MACARIO KING, ET AL.

,
vs.
PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL.,
GR L-14859 March 31, 1962
Facts:
Macario King became the owner of a grocery wholesale and retail business wherein
he had 15 employees, 3 of which were Chinese nationals occupying the following
positions: one as purchaser, and two as salesmen. He sought permission to retain
the services of these employees, but was denied. Under the Retail Trade Law, retail
trade has been completely nationalized in the Philippines, and under CA 108, Sec. 2A as amended by RA 134, only Philippine citizens may be employed by nationalized
businesses, except when they occupy technical positions, in which case, previous
authorization must be sought from the President. In this case however, the positions
they occupied were not technical positions, and as such, they cannot be permitted
to work.
Issue:
Is the employment of aliens in non-control positions in a retail establishment or
trade prohibited by CA 108?
Position of Petitioner:
Their continued employment should be allowed, since they occupy non-control
positions, and do not participate in the management, operation, administration or
control of the trade business, as is prohibited under Section 2-A.
Position of Respondent:
The full provision reads, to intervene in the management, operation,
administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer
therein which signifies the legislative intent to include the entire scale of
personnel activity that even laborers are exclude from employment.
Ruling:
The respondents are correct. Applying the principle of redendo singula singulis, the
antecedents, management, operation, administration and control and the
consequents, officer, employee, and laborer" should be read distributively to the
effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which is appears by context
most properly relate, and to which it is most applicable.
When the law says you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to
management, operation, administration and control, whether as an officer,
employee, or labourer therein, it only means one thing: the employment of a
person who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position
is prohibited.
Exception to Ban on Employment: CA 108, Section 2-A
or in any manner permits or allows any person, not possessing the qualifications
required by the Constitution or existing laws to acquire, use, exploit or enjoy a right,
franchise, privilege, property or business, the exercise and enjoyment of which are
expressly reserved by the Constitution or existing laws to citizens of the Philippines

or of any other specific country, to intervene in the management, operation,

administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer
therein, with or without remuneration except technical personnel whose
employment may be specifically authorized by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Department Head concerned

UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.,

vs.
RICE AND CORN BOARD, ET AL.
GR L-21013 August 17, 1967
Facts:
Universal Corn Products is a corporation the capital stock of which is wholly-owned
by citizens of the Philippines, and is engaged in certain lines of activity which are
covered by RA 3018. The same law created the Rice and Corn Board, which is
authorized to regulate the rice and corn trade in the Philippines. In keeping with this
mandate, the board promulgated the question resolution, limiting the employment
to Filipino citizens only, in Filipino-owned establishments engaged in the rice and/or
corn industry, except for technical personnel with previous authorization from the
President. The said resolution merely mirrors the limitations set by the CA 108, as
amended by RA 134.
Petitioners are alien employees of the corporation, occupying the positions of
executive vice-president, comptroller, sales manager, chief warehouseman,
assistant plant superintendent, cashier, and sales supervisor. They question the
constitutionality of the resolution as violative of due process and equal protection of
the laws, and for being made to apply retroactively.
Issue:
Is the assailed resolution unconstitutional?
Ruling: The resolution is constitutional.
A. There is no retroactive application.
Citing Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio: We are sorry to say that this contention is not
correct. To apply the provision of Republic Act No. 546 to the petitioners is not to
apply it retrospectively, because to do so is to make said Act merely effective, not
before, but after the date it was approved or became effective, and it will affect
their continuance in office, not before, but after the approval of Republic Act No.
546. The fact that they have been appointed prior thereto does not make said Act of
retroactive effect."
B. Violation of Constitutional Rights
Citing King v. Hernaez: "It is hard to see how the nationalization of employment in
the Philippines can run counter to any provision of our Constitution considering that
its aim is not exactly to deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise under it but
rather to promote, enhance and protect those that are expressly accorded to a
citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The nationalization
of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be
branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because
its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of the
country. This is what we expressed in no uncertain terms in the Ichong case when
we declared constitutional the nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said
there that it is a law 'clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security
itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, through which and by

which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its
citizens.

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION,

vs.
ANTI-DUMMY BOARD
GR L-26094 August 18, 1972
Facts:
Plaintiff Luzon Stevedoring Corporation is a public utility corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. Under Section 16(a) of our Public Service
Act, public utility corporations, such as plaintiff, may be organized provided that at
least 60% of the subscribed or paid-up capital stock thereof belongs entirely to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States, and the remaining 40% of the said
subscribed or paid-up capital stock may belong to non-American aliens, which is the
case here. The Petitioner has 9 non-American aliens in its employ, and as such,
question whether or not the employment of plaintiff's non-American aliens was
within the prohibition stated in Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law, as in the ruling
in King v. Hernaez.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against the employment of non-American aliens in
public utility corporations refers only to business, right, franchise or privilege which
is completely nationalized.
Position of Petitioner:
The ruling in Hernaez should not apply in this case, since the entity therein
contemplated was a natural person, well within the scope of the 3 rd predicate under
Section 2-A. In this case however, an artificial person is involved, and as such, the
3rd predicate prohibiting the employ of non-American aliens shall not apply.
Furthermore, the absence of the phrase or to qualified corporations or
associations immediately after the phrase citizens of the Philippines or of any
other specific country in the 3rd clause shows the intent of Congress to limit the
prohibition to public utilities wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines or of any
other specific country.
Ruling:
The policy or purpose of the amendatory law, Republic Act No. 134, in inserting
Clause 3 in Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 421, was to plug all loopholes that may be utilized by
designing foreigners to circumvent the nationalization laws of the country,
regardless of whether such laws provide for complete or only partial nationalization
of the right, franchise, privilege, property or business covered thereby.
The correct construction should be that all the three clauses including clause 3 of
Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law are dependent on and are subordinate to its
principal and only opening clause. Tested by the rules of grammar, the three
dependent clauses are merely the three different predicates of the same subject,
the sole opening clause; because the questioned clause 3, like the first two
preceding clauses, cannot stand by itself and is meaningless without, and unless
read together with, said opening clause. The three dependent clauses or predicates
are three separate criminal acts for which a person, corporation or association
mentioned in the opening clause, whether completely or partially nationalized, is
liable; because the opening clause includes corporations or associations at least 60

per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by Filipino citizens or of any other
specific country.
Then again, the term "citizens of the Philippines" as employed in the questioned
clause of Section 2-A of the Anti- Dummy Law includes both natural and juridical
persons in much the same manner that the term "person" in the due process clause
of the Bill of Rights comprehends both human beings and artificial persons.