
defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
It appears that defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order which declared them as
in default. They explained therein that they received the Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of
June 18, 1992, giving them no chance to appear for such proceeding in the morning of that day. The
Motion was opposed by plaintiffs contended that defendants' counsel actually received his copy of the
Notice and that counsel's receipt of the said notice was sufficient to bind defendants who received said
notice on the next day.
ISSUE:
WON the notice of pre-trial to the counsel is enough and thus the order of default was proper.
HELD: NO.
When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule 20 of the pre-1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:
"SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall
direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider" . This provision
mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the parties and their lawyers.
Hence, before being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must be
shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial conference. Moreover, if served only on the
counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the
place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the
judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of
notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying them the opportunity to
fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.
Of course, this situation would not have arisen under Section 3,[13] Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It specifically provides that notice of pretrial shall be served on counsel, who is charged
with the duty of notifying the client. Considering the milieu of the present case, however, such
amended proviso is not applicable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SB, Marcoses et al
2003-07-15 | G.R. No. 152154
FACTS:
Republic, through PCGG, represented by the OSG,filed a petition for forfeiture before
theSandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand
E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs.

After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial, the case was set
for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary
judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a
summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to
the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her corespondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision[9] dated September 19,
2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, but reversed it upon
Marcoses' MR.
ISSUE:
WON the pre-trial brief of the respondents complied with the requirements set by law.
HELD: NO.
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos
stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and
substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single
document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial
briefs
which shall contain, among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.[49]
It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to
state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence
each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with
a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of
the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact
and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a
trial.
Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues
and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified
period for the prompt disposition of the action.
Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference,
petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment.

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